Ladies and gentlemen, colleagues, welcome to the second panel this morning. It will be on West Africa and the Sahel, violent extremist organizations. The panelists are all to my right, starting with Bruce Whitehouse from Lehigh University, Jimam Lar from the University of Joss in Nigeria, Joel Mokoma of Punch newspaper, also from Nigeria, Emi Nyang from the University of Witt Wattastrand in South Africa. Their papers are going to speak to West Africa. And some of my earlier remarks on the geographies of conflict and the way the local connects with the national, regional, and global will come alive in some of the presentations you're going to listen to. But without further ado, and with an eye on time, I would advise the presenters to limit their initial presentations to 10 minutes. Therefore, it's my pleasure to call on Bruce Whitehouse of Lehigh University to make his presentation. Thank you very much. I'm the social anthropologist who was invoked in the previous panel. Here I am. I'm not going to be speaking about jihadis or Islamists or the other kinds of violent extremists that tend to get spoken about in these kind of forums. I'm going to be talking about very local and national level context in Mali. We got the kind of regional picture in the previous panel. So just to bring you up to date on what's been happening in Mali, last year, 2016, there were two times as many deadly attacks on civilians, Mali and government personnel, and international military personnel, French and UN, as there were the year before. Over 300 fatalities, two thirds of them civilians. Here's a map. Those blue dots are all locations of violent incidents, mostly carried out in 2015. So you can see that the geographic scope of violence has really shifted far down from the north, which had been occupied by Islamists in 2012 and is now, in the last couple of years, has been at its most intense in the central regions of the country and has, in fact, spread throughout the south and into the west as well. So this is a generalized problem. The first two months of this year, there have already been 193 deaths in 36 attacks, two thirds of them concentrated, again, in the central region of the country here. The UN peacekeeping mission in Mali, Minusma is the deadliest and has been for a few years running now, the deadliest peacekeeping operation in the world. So I want to emphasize that what's going on, the current crisis in Mali is no mere repeat of earlier cyclical rebellions that the country has known in its recent history. The security situation is indeed grave and I won't even get into the domestic politics or the economy. The Malian government led by President Ibrahim Bukarketa, that's him in the cartoon over here, trying to keep the ship of state from sinking, doesn't seem to have very much to say about the challenges facing the country. A number of people have described the Malian state as a Potemkin state, a fake state, a counterfeit state. How did we get to this juncture? There are many conflicting answers to that question. The answer that I want to offer today is informed by the time that I spent in Bamako and elsewhere in Mali. I've been struck by how much at odds the different narratives of Mali's present crisis are the ones that are told in Mali versus the ones that are told here in Washington or in international media. I'm going to try to bridge that divide today very briefly. And I want to talk about competing nationalisms. This is a term I borrow from historian Bosley Cook, who literally wrote the book on the conflict in northern Mali. We're talking about two different nationalist discourses and camps, each of which is divided and fractious and internally heterogeneous, split by distinctions of caste and clan and ethnicity. But I'm going to concentrate on the opposition between these two competing nationalism. The first being Malian nationalism. Now the mold for this was set in the period of decolonization in the 1950s, a post-war period, up through the 1960s. The founding president, Modi Bulketa, who's depicted here on the slide, valorized a unitary national identity based on the Malian Empire, which existed from the 13th to the 17th century. That's a map of it, circa 1350 over here. And was a very successful, long-standing and socially diverse polity for centuries. But Malian nationalism in the middle 20th century was also created in opposition to French colonial policies, especially monetary and security policy. Modi Bulketa wanted, and his party, wanted a highly centralized modernizing state and in seeking that objective, they found themselves being opposed by another brand of nationalism, which is Tuareg nationalism. We heard a little bit about the Tuareg in the previous panel. They're a group of primarily nomadic people who live throughout northern Mali, this area that's shaded green here. But in neighboring countries as well, Mauritania, Algeria, Niger, a little bit in Burkina as well. And this name that the separatists took for their state that they declared in 2012, Azawad, this was never a polity in pre-colonial or colonial times. It's a fairly recent creation. Tuareg rebelled against the central Malian government in 1963 and 64. But they weren't seeking independence at that point. They were merely rebelling against central government control. They weren't trying to create a state. It wasn't until the 1990s that Mali's Tuareg nationalists set for themselves this goal of creating an independent state called Azawad. And the government of Mali has historically depicted these rebels as racist feudalists engaged in a kind of apartheid project. The Tuareg, particularly the separatist leaders, come from light-skinned clans and have a history of domination over dark-skinned slaves and subordinate clans and groups within their society as well as other ethnic groups in the region. But it's also important that when this separatist movement arose in 2011, 2012, it framed its agenda within Mali's existing boundaries. They weren't claiming territory in Algeria or Niger. They were setting themselves up not as a transnational organization, though their presence and activities very much are. But their political claims were entirely within this national framework. So these two competing nationalisms depend on certain mythologies about history, about culture, about politics. And these mythologies include the notion that from the perspective of each of these nationalist movements, the notion that the other movement is irredeemably racist and bent on domination. These discourses have changed very little in the past 60 years. It sounds like a time warp when you listen to spokesmen of the different groups talking today about the other. They very much mirror what was being said in the 1950s and 60s. I want to bring up very briefly a historical entity that is very little known, at least here in the United States. This was the organization commune des régions or CRS, set up by the French in the waning days of their colonial rule in Northwest Africa in the late 1950s. You can see the boundaries of it extended from the Mauritanian border over here through the Moroccan border encompassed all of southern and central Algeria and a bit of Niger and northern parts of Niger and Chad as well. Now this ultimately wasn't successful or long lived. It was made moot by Algerian independence in 1962, officially dissolved by the French in 1963. But its memory, its ghost, if you will, continues to haunt people of the region. And particularly in northern Mali, I'm not sure if this is even as relevant in Niger and Chad today. But in northern Mali and throughout Mali, people remember this attempt to set up this semi-autonomous zone under French control in the 1950s. And they interpret current events through that historical lens. Malian nationalists, the term Azouad, which, if you notice, it corresponds very closely to this zone that the French wanted to set aside in the 1950s, is an illegitimate neocolonialist project that was established to undermine Malian sovereignty. Former Malian cabinet minister has accused France of engaging in a decades-long campaign to raise the Tuareg against the central Malian state. So Malian nationalists don't see this as a kind of endogenous conflict. They see it very much as one that's been foisted upon them from abroad. And when they think about a federal solution, they're really not thinking about, say, the United States or Canada or even Belgium. They're thinking about Nigeria. And it's not necessarily a model that they want to follow. I'll discuss a few ways in which Malian nationalists tend to represent Tuareg rebellion. And Tuareg rebels in particular, but Tuareg people sometimes more generally. Feudal and aggressive, as I mentioned. This term, apatskid, comes up in French a lot, which is the idea that these are people who have no state. And it hints at the notion that modern state structures and citizenship are irreconcilable with Tuareg social structure and values. They're often termed the spoiled children of the Republic by Malian nationalists because over the years, the Malian government has tried to use peace accords. We heard some references to them earlier to bring rebels into the national fold, offering them certain material incentives. And the perception is that they will take this money or these jobs or use these resources and then go right back to their old game of rebellion and dominating their black neighbors. And then that they benefit, no matter what crimes they commit, while they're carrying out their rebellion, that they're not going to be held responsible for them. And this bitter history of domination and oppression is just going to be swept under the rug by whatever deal has worked out in Algiers or elsewhere. So I can't stress enough the degree to which Malian nationalists and the elite in Bamako sees this threat of Tuareg separatism as the kind of existential danger to the Malian republic. It's not the danger posed by jihadis by AQIM or what have you. To quote the French writer Jean-Claude Staffnotin, when Paris warns Bamako about the rising threat of terrorists, it's thinking of AQIM and its allies. When Bamako complains to Paris about the threat that terrorists pose for the country, it's thinking of the Tuareg. So we're really, this is the gap that I'm trying to bridge here and I don't know if that's even feasible for one person to do. The points I want to leave you with, number one, what if jihadist insurgencies really not the issue here? What if it's an epiphenomenon? And I don't raise this question merely because Malian nationalists pretend to see things this way. I think we should think of the Malian nation state as the patient, we're trying to diagnose the ills of this patient. We have to recognize that Tuareg separatism is the open wound endangering its survival. And jihadis violence has been this kind of opportunistic infection that's set in in 2011, 2012. And now it's endangering the life of the patient and it might even spread to some other patients in the ward, Molly's neighbors in the region. But I don't think even Tuareg separatism itself is the core of the problem. The core of the problem is the Malian state. And it's long overdue for a thorough rethinking of its role, its function, how government is going to operate and relate to the society. A window for this rethinking opened with the French military intervention and the dramatic crisis that played out in 2012, 2013. Unfortunately, I think that window is now closed and the Malian political establishment has shown little interest in taking part in that discussion. So the question is how do we get from a fake state to one that's genuine, incredible and capable? Can we get to that point? Finally, and we've heard some references to this in the previous session as well, I don't see the current peace process being driven by the Algerian government as bringing about the kind of answers that Molly really needs. Neither the Malian government nor the rebels are sincerely interested in implementing the accord. They're more interested in maintaining the status quo, which serves their interest in a number of ways. They're more interested in holding on to control of the lucrative smuggling routes that have very high stakes. The Algiers process has been very exclusive and top down, as Claire mentioned. Previous peace accords were constructed in the same way from the top down and they have always failed in their implementation and only led to greater violence. The last comprehensive peace accord signed in 1992 led to the deadliest outbreaks of violence two years after their signing. Well, in June, we're gonna be coming to the two year mark since the latest Algiers Accord was signed. So I think we need to be prepared for the specter of even greater violence and not less. So on that happy note, I'll turn it over to my colleagues. Thank you very much, Bruce Whitehouse. It's now my pleasure to call upon Jim Hamla to make his presentation. Thank you very much for inviting us and having us here. Extremely pleased to be here and to share some of the insights I've gained from my research in largely in central Nigeria. So basically I'll just quickly focus a lot on this map here. So what I want to share with you basically is the search that I've been conducting around these areas here, these populated areas of central Nigeria here, largely focusing on southern Kaduna state here, the Josplatu right here, but also southern Bauchi state. And its areas are referred to as central Nigeria's conflict theaters, basically. Areas in the central Nigerian area where for a very long period of time we've had successive several episodes of outbreaks of collective violence. But my presentation today is a bit to focus on how the Boko Haram insurgency, which basically has been focused, the epicenter focus around the northeast here has found penetration and tries to interact with these pre-existing cases of collective violence. Firstly, basically to try to exacerbate and feed into these existing contestations, but also to try to divide the attention of the Nigerian state in terms of how it focuses its attention on fighting the Boko Haram insurgency. But to start with, first of all, what is it that brings these cases together? What is the convergence point of these conflicts that I've been studying for the last 10 years or so? I would argue that the converging points are, firstly, the obvious note that the conflicts in these areas are largely mobilized around ethnic and religious lines. You have historical relationships of contestation between groups that are largely on one hand, groups who regard themselves as autochthonous, indigenous, mostly today largely Christian, with a minority house Muslim population. But also relevant is to understand how these groups conceptualize security at the local level. And this is very important because when we look at the three different states, the Constituent Nigerian States, I'm referring to here. If you take Bauchi State, for example, if you are a Seya or a Christian in Bauchi State, you have this relationship of mistrust for the Bauchi State government because it's largely Muslim house Fulani. Similarly, if you are a house Muslim in Plateau State, you also have that relationship of distrust for the Plateau State government because it's largely Christian and seen as indigenous to Plateau. Similarly, if you are from Khafan Chang or the southern parts of Kaduna State, you have this also historical relationship of mistrust and suspicion for the Kaduna State government because, of course, again, largely house Fulani. So the conception of security depends on the relationship of these groups have with the Constituent States. This is very important to take on board. Thirdly, you also have competition and contestation for land, which also feeds into this group dynamic. So these indigenous groups regard themselves as ancestral. They regard themselves as having customary ownership to the land and the very important point I always point out is often when there are attempts to mediate the conflict and try to say, okay, we have to move this group here or get allocations of land there, people actually resist this in terms of the notion or the idea of virgin land arguing that all land has ownership. No land is virgin land. If you want to know who owns land, go and trespass and you will find who owns that. So not to refer to inhabiting as evidence or a yardstick for measuring ownership. All often you hear this being raised. So also important to basically make a few references of how first and foremost the Boko Haram conflict interacts with this central region in regards to how you've had the level or the number of IDPs who have found shelter within the central region. And the point is, as you would read in most of the NGO reports, most of the IDPs are not living in the camps. Most of them are living with households and you find a large numbers of them within the central region. Mostly the Christian IDPs have in plateau states, Southern Katrina state all the way even to the federal capital here in Abuja. I think also important to note is, of course the improvement in the situation regarding the militant capacity of Boko Haram, this has been degraded substantially, but also the challenge of the humanitarian issues which in spite of all the effort that has been made and let's say that there's been a lot of effort made by the Nigerian government but also by NGOs and all the other people who are active in this area, it's still grossly inadequate and because largely rural peoples have not had enough access to some of this relief and this support that has been coming in. But also important is the prevalence of IEDs, improvised explosive devices all over the place, more or less like mines. This makes the location of the IDPs back to their homesteads very, very difficult but it also makes the work of humanitarian organizations very, very slow too. So a major issue in the ongoing situation in the area. To now basically focus on some of the points of which how Boko Haram has all the convergent points if you may. Firstly, whether it's collective violence, whether it's counter insurgency, whether it's cases of communities responding to these issues there is a convergence of an understanding of conflict management as self defense. So you have a lot of these groups mobilizing and what this leads to is it increases the level of arms preparation in the areas completely. Small arms like weapons have always been an issue with the Nigerian state and the Nigerian society but in these areas where you have these continuous outbreaks of violence it becomes a more serious issue. So basically arms are prohibited in Nigeria but whether it's church organizations, Muslim communities, everybody's armed and particularly in these areas where there's a high level of violence. So you find the arms dealers basically moving from one area of conflict to another. Not minding basically who buys these arms or who procures it from them. Also important is how as I said earlier how Boko Haram has tried to basically intervene into these conflict areas and particularly if we observe the initial attacks that Boko Haram had in these areas like Joss in Platrice State but also in Taffar-Boleva, the attacks were targeted at Christian groups, Christian churches and this had a way of exacerbating the conflict because there were reprisal attacks against innocent locals who had nothing to do with this.  It also led to these communities mobilizing beyond religious and ethnic lines. So for example in Joss Platrice State you had the community leaders, religious leaders of both sides condemning the attacks but also mobilizing the communities against Boko Haram. It's also important to note how particularly the Christians within these communities try to appropriate discourses of the global war on terror and also often see this link this Boko Haram phenomena to the Sokotoji had and the attempts historically to penetrate of the central Nigerian area. I think it's also relevant to make the point that in all these cases whether we look at the Boko Haram insurgency, counter insurgency or we look at everyday policing or attempts at mobilizing against against collective violence you always have these cases of a hybridization of security agencies. So from the civilian GGGTF working with Nigerian military to cases in Patrice State of this formation called Operation Rainbow which is a UNDP sponsored hybrid security formation made up of the military, the police but also local vigilante groups. So it's very important to also note that for example now some members of the civilian GGGTF group who about 30,000 of them last year were recruited into Nigerian army but the point also to make is not all of them want to join the army. If you talk to them, some of them talk about wanting to go back to school, some of them were mechanic apprentices before they joined the civilian GGF so there's that need to be more creative in engaging with them and trying to find out what would they want to do after this effort of which they've been supporting the army has come to pass because it would be quite risky of course to allow them basically back into society without any proper structured program to take care of their needs. So, okay, two minutes. If I could just then quickly round up what then can we take away from this? I think the first point I want to make I think is a very important one is if we look at how the insurgency has basically moved from its epicenter here in Borno State in Meduguri it moved south to the Adamawa Northern Adamawa State here but attacks also occurred a lot within this area of the Central region as I referred earlier. Interestingly, the Northwest of Nigeria, the seat of the Sokoto Caliphate states like Sokoto, Zampara, Kebi have not experienced substantial inroads of Boko Haram. Boko Haram activities basically ended in Kano State here. So I think it's important because we find the leadership, the agency, social legitimacy of religious and community leaders, traditional leaders very, very important in trying to curtail the activities of Boko Haram here. So I think it's important to understand in more detailed terms how an area having perhaps the same developmental indices, all those issues, all those factors within that cocktail that created the Boko Haram insurgency, we find quite a number of them here in the Northwest yet the phenomenon has not had the same impact. There are a few studies being done on this like a PhD I think which was defended quite I think last year to try to understand why this is so and why there was a further penetration into these areas where there has been preexisting collective violence. I think also the importance therefore of local authorities has to be emphasized but also very important is when we imagine how we support security agencies, when we imagine how we conceptualize security sector reform, the importance of non-state actors. And here I refer to civil non-state actors that are providing support. So the need to consider who is actually providing security on the ground, not who should be providing it, very, very important. And finally, the importance of encouraging the Nigerian government to find a very creative means of demobilization, disarmament and reintegration because as long as you have all these arms all over the place, even when collective violence freezes as is the case in some of these parts, you still have the criminality going on, armed robbery and what have you. I would have to stop there. Thank you very much. Well, thank you very much, GMAM. It's now my pleasure to call upon Joel Wachoma to make his presentation. Thank you very much. Good morning, everybody. Interestingly, this week marks the third anniversary of the Chiborgia's abduction. And the focus of the Nigerian media has been trying to explore the counter insurgency, the missing links in the counter insurgency in Nigeria, essentially what has not been done or what has been done to ultimately rescue the Chiborgias because the Chiborgias has been widely noted is this singular phenomenon of a singular factor that internationalized the Chiborgia insurgency in Nigeria. But it is interesting to note that Nigeria has been dealing with Bukawara insurgency from 2002 upon 2009. So what made it become what was the factor that was behind this radicalization is being widely known by the media in Nigeria that the unfortunate killing of Mohamed Yusuf in 2009 actually exposed its members to radicalization and turning to weapon. But that has not lost with the issue. Before 2009, the Nigerian media has not been focusing so much on extremism, violent extremism. The major secretaries in Nigeria had been before 2009, militancy in the oil rich Niger data region. For obvious reasons because hydrocarbon is responsible for funding Nigeria states. So because of the militancy in the Nigerian region, so the media has been focusing attention on the activities of these militants upon 2009 when Bukawara became an issue of interest to the media. Now from 2009, 2002, upon 2009, we have had figures relating to how was the figure of people that have died from the activities of Bukawara. We have figures ranging from 20,000 deaths and 2.15 million displacement. And this accounts for the worst humanitarian crisis on the African continent, which is taxing the Nigerian government. And also credit must be given to international agencies that have rallied around Nigeria to ensure that the IDPs, like Jiman said, that have been as a result of the displacement of these people. If I must point out, however, as you take, Bukawara, at the point of its occupation in Nigeria, was controlling an area the size of Belgium, 27 local government area. It was fully occupying the areas. And since then, two administrations in Nigeria have been battling, and the media has been reporting, and also be focusing attention on what are the different approaches that have been adopted by these two different administrations that have present Gulogunatan that interestingly lost a relation in 2015, apparently because of the third way, as it's been reported in the media. The third way he responded is one to the abduction of the Chibogias and to the handling of the Bukawaram insurgency. And ironically too, President Buari, that came in and promised that if he vote for me, I'm gonna, I will have defeat Bukawaram in less than one year. And to his credit, so far, Bukawaram is no longer controlling any territory of note in Nigeria. That is the credit of the current government. But what has happened is that Bukawaram has transformed from a territory occupying insurgency group to a much more deadlier group, throwing suicide bombs, which is what attention should be focused on how to ensure that we are able to deal with this issue, because Nigeria has not been used to suicide bombing before, and Nigeria is a many loving, fond loving set of people. So we never factored suicide bombing. All that we had about suicide bombing was from North Africa, from the Middle East region, but suddenly suicide bombing has become a reality of note to Nigeria, which is very striking. So how did Nigeria government begin to deal with insurgency in Bukawaram? The first thing of note was, they were taken aback. They have not had this type of thing before, a country that has about 100,000 man army that is noted to have exiled in peacekeeping across the world. Now having to deal with Anama Force, Anama Force group of people that is nimble, that is able to assimilate, that is, so it was a very big challenge. Two, because Bukawaram feeds into religious extremism, and Nigeria being a very pluralistic and religious country. It was difficult to factor an issue, the difficult to factor a functional response to dealing with Bukawaram then. So what has been done? Since President Bukawari has come into power, there has been, like I noted earlier, there has been sources in thickening away the operational base of Bukawaram, which is San Pisa Forest. So it has been cleared, but still, as we are noting, we have noted, discovered the whereabouts of the Chiborgias. The victory of Nigeria over Bukawaram will be signposted by the discovery or the rescue of the remaining Chiborgias, which is what we are hoping that international community will intensify their force. We appreciate their force. The Njermida appreciate their force international community in helping deal with the challenge of Bukawaram and essential also to rescue the Chiborgias. But what was the major attraction? The Chiborgias was not, the Chiborgias abduction was not the ultimate thing that Bukawaram did in Nigeria. Before then, in 2014, a group of boys, 54 young boys in high school, in Bune, we are slaughtered by Bukawaram. And there was not so much interest, you know. There was not much attention being paid about it. Then, there are about in a place called, from Bune Yadi, Baga. The Baga incident was such that outraged the world. We are about, some records, about one to 3,000 people, the village was razed to the ground by a massive onslaught of Bukawaram. And in Nigeria, that was actually asking question that within that period, how come the world was indifferent? So to say, or was not as outraged as they were when the Charlie Hebdo attack took place in France. How come there was, I belong to Charlie, I belong to a support run. There were protests, demonstrations across the world, across the Western capital, for the Charlie Hebdo, a very unfortunate incident anyway. But there was not so much protest across the world, capital over the 3,000 killing in Baga. So it attracted no more immediate attention and interrogation of the relationship between Nigeria as a country and also his neighbors and his partners. Now, strikingly too, the first major security meeting involving Bukawaram victim nations, of the Lechad Bezin involving Niger, Chad, Nigerian, Cameroon, was confirmed by France. So it means that the approach, the most sustainable approach to solving content, insurgency, should actually be localized. The most efficient way to find answers to insurgency should be localized. But France came in and took the burden off the West Africa. Echo was also, has not been even forthcoming up until recently. So the media has been asking what has been the missing link? What is, why is Nigeria not being able to effectively deal with the challenge of Bukawaram? One of which is Nigeria's government's physician with security-centric approach. They feel that perhaps because the first perception was Bukawaram is a racked-tag army. A racked-tag army located in Medugri, who would be able to deal with it. We have an army that has had experience in dealing with peacekeeping. But there's a wide gulf of difference, as we noted, between peacekeeping operations and fighting insurgency. Nigerian military has not been trained enough to deal with insurgents. So that's a gap that we noticed. Two, the fact that we did not factor local support, there was no buy-in, local buy-in, into the counter-insurgency strategy of government. So there was a disconnect. The people who are direct victims, who should provide information to government or to the military, were actually skeptical. Because the two were victims of the activities of Bukawaram. So they were not providing the necessary logistical support to government to fight Bukawaram. Primarily because of the reported cases of abuse of Nigerian military towards the soldiers while they were fighting Bukawaram. And before I am being cut out, they also need to say what doing needs to do. Bukawaram has brought about a huge humanitarian crisis in Nigeria. 2.15 million is a huge challenge to Nigeria. But there is an environment that makes insurgents flourish or that makes it inevitable in the part of the country in Nigeria, the Northeast. That is the deficit that makes, for instance, from the 40.7 million out of school children in the world, 7.5 million come from Nigeria. And 75% of that come from Northeast. So that's the link between deprivation, lack of access to education to insurgents. So if you are going to have a hand on dealing with insurgents in Nigeria effectively, we must find a way of closing the gap of lack of access to education in the Northeast of Nigeria. Thank you very much. So far we are not doing badly for time. And I know that Amy is going to keep the trend. And on that note, I invite you, Amy, to make your presentation. Thank you. Thank you very much for the invitation. I'm very glad to be here. So my talk will touch upon armed groups, mainly in Central Mali, because a lot has been said about the Norths. And I do not want to repeat what has been said by some of my colleagues. And I am mainly interested in looking at what each one of the groups are present in Central Mali. Tell us about the nature of the conflict in Mali and in the Sahel more generally. Secondly, I'm also interested in looking at security concerns as framed by Sahelians themselves. So in our writing, for most of us interested in this region, we often tend to look at security concern in terms of the capacity for harm and damage but kind of inflected by armed groups. But rarely do we pose and think about what it means for a Sahelian to be safe and to be secure. And one of the arguments I'm trying to make is that the kind of statist and state-centered responses that have been provided so far in relation to the conflict in Sahel have also to be seen as part of the security concerns that Sahelians themselves might be facing. So one of the main problems in Mali and some of my colleagues have touched on this in the previous panel has got to do with the lack of implementation of the successive piece a court has been signed. So you have the, come around to the court of 1991, the National Pact of 1992, the Algeria Courts of 2006 and the latest talks that were brokered by Algeria and signed in June 2015, none of which has been implemented due to the satisfaction of parties involved. So the main problem here is the problem of implementing what has been agreed upon between the Mali and government on the one hand and insurgent group from the North. And here we are talking about the Trieric problem. But the Trieric problem has been a divisive problem in the Mali and national project, if you want. So the Trieric are not the only minority in the North. They are not the only minority that have been neglected and whose needs have not been met by successive governments. And so you have the Flanders, you have the Songhai, you have other minorities from the North and the center who deeply resent the fact that the Trieric might have benefited from too much attention. And you have all sorts of ideas coming from, you have all sorts of colonial ideas about the blue man of the desert. So there's all sorts of fantasies, if you want, around Trieric as a population that do not resist the idea of the state. And in the literature around state building, it is a very attractive idea to think about alternative to the Westphalian system. So it becomes very interesting for those that are interested in these questions to think about the Trieric as a potential alternative to politics and political formation that aren't necessarily based on the Westphalian framework. So for that and all sorts of reasons, the Trieric question has been elevated to levels that other minorities think is unfair to them and to their sort of needs. So the Trieric question then, and Bruce has touched upon this question, has to be revisited for also the kind of implications it has beyond the demand for statehood, which itself has gone through different phases. The Trieric autonomous movement was never about having a separate state. But since 2012, the idea of other world so this land that is imagined as a pan-Trieric nation, its possibility has been floated a lot more firmly since the 2012 conflict. But to come back to my concern here, which is the rise of armed groups in Central Mali. So one has to look at two different trends that are at works here. On the one hand, you have religious radicalization that has been extended to the center of Mali, but with a different kind of meaning to it. So it's not just a matter of al-Qaeda recruiting heavily in the center, which it has tried to do. But what you have since 2015 and a bit in the past three years, oh, you have the Flamie and the Foreign National de Liberation de Massina, which has radicalized. So to become a jihadi group if you want, but which at its deep roots is not necessarily a jihadi group if you think about religious radicalization, not as a matter of Islamist radicalization, but as a matter of radicalization, as a matter of an Islamization of a radical group. So the Flamie have taken arms because they have understood that to be invited to the peace talk, you have to be an armed group. So this is one new implication of the framework of peace talks that have been put in place since, I mean, in the successive 12-way uprising. So Bruce has touched upon these issues, the fact that you have in the past couple of years over 100, close to 200 incidents, implicating mostly unidentified groups that are targeting either the Malian gendarmerie police outpost or Malian armed force troops they call Fama or that involve inter-communal violence that take the form of band-a-tas of retaliation. So you have a Bambara farmer that gets killed in a mob tea and you have a campaign of retaliation that takes place. So if you look at the targets, one can draw a few things here. The first one would be that jihadism is probably not the most important problem in terms of security problems that are facing Mali, at least in the center of the country. The problem of land, the problem of rights to access and rights of use of shared communal resources is one major problem. Second one is you have a deep, long-standing suspicion and distrust towards the Malian state or any status intervention for that matter. So the state here, someone said earlier that the problem of Mali is the problem of state. Maybe it is, but I think it's not. So the way in which the Malian state has extended its authority in the north has historically been in the form of sending military or administrative agents who are seen as agents of extraction, if you want, whether it's tax or something else. So the problem might be a problem of state and state building, but I would argue that the problem is, in the nature of the quality of the kind of state that is being deployed in the center and in the north. Some of the minorities in the north have seen the state as a repressive machine. And therefore, if the state has to come back, and if you look at the literature, it's very common to see things like the Sahel being an ungoverned space, a no man's land. So the idea that the problem of the Sahel is a problem of governance. So this might be the case. But what it implies is that to just extend the state from Bamako has never worked and will never work. So Bamako has gone about extending itself into the center and the north in two ways. So one way has been by sending administrative and military agents. The second one has been by building patronage networks in the center and in the north. And what that has partly done was to disrupt the old hierarchies that are in place. So if you look at, and this brings me to my, I don't know if it's very, if you can't see from the back. So what I've tried to do here is to group some of the groups that are present in central Mali in a very simplified manner, I have to say. So one column is about the pro-Bamako group. The second one is the anti-Bamako groups in the third column, anti-Bamako groups with a radical agenda. Again, it's a very simplified picture. It doesn't really capture the complexity of these groups. And one observation that can be made, firstly, is that it's very difficult to track these groups because they fragment, they disintegrate, they change names, they, so, I mean, in theory, Operation Cerval, Operation Barkan, and the latest peace talks in theory are supposed to have firmly isolated the Islamists, but they have not disappeared. So they've rather been dispersed. So they have found ways to combat, especially in the center. So the center was never really involved in the conflict in the north. On the contrary, it has been at the receiving end of violence. So combatants would generally withdraw towards the center and try and recruit among young people there. But what you have recently is that as an attempt to counter the effect of the Trawag nationalist movement, the Songhai, the Flani, and other minorities have mobilized in the form of self-defense groups, some of which have been in support of the government. So they may or may not be receiving material support from the government, but it's certainly pro-Bamako. So most of the groups that you see under pro-Bamako are, in fact, so-called self-defense militia. That, again, I think Jamal actually said something along the lines of security, meaning the management of security, meaning self-defense for some groups. And I think this is very true for the center of Mali. So where the government has failed to provide services and security, communities have taken things in their own hands. And the result has been the proliferation of all sorts of militia, and some of which are in discussion or not with Bamako. So under the anti-Bamako camp, you have mostly groups that are affiliated with an idea of the Trawag nationalism, some of which aren't necessarily advocating for a separate state. But nonetheless, I mean, some of them, most of them have some thing about Azawad. And again, Azawad was shown by Bruce. And on the third column, you have some of the well-known groups such as Al-Qaeda, Akmi, Mujwa, Al-Murabitun, which is the group of Belmokhtar that Dalia started on earlier. You have Ansar al-Din. You have the Masina-based groups, which, again, are not necessarily jihadi groups in the conventional sense, but they are ethnic-based groups that have radicalized using Islam's justification, which is very easy anyway to do these days. So mostly, this is what you have. And again, it's very difficult to track these different groups because they tend to morph into a new groups and change names. So I guess I would just say a couple of things to close. And I want you to show also a map of where you have a concentration of violence in the center. Generally, in the Masina, the Masina is the cultural and the historical center for the flanee between Mobti there and Segu. But also, you have a concentration of violence around the highway, so around the southeast. This would be the main areas. So a couple of remarks here. So if you look at the Gandakoy, and Gandakoy literally means sons of the soil or owners of the land. One of the main problems now, at least when it comes to central Mali, so a reading of violence in terms of Islamism, in terms of radical Islam is not always helpful. I think one has to try and understand the local rationalities and the subjectivities that underline some of these problems. And one way to do it is to really try and look at where some of these groups come from. So the Gandakoy has existed since 1990s, and it was explicitly formed as an anti-Tuaare group. So I think this is quite significant in terms of understanding what this particular group stands for. You also have another group that is similar to the Gandakoy, called the Gandaezo, and they have come together to build the platform, again in support of Bamako. But that itself does pose a host of problems for what it means for other minorities in the center. Because again, a signal there is that if you want to be heard, you have to form an armed group, and you have to claim to be fighting in the name of either the Malian nation state. Because one criticism that is often developed against the Tuaareg is that despite so much attention and resources being pumped into the North, they have no commitment whatsoever to the Malian national project. And it is therefore unfair to other groups to not have similar tension. Yes, thank you. Thank you. Thank you very much. I think we have listened to four very exciting presentations. I would just make a very few remarks and pose some questions for you to reflect on, and then we'll go ahead to collect questions from members of this distinguished audience. I think the first question I have for all the presenters is this. What is happening to the democratic project in West Africa? It would appear that the two countries of focus, Mali and Nigeria, have both what you would call vibrant democratic systems. Why does it appear that after long years of military dictatorship and a return to elected civilian governments, it appears that there has been an escalation, not just in terms of the divisions and the cleavages within the societies, but conflict? Is democracy as a framework of governance and conflict prevention, management and resolution failing? Or are people really voting against it? This is the first general question. The second question I raise is the centrality of land in a lot of these local conflicts. Would it be possible to see if any connection exists between this and climate change, for example, in terms of the movement from the drier parts of the region to the wetter parts of the region and how this is feeding into local conflict dynamics? Coming back to the presenters, I would say for Bruce, the role of history is so important. I would just ask you a complicated question. How do you resolve these contended nationalisms in Mali? What are your thoughts about this? Are we giving this a thought? Ujimam, I'd like to hear more about local policing. Both in the context of local conflict resolution, as well as issues around stability, rehabilitation, and resettlement, what should this local policing look like? And how do you think both national, regional, and international actors can either support or engage with such initiatives? For Joel, I would ask you the question of female suicide bombers, which is the most recent face of Boko Haram. What can we learn from the media coverage? Who are these girls? Where do they come from? Why are they the ones being laced with lethal weapons to go and blow themselves up? And what does this mean for the fight against Boko Haram in terms of the military responses to this new phenomenon? For Amy, you spoke about the Sahelian concept of security when you talk to ordinary Sahelians. What is this concept like? How do they see themselves, both in relation to their national governments and two in relation to the international community? And do you think that that conception of security has any prospects? Finally, this is another general question to all of you, the international community. Where in your experience, in terms of your research, in terms of people you speak to, where do you think the gaps exist in the way the international community has engaged, both in terms of understanding the conflict dynamics and in the kind of responses, both military and non-military, including humanitarian. Where do you see the gaps? And how do you think international intervention or international assistance can be more useful? I think those are my questions to you. I know that they are not too difficult, given that a lot of you have been working on this. If you would take a little bit of time to respond quickly, we would have some time to take some questions from this audience. So we'll start in reverse order. The last person was Amy. So Amy, can you please respond? I'll respond to your question about democracy indirectly. So if you take the case of Mali in 2004, the government formally recognized the Islamic Council as an institution that should be heard in all sorts of matters in the country. So the Mali government tried to reform the family code in 2009, and this triggered great resistance, which was led by the Islamic Council. There were over 60,000 people who marched in Mali against the code which tried to do, among other things, to extend inheritance rights to the girls and women, to raise the age of marriage for young girls. And also, there was something about land rights, et cetera. But this was greatly opposed by Muslim clerics and many Malians, in fact. So the point of this is to say, so for a country that has over 90% of its population that claims to be Muslim, the kind of national project that you have in Mali is a colonial artifact that thinks of the ideal Mali and citizen as French-schooled and perhaps somebody who's Bambana and who speaks Bambara. So there's a way in which the idea of the ideal national Malian citizen does not really take into account the fact of Islam, the fact of many young girls and boys as-schooled in Arabic and past high school, they have no prospects whether of finding a job or continuing education. So you have these kind of problems, I think, that complicate this picture of Malian democracy that has been depicted. So it's a democracy that, in theory, has worked for a while until we've realized that the fact of plurality was not really fully taken into account. Thank you very much. You're welcome. OK. I want to say that in the case of Nigeria and the state of democracy, one of the most noble thing we have had now is that there's an elite consensus that there is no need for military intervention again in Nigerian politics and government. Nigeria has a very peculiar experience. From 1960 independence to now, this is the longest experiment with democracy from 1990 to now. And interestingly, at the same time, there has been no greater time of discontent than now. The people do not want the military. The military used to serve as an alternative to a bungling political elite. So each time there was this discontent previously, it would say either class of the political divide would clamor for military intervention. But now, there is no such open clamor. So that is, there is an elite consensus that even though we are bungling along, we are wobbling along, we still cherish this democracy. So that is a commendation for them. But the most striking thing is that the people have been prized out of democracy. They assess the opportunities which democracy delivers has not been made available to a white spectrum of Nigerians. It is interesting to note that why there has been an increase in the budgetary allocation over the years in Nigeria. There is also a corresponding increase in the exclusion of the people from this. And that has triggered violence, violent responses, while the election has become much more militarized and violent. Still, nobody wants to invite the military as an alternative. That is it. Then the question you asked me about PME, suicide bombers, who are these guys? The Nigerian media have been trying to find out, is there a link between the unresolved whereabouts of the Chibok girls and these young girls that have been discovered to be suicide bombers? It is still in the realm of concentration that these girls who have been used as suicide bombers are actually the remaining Chibok girls that have not been rescued. But one thing that is to be noted, however, is the place of radicalization or indoctrination which Boko Haram has done. And that is where the media has noted the need to counter the narrative of Boko Haram by moderate Muslims in Nigeria. There is a need for moderate Muslims to begin to rise up and begin to speak much more louder that Boko Haram does not represent the Muslim interests. That what they are is actually anti-people. It is when they begin to give and amplify this narrative in the media that there will be a strong resistance to the use, whether of gears or of any element. Thank you very much, Imam. Thank you very much. I think as a historian who likes to always take the long view, I think the nature of contemporary Nigerian society and our struggles with embedding and trying to entrench democratic rule has to always be considered with a look at the colonial history, the history of military rule in Nigeria, and the nature of which Nigerian society has substantially been militarized to the extent that if you consider how even security agencies are socialized, it's a very, very violent process. And I think it's difficult to detach this from society. It's all embedded within one society. So I mean, but also how the state exerts its control during military rule, but also during these years of civil rule and the issues of exclusion that Joel has referred to. So this, I think, explains a lot of how conflicts, contestations, how group differences quickly resolve into violence. It's about that nature of how society is militarized, but also how there is a uniformalization of Nigerian society. You find it from the Boy Scout to Vigilantes to this proliferation of security agencies. Always there is a new build to create a new security agency in Nigeria. Everybody has a uniform. And once you have a uniform, you have some level of authority. So this all feeds into these challenges. But as Joel said, I think the fact, if you remember when our former president was fatally ill and President Eradua, our country was an autopilot. In those years of those the 90s and the 80s, I mean, it would have been like this. There would have been a coup. But for some reason, we scaled that. That was, for me, a major litmus test of the democratic project in Nigeria, but also all the crises we've had with Boko Haram and the failure of the state to also respond to that. Also, we survived that. So it shows you to a great level how it doesn't, obviously, it's not clear to see, but I think gradually in different processes, top, bottom, bottom, top, we are busy in gendering it. And I think we just perhaps need to do more. Civil society in Nigeria generally need to do more about it. And the question about the police, I think take a look at any federal nation, federal society, federal country in the world, and no federal state maintains a centralized police force. This is a big problem in Nigeria. The police remain centralized. We have to find a way to defeat these interests at these powerful people in Nigeria who have refused to allow the police to be decentralized. There is no way you can have culpable homicide to criminal breach of trust and everything theft being dealt with by the same police force. There has to be a way of accommodating local actors, vigilante groups who have a civil role to play and are playing that role, traditional rulers. In spite of all the removal of traditional rulers from executive power and constitutional roles, they are still very, very active. They are still very resilient. So I think it's important to consider, for the Nigerian government to consider, means of decentralizing the police and accommodating local policing actors. I think that's the only way which we could improve the policing situation in the country. Yeah, thank you very much. Okay, Cyril asked some really important questions. What's happening to West Africa's democratic project is democracy failing or people voting against it? I was in Bamako at the time of the 2012 coup when a group of junior army officers ousted a democratically elected president and there was very little public outcry against that coup at the time. But I don't think the problem was that people were frustrated with democracy. The problem was that people didn't feel that this ostensibly democratic regime was delivering meaningful democracy. It had very little popular buy-in, levels of voter turnout were low, had been low throughout Mali's 20-year democratic process. So I think the support for democracy is there, but there's a feeling that it needs to be achieved through some other kind of mechanism that the kind of trappings of formalist democracy haven't been serving ordinary people very well. I do think land conflict has been central to the kind of undermining of the state, the rule of law throughout the region, and Mali in particular. Cyril asked me, so how does Mali resolve these competing nationalisms? And I think we have to ponder a post-national response to that question or a post-secular response. The nationalist project has been inherently kind of centralizing and exclusive as long as it's been attempted in Mali. And I think there's a number of scholars, Georg Kluut, who works in the region who has written about the crisis of the nation state, has encouraged thought about post-national and post-vabrarian forms of governance. He's written about heterarchy, which is this sort of large, diverse, internally heterogeneous political structure that operates in the absence of a central state. He's written about Paris sovereignty, so I think there are concepts that we can work with if we're willing to sort of question the legacy of European 17th century enlightenment thinking. And finally, how can the international community better engage?  The family code reform that Amy mentioned a few minutes ago, that was EU condition for continued financial support of the Malian government. Malian people weren't interested in it. We may all think that progressive family and gender legislation is a good thing and we should, but we have to recognize their limits to what we can and should impose on ostensibly sovereign people. And I would argue that the backlash against that 2009 family code, which was initially voted in by a large majority in the Malian parliament, because they recognized, hey, we need to do this, we want to get more money. It had very little popular support and the backlash against it was in fact a victory for democracy if you want to see it that way. Maybe not one that played out in the way that we like to see, but democracy isn't always pretty as we know. So I think popular will and sovereignty, we need to do more than just talk about respecting them. We need to walk that walk as well. And then finally, I think the international community can facilitate grassroots peace building, stop all this top down, elite centric exclusive talks going on in Algiers. They always seem to happen in Algiers for some reason. In 1995, when the violence in Northern Mali finally ended, it was through this grassroots peace building effort that got started in a community called Buram that began through local leaders, clan leaders, religious leaders. It doesn't necessarily have to be secular. It doesn't have to be national level leaders who instigate this process. But I think there are ways that governments of goodwill can help bring those kind of bottom up solutions about rather than expecting them to originate in national capital. Oh, thank you very much. At this point, I will quickly invite contributions from the, yes, madam. I saw another lady and there's a man waving at the back and there's a gentleman behind. We take that for the first round. I have a, I have a- Can you please introduce yourself? Manal Taha, I work for the United States Institute of Peace. Yes, IP. I have one questions and one comment. The question about Nigeria, you said that local perceive their security according to who is governing them. If it's the Christians and their majority minority are Muslim, then they feel they are not secure enough. So what's exactly the work had been done to for inclusion and representation at the local level in these governments at the regional level? And then the other comments is about Tawaric. I saw people here talk about Tawaric as one tribe and we should just consider Tawaric as a nation. They are like five main kingdoms that they are different from place to other place. And I found that ironically in Libya, they are actually compete and obey the orders with the government. They are the most soldiers with the, they are the most active soldiers protecting the state of Gaddafi for a long time. Even after he died, they just flew to Mali. That's, it tells something about their buying to the state orders. So what's happening in other part that people really don't touch base on it is their contested relationship with France. Like in my work with Tawaric in Libya or in Niger and Algeria, they mention it. They spell it very clearly that the relationship with France is very contested. And then maybe part of it is why they are not buying the Mali and nationalist program project is do they see themselves represented in that project? To what extent that their cultural rights is being included and protected in that and to what extent that they be reached in the region in Norsan Mali. So that's also maybe some comments I wanna add it on Tawaric. Thank you. Thank you very much. Yes, the lady, three Rosiwe. And after her, the gentleman. Hello, my name is Lucy Amadou. Oh, closer, okay. So thank you for this very informative panel. For me, I was particularly interested in the self-defense groups that were mentioned that are arising in Mali because the narrative has indeed been mostly controlled by the Tawaric and the Tawaric interests. So for me, I'd like to find out a little bit more about those self-defense groups and particularly two things. For one are the Sunrai group with the exception of the Masina from the Masina that's a little bit different for the Sunrai specific groups or the Fulani specific groups. I'd like to find out if there are mainly located in the north or if there's a relationship and somehow a network that extends to the Sunrai who may be in Sikaso, Mupti, Kai, other regions of Mali. And secondly, if there is some type of collaboration among these different self-defense groups in case like the Sunrai, the Fulani or any others as a united front against the Tawaric because it seems to be a prevalent thing or if it's creating or highlighting more intense self-sufficiency or self-awareness about Sunrai's just looking out for Sunrai interests or so on. Thank you. Thank you. My name is Yahya Fonusiu with the United State of Africa 2017 Project Task Force LLC. My colleagues and peers are not in this room. I'm 74 years old. You don't want to know what I did to the colonialists in Africa. Now, in the 60s, we used to say these African countries are not viable. So you guys go introduce, think about that and analyze it from those perspective. The reason you're having this problem, those states cannot meet the needs of the people. So you need to think otherwise of doing it. Also, you need to do a research and find out the people in Africa, not you or me. The other ones, the other people that do they have any allegiance to these government sovereign state? They don't. We have already done our research. You guys go do it. You will find that you have more money to do it. We did it with little money and you'll find out what is about to happen in Africa. The governing classes in Africa are about to be doomed. Thank you for that. Now we are going to move to the first side of the room. There's a gentleman. I think that one's... Oh, no, please, please. Sorry. No, no, no, please, please go ahead. Go ahead. Sorry. Then after you, then the gentleman in the seat. This is good. Thank you. I'm an independent consultant and Sahel researcher. My question is about... So we're going back to the title of this panel, Violence Extremist Organizations in West Africa and the Sahel. When we look at these groups where they operate is mainly on the borders and the populations that affected the most about violence extremist organizations and other armed groups out on the borders. So they suffered all sorts of reasons, all sorts of... They suffered at different levels economically and so forth. So I'm wondering what those democracies in the Sahel, in Bamako, Abuja, Nyami, Wakka, what they're doing to bring life to normal to these communities on the borders. So they're able to move freely as they used to across the borders to conduct trade and business with their neighbors in different communities because they're not just affected by VEOs but also by the security efforts by Barhan and other regional forces because they weren't there, but when they came in, they told people you're not able to move anymore across the borders to conduct business. So they lost their main livelihood. So I'm just curious and wondering like what are some of the efforts to bring back normal to these communities? Thank you. Thank you very much now. Hi, Brian Stout, Foreign Policy Magazine. The United States Military Africa Command has a productive relationship with the military of Mali. Could you speak, anyone on the panel, to the dynamics ethnically as has been discussed, whether any of this plays out within the Mali and military and how that would affect the U.S. relationship with the Mali security apparatus? And additionally, if there are any non-state actor armed groups within Mali, that it would be productive for the U.S. to have any kind of relationship with going forward. Gus, thank you very much. At this point, I'm sorry that we have to bring the questions from the side of the hall to a stop. You have, in terms of time, I have five minutes and I have four speakers. I would pass in terms of making any concluding remarks. So I would say as much as possible if you can squeeze in everything into one minute each, starting with the first presenter to the last presenter in that order. Okay, so that's me. That's you. I'm just gonna take the last question because I didn't really hear questions than the previous people that I could address. The U.S. military has had a longstanding relationship with the Mali and military going back to the 1980s, but it cut that off after the coup and my understanding is that it never really formally reestablished direct military cooperation. There was some, I think, funding of a gendarme training or something last year, a very small scale. My impression is that the Pentagon is still reluctant after kind of getting its fingers burned in 2012 when the Mali and military collapsed and a lot of the people that it had trained and the equipment that it had delivered to the Mali and armed forces actually went over to the other side. I don't, frankly, see the U.S. having an active role there. The U.S. is there, France is there, the United Nations is there. I'd be surprised if the U.S. military wanted to go back into Mali any time soon. Yeah, thank you very much. G, ma'am. Thank you. What has been done about inclusion and representation? I think, just to emphasize the point I was making in that context is this mistrust is based on, one, the historical relationships that some of it which is informed by how majority ethnic groups have mediated administrative control over some areas during the colonial rule but also contemporary violence. So, for example, you have in Platteau State the new government that was elected in 2015 trying to extend social services to the house or community, for example, in Joss. Healthcare, access roads, appointments to the government. So, trying to do this as a way of inclusiveness. But also, you have cases in Bauchi State where the Sayawa minority ethnic group continue to tell us that, I mean, who are we without a chief? So, the perennial contestation for them is having a traditional ruler of their own in the particular town they feel they are taught on us to. So, they say, without a chief, who are we? So, even if you bring social services, you build hospitals, you build schools, and you don't appoint a traditional ruler for these people, as far as they're concerned, they are excluded, for example. So, there are efforts, but some of these efforts are not targeted to the demands of the people. And just to say something quickly about the borders, because I'll speak on a specific border, I'm doing ongoing research on how the Boko Haram insurgency has impacted on mobility and security across the Katsina Maradi border of Niger and Nigeria. Those who know would know that this border is a pre-colonial border. It was a border that was created during the Sokota Jihad. The Umfodio's forces were stopped at Maman Maradi, so you have that border, which still remains up to date. And what we find is an intensification of state security presence. So, the state responds by securitization, and this securitization also involves non-state actors also. So, I think there is a need, as Amy has pointed out, for the state to respond in other forms, extend its influence in other forms, not just in securitization, but we could expand on that. Yeah, thank you very much. Joel, your one minute starts now. What? Thank you very much. What's the Nigerian government doing to ensure inclusion? The Nigerian government is assuming that, we're working on an assumption that lack of access to opportunities in the Northeast is responsible for the rising insurgents has done one thing remarkable in the last one year. It has set up what they call presidential initiative for North East, where it dedicated a certain amount of money and primarily to address the infrastructure gap in the Northeast. The Northeast accommodates or houses the largest number of out-of-school children in Nigeria. The Northeast has the highest number of girls that do not have access to education in Nigeria. So, this initiative, which is a very commendable one, is aimed at addressing this challenge, but it requires enormous, enormous financial investment. Then, also, I'll do something similar to what they have done in the Niger data, where they have what they call Niger Data Development Commission. Also, believing that the militancy in the Niger data is as a result of the dispoliation of oil companies in the area, the federal government set up this energy sector. In the case of North East, there's a set of North East development commission. It is still being worked out in the National Assembly, whereby a certain percentage of resources will be devoted to this institutionalized framework that address these gaps. And, interestingly, rather, what the responses of the federal government are as laudable as they are, is also forming some sense of the solutionment and that part of the country. The government is devoting all attention to one part of the country, where it comes from, as the president, where it comes from. So, there's the needs to have a precarious balancing of this to ensure that the stability of the country is serious, and that is what is being worked on now. Thank you very much, Amy. Maybe very quickly, on the question about the polarization of ethnicity in the recent conflict, I mean, it wasn't always the case. And I tend to look at the conflict around access, which is, which become ethnicized if you want. So, if you look at, so there's the Songhai Self-Defense Group, the Move More, the Liberation du Normale, which is a Songhai Flany mix, a self-defense group, which has people from different ethnic groups, and as opposed to the Gandakoi, which is predominantly Songhai. And if you look at the Tuareg, and this also touched upon the question, your comment around the complexity of the Tuareg, nation that we should not think about, talk about the Tuareg is one thing. I mean, that's true, but I mean, the topic was not on the Tuareg. And in fact, if you look at the one of the self-defense group called the Gassia, which is a pro-Pamako group, they are Imbrad-based, and the Imbrad opposed to the Ifogas, and so what it does, I mean, the conflict lays bare the internal division also that you have within the Tuareg nation in terms of social hierarchy. So again, ethnicity and all of these things come to a head, I guess when it comes to times of conflict. And on this note, I want to ask the Saudis to join me in thanking our presenters for such significant respect.


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I'd like to say a lot of what I'm going to talk about is very much in concert, I think, with previous two speakers. And I'm coming at this in the background of having worked in open data when I worked for the mayor of London and set up the London data store in 2009, and also now as part of SME in public transport data. And I'm heartened to hear the kind of emphasis on the human side of things because too often the whole future cities rhetoric is very technocratic and you don't hear the human voice very much. But we've got to remember the whole future, the whole kind of smart city, future city concept goes back over 20 years now, and that's a long time. And really fundamentally, although there's lots of different definitions of what it means, it really boils down to three dimensions that I'm going to talk about today. So technology, the human element and the institutional element. And in terms of the technology, I mean obviously we're talking about infrastructure. So whether that's sensors or it's broadband or it's Wi-Fi, we're talking about open data, whether that's from public sector or private utility companies, and also handling kind of emergent propositions that come into the mix. So the idea of sensors, for example, 10 years ago, was nowhere near as developed as it is now. So there's a constant iteration actually about the smart city means because the technologies are emerging and changing. So coming up to the Olympics, for example, in City Hall, we were very concerned with Wi-Fi availability in the city during the Olympics. So we had a mad sort of push to get 120 underground stations of Wi-Fi enabled before the Olympics. Of course, as we were doing that from a state, sort of regional city point of view, smart phones and availability of Wi-Fi and peer-to-peer Wi-Fi sharing networks were already happening as well. So my point is that the narrative of the smart city changes because the technology is emergent. But also, we talk about smart cities, but less about smart citizens. So the capability of the smart city idea to scale, and that's the question we're looking at today, how does it scale, is very dependent on what citizens understand and know, for example, about data and what are the discussions that we need to have with citizens about rights and responsibilities, you know, about surveillance, about pervasive technology, about invasion of privacy. And so that human knowledge, education about data, education about technology, and an understanding of the city and its challenges. And the last element of that is institutional. So what we're talking about are there, you know, is the policy and governance in place? You know, in London, there was a very clear mandate from the mayor of London to open data. That is not always, you know, clear elsewhere. I'll talk a bit more about that on the next slide. One of the things that fascinated me when I was in City Hall was the smart city debate is being driven largely by companies who have an interest in selling products and services in that area. And that's fine. That's what the market does. However, in order to get to the smart city space where you have the integration of these three things, there has to be a massive amount of collaboration. And I don't see the ability in the private sector, nor in the public sector to be that collaborative, to understand what collaboration is. You know, it's a compromise for everybody. It's not a first to market advantage. So there's a critical problem there, I think, in terms of the collaboration space. And lastly, of course, there's trust. So if smart city initiatives are being partly driven by our institutions, what is the level of trust in the citizenry that these institutions are doing these things for our goods? So the debate is largely framed around efficiency, driving out efficiency. But we really need to look at, you know, what is the trust question? And so if I was to frame that in terms of tensions, going back to the question of how do we scale, my point would be it'll probably be another 20 years, if we're already 20 years into this debate before we're even at a stage where we can talk about scaling. What we need to talk about is how are we going to confront the very clear tensions there are between these three elements. And I say that as somebody who was there at the beginning in terms of trying to establish this and is now trying to sell in and co-create a market from open data. So from the technology point of view, if you look at the existing incumbents in local government, right, in lots of public sector agencies, in cities where we're trying to sell in, we're looking at, you know, proprietary relationships that already exist. You've got to understand local authorities very often will negotiate contracts that can last for 10 to 15 years, okay? So some of these contracts just get rolled over and there's no entry point in for a change or for disruption. Many, both in the private and public sector, organizations are dealing with threats to existing business models. So when we look at the kind of agile propositions that come in in a smart city space, they're often exponentially cheaper, okay, but they're also a threat to business models. So companies, large consultancy firms are saying, how can these smart city, small agile people do this for this cost? What does that do to our day rate? Well, it blows a big hole in the day rate is the answer.  So there's a natural resistance to that because you're changing the status quo. So this is not just about how do we make the city better. It's how do the existing incumbents try and develop a new business model, which of course is the threat of the digital economy. And of course, you've got procurement. Let's not even go there. So, you know, you never get fired for hiring IBM. Isn't that the statement? But for procurement cycles and timelines for local authorities, it's very hard for the public sector generally to engage because it's a different procurement model. We're asking people sometimes to take data, for example, in Transport API and a subscription model. You know, that's very low cost. That looks completely different to an EU tender process that usually takes about 18 months by which time you've got to the end of the 18 months you've gotten something that doesn't fit for purpose anymore. So there's an inherent tension within the technology space in the current space. If we look at institutional and policy, even when you have policy, the will is there, there's an institutional blockage in terms of hierarchies. So people do not want to be open in bureaucracies, okay? If the mayor says, you've got to open your data, you'll have public officials who really don't want to do that. Or you'll have such a dissonance between the policy wanting to do right, and I'll give you an example of that in my own hometown in Dublin, where the four local, the four Dublin authorities have all worked together with the National University of Meneuth to establish something called Dublin, ostensibly an open data platform for the Dublin region. Brilliant, okay, so far so good. But it's there four years now and the innovation is not happening on the data. Okay, and I was recently asked by the Dublin City Manager to look at why that might be. And when you look at it, and you look at it, there are a number of reasons and this is the dissonance between the policy and the reality on the ground. You know, it's governed by a license called Public Sector Ireland Information License, which actually has a clause in it that says, you cannot use this data for anything immoral, only in Ireland. You cannot use this data for anything illegal. And it also has fairly chilling clauses in relation to sub-distribution, okay? So the policy intent is there, but the reality in terms of what we're actually, how you're licensing things, the knowledge internally in the authority is not there to understand that technology simply will not reuse data that has that kind of chilling caveat in terms of usage, why would they? Okay, apart from other problems. The second problem with it, for example, is you have to become a member of Dublin to access the data and then you have to download two forms that you sign and post back to the National University of Maneuth to get access. So I did write to them recently, I emailed them recently and said, I'm guessing they'd rather just scrape it. So there's a whole kind of tension there. If we look at risk-averse organizations, I think that Rick mentioned that. And I think the whole space is lacking leadership, certainly at a local government level, and I'll talk a bit more about that in a minute. And then on the human side, I think we've got a whole lot of challenges because essentially the discourse has to be and Tom referenced it and Rick as well, the human outcomes for people. We don't want to be done too, right? So there's a whole lot of who is taking my data? Who is using it? What are they using it for? And I do think there is going to be a lot of tension coming around the digital economy because if we look at something like Instagram, it's bought over for whatever number of billions, okay? There are 13 employees in that organization using my data, our creativity, but we're not getting any of the shares, right? Nothing, any comeback for all of the content that's been created. And when you match that with the sort of levels of disadvantage that are growing, we're now going to reach shortly one million people using food banks in this country, one million people using food banks, okay? When you have that level of disadvantage and that sort of lack of opportunity in the hollowing out of jobs that are happening in a digital economy, we're into some serious friction in coming. And that's a difficulty when you need to have conversations with citizens about let me use your data. I'll do stuff with your data. It's like, well, what do I get back? Not to mind the whole surveillance and forcing. So if you look at, for example, the universal job match for benefits in this country says people have to go 35 hours online to prove that they are applying for jobs, right? Which is all right if you have a computer at home, but if you've got to get it to the library, then you spend half your benefits on getting there. So I think we've got very serious issues coming up and I think we need to look at what are the needs, we will see developments in the city space that are citizen driven because they will be driven by what they want to achieve. But I also think we have to look at that whole nexus around lack of trust and disadvantage. And this is a general point I would make that in relation to technology and new business models, there's a crisis in thought leadership. And I think that's why I'd very much echo the point Rick made about the need for us as a community. We are the people who know a lot about this. There's so many other people who don't that we need to work together. And given the time that's in it, I thought I'd do a little search. That should say smart cities is zero through all of the manifestos. Well, if you think smart cities is anywhere on the landscape, you would be sorely mistaken because the word smart barely appears, not to mind cities. So it is worth taking a look at that and that's what the leadership, the future government, whoever it is, this is not an agenda that they're really strong on. But in thinking about that, I thought, well, if there was a challenge of leadership to come and I was to look for something disruptive, what might I conclude? And I might conclude that, the person on the left might be closer to the understanding of a kind of smart city only because he understands the effects and power of a digital age and he has built his influencing role in that. But he's kept very close to disadvantage and to trying to use his celebrity for good. So I just thought I'd put that there as the last slide of maybe it's not as mad as it might look. Thank you very much.


Welcome to week three of basic serials cataloging. Last week we talked about some of the mark fields in a record for a serial. We talked mainly about the ones that deal with title-related information. This week we're going to talk about a lot more mark fields in a serial record. This is probably maybe the most technically difficult week of the class. In this video we're going to be talking about mark fields for other descriptive elements and access points. And then we'll talk about notes in the next video for this week. The first field we're going to talk about is the 250 field, which is where you put an addition statement. Now the addition statement is a little bit different with serials than with monographs because an addition has to apply to all issues of a particular resource. So where you almost often see this in the 250 field would be when there are two versions of a resource issued simultaneously. For example, you'll see on the slide here where you could have one that are published for different geographic areas, a Northwest addition and a Southern addition or for different intended uses, a reference addition and a personal addition or in different languages, say Spanish and English. So these are issues that come out simultaneously and the entire run of the periodical is published in multiple editions. And so the content might vary a little bit based on what addition it is. And so this is the type of addition statement that would go in a 250 field. You can see that the addition statement goes in subfield A and both indicators are blank. They are undefined for a 250 field. Now, you might see other things that say addition on the cover of an issue of a serial, but they're not considered necessarily addition statements that would go in the 250 field. They might be more an example of the numbering of the serial. If it's an annual report or something like that, each issue, so to speak, would come out once a year and would be called the 1990 edition, the 1991 edition, things like that. So numbered additions or additions based on the year are generally considered to be more of numbering and they would appear in the 362 field, which we'll talk more about later. The next field we're going to talk about is the 264 field. And this is where you put information about the publication of a resource. This would include the place of publication, the name of the publisher, and the date of publication. So you should record the place of publication and the name of the publisher as they appear on the item. If some part of the name is abbreviated on the item, abbreviated in your record. If it's all spelled out, spell it out on your record. Same goes for the place of publication. If it has a city and a state, include those both. If it just has the city, go ahead and just include that. If the state is abbreviated, if it's spelled out, spell it out in your record. The place of publication goes in subfield A, and the publisher's name goes in subfield B. And notice there's a space colon space for the punctuation between these two subfields. I will say for the purposes of this class, we're always talking about publication information in the 264 field. So the second indicator will always be a one. That means that we're talking about publisher information. If you have the first or the last piece in hand in front of you, then you can go ahead and put a date in subfield C in your 264 field. If you have both the first and last issue, you can have a range of dates, say 1985 to 2007, expressed as 1985-2007, and then a period. If you just have the first issue, you put the first date, and if you know the publication is still going, have a hyphen, and then leave that open end in. If you have just the last issue, put a hyphen, and then the last date. So it's just the closing end of a range of dates. If you have a change in publisher, and sometimes serials do, you can use more than one 264 field. In this case, you would add a subfield three to each of them, specifying what dates the serial was published by each publisher. The earliest publisher would have a blank first indicator in your 264 field. The current one would have a three. Again, both of them would have one for the second indicator. And so you'd notice that, like I said, you have a subfield three to specify the dates, and then as usual, your subfield A is for the place of publication. And of course, your publisher's name would still go in subfield B. If you don't know the dates that this serial ran and you can't approximate them, then you don't need to record a date. You just have a subfield A with the place of publication and a subfield B with the publisher's name. You don't need a subfield C at all. The next field we're going to talk about is the 300 field for physical description. This is just what it sounds like. You describe what the item looks like, how big it is, how many volumes it has, does it have illustrations. If a serial is complete, meaning it has finished being published and you know how many volumes there were overall, you can include that information, put 27 volumes, for example, in your subfield A for your 300 field. Then you have a space, colon space, and then in subfield B you put in illustration information. If there are illustrations, go ahead and include that information. Then you have a space, semicolon space, and in subfield C you put the dimensions, meaning the height of the item, and you measure that in centimeters, rounded up to the nearest centimeter. I'll mention at this point, notice that both indicators for the 300 field are undefined, they're both blank. If the serial is not complete, then you don't know how many total volumes there are, so you can just put the word volumes to indicate that it was issued in multiple volumes, and then have subfield B and subfield C the same as you would with a complete serial, or according to the RDA rules, you can omit this field entirely if the publication is still being published and you can come back and add it when it's complete. The next field you'll see in serial records is the frequency note. This goes in a 310 field, and the frequency is just how often this publication is published, annual. A lot of things come out once a year, quarterly, for four times a year. There might be a little bit more obscure. For example, the example we looked at last week with the Tennessee ancestors serial came about three times a year, so three numbers a year is what we would put in the subfield A. Again, both indicators are blank for this field. Optionally, if you know the former frequency, this is another tricky thing about serial, sometimes they change frequency. So if you know the former frequency, you can go ahead and put that in a 321 field. You still put the current frequency in 310, but you can add a subfield B for the dates when it started being issued at this frequency, and then you have a 321 field with the former frequency and the dates that it was issued at this frequency. Another field is to indicate the numbering of the serial item. This goes in the 362 field. Use this field only when information is available about the first or last issued. If you have that information in front of you or you know the information about that item, so it can say began in 1990, or it can have a volume and a date, and it can also tell you when it seizes. These are what's called unformatted numbering statements, so that means they get a first indicator of one for this 362 field, and the second indicator is blank. If both the numbering, so number one, for example, and the chronology, the dates, January 1997, and that top example, if those are both available, go ahead and include them both. You would put the numbering first and then the chronology in parentheses, and if the numbering or the date, I mean the name of the month, are spelled out on the item, spell them out. If they're abbreviated, go ahead and abbreviate them in your record as they appear on the item. You can, however, make some changes. You can change Roman numerals to Arabic numerals, because that's probably easier to understand, and you should convert words to numbers. So if it was volume one, spelled out O-N-E, you can go ahead and put that as a number in your record, in your 362 field. The next three elements we're gonna kind of talk about as a group, they are content type, media type, and carrier type. They are new elements for RDA. They did not exist under ASCR two rules. These were placed, what's known as the general material designation, the GMD, which was that term in brackets that you would see right after the title of an item when you do a search result, when you do a search and you get your results list. Content type, media type, and carrier type all kind of work together to describe what an item is that you're cataloging. Content type is the broadest, sort of most abstract. It doesn't have anything to do with the physical carrier. For example, print books and e-books both have a content type of text because that's still what they are, regardless of how you interact with them in a physical object. Media type has more to do with how you interact with the item, what type of equipment you need to interact with the item. So for example, DVDs and streaming videos both have the media type of video because they're both visual items. You use some kind of video equipment to interact with them. But they have different carriers. One comes on a disk and one is an online resource. So they have the same media type, but as we'll see, they have different carrier types. A DVD would have the carrier type of video disk whereas a streaming video would have the carrier type of online resource. So they are both related because they have the same media type of video, but the physical item is different in these cases. So as you saw in the past two slides, content type, media type, and carrier type go in Markfields 336, 337, and 338. They come, the terms that you need to use in these fields come from very specific lists of approved terms. They are part of the RDA rules. They're available on the RDA toolkit, which is the online product that you can access the RDA rules for a subscription theme. They are also all available for free on the Library of Congress website. So those are the lists to consult for your content type, media type, and carrier type. These are pre-established control vocabularies. You can't just use whatever term you want. You need to choose one from these lists. The good thing is that once you know what the content, media, and carrier type is for a particular type of item you're working with, you can just use it across the board. So for example, a print serial, a text item that you hold in your hand in volumes, the carrier, our content type is text, and so that goes in subfield A of your 336 field. The media type is unmediated because you don't need any extra equipment in order to read a print serial. You just need the volume there in your hand. So that unmediated goes in subfield A of your 337 field. And the carrier type, the physical thing that you actually hold in your hand is a volume. So that goes in your subfield A of your 338 field. Subfield two as well. These are used to specify the source of these terms. Like I said, they have to come from these control lists in the RDA rules. And right now, that's the only option for these terms. So the subfield two is for the 336, 337, and 338 fields will always look like this. So no matter what it is that you're cataloging. And these are all kind of codes that mean this comes from the RDA list of content, media, and carrier types. So for the 336 field, subfield two is RDA content, run together like one word. For the 337, it's RDA media, and for the 338, it's RDA carrier. And so you'll notice that those subfield two, within those fields, subfields is the same regardless of the form that you're working with. Remember that across the board. So here's an example for an online serial, for example. And you'll notice that the content type of text is still the same, but it's not unmediated. You need a computer in order to read it. So computer is the term in the 337 field, subfield A. And then your carrier type is online resource. Meaning that it's not something you have on a disk. For example, it's not on a CD, it is online. So that goes in your subfield A of your 338 field. The last thing we're gonna talk about this week is, or I'm sorry, in this section, is an access point for a corporate body. Sometimes in serials, you might want to be able to search for an organization that is related to the serial somehow. In this case, this item was published by Academic Press, but there was a note that says it's published under the auspices of the International Academy of Science. And so if you think that's an important organization that your patrons might want to search for, you can include a 710 field, which is for an access point for a corporate body. And go ahead and you would need to look up the correct form of this in the authority file and then put that in a 700, I'm sorry, a 710 field. So those are the other remaining descriptive elements and an access point field for serial records.