Question 15 of Summa Theologica Parse Prima Initial Questions. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. This recording is by Jim Ruddy. Summa Theologica Parse Prima Initial Questions by St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 15 of Ideas. After considering the knowledge of God, it remains to consider ideas. And about this, there are three points of inquiry. Whether there are ideas, whether they are many or one only. And whether there are ideas of all things known by God. First article. Whether there are ideas. Objection 1. It seems that there are no ideas. For Dionysius says that God does not know things by ideas. But ideas are for nothing else except that things may be known through them. Therefore there are no ideas. Objection 2. Further, God knows all things in himself as has been already said. But he does not know himself through an idea, neither therefore other things. Objection 3. Further, an idea is considered to be the principle of knowledge and action. But the divine essence is a sufficient principle of knowing and affecting all things. It is not therefore necessary to suppose ideas. On the contrary, Augustine says such is the power inherent in ideas that no one can be wise unless they are understood. I answer that it is necessary to suppose ideas in the divine mind. For the Greek word idea is in Latin forma. Hence by ideas are understood the forms of things existing apart from the things themselves. Now the form of anything existing apart from the thing itself can be for one of two ends, either to be the type of that of which it is called the form or to be the principle of the knowledge of that thing in as much as the forms of things knowable are said to be in him who knows them. In either case we must suppose ideas as is clear from the following reason. In all things not generated by chance the form must be the end of any generation whatsoever. But an agent does not act on account of the form except insofar as the likeness of the form is in the agent as may happen in two ways. For in some agents the form of the thing to be made pre-exists according to its natural being as in those that act by their nature as a man generates a man or fire generates fire. Whereas in other agents the form of the thing to be made pre-exists according to intelligible being as in those that act by the intellect and thus the likeness of a house pre-exists in the mind of the builder. And this may be called the idea of the house since the builder intends to build his house like to the form conceived in his mind. As then the world was not made by chance but by God acting by his intellect as will appear later there must exist in the divine mind a form to the likeness of which the world was made and in this the notion of an idea consists. Reply to Objection 1. God does not understand things according to an idea existing outside himself. Thus Aristotle rejects the opinion of Plato who held that ideas existed of themselves and not in the intellect. Reply to Objection 2. Although God knows himself and all else by his own essence yet his essence is the operative principle of all things except of himself. It has therefore the nature of an idea with respect to other things though not with respect to himself. Reply to Objection 3. God is the similitude of all things according to his essence therefore an idea in God is identical with his essence. Second article whether ideas are many. Objection 1. It seems that ideas are not many for an idea in God is his essence but God's essence is one only therefore there is only one idea. Objection 2. Further as the idea is the principle of knowing and operating so are art and wisdom but in God there are not several arts or wisdoms therefore in him there is no plurality of ideas. Objection 3. Further if it be said that ideas are multiplied according to their relations to different creatures it may be argued on the contrary that the plurality of ideas is eternal if then ideas are many but creatures temporal then the temporal must be the cause of the eternal. Objection 4. Further these relations are either real and creatures only or in God also if in creatures only since creatures are not from eternity the plurality of ideas cannot be from eternity if ideas are multiplied only according to these relations but if they are real in God it follows that there is a real plurality in God other than the plurality of persons and this is against the teaching of Damascene who says in God all things are one except in generability, generation and procession. Ideas therefore are not many. On the contrary Augustine says ideas are certain principle forms or permanent and immutable types of things they themselves not being formed. Thus they are eternal and existing always in the same manner as being contained in the divine intelligence whilst however they themselves neither come into being nor decay yet we say that in accordance with them everything is formed that can rise or decay and all that actually does so. I answer that it must necessarily be held that ideas are many in proof of which it is to be considered that in every effect the ultimate end is the proper intention of the principal agent as the order of an army is the proper intention of the general. Now the highest good existing in things is the good of the order of the universe as the philosopher clearly teaches therefore the order of the universe is properly intended by God and is not the accidental result of a succession of agents as has been supposed by those who have taught that God created only the first creature and that this creature created the second creature and so on until this great multitude of beings was produced. According to this opinion God would have the idea of the first created thing alone whereas if the order itself of the universe was created by him immediately and intended by him he must have the idea of the order of the universe. Now there cannot be an idea of any whole unless particular ideas are had of those parts of which the whole is made just as a builder cannot conceive the idea of a house unless he has the idea of each of its parts so then it must needs be that in the divine mind there are the proper ideas of all things and so Guston says that each thing was created by God according to the idea proper to it from which it follows that in the divine mind ideas are many. Now it can easily be seen how this is not repugnant to the simplicity of God if we consider that the idea of a work is in the mind of the operator as that which is understood and not as the image whereby he understands which is a form that makes the intellect enact. For the form of the house in the mind of the builder is something understood by him to the likeness of which he forms the house and matter. Now it is not repugnant to the simplicity of the divine mind that it understands many things though it would be repugnant to its simplicity where his understanding to be formed by a plurality of images hence many ideas exist in the divine mind as things understood by it as can be proved thus in as much as he knows his own essence perfectly he knows it according to every mode in which it can be known now it can be known not only as it is in itself but as it can be participated in by creatures according to some degree of likeness but every creature has its own proper species according to which it participates in some degree in likeness to the divine essence so far therefore as God knows his essence as capable of such imitation by any creature he knows it as particular type and idea of that creature and in like manner as regards other creatures so it is clear that God understands many particular types of things and these are many ideas replied to objection one the divine essence is not called an idea in so far as it is that essence but only in so far as it is the likeness or type of this or that thing hence ideas are said to be many in as much as many types are understood through the self same essence replied to objection two by wisdom and art we signify that by which God understands but an idea that which God understands for God by one understands many things and that not only according to what they are in themselves but also according as they are understood this is to understand the several types of things in the same way an architect is said to understand a house when he understands the form of the house and matter but if he understands the form of the house as devised by himself from the fact that he understands that he understands it he thereby understands the type or idea of the house now not only does God understand many things by his essence but he also understands that he understands many things by his essence And this means that he understands the several types of things, or that many ideas are in his intellect as understood by him. Replied to Objection 3, such relations whereby ideas are multiplied are caused not by the things themselves, but by the divine intellect comparing its own essence with these things. Replied to Objection 4, relations multiplying ideas do not exist in created things but in God, yet they are not real relations such as those whereby the persons are distinguished but relations understood by God. Third article, whether there are ideas of all things that God knows. Objection 1, it seems that there are not ideas in God of all things that he knows for the idea of evil as not in God, since it would follow that evil was in him. The evil things are known by God, therefore there are not ideas of all things that God knows. Objection 2, further God knows things that neither are nor will be nor have been as has been said above. But of such things there are no ideas, since as Dionysius says, acts of the divine will are the determining and effective types of things, therefore there are not in God ideas of all things known by him. Objection 3, further God knows primary matter of which there can be no idea, since it has no form, hence the same conclusion. Objection 4, further it is certain that God knows not only species but also genera, singulars and accidents, but there are not ideas of these according to Plato's teaching who first taught ideas, as Augustine says, therefore there are not ideas in God of all things known by him. On the contrary, ideas are types existing in the divine mind as is clear from Augustine, but God has the proper types of all things that he knows, and therefore he has ideas of all things known by him. I answer that, as ideas according to Plato are principles of the knowledge of things and of their generation, an idea has this twofold office as it exists in the mind of God. So far as the idea is the principle in the making of things it may be called an exemplar and belongs to practical knowledge, but so far as it is a principle of knowledge it is properly called a type and may belong to speculative knowledge also. As an exemplar, therefore, it has respect to everything made by God in any period of time, whereas a principle of knowledge it has respect to all things known by God even though they never come to be in time and to all things that he knows according to their proper type, insofar as they are known by him in a speculative manner. Reply to Objection 1. Evil is known by God not through its own type, but through the type of good. Evil therefore has no idea in God, neither insofar as the idea is an exemplar nor as a type. Reply to Objection 2. God has no practical knowledge except virtually of things which neither are nor will be nor have been. Hence with respect to these there is no idea in God insofar as idea signifies an exemplar but only insofar as it denotes a type. Reply to Objection 3. Plato is said by some to have considered matter as not created and therefore he postulated not an idea of matter but a con cause with matter. Since however we hold matter to be created by God though not apart from form, matter has its idea in God but not apart from the idea of the composite for matter in itself can neither exist nor be known. Reply to Objection 4. Genus can have no idea apart from the idea of species insofar as idea denotes an exemplar for genus cannot exist except in some species. The same is the case with those accidents that inseparably accompany their subject for these come into being along with their subject. But accidents which supervene to the subject have their special idea. For an architect produces through the form of the house all the accidents that originally accompany it whereas those that are super added to the house when completed such as painting or any other such thing are produced through some other form. Now individual things according to Plato have no other idea than that of species both because particular things are individualized by matter which as some say he held to be uncreated and the con cause with the idea and because the intention of nature regards the species and produces individuals only that in them the species may be preserved. However divine providence extends not merely to species but to individuals as will be shown later. The end of question 15. Question 16 of Summa Theologica, Pars Prima, Initial Questions. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org. This recording is by Jim Ruddy. Summa Theologica, Pars Prima, Initial Questions by St. Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province. Question 16 of Truth. Since knowledge is of things that are true after the consideration of the knowledge of God we must inquire concerning truth. About this there are eight points of inquiry whether truth resides in the thing or only in the intellect. Whether it resides only in the intellect composing and dividing. On the comparison of the true to being. On the comparison of the true to the good. Whether God is truth. Whether all things are true by one truth or by many. On the eternity of truth and on the unchangeableness of truth. First article, whether truth resides only in the intellect. Objection one, it seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect but rather in things. For Augustine condemns this definition of truth that is true which is seen since it would follow that stones hidden in the bosom of the earth would not be true stones as they are not seen. He also condemns the following that is true which is as it appears to the knower who is willing and able to know for hence it would follow that nothing would be true unless someone could know it. Therefore he defines truth thus that is true which is. It seems then that truth resides in things and not in the intellect. Objection two, further whatever is true is true by reason of truth. If then truth is only in the intellect nothing will be true except insofar as it is understood but this is the error of the ancient philosophers who said that whatever seems to be true is so. Consequently mutual contradictory seem to be true as seen by different persons at the same time. Objection three, further that on account of which a thing is so is itself more so as is evident from the philosopher but it is from the fact that a thing is or is not that our thought or word is true or false as the philosopher teaches. Therefore truth resides rather in things than in the intellect. On the contrary the philosopher says the true and the false reside not in things but in the intellect. I answer that as the good denotes that towards which the appetite tends so the true denotes that towards which the intellect tends. Now there is this difference between the appetite and the intellect or any knowledge whatever that knowledge is according as the thing known as in the knower whilst appetite is according as the desire tends towards the thing desired. Thus the term of the appetite namely good is in the object desirable and the term of the intellect namely true is in the intellect itself. Now as good exists in a thing so far as that thing is related to the appetite and hence the aspect of goodness passes on from the desirable thing to the appetite and so far as the appetite is called good if its object is good. So since the true is in the intellect and so far as it is conformed to the object understood the aspect of the true must needs pass from the intellect to the object understood so that also the thing understood is said to be true and so far as it has some relation to the intellect. Now a thing understood may be in relation to an intellect either essentially or accidentally. It is related essentially to an intellect on which it depends as regards its essence but accidentally to an intellect by which it is knowable even as we may say that a house is related essentially to the intellect of the architect but accidentally to the intellect upon which it does not depend. Now we do not judge a thing by what is in it accidentally but by what is in it essentially and so everything is said to be true absolutely and so far as it is related to the intellect from which it depends and thus it is that artificial things are said to be true as being related to our intellect for a house is said to be true that expresses the likeness of the form of in the architect's mind and words are said to be true so far as they are the signs of truth in the intellect in the same way natural things are said to be true and so far as they express the likeness of the species that are in the divine mind for a stone is called true which possesses the nature proper to a stone according to the preconception in the divine intellect thus then truth resides primarily in the intellect and secondarily in things according as they are related to the intellect as their principle consequently there are various definitions of truth Augustine says truth is that whereby is made manifest that which is and Hillary says truth makes being clear and evident and this pertains to truth according as it is in the intellect as to the truth of things in so far as they are related to the intellect we have Augustine's definition truth is a supreme likeness without any unlikeness to a principle also and some definition truth is rightness perceptible by the mind alone for that is right which is in accordance with the principle also have a sentence definition the truth of each thing is a property of the essence which is immutably attached to it the definition that truth is the equation of thought and thing is applicable to it under either aspect reply to objection one Augustine is speaking about the truth of things and excludes from the notion of this truth relation to our intellect for what is accidental is excluded from every definition replied to objection to the ancient philosophers held that the species of natural things did not proceed from any intellect but were produced by chance but as they saw that truth implies relation to intellect they were compelled to base the truth of things on their relation to our intellect from this conclusions result that are inadmissible in which the philosopher refutes such however do not follow if we say that the truth of things consists of their relation to the divine intellect replied to objection three although the truth of our intellect is caused by the thing yet it is not necessary that truth should be there primarily anymore than that health should be primarily in medicine rather than in the animal for the virtue of medicine and not its health is the cause of health for here the agent is not univical in the same way the being of the thing not its truth is the cause of truth in our intellect hence the philosopher says that a thought or a word is true from the fact that the thing is not because the thing is true second article whether truth resides only in the intellect composing and dividing objection one it seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing for the philosopher says that as the senses are always true as regards their proper sensible objects so is the intellect as regards what a thing is now composition and division are neither in the senses nor in the intellect knowing what a thing is therefore truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing objection two further Isaac says in his book on definitions that truth is the equation of thought and thing now just as the intellect with regard to complex things can be equated to things so also with regard to simple things and this is true also of sense apprehending a thing as it is therefore truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing on the contrary the philosopher says that with regard to simple things and what a thing is truth is found neither in the intellect nor in things I answer that has stated before truth resides in its primary aspect in the intellect now since everything is true according as it has the form proper to its nature the intellect in so far as it is knowing must be true so far as it has the likeness of the thing known this being its form as knowing for this reason truth is defined by the conformity of intellect and thing and it's to know this conformity is to know truth but in no way can sense know this for all those sight has the likeness of a visible thing yet it does not know the comparison which exists between the thing seen and that which itself apprehends concerning it but the intellect can know its own conformity with the intelligible thing yet it does not apprehend it by knowing of a thing what a thing is when however it judges that a thing corresponds to the form which it apprehends about that thing then first it knows and expresses truth this it does by composing and dividing for in every proposition it either applies to or removes from the thing signified by the subject some form signified by the predicate and this clearly shows that the sense is true of anything as is also the intellect when it knows what a thing is but it does not thereby know or affirm truth this is in like manner the case with complex or not complex words truth therefore may be in the senses or in the intellect knowing what a thing is as in anything that is true yet not as the thing known in the knower which is implied by the word truth for the perfection of the intellect is truth as known therefore properly speaking truth resides in the intellect composing and dividing and not in the senses nor in the intellect knowing what a thing is and thus the objections given are solved third article whether the true and being are convertible terms objection one it seems that the true and being are not convertible terms for the true resides properly in the intellect as stated but being is properly in things therefore they are not convertible objection two further that which extends to being and not being is not convertible with being but the true extends to being and not being for it is true that what is is and that what is not is not therefore the true and being are not convertible further objection three things which stand to each other in order of priority and posteriority seem not to be convertible but the true appears to be prior to being for being is not understood except under the aspect of the true therefore it seems they are not convertible on the contrary the philosopher says that there is the same disposition of things in being and in truth I answer that as good has the nature of what is desirable so truth is related to knowledge now everything in so far as it has being so far is it knowable therefore it is said in de anema that the soul is in a some manner all things through the senses and the intellect and therefore as good is convertible with being so is the true but as good adds to being the notion of desirable so the true adds relation to the intellect replied to objection one the true resides in things and in the intellect as said before but the true that is in things is convertible with being as to substance while the true that is in the intellect is convertible with being as the manifestation with the manifested for this belongs to the nature of truth as has been said already it may however be said that being also is in things and in the intellect as is the true although truth is primarily in the intellect while being is primarily in things and this is so because truth and being differ in idea replied to objection to not being has nothing in itself whereby it can be known yet it is known in so far as the intellect renders it knowable hence the true is based on being in as much as not being is a kind of logical being apprehended that is by reason replied to objection three when it is said that being cannot be apprehended except under the notion of the true this can be understood in two ways in the one way so as to mean that being is not apprehended unless the idea of the true follows apprehension of being and this is true in the other way so as to mean that being cannot be apprehended unless the idea of the true be apprehended also and this is false but the true cannot be apprehended unless the idea of being be apprehended also since being is included in the idea of the true the case is the same if we compare the intelligible object with being for being cannot be understood unless being is intelligible yet being can be understood while its intelligibility is not understood similarly being when understood is true yet the true is not understood by understanding being fourth article whether good is logically prior to the true it seems that good is logically prior to the true for what is more universal is logically prior as is evident from the physics but the good is more universal than the true since the true is a kind of good namely of the intellect therefore the good is logically prior to the true objection to further good is in things but the true is in the intellect composing and dividing as said above but that which is in things is prior to that which is in the intellect therefore good is logically prior to the true objection three further truth is a species of virtue as is clear from the ethics but virtue is included under good since as Augustine says it is a good quality of the mind therefore the good is prior to the true on the contrary what is in more things is prior logically but the true is in some things wherein good is not as for instance in mathematics therefore the true is prior to good i answer that although the good and the true are convertible with being as to suppositum yet they differ logically and in this manner the true speaking absolutely is prior to good as appears from two reasons first because the true is more closely related to being than is good for the true regards being itself simply and immediately while the nature of good follows being in so far as being is in some way perfect for thus it is desirable secondly it is evident from the fact that knowledge naturally precedes appetite hence since the true regards knowledge but the good regards the appetite the true must be prior in idea to the good reply to objection one the will and the intellect mutually include one another for the intellect understands the will and the will wills the intellect to understand so then among things directed to the object of the will are comprised also those that belong to the intellect and conversely whence in the order of things desirable good stands as the universal and the true as the particular whereas in the order of intelligible things the converse is the case from the fact then that the true is a kind of good it follows that the good is prior in the order of things desirable but not that it is prior absolutely reply to objection two a thing is prior logically and so far as it is prior to the intellect now the intellect apprehends primarily being itself secondly it apprehends that it understands being and thirdly it apprehends that it desires being hence the idea of being is first that of truth second and the idea of good third though good is in things reply to objection three the virtue which is called truth is not truth in general but a certain kind of truth according to which man shows himself indeed in word as he really is but truth as applied to life is used in a particular sense in as much as a man fulfills in his life that to which he is ordained by the divine intellect as it has been said that truth exists in other things whereas the truth of justice is found in man as he fulfills his duty to his neighbor as ordained by law hence we cannot argue from these particular truths to truth in general fifth article whether god is truth objection one it seems that god is not truth for truth consists of the intellect composing and dividing but in god there is not composition and division therefore in him there is not truth objection two further truth according to a dustin is a likeness to the principle but in god there is no likeness to a principle therefore in god there is not truth objection three further whatever is said of god is said of him as of the first cause of all things thus the being of god is the cause of all being and his goodness is the cause of all good if therefore there is truth in god all truth will be from him but it is true that someone sins therefore this will be from god which is evidently false on the contrary our lord says i am the way the truth and the life i answer that as said above truth is found in the intellect according as it apprehends a thing as it is and in things according as they have being conformable to an intellect this is to the greatest degree found in god for his being is not only conformed to his intellect but it is the very act of his intellect and his act of understanding is the measure and cause of every other being and of every other intellect and he himself is his own existence and act of understanding once it follows not only that truth is in him but that he is truth itself and the sovereign and first truth reply to objection one although in the divine intellect there is neither composition nor division yet in his simple act of intelligence he judges of all things and knows all things complex and thus there is truth in his intellect reply to objection two the truth of our intellect is according to its conformity with its principle that is to say to the things from which it receives knowledge the truth also of things is according to their conformity with their principle namely the divine intellect now this cannot be said properly speaking of divine truth unless perhaps insofar as truth is appropriated to the son who has a principle but if we speak of divine truth in its essence we cannot understand this unless the affirmative must be resolved into the negative as when one says the father is of himself because he is not from another similarly the divine truth can be called a likeness to the principle in as much as his existence is not dissimilar to his intellect reply to objection three not being and privation have no truth of themselves but only in the apprehension of the intellect now all apprehension of the intellect is from God hence all the truth that exists in the statement that a person commits fornication is true is entirely from God but to argue therefore that this person fornicates is from God is a fallacy of accident sixth article whether there is only one truth according to which all things are true objection one it seems that there is only one truth according to which all things are true for according to augustin nothing is greater than the mind of man except god now truth is greater than the mind of man otherwise the mind would be the judge of truth whereas in fact it judges all things according to truth and not according to its own measure therefore god alone is truth therefore there is no other truth but god objection two further anselm says that as is the relation of time to temporal things so is that of truth to true things but there is only one time for all temporal things therefore there is only one truth by which all things are true on the contrary it is written truths are decayed from among the children of men i answer that in one sense truth whereby all things are true is one and in another sense it is not in proof of which we must consider that when anything is predicated of many things univically it is found in each of them according to its proper nature as animal is found in each species of animal but when anything is predicated of many things analogically it is found in only one of them according to its proper nature and from this one the rest are denominated so healthiness is predicated of animal of urine and a medicine not that health is only in the animal but from the health of the animal medicine is called healthy and so far as it is the cause of health and urine is called healthy and so far as it indicates health and although health is neither in medicine nor in urine yet in either there is something whereby the one causes and the other indicates health now we have said that truth resides primarily in the intellect and secondarily in things according as they are related to the divine intellect if therefore we speak of truth as it exists in the intellect according to its proper nature then are many there are many truths and many created intellects and even one and the same intellect according to the number of things known once a gloss on the psalms says truths are decayed from among the children of men as from one man's face many likenesses are reflected in a mirror so many truths are reflected from the one divine truth but if we speak of truth as it is in things then all things are true by one primary truth to which each one is assimilated according to its own entity and thus although the essences or forms of things are many yet the truth of the divine intellect is one in conformity to which all things are said to be true replied to objection one the soul does not judge of things according to any kind of truth but according to the primary truth in as much as it is reflected in the soul as in a mirror by reason of the first principles of the understanding it follows therefore that the primary truth is greater than the soul and yet even created truth which resides in our intellect is greater than the soul not simply but in a certain degree and so far as it is its perfection even as science may be said to be greater than the soul yet it is true that nothing subsisting is greater than the rational soul except god replied to objection two the saying of ansama's correct in so far as things are said to be true by their relation to the divine intellect seventh article whether created truth is eternal objection one it seems that created truth is eternal for augustin says nothing is more eternal than the nature of a circle and that two added to three make five but the truth of these is a created truth therefore created truth is eternal objection two further that which is always is eternal but universals are always and everywhere therefore they are eternal so therefore is truth which is the most universal objection three further it was always true that what is true in the present was to be in the future but as the truth of a proposition regarding the present is a created truth so is that of a proposition regarding the future therefore some created truth is eternal objection four further all that is without beginning and end is eternal but the truth of renunciables is without beginning and end for if their truth had a beginning since it was not before it was true that truth was not and true of course by reason of truth so that truth was before it began to be similarly if it be asserted that truth has an end it follows that it is after it has ceased to be for it will still be true that truth is not therefore truth is eternal on the contrary god alone is eternal as laid down before i answer that the truth of annunciations is no other than the truth of the intellect for an an annunciation resides in the intellect and in speech now according as it is in the intellect it has truth of itself but according as it is in speech it is called annunciable truth according as it signifies some truth of the intellect not on account of any truth residing in the annunciation as though in a subject thus urine is called healthy not from any health within it but from the health of the animal which it indicates in like manner had has already been said that things are called true from the truth of the intellect hence if no intellect were eternal no truth would be eternal now because only the divine intellect is eternal in it alone truth has eternity nor does it follow from this that anything else but god is eternal since the truth of the divine intellect is god himself as shown already replied to objection one the nature of a circle and the fact that two and three make five have eternity in the mind of god replied to objection two that something is always and everywhere can be understood in two ways in one way as having in itself the power of extension to all time and to all places as it belongs to god to be everywhere and always in the other way is not having in itself determination to any place or time as primary matter is said to be one not because it has one form but by the absence of all distinguishing form in this manner all universals are said to be everywhere and always and so far as universals are independent of place and time it does not however follow from this that they are eternal except in an intellect if one exists that is eternal replied to objection three that which now is was future before it actually was because it was in its cause that it would be hence if the cause were removed that things coming to be were not in future but the first cause is alone eternal and so does not follow that it was always true that what now is would be except in so far as its future being was in the semp eternal cause and god alone is such a cause replied to objection four because our intellect is not eternal neither is the truth of enunciable propositions which are formed by us eternal but it had a beginning in time now before such truth existed it was not true to say that such a truth did exist except by reason of the divine intellect wherein alone truth is eternal but it is true now to say that the truth did not then exist and this is true only by reason of the truth that is now in our intellect and not by reason of any truth in the things for this is truth concerning not being and not being has not truth of itself but only so far as our intellect apprehends it hence it is true to say that truth did not exist in so far as we apprehend it's not being as proceeding as being eighth article whether truth is immutable objection one it seems that truth is immutable for auguston says that truth in mind do not rank as equals otherwise truth would be mutable as the mind is objection two further what remains after every change is immutable as primary matter is unbegotten and incorruptible since it remains after all generation and corruption but truth remains after all change for after every change it is true to say that a thing is or is not therefore truth is immutable objection three further if truth of an enunciation changes it changes mostly with the changing of the thing but it does not thus change for truth according to anselm is a certain rightness in so far as a thing answers to that which is in the divine mind concerning it but this proposition that Socrates sits receives from the divine mind the signification that Socrates does sit and it has the same signification even though he does not sit therefore the truth of the proposition in no way changes objection four further where there is the same cause there is the same effect but the same thing as the cause of the truth of the three propositions Socrates sits will sit sat therefore the truth of each is the same but one or other of these must be the true one therefore the truth of these propositions remains immutable and for the same reason that of any other on the contrary it is written truths are decayed from among the children of men i answer that truth properly speaking resides only in the intellect as said before but things are called true in virtue of the truth residing in an intellect and some mutability of truth must be regarded from the point of view of the intellect the truth of which consists in its conformity to the thing understood now this conformity may vary in two ways even as any other likeness through change in one of the two extremes and in one way truth varies on the part of the intellect from the fact that the change of opinion occurs about a thing which in itself has not changed and in another way when the thing is changed but not the opinion and in either way there can be a change from true to false if then there is an intellect wherein there can be no alternation of opinions and the knowledge of which nothing can escape and this is immutable truth now such is the divine intellect as is clear from what has been said before hence the truth of the divine intellect is immutable but the truth of our intellect is mutable not because it is itself the subject of change but in so far as our intellect changes from truth to falsity for thus forms may be called mutable whereas the truth of the divine intellect is that according to which natural things are said to be true and this is all together immutable reply to objection one Augustine is speaking of divine truth reply to objection true the true and being are convertible terms hence just as being is not generated nor corrupted of itself but accidentally in so far as this being or that is corrupted or generated as is said in the physics so does truth change not so as that no truth remains but because that truth does not remain which was before replied to objection three a proposition not only has truth as other things are said to have it in so far that is as they correspond to that which is the design of the divine intellect concerning them but it is said to have truth in a special way in so far as it indicates the truth of the intellect which consists in the conformity of the intellect with a thing when this disappears the truth of an opinion changes and consequently the truth of the proposition so therefore this proposition Socrates sits is true as long as he is sitting both with the truth of the thing in so far as the expression is significative and with the truth of signification in so far as it signifies a true opinion when Socrates rises the first truth remains but the second is changed reply to objection four the sitting of Socrates which is the cause of the truth of the proposition Socrates sits has not the same meaning when Socrates sits after he sits and before he sits it's the truth which results varies and is variously signified by these propositions concerning present past or future thus it does not follow though one of the three propositions is true that the same truth remains invariable the end of question 16 question 17 of Sumo Paras Prima initial questions this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org this recording is by Jim Ruddy Sumo Teologica Paras Prima initial questions by Saint Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province question 17 concerning falsity we next consider falsity about this four points of inquiry arise whether falsity exists in things whether it exists in the sense whether it exists in the intellect and concerning the opposition of the true and the false first article whether falsity exists in things objection one it appears that falsity does not exist in things where Augustine says if the true is that which is it will be concluded that the false exists nowhere whatever reason may appear to the contrary objection two further false is derived from falare to deceive but things do not deceive for as Augustine says they show nothing but their own species therefore the false is not found in things objection three further the true is said to exist in things by conformity to the divine intellect as stated above but everything and so far as it exists imitates God therefore everything is true without admixture of falsity and thus nothing is false on the contrary Augustine says everybody is a true body and a false unity for it imitates unity without being unity but everything imitates the divine unity yet falls short of it therefore in all things falsity exists i answer that since true and false are opposed and since opposites stand in relation to the same thing we must needs seek falsity where primarily we find truth that is to say in the intellect now in things neither truth nor falsity exists except in relation to intellect and since everything is denominated simply by what belongs to it per se but is denominated relatively by what belongs to it accidentally a thing indeed may be called false simply when compared with the intellect on which it depends and to which it is compared per se but may be called false relatively as directed to another intellect to which it is compared accidentally now natural things depend on the divine intellect as artificial things on the human where for artificial things are said to be false simply and in themselves insofar as they fall short of the form of the art once a craftsman is said to produce a false work if it falls short of the proper operation of his art in things that depend on God falseness cannot be found insofar as they are compared with the divine intellect since whatever takes place in things proceeds from the ordinance of that intellect unless perhaps in the case of voluntary agents only who have it in their power to withdraw themselves from what is so ordained wherein consists the evil of sin the sins themselves are called untruths and lies in the scriptures according to the words of the text why do you love vanity and seek after lying as on the other hand virtuous deeds are called the truth of life as being obedient to the order of the divine intellect thus it is said he that doth truth cometh to the light but in relation to our intellect natural things which are compared there to accidentally can be called false not simply but relatively and that in two ways in one way according to the thing signified and thus the thing is said to be false as being signified or represented by word or thought that is false in this respect anything can be said to be false as regards any quality not possessed by it as if we should say that a diameter is a false commensurable thing as the philosopher says so too augustin says the true tragedian is a false hector even as on the contrary anything can be called true in regard to that which is becoming to it in another way a thing can be called false by way of cause and thus the thing is said to be false that naturally begets a false opinion and whereas it is innate in us to judge things by external appearance since our knowledge takes its rise from senses which principally and naturally deals with external accidents therefore those external accidents which resemble things other than themselves are said to be false with respect to those things thus gall is falsely honey and tin false gold regarding this augustin says we call those things false that appear to our apprehension like the true and the philosopher says things are called false that are naturally apt to appear such as they are not or what they are not in this way a man is called false as delighting in false opinions or words and not because he can invent them for in this way many wise and learned persons might be called false as stated in the metaphysics replied to objection one a thing compared with the intellect is said to be true in respect to what it is and false in respect to what it is not hence the true tragedian is a false hector as stated in the soliloquies as therefore in things that are is found a certain non-being so in things that are is found a degree of falseness replied to objection two things do not deceive by their own nature but by accident for they give occasion to falsity by the likeness they bear to things which they are actually not replied to objection three things are said to be false not as compared with the divine intellect in which case they would be false simply but as compared with our intellect and thus they are false only relatively to the argument which is urged on the contrary likeness or defective representation does not involve the idea of falsity except insofar as it gives occasion to false opinion hence the thing is not always said to be false because it resembles another thing but only when the resemblance is such as naturally to produce a false opinion not in any one case but in the majority of instances second article whether there is falsity in the senses objection one it seems that falsity is not in the senses for augustin says if all the bodily senses report as they are affected i do not know what more we can require from them thus it seems that we are not deceived by the senses and therefore that falsity is not in them objection two further the philosopher says that falsity is not proper to the senses but to the imagination objection three further in non-complex things there is neither true nor false but in complex things only but affirmation and negation do not belong to the senses therefore in the senses there is no falsity on the contrary augustin says it appears that the senses entrap us into error by their deceptive similitudes i answer that falsity is not to be sought in the senses except as truth is in them now truth is not in them in such a way as that the senses no truth but in so far as they apprehend sensible things truly as said above and this takes place through the senses apprehending things as they are and hence it happens that falsity exists in the senses through their apprehending or judging things to be otherwise than they really are the knowledge of things by the senses is in proportion to the existence of their likeness in the senses and the likeness of a thing can exist in the senses in three ways in the first way primarily and of its own nature as in sight there is the likeness of colors and of other sensible objects proper to it secondly of its own nature though not primarily as in sight there is the likeness of shape size and of other sensible objects common to more than one sense thirdly neither primarily nor of its own nature but accidentally as in sight there is the likeness of a man not as man but in so far as it is accidental to the colored object to be a man since then has no false knowledge about its proper objects except accidentally and rarely and then because of the unsound organ it does not receive the sensible form rightly just as other passive subjects because of their indisposition received effectively the impressions of the agent hence for instance it happens that on a count of an unhealthy tongue sweet seems bitter to a sick person but as to common objects of sense and accidental objects even a rightly disposed sense may have a false judgment because it is referred to them not directly but accidentally or as a consequence of being directed to other things replied to objection one the affections of sense is its sensation itself hence from the fact that sense reports as it is affected it follows that we are not deceived in the judgment by which we judge that we experience sensation since however sense is sometimes affected erroneously of that object it follows that it sometimes reports erroneously of that object and thus we are deceived by sense about the object but not about the fact of sensation reply to objection two falsity is said not to be proper to sense since sense is not deceived as to its proper object hence in another translation it is said more plainly sense about its proper object is never false falsity is attributed to the imagination as it represents the likeness of something even in its absence hence when anyone perceives the likeness of a thing as if it were the thing itself falsity results from such an apprehension and for this reason the philosopher says that shadows pictures and dreams are said to be false and as much as they convey the likeness of things that are not present in substance replied to objection three this argument proves that the false is not in the sense as in that which knows the true and the false third article whether falsity is in the intellect objection one it seems that falsity is not in the intellect for augustin says everyone who is deceived understands not that in which he is deceived but falsity is said to exist in any knowledge in so far as we are deceived therein therefore falsity does not exist in the intellect objection two further the philosopher says that the intellect is always right therefore there is no falsity in the intellect on the contrary it is said in de anima that where there is composition of objects understood there is truth and falsehood but such composition is in the intellect therefore truth and falsehood exist in the intellect i answer that just as a thing has being by its proper form so the knowing faculty has knowledge by the likeness of the thing known hence as natural things cannot fall short of the being that belongs to them by their form but may fall short of accidental or consequent qualities even as a man may fail to possess two feet but not fail to be a man so the faculty of knowing cannot fail in knowledge of the thing with the likeness of which it is informed but may fail with regard to something consequent upon that form or accidental there too for it has been said that sight is not deceived in its proper sensible but about common sensibles that are consequent to that object or about accidental objects of sense now as the sense is directly informed by the likeness of its proper object so is the intellect by the likeness of the essence of a thing hence the intellect is not deceived about the essence of a thing as neither the sense about its proper object but in affirming and denying the intellect may be deceived by attributing to the thing of which it understands the essence something which is not consequent upon it or is opposed to it for the intellect is in the same position as regards judging of such things as sense is as to judging of common or accidental sensible objects there is however this difference as before mentioned regarding truth that falsity can exist in the intellect not only because the knowledge of the intellect is false but because the intellect is conscious of that knowledge as it is conscious of truth whereas in sense falsity does not exist as known as stated above but because falsity of the intellect is concerned essentially only with the composition of the intellect falsity occurs also accidentally in that operation of the intellect whereby it knows the essence of the thing insofar as composition of the intellect is mixed up in it this can take place in two ways in one way by the intellect applying to one thing the definition proper to another as that of a circle to a man where for the definition of one thing is false of another in another way by composing a definition of parts which are mutually exclusive for thus the definition is not only false of the thing but false in itself a definition such as a reasonable four-footed animal would be of this kind and the intellect false in making it for such a statement as some reasonable animals are four-footed is false in itself for this reason the intellect cannot be false in its knowledge of simple essences but it is either true or it understands nothing at all replied to objection one because the essence of a thing is the proper object of the intellect we are properly said to understand a thing when we reduce it to its essence and judge of it thereby as takes place in demonstrations in which there is no falsity in this sense auguston's words must be understood that he who is deceived understands not that wherein he is deceived and not in the sense that no one is ever deceived in any operation of the intellect replied to objection two the intellect is always right as regards first principles since it is not deceived about them for the same reason that it is not deceived about what a thing is for self-known principles are such as are known as soon as the terms are understood from the fact that the predicate is contained in the definition of the subject fourth article whether true and false are contraries objection one it seems that true and false are not contraries for true and false are opposed as that which is to that which is not for truth as auguston says is that which is but that which is and that which is not are not opposed as contraries therefore true and false are not contrary things objection two further one of two contraries is not in the other but falsity is in truth because as auguston says a tragedian would not be a false hector if he were not a true tragedian therefore true and false are not contraries objection three further in god there is no contrarity for nothing is contrary to the divine substance as auguston says but falsity is opposed to god for an idol is called in scripture a lie they have laid hold on lying that is to say an idol as aglass says therefore false and true are not contraries on the contrary the philosopher says that a false opinion is contrary to a true one i answer that true and false are opposed as contraries and not as some have said as affirmation and negation improve of which it must be considered that negation neither asserts anything nor determines any subject and can therefore be said of being as of not being for instance not seeing or not sitting but privation asserts nothing whereas it determines its subject for it is negation in a subject as stated in metaphysics for blindness is not said except of one whose nature it is to see contraries however both assert something and determine the subject where blackness is a species of color falsity asserts something for a thing is false as the philosopher says it as much as something is said or seems to be something that it is not or not to be what it really is for as truth implies an adequate apprehension of a thing so falsity implies the contrary hence it is clear that true and false are contraries reply to objection one what is in things is the truth of the thing but what is apprehended is the truth of the intellect wherein truth primarily resides hence the false is that which is not as apprehended to apprehend being and not being implies counter rioting whereas the philosopher proves the contrary of this statement god is good is god is not good reply to objection two falsity is not founded in the truth which is contrary to it just as evil is not founded in the good which is contrary to it but in that which is its proper subject this happens in either because true and good are universals and convertible with being hence as every privation is founded in a subject that is a being so every evil is founded in some good and every falsity in some truth reply to objection three because contraries and opposites by way of privation are by nature about one and the same thing therefore there is nothing contrary to god considered in himself either with respect to his goodness or his truth for in his intellect there can be nothing false but in our apprehension of him contrary is exist for the false opinion concerning him is contrary to the true so idols are called lies opposed to the divine truth in as much as the false opinion concerning them is contrary to the true opinion of the divine unity the end of question 17 question 18 of summa theologica pars prima initial questions this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org this recording is by Jim Ruddy summa theologica pars prima initial questions by st. Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the english Dominican province question 18 the life of god since to understand belongs to living beings after considering the divine knowledge and intellect we must consider the divine life about this four points of inquiry arise to whom does it belong to live what is life whether life is properly attributed to god and whether all things in god are life first article whether to live belongs to all natural things objection one it seems that to live belongs to all natural things for the philosopher says that movement is like a kind of life possessed by all things existing in nature but all natural things participate in movement therefore all natural things partake of life objection two further plants are said to live in as much as they have in themselves a principle of movement of growth and decay but local movement is naturally more perfect than and prior to movement of growth and decay as the philosopher shows since then all natural bodies have in themselves some principle of local movement it seems that all natural bodies live objection three further amongst natural bodies the elements are the less perfect yet life is attributed to them for we speak of living waters much more therefore have other natural bodies life on the contrary Dionysius says the last echo of life is heard in the plants whereby it is inferred that their life is life in the lowest degree but inanimate bodies are inferior to plants therefore they have not life i answer that we can gather to what things life belongs and to what it does not from such things as manifestly possess life now life manifestly belongs to animals for it is said in the vegetabulous that in animals life is manifest we must therefore distinguish living from lifeless things by comparing them to that by reason of which animals are said to live and this it is in which life is manifested first and remains last we say then that an animal begins to live when it begins to move of itself and as long as such movement appears in it so long as it is considered to be alive when it is no when it no longer has any movement of itself but is only moved by another power then its life is said to fail and the animal to be dead whereby it is clear that those things are properly called living that move themselves by some kind of movement whether it be movement properly so called as the act of an imperfect being that is of a thing in potentiality is called movement or movement in a more general sense as when said of the act of a perfect thing as understanding and feeling are called movement accordingly all things are said to be alive that determine themselves to movement or operation of any kind whereas those things that cannot by their nature do so cannot be called living unless by a similitude replied to objection one these words of the philosopher may be understood either of the first movement namely that of the celestial bodies or of the movement in its general sense in either way is movement called the life as it were of natural bodies speaking by a similitude and not attributing it to them as their property the movement of the heavens is in the universe of corporeal natures as the movement of the heart whereby life is preserved is in animals similarly also every natural movement in respect to natural things has a certain similitude to the operations of life hence if the whole corporeal universe were one animal so that its movement came from an intrinsic moving force as some in fact have held in that case movement would really be the life of all natural bodies replied to objection two two bodies whether heavy or light movement does not belong except in so far as they are displaced from their natural conditions and are out of their proper place for when they are in the place that is proper and natural to them they are at rest plants and other living things move with vital movement in accordance with the disposition of their nature but not by approaching there too or by receding from it for in so far as they recede from such movement so far do they recede from their natural disposition heavy and light bodies are moved by an extrinsic force either generating them and giving them form or removing obstacles from their way they do not therefore move themselves as do living bodies replied to objection three waters are called living that have a continuous current for standing waters that are not connected with a continually flowing source are called dead as in cisterns and ponds this is merely a similitude in as much as the movement they are seen to possess makes them look as if they were alive yet this is not life in them in its real sense since this movement of theirs is not from themselves but from the cause that generates them the same as the case with the movement other heavy and light bodies second article whether life is an operation objection one it seems that life is an operation for nothing is divided except into parts of the same genus but life is divided by certain operations as is clear from the philosopher who distinguishes four kinds of life namely nourishment sensation local movement and understanding therefore life is an operation objection two further the act of life is said to be different from the contemplative but the contemplative is only distinguished from the active by certain operations therefore life is an operation objection three further to know god is an operation but this is life as is clear from the words of john now this is eternal life that they may know the the only true god therefore life is an operation on the contrary the philosopher says in living things to live is to be i answer that as is clear from what has been said our intellect which takes cognizance of the essence of the thing as its proper object gains knowledge from sense of which the proper objects are external accidents hence from external appearances we come to the knowledge of the essence of things and because we name a thing in accordance with our knowledge of it as is clear from what has been already said so from external properties names are often imposed to signify essences and such names are sometimes taken strictly to denote the essence itself the signification of which is their principal object but sometimes and less strictly to denote the properties by reason of which they are imposed and so we see that the word body is used to denote a genus of substances from the fact of their possessing three dimensions and is sometimes taken to denote the dimensions themselves in which sense body is said to be a species of quantity the same must be said of life the name is given from a certain external appearance namely self movement yet not precisely to signify this but rather a substance to which self movement and the application of itself to any kind of operation belongs naturally to live accordingly is nothing else than to exist in this or that nature and life signifies this though in the abstract just as the word running denotes to run in the abstract hence living is not an accidental but an essential predicate sometimes however life is used less properly for the operations from which its name is taken and thus the philosopher says that to live is principally to sense or to understand reply to objection one the philosophy here takes to live to mean an operation of life or it would be better to say that sensation and intelligence and the like are sometimes taken for the operations sometimes for the existence itself of the operator for he says that to live is to sense or to understand in other words to have a nature capable of sensation or understanding thus then he distinguishes life from the four operations mentioned for in this lower world there are four kinds of living things it is the nature of some to be capable of nothing more than taking nourishment and as a consequence of growing and generating others are able in addition to sense as we see in the case of shellfish and other animals without movement others have the further power of moving from place to place as perfect animals such as quadrupeds and birds and so on others as man have the still higher faculty of understanding replied to objection two by vital operations are meant those whose principles are within the operator and in virtue of which the operator produces such operations of itself it happens that there exist in men not merely such natural principles of certain operations as are their natural powers but something over and above them such as habits inclining them like a second nature to particular kinds of operations so that the operations become sources of pleasure thus as by a similitude any kind of work in which a man takes delight so that his bent is towards it his time spent in it and his whole life ordered with a view to it is said to be the life of that man hence some are said to lead a life of self-indulgence others a life of virtue in this way the contemplative life is distinguished from the active and thus to know god is said to be life eternal wherefore the reply to the third objection is clear third article whether life is properly attributed to god objection one it seems that life is not properly attributed to god for things are said to live in as much as they move themselves as previously stated but movement does not belong to god therefore neither does life objection two further in all living things we must need supposed some principle of life hence it is said by the philosopher that the soul is the cause and principle of the living body but god has no principle therefore life cannot be attributed to him objection three further the principle of life in the living things that exist among us is the vegetative soul but this exists only in corporeal things therefore life cannot be attributed to incorporeal things on the contrary it is said my heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living god i answer that life is the highest degree properly in god in proof of which it must be considered that since a thing is said to live and so far as it operates of itself and not as moved by another the more perfectly this power is found in anything the more perfect is the life of that thing and things that move and are moved a three-fold order is found in the first place the end moves the agent and the principal agent is that which acts through its form and sometimes it does so through some instrument that acts by virtue not of its own form but of the principal agent and does no more than execute the action accordingly there are things that move themselves not in respect of any form or end naturally inherent in them but only in respect to the executing of the movement the form by which they act and the end of the action being alike determined for them by their nature of this kind are plants which move themselves according to their inherent nature with regard only to executing the movements of growth and decay other things have self movement in a higher degree that is not only with regard to executing the movement but even as regards to the form the principle of movement which form they acquire of themselves of this kind are animals in which the principle of movement is not a naturally implanted form but one received through sense hence the more perfect is their sense the more perfect is their power of self movement such as have only the sense of touch as shellfish move only with the motion of expansion and contraction and thus their movement hardly exceeds that of plants whereas such as have the sensitive power in perfection so as to recognize not only connection and touch but also objects apart from themselves can move themselves to a distance by progressive movement it although animals of the latter kind receive through sense the form that is the principle of their movement nevertheless they cannot of themselves propose to themselves the end of their operation or movement for this has been implanted in them by nature and by natural instinct they are moved to any action through the form apprehended by sense in such animals as move themselves in respect to an end they themselves propose are superior to these this can only be done by reason and intellect whose province it is to know the proportion between the end and the means to that end and duly coordinate them hence a more perfect degree of life is that of intelligent beings for their power of self movement is more perfect this is shown by the fact that in one and the same man the intellectual faculty moves the sensitive powers and these by their command move the organs of movement thus in the arts we see that the art of using a ship that is the art of navigation rules the art of ship designing and this in its turn rules the art that is only concerned with preparing the material for the ship but although our intellect moves itself to some things yet others are supplied by nature as our first principles which it cannot doubt and the last end which it cannot but will hence although with respect to some things it moves itself yet with regard to other things it must be moved by another where for that being whose act of understanding is its very nature and which in what it naturally possesses is not determined by another must have life in the most perfect degree such as god and hence in him principally is life from this the philosopher concludes after showing god to be intelligent that god has life most perfect and eternal since his intellect is most perfect and always in act replied to objection one as stated in the metaphysics action is to fold actions of one kind pass out to external matter as to heat or to cut whilst actions of the other kind remained in the agent as to understand to sense and to will the difference between them is this that the former action is the perfection Not of the agent that moves but of the thing moved whereas the latter action is the perfection of the agent and because movement is an active the thing in movement the latter action and so far as it is the act of the operator is called its movement by this similitude that has movement is an act of the thing moved so an active this kind is the act of the Asian although movement is an act of the imperfect, that is, of what is in potentiality, while this kind of act is an act of the perfect, that is to say, of what is inact, as stated in Deanima. In the sense, therefore, in which understanding is movement, that which understands itself is said to move itself. It is in this sense that Plato also taught that God moves himself, not in the sense in which movement is an act of the imperfect. Reply to Objection 2.  Reply to Objection 3. Life in this lower world is bestowed on a corruptible nature that needs generation to preserve the species and nourishment to preserve the individual. For this reason life is not found here below apart from a vegetative soul, but this does not hold good with incorruptible natures. Fourth Article. Whether all things are life in God. Objection 1. It seems that not all things are life in God, for it is said, in him we live and move and be, but not all things in God are movement, therefore not all things are life in him. Objection 2. Not all things are in God as their first model, but things modeled ought to conform to the model. Since then not all things have life in themselves, it seems that not all things are life in God. Objection 3. Further, as Augustine says, a living substance is better than a substance that does not live. If therefore things which in themselves have not life are life in God, it seems that things exist more truly in God than themselves, but this appears to be false, since in themselves they exist actually, but in God potentially. Objection 4. Further, just as good things and things made in time are known by God, so are bad things and things that God can make, but that will never be made. If therefore all things are life in God in as much as known by him, it seems that even bad things and things that will never be made are life in God as known by him, this appears inadmissible. On the contrary, it is said, what was made in him was life, but all things were made except God, therefore all things are life in God. I answer that in God to live is to understand as before stated. In God intellect the thing understood and the act of understanding are one and the same, hence whatever is in God as understood is the very living or life of God. Now wherefore, since all things that have been made by God are in him as things understood, it follows that all things in him are the divine life itself. Objection 1. Creatures are said to be in God in a twofold sense, in one way so far as they are held together and preserved by the divine power even as we say that things that are in our power are in us and creatures are thus said to be in God even as they exist in their own natures. In this sense we must understand the words of the apostle when he says in him we live, move and be since our being and living and moving are themselves caused by God. In another sense things are said to be in God as in him who knows them in which sense they are in God through their proper ideas which in God are not distinct from the divine essence.  Objection 2. The thing modeled must be like the model according to the form not the mode of being. For sometimes the form has being of another kind in the model from that which it has in the thing modeled thus the form of a house has in the mind of the architect immaterial and intelligible being but in the house that exists outside his mind material and insensible being. Hence the ideas of things though not existing in themselves are life in the divine mind as having a divine existence in that mind. Reply to Objection 3. If form only and not matter belong to natural things then in all respects natural things would exist more truly in the divine mind by the ideas of them than in themselves for which reason in fact Plato held that the separate man was the true man and that man as he exists in matter is man only by participation. But since matter enters into the being of natural things we must say that those things have simply being in the divine mind more truly than in themselves because in that mind they have an uncreated being but in themselves a created being whereas this particular being a man or horse for example has this being more truly in its own nature than in the divine mind because it belongs to human nature to be material which as existing in the divine mind it is not. Even so a house has nobler being in the architect's mind than in matter yet a material house is called a house more truly than the one which exists in the mind since the former is actual the latter only potential. Why to objection for although bad things are in God's knowledge as being comprised under that knowledge if they are not in God as created by him or preserved by him or as having their type in him they are known by God through the types of good things and it cannot be said that bad things are life in God those things that are not in time may be called life in God in so far as life means understanding only and in as much as they are understood by God but not in so far as life implies a principle of operation. End of question 18.