Chapter 7, Part 1 of the Life of Washington, Volume 3 by John Marshall. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Chapter 7, Part 1, Distress in the American Camp, Expedition Against Staten Island, Requisitions on the State's New Scheme of Finance, Committee of Congress deputed to camp, Resolution to Makeup, Depreciation of Pay, Mutiny in the Line of Connecticut, General Knipphausen enters Jersey, Sir Henry Clinton returns to New York, Skirmish at Springfield, Exertions to Strengthen the Army, Bank Established in Philadelphia, Contributions of the Ladies, Further Proceedings of the States, Arrival of a French Armament in Rhode Island, Changes in the Quarter Master's Department, Enterprise Against New York Abandoned, Naval Superiority of the British, 1780, While Disasters Thus Crowded on Each Other, In the Southern States, the Commander-in-Chief found himself surrounded with difficulties, which required his utmost exertions to avoid calamities equally distressing. His urgent requisitions form him to supply the places of those who were leaving the service were not complied with and that soldiers who remained could scarcely be preserved from either perishing with cold and hunger or dispersing and living on plunder. General Green and Colonel Wadsworth, who had for the preceding year been at the head of the Quarter Master and Commissary Departments, possessed distinguished merit and had employed assistance of unquestionable ability and integrity. Yet for a great part of the campaign, the rations were frequently reduced and the Army was rarely supplied with provisions for more than a few days in advance. Soon after coming into winter quarters, the magazines were exhausted and afforded neither meat nor flour to be delivered to the men. This state of things had been long foreseen and all the means and the power of the Commander-in-Chief had been used to prevent it. Repeated representations of the actual famine with which the Army was threatened had been made to Congress and to the state governments, but no adequate relief was afforded and such was the condition of the finances so embarrassing the state of affairs that it was perhaps attainable only by measures which the governments could not venture to adopt. The rapid depreciation of the continental currency had long been viewed with apprehensive anxiety by the enlightened friends of the Revolution and various unsuccessful expedients had been assayed for the purpose of checking its progress. All perceived that the great quantity in circulation was the principal cause of the diminution of its value and Congress had resolved not to exceed 200 millions of dollars in their emissions. In the meantime, the utmost endeavors were used to defer an evil. So justly dreaded and among the expedients employed was that of withholding from the public agents the money which was necessary for public purposes, the unwise experiment while it defeated its own object threatened the dissolution of the American Army. The difference between the value of the article at the times of contract and the payment was soon perceived and of course influenced its price but this was the least mischievous consequence of this mistaken policy. The public agents contracted enormous debts which they were unable to discharge. Repeated disappointments destroyed their credit and towards the close of the year 1779 they found it impracticable to obtain supplies for the subsistence of the Army. From these causes the contracts entered into could not be co-extensive with the public wants and many of those which were made were not complied with in this critical state of things. An entire revolution was made in the commissary department such was the prejudice against the system adopted by Great Britain for supplying by contract that it had been usual to allow as a compensation through the commissary a stipulated commission on all the monies expended on public account. After some time this allowance was supposed to be an inducement to purchase at high prices and an arrangement was made on the 1st of January by which the commissary general was to receive a fixed nominal salary in the paper currency and was permitted to appoint assistants whose compensations were also fixed and who were to defray out of those compensations all the expenses attending the transactions of the business. The practice of allowing them rations and forage was discontinued. This new system was unfortunately so modified as to increase the embarrassments of the department. It was found difficult to obtain assistance and agents for the compensation allowed and those who were willing to be employed were unequal to the duties assigned them. For several days the soldiers were reduced to half allowance and sometimes to less. At length the fierce came to the crisis which had long been threatened. In early in January a letter was received from Colonel Wasworth informing the general that it was absolutely out of his power to supply the army longer with meat as he was without money and had totally exhausted his credit. About the same time the assistant commissary residing in camp gave notice that his stock of provisions was on the point of being expended and that he had no immediate prospect of a father supply. This state of things compelled the commander in chief to adopt efficacious measures to relieve the immediate and pressing wants of his soldiers. He required from each county in the state of Jersey a quantity of meat and flour proportion to its resources to be raised and forwarded to the army within a limited time not exceeding six days. In a circular letter addressed to the magistrates he stated the pressing wants of the army and the necessity of resorting to coercion should his requisition fail. To the honor of the magistrates and people of New Jersey although their country was much exhausted the supplies required were instantly furnished and a temporary relief obtained. The patient and then complaining fortitude with which the soldiers bore their sufferings was strong evidence of their patriotism could not fail to make a deep impression on their general but while their virtues excited his sensibilities he expressed his fears very freely to Congress that they might be too severely tried. The unusual severity. The winter seemed to furnish an opportunity for active enterprise which the commander in chief observed without being able to improve the garrison of New York and its immediate dependencies was supposed to be reduced to 10 or 11,000 defecteds and the security here to forward derived from its sensual situation no longer existed. The ice was so strong that the whole army with a strain of wagons and artillery might pass over without danger. This circumstance afforded a glorious occasion for striking a blow which if successful would most probably terminate the war. The effort would seem not to have exceeded the strength of America. Could that strength have been exerted in proper season but the government possessed neither sufficient energy nor concentration of power to call it forth and this opportunity passed away as many which present themselves in the course of human affairs must pass away if those who should take advantage of them only begin to deliberate about making preparations in the season for action. The force under the immediate command of general Washington was decidedly inferior to that in New York and so far was he from having reason to expect immediate reinforcements that Congress had not agreed on making a requisition for them. In addition to this feebleness and poignant numbers the soldiers were not half clothed. Provisions for immediate use could be obtained only by contributions from the people. The quarter masters department was unable to put an army in motion and the military chest did not contain a dollar. Under the pressure of this combination of discouraging circumstances the act of mind of Washington still looked forward to the possibility of deriving some advantage from the exposed situation of his adversary. The troops on Staten Island were competed at 1,000 or 1,200 men and the firm Bridge of Ice now uniting that island to the Jersey shore seemed to furnish an opportunity for bearing off this core. General Washington determined to make the attempt with 2,500 men to be commanded by Major General Lord Sterling. The more distant troops moved down on sleds and to favor a surprise the opinion was inculcated that they only constituted a relief for the detachment already on the lines. January on the night of the 14th of January Lord Sterling moved over from DeHart's point and detaching Lieutenant Colonel Willett to Decker's house where Buskirk's regiment was stationed proceeded himself to the watering place where the main body was posted. Notwithstanding the precautions which have been taken the alarm had been given at each post and the troops had saved themselves and their works so that only a few prisoners were made contrary to the intelligence previously received the communication with New York was still open and the works appeared too strong to justify the hazard of attempting to carry them by assault. January 17th the object of the expedition being unattainable Lord Sterling commenced his retreat which was affected with considerable loss. A body of cavalry which charged his rear was repulsed but from the intenseness of the cold and the defectiveness of his means to protect his men from it. Some of them were frostbitten and a few stragglers were made prisoners. The excessive cold continuing the rivers were soon afterwards completely blocked up. Even arms of the sea were passable on the ice and the islands about the mouth of the Hudson presented the appearance of one whole and unbroken continent. This state of things produced a great degree of suffering among all classes in New York. The supplies usually received by water failed totally and a great scarcity of provisions and a few was the consequence. To increase the scarcity the American troops on the lines were so disposed as to interrupt the communication between the country and the town and these arrangements produced a partisan war in which the advantage was rather on the side of the British. In one of the most important of these skirmishes Captain Roberts of Massachusetts with 14 of his men were killed on the spot, 17 were wounded of whom three died in a few days and Lieutenant Colonel Thompson of Massachusetts who commanded the party to captains for subalterns and 99 commissioned officers and privates were made prisoners. The admission of the full sum of 200 millions of dollars in continental bills of credit which Congress had solemnly resolved not to exceed had been completed in November, 1779 and the money was expended. The requisitions on the states to replenish the treasury by taxes were not fully complied with and had they even been strictly observed and would not have produced the sum equal to the public expenditure. It was therefore necessary to devise other measures for the prosecution of the war. During the distresses which brought the army to the brink of dissolution, these measures were under consideration. So early as December 1779, Congress had determined to change the mode of supplying the army from purchases to requisitions of specific articles on the several states. As preliminary to this system, commissioners were appointed to make the estimates and to introduce every practicable reform in the expenditures. This subject was under deliberation until the 25th of February when sundry resolutions were passed apportioning on the states, their respective quarters of provisions, spirits and forage for the ensuing campaign. The value of the several articles was estimated in specie and assurances were given that accounts between the states should be regularly kept and finally settled in Spanish mill dollars. For the purpose of inducing and facilitating a compliance with these requisitions, Congress also resolved that any state which shall have taken the necessary measures for furnishing its quota and have given notice thereof to Congress shall be authorized to prohibit any continental quartermaster or commissary from purchasing within its limits. These resolutions constituting the basis about new system on which the future subsistence of the army was essentially to depend were too deeply interesting not to receive the anxious attention of the commander in chief with regret he communicated to Congress the radical defects he perceived in their arrangements with his apprehensions that this untried scheme would fail in practice. His judgment and the judgment of all men engaged in high and responsible situations was decidedly in favor of conducting the war on a national rather than on a state system but independent of this radical objection economy had been so much more consulted than the probable necessities of the army that in almost every article the estimate had fallen far short of the demand to be reasonably expected. The total omission to provide means for supplying occasional deficiencies from the surplus resources of any particular state was an error of still greater magnitude. It was obvious that the demand in any state which should become the theater of war would be much greater than its quota and experience had shown that the carriage of specific articles from distant places was always difficult and expensive and sometimes impracticable. Yet no means were adopted to supply such extraordinary demand whatever it might be the resources of the country a still more radical objection to the system was the principle enabling any state which should take means to comply with the requisition and should notify those means to the government of the United States to prohibit the continental agents from making any purchases within its territory. Among the states which adopted the proposition of Congress was New Jersey in which the largest division of the army was stationed its legislature passed an act prohibiting the purchase of provisions within its jurisdiction by the staff of the continental line under severe penalties and refused to authorize its own agents to provide for any emergency however pressing. It was an additional objection to these requisitions that they specified no periods of the year within which certain portions of the articles demanded should be raised and consequently might be complied with although the army should be left destitute of every necessary for a considerable part of the campaign. These suggestions however with others less material to the military operations did not receive the attention which was due to their importance a disposition in the members of Congress growing inevitably out of the organization of the government to consult the will of their respective states and to prefer that will to any other object had discovered itself at an early period and had gained strength with time. The state of the national treasury was calculated to promote this disposition. It was empty and could be replenished only by taxes which Congress had not the power to impose or by new emissions of bills of credit which the government had pledged the public faith not to make and which would rest for their redemption only on that faith which would be violated in the very act of their emission under these circumstances it required a degree of energy seldom found to struggle with surrounding difficulties for the preservation of a general system and to resist the temptation to throw the nation at the feet of the states in whom the vital principle of power the right to levy taxes was exclusively vested while the continental currency preserved its value its this essential defect of the constitution was in some measure concealed. The facility with which money was obtained from the press was a temporary substitute for the command of the resources of the country but when this expedient failed it was scarcely possible to advance a single step but under the guidance of the respective states. Whatever might be the future effect of this system it was impracticable to bring it into immediate operation. The legislatures of the several states by whom it was to be adopted and carried into execution were many of them not them in session and were to meet at different times through the ensuing spring. It was consequently to be expected that great part of that summer would pass away before the supplies to be raised by the measure could be brought into use. In the meantime and until a new scheme of finance which accompanied the requisition of specific articles should be tried there was no regular provision for the army. Financial regulations bills to the amount of 100,000 pounds sterling payable at six months site were drawn on Mr. J and others to the same amount on Mr. Lawrence who were empowered to negotiate loans in Europe. These bills were sold in small sums on pressing occasions and the loan offices remained open for the purpose of borrowing from individuals. This new scheme of finance was a second essay to substitute credit unsupported by solid funds and resting solely on that public faith for money. The vast quantity of bills unavoidably emitted before the establishment of regular governments possessing sufficient energy to enforce the collection of taxes or to provide for their redemption and before the governments of Europe were sufficiently confident of their stability to afford them aid or credit was assigned by Congress as the principal cause of that depreciation which had taken place in the continental currency. The United States were now they set under different circumstances. Their independence was secure. Their civil governments were established ambiguous and the spirit of their citizens ardent for exertion to government being thus rendered competent to the object it was necessary to reduce the quantity of paper and circulation and to appropriate funds that should ensure the puncture redemption of the bills. For these purposes, the several states were required to continue to bring into the continental treasury monthly from February to April inclusive their full quotas of 15 millions of dollars in complying with this requisition, one Spanish mill dollar was to be received in lieu of $40 of the paper currency. The bills so brought in were not to be reissued but destroyed and other bills not to exceed $1 for every 20 received in discharge of taxes were to be emitted. These bills were to be redeemable within six years and were to bear an interest of five per cent per annum to be paid at the time of their redemption in specie or at the election of the holder annually and bills of exchange drawn by the United States on their commissioners in Europe at four shillings and sixpence sterling for each dollar. They were to be issued in ascertain proportions on the funds of the several states with a collateral security on the part of the government to pay the quota of any particular state which the events of the war might render incapable of complying with its own engagements. The bills were to be deposited in the continental loan offices of the several states and were to be signed only as the money then in circulation should be brought in by taxes or otherwise. And being signed, six tenths of them were to be delivered to the states on whose funds they were to be issued and the remaining four tends to be retained for the use of the continent. The operation of this scheme of finance was necessarily suspended by the same causes which suspended that for requiring specific articles. It depended on the sanction and cooperation of the several state legislatures, many of which were yet to convene as it would be impracticable to maintain the value of the money about to be emitted should the states continued to issue bills of credit. They were earnestly requested to suspend future emissions and to call the current paper out of circulation but the time for this measure was not yet arrived and many of the states continued the use of the press till late in the following year. The establishment of the army for the ensuing campaign was fixed at 35,211 men and the measures for recruiting it were founded on the state system which was become entirely predominant. The few intelligent statesmen who could combine practical good sense with patriotism perceived the dangerous in efficacy of a system which openly abandoned the national character and proceeded on the principle that the American Confederacy was no more than an alliance of independent nations. That great delays would be experienced that the different parts of the plan would be acted on to unequally and to and certainly to furnish a solid basis for military calculations that the system would be totally deranged in its execution where mischiefs foreseen and lamented by many as resulting inevitably from a course of measures to which the government of the union was under the painful necessity of submitting. Sir Niam said the commander-in-chief in a confidential letter to a member of the national legislature that unless Congress speaks in a more decisive tone unless they are vested with powers by the several states competent to the great purposes of the war or assume them as a matter of right and they in the states respectively act with more energy than they hitherto have done. Our cause is lost. We can no longer drudge on in the old way by ill timing, the adoption of measures, by delays in the execution of them or by unwarrantable jealousies. We incur enormous expenses and derive no benefit from them. One state will comply with a requisition from Congress. Another neglects to do it. A third executes it by halves and all differ in the manner, the matter or so much in point of time that we are all working uphill. And while such a system as the present one or rather want of one prevails, we ever shall be unable to apply our strength or resources to any advantage. This, my dear sir, is plain language to a member of Congress, but it is the language of truth and friendship. It is the result of long thinking, close application and strict observation. I see one head gradually changing into 13. I see one army branching into 13. And instead of looking up to Congress as the supreme controlling power of the United States, consider themselves as dependent on their respective states. In a word, I see the power of Congress declining too fast for the respect which is due to them as the great representative body of America and I'm fearful of the consequences. But whatever might be his objections to the proposed system, General Washington was unremitting in his endeavors to render the plan perfect in detail and to give to its execution all the aid which his situation and influence enabled him to afford. The distresses of the army for food which had found temporary relief in that particular exertions of the magistrates and people of New Jersey soon returned and it became what's more necessary even after the magazines have been in some degree replenished to recur to the same persons for assistance. The supplies of forage had failed and a great proportion of the horses had perished or been rendered unfit for use. Neither funds nor credit were possessed for the purchase of others. And the quarter master general found himself unable to transport provisions from remote magazines into camp. This circumstance reduced the commander in chief to the painful necessity of calling on the patriotism of private citizens under the penalty of military impressment should a voluntary contribution be refused for those means of conveyance which the government could not supply. The want of food was not the only difficulty to be surmounted. Others of a serious nature presented themselves. The pay of an officer was reduced by the depreciation of the currency such a miserable pittance as to be unequal to the supply of the most moderate demands. The pay of a major general would no longer hire an express rider and that of a captain would not purchase the shoes in which he marched. The American officers were not rich and many of them had expended their little all in the service. If they had exhausted their private funds or if they possessed none, they could rely only on the state to which they belong for such clothing as the state might be willing or able to furnish. These supplies were so insufficient and unequal as to produce extreme dissatisfaction in the lines of some of the states that officers gave notice in a body of their determination to resign on a given day if some decent and certain provision should not be made for them. The remonstrances of the commander-in-chief produced an offer to serve as volunteers until their successor should be appointed and on the rejection of this proposition they were with difficulty induced to remain in service. Under these complicated embarrassments, they required all that enthusiastic patriotism which preeminently distinguishes the soldier principle, all that ardent attachment to the cause of their country which originally brought them into the field in which their sufferings could not diminish all the influence of the commander-in-chief whom they almost adored to retain in their service men who felt themselves neglected and who believed themselves to be the objects of the jealousy of their country rather than of its gratitude. Among the private causes of disgust grew out of the very composition of the army which increased the dissatisfaction produced by their multiplied wants. The first effort made to enlist troops for the war had in some degree succeeded while these men found themselves obliged to continue in service without compensation and often without the common necessaries of life. They perceived the vacant ranks and their regiments filled up by men who were to continue only for a few months and who received bounties for that short service from individuals or from the states which were of great real value and which appeared to soldiers not acquainted with the actual state of depreciation to be immense. They could not be able to compare situations and to repine and add engagements which deprived them of advantages which they saw in possession of others. Many were induced to contest those engagements many to desert a service in which they experienced such irritating inequalities and all felt with the more opponent indignation those distressing failures in the commissary department which so frequently recurred. Committee of Congress deputed decant in consequence of the strong representations made to Congress on these various causes I've described. A committee of three members repaired the camp for the purpose of consulting with commander-in-chief on such arrangements as the means and possession of the government would enable it to make and the present state of the army might require in representing the condition of the troops they said that the army was unpaid for five months that a seldom had more than six days provisions in advance and was on several occasions for several successive days without meat that the army was destitute of forage that the medical department had neither tea, chocolate wine nor spiritus liquors of any kind that every department of the army was without money and had not even the shadow of credit left that the patients of the soldiers born down by the pressure of complicated sufferings was on the point of being exhausted. To relieve this glumete state of things by transfusing into an array of hope for the future a resolution was passed declaring that Congress would make good to the line of the army and to the independent core thereof the deficiency of their original pay which have been occasioned by the depreciation of the continental currency and that the money or other articles here to forth received should be considered as advanced on account to be comprehended in that settlement to be finally made. The benefits of this resolution were confined to those who were then in actual service or should thereafter come into it and who were engaged for the war or for three years. This resolution was published in general orders and had considerable influence on the army but not sufficient to remove the various causes of dissatisfaction which existed and were continually multiplying the engagement to make good to depreciation of their pay was an act of justice to long withheld and no promise for the future could supply the place of present comfortable subsistence. No hope was given that their condition in this respect would be improved for a considerable time the troops received only from one half to one eighth of a ration of meat and at length were several days without a single pound of that necessary article. This long course of suffering had unavoidably produced some relaxation of discipline and it gradually soured the minds of the soldiers to such a degree that their discontents broke out into actual mutiny. May 25th on the 25th of May two regiments belonging to Connecticut paraded under arms with a declared resolution to return home or to obtain subsistence at the point of the bayonet. The soldiers of the other regiments though not actually joining the mutineers showed no disposition to suppress the mutiny by great exertions on the part of the officers aided by the appearance of a neighboring brigade of Pennsylvania then commended by Colonel Stewart the leaders were secured in. The two regiments brought back to their duty. Some sentiments however were disclosed by the soldiers in answer to the remonstrances of their officers of a serious and alarming nature. Their pay was now five months in a rear and the depreciation of the money they said was such that it would be worth nothing when received and reminded of the late resolution of Congress for making good the loss sustained by depreciation of the reputation acquired by their past good conduct and of the value of the object for which they were contending. They answered that their sufferings were too great to be longer supported that they wanted present relief and must have some present substantial recompense for their services. A paper was found in the brigade which appeared to have been brought by some emissary from New York stipulating the troops to the abandonment of the cause in which they were engaged. Gene said, this concerns of the army and the complaints excited in the country by the frequent requisitions on the people of New Jersey have been communicated with such exaggeration to the officer commanding in New York as to induce the opinion that the American soldiers were ready to desert their standards and the people of New Jersey to change their government. General Niphausen enters Jersey to countenance these dispositions. General Niphausen embarked at Staten Island and landed in the night with about 5,000 men at Elizabeth Town Point in New Jersey. Early next morning he marched towards Springfield by the way of Connecticut farms but soon perceived that the real temper both of the country and the army had been misunderstood. On the appearance of the enemy the militia assembled with alacrity and aided the small patrolling parties of continental troops and harassing him on his mark from Elizabeth Town to the Connecticut farms a distance of five or six miles where a halt was made in his spirit of revenge and worthy the general of an army more in the character of Tryon who was present than of Niphausen who commanded this settlement was reduced to ashes. From the farms Niphausen proceeded to Springfield the Jersey Brigade commanded by General Maxwell and the militia of the adjacent country took an advantageous position at that place and seemed determined to defend him. Niphausen halted in its neighborhood and remained on his ground until night. Having received intelligence of this movement General Washington put his army in motion early in the same morning that Niphausen marched from Elizabeth Town point and advanced to the short hills in the rear of Springfield while the British were in the neighborhood of that place. Dispositions were made for an engagement the next morning but Niphausen retired in the night to the place of his disembarkation. General Washington continued on the hills near Springfield too weak to hazard and engagement but on ground chosen by himself his continental troops did not exceed 3,000 men a return of the whole army under his immediate command made on that 3rd of June exhibited in the column of present fit for duty only 3,760 rank and file. So reduced was that force on which America relied for independence you but too well know said General Washington that letter to a friend giving an account of this incursion and will regret with me the cause which justifies this insulting maneuver on the part of the enemy. It deeply affects the honor of the states a vindication of which could not be attempted in our present circumstances without most intimately hazarding their security at least so far as it may depend on the preservation of the army. Their character, their interests, their all that is dear call upon them in the most pressing manner to place the army immediately on a respectable footing. The long continuous of Niphausen at Elizabethtown strengthened a suspicion that Sir Henry Clinton was about to return from South Carolina and intended without disembarking his troops to proceed up the Hudson to West Point and that the movement into Jersey was a faint design to cover the real object. The letters of the commander-in-chief addressed about this period to those who might be supposed to possess influence in the government of the union or in those of the states exhibit his conjectures respecting the designs of his adversary as well as his apprehensions from the condition of his own army. To the committee of Congress in camp he observed General Niphausen still continues in the jerseys with all the force which can be spared from New York a force greatly superior to ours. Should Sir Henry join him, their superiority will be decided and equal to almost anything they might think proper to attend. The enemy it is true are at this time inactive but their continuance in their present position proves that they have some project of importance in contemplation. Perhaps they are only waiting until the militia grow tired and return home which they are doing every hour to prosecute their designs with the less opposition. This would be a critical moment for us. Perhaps they are waiting the arrival of Sir Henry Clinton either to push up the North River against the Highland Post or to bend their whole force against this army. In either case the most disastrous consequences are to be apprehended. You who are well acquainted with our situation need no arguments to advance the danger. The militia of this state have run to arms and behaved with an ardor and spirit of which there are few examples of perseverance in enduring the rigors of military service is not to be expected from those who are not by profession obliged to it. The reverse of this opinion has been a great misfortune in our affairs and it is high time we should recover from an error of so pernicious a nature. We must absolutely have a force of a different composition or we must relinquish the contest. In a few days we may expect to rely almost entirely on our continental force and this from your own observation is totally inadequate to our safety. The exigency calls loudly on the stage to carry all the recommendations of the committee into the most vigorous and immediate execution but more particularly that for completing our batteries by a draft with all possible expedition. End of chapter seven part one, section seven part two of the life of Washington volume three by John Marshall. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Chapter seven part two, June 18, Sir Henry Clinton returns to New York. In this precise state of things he received intelligence of the return of Sir Henry Clinton from the conquest of South Carolina. The regular force in New York in its dependencies was now estimated at 12,000 men, great part of whom might be drawn into the field for any particular purpose because Sir Henry Clinton could command about 4,000 militia and refugees for garrison duty. In communicating to Congress the appearance of the British fleet off the hook, General Washington observed a very alarming scene may shortly open and it will be happy for us if we shall be able to steer clear of some serious misfortune in this quarter. I hope the period has not yet arrived which will convince the different states by fatal experience that some of them have mistaken the true situation of this country. I flutter myself however, that we may still retrieve our affairs if we have but a just sense of them and are actuated by a spirit of liberal policy and exertion equal to the emergency. Could we once see this spirit generally prevailing? I should not despair of a prosperous issue of the campaign but there is no time to be lost. The danger is imminent and pressing. The obstacles to be surmounted are great and numerous and our efforts must be instant, unreserved and universal. On the arrival of Sir Henry Clinton the design of acting offensively in the jerseys was resumed but to divide the American army demonstrations were made of an intention to seize West Point. To be in readiness for either object, General Green was left at Springfield with two brigades of continental troops and with the Jersey militia while with the greater part of his army General Washington proceeded slowly towards Pompton watching attentively the movements of the British and apparently unwilling to separate himself too far from Green. He had not marched farther than Rockaway 11 miles beyond Moorstown when the British army advanced from Elizabethtown towards Springfield in great force. General Washington detached the brigade to hang on their right flank and returned with the residue of his army five or six miles in order to be in a situation to support Green. June early in the morning of the 23rd the British army moved into columns with great rapidity towards Springfield. Major Lee was advanced on the Vauxhall road which was taken by the right column and Colonel Dayton on the direct road which was taken by the left. Both these corps made every possible exertion to check the advancing enemy while General Green concentrated his little army at Springfield. Skirmish at Springfield. Scarcely had he made his dispositions when the British front appeared and a cannonade commenced between their van and the American artillery which defended a bridge over Raway a small river running east of the town which was guarded by Colonel Angel with less than 200 men. Colonel Shreve was posted at a second bridge also over a branch of the Raway in order to cover the retreat of Angel from the first. Major Lee with his dragoons and the piquets under Captain Walker supported by Colonel Ogden was directed to defend a bridge on the Vauxhall road. The residue of the Continental troops were drawn up on high ground in the rear of the town with the militia on their flanks. The right column of the British advanced on Lee who disputed the passage of the bridge until a considerable body of the enemy forwarded the river above him and gained the point of a hill which endangered his position. At this instant their left attacked Colonel Angel who defended himself with persevering gallantry. The conflict was sharp and was maintained for about half an hour when compelled by superior numbers to give way he retired in good order and brought off his wounded. His retreat was covered by Colonel Shreve who after Angel had passed him was ordered by General Green to join his brigade. The English then took possession of the town and reduced it to ashes. The obstinate resistance which had been encountered the gallantry and discipline displayed by the Continental troops who had been engaged the strength of Green's position. The firm countenance maintained by his troops small detachments of whom kept up a continual skirmishing with a view to save a part of the town all contributed to deter Sir Henry Clinton from a farther prosecution of his original plan. He withdrew that afternoon to Elizabeth Town and in the following night passed over to Staten Island it is probable that the caution manifested during this expedition is to be ascribed to the intelligence that a formidable fleet and army from France was daily expected on the coast. When the Marquis de Lafayette obtained permission to visit his native country he retained with his rank in the American army that zeal for the interests of the United States which the affectionate attentions he had received and the enthusiasm of a soldier and the cause of those for whom he had made his first campaigns were calculated to inspire in a young and generous mind in favor of an infant people struggling for liberty and self-government with the hereditary rival of his nation. He was received at the court of Versailles with every mark of favor and distinction and all his influence was employed in impressing on the cabinet the importance and policy of granting suckers to the United States. Having succeeded in this favorite object and finding no probability of active employment on the continent of Europe he obtained permission to return to America. Lafayette brings intelligence of aid from France. He arrived late in April at Boston and hastened to headquarters when he proceeded to the seat of government with the information that his most Christian majesty had consented to employ a considerable land and naval armaments in the United States for the ensuing campaign. This intelligence gave a new impulse both to Congress and the state legislatures, exertions of Congress and of the commander in chief to strengthen the army. The states from New Hampshire to Virginia inclusive were required to pay within 30 days 10 millions of dollars part of their quotas which became due on the 1st of March and specie bills to the amount of $50,000 were drawn on Messieurs, Franklin and Jay. These sums were sacredly appropriated to the objects of bringing the army into the field and forwarding their supplies. The defects in the requisition system which had been suggested by General Washington were corrected and the committee and camp at the head of which was the late general scholar was empowered at the request of the commander in chief to take such measures as were in the power of Congress for drawing out the resources of the nation. To give effect to these resolutions the several state legislatures from New Hampshire to Virginia inclusive were requested to invest the executives or some other persons with powers sufficiently ample to comply with such applications as might be made to them by the committee and camp and a circular letter was addressed to the state governments urging them to second the efforts of Congress. The letters equally stimulating were written by the committee from camp and the well-earned influence of the commander in chief was also employed to induce an exertion proportion to the crisis. In addition to those incentives which might operate on ardent minds he endeavored by a temperate review of the situation and resources of the belligerent powers to convince the judgment that America would have real cause to fear the issue of the contest should she neglect to improve the advantage to be afforded by the suckers expected from France. Under the impressions produced by these representations the state legislatures generally passed the laws which were required but the energy displayed in their passage was not maintained in their execution. In general the assemblies followed the example of Congress and a portion on the several counties or towns within the state the quota to be furnished by each. This division of the state was again to be subdivided into classes each of which was to furnish a man by contributions or taxes imposed upon itself. Tardy proceedings of the states these operations were slow and unproductive. It was not on the state's sovereignty's only the beneficial effects were produced by a candid statement of public affairs. Several patriotic individuals contributed largely from their private funds to the aid of the public. The merchants and other citizens of Philadelphia with a zeal guided by that sound discretion which turns expenditure to the best account established a bank for the support of which they subscribe 315,000 pounds. Pennsylvania money to be paid if required in specie the principal object of which was to supply the army with provisions and ROM. By the plan of this bank its members were to derive no emolument whatever from the institution for advancing their credit and their money. They required only that Congress should pledge the faith of the union to reimburse the costs and charges of the transaction in a reasonable time and should give such assistance to its execution as might be in their power. The ladies of Philadelphia too gave a splendid example of patriotism by large donations for the immediate relief of the suffering army. This example was extensively followed but it is not by the contributions of the generous that a war can or ought to be maintained. The purse of the nation alone can supply the expenditures of a nation. And when all are interested in a contest all ought to contribute to its support. Taxes and taxes only can furnish for the prosecution of a national war means which are just in themselves or competent to the object. Notwithstanding these donations the distresses of the army for clothing especially still continued. And where the more severely felt when a cooperation with French troops was expected so late as the 20th of June General Washington informed Congress that he still labored under the painful and humiliating embarrassment of having no shirts for the soldiers many of whom were destitute of that necessary article. For the troops to be without clothing at any time he added is highly injurious to the service and distressing to our feelings. But the want will be more peculiarly mortifying when they come to act with those of our allies. If it be possible I have no doubt immediate measures will be taken to relieve their distress. It is also most sincerely wished that there could be some supplies of clothing furnished to the officers. There are a great many whose condition is still miserable. This is in some instances the case with the whole lines of the states it would be well for their own sakes and for the public good if they could be furnished. They will not be able when our friends come to cooperate with us to go on a common routine of duty and if they should they must from their appearance be held in low estimation. This picture presents in strong colors the real patriotism of the American army. One heroic effort though it may dazzle the mind with its splendor is an exertion most men are capable of making but continued patience suffering and unremitting perseverance in a service promising no personal emolument and exposing the officer unceasingly not only to wants of every kind but to those circumstances of humiliation which seem to degrade him in the eyes of others demonstrate a fortitude of mind, a strength of virtue and a firmness of principle which ought never to be forgotten. As the several legislative acts for bringing the army into the field did not pass until the months of June and July General Washington remained uninformed of the force on which he might rely and was consequently unable to form any certain plan of operations. This suspense was the more cruelly embarrassing as in the event of an attempt upon New York it was of the utmost importance that the French fleet should on its arrival take possession of the harbor which was then weakly defended but should this measure be followed by a failure to furnish the requisite support it would not only be ineffectual but in a very possible state of things might sacrifice the fleet itself. Should it be ascertained that the states were either unable or unwilling to make the exertions necessary for the siege of New York other objects presented themselves against which the allied arms might be turned to advantage to avoid the disgrace and danger of attempting what could not be effected and the reproach of neglecting any attainable object were equally desirable and equally required a correct knowledge of the measures which would be taken by the states. In a letter to Congress communicating his anxiety on this interesting subject and his total want of information respecting it General Washington observed the season is come when we have every reason to expect the arrival of the fleet and yet for want of this point of primary consequence it is impossible for me to form a system of cooperation I have no basis to act upon and of course were this generous sucker of our ally now to arrive I should find myself in the most awkward embarrassing and painful situation the general and the admiral from the relation in which I stand as soon as they approach our coast will require of me a plan of the measures to be pursued and there are of right to be one prepared by circumstances I am I cannot even give them conjectures from these considerations I've suggested to the committee by a letter I had the honor of addressing them yesterday the indispensable necessity of their writing again to the states urging them to give immediate and precise information of the measures they have taken and of the result the interest of the states the honor and reputation of our councils the justice and gratitude due to our allies all require that I should without delay be enabled to ascertain and inform them what we can and cannot undertake there is a point which ought now to be determined on the success of which all our future operations may depend on which for want of knowing our prospects I can make no decision for fear of involving the fleet and army of our allies and circumstances which would expose them if not seconded by us to material inconvenience and hazard I shall be compelled to suspend it and the delay may be fatal to our hopes the tardy proceedings of the states were not less perplexing to Congress than to the commander-in-chief to the minister of his most Christian majesty who had in the preceding January communicated the probability of receiving sucker from France that body without calculating accurately the means of complying with its engagements had pledged itself unequivocally for effectual cooperation the minister was assured that the United States had expectations on which they could rely with confidence of bringing into the field for the next campaign an army of 25,000 men and that such numbers of militia might be added to this continental force as would render it competent to any enterprise against the post occupied by the British within the United States Assurances were also given that ample supplies of provisions for the combined armies should be laid up in magazines under the direction of Congress the French minister addressed Congress on this subject about the time that General Washington expressed so strongly the necessity of knowing with certainty on what reinforcements he was to calculate thus pressed by their general and their ally Congress renewed their urgent requisitions on the states and desired the several governments to correspond weekly with the committee at headquarters on the progress made in complying with them In the meantime, General Washington meditated unceasingly on the course to be pursued in the various contingencies which might happen and endeavour to prepare for any plan of operations which circumstances might render advisable the arrival of Sir Henry Clinton diminished the variety of aspects in which the relative situation of the two armies was to be contemplated and rendered the success of an attempt on New York more doubtful it was now thought advisable that the armament from France instead of sailing directly to the hook should proceed in the first instance to Rhode Island where after disembarking the troops and providing for the sick it might wait until a definitive plan of operation should be concerted July 13th arrival of a French armament in Rhode Island on the 13th of July while the result of the measures adopted by the several states remained uncertain the French fleet entered the harbor of Newport and letters were soon afterwards received from the Cante de l'Enchambot and the Chevalier to Ney the officers commanding the landed naval forces transmitting to General Washington an account of their arrival of their strength, their expectations and their orders the troops designed to serve in the United States had assembled early in the year at breast but the transports at that place having been chiefly employed for an armament destined for the West Indies and the ports from which it had been intended to draw others being blockaded only the first division consisting of five thousand men had arrived at Newport but letters from France contained assurances that the second division of the army might soon be expected to obviate these difficulties which had occurred on former occasions respecting rank the orders given to Lieutenant General D'Enchambot which were enclosed in his first letter placed him entirely under the command of General Washington the French troops were to be considered as auxiliaries and were according to the usages of war to cede the post of honor to the Americans convinced that cordial harmony between the Allied forces was essential to their success both generals cultivated carefully the friendly dispositions felt by the troops towards each other warm professions of reciprocal respect esteem and confidence were interchanged between them and each endeavor to impress on the other and on all military and civil departments the conviction that the two nations and two armies were united by the ties of interest and affection on this occasion, General Washington recommended to his officers as a symbol of friendship and affection for their allies to engraft on the American cockade which was black a white relief that being the color of the French cockade latest was the arrival of the French troops they found the Americans unprepared for active and offensive operations not even at that time where the numbers ascertained which would be furnished by the states yet it was necessary for General Washington to communicate a plan of the campaign to the Rochambeau the season was already so far advanced that preparations for the operations contemplated eventually on the arrival of the second division of the French fleet must be immediately made or there would not be time though every circumstance should prove favorable to execute the design against New York such a state of things so ill-comported with the engagements of Congress and with the interests of the nation that trusting to his being enabled by the measures already taken by the states to comply with what was incumbent on him to perform he determined to hazard much rather than forgo the advantages to be derived from the aides afforded by France in communicating this resolution of Congress he said, pressed on all sides by a choice of difficulties in that moment rich required decision I have adopted that line of conduct which comported with the dignity and faith of Congress the reputation of the states on the honor of our arms I have sent on definitive proposals of cooperation to the French general and Admiral neither the period of the season nor a regard to decency would permit delay the dies cast and it remains with the states either to fulfill their engagements preserve their credit and support their independence or to involve us in disgrace and defeat notwithstanding the failures pointed out by the committee I shall proceed on the supposition that they will ultimately consult their own interest and honor and not suffer us to fail for the want of means which it is evidently in their power to afford what has been done and is doing by some of the states confirms the opinion I have entertained of sufficient resources in the country of the disposition of the people to submit to any arrangement for bringing them forth I see no reasonable ground to doubt if we fail for want of proper exertions in any of the governments I trust the responsibility will fall where it ought and that I shall stand justified to Congress my country and the world Beverly Robinson mansion at West Point Benedict Arnold made it this house is at quarters while in command of the fort in Garrison there it was here that Washington came to breakfast with Arnold one September morning in 1780 and made the discovery that his host had turned traitor and was conspiring to surrender West Point to the British a decisive naval superiority however was considered as the basis of any enterprise to be undertaken by the Allied arms this naval superiority being assumed the outlines of the plan were drawn and the fifth of August was named as the day on which the French troops should re-embark and the American army assemble at Morris Sonia this plan was committed to major general the Marquis de la Fied who was authorized to explain the situation of the American army and the views of the general to the Rochambe it was to be considered as preliminary to any operation that the fleet and army of France should continue their aid until the enterprise should succeed or be abandoned by mutual consent the Chevalier de Ternay did not long maintain his superiority at sea three days after he reached Newport Admiral Greaves arrived with six ships of the line and transferred it to the British on his appearance off the hook Arbathnot passed the bar with four ships of the line and hearing that de Ternay had reached Rhode Island proceeded thither and cruised off the harbor the Cond de Rochambeau had been put into possession of all the forts and batteries about Newport and the fleet had been moved in a line so as to cooperate with the land forces this position appearing too formidable to be attempted by the fleet alone Arbathnot continued to cruise off Block Island as the commanders of the Allied forces still cherish the hope of acquiring a superiority at sea the design of New York was only suspended this hope was strengthened by intelligence that the Cond de Rochambeau had been joined in the West Indies by a powerful Spanish armament the Chevalier de Ternay had dispatched a packet to inform him that he was blocked up by a superior force and to solicit such reinforcements as the situation of the Count might enable him to spare relying on the success of this application on the arrival of the Second Division of the Squadron for Breast the American General impatiently expected the moment when de Ternay would be enabled to act defensively in this crisis of affairs a derangement took place in a most important department which threatened to disconcert the whole plan of operations though every other circumstance should prove favorable the immense expenditure of the quarter masters department the inadequacy of the funds with which it was supplied the reciprocal disgusts and complaints produced by these causes had determined Congress to make still another radical change in the system this subject had been taken up early in the winter but such were the delays in separable from the proceedings of the government that the report of the committee was not made until the month of March nor finally decided on until the middle of July this subject was too interesting to the army and to the important operations meditated for the campaign not to engage the anxious attention of the commander in chief at his request the quarter master general while the army lay in winter quarters prepared to Philadelphia for the purpose of giving Congress all the information he possessed he proposed to withdraw the management of the department almost entirely from the civil government and to place it under the control of the person who should be at its head subject only to the direction of the commander in chief the views of Congress were entirely different while the subject remained suspended before that body it was taken up by the committee of cooperation at headquarters where the combined experience and talents of generals Washington, Scotland Green were employed in digesting a system adapted to the actual situation of the United States which was recommended to Congress to give the more weight to his opinion by showing its disinterestedness general Green offered to continue in the discharge of the duties assigned to him without any other extra emolument than his family expenses this plan whatever might have been its details was in its general outlines unacceptable to Congress a system was at length completed by that body which general Green believed to be incapable of execution resolving not to take upon himself the responsibility of measures the issue of which must be calamitous and disgraceful he determined to withdraw from a station in which he'd despair of being useful apprehending the worst consequences from his resignation in so critical a moment general Washington pressed him to suspend this decisive step until the effect of an application from himself and from the committee of cooperation should be known their representations produced no effect the resolution to make this bold experiment was unalterable general Green's resignation was accepted and the letter conveying it excited so much irritation that a design was intimated of suspending his command in the line of the army but these impressions soon wore off and the resentment of the moment subsided Colonel Pickering who succeeded general Green possessed in an eminent degree those qualities which fitted him to combat and subdue the difficulties of his department to great energy of mind and body he added a long experience in the affairs of the continent with an ardent zeal for its interests and general Green himself with several of the former officers at the request of the commander in chief continued for some time after their resignation to render all the services in their power but there was a defective means for which neither talents nor exertion could compensate in the commissary department the same distress was experienced general Washington was driven to the necessity of emptying the magazines at West Point in a foraging on a people whose means of subsisting themselves were already nearly exhausted by the armies on both sides the inadequate supplies drawn from these sources afforded but a short relief and once more at a time when the public imagination was contemplating brilliant plans the execution of which required steady courage with persevering labor and consequently ample magazines the army was frequently reduced to the last extremity by the want of food so great were the embarrassments produced by the difficulty of procuring subsistence but although the second division of a fleet from breast was daily expected general Washington found it necessary to counterman the orders under which the militia were marching to camp such was the state of preparation for the campaign when intelligence was brought by the alliance forget that the port of breast was blockaded in the hope however that the combined fleets of France and Spain would be able to raise the blockade general Washington adhered steadily to his purpose respecting New York and continued his exertions to provide the means for its execution the details of the plan of cooperation continued to be the subject of a correspondence with the counter Woh Shambot and the Chevalier de Tene and at length a personal interview was agreed upon to take place on the 21st of September at Hartford in Connecticut Enterprise against New York relinquished in this interview ulterior eventual measures as well as an explicit and detailed arrangement for acting against New York where the subjects of consideration know one of the plans however then concerted for the present campaign was carried into execution all except then invasion of Canada depended on a superiority at sea which was soon rendered almost hopeless by certain information that the camp de Huishan had sailed for Europe naval superiority of the British not long after receiving this information Admiral Rodney arrived at New York at 11 ships of the line and four frigates this reinforcement not only disconcerted all the plans of the allies but put it in the power of the British to prosecute insecurity their designs in the south plans for the campaign abandoned it may well be supposed that the commander-in-chief did not relinquish without infinite chagrin the sanguine expectations he had formed of rendering this summer decisive of the war never before had he indulged so strongly the hope of happily terminating the contest in a letter to an intimate friend this chagrin was thus expressed we are now drawing to a close an inactive campaign the beginning of which appeared pregnant with events of a very favorable complexion I hoped but I hoped in vain that a prospect was opening which would enable me to fix a period to my military pursuits and restore me to domestic life the favorable disposition of Spain the promised sucker from France the combined force in the west Indies the declaration of Russia acceded to by other powers of Europe humiliating the naval power of Great Britain the superiority of France and Spain by sea and Europe the Irish claims and English disturbances formed in the aggregate and opinion in my breast which is not very susceptible of peaceful dreams that the hour of deliverance was not far distant for that however unwilling Great Britain might be to yield the point it would not be in her power to continue the contest but alas these prospects flattering as they were have proved elusive and I see nothing before us but accumulating distress we have been half of our time without provisions and are likely to continue so we have no magazines nor money to form them we have lived upon expedience until we can live no longer in a word the history of the war is a history of false hopes and temporary devices instead of system and economy it is in vain however to look back nor is it our business to do so our case is not desperate if virtue exists in the people and there is wisdom among our rulers but to suppose that this great revolution can be accomplished by a temporary army that this army will be subsisted by a state's supplies and that taxation alone is adequate to our wants is in my opinion absurd and as unreasonable as to expect an inversion of the order of nature to accommodate itself to our views if it were necessary it could be easily proved to any person of a moderate understanding than an annual army or any army raised on the spur of the occasion besides being unqualified for the end designed is in various ways that could be enumerated 10 times more expensive than a permanent body of men under good organization or military discipline which never was nor will be the case with raw troops a thousand arguments resulting from experience and the nature of things might also be adduced to prove that the army if it is to depend upon state's supplies must disband or starve and that taxation alone especially at this late hour cannot furnish the means to carry on the war is it not time to retract from error and benefit by experience or do we want further proof of the ruinous system we have pertinaciously adhered to End of chapter seven part two chapter eight part one of the life of Washington volume three by John Marshall this LibriVox recording is in the public domain chapter eight part one treason and escape of Arnold trial and execution of Major Andre precautions for the security of West Point letter of general Washington on American affairs proceedings of Congress respecting the army major Talmadge destroys the British stores at Corum the army retires into winter quarters eruption of major Carlton into New York European transactions 1780 while the public mind was anticipating great events from the combined arms of France and America treason lay concealed in the American camp and was plotting the ruin of the American cause the great services and military talents of general Arnold is courage and battle and patient fortitude under excessive hardships has secured to him a high place in the opinion of the army and of his country not having sufficiently recovered from the wounds received before Quebec and at Saratoga to be fit for active service and having large accounts to settle with the government which required leisure he was on the evacuation of Philadelphia in 1778 appointed to the command in that place unfortunately that strength of principle and correctness of judgment which might enable him to resist the various seductions to which his fame and rank exposed him in the metropolis of the Union were not associated with the firmness which he had displayed in the field and in the most adverse circumstances yielding to the temptations of a false pride and forgetting that he did not possess the resources of private fortune he indulged in the pleasures of a sumptuous table and expensive equipage and soon swelled his debts to an amount which it was impossible to discharge unmindful of his military character he engaged in speculations which were unfortunate and with the hope of immense profit took shares and privateers which were unsuccessful his claims against the United States were great and he looked to them for the means of extricating himself from the embarrassments in which his indiscretions had involved him but the commissioners to whom his accounts were referred for settlement had reduced them considerably and on his appeal from their decision to Congress a committee reported that the sum allowed by the commissioners was more than he was entitled to receive he was charged with various acts of extortion on the citizens of Philadelphia and with peculating on the funds of the continent not the less soured by these multiplied causes of irritation from the reflection that they were attributable to his own follies and vices he gave full scope to his resentments and indulged himself in expressions of angry reproach against what he termed the ingratitude of his country which provoked those around him and gave great offense to Congress having become peculiarly odious to the government of Pennsylvania the executive of that state exhibited formal charges against him to Congress who directed that he should be arrested and brought before a court martial his trial was concluded late in January 1779 and he was sentenced to be reprimanded by the commander in chief this sentence was approved by Congress and carried into execution from the time this sentence against him was approved if not sooner his proud and principled spirit revolted from the cause of his country and determined him to seek an occasion to make the objects of his resentment the victims of his vengeance turning his eyes on West Point as an acquisition which would give value to treason and inflict a mortal wound on his former friends he sought the command of that fortress for the purpose of gratifying both his avarice and his hate to New York the safety of West Point was peculiarly interesting and in that state the reputation of Arnold was particularly high to its delegation he addressed himself and one of its members had written a letter to General Washington suggesting doubts respecting the military character of how to whom its defense was then entrusted and recommending Arnold for that service this request was not forgotten some short time afterwards General Scholar mentioned to the commander in chief a letter he had received from Arnold intimating his wish to join the army but stating his inability in consequence of his wounds to perform the active duties of the field General Washington observed that as there was a prospect of a vigorous campaign he should be gratified with the aid of General Arnold that so soon as the operations against New York should commence he designed to draw his whole force into the field leaving even West Point to the care of Invalids and a small garrison of militia recollecting however the former application of a member of Congress respecting this post he added that if with this previous information that situation would be more agreeable to him than a command in the field his wishes should certainly be indulged this conversation being communicated to Arnold he caught eagerly at the proposition though without openly discovering any solicitude on the subject and in the beginning of August prepared to camp where he renewed the solicitations which had before been made indirectly at this juncture Sir Henry Clinton embarked on an expedition he meditated against Rhode Island and General Washington was advancing on New York he offered Arnold the left wing of the army which that officer declined under the pretext mentioned in his letter to General Schuyler incapable of suspecting a man who had given such distinguished proofs of courage and patriotism the commander-in-chief was neither alarmed at his refusal to embrace so splendid an opportunity of recovering the favor of his countrymen nor at the embarrassment accompanying that refusal pressing the subject no farther he assented to the request which had been made and invested Arnold with the command of West Point previous to his soliciting this station he had in that letter to Colonel Robinson signified his change of principles and his wish to restore himself to the favor of his prince by some signal proof of his repentance this letter opened the way to a correspondence with Sir Henry Clinton the immediate object of which after obtaining the appointment he had solicited was to concert the means of delivering the important post he commanded to the British general Major John Andre an aide to Camp of Sir Henry Clinton an adjutant general of the British army was selected as the person to whom the maturing of Arnold's treason and the arrangements for its execution should be entrusted a correspondence was carried on between them under a mercantile disguise in the feigned names of Gustavus and Anderson in that link to facilitate their communications the vulture's loop of war moved up the North River and took a station convenient for the purpose but not so near as to excite suspicion treason and escape of Arnold the time when General Washington met the Count de Rochambeau at Hartford was selected for the final adjustment of the plan and as a personal interview was deemed necessary Major Andre came up the river and went on board the vulture the house about Mr. Smith without the American posts was appointed for the interview and to that place both parties repaired in the night Andre being brought under a pass for John Anderson in a boat dispatch from the shore while the conference was yet unfinished daylight approached and to avoid discovery Arnold proposed that Andre should remain concealed until the succeeding night he is understood to have refused to be carried with the American posts but the promise to respect this subjection was not observed they continued together the succeeding day and when in the following night his return to the vulture was proposed the boatman refused to carry him because she had shifted her station during the day in consequence of a gun which was moved to the shore without the knowledge of Arnold and brought to bear upon her this embarrassing circumstance reduced him to the necessity of endeavoring to reach New York by land to accomplish this purpose he reluctantly yielded to the urgent representations of Arnold and laying aside his regimentals which he had hitherto worn under a serve to put on a plain suit of clothes and received a pass from General Arnold authorizing him under the name of John Anderson to proceed on the public service to the white planes or lower if he thought proper with this permit he had passed all the guards and posts on the road unsuspected and was proceeding to New York in perfect security when one of three militiamen who were employed between the lines of the two armies springing suddenly from his covert into the road seized the reins of his bridle and stopped his horse losing his accustomed self-possession Major Andre instead of producing the pass from General Arnold asked the man hastily where he belonged he replied to below a term implying that he was from New York and so said Andre not suspecting deception am I he then declared himself to be a British officer on urgent business and begged that he might not be detained the appearance of the other militiamen disclosed his mistake too late to correct it he offered a purse of gold and a valuable watch with tempting promises of ample reward from his government if they would permit him to escape but his offers were rejected and his captors proceeded to search him they found concealed in his boots in Arnold's handwriting papers containing all the information which could be important respecting West Point when carried before Lieutenant Colonel Jamison the officer commanding the scouting parties on the lines he still maintained his assumed character and requested Jamison to inform his commanding officer that Anderson was taken Jamison dispatched an express with his communication on receiving it Arnold comprehended the full extent of his danger and flying from well-merited punishment took refuge on board the vulture where Washington stayed during Andre's trial in this brick house at Tappan Rockland County, New York the American commander in chief during September 1780 awaited the result of the trial of Major John Andre who conspired with Benedict Arnold for the betrayal of West Point to the British 14 American officers sat in judgment on Andre and ordered his execution on October 2, 1780 in Tappan also is still standing the old tavern where Andre was imprisoned when sufficient time for the escape of Arnold was supposed to have elapsed Andre no longer affecting concealment acknowledged himself to be the adjutant general of the British Army Jamison seeking to correct the mischief of his indiscreet communication to Arnold immediately dispatched a packet to the commander in chief containing the papers which have been discovered with a letter from Andre relating the manner of his capture and accounting for the disguise he had assumed the express was directed to meet the commander in chief who was then on his return from Hartford but taking different roads they missed each other and a delay attended the delivery of the papers which ensured the escape of Arnold precautions for the security of West Point every precaution was immediately taken for the security of West Point after which the attention of the commander in chief was turned to Andre a board of general officers of which Major General Green was president and the two foreign generals Lafayette and Steuben were members was called to report a precise state of his case and to determine the character in which he was to be considered and the punishment to which he was liable the frankness and magnanimity with which Andre had conducted himself from the time of his appearance in his real character had made a very favorable impression on all those with whom he had held any intercourse from this cause he experienced every mark of indulgent attention which was compatible with his situation and from a sense of justice as well as of delicacy was informed on the opening of the examination that he was at liberty not to answer any interrogatory which might embarrass his own feelings but as if only desirous to rescue his character from imputations which he dreaded more than death he confessed everything material to his own condemnation but would divulge nothing which might involve others trial and execution of Major Andre the board reported the essential facts which had appeared with their opinion that Major Andre was a spy and ought to suffer death the execution of this sentence was ordered to take place on the day succeeding that on which it was pronounced superior to the tears of death but dreading disgrace Andre was deeply affected by the mode of execution which the laws of war decreed to persons in his situation he wished to die like a soldier not as a criminal to obtain a mitigation of his sentence in this respect he addressed a letter to General Washington replete with the feelings of a man of sentiment and honor but the occasion required that the example should make his full impression and this request could not be granted he encountered his fate with composure and dignity and his whole conduct interested the feelings of all who witnessed it the general officers lamented the sentence which the usages of war compelled them to pronounce and never perhaps did the commander in chief obey with more reluctance the stern mandates of duty and policy the sympathy excited among the American officers by his fate was as universal as it is unusual on such occasions and proclaims alike the merit of him who suffered and the humanity of those who inflicted the punishment great exertions were made by Sir Henry Clinton to whom Andre was particularly dear first to have him considered as protected by a flag of truce and afterwards as a prisoner of war even Arnold had the hardy hood to interpose after giving a certificate of facts tending as he's supposed to exculpate the prisoner exhausting his powers of reasoning on the case and appealing to the humanity of the American general he sought to intimidate that officer by stating the situation of many of the most distinguished individuals of South Carolina who had forfeited their lives but had hitherto been spared through the clemency of the British general this clemency he said could no longer be extended to them should Major Andre suffer it may well be supposed that the interposition of Arnold could have no influence on Washington he conveyed Mrs. Arnold to her husband in New York and also transmitted his clothes and baggage for which he had written but in every other respect his letters which were unanswered were also unnoticed the mingled sentiments of admiration and compassion excited in every bosom for the unfortunate Andre seemed to increase the detestation in which Arnold was held Andre said General Washington in a private letter has met his fate with that fortitude which was to be expected from an accomplished man and a gallant officer but I am mistaken if at this time Arnold is undergoing the torments of a mental hell he wants feeling from some traits of his character which have lately come to my knowledge he seems to have been so hardened in crime so lost all sense of honor and shame that while his faculty still enabled him to continue his sort of pursuits there will be no time for remorse from motives of policy or of respect for his engagements Sir Henry Clinton conferred on Arnold the commission of a brigadier general in the British service which he preserved throughout the war yet it is impossible that rank could have rescued him from the contempt and detestation in which the generous, the honorable and the brave could not cease to hold him it was impossible for men of this description to bury the recollection of his being a traitor a sordid traitor first the slave of his rage then purchased with gold and finally secured at the expense of the blood of one of the most accomplished officers in the British army his representations of the discontent of the country and of the army concurring with reports from other quarters had excited the hope that the loyalists and the dissatisfied allured by British gold and the prospect of rank in the British service would flock to his standard and form a core at whose head he might again display his accustomed intrepidity with his hope he published an address to the inhabitants of America in which he labored to palliate his own guilt and to increase their dissatisfaction with the existing state of things this appeal to the public was followed by a proclamation addressed to the officers and soldiers of the Continental Army who have the real interests of their country at heart and who are determined to be no longer the tools and dupes of Congress or of France the object of this proclamation was to induce the officers and soldiers to desert the cause they had embraced from principle by holding up to them the very flattering offers of the British general and contrasting the substantial emoluments of the British service with their present deplorable condition he attempted to cover this dishonorable proposition with a decent garb by representing the base step he invited them to take as the only measure which could restore peace, real liberty and happiness to their country these inducements did not produce their intended effect although the temper of the army might be irritated by real suffering by the supposed neglect of government no diminution of patriotism had been produced through all the hardships, irritations and vicissitudes of the war Arnold remains the solitary instance of an American officer who abandoned the side first embraced in this civil contest and turned his sword upon his former companions in arms when the probable consequences of this plot had it been successful, were considered and the combination of apparent accidents by which it was discovered and defeated was recollected all were filled with awful astonishment and the devout perceived in the transaction the hand of providence guiding America to independence the thanks of Congress were voted to the three militiamen who had rendered this invaluable service and a silver medal with an inscription expressive of their fidelity and patriotism was directed to be presented to each of them in addition to this flattering testimonial of their worth and as a farther evidence of national gratitude a resolution was passed granting to each $200 per annum during life to be paid in species or an equivalent in current money the efforts of General Washington to obtain a permanent military force or its best substitute a regular system for filling the vacant ranks with drafts who should join the army on the first day of January in each year were still continued notwithstanding the embarrassments with which Congress was surrounded it is not easy to find adequate reasons for the neglect of representation so interesting and of recommendations apparently so essential to the safety of the United States parties in Congress private letters disclose the fact that two parties still agitated Congress one entered fully into the views of the commander-in-chief the other jealous of the army and apprehensive of its hostility to liberty when peace should be restored remained unwilling to give stability to its constitution by increasing the numbers who were to serve during the war they seem to dread the danger from the enemy to which its fluctuations would expose them less than the danger which might be apprehended for the civil authority from its prominent character they caught with a vanity at every intelligence which encouraged the flattering hope of a speedy peace but entered reluctantly into measures founded on the supposition that the war might be of long duration perfectly acquainted with the extent of the jealousies entertained on this subject although to use his own expressions to a friend heaven knows how unjustly General Washington had foreborn to press the necessity of regular and timely reinforcements to his army so constantly and so earnestly as his own judgment directed but the experience of every campaign furnished such strong additional evidences of the impolicy and danger of continuing to rely on temporary expedience and the uncertainty of collecting a force to cooperate with the auxiliaries from France was so peculiarly embarrassing that he at length resolved to conquer the delicacy by which he had been in some degree restrained and to open himself fully on the subject which he seemed more essential than any other to the success of the war in August while looking anxiously for such a reinforcement to the Chevalier de Tune as would give him the command of the American seas and while uncertain whether the campaign might not pass away without giving a single advantage promised at his opening he transmitted a letter to Congress fully and freely imparting his sentiments on the state of things. End of chapter eight, part one. Chapter eight, part two of the life of Washington. Volume three by John Marshall. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Chapter eight, part two of General Washington on American affairs. As this letter contains an exact statement of American affairs according to the view taken of them by General Washington and a faithful picture of the consequences of the ruinous policy which had been pursued drawn by the man best acquainted with them, copious extracts from it will at least be excused. After examining the sources of supplies for the campaign he proceeds to say but while we are meditating offensive operations which may not be undertaken at all or being undertaken may fail, I am persuaded Congress are not inattentive to the present state of the army and will view in the same light with me the necessity of providing in time against a period the first of January when one half of our present force will dissolve. The shadow of an army that will remain will have every motive except mere patriotism to abandon the service without the hope which has hitherto supported them of a change for the better. This is almost extinguished now and certainly will not outlive the campaign unless it finds something more substantial to rest upon. This is a truth of which every spectator of the distresses of the army cannot help being convinced those at a distance may speculate differently but on the spot an opinion to be to the contrary judging human nature on the usual scale would be chimerical. The honorable, the committee of Congress who have seen and heard for themselves will add their testimony to mind and the wisdom and justice of Congress cannot fail to give it the most serious attention. To me it will appear miraculous if our affairs can maintain themselves much longer in their present train. If either the temper or the resources of the country will not admit of an alteration we may expect soon to be reduced to the humiliating condition of seeing the cause of America in America upheld by foreign arms. The generosity of our allies has acclaimed to all our confidence and all our gratitude but it is neither for the honor of America nor for the interest of the common cause to leave the work entirely to them. He then reviewed the resources of Great Britain and after showing her ability still to prosecute the war added the inference from these reflections is that we cannot count upon a speedy end of the war and that it is the true policy of America not to content herself with temporary expedience but to endeavor if possible to give consistency and solidity to her measures. An essential step to this will be immediately to devise a plan and put it in execution for providing men in time to replace those who will leave us at the end of the year and for subsisting from making a reasonable allowance to the officers and soldiers. The plan for this purpose ought to be of general operation and such as will execute itself. Experience has shown that a peremptory draft will be the only effect or one if a draft for the war or for three years can be effected it ought to be made on every account a shorter period than a year is inadmissible. To one who has been witnessed to the evils brought upon us by short enlistments the system appears to have been pernicious beyond description and a crowd of motives present themselves to dictate a change. It may easily be shown that all the misfortunes we have met with in the military line are to be attributed to this cause. Had we formed a permanent army in the beginning which by the continuance of the same men in service had been capable of discipline we never should have to retreat with a handful of men across the Delaware in 1776 trembling for the fate of America which nothing but the infatuation of the enemy could have saved. We should not have remained all the succeeding winter at their mercy with sometimes scarcely a sufficient body of men to mount the ordinary guards liable at every moment to be dissipated if they had only thought proper to march against us. We should not have been under the necessity of fighting at brandy wine with an unequal number of raw troops and afterwards of seeing Philadelphia fall a prey to a victorious army. We should not have been at Valley Forge with less than half the force of the enemy destitute of everything in a situation neither to resist nor to retire. We should not have seen New York left with a handful of men yet an overt match for the main army of these states while the principal part of their force was detached for the reduction of two of them. We should not have found ourselves this spring so weak as to be insulted by 5,000 men unable to protect our baggage and magazines, their security depending on a good countenance and a want of enterprise in the enemy. We should not have been the greatest part of the war inferior to the enemy indebted for our safety to their inactivity enduring frequently the mortification of seeing inviting opportunities to ruin them, pass unimproved for want of a force which the country was completely able to afford to see the country ravaged, our towns burnt, the inhabitants plundered, abused, murdered with impunity from the same cause. After presenting in detail the embarrassments under which the civil departments of the army also had labored in consequence of the expensiveness and waste inseparable from its temporary character, he proceeded to observe, there is every reason to believe that the war has been protracted on this account, our opposition being less made the successes of the enemy greater. The fluctuation of the army kept alive their hopes and at every period of dissolution of a considerable part of it. They have flooded themselves with some decisive advantages. Had we kept a permanent army on foot, the enemy could have had nothing to hope for and would in all probability have listened to terms long since. If the army is left in its present situation, it must continue an encouragement to the efforts of the enemy. If it is put in a respectable one, it must have a contrary effect and nothing I believe will attend more to give us peace the ensuing winter. Many circumstances will contribute to a negotiation. An army on foot not only for another campaign but for several campaigns would determine the enemy to Pacific measures and enable us to insist upon favorable terms and forcible language. An army insignificant in numbers, dissatisfied, crumbling to pieces would be the strongest temptation they could have to try the experiment a little longer. It is an old maxim that the surest way to make a good peace is to be well-prepared for war. I cannot forbear returning in this place to the necessity of a more ample and equal provision for the army. The discontents on this head have been gradually matured to a dangerous extremity. There are many symptoms that are alarmed and distressed me, endeavors are using to unite both officers and men in a general refusal of the money and some core now actually declined receiving it. Every method has been taken to counteract it because such a combination in the army would be a severe blow to our declining currency. The most moderate insist that the accounts of depreciation ought to be liquidated at stated periods and certificates given by government for the sums due. They will not be satisfied with a general declaration that it shall be made good. I have often said in a big leave to repeat it the half-pay provision is in my opinion the most politic and effectual that can be adopted on the whole if something satisfactory be not done the army already so much reduced in offices by daily resignations as not to have a sufficiency to do the common duties of it must either cease to exist at the end of the campaign or will exhibit an example of more virtue, fortitude, self-denial and perseverance than has perhaps ever yet been paralleled in the history of human enthusiasm. The dissolution of the army is an event that cannot be regarded with indifference. It would bring accumulated distress upon us. It would throw the people of America into a general consternation. It would discredit our cause throughout the world. It would shock our allies. To think of replacing the officers with others is visionary. The loss of the veteran soldiers could not be replaced to attempt to carry on the war with militia against disciplined troops will be to attempt what the common sense and common experience of mankind will pronounce to be impracticable. But I should fail in respect to Congress to dwell on observations of this kind in a letter to them. Proceedings of Congress respecting the army had length the committee presented their report reorganizing the regiments, reducing their number and apportioning on the several states their respective numbers to complete the establishment. This report being approved by Congress was transmitted to the commander-in-chief for his consideration. By this arrangement, the states were required to recruit their quotas for the war and to bring them into the field by the 1st of January. But if in any state it should be found impracticable to raise them in for the war by the first day of December, it was recommended to such state to supply the deficiency with men engaged to serve for not less than one year. In compliance with the request of Congress, General Washington submitted his objections to the plan in a long and respectful letter. He recommended that legionary corps should be substituted in the place of regiments entirely of cavalry. He thought it more advisable that the infantry attached to the cavalry should compose a part of the corps permanently than that it should be drawn occasionally from the regiments of foot. The reduction in the number of regiments appeared to him a subject of great delicacy. The last reduction he stated occasioned many to quit the service, independent of those who were discontinued and had left durable seeds of discontent among those who remained. The general topic of declamation was that it was as hard as dishonorable for men who had made every sacrifice to the service to be turned out of it at the pleasure of those in power without an adequate compensation in the maturity to which their uneasiness had now risen from a continuance of misery, they would be still more impatient under an attempt of a similar nature. It was not, he said, the intention of his remarks to discourage reform, but to show the necessity of guarding against the ill effects which might otherwise attended by making an ample provision both for the officers who should remain in the service and for those who should be reduced. This should be the basis of the plan and without it, the most mischievous consequences were to be apprehended. He was aware of the difficulty of making a present provision sufficiently ample to give satisfaction, but this only proved the expediency of making one for the future and brought him to that which he had so frequently recommended as the most economical, the most politic and the most effectual that could be devised. This was half paid for life. Supported by the prospect of a permanent provision, the officers would be tied to the service and would submit to many momentary privations into those inconveniences which the situation of public affairs rendered unavoidable. If the objection drawn from the principle that the measure was incompatible with the genius of the government should be thought insurmountable, he would propose a substitute less eligible in his opinion but which would answer the purpose. It was to make the present half paid for seven years, whole pay for the same period. He also recommended that depreciation on the pay received should be made up to the officers who should be reduced. No objection occurred to the measure, now recommended, but the expense it would occasion. In his judgment, whatever would give consistency to the military establishment would be ultimately favorable to economy. It was not easy to be conceived except by those who had witnessed it, what an additional waste and increased consumption of everything and consequently what an increase of expense resulted from laxness of discipline in an army and where officers thought they did a favor by holding their commissions and the men were continually fluctuating to maintain discipline was impossible. Nothing could be more obvious to him than that sound military establishment and real economy were the same, that the purposes of war would be greatly promoted by it was too clear to admit of argument. He objected also to the mode of effecting the reduction. This was by leaving it to the several states to select the officers who should remain in service. He regretted that Congress had not thought proper to retain the reduction and incorporation of the regiments under their own discretion. He regretted that it should be left to the states not only because it was an adherence to the state system which in the arrangements of the army he disapproved but because also he feared it would introduce much confusion and discontent in a business which ought to be conducted with the greatest circumspection. He feared also that professing to select the officers to be retained in service would give disgust both to those who should be discontinued and to those who should remain. The former would be sent away under the public stigma of inferior merit and the latter would feel no pleasure in a present preference when they reflected that at some future period they might experience a similar fate. He wished with much sincerity that Congress had been pleased to make no alteration in the term of service but had confounded their requisition to men who should serve the war to be raised by enlistment, draft or assessment as might be found necessary. As it now stood there would be very few men for the war and all the evils of temporary engagements would still be held. In the present temper of the states he entertained the most flattering hopes that they would enter on vigorous measures to raise an army for the war if Congress appeared decided respecting it but if they held up a different idea as admissible it would be again concluded that they did not think an army for the war was essential. This would encourage the opposition of men of narrow interested and feeble tempers and enable them to defeat the primary object of the revolution. This letter was taken into consideration and the measures that recommended were pursued in almost every particular even the two great principles which were viewed with most jealousy an army for the war and half pay for life were adopted it would have greatly abridged the calamities of America could these resolutions have been carried into execution every effort for the purpose was made by the commander in chief to place the officers of the army in a situation which would render their commissions valuable and hold out to them the prospect of a comfortable old age in a country saved by their blood their sufferings and the labors of their best years was an object which had always been dear to the heart of general Washington and he had seized every opportunity to press it on Congress that body had approached it slowly taking step after step with apparent reluctance as the necessity of the measure became more and more obvious the first resolution on the subject passed in May 1778 allowed to all military officers who should continue in service during the war and not hold any office or profit under the United States or any of them half pay for seven years if they live so long at the same time the sum of $80 in addition to his pay was granted every non-commissioned officer and soldier who should serve to the end of the war in 1779 this subject was resumed after much debate his father consideration was postponed and the officers and soldiers were recommended to the attention of their several states with a declaration that their patriotism, valor and perseverance in defense of the rights and liberties of their country had entitled them to the gratitude as well as the approbation of their fellow citizens in 1780 a memorial from the general officers depicting in strong terms the situation of the army and requiring present support and some future provision was answered by a reference to what had been already done and by a declaration that patients self-denial fortitude and perseverance and the cheerful sacrifice of time and health are necessary virtues which both the citizen and soldier are called to exercise while struggling for the liberties of their country and that moderation, frugality and temperance must be among the chief supports as well as the brightest ornaments of that kind of civil government which is wisely instituted by the several states in this union. This philosophic lecture on the virtues of temperance to men who were often without food and always scantily supplied was still calculated to assuage irritations fomented by the neglect which was believed to have been sustained. In a few days afterwards the subject was brought again before Congress and at more conciliating temper was manifested the odious restriction limiting the half pay for seven years to those who should hold no post of profit under the United States or any of them was removed and the bounty allowed the men was extended to the widows and orphans of those who died or should die in the service at length the vote passed which has been stated allowing half pay for life to all officers who should serve in the armies of the United States to the end of the war. Resolutions were also passed recommending it to the several states to make up the depreciation on the pay which had been received by the army and it was determined that their future services should be compensated in the money of the new emission the value of which it was supposed might be kept up by taxes and by loans. While the government of the union was thus employed in maturing measures for the preservation of its military establishment the time for action passed away without furnishing any material event. The hostile armies continued to watch each other until the season of the year forced them out of the field. Just before retiring into winter quarters a handsome enterprise was executed by Major Talmage of Colonel Sheldon's regiment of Light Dragoons. That gentleman had been generally stationed on the lines on the east side of the North River and had been distinguished for the accuracy of his intelligence. He was informed that a large magazine of forage had been collected at Corum on Long Island which was protected by the militia of the country the cruises in the sound and a small garrison in its neighborhood. Major Talmage destroys the British stores at Corum at the head of a detachment of 80 dismounted dragoons under the command of Captain L. Edgar and of eight or 10 who were mounted he passed the sound where it was 20 miles wide marched across the island in the night and so completely surprised the fort that his troops entered the works on three different sides before the garrison was prepared to resist them. The British took refuge in two houses connected with the fortifications and commenced to fire from the doors and windows. November 21 these were instantly forced open and the whole party amounting to 54 among whom were a Lieutenant Colonel Captain and Subaltern were killed or taken stores to a considerable amount were destroyed. The fort was demolished and the magazines were consumed by fire. The objects of the expedition being accomplished Major Talmage recross the sound without having lost a man. On the recommendation of General Washington Congress passed a resolution expressing a high sense of the merit of those engaged in the expedition. December the army retires into winter quarters no objects for enterprise presenting themselves the troops replaced in winter quarters early in December. The Pennsylvania line was stationed near Morristown the Jersey line about Pompton on the confines of New York and New Jersey and the troops belonging to the new England states at West Point and in its vicinity on both sides of the North River. The line of the state of New York remained at Albany to which place it had been detached for the purpose of opposing an invasion from Canada. Eruption of Major Carlton into New York. Major Carlton at the head of 1,000 men composed of Europeans, Indians and Tories had made a sudden eruption into the northern parts of New York and taken for its Anne and George with their garrisons. At the same time, Sir John Johnson at the head of a corps composed of the same materials appeared on the Mohawk. Several sharp skirmishes were fought in that quarter with the continental troops and the regiment of new levies aided by the militia of the country. General Clinton's brigade was ordered to their assistance but before he could reach the scene of action the invading armies had retired after laying waste the whole country through which they passed. While the disorder of the American finances the exhausted state of the country and the debility of the government determined Great Britain to persevere in offensive war against the United States by keeping alive her hopes of conquest Europe assumed an aspect not less formidable to the permanent grandeur of that nation than hostile to its present views. European transactions in the summer of 1780 Russia, Sweden and Denmark entered into the celebrated compact which has been generally not nominated the armed neutrality. Holland had also declared a determination to exceed to the same Confederacy and it is not improbable that this measure contributed to the declaration of war which was made by Great Britain against that power towards the close of the present year. The long friendship which had existed between the two nations was visibly weakened from the commencement of the American war. Holland was peculiarly desirous of participating in that commerce which the independence of the United States would open to the world and from the commencement of hostilities her merchants especially those of Amsterdam watched the progress of the war with anxiety and engaged in speculations which were profitable to themselves and beneficial to the United States. The remonstrances made by the British minister at the Hague against this conduct were answered in the most amicable manner by the government but the practice of individuals continued the same. When the war broke out between France and England a number of Dutch vessels trading with France laden with materials for shipbuilding were seized and carried into the ports of Great Britain although the existing treaties between the two nations were understood to exclude those articles from the list of contraband of war. The British cabinet justified these acts of violence and persisted in refusing to permit naval stores to be carried to her enemy in neutral bottoms. This refusal however it was accompanied with friendly professions and an offer to pay for the vessels and cargoes already seized and with proposals to form new stipulations for the future regulation of that commerce. The stage general refused to enter into any negotiations for the modification of subsisting treaties and the merchants of all the great trading towns especially those of Amsterdam expressed the utmost indignation at the injuries they had sustained. In consequence of this conduct the British government required those suckers which were stipulated in ancient treaties and insisted that the causes that are as had now occurred. Advantage was taken of the refusal of the stage general to comply with this demand to declare the treaties between the two nations at an end. The temper produced by the state of things inclined Holland to enter into the treaty for an armed neutrality and in November the Dutch government acceded to it. Some unknown causes prevented the actual signature of the treaty on the part of the stage general until a circumstance occurred which was used for the purpose of placing them in a situation not to avail themselves of the aid stipulated by that confederacy to its members. While Mr. Lee, one of the ministers of the United States was on a mission to the courts of Vienna and Berlin he fell in company with Mr. John the merchant of Amsterdam with whom he held several conversations on the subject of a commercial intercourse between the two nations the result of which was that the plan of an eventual commercial treaty was sketched out as one which might thereafter be concluded between them. This paper had received the approbation of the pensionary Van Berkel and of the city of Amsterdam but not of the stage general. Mr. Henry Lawrence, late president of Congress was deputed to the stage general with this plan of a treaty for the double purpose of endeavoring to complete it and of negotiating alone for the use of his government. On the voyage he was captured by British frigate and his papers which he had thrown overboard were rescued from the waves by a British sailor. Among them was found the plan of a treaty which had been mentioned on which was immediately transmitted to Sir Joseph York the British minister at the Hague to be laid before the government. The explanations of this transaction not being deemed satisfactory by the court of London Sir Joseph York received orders to withdraw from the Hague soon after which war was proclaimed against Holland. This bold measure which added one of the first maritime powers in Europe to the formidable list of enemies with whom Britain was already encompassed was perhaps not less prudent than courageous. There are situations to which only high-minded nations are equal in which a daring policy will conduct those who adopt it safely through the very dangers it appears to invite dangers which a system suggested by attendant caution might multiply instead of avoiding. The present was probably one of those situations. Holland was about to become a member of the armed neutrality after which her immense navigation would be employed and molested in transporting the property of the enemies of Britain and then supplying them with all the materials for shipbuilding or the whole confederacy must be encountered. America, however, received with delight the intelligence that Holland also was engaged in the war and founded additional hopes of its speedy termination on that event. End of chapter eight, part two.