Question 49 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde, triates on the cardinal virtues, the virtue of prudence. This is the LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde, triates on the cardinal virtues, the virtue of prudence. By St. Thomas Aquinas, translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 49 of each quasi-integral part of prudence, in eight articles. We must now consider each quasi-integral part of prudence, and under this head there are eight points of inquiry. First, memory. Second, understanding or intelligence. Third, docility. Fourth, shrewdness. Fifth, reason. Sixth, foresight. Seventh, circumspection. Eighth, caution. First article, whether memory is a part of prudence. Objection 1. You had seen that memory is not a part of prudence. For memory, as the philosopher proves, in On Memory and Reminiscence, Part 1, is in the sensitive part of the soul, whereas prudence is in the rational part, Confer Ethics 6.5. Therefore, memory is not a part of prudence. Objection 2. Further, prudence is acquired and perfected by experience, whereas memory is in us from nature. Therefore, memory is not a part of prudence. Objection 3. Further, memory regards the past, whereas prudence regards future matters of action, about which counsel is concerned, as stated in Ethics 6, 2 and 7. Therefore, memory is not a part of prudence. On the contrary, Tully, as he states in his Rhetorix, 2.53, places memory among the parts of prudence. I answer that, prudence regards contingent matters of action, as stated above, Question 47, Article 5. Now in such like matters, a man can be directed, not by those things that are simply and necessarily true, but by those which occur in the majority of cases, because principles must be proportionate to their conclusions, and like must be concluded from like, Ethics 6, also posterior, Analytics 132. But we need experience to discover what is true in the majority of cases, wherefore the philosopher says in Ethics 2, 1, that intellectual virtue is engendered and fostered by experience and time. Now experience is the result of many memories, as stated in Metaphysics 1, 1, and therefore prudence requires the memory of many things, hence memory is fittingly accounted as a part of prudence. Reply to Objection 1, as stated above in Question 47, Articles 3 and 6. Prudence applies universal knowledge to particulars, which are objects of sense. Hence many things belonging to the sensitive faculties are requisite for prudence, and memory is one of them. Reply to Objection 2, just as aptitude for prudence is in our nature, while its perfection comes through practice or grace. So too, as Tully says in his rhetoric, 3, 16 and 24. Memory not only arises from nature, but is also aided by art and diligence. There are four things whereby a man perfects his memory. First, when a man wishes to remember a thing, he should take some suitable, yet somewhat unwanted illustration of it. This the unwanted strikes us more, and so makes a greater and stronger impression on the mind. The mind, and this explains why we remember better what we saw when we were children. Now the reason for the necessity of finding these illustrations or images is that simple and spiritual impressions easily slip from the mind, unless they be tied as it were to some corporeal image, because human knowledge has a greater hold on sensible objects. For this reason memory is assigned to the sensitive part of the soul. Secondly, whatever a man wishes to retain in his memory, he must carefully consider and set in order, so that he may pass easily from one memory to another. Since the philosopher says, in On Memory and Reminiscence 2, Sometimes a place brings memories back to us. The reason being that we pass quickly from one to the other. Thirdly, we must be anxious and earnest about the things we wish to remember, because the more a thing is impressed on the mind, the less it is liable to slip out of it. For Tully says in his rhetoric, on the art of rhetoric number three, that anxiety preserves the figures of images and tire. Fourthly, we should often reflect on the things we wish to remember. Hence the philosopher says, on memory number one, that reflection preserves memories, because as he remarks, on memory number two, custom is a second nature. Wherefore, when we reflect on a thing frequently, we quickly call it to mind, through passing from one thing to another by a kind of natural order. Reply to Objection 3. It behooves us to argue, as it were, about the future from the past, wherefore memory of the past is necessary in order to take good counsel for the future. Second article. Whether understanding is a part of prudence. Note, understanding may also be translated as intuition, because Aristotle employs the word noose. Objection one. You would seem that understanding is not a part of prudence. When two things are members of a division, one is not part of the other. But intellectual virtue is divided into understanding and prudence, according to Ethics 6.3. Therefore understanding should not be reckoned a part of prudence. Objection two. Further. Understanding is numbered among the gifts of the Holy Ghost, and corresponds to faith as stated above, in Question 8, Articles 1 and 8. But prudence is a virtue other than faith, as is clear what has been said above, in Question 4, Article 8, and in Paras Prima Sukundey, Question 62, Article 2. Therefore, understanding does not pertain to prudence. Objection 3. Further. This is about singular matters of action, see Ethics 6.7. Whereas understanding takes cognizance of universal and immaterial objects, on the Soul 3.4. Therefore, understanding is not a part of prudence. On the contrary, Tully, in his Rhetorix 253, accounts intelligence a part of prudence, and Microbius, on his commentary from Cicero on the dream of Scipio 1.8, mentions understanding, which comes to the same. I answer that, understanding denotes here not the intellectual power, but the right estimate about some final principle, which is taken as self-evident. Thus we are said to understand the first principles of demonstrations. Now every deduction of reason proceeds from certain statements which are taken as primary. Therefore, every process of reasoning must needs proceed from some understanding. Therefore, since prudence is right reason applied to action, the whole process of prudence must needs have its source in understanding. Hence it is that understanding is reckoned a part of prudence. Apply to Objection 1. The reasoning of prudence terminates, as in a conclusion, in the particular matter of action, to which, as stated above in Question 47, Articles 3 and 6, it applies the knowledge of some universal principle. Now a singular conclusion is argued from a universal and singular proposition. Wherefore the reasoning of prudence must proceed from a twofold understanding. The one is cognizant of universals, and this belongs to the understanding which is an intellectual virtue, whereby we know naturally not only speculative principles, but also practical universal principles such as one should do evil to no man, as shown above in Question 47, Article 6. The other understanding, as stated in Ethics 6.11, is cognizant of an extreme, that is, of some primary singular and contingent practical matter, notably the minor premise, which must needs be singular in the syllogism of prudence, as stated above in Question 47, Articles 3 and 6. Now this primary singular is some singular end, as stated in the same place, wherefore the understanding which is a part of prudence is a right estimate of some particular end. Reply to Objection 2. The understanding which is a gift of the Holy Ghost is a quick insight into divine things as shown above, Question 8, Articles 1 and 2. It is, in another sense, that it is accounted a part of prudence, as stated above. Reply to Objection 3. The right estimate about a particular end is called both understanding, insofar as its object is a principle, and sense, insofar as its object is a particular. This is what the philosopher means when he says in Ethics 5.11, of such things we need to have the sense, and this is understanding. But this is to be understood as referring not in the particular sense, whereby we know proper sensibles, but to the interior sense, whereby we judge of a particular. Third article. Whether docileity should be accounted a part of prudence. Objection 1. You would seem that docileity should not be accounted a part of prudence. For that which is a necessary condition of every intellectual virtue, should not be appropriated to one of them. But docileity is requisite for every intellectual virtue, therefore it should not be accounted a part of prudence. Objection 2. Further. That which pertains to a human virtue is in our power, since it is for things that are in our power that we are praised or blamed. Now, it is not in our power to be docile, for this is befitting to some through their natural disposition. Therefore, it is not a part of prudence. Objection 3. Further, docileity is in the disciple, whereas prudence, since it makes precepts, seems rather to belong to teachers who are also called preceptors. Therefore, docileity is not a part of prudence. On the contrary, Macrobius, in his commentary from Cicero on the Dream of Sipio 1.8. Following the opinion of Plotinus, places docileity among the parts of prudence. I answer that, as stated above in Article 2, the first reply, and in Question 47, Article 3. Prudence is concerned with particular matters of action, and since such matters are of infinite variety, no one man can consider all of them sufficiently. Nor can this be done quickly, for it requires length of time. Hence, in matters of prudence, man stands in very great need of being taught by others, especially by old folk who have acquired a sane understanding of the ends in practical matters. Wherefore, the philosopher says in Ethics 6.11. It is right to pay no less attention to the undemonstrated assertions and opinions of such persons as are experienced, older than we are, and prudent, than to their demonstrations, for their experience gives them an insight into principles. Thus it is written in Proverbs 3.5. Lean not on thy own prudence, and in Ecclesiasticus 6.35. In the multitude of the ancients, that is, the old men, that are wise, and join thyself from thy heart to their wisdom. Now, it is a mark of docility to be ready to be taught, and consequently, docility is fittingly reckoned a part of prudence. Reply to Objection 1. Although docility is useful for every intellectual virtue, yet it belongs to prudence chiefly, for the reason given above. Reply to Objection 2. Man has a natural aptitude for docility, even as for other things connected with prudence. Yet his own efforts count for much towards the attainment of perfect docility. And he must carefully, frequently, and reverently apply his mind to the teachings of the learned, neither neglecting them through laziness, nor despising them through pride. Reply to Objection 3. By prudence, man makes precepts not only for others, but also for himself as stated above. Question 47. Article 12. Third reply. And says stated in Ethics 6.11. Even in subjects, there is place for prudence, to which docility pertains. And yet even the learned should be docile in some respects, since no man is altogether self-sufficient in matters of prudence as stated above. Fourth article. Whether shrewdness is part of prudence. Objection 1. You would seem that shrewdness is not a part of prudence. For shrewdness consists in easily finding the middle term for demonstrations as stated in posterior Analytics 134. Now the reasoning of prudence is not a demonstration, since it deals with contingencies. Therefore, shrewdness does not pertain to prudence. Objection 2. Further. Good counsel pertains to prudence according to Ethics <IP_ADDRESS>. Now there is no place in good counsel for shrewdness. See Ethics 6.9. And posterior Analytics 134. Which is a kind of eustokia, that is a happy conjecture. For the latter is unreasoning and rapid. Whereas counsel needs to be slow as stated in Ethics 6.9. Therefore shrewdness should not be accounted a part of prudence. Objection 3. Further. Shrewdness as stated above in Question 48 is a happy conjecture. Now it belongs to rhetoricians to make use of conjectures. Therefore shrewdness belongs to rhetoric rather than to prudence. On the contrary. Isidor says in his Etymologies 10. A solicitous man is one who is shrewd and alert. Solers, cheetus. But solicitude belongs to prudence as stated above. Question 47 Article 9. Therefore shrewdness does also. I answer that. Prudence consists in a right estimate about matters of action. Now a right estimate or opinion is acquired in two ways. Both in practical and in speculative matters. First by discovering it oneself. Secondly by learning it from others. Now just as docility consists in a man being well disposed to acquire a right opinion from another man. So shrewdness is an apt disposition to acquire a right estimate by oneself. Yet so that shrewdness be taken for eustokia, of which it is a part. For eustokia is a happy conjecture about any matter. While shrewdness is an easy and rapid conjecture in finding the middle term. Busterior Analytics 134. Nevertheless the philosopher who calls shrewdness a part of prudence. Note this refers to Andronicus. Confer question 48, Objection 1. Takes it for eustokia in general. Hence he says shrewdness is a habit whereby congruities are discovered rapidly. Reply to Objection 1. Shrewdness is concerned with the discovery of the middle term. Not only in demonstrative, but also in practical syllogisms. As for instance, when two men are seen to be friends, they are reckoned to be enemies of a third one, as the philosopher says in Busterior Analytics 134. In this way shrewdness belongs to prudence. Reply to Objection 2. The philosopher adduces the true reason, Ethics 6.9, to prove that a bulia, that is good counsel, is not eustokia, which is commended for grasping quickly what should be done. Now a man may take good counsel, though he be long and slow in so doing, and yet this does not discount the utility of happy conjecture in taking good counsel. Indeed it is sometimes a necessity, when for instance something has to be done without warning. It is for this reason that shrewdness is fittingly reckoned a part of prudence. Reply to Objection 3. Rhetoric also reasons about practical matters, wherefore nothing hinders the same thing belonging both to rhetoric and prudence. Nevertheless conjecture is taken here not only in the sense in which it is employed by returations, but also as applicable to all matters whatsoever wherein a man is said to conjecture the truth. Fifth article. Whether reason should be reckoned a part of prudence. Objection 1. You would seem that reason should not be reckoned a part of prudence. For the subject of an accident is not a part thereof, but prudence is in the reason as its subject, Ethics 6.5. Therefore reason should not be reckoned a part of prudence. Objection 2. Further, that which is common to many should not be reckoned a part of any one of them. Or if it be so reckoned, it should be reckoned a part of that one to which it chiefly belongs. Now reason is necessary in all the intellectual virtues, and chiefly in wisdom and science, which employ a demonstrative reason. Therefore reason should not be reckoned a part of prudence. Objection 3. Further, reason as a power does not differ essentially from the intelligence as stated above. Parse Prima, Question 79, Article 8. If therefore intelligence be reckoned a part of prudence, it is superfluous to add reason. On the contrary, Macrobius in his commentary from Cicero on the dream of Scipio I following the opinion of Plotinus numbers reason among the parts of prudence. I answer that the work of prudence is to take good counsel as stated in Ethics 6.7. Now counsel is a research proceeding from certain things to others, but this is the work of reason. Wherefore it is requisite for prudence that man should be an apt reasoner. And since the things required for the perfection of prudence are called requisite or quasi-intercal parts of prudence, it follows that reason should be numbered among these parts. Reply to Objection 1. Reason denotes here not the power of reason, but its good use. Reply to Objection 2. The certitude of reason comes from the intellect. Yet the need of reason is from a defect in the intellect. Since those things in which the intellect of power is in full vigor have no need for reason, for they comprehend the truth by their simple insight as do God and the angels. On the other hand, particular matters of action, wherein prudence guides, are very far from the condition of things intelligible, and so much the farther as they are less certain and fixed. Thus matters of art, though they are singular, are nevertheless more fixed and certain, wherefore in many of them there is no room for counsel on account of their certitude, as stated in Ethics 3.3. Hence, although in certain other intellectual virtues reason is more certain than in prudence, yet prudence, above all, requires that a man be an apt reasoner, so that he may rightly apply universals to particulars, which latter are various and uncertain. Reply to Objection 3. Although intelligence and reason are not different powers, yet they are named after different acts. For intelligence takes its name from being an intimate penetration of the truth. Confer parts Secunda Secunde, Question 8, Article 1. While reason is so called from being inquisitive and discursive, hence each is accounted a part of reason as explained above, in Article 2, as well in Question 47, Articles 2 and 3. 6. Article Whether foresight should be accounted a part of prudence. Note, foresight is translated from the Latin word Providencia, which may be translated either Providence or foresight. Objection 1. It would seem that foresight should not be accounted a part of prudence. For nothing is part of itself. Now foresight seems to be the same as prudence, because according to Isidor in his etymologies No. 10, a prudent man is one who sees from afar, por rovidens. And this is also the derivation of Providencia, foresight, according to Boethius in On the Consolation of Philosophy 5. Therefore, foresight is not a part of prudence. Objection 2. Further, prudence is only practical, whereas foresight may be also speculative, because seeing, once we have the word to foresee, has more to do with speculation than operation. Therefore, foresight is not a part of prudence. Objection 3. Further, the chief act of prudence is to command, while its secondary act is to judge and to take counsel. But none of these seems to be properly implied by foresight. Therefore, foresight is not a part of prudence. On the contrary, stands the authority of Tully and Microbius, who number foresight among the parts of prudence, as stated above in Question 48. I answer that, as stated above in Question 47, Article 1, as well as in Article 6 and 13. Prudence is properly about the means to an end, and its proper work is to set them in due order to the end. And although certain things are necessary for an end, which are subject to divine providence, yet nothing is subject to human providence, except the contingent matters of action, which can be done by man for an end. Now the past has become a kind of necessity, since what has been done cannot be undone. In like manner, the present as such has a kind of necessity, since it is necessary that Socrates sit so long as he sits. Consequently, future contingents, insofar as they can be directed by man to the end of human life, are the matter of prudence. And each of these things is implied in the word foresight, for it implies the notion of something distant, to which that which occurs in the present has to be directed. Therefore foresight is part of prudence. Reply to Objection 1. Whenever many things are requisite for a unity, one of them must needs be the principle to which all the others are subordinate. Hence in every whole, one part must be formal and predominant whence the whole has unity. Accordingly, foresight is the principle of all the parts of prudence. Since whatever else is required for prudence is necessary precisely that some particular thing may be rightly directed to its end. Hence it is that the very name of prudence is taken from foresight, Providencia, as from its principle part. Reply to Objection 2. Speculation is about universal and necessary things, which in themselves are not distant, since they are everywhere and always, though they are distant from us insofar as we fail to know them. Hence foresight does not apply properly to speculative but only to practical matters. Reply to Objection 3. Right order to an end, which is included in the notion of foresight, contains rectitude of counsel, judgment and command, without which no right order to the end is possible. Seventh article. Whether circumspection can be a part of prudence. Objection 1. You would seem that circumspection cannot be a part of prudence. For circumspection seems to signify looking at one's surroundings, but these are of infinite number and cannot be considered by the reason wherein is prudence. Therefore, circumspection should not be reckoned a part of prudence. Objection 2. Further, circumstances seem to be the concern of moral virtues rather than of prudence. But circumspection seems to denote nothing but attention to circumstances. Therefore, circumspection apparently belongs to the moral virtues rather than to prudence. Objection 3. Further, whoever can see things afar off can much more see things that are near. Now foresight enables a man to look on distant things. Therefore, there is no need to account circumspection a part of prudence in addition to foresight. On the contrary, stands the authority of Macrobius quoted above in question 48. I answer that, as stated above in article 6. It belongs to prudence chiefly to direct something aright to an end. And this is not done aright unless both the end be good and the means good and suitable. Since, however, prudence, as stated above in question 47 article 3, is about singular matters of action, which contain many combinations of circumstances, which happens that a thing is good in itself and suitable to the end and nevertheless becomes evil or unsuitable to the end by reason of some combination of circumstances. Thus, to show signs of love to someone seems, considered in itself, to be a fitting way to arouse love in his heart. Yet if pride or suspicion of flattery arise in his heart, it will no longer be a means suitable to the end. Hence the need of circumspection in prudence, notably of comparing the means with the circumstances. Reply to objection 1. Though the number of possible circumstances be infinite, the number of actual circumstances is not. And the judgment of reason in matters of action is influenced by things which are few in number. Reply to objection 2. Circumstances are the concern of prudence, because prudence has to fix them. On the other hand, they are the concern of moral virtues, insofar as moral virtues are perfected by fixing of circumstances. Reply to objection 3. Just as it belongs to foresight, to look on that which is by its nature suitable to an end, so it belongs to circumspection to consider whether it be suitable to the end in view of the circumstances. Now each of these presents a difficulty of its own, and therefore each is reckoned a distinct part of prudence. Eighth article. Whether caution should be reckoned a part of prudence. Objection 1. It would seem that caution should not be reckoned a part of prudence. For when no evil is possible, no caution is required. Now no man makes evil use of virtue, as Augustine declares on the free choice of the will 219. Therefore, caution does not belong to prudence which directs the virtues. Objection 2. Further, to foresee good and to avoid evil belong to the same faculty. Just as the same art gives health and cures ill health. Now it belongs to foresight to foresee good and consequently also to avoid evil. Therefore, caution should not be accounted a part of prudence, distinct from foresight. Objection 3. Further, no prudent man strives for the impossible. But no man can take precautions against all possible evils. Therefore, caution does not belong to prudence. On the contrary, the Apostle says in Ephesians 5.15, See how you walk cautiously. Note, the Dewey version translates cautiously as circumspectly. I answer that the things with which prudence is concerned are contingent matters of action. Wherein, even as false is found with true, so is evil mingled with good on account of the great variety of these matters of action wherein good is often hindered by evil and evil has the appearance of good. Wherefore prudence needs caution so that we may have such a grasp of good as to avoid evil. Reply to Objection 1. Caution is required in moral acts that we may be on our guard not against acts of virtue but against the hindrance of acts of virtue. Reply to Objection 2. It is the same in idea to ensue good and to avoid the opposite evil. But the avoidance of outward hindrances is different in idea. Hence caution differs from foresight although they both belong to the one virtue of prudence. Reply to Objection 3. Of the evils which man has to avoid, some are a frequent occurrence. The like can be grasped by reason and against them caution is directed either that they may be avoided altogether or that they may do less harm. Others there are that occur rarely and by chance and these, since they are infinite in number cannot be grasped by reason nor is man able to take precautions against them. Although by exercising prudence he is able to prepare against all the surprises of chance so as to suffer less harm thereby. Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde Triatis on the Cardinal Virtues The Virtue of Prudence by Saint Thomas Aquinas translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province Question 50 of the Subjective Parts of Prudence in four articles. We must in due sequence consider the Subjective Parts of Prudence and since we have already spoken of the prudence with which a man rules himself in Question 47 and following. It remains for us to discuss the species of prudence whereby a multitude is governed. Under this head there are four points of inquiry. First, whether a species of prudence is reignitive. Second, whether political and third, domestic economy are species of prudence. Fourth, whether military prudence should be reckoned a part of prudence. First article, whether a species of prudence is reignitive. Objection 1 It would seem that reignitive should not be reckoned a species of prudence. For reignitive prudence is directed to the preservation of justice since according to Ethics 5.6 the prince is the guardian of justice. Therefore, reignitive prudence belongs to justice rather than to prudence. Objection 2 Further, according to the philosopher in Politics 3.5 a kingdom, a regnum, is one of six species of government. But no species of prudence is ascribed to the five forms of government which are aristocracy, polity, also called democracy Confer Ethics 8.10 tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy. Therefore, neither should a reignitive species be ascribed to a kingdom. Objection 3 Further, law giving belongs not only to kings but also to certain others placed in authority and even to the people according to Isidor in Etymology 5. Now the philosopher in Ethics 6.8 reckons a part of prudence to be legislative. Therefore, it is not becoming to substitute reignitive prudence in its place. On the contrary, the philosopher says in Politics 3.11 that prudence is a virtue which is proper to the prince. Therefore, a special kind of prudence is reignitive. I answer that, as stated above in Question 47, Articles 8 and 10. It belongs to prudence, to govern, and to command. So that wherever in human acts we find a special kind of governance and command, there must be a special kind of prudence. Now it is evident that there is a special and perfect kind of governance in one who has to govern not only himself but also the perfect community of a city or kingdom. Because a government is the more perfect according as it is more universal extends to more matters and attains a higher end. Hence prudence in its special and most perfect sense belongs to a king who is charged with the government of a city or kingdom. For which reason a species of prudence is reckoned to be reignitive? Reply to Objection 1 All matters connected with moral virtue belong to prudence as their guide. Wherefore, right reason in accord with prudence is included in the definition of moral virtue, as stated above. For this reason also, the execution of justice in so far as it is directed to the common good, which is part of the kingly office, needs the guidance of prudence. Hence these two virtues, prudence and justice, belong most properly to a king who is charged with prudence and justice, belong most properly to a king according to Jeremiah 23.5 A king shall reign and shall be wise and shall execute justice and judgment in the earth. Since, however, direction belongs rather to the king and execution to his subjects. Pregnative prudence is reckoned to be directed rather than to justice which is executive. Reply to Objection 2 A kingdom is the best of all governments, as stated in Ethics 8.10. Wherefore, the species of prudence should be denominated rather from a kingdom, yet so as to comprehend under reignitive all other rightful forms of government, first forms which are opposed to virtue and which, accordingly, do not pertain to prudence. Reply to Objection 3 The philosopher names Ragnative Prudence after the principal act of a king which is to make laws and although this applies to the other forms of government, this is only insofar as they have a share of kingly government. Second article Whether political prudence is fittingly accounted a part of prudence Objection 1 It would seem that political prudence is not fittingly accounted a part of prudence, for Ragnative is a part of political prudence as stated above in Article 1. But a part should not be reckoned a species with the whole. Therefore, political prudence should not be reckoned a part of prudence. Objection 2 Further The species of habits are distinguished by their various objects. Now, what the ruler has to command is the same as what the subject has to execute. Therefore, political prudence as regards the subjects should not be reckoned a species of prudence distinct from Ragnative prudence. Objection 3 Further Each subject is an individual person. Now, each individual person can direct himself sufficiently by prudence commonly so called. Therefore, there is no need of a special kind of prudence called political. On the contrary, the philosopher says in Ethics 6.8 that of the prudence which is concerned with the state one kind is a master prudence and is called legislative. Another kind bears the common name political and deals with individuals. I answer that a slave is moved by his master and a subject by his ruler, by command. But otherwise than as irrational and inanimate beings are set in motion by their movers. For irrational and inanimate beings are moved only by others and do not put themselves in motion since they have no free will whereby to be masters of their own actions. Wherefore, the rectitude of their government is not in their power but in the power of their movers. On the other hand, men who are slaves or subjects in any sense are moved by the commands of others in such a way that they move themselves by their free will. Wherefore, some kind of rectitude of government is required in them so that they may direct themselves in obeying their superiors. And to this belongs that species of prudence which is called political. Reply to Objection 1 As stated above, ragnative is the most perfect species of prudence wherefore the prudence of subjects which falls short of ragnative prudence retains the common name of political prudence. Even as in logic, a convertible term which does not denote the essence of a thing retains the name of proper. Reply to Objection 2 A different aspect of the object diversifies the species of a habit, as stated above. Question 47, Article 5 Now the same actions are considered by the king but under a more general aspect as by his subjects who obey. Since many obey one king in various departments hence ragnative prudence is compared to this political prudence of which we are speaking as mastercraft to handicraft. Reply to Objection 3 Man directs himself by prudence commonly so called in relation to his own good but by political prudence of which we speak he directs himself in relation to the common good. Third Article Whether a part of prudence should be reckoned to be domestic. Objection 1 It would seem that domestic should not be reckoned a part of prudence. For according to the philosopher in Ethics 6.5 Prudence is directed to a good life in general whereas domestic prudence is directed to a particular end notably wealth according to Ethics 1.1 Therefore a species of prudence is not domestic. Objection 2 Further, as stated above in Question 47, Article 13 prudence is only in good people but domestic prudence may be also in wicked people since many sinners are provident in governing their household. Therefore domestic prudence should not be reckoned a species of prudence. Objection 3 Further, just as in a kingdom there is a ruler and subject so also is there in a household. If therefore domestic, like political, is a species of prudence there should be a paternal corresponding to reignitive prudence. Now there is no such prudence. Therefore neither should domestic prudence be accounted a species of prudence. On the contrary, the philosopher states in Ethics 6.8 that there are various kinds of prudence in the government of a multitude one of which is domestic, another legislative and another political. I answer that different aspects of an object in respect of universality and particularity or of totality and partiality diversify arts and virtues and in respect of such diversity one act of virtue is principal as compared with another. Now it is evident that a household is a mean between the individual and the city or kingdom since just as the individual is part of the household so is the household part of the city or kingdom and therefore just as prudence commonly so called which governs the individual is distinct from political prudence so must domestic prudence be distinct from both. Reply to Objection 1 Riches are compared to domestic prudence not as its last end but as its instrument as stated in Politics 1.3 On the other hand, the end of political prudence is a good life in general as regards the conduct of the household. In Ethics 1.1 the philosopher speaks of riches as the end of political prudence by way of example and in accordance with the opinion of many. Reply to Objection 2 Some sinners may be provident in certain matters of detail concerning the disposition of their household but not in regard to a good life in general as regards the conduct of the household for which above all a virtuous life is required. Reply to Objection 3 The father has in his household an authority like that of a king as stated in Ethics 8.10 but he has not the full power of a king where for paternal government is not reckoned a distinct species of prudence like regnative prudence. Fourth article whether military prudence should be reckoned a part of prudence. Objection 1 You would seem that military prudence should not be reckoned a part of prudence. For prudence is distinct from art according to Ethics 6.3 Now military prudence seems to be the art of warfare according to the philosopher Ethics 3.8 Therefore military prudence should not be accounted a species of prudence. Objection 2 Further Just as military business is contained under political affairs so too are many other matters such as those of tradesmen, craftsmen and so forth but there are no species of prudence corresponding to other affairs in the state. Neither therefore should any be assigned to military business. Objection 3 Further The soldier's bravery counts for a great deal in warfare. Therefore military prudence pertains to fortitude rather than to prudence. On the contrary it is written in Proverbs 24.6 War is managed by due ordering and there shall be safety where there are many councils. Now it belongs to prudence to take counsel. Therefore there is great need in warfare for that species of prudence which is called military. I answer that whatever things are done according to art or reason should be made to conform to those which are in accordance with nature and are established by the divine reason. Now nature has a twofold tendency. First to govern each thing in itself. Secondly to withstand outward assailants and corruptives. And for this reason she has provided animals not only with the concuposable faculty whereby they are moved to that which is conducive to their well-being but also with the irascible power whereby the animal withstands an assailant. Therefore in those things also which are in accordance with reason there should not only be political prudence which disposes in a suitable manner such things as belong to the common good but also a military prudence whereby hostile attacks are repelled. Reply to Objection 1 Military prudence may be an art insofar as it has certain rules for the right use of certain external things such as arms and horses but insofar as it is directed to the common good it belongs rather to prudence. Reply to Objection 2 Other matters in the state are directed to the profit of individuals whereas the business of soldiering is directed to the service belongs to fortitude but the direction protection of the entire common good Reply to Objection 3 The execution of military service belongs to fortitude but the direction especially insofar as it concerns the commander-in-chief belongs to prudence End of question 50 Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC Question 51 Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde Triaties on the Cardinal of Virtues The Virtue of Prudence This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde Triaties on the Cardinal of Virtues The Virtue of Prudence by St. Thomas Aquinas Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province Question 51 Of the Virtues which are connected with prudence in four articles In due sequence we must consider the virtues that are connected with prudence and which are its quasi-potential parts Under this head there are four points of inquiry First Whether Eubulia is a virtue Second Whether it is a special virtue distinct from prudence Third Whether Sinesis is a special virtue Fourth Whether Gnome is a special virtue Note These three Greek words may be rendered as the faculties of deliberating well Eubulia Of judging well according to common law Sinesis And of judging well according to general law Gnome, respectively First article Whether Eubulia is a virtue Objection 1 It would seem that Eubulia is not a virtue For according to Augustine On the free choice of the will to 18 and 19 No man makes evil use of virtue Now some make evil use of Eubulia or good counsel Either through devising crafty counsels In order to achieve evil ends Or through committing sin In order that they may achieve good ends As those who rob that they may give alms Therefore Eubulia is not a virtue Objection 2 Further Virtue is a perfection according to Physics 7 But Eubulia is concerned with counsel Which implies doubt and research And these are marks of imperfection Therefore Eubulia is not a virtue Objection 3 Further Virtues are connected with one another as stated above Paris Prima Secunde question 65 Now Eubulia is not connected with the other virtues Since many sinners take good counsel And many godly men are slow in taking counsel Therefore Eubulia is not a virtue On the contrary, according to the philosopher In Ethics 6.9 Eubulia is a right counseling Now the perfection of virtue consists in right reason Therefore Eubulia is a virtue I answer that as stated above in Question 47 Article 4 The nature of a human virtue consists in making a human act good Now among the acts of men It is proper to him to take counsel Since this denotes a research of the reason About the actions he has to perform And whereof human life consists For the speculative life is above man As stated in Ethics 10 But Eubulia signifies goodness of counsel For it is derived from the Eub, good, and Bule, counsel Being a good counsel Or rather a disposition to take good counsel Hence it is evident that Eubulia is a human virtue Reply to Objection 1 There is no good counsel Either in deliberating for an evil end Or in discovering evil means For attaining a good end Even as in speculative matters There is no good reasoning Either in coming to a false conclusion Or in coming to a true conclusion From false premises Through employing an unsuitable middle term Hence both the aforesaid processes Are contrary to Eubulia As the philosopher declares in Ethics 6.9 Reply to Objection 2 Although virtue is essentially a perfection It does not follow that whatever is the matter of a virtue Implies perfection For man needs to be perfected by virtues in all his parts And this not only as regards the acts of reason Of which counsel is one But also as regards the passions of the sensitive appetite Which are still more imperfect It may also be replied that human virtue is a perfection According to the mode of man Who is unable by simple insight To comprehend with certainty the truth of things Especially in matters of action which are contingent Reply to Objection 3 In no sinner as such is Eubulia to be found Since all sin is contrary to taking good counsel For good counsel requires not only the discovery Or devising a fit means for the end But also other circumstances Such are suitable time So that one be neither too slow Nor too quick in taking counsel And the mode of taking counsel So that one be firm in the counsel taken And other like do circumstances Which sinners fail to observe when they sin On the other hand Every virtuous man takes good counsel in those things Which are directed to the end of virtue Although perhaps he does not take good counsel In other particular matters For instance in matters of trade Or warfare and the like Second article Whether Eubulia is a special virtue Distinct from prudence Objection 1 It would seem that Eubulia is not A distinct virtue from prudence For according to the philosopher in Ethics 6.5 The prudent man is seemingly One who takes good counsel Now this belongs to Eubulia as stated above Therefore Eubulia is not distinct from prudence Objection 2 Further, human acts To which human virtues are directed Are specified chiefly by their end As stated above Paras Prima Secunde, Question 1, Article 3 And Question 18, Articles 4 and 6 Now Eubulia and prudence Are directed to the same end As stated in Ethics 6.9 Not indeed to some particular end But to the common end of all life Therefore Eubulia is not A distinct virtue from prudence Objection 3 Further, in speculative sciences Research and decision belong to the same science Therefore, in like manner These belong to the same virtue In practical matters Now research belongs to Eubulia While decision belongs to prudence There Eubulia is not a distinct Virtue from prudence On the contrary Prudence is preceptive According to Ethics 6.10 But this does not apply to Eubulia Therefore Eubulia is a distinct Virtue from prudence I answer that as stated above in Article 1 Virtue is properly directed to an act Which it renders good And consequently, virtues must differ According to different acts Especially when there is a different Kind of goodness in the acts Therefore, if various acts Contained the same kind of goodness They would belong to the same virtue Thus the goodness of love, desire and joy Depends on the same Wherefore all these belong to the same Virtue of charity Now acts of the reason that are Ordained to action are diverse Nor have they the same kind of goodness It is owing to different causes That a man acquires good counsel Good judgment or good command Inasmuch as these are sometimes Separated from one another Consequently, Eubulia Which makes man take good counsel Must needs be a distinct Virtue from prudence Which makes man command well And since counsel is directed To command, as to that Which is principle So Eubulia is directed to prudence As to a principal virtue Without which would be no virtue at all Even as neither are the moral virtues Without prudence nor the other virtues Without charity Reply to Objection 1 It belongs to prudence to take good counsel By commanding it To Eubulia by eliciting it Reply to Objection 2 Different acts are directed In different degrees to the one end Which is a good life in general Confer Ethics 6.5 For counsel comes first Judgment follows And command comes last The last named has an immediate Relation to the last end Whereas the other two acts Are related there too remotely Nevertheless these have Certain proximate ends of their own The end of counsel being the discovery Of what has to be done And the end of judgment, certainty Hence this proves not that Eubulia is not a distinct Virtue from prudence But that it is subordinate there too As a secondary to a principal virtue Reply to Objection 3 Even in speculative matters The rational science of dialectics Which is directed to research and discovery Is distinct from demonstrative science Which decides the truth Third article Whether sinesis is a virtue Objection 1 You would seem that sinesis Is not a virtue Virtues are not in us by nature According to Ethics 2.1 But sinesis is natural to some As the philosopher states Ethics 6.11 Therefore sinesis is not a virtue Objection 2 Further, as stated in the same book Ethics 6.10 Sinesis is nothing but A faculty of judging But judgment without command Can be even in the wicked Since then virtue is only in the good It seems that sinesis Is not a virtue Objection 3 Further, there is never a defective command Unless there be a defective judgment At least in a particular matter of action For it is in this That every wicked man errs If therefore sinesis Be reckoned a virtue directed to good judgment It seems that there is no need For any other virtue directed to good command And consequently Prudence would be superfluous Which is not reasonable Therefore sinesis Is not a virtue On the contrary Judgment is more perfect than counsel But eubulia, or good counsel, is a virtue Much more, therefore, is sinesis a virtue As being good judgment I answer that Sinesis signifies a right judgment Not indeed about speculative matters But about particular practical matters About which also is prudence Hence in Greek some, in respect of sinesis Are said to be sinetoi, that is, persons of sense Or eusinetoi, that is, men of good sense Just as on the other hand Those who lack this virtue are called a sinetoi That is, senseless Now different acts Which cannot be ascribed to the same cause Must correspond to different virtues And it is evident that goodness of counsel And goodness of judgment Are not reducible to the same cause For many can take good counsel Without having good sense So as to judge well Even so, in speculative matters Some are good at research Through the reason being quick at arguing From one thing to another Which seems to be due to a disposition Of their power of imagination Which has a facility in forming phantasms And yet such persons sometimes lack good judgment And this is due to a defect in the intellect Arising chiefly from a defective disposition Of the common sense which fails to judge a right Hence there is need besides eubulia For another virtue Which judges well And this is called sinesis Reply to Objection 1 Right judgment consists in the cognitive power Apprehending a thing just as it is in reality And this is due to the right disposition Of the apprehensive power Thus if a mirror be well disposed The forms of bodies are reflected in it Just as they are Whereas if it be ill disposed The images therein appear distorted and mishappen Now that the cognitive power be well disposed To receive things just as they are in reality Is radically due to nature But as to its consummation Is due to practice Or to a gift of grace And this in two ways First, directly On the part of the cognitive power itself For instance, because it is imbued Not with distorted, but with true and correct ideas This belongs to sinesis Which in this respect is a special virtue Secondly, indirectly Through the good disposition of the appetitive power The result being that one judges well Of the objects of appetite And thus a good judgment of virtue Results from the habits of moral virtue But this judgment is about the ends Whereas sinesis is rather about the means Replied to objection too In wicked men There may be right judgment of a universal principle But their judgment is always corrupt In the particular matter of action As stated above Question 47, Article 13 Reply to Objection 3 Sometimes after judging a right We delay to execute Or execute negligently or inordinately Hence, after the virtue which judges a right There is a further need of a final and principal virtue Which commands a right And this is prudence Fourth article Whether genome is a special virtue Objection 1 It would seem that genome is not a special virtue Distinct from sinesis For a man is said, in respect of sinesis To have good judgment Now no man can be said to have good judgment Unless he judge a right in all things Therefore, sinesis extends to all matters of judgment And consequently, there is no other virtue Of good judgment called genome Objection 2 Further Judgment is midway between counsel and precept Now there is only one virtue of counsel Notably, obulia And only one virtue of command Notably, prudence Therefore, there is only one virtue of good judgment Notably, sinesis Objection 3 Further Rare occurrences wherein there is need to depart From the common law Seem for the most part to happen by chance And with such things reason is not concerned As stated in Physics 2.5 Now all the intellectual virtues depend on right reason Therefore, there is no intellectual virtue about such matters On the contrary, the philosopher concludes, in Ethics 6.11 That genome is a special virtue I answer that cognitive habits differ according to higher and lower principles Thus, in speculative matters, wisdom considers higher principles than science does And consequently is distinguished from it And so must it be also in practical matters Now it is evident that what is beside the order of a lower principle or cause Is sometimes reducible to the order of a higher principle Thus, monstrous births of animals are beside the order of the active seminal force And yet they come under the order of a higher principle, namely of a heavenly body Or higher still of divine providence Hence by considering the active seminal force One could not pronounce a surjudgment on such monstrosities And yet this is possible if we consider divine providence Now it happens sometimes that something has to be done Which is not covered by the common rules of actions For instance, in the case of the enemy of one's country When it would be wrong to give him back his deposit Or in such similar cases Hence it is necessary to judge of such matters according to higher principles than the common laws According to which Sinesis judges And corresponding to such higher principles It is necessary to have a higher virtue of judgment Which is called Gnome And which denotes a certain discrimination in judgment Reply to Objection 1 Sinesis judges rightly about all actions that are covered by the common rules But certain things have to be judged besides these common rules, as stated above Reply to Objection 2 Judgment about a thing should be formed from the proper principles thereof Whereas research is made by employing also common principles Wherefore also in speculative matters Dialectics, which aims at research, proceeds from common principles While demonstration, which tends to judgment, proceeds from proper principles Hence Eubulia, to which the research of council belongs, is one for all But not so Sinesis, whose act is judicial Command considers in all matters the one aspect of good Wherefore prudence also is only one Reply to Objection 3 It belongs to divine providence alone To consider all things that may happen beside the common course On the other hand, among men, he who is most discerning Can judge a greater number of such things by his reason This belongs to Gnome Which denotes a certain discrimination in judgment End of Question 51 Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC Question 52 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde Triaties on the Cardinal Virtues The Virtue of Prudence This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde Triaties on the Cardinal Virtues The Virtue of Prudence By St. Thomas Aquinas Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province Question 52 of The Gift of Council in four articles We must now consider The Gift of Council Which corresponds to Prudence Under this head, there are four points of inquiry First, whether Council should be reckoned Among the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost Second, whether The Gift of Council corresponds to Prudence Third, whether The Gift of Council remains in Heaven Fourth, whether The Fifth Beatitude Blessed are the Merciful, etc. corresponds to The Gift of Council First article Whether Council should be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost Objection 1 It would seem that Council should not be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost The gifts of the Holy Ghost are given as a help to the virtues according to Gregory On the Morals of Job 249 Now for the purpose of taking Council Man is sufficiently perfected by the virtue of Prudence Or even of Eubulia as is evident from what has been said Question 47, article 1, second reply And question 51, articles 1 and 2 Therefore, Council should not be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost Objection 2 Further, the difference between the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost And the gratuitous graces Seems to be that the latter are not given to all But are divided among various people As the gifts of the Holy Ghost are given to all who have the Holy Ghost But Council seems to be one of those things which are given by the Holy Ghost Especially to certain persons according to 1 Maccabees 265 Behold, your brother Simon is a man of Council Therefore, Council should be numbered among the gratuitous graces Rather than among the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost Objection 3 Further, it is written in Romans 814 Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God But counselling is not consistent with being led by another Since then the gifts of the Holy Ghost are most befitting the children of God Who have received the Spirit of adoption of sons It would seem that Council should not be numbered among the gifts of the Holy Ghost On the contrary, it is written in Isaiah 11-2 The Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him The Spirit of Council and of fortitude I answer that as stated above in Bar's Prima Secunde, Question 68, Article 1 The gifts of the Holy Ghost are dispositions whereby the soul is rendered amenable To the motion of the Holy Ghost Now God moves everything according to the mode of the thing moved Thus he moves the corporeal creature through time and place And the spiritual creature through time but not through place As Augustine declares On the literal meaning of Genesis 8, 20 and 22 Again, it is proper to the rational creature to be moved through the research of reason To perform any particular action And this research is called Council Hence the Holy Ghost is said to move the rational creature by way of Council Wherefore Council is reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost Reply to Objection 1 Prudence, or Eubulia, whether acquired or infused Directs man in the research of Council according to principles that the reason can grasp Hence Prudence, or Eubulia, makes man take good Council either for himself or for another Since, however, human reason is unable to grasp the singular and contingent things which may occur The result is that the thoughts of mortal men are fearful And our Council's uncertain Wisdom 914 Hence in the research of Council Man requires to be directed by God who comprehends all things And this is done through the gift of Council Whereby man is directed as though Counciled by God Just as, in human affairs, those who are unable to take Council for themselves Seek Council from those who are wiser Reply to Objection 2 That a man be of such good Council as to Council others May be due to a gratuitous grace But that a man be Counciled by God as to what he ought to do in matters necessary for salvation Is common to all Holy Persons Reply to Objection 3 The children of God are moved by the Holy Ghost according to their mode Without prejudice to their free will, which is the faculty of will and reason Confer commentary on the sentences of Peter Lombard, 324 Accordingly, the gift of Council is befitting the children of God insofar as the reason is instructed by the Holy Ghost about what we have to do Second article Whether the gift of Council corresponds to the virtue of prudence Objection 1 It would seem that the gift of Council does not fittingly correspond to the virtue of prudence For the highest point of that which is underneath touches that which is above As Dionysius observes on the Divine Names 7 Even as a man comes into contact with the angel in respect of his intellect Now cardinal of virtues are inferior to the gifts as stated above Paras Primesacunde question 68 article 8 Since then Council is the first and lowest act of prudence While command is its highest act and judgment comes between It seems that the gift corresponding to prudence is not Council But rather a gift of judgment or command Objection 2 Further, one gift suffices to help one virtue Since the higher a thing is, the more one it is has proved in on the causes Now prudence is helped by the gift of knowledge Which is not only speculative but also practical as shown above Question 9 article 3 Therefore, the gift of Council does not correspond to the virtue of prudence Objection 3 Further, it belongs properly to prudence to direct as stated above Question 47 article 8 But it belongs to the gift of Council that man should be directed by God as stated above Article 1 Therefore the gift of Council does not correspond to the virtue of prudence On the contrary The gift of Council is about what has to be done for the sake of an end Now prudence is about the same matter Therefore they correspond to one another I answer that a lower principle of movement is helped chiefly And is perfected through being moved by a higher principle of movement As a body through being moved by a spirit Now it is evident that the rectitude of human reason is compared to the divine reason As a lower mode of principle to a higher For the eternal reason is the supreme rule of all human rectitude Consequently prudence, which denotes rectitude of reason Is chiefly perfected and helped through being ruled and moved by the Holy Ghost And this belongs to the gift of Council as stated above in Article 1 Therefore the gift of Council corresponds to prudence as helping and perfecting it Reply to Objection 1 To judge and command belongs not to the thing moved but to the mover Wherefore, since in the gifts of the Holy Ghost The position of the human mind is of one moved rather than of a mover as stated above Article 1, also Paris Prima Secunde, Question 68, Article 1 It follows that it would be unfitting to call the gift corresponding to prudence By the name of command or judgment Rather than of Council, whereby it is possible to signify that the Council the mind Is moved by another counselling it Reply to Objection 2 The gift of knowledge does not directly correspond to prudence Since it deals with speculative matters Yet by a kind of extension it helps it On the other hand, the gift of Council corresponds to prudence directly Because it is concerned about the same things Reply to Objection 3 The mover that is moved moves through being moved Hence the human mind from the very fact that it is directed by the Holy Ghost Is enabled to direct itself and others Third Article Whether the gift of Council remains in heaven Objection 1 It would seem that the gift of Council does not remain in heaven For Council is about what has to be done for the sake of an end But in heaven nothing will have to be done for the sake of an end Since their man possesses the last end Therefore the gift of Council is not in heaven Objection 2 Further, Council implies doubt For it is absurd to take Council in matters that are evident As the philosopher observes Ethics 3-3 Now all doubt will cease in heaven Therefore there is no Council in heaven Objection 3 Further The saints in heaven are most conformed to God according to 1 John 3-2 When he shall appear, we shall be like to him But Council is not becoming to God according to Romans 11-34 Who hath been his Councillor? Therefore neither to the saints in heaven is the gift of Council becoming On the contrary, Gregory says, on the morals of Job 17-12 When either the guilt or the righteousness of each nation Is brought into the debate of the heavenly court The guardian of that nation is said to have won in the conflict Or not to have won I answer that as dated above in Article 2 Also in Paras Prima Secunde, Question 68, Article 1 The gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected with the motion of the rational creature by God Now we must observe two points concerning the motion of the human mind by God First, that the disposition of that which is moved differs While it is being moved from its disposition when it is in the term of movement Indeed, if the mover is the principle of the movement alone When the movement ceases, the action of the mover ceases as regard the thing moved Since it has already reached the term of movement Even as a house, after it is built, ceases being built by the builder On the other hand, when the mover is cause not only of the movement But also of the form to which the movement tends Then the action of the mover does not cease even after the form has been attained Thus the sun lightens the air even after it is lightened In this way, then, God causes in us virtue and knowledge Not only when we first acquire them, but also as long as we persevere in them And it is thus that God causes in the blessed a knowledge of what is to be done Not as though they were ignorant, but by continuing that knowledge in them Nevertheless, there are things which the blessed, whether angels or men, do not know Such things are not essential to blessedness, but concern the government of things according to divine providence As regards these, we must make a further observation, namely That God moves the mind of the blessed in one way and the mind of the wayfarer in another For God moves the mind of the wayfarer in matters of action By soothing the pre-existing anxiety of doubt Whereas there is simple nescience in the mind of the blessed as regards the things they do not know From this nescience, the angel's mind is cleansed according to Dionysius on the Divine Hierarchy 7 Nor does there proceed in them any research of doubt, for they simply turn to God And this is to take counsel of God, for as Augustine says in, on the literal meaning of Genesis 519 The angels take counsel of God about things beneath them Wherefore, the instruction which they receive from God in such matters is called counsel Accordingly, the gift of counsel is in the blessed, insofar as God preserves in them the knowledge that they have And enlightens them in their nescience of what has to be done Reply to Objection 1 Even in the blessed there are acts directed to an end, or resulting as it were, from the attainment of the end Such as the acts of praising God, or of helping on others to the end which they themselves have attained For example, the ministrations of the angels and the prayers of the saints In this respect, the gift of counsel finds a place in them Reply to Objection 2 Doubt belongs to counsel according to the present state of life But not to that counsel which takes place in heaven Even so, neither have the theological virtues quite the same acts in heaven as on the way thither Reply to Objection 3 Counsel is in God, not as receiving but as giving it And the saints in heaven are conformed to God as receivers to the source whence they receive Fourth Article Whether the fifth beatitude, which is that of mercy, corresponds to the gift of counsel Objection 1 It would seem that the fifth beatitude, which is that of mercy, does not correspond to the gift of counsel For all the beatitudes are acts of virtue, as stated above in Bar's Prima Secunde, Question 69, Article 1 Now we are directed by counsel in all acts of virtue Therefore, the fifth beatitude does not correspond more than any other to counsel Objection 2 Further Precepts are given about matters necessary for salvation While counsel is given about matters which are not necessary for salvation Now mercy is necessary for salvation according to James 2.13 Judgment without mercy to him that hath not done mercy On the other hand, poverty is not necessary for salvation, but belongs to the life of perfection according to Matthew 1921 Therefore, the beatitude of poverty corresponds to the gift of counsel rather than to the beatitude of mercy Objection 3 Further The fruits result from the beatitudes, for they denote a certain spiritual delight resulting from the perfect acts of virtue Now none of the fruits correspond to the gift of counsel, as appears from Galatians 5.22 and 23 Therefore, neither does the beatitude of mercy correspond to the gift of counsel On the contrary, Augustine says in On the Sermon of the Mount 4 Counsel is befitting the merciful, because the one remedy is to be delivered from evil so great to pardon and to give I answer that counsel is properly about things useful for an end Hence, such things as are of most use for an end should above all correspond to the gift of counsel Now such is mercy according to 1 Timothy 4.8 Godliness Note Pietas, which our English word piti, which is the same as mercy See note on Parse Secunda Secunde, Question 30, Article 1 Is profitable to all things Therefore, the beatitude of mercy specially corresponds to the gift of counsel, not as eliciting but as directing mercy Reply to Objection 1 Although counsel directs in all the acts of virtue, it does so in a special way in works of mercy, for the reason given above Reply to Objection 2 Counsel, considered as a gift of the Holy Ghost, guides us in all matters that are directed to the end of eternal life, whether they be necessary for salvation or not And yet not every work of mercy is necessary for salvation Reply to Objection 3 Fruit denotes something ultimate Now the ultimate in practical matters consists not in knowledge but in an action which is the end Hence, nothing pertaining to practical knowledge is numbered among the fruits but only such things as pertain to action In which practical knowledge is the guide Among these we find goodness and benignity, which correspond to mercy End of Question 52, Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC