Hi and welcome to this talk on TARDIS, a foundation of Timelock puzzles in UC, or rather time and relative delay in simulation. We will cover first an introduction of the concept of Timelock puzzles, which has inspired this work, and then a summary of our contributions, which will be followed by a detailed account of the following contributions. First of all, our detailed abstract composable time model, which services basis for our composable treatment of Timelock puzzles in the UC framework. And finally, our application to two-party computation without putting the pen on the board, which is built from our UC Timelock puzzles. And we'll finalize with a brief discussion of some future, or should I say past works. The concept of Timelock puzzles has been introduced back in 96 and allows parties to encrypt the message to the future. The idea is that a Timelock puzzle can be generated in such a way that it contains a message X, but it will take at least some minimal amount of time until the message X can be retrieved from the TLP. The message will be obtained after we say the Timelock puzzle is solved. Since you construct and model this sort of cryptographic primitive, we actually need a computational task that must be executed in sequential steps in such a way that each step takes at least a minimum amount of time. And with the guarantee that an adversary who has more computational resources cannot simply parallelize the process of computing the steps. This concept, as well as one of the first assumptions that allows us to build this Timelock puzzles, was first introduced by Rivas Shamir and Wagner in 96. And it was based on this problem of computing iterated squareings of elements of groups of unknown order. In particular, they used the problem of computing successive squareings of a random group element from the group of primitive residues modulo and RSA modulus. Their assumption essentially says that if you want to compute G to the two to the T, you will need at least as much time as it would take to compute T sequential squareings departing from G. Namely, G to the two, all the way to G to the two to the two, G to the two to the three, all the way to G to the two to the T. And using this problem, they concocted an interesting scheme that allows for a sender to lock a message inside a Timelock puzzle in such a way that a party who computes this T successive squareings is able to retrieve the message. And so the party after computing for some amount of time equivalent to T times the amount of time that it takes to solve a single step. On the other hand, notice that a party who has a trapdoor in this case the order of the group can easily compute the Timelock puzzle itself without having to perform the T sequential computational steps. What we do with the sort of construction is that it has no composability guarantee, meaning that there is no guarantee that the primitive remains secure that it has the same security properties when it is executed in parallel with other cryptographic primitives and protocols or other instances of itself. It means in practice that we cannot use Timelock puzzles and other timed primitives without composability guarantees to actually build more complex protocols and applications. In order to build such complex protocols and applications we need a Timelock puzzle construction that is composable that remains secure in situations where it is arbitrarily composed with other primitives and protocols. In order to achieve that we actually face a number of challenges. First of all, in the setting we are working at of the universal composability framework, we have no notion of time. We first need to define what time means in a composable sense. And in this case, different from previous works, we actually do not want to implement any sort of synchronized clock or to imply that the users have access to notions of time explicitly. What to do is to make sure that time passes equally for all parties involved in multiple executions of a protocol or of different protocols, and that time indeed is passing. But again without implying any synchronicity or implying that parties have any access to clocks. However, even if we can do that, we then have the issue of enforcing sequential computation. This issue arises when you observe how the UC framework models parallel execution of a protocol or multiple protocols. In this setting, we have the environment which orchestrates the execution of all parallel sessions and parallel instances of protocols, and the environment can activate each party in each session in a sequence. While having the this party's belief that they are indeed at the same point in time, because they are essentially suspended while another session in an or another party in the same sessions being executed. Using this fact, an environment could easily circumvent a time lock assumption by using multiple sessions to solve all of the steps of a time lock puzzle. Say you are given the initial time lock puzzle we discussed, which is basically a random group element and then the message multiplied by that random group element raised to a power that is equivalent to the number of steps we want. This environment could start by having the first session perform the first step, then activating the parties in the second session to perform the second step. And proceed like this until it gets to a teeth session where it obtains the final computational step needed to solve this time lock puzzle. All the while keeping the ideal adversaries and parties in each session, oblivious from this strategy of solving the time lock puzzle, making simulation extremely hard. So we need to deal both with the problem of modeling time and then with the problem of having a proper model for sequential computational assumptions. In order to do that, we first present an abstract model for time in the universal compulsability framework that enforces the passage of time equally for all parties and all sessions. But does not imply that parties have access to synchronized clocks or to explicit messages showing the passage of time. Based on this model, we present a UC treatment of time lock puzzles that includes both a definition of time lock puzzles within the UC model, and also a definition of the RSW96 time lock assumption based on iterated in the UC framework. Using our notion of composable time lock puzzles in our abstract model of time, we then prove that programmable random oracles are actually necessary for you see secure time lock puzzle constructions. We see having other setup assumptions, or the combination of other setup assumptions and a non programmable random oracle, or essentially any combination of setup assumptions that does not include a random oracle is not sufficient for constructing a UC secure time lock puzzle. And we prove this fact. Knowing that this is necessary. We then construct our time lock puzzle protocol, and also our application of time lock puzzles to two party computation with output independent abort while assuming a programmable random oracle as a set of time lock puzzles. Back to our application. The essential idea here is that we provide a notion of security for two party computation that sits in between two party computation with a board and fair to party computation. With the output independent abort, the adversary is still able to force the protocol execution to abort and then learn the output. However, it can only learn the output after making the decision of whether it will force the abort or not. This means that the adversary cannot make an informed decision to cause an abort based on the output, fulfilling a certain requirement or not fulfilling a certain requirement that might be advantages or disadvantages for the adversary. Related to our current effort, there is a number of works that have dealt with time in the UC model, and also with the modeling and construction of time lock puzzles with some sort of no malleability property. Initially, when time was being modeled in the UC framework, a number of clock functionalities have been proposed that essentially provide a synchronized clock to honest parties, allowing those parties as well as functionalities to ask for the current time. Also, in the related works on time lock puzzles, apart from the seminal work that introduced the first construction and the concept, we have a couple of very recent works that have constructed no malleable versions of time lock puzzles, which are closely related to our notion of universally composable time lock puzzles. However, here we we highlight that while some of these constructions do not need a random oracle, they also do not achieve arbitrary composability guarantees, which we do using random oracles and proving them to be necessary. Finally, there has been work on applying time lock puzzles to construct a notion of partial fairness for two party computation, which is, however, restricted to a setting without composability guarantees, which is not our case since we propose a non-composable to party computation with our notion of output independent of bar. So let's start understanding our notion of abstract composable time. In our model, instead of having a global clock, we have a global ticker functionality that provides no information about the passage of time to parties, but only to functionalities. However, this global ticker does not tell the functionalities a current value of a time counter. It only tells a functionality that a new tick has happened since the last time it has been activated by that functionality. We allow functionalities to query whether a new tick has happened and receive an answer telling the functionality whether this happened or not. However, parties are only allowed to communicate to the global ticker functionality in order to acknowledge that they have been activated since the last time they should have been activated according to the protocols we built on this model. So if a party is supposed to, for example, receive a message or observe a different event before acknowledging that time is supposed to advance, it waits until this event happens in order to activate the global ticker. However, upon activating a global ticker to acknowledge that a new that that time has passed for that party that it has been activated. Parties do not receive any acknowledgement from the global ticker nor any information about whether a new tick has happened, or about any sort of current time counter which is not kept at all by the global ticker. On the other hand, notice that you could use our global ticker to construct a clock functionality that continuously queries a global ticker for new ticks and when a new tick happens, simply increments an internal counter that it then makes available to function to other parties. Of course, in that protocol for a clock, the parties would be expected to activate the global ticker when they agree on the passage of time. Based on this model. We construct a universally composable notion of time lock puzzles, and of the underlying sequential computation assumptions that are needed for constructing such a primitive. In our model, a time lock puzzle is generated, taking as input a message X that is locked inside the puzzle, and a parameter tick T that indicates the amount of ticks that should be necessary for that message to be recovered from the puzzle. The time in this case is of course measured in the number of ticks that happened with respect to the global ticker. The parties are allowed to retrieve the message from the time lock puzzle functionality. Whenever they have activated that time lock puzzle functionality throughout T consecutive ticks or throughout a number T of ticks with a query to solve a given time lock puzzle. The interesting point of this approach is that we do not have to keep track of current concrete values of time in our proofs or protocol constructions. Instead, we just need to keep track of events. For example, a message being received, or a time lock puzzle being solved, which indicates that a certain amount of time has passed of course because we know that the time lock is only solved after a number of ticks and makes it simpler to keep track of event based protocols. As I mentioned before, we still need to model the underlying assumptions of sequential computation in order to construct our UC time lock puzzles. In this paper, we model the iterated squaring assumptions from RSW96 by providing an ideal functionality that captures it in a generic group model style, where parties are given random strings that represent each group element, but nobody's given any representation of those group elements. This allows parties to ask for as many group operations as they want during one tick, but they only receive the identifier, the random string identifying a group element after the next tick has happened. This means that if they know the identifying strings for many different group elements, they can, as they should, be able to solve several steps of a time lock puzzle in parallel, of several different time lock puzzles in parallel, but they only learn the identification for the resulting states of the time lock puzzles when the next tick happens, which ensures that each operation takes at least one tick. So this is a global functionality, which ensures that neither the environment nor the simulator have any special power over it in order to manipulate it to do any sort of faster computation than on a spout issue. Basically, this functionality has an internal table that associates each random identifying string to a group element and allows parties to both request a random group element upon which they receive the random string associated to this random group element or to request a squaring of that group element upon which the squaring is computed, but not yet revealed to the parties. They only know that this has been done. And then it has an interface that allows parties to receive the results of this squaring that happened in a previous tick. In the next tick, they can receive the results of the operations they performed in the previous tick. We also allow a special party called the owner to obtain a trap door that allows for instance squaring. If you want to relate this to the original assumption, this would be the P and Q that allow you to compute the file then that is the order of the time lock puzzle. So any party who has this trap door can now do instance squaring. And this can be used for public verifiability, for example, which we show in a future work. The point is that when the owner activates the functionality for the first time, it receives the trap door, and then any party can still do their calls for getting random group elements without knowing the trap door. Any party who has the trap door, maybe the owner himself or another party that has received that from the owner can now do instance squaring. Our TOP construction itself will use a new instance of FRSW for each TOP into global random oracles H1 and H2. The idea is to start by the party who generates the TOP, creating a new RSW group with our FRSW idea of functionality and obtaining the trap door. Then this party obtains a random group element and computes a number of iterated squaring's immediately using the trap door. Now, we essentially commit to this initial and final states, as well as the message and the trap door using the global random oracle, and create a couple of tags that encode this message and trap door in such a way that someone who solves the puzzle should retrieve the original message and the trap door. This will become important when we solve and verify this time lock puzzle, because now after we solve the time lock puzzle, we can use the trap door to both verify that the final state and the message are coherent with the committed states in H1 and H2. Notice that since this basically works as a global random oracle commitment, it also allows us to do simulation in a quite straightforward way. The simulator can always extract the message from H2 and the tags, and it can verify that those tags have been correctly generated. If we need to equivocate the message inside a time lock puzzle, we then resort to the programmability of the random oracle, which we also proved to be necessary, and simply program the output of the random oracle in this initial inputs that we have used to generate a bogus random oracle to actually output something that is consistent with the message we learn from the functionality. Now, using this time lock puzzles, this UC time lock puzzles as a generic building block, which we can do because they are composable, we now introduce the application to output independent abort. In this setting, we allow the adversary steel to cause an abort because it is impossible to prevent that in a setting with the dishonest majority, as we know from Cleve's seminal result. But we keep the adversary from seeing the output before it is forced to commit to forcing an abort or not. So basically, the adversary cannot bias the outputs based on a rational strategy. The basic idea for constructing this is that we execute the protocol up to a certain point up to the last round of the protocol, and then we have the party send the last protocol messages inside time lock puzzles in such a way that they do not know what the last messages of the protocol will be before a certain time has elapsed. Now, the adversary must send its own time lock puzzle before the honest time lock puzzle is sent and and solved. If the honest time lock puzzle is solved before the the adversary has sent its own puzzle, we detect an abort. The adversary will still be able to learn the output, but now it has committed to having aborted before it could actually see what was inside the honest party time lock puzzle and compute the output in advance. Of course this require careful parameterization of the delays of both the time lock puzzles and the proper treatment of the communication delay, which we also introduced as a functionality for a delayed channel within our abstract model for time. The applications of such a strategy are multiple, for example, constructing randomness beacons or a better secure computation with financial incentives. Since now the adversary has to decide whether to abort or not before it actually sees the output message. And in future works we generalize this approach to the multi party case. Talking about future works or should I say, past works, because it is already publicly available in the craft paper on imprint. We show that we can generalize our TLP construction in order to construct it from any sequential computational problem instead of the specific iterated squaring problem. And we provide that you see abstraction for such problems as well as showing that we can obtain public verifiability for our time lock puzzle construction from TARDIS, meaning that we can prove whether a time lock puzzle is valid or not or whether a certain message has been stored inside a solve time lock puzzle in such a way that the third party verifier does not have to solve the puzzle itself. The third party verifier can verify this proof in constant time after it has been generated by another party who solved this time lock puzzle. Moreover, we provide the first model in UC for verifiable delay functions which are related time based cryptographic primitives based on a global random marco as usual, since it is necessary and departing from a generic standalone VDF that we model as a VDF in that sort of generic group model style functionality as we had modeled the sequential computation. Using this construction, we provide the first full proof of the folklore VDF based randomness beacon construction that is quite popular in the blockchain community. And we actually show that we can get a much better construction for such a randomness beacon based on our novel publicly verifiable time lock puzzles. And the way that our construction improves in efficiency is that it will output a random value as fast as the network conditions allow. Finally, we then generalize our two PC construction without putting the pen and the boards to a NPC construction with multiple parties. And we also provide an output independent abort NPC with financial penalties and rewards. The contributions in this case are actually twofold because we in fact improve on the efficiency of existing NPC protocols with financial penalties and rewards even the ones that do not have the output independent abort property. And we also improve on the state of the art of how you can provide incentive mechanisms for NPC with financial penalties and rewards. Because now we can provide incentive mechanisms where the adversary has no knowledge about the outcome of the computation when deciding to abort or not so it is essentially taking a blind making a blind decision. Thanks for watching this talk, and you can find more information about both this paper 30s and its follow up crafts on the print. Thank you again, and have a good day.


Identifying what type of market cycle we are currently in 2020 and 2021 was a very, very aggressive bull cycle. That means that every single stock you bought, no matter what stock it was, it would just go straight up and straight up and straight up 2022, which is when I'm recording this video, we are in the most aggressive bear cycle in history, which means that stocks are just going straight down and straight down and straight down and straight down. So knowing that we're an aggressive bear cycle, this should tell you that you should not be looking to day trade long on these stocks. Investing is a totally different story. I'm just talking about day trading right now.


Felly mae'n warfa'r wneud yn fwyau. Felly rwy'n cael ei ryllteb i ddwygenol ar hyn, o ffó yw ddin. Ie, fod yn gyda'r oohi ddiogelio i'r gael Ffersdarbyn yna. Mae'n cael ei ddweud, mae'n ffordd. Mae'n cefnod gwneud. Mae'n gaelio i'r ddweud. Mae'n cael ei ddweud yn llerdigau. Nes gwych oeddennig, mae'n ymar 1890, ychydig yw'r gweld y gaelio'i dylai gyda'i gweld i'r llog oeddi, mae'n cael ei ddweud. i ni'n gweithio. Felly, yw'r rhesyf i'r cyfrwyng iawn am fy teimlo'r gwaith ar gyfer y Llyfrgell. Felly, goll i'r gwaith yn gweithio. Felly mae'r gweithio gyda'r cyfrwyng iawn. Yr gwaith yn ymgyrch, mae'r cyfrwyng iawn ar gyfer y cyfrwyng iawn ac yn ei ddaeth i'r gwaith. Mae'r gwaith yn ymgyrch. Yr rhaid yn bryd, ac yw'r cyfrwyng iawn yma. A'r gwaith yn yma, mae'r cyfrwyng iawn yn ymgyrch, Eu hwn borlyw stêw, ac mae'r pleth yn ein ysgyrdd, yn fydd o'i sorg. Mae'n oeddi, mae'n oeddi aeth y gweithio'n gwirio eich gallu, mae'r gweithio yn y gweithio'n gwirio eich gyfrannu. Mae'r gweithio sy'n aeth gyfrannu byddwn yn ei gwirio. Mae'r ddeunydd, mae'r cwmwnewnol sydd o'n ddau. Mae'n iawn o'r ffordd, ac mae'n ddechrau, yn ddweud yw hwn oeddi'r gweithio'n gweithio. I'm not sure if me and Andy spoke about it or it was just the way I decided to go to the back or I don't know if he spotted me. I've managed to get away from my marker and if the size of me, if you don't mark me tight and you give me a run in it, the defenders have got no chance. I managed to get away and I managed to come in and get the header on it. I fuelled away round and I've come down the side and I've whipped off my top and swung it round my head. Everybody's screaming and I'm throwing my top round my head and everything. It was fantastic man. I didn't have much muscles at the time. I mean I was a bit embarrassed afterwards but it was fantastic. Great day. Another winner against Man United come through this area of the pitch. We've got a wide free kick and I stood a bit offside here and known full well that the defenders were going to come back to me. So I stood a bit offside. Michael Artheta was on the ball, knew he was going to put a good ball in. I knew they were coming back to me and I didn't really need to dare look to be honest here because he put in such a great delivery. I've just managed to get across and when the ball was coming in I knew full well I was going to get my head in it and guide it into the goal. So that was 10 years after the first goal which was the winner and it was nice to get that 10 years later. It was towards the back end of my career. There was about 40 seconds or a minute where everybody was just pressing the ball and the fans were screaming. We just knew that this was going to be your night. We just knew that something good was going to happen. It was going to happen in part of the game and the players all pressed, they attacked and we managed to get the free kick here there. But leading up to that free kick that was unbelievable. I mean the atmosphere was incredible and of course then we stuck the ball in the net and it was just the roof come off me. It came off. It was shaking me. That was the best atmosphere I've ever felt in this game that night. Whoever was there, they'd probably tell you the same. It was an unbelievable night. The seat that I'm sitting in that makes me really proud. This is my daughter's seat and this is one of my son's seats and this is my other son's seat. So my three children sitting in this section in the Gladys Street and that makes me incredibly proud that we're all Evertonians and we all go to the game and we all enjoy that experience and my family are here and they're standing with me when I sit over there and I know my three kids are sitting over here. It makes me incredibly proud that they're a party, the experience and a party of Everton family. I've come back here as a coach. It meant everything to me. I was absolutely delighted, you know what I mean? I was made up.   It's a fantastic feeling. I mean this is, I've got my family and I've got Everton. I love the place and it means everything to me to be a part of the club and to be a part of the fans and that feeling on a Saturday when you come out here and we're all in the stadium wanting the Blues to win. It's a tremendous, tremendous lot of power there and energy and it's just, I feel a part of the Everton family and I feel a part of the fans and of course when we're celebrating that win you know it's nothing better.


Thank you and welcome for joining us here at the series of events of the 2020 2021 North American colloquium on climate policy. Thanks very much for being here. This is the second of three web events, marking the release of eight reports on the topic of North American climate policy. I'm an assistant professor of political science at the University of New Brunswick, and I'll be moderating today's event on the topic of green bilateralism and methane policy. Now, as many of you may know, the North American colloquium is a collaborative venture between the University of Michigan's Ford School of Public Policy, specifically its International Policy Center, the University of Toronto, and the Autonomous National University of Mexico. And this colloquium was established in 2018 and what it does is it brings together leading academic analysts and practitioners from Mexico, Canada and the United States to address key public policy issues facing all three countries. And last year's issue was climate change and so these events and reports on the topic are really a culmination of this year long focus on North American climate policy. And it's also been made possible by the very generous support of the Meany Family Foundation, for which, whose support we're very grateful. So today's event will have about an hour of a run time. It will focus on three reports that I'm delighted to be moderating. So there's first is Canada U.S. Green bilateralism targeting cooperation for climate mitigation by Deborah Van Knighten and Mark McWinnie. And the second one, sorry, they're from Wilford Laurier University and Carleton University, respectively. And the number that we'll hear about today is methane, methane politics and policy in North America by Barry Ray from the University of Michigan. And finally we'll finish up with the dark course of climate change agricultural methane governance in the United States and Canada by Patricia Fisher, also of the University of Michigan. So I've had the great fortune to listen to some of these early presentations and read, sorry, read earlier versions of these reports as they developed. And I really commend all of the authors on their insightful research and analysis and the creation of these reports that really provide an excellent, excellent contribution to our understanding of climate politics in North America and particularly focused on short lived climate pollutants. And so to set our stage for discussions. I'm just going to take a minute or two to highlight some main themes that I see saw as I reread these reports, and, and just to draw through to sort of have you thinking about these as we go forward with the presentations. So first, what I'd like to say is that these reports really provide a compelling examination of as Trish calls them the dark horses of climate change. These are an area of focusing on the elements of GHD admissions and related policy instruments which really have been until very recently out of the public eye, as compared to you know the the sort of high profile topics of carbon pricing for example. These are areas that have often been understudied by climate social scientists who are more focused on carbon pricing and renewable energy procurement. But these reports really demonstrate just how crucial figuring out the politics and the policymaking of these areas will be to achieving deep decarbonization. In particular methane forms a common thread through all these reports as I said, but these reports other tight always also touch on discussions of other short lived climate pollutants. And together they really provide an invaluable primer on why these pollutants are such a problem for climate, why they're often neglected, and why some are more likely to be politically feasible than others. Second, the other sort of theme that I'd like to draw out is that these papers really pay a close attention to the intersecting threads of governance between international agreements bilateral cooperation and national and subnational climate policy. The features of these reports demonstrate these opportunities, but also the shortcomings of high profile international agreements, because in many cases, even when political leadership is present climate policy is constrained and we'll get into that in our conversation I think today. And finally, as with the earlier papers and released in the series for those of you who are able to attend the earlier event. These papers really touch on the importance of the politics of natural gas, whether it's shale gas or liquefied natural gas or renewable natural gas, otherwise known as bio methane and as we all know the geopolitics of natural gas markets rapidly flux with the Russian Ukraine war, but I think that these papers demonstrate the ways in which the production distribution and use of natural gas in North America has really already been rapidly shifting and changing over the last decades and has even changed just during the research of these reports and the timeliness of these reports is incredibly important. And so the work of these authors really reminds us that while the particular current of configuration of events may seem utterly new. In many cases today's energy politics are deeply rooted in past policies and past climate governance arrangements. Thoughts, I would like to pass the floor over to Deb and work. Okay. All right, so I want to just provide a little bit of an overview of what we were trying to do in our paper and then, and a few main takeaways and then I'm going to hand it over to Mark to talk about some of the case studies. In our paper what we really try to do is assess where it makes most sense for Canada in the US to cooperate on policy. And we talk a little bit about how it should be done and how it is being done. So, first what we did is we looked across sort of all of the climate policy and programming in the two countries and, and we look at where there's the closest policy alignment, and then this leads us to a focus on three cases the carbon capture and storage technologies, the reduction of short lived climate pollutants, and then electrification of transport and our focus is really on on electric vehicles, passenger vehicles. And so then what we do with those three cases we dig a bit deeper and we assess bilateral cooperation in those areas, according to a set of seven attributes that we think really should typify good, you know, effective bilateral cooperation. Things like high levels of political commitment, the presence of strategic domestic partners that can help you achieve your agenda, legislative or regulatory framework supporting action.  And there's, there's three kind of takeaways from our partner from our paper. The first is that, you know, there's no doubt that a coordinated and ambitious cross border climate policy strategy is needed in North America, right, we don't we don't simply want to push greenhouse gases around the continent. We want to reduce them, and we need to make every effort to capitalize on what are very close economic and trade ties. And, you know, we want to make sure that North America uses its combined forces to secure a place in the global race for market share and clean tech, because we are definitely in a global race right but that's not what we have in place currently. There is no ambitious cross border climate policy strategy with, you know, with a coherent vision. So under the Biden and Trudeau administrations the architecture supporting bilateral cooperation is lightweight. It's not well institutionalized it's functionally intense, or or functionally intense, and it's not particularly cohesive. The other cross or chosen areas is that bilateral cooperation takes place via a pretty broad array of distinctive cooperative channels and structures that are kind of loosely gathered under an executive umbrella. Right and and you know what we find is this really fragments continental policy efforts. The second takeaway is is a really political one. And that is, while the political will to take ambition ambitious action related to greenhouse gas mitigation, and a green transition is readily available on both sides of the border like this is a, this is a great moment in time for the two countries to be cooperating. The bilateral infrastructure is really vulnerable to domestic political headwinds, but those, but but they're not equally vulnerable. And so what something that I think Mark and I want to draw out in the discussion today is that, you know, if you look across the next two three years, what's left in the mandates of the two administrations. What you see is that domestic politics and opposition are strong are stronger constraint in the US case then in Canada across all of our, all the cases that we look at right, and in fact in Canada I'm going to, you know, sort of controversial make controversially make the argument that national climate policy has become somewhat less vulnerable to opposition from the provinces and large industries. So we can talk about that. And then the third kind of takeaway is that, certainly in the cases of carbon capture storage and EV is right Canada in the US could and should be adopting what Mark and I talk about as a cluster strategy for pursuing continental climate cooperation but they fell to do so thus far. Short-lived climate pollutants. They work less well in a cluster format we can talk about that as well.  Thanks Deborah. Yeah, so one of the one of the key issues that we wanted to define with with this paper is is not only how you go about clustering but how do you choose particular policy areas that, you know, have tendencies that differ from one another, but also can show you how the bilateral cooperative processes may or may not be actually playing out within the domain. So as Deborah indicated, short-lived climate, climate pollutants are interesting and they don't necessarily lend well to a clustered format, yet they have the longest history as far as like formal bilateral regulatory approaches are concerned. So whether you go back to the Canada US air quality agreement or the net zero producers form or the expert working group on black carbon and methane. These are domains and jurisdictions where there has been significant discussion between Canada in the US, and it seems that efforts have not necessarily fallen off but they may have fallen short compared to what it is that we wanted to see so taking a form of, you know, ministerials and joint statements but not actually getting together within, you know, forum discussions and, you know, putting your heads together in a manner that is both constructive and, you know, cooperative so SLCPs, we'd say we chose them on the characterization that you do have this established, you know, regulatory working relationship, but it may not be being explored to its fullest potential. If we turn to vehicle electrification or just electrification in general, the domain itself is interesting because it's characterized by both, you know, cooperation and competitiveness. So we're concerned with vehicle elect electrification within the entire life cycle of, you know, the transition to EV so starting with critical minerals, and then we're looking at vehicle manufacturer battery manufacturer recycling charging infrastructure as the kind of the four key or four or five, including critical mineral strategies that need to sort of be built out in an integrated fashion. But it doesn't seem to be the case for this industry thus far and we think that that stems from, you know, that the competitive the competitiveness of the industry itself, and the desire for a number of key actors and players to be leveraging or attempting to leverage comparative advantage within the domain itself. We certainly understand why this might be the case but we also question whether or not the industry itself can be deployed in a more constructive fashion, if we have, you know, more cooperation on the table. If we stick to these discussions at high level ministerials and in little statements here and there, are we actually talking about cooperation or are the two countries running in parallel with each other. We're talking that point of intersection where intersection is constructive and for the benefit of, of both parties, and there are little items that we can pick out out of, you know, each aspect of that quad factor plus critical minerals and we want to keep critical conversations because the United States has said on multiple occasions that they need to enter into some sort of dependency agreement for their supply of critical minerals. And in Canada is certainly well positioned to fulfill that need but it's going to take an amount of cooperation for that to unfold in a constructive fashion. The CES on the other hand is characterized by, you know, some infrastructure in place and some prior development and developmental cooperation in place. As far as wayburn midale or regional characterization through the PCOR partnership, but it's kind of fallen off the map and we have private actors, taking the steps further in their own regard. Much commitment on the national or the international level we we know that enhanced oil recovery has certainly made the conversation around carbon capture and storage a little bit difficult. But it is still an area where we see promise for cooperation. If we think about CCS in the form of hub source and sync networks, then there's a number of avenues for entrance for for interested parties. Very much, Mark and Deborah you've given us a lot to think about. And we'll move on to Barry who's going to talk about methane and North America. Thanks so much Heather. I know that addressing carbon emissions are really hard political slog, whether we're in Canada, the United States, Mexico, anywhere in the world, to devise policies that have a strong base of political support and create policies that are durable and really drive down carbon emissions is tough to do regardless of sector. One thing and Heather you said it very nicely at the outset that really kind of links across our papers is in varying ways. Each has a focus on the question of short lived climate pollutants. And this is really an area where our natural and physical science colleagues have done most of the lifting and the social sciences have been relatively late to the table to think about those but at least in each of these papers certainly a major focus of mine is the question that when the climate impacts are intensely front loaded, they become near term climate impacts which is true for methane hydrofluorocarbons black carbon and the other short lived climate pollutants. Does that shift or change the politics, because you can argue and perceive that there's a near term or shorter term benefit, as opposed to the discussions we often have in carbon where we're discussing about generations or many many decades where there might be some benefit to telling does that change the politics. In that sense the case that I'm examining CH for methane in the energy sector particularly oil and gas production should be a pretty easy case to make an argument for extensive political engagement. A ton of methane has 87 times the global warming capacity of a similar amount of carbon during its first two decades in the atmosphere consistent with these other pollutants. The oil and gas is the waste of a non renewable natural resource that if captured is in effect gas and has considerable commercial value. There's money being lost all over the place of sloppy oil and gas operations. Methane is clearly on air toxic, in many respects depending on the venting and flaring combinations that are in play and falls directly into the orbit of air quality and air protection. There are also models corporations that have found it relatively easy for some time to minimize methane releases. The European context Norway and the Middle Eastern context Saudi Arabia who actually had enviable methane reduction captured records in some cases for decades or in Norway's cases generations. There was an IEA study that came out two months ago that said if the entire world were to adopt Norway's long standing standards for oil and gas related to methane. We would achieve more than 90% reduction in energy sector methane. Low hanging fruit which I'm reluctant to use because it's almost always trying to let in discussions of methane and so here I go. The reality that for this kind of methane release, the technologies to capture or to mitigate to reduce those emissions are really quite stunning many of them have been around for some time. And many of them are very cost effective, especially when you weigh in the gas capture and economic use of the gas. And yet, when we turn to methane across North America historically but most oil and gas producing states around the world. There's the politics of which there's very very literate very little literature and collectively we're all making contributions to thinking about some of these issues with these with these papers. We're just focusing on these three neighboring Petro States, Mexico, Canada and the United States, especially in very highly decentralized regimes like Canada, and the United States where you have your Texas's and albertas that are given enormous flexibility and latitude to design their own policies in those systems. And each focus is an area of rather soft continental policy agreement, a 2016 North American leader summit not the first not the last, which agreed among the three leaders of North America at that time to achieve deep energy sector methane reductions by the middle of this decade, and much of the paper takes the story across those three cases. And it happens when continental leaders come together and sign a formal agreement. Mexico actually followed fairly promptly and passed legislation that gain accolades from groups like the Environmental Defense Fund, state of the art methane legislation. It's still on the books, by all accounts, it has not been implemented. And so especially under the energy, the oil renationalization under the current government has the remarkable and staggering record of producing less oil, much more methane, and now having to increase its imports of gas from Texas via pipeline to compensate for flared losses of gas that it's producing on its own. Yes, the US ultimately from 2016 shirt. We had one administration the Trump administration reverse efforts by the Obama administration to create a regulatory regime through unilateral executive action. We had aggressive opposition from almost all at that time production states to any federal activity or initiative. And the history of Syria's congressional engagement and very uneven performance across states and firms in the Syria. The exceptional case here is Canada, the Trudeau government, really even before the summit was moving to develop a more credible methane regime model on some best practices has moved to implement that and is actually essentially on track to meet the United Decade 2025 emission reduction targets, three nations, three very different paths. And Heather you've referred to this at the outset one thing that really kind of struck me in my paper is that I thought I was done with this paper about a year ago first draft, and then like policy happened, and politics began to shift and I don't mean to you know, glacial great glacial tectonic shifts and yet, if you look at certainly the American case. Energy sector methane has really begun to move over the last 13 or 14 months, another change of administrations and I don't quite a bit of time toward the very end of the paper over kind of a meditation on what this means in the US. January of 2021. The first time Congress acted using the congressional review act to overturn the Trump administration actually some Republican support, primarily Democrats. We're ignoring the Obama era, let's regulations through legislation not regulation, giving EPA and federal agencies a chance to kind of build on that record. We've begun to see a small set of production states, particularly Colorado and New Mexico our second largest oil producer now after Texas, developing pretty aggressive regulatory programs to capture methane on their own. And that's what Davidson divides between varying types of oil and gas producer industries. It is no longer the uniform coalition that would be opposed to every possible methane proposal at a state capital. And then we have things like the new North American leaders pledge, which is now five months old. They're back together again a different group. And now they've doubled down on the earlier pledge they've changed the language but we now have a new North American agreement. The global provision, the ultimate international soft law, the global methane pledge 110 nations have joined President Biden's challenge to try to achieve a 30% reduction in all of methane through 2030 we'll see how that goes. 110 nations are on board really to this point only Canada has stepped forward and said, we're not only pledging it but here's how we're going to do it. That said, all of this is very uncertain. It is very fragile. And any of these late pivots should not be suggesting that we are well on our way to a very clear and effective methane regime. And yet, we're in a very different place than the first time I actually presented some version of this to my team to my colleagues here but then but then others. And it has made me wonder if you combine this with what we're seeing in the hydrofluorocarbons area in the US but the other countries. If there are some ways that we can begin to think about a North American leadership role in in these areas, mindful though is Deb you pointed out the clustering and aligning these different nations becomes a huge huge challenge so some initial thoughts thanks. Thanks very and we'll move on to Trish Fisher and the politics of agricultural methane. Thanks Heather.  I'd particularly like to thank Barry for his ongoing mentorship. Heather and Marcella Lopez Vallejo for their very thoughtful feedback and Josh for all of his hard work and putting on this colloquium. While I've been interested in the role of livestock in the climate crisis since before I started graduate school. Not only first year at the Ford school that I learned just how under examined from a policy perspective, livestock and agricultural methane were especially in North America. During the last year and a half as I've been researching agricultural methane policy under Barry's tutelage. There has been a pretty seismic shift in the global climate policy arena as very alluded to with nothing moving from relative obscurity to center stage. Despite this unprecedented level of attention on methane, livestock agriculture, which is one of the largest sources of methane emissions globally, simply has not received the same level of attention from climate policy scholars or policymakers. So my paper is an attempt to begin filling that gap by examining the federal and sub federal approaches to agricultural methane mitigation in the US and Canada. These two countries represent particularly important cases for agricultural methane governance. They represent small shares of the global population, but are two of the world's largest producers, consumers and exporters of livestock and animal source food products. As such, the US and Canada bear disproportionate responsibility for global livestock methane emissions, which are estimated to comprise roughly 6% of global greenhouse gas emissions. This issue has become all the more urgent because in the last few years, climate research has demonstrated that even a global combustion of fossil fuels were to cease immediately. Emissions from the global food system alone would preclude 1.5 degrees Celsius of warming and threaten the conclusion of two degrees Celsius of warming by 2100. Half of emissions from the global food system stem from livestock production. Emissions from livestock agriculture have become the so called dark horse of climate change. My paper's key finding is that neither Canada nor the US are considering policy approaches that even approximate the types of comprehensive changes to the food system that will be necessary to avert more than two degrees of warming. To date, the US has focused almost entirely on addressing the small fraction of livestock methane emissions that result from the decomposition of livestock waste. This has primarily been done by subsidizing and incentivizing extraordinarily expensive biogas recovery systems, which can generate electricity or renewable natural gas from livestock waste. These policies do nothing to address the source of the vast majority of livestock methane emissions and tariff fermentation, which is a natural and essential part of ruminant livestock digestive systems. So Canada, on the other hand, has focused on the demand side by recommending reduced consumption of red meat and dairy products, which has in some ways put it ahead of the US. Canada has not pursued any additional policies, for example, a meat tax that would actually put teeth behind these dietary recommendations and begin to draw down livestock production. So for the sake of brevity, I'd be happy to discuss some of the science of livestock methane mitigation, as well as state and provincial strategies during the Q&A. The US and Canada are beginning to fall behind peer countries in terms of livestock methane. For instance, Ireland, the Netherlands and New Zealand have enacted or are considering far more aggressive approaches to livestock methane mitigation, such as mandatory cuts in livestock production and inclusion of agricultural emissions and New Zealand's greenhouse gas pricing scheme. So in conclusion, I hope that by detailing the American and Canadian approaches to agricultural methane governance. My paper will contribute to a small but growing body of research that demonstrates the gap between what is currently being done and the scale of approaches necessary to overt the most catastrophic climate scenarios. There are enormous political barriers ranging from powerful vested interests to voters' dietary preferences that have rendered this such a difficult aspect of the climate crisis to address. We know what needs to be done. Countries in the global north, but particularly the US, given the outsized global influence of American agricultural policy, must transition away from red meat and dairy consumption. However, it remains an open question whether we will muster the political will to effectively address this large and growing source of methane emissions. And with that, I will turn it over back over to Heather. Thanks Trish. Thanks everybody for for those encapsulations. I'll just let everybody who's on the call know that the papers are just currently in press. They're coming out very soon. And so everyone who's here today will we can email you a link to the copy of the papers. I really, really encourage you to read them there. They're just excellent. And I think so what I'll do to kick us off for a little bit of questions a little bit of conversation for about 10 minutes and then we'll open up the floor for conversation for questions. In the interest of time, what I'll ask you to do is to just type your question into the chat so we can, you can either you're welcome to just direct message me Heather Miller, or you can just share it with everyone and then we'll try to sort of cluster those questions towards in about 10 To start us off what I'd like to do is to just pick up on those domestic headwinds that Deborah was talking about what struck me and I know it's my own confirmation bias because I study subnational climate policy, but really the role of these subnational governments as both leaders and ligards in driving momentum around some of these areas, particularly around CCS and electrification of transport but also those production states and agricultural equivalent in interest case so encouraging anyone to jump in and just tell us a little bit more about what your findings were. Well, you know what I'll start us off and try to be controversial. So, when we when we think about Canada, the US and Mexico is, you know, it's a different federal system, but you know, certainly in Canada, the provinces and states have the power to just obstruct, obstruct, obstruct, and they're very effective at doing so. On the other hand, we have those that lead, we have those subnational provinces and states that lead and we also have some good Mexican examples of states that try to lead right. I would say what's interesting right now is that in Canada, the leaders the provinces that are leader leaders are being enabled. The ones that are obstructionists are are being weighed down by the, you know, these layers of federal policies that are being put in place successfully. You know, I would say from the pan Canadian framework to the Supreme Court decision that the feds have precedence in climate policy. And then these layers of ledges greenhouse gas emissions accountability act we've got the emissions reduction plan now we've got methane regulations and then you know they're going to cap oil and gas so I would say that those provinces that want to be obstructionist and have long been obstructions are finding that they can't get purchased in the same way anymore. And, you know, I'll leave it to the others to talk about whether that they see anything like that happening. So depth I'd like to pick up on the first part of your comment, the leader and laggard divide. And we see that big time across the climate space in the US. What makes methane though probably even more complicated than carbon is that there's probably great political will to move on methane among the many states that don't produce oil and gas. And many of them don't have large manufacturing sectors don't use a lot of gas. And the closer you get to points of actual production in states, the political will to address methane declines dramatically. You look at the 15 large production states which are the mainly the jurisdictions that I look at and in my paper. Here you also see how incredibly hyper partisan and divisive methane policy has been amongst states more generally as well, but the Republican Democratic divide which wasn't really true in the first decade of the century but has been there ever since. Almost all of those states are pure Republican states. Politically it would probably be very hard for anyone to survive certainly statewide emphasizing a particular methane strategy or the like and where we do begin to see some states starting to push the edge I mentioned Colorado and New Mexico. These are the states that kind of flip the script and are all Democratic, usually start with a governor kind of pushing the edge legislative pickup, but those are still the minority of production states in the US and so if you look at just those states of one party. New policy leaders they're constantly moving the rest of the pack still would have to be drag kicking and screaming. One last point is I think we really do see in this area, the ability of states, not just to kind of push new policy, but block and actively try to undermine everything that the federal government might try to do. And a real challenge for what the Biden is trying to do through executive action is a lot of that is still going to have to be run through interstate negotiations under the Clean Air Act. State implementations and procedures that could take years to put something into play. And so we may see that script repeat itself. So some thoughts from the energy sector. Yeah, I would just add very briefly that federalism pose an enormous challenge for livestock methane mitigation because livestock agriculture exists and it's mostly viable in every American state and Canadian province. So, you know, livestock agriculture is a highly mobile source of emissions livestock are typically already shipped over very long differences distances. So this, this is a real challenge of when states want to take more serious action. They are basically just ensuring that their livestock industry is going to move to another state or province. And so in, in livestock agriculture, you know, by far, the case that is the most has developed the most comprehensive approach to mitigation is California, and their signature livestock policy, specifically states that the most one of the most overriding objectives is minimizing leakage to other countries and other states so it's a real challenge at the federal level but there has been some action notably in California and Alberta in Canada. Thank you everybody that that raises the, the other thought that I had that I was really curious about which is the role of technical or technological uncertainty versus political viability or feasibility of the these policies and one thing, Deborah mark, I just want to reiterate for our audience, just how comprehensive the work is with regard to measures and really that I really appreciate this combination of conversation about technological readiness as well as the sort of the governance structures that are there and I'm wondering if in your work you talk about the tension between CCS still being as yet commercially unproven but politically viable, whereas Trish your work really highlights the extreme unproven nature of any kind of classified policy solutions for methane mitigation, whereas Barry your work's almost you know it's the other side it's sort of technologically we know what to do it's it's just not there so I'm wondering if you might talk. If anyone has any thoughts about the sort of role of of both technological but also political uncertainty in your research and the way that they interact. I mean, I guess I can start that off from the technological side, at least and because you brought up carbon capture, it is an interesting domain to kind of begin with one of the big issues with carbon capture is of course that it is prohibitively and time prohibitively expensive and we're trying to, you know, understand that there is the direct air capture route which is, of course the, you know, most promising application of carbon capture because it has the ability to actually generate negative emissions. The problem with that of course is that pulling carbon directly out of the atmosphere in any CCS conversation is at the bottom of the feasibility chain. It just is too expensive we do have, you know, big private sector players, like looking into this issue, but at this point in time we need to think about carbon capture and sequestration, usually through, you know, the oil and gas channels. But with with that being said, the conversation then turns to what are you actually doing when you sequester carbon and whether or not you are using that sequestered carbon for the purposes of enhanced oil recovery. And one of the big hindrances for CCS really taking off is a concern that stems from EOR because EOR pushes the emissions somewhere down the road. Yes, you are taking, you know, carbon and recycling it as part of the process, but that those fossil fuels are still going to be burned somewhere down the line so thinking about downstream emissions certainly, you know, scares people a little bit on EOR and the pushback in the Canadian context has been big on that we just had a big letter from over 400 concerned scientists in Canada, because the Canadian economy is currently proposing or just had a consultation period on how they would structure a tax credit for carbon capture purposes, and the resounding consensus was that if this is going to happen and if we facilitate this credit. We do not want to see it going towards EOR. In time, you still want to be able to leverage the industry itself you want to create economies of scale within the industry so it I think it is a bit of a balancing act, at least on that technological side. But as we see the technology kind of proliferate into different industries and methane is certainly a big one which I think that that Barry can speak to. I wouldn't call it off the table it's we need to, you know, encourage and facilitate the investment so that we can, you know, downsize on the on the side of cost and then increase on the on the side of efficiency. So if I could pick up on that you know Heather you frame the methane point in your great question that technologically we seem to know what to do about it. And yet there's a flip side to that. Technically we actually don't know how much methane is being produced from site to site, state to state province to province. I mean we're like way off. And unlike most of the other climate contaminants, certainly carbon but others, we don't have reliable data. And one of the themes that I explore in the paper is this sort of irony where we have all this capture technology and all the rest but it's only belatedly that we're beginning to develop a recognition that the reporting systems that have been placed which are largely industry driven exhibit an extraordinary downward bias and a broad rule of thumb across a large large number of studies is that a lot of posted data is off by 40 to 70%. You know, imagine if we were having this conversation about greenhouse gas emissions from a power plant, well, we're not sure. This is really, really challenging, yet it's also one where I think the natural and physical sciences that have focused on monitoring and satellite and overflight issues have really brought much, much more attention at least to energy sector methane than perhaps livestock agriculture and some of these other areas. And there could be some really significant advancements if we get those numbers right in part because of the bad news. The numbers are going to be much, much higher than anyone wanted to believe five or 10 years ago when natural gas seemed a much more attractive alternative to coal than it is now. So I think for livestock there, there are some parallels with energy sector methane which is that we really have no idea how how much methane emissions are coming from livestock and particularly from livestock waste. So there's been recent studies have demonstrated that there's just this enormous gap between bottom up estimates from livestock waste and like when they actually deploy those that are doing aerial surveillance technology and we're talking about orders of magnitude difference and in the estimate in the estimate so the numbers that are typically cited in the literature are probably way, way off. In terms of what the future of technology is going to look like in livestock methane mitigation. I think it's going to come down to how fast the FDA and similar bodies globally are going to be able to approve drugs vaccines and genetically engineered animals to decrease their methane emissions so there have been genetically engineered cattle already approved by the FDA to be heat tolerant so I think like that's where we're going in the future. But there's obviously this sort of enormous question about the consumer acceptance and potential health implications like on animal health and subsequently human health of what you know genetically engineered cattle needs. I think I'm going to move on to some questions from the audience I'm going to ask one for each of the presenters, just to get them out there and have you chance to think about them so first for Debra and Mark from Christopher Barrack. There are inherently different incentives for cooperation on a policy option or there sorry inherently different incentives for cooperation on policy option like CCS to an area like electrification. And if so are there some areas in particular that you really want to push with regard or that you found with regards to low hanging fruit in terms of North American cooperation. So for Barry, looking at the, the different paths between Canada the US and Mexico. What kind of variation do you see across the cases with particularly with regards to interest group mobilization or relative costs or differences in constituencies that might benefit from these more stringent regulations, like those found in other parts of the world and that's from the Dutch Pell. And as well for Trish, just to give you an opportunity to talk a bit about this, the comprehensive work in your paper about supply side or supply side measures. I'm just wondering if you want to talk a little bit more about demand side policies and what some of those might look like from from your other, from your other cases that you look at in the paper. And I guess maybe Deborah Mark, if you are willing to go first. Sure, well, you know, that's a really hard question, Christopher.  So, you know, we have to make we have to do the hard stuff. Now, that said, um, two quick thoughts below hanging fruit is energy efficiency, right, which we could be doing, you know, Mark and I started looking at that that's not something that we went, we dug into in the paper. That is the low hanging fruit and in the North American context we could be doing a lot more and there's infrastructure there.  But like, I think EVs are just an open and shut case. Who else is going to compete with China in terms of manufacturer of batteries, manufacturer of cars, the critical minerals to create all of this, plus battery recycling, which we need to talk more about battery recycling. That's an area that is under kind of provision globally. North America could be North America could be the battery recycling kind of center. Right. But all of those components that Mark and I talk about we talk about like the EV quad factor, right trifecta is a horse bet that you put in we call it the, the quad factor right. We could be organizing this on a continental scale to compete and we're not, we're not doing that and you know Mark and I are just like, why we keep having these discussions about this makes so much sense. And, and, you know, Canada should be playing hardball and saying, we got the critical minerals, but we're not going to give them unless we're doing this, this and the other thing so let's let's play ball and we did we don't see that happening. Yeah, thanks. And thanks Eric for the question. I think this question of playing ball is a really interesting one. And in part, I think one of the questions that I've been posing a lot over our project is should we really think about tri lateralism and the full continent, or do we look for targets of opportunities when at least two of the three nations are aligning as always, given the history and the challenges and doing some of this. And how do you sort of play off these differences. That's one observation relatedly and we just mentioned the US, Mexico, Canada trade agreement, replacing the NAFTA agreement, put together the last stages of the negotiation is an interesting one to weigh and think about because it might it could have theoretically built on what NAFTA began and some of the environmental space it largely did not US MCA has had some great advantages, advances continentally and digital governance, labor policy it was supported by a lot of Republicans and Democrats through the approval process in Congress. And yet that whole continental question, could you come back through the amendment process or the fact that US MCA has to be revised I believe every six reviewed every six years. Could you bring in some of this content into that is that an arena to play ball if you did. What would be that sweet or subset of policies. One last point is that we really haven't talked about this much in our discussions but I think a significant is thinking about how different the three nations are in terms of carbon pricing. As Canada moves toward end of the decade toward a $170 a time carbon price Canadian currency but a huge new price. The Mexican carbon price is at about $1 converted to us with exemptions for natural gas, and the US carbon price as best as I can see is going to remain at zero. The possibility that the European Union is going to launch a process known as carbon border adjustment trade wars, tariffs and all the rest is North America going to align and work against or work with Europe. And what happens when we have this sort of interesting cross border dynamic when you cross over where I live the ambassador bridge and you move from a carbon free tax zone to one of the largest carbon prices in the world. And all of those pieces is that cuts across whether we're looking at methane or some of these other areas and I think that's some of the underlying policy for which I'm not at all sure there's a good institutional design yet. And Trish I want to leave it with you to, to, it's just tell us more about those demand side policies if you want. So, in 2019, Canada rolled out new dietary guidelines, which really emphasize the need to transition away from a million protein and towards mostly plant these sources of protein. And these dietary guidelines have been heralded by all different kinds of environmental organizations as sort of sample sustainable nutrition guidelines. So I think there's definitely something there. But there's a study out of the OECD that has shown that red meat consumption is not going to change in Canada without some sort of market intervention. So, there's a pretty substantial literature and public health that sort of demonstrates that dietary guidelines only do so much like they're good but they're, they don't really move the needle all that much. This is really like a very small and emerging field of research so there's not a lot there there. But I will say that a host of European countries have implemented these same kinds of dietary guidelines that really specify that you should be eating almost no red meat whatsoever. Countries including Australia and the UK have considered meat taxes, but none have been implemented. With the exception of it in Hungary, which has sort of a broader junk food tax, which I think like hamburgers and things like that like qualify in the junk food tax. And then lastly, this is being rolled out across the EU and there's constant battles by different countries with large meat, pork and cheese industries. But the EU has a system called NutriScore, which puts like a red, yellow, green label on food packaging that indicates sort of the health and sustainability implications of your food choices. Luckily, sustainable diets and healthy diets like pretty much overlap entirely so it's a pretty easy score, something to think about, but yeah there's there's constantly, you know, Spanish pork producers and Italian cheeses that are getting really angry about you know the lack of a green NutriScore on their foods. We're getting close to time so I'm going to leave a minute for everyone to provide a last thought if they want while you're thinking about what that last thought will be. Del you remind everyone that there is one last panel in this series which will be held next Tuesday, April 12 from the same time, four to five EDT and that is on US Canada climate public opinion and urban climate governance with the excellent Christopher Bork, Eric LaChapelle, Sarah Hughes, and Brendan Boyd, really a very exciting panel as well. So I will turn back over to our presenters to share their final thoughts. Maybe I'll go in backwards order this time so Tricia I'll start with you. So I think we're at this really pivotal moment where there seems to just be a convergence of a ton of different forces that make mostly plant based diets. You know the easy choice inflation in red meat has been the highest of any food category in the US and Canada. So the evidence about colorectal cancer and other forms of chronic diseases from red meat just keeps on piling up year after year. And the climate implications of red meat and dairy consumption are increasingly being spotlighted by the IPCC and other climate and environmental body. It is clearly a really tremendous problem that has very little political interest in it. And I think it's some of you may remember this that a study actually from University of Michigan came out right at the beginning of the Biden administration. I was talking about meat and climate and it became like sort of a social media phenomenon that Biden was trying to take away your hamburgers. And I think that sort of just sums up how difficult it is that like our national identities are very much tied in both countries with meat and dairy consumption and that is going to be a really difficult issue to solve. Very energy methane Heather goes back to the point that you raised at the end of your opening, what is the future of natural gas and how do we think about it. On the one hand, reducing methane reduces impacts but perhaps opens a path for continued use of natural gas and yet, as we look at climate policy as we look at European energy policy. So just to get to zero use and production of oil and gas is a very uncertain one, not just in North America so the methane piece is part of that larger cell and conversation about how we we achieve these transitions. Thanks. We're to mark and Deborah for final thoughts. I think the final thought for us just comes out of that that cluster approach at large and understanding that if we are going to make our way, you know, through this climate crisis with good structured and well mannered policy. I think that is not only like a need to cooperate but also a serious amount of potential for cooperation. And I think that as, you know, or we think that as, you know, the climate crisis presents this global commons problem. So there is part of that that suggests that you need to have cooperation in order to get through it the actions that states may take on their own will have the potential to mitigate to an extent. But I think that there's, or we think that there's a need to picture this landscape as one of cooperation and not necessarily one of competition because that will probably, or will hopefully lead to, you know, a much more constructive approach. So not only getting through this but also the next steps to sort of take after you've you've hopefully handled some of the most damning parts of it. Well, thanks everybody and thank you everyone for attending today. I hope you have a wonderful evenings and encourage you to again just register by clicking on the Ford school website for that panel. Next week and yes, a huge congratulations on the achievement of these final reports. And again, encourage you all to read them they are great reading. Thank you.


Hi everyone, Joe for Jasmine's casewrakes.com coming at you with 2023 Topps Museum Collection Baseball 1 box random division break number 19 And a free spot giveaway here as well big thanks to this group for making it happen if you bought a full spot You got a chance to win a full spot So let's roll randomize it one into three four times between David and Eric one two three and Once more fourth and final time It's gonna be David David with the extra spot after four Now let's randomize you a division Let's roll it and randomize it six and a five eleven times their names and divisions two three And eleven then final time after eleven we got some davids down to a couple erics Eleven times for the divisions To Eleven the final time what a tyreek he'll do All right david nl west a l west a l central nl east Eric nl central nl east I'll spotize those by division I are you guys gonna trade between each other not sure I don't think I saw any of either of those guys in the chat today, but Let's pick a box first So we'll go one two three for the left side four five six for the right side and then we'll pick an individual box There's four we'll go right side and then we'll go One two three four on the dice roll if I roll a five or a six. I'll just roll again like that And that And it's one top box All right looks like no I don't know if they're there, but it looks like no deals So let's just close the trade window. Let's print and rip Twc trade window closed David and eric good luck We have a packers td maybe Oh, we've got a redemption down here Any guesses on the redemption for bragging rights? There's a gunner henderson your al rookie of the year gabriel morano into two ninety nine Gabriel morano will go to the snakes. That's going to be nl west That will be for david gunner henderson al east also for david Miguel vargas might have to give up that number And he reveals a uh a nice quartet here brice harper mani machado christian yellich nick casianos that is uh, I can't see the number because it's Casianos is jersey here Looks like that is 63 out of 99 What's the uh, what's the relationship between all four of these players? Why are they on this one card? So that'll be a randomizer between the al uh nl east nl west and nl central All right, are they different people? Yes, I think they're different people. All right, jordan walker Reveals a bobbywood jr. Nice 57 out of 99 That'll be for the al central david and we have carlos korea 22 out of 35 al central david And the redemption It's the other way around and the redemption Congratulations, someone is due to receive a single player signature swatches triple relic autograph. All right. Good luck to both of you It's gonna be jose barrios Toronto blue jays al east david with the al east All right now the randomizer All right, so we got brice harper nl uh east Let's just go Make that easy fillies padres and then milwaukee fillies again. So philadelphia has the odds On their side team on top after three into three six the hard way. We'll get it one two three four five And six goes to milwaukee. That's the nl central last spot mojo helping eric out Gets the quad relic 63 out of 99. There you go. Eric will something for you All right, thanks everybody another one box breakdown. I'm joe. I'll see you next time for the next one