on demobilizations in Colombia in evolving process. For those who are tweeting, the hashtag for today's event is hashtag Columbia Peace Forum. You can also tune in for translation to channel one for English and channel three for Spanish. And I'd like to say a special word of welcome, bienvenido to our web viewers today. On behalf of the US Institute of Peace and our other co-sponsors, the Columbia Committee for Human Rights and the Center for Latin American Studies at Georgetown University, I'd like first to welcome our panelists, Jose Aristizaval and Miriam Criado. We are grateful that they're taking the time from their schedules to travel to Washington to help educate policymakers and others in the DC community about their struggles to end the conflict, which has gone on for half a century at tremendous cost in lives, money, and opportunities, and to share their unique perspectives on war and peace. And we are pleased to collaborate once again with two partners, the Columbia Committee for Human Rights and Georgetown University, particularly the Center for Latin American Studies, who have been dedicated to the cause of peace and human rights in Colombia for many decades. I'd also like to welcome all of you who have weathered the rain to join us. I acknowledge the many members of the diplomatic community, including ambassadors and representatives before the OES from Colombia, Mexico, and Ecuador, as well as the mission to support the peace process and representative from the Department of Political Affairs at the UN. We also have ambassadors and political representatives to the White House from Uruguay, Nicaragua, Austria, Russia, and Japan. We have representation from across the US government, State Department, Defense Department, the Army, and the Congress, and many representatives of the Colombian community living in the United States and other non-governmental and international organizations. I'd also like to give a special word of welcome to former Colombian Senator and Minister Cecilia Lopez-Montano and to the representative of the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace from Colombia, not sure where he is. From the academic community, we also have quite a selection of people. We have students and faculty from area universities, which you might expect, Johns Hopkins University, of course, Georgetown, National Defense University, American University, George Washington University, Montgomery College, and the University of Maryland. But we're also pleased to have scholars from Colgate College in New York, the University of Innsbruck in Austria, the University of Liberia, the University of New Bulgaria, and St. John's. And finally, a special word of welcome to the press as well. I'd like to acknowledge the various USIP staff and teams that have made today's event possible, as well as those unnamed persons from the cosponsoring institutions, the technicians, the public affairs people, the congressional liaison office, the conference and events management team, and my research assistant, Natalia Tejada. Our translators for today are Marta Goldstein and Marta Gutierrez, Shepard. Now, I'd like to turn over the podium to the vice president of the Academy for International Conflict Management and Peace Building, George Lopez, for a few words. Jenny, thank you very much. I'm here simply to welcome you on behalf of USIP to this very, very important event, as many of you know who've joined us at other times before. The Columbia Peace Forum is one of the great events in Washington, from our point of view, for dialogue, not only updates on the peace process, but also bringing timely, timely questions and concerns in this ongoing evolution of the last two years. As you may know, the United States Institute of Peace is the congressionally funded organization in Washington, which is designed to try to prevent, mitigate, and if it breaks out, resolve violent conflict. These are challenging times for that in our global enterprise. But Columbia has had a very special place in our programming for more than a decade. And this moment, as many of you know who are so involved in this field, is especially important for clear, cogent, and policy relevant recommendations. Little did we know two weeks ago when we thought we could go forward with this day that the last 48 hours would be such a critical moment in the peace process. And I'm sure that will be addressed by our good partners and panelists. But we wanted to welcome you. The diversity of people committed to this that Ginny has acknowledged really tells us the strength in this community in Washington, the commitment to the process. And we know today will be very enlightening. Thank you all for being with us. Thank you for our translators for making it possible for this to be such a versatile venture and to our Colombian friends who join us by the miracle of technology. Welcome to you all. Thank you, George. Last night at about 1 a.m. I was just finishing up my remarks on the background of the peace process and how exciting it was that this week would mark two years since the peace process started with all sorts of accomplishments, three provisional agreements signed on rural development, political participation and illicit crops and drug trafficking, of discussions on victims and the end of the conflict well underway with subcommittees established with high level government officials and military and high level FARC military commanders in Havana trying to iron out the technical aspects of the peace process. And what should I find but that Santos had just finished a press conference at midnight announcing that the talks in Havana would be suspended provisionally and temporarily while an investigation would be carried out of the kidnapping of a general who had been traveling in the Chaco region and accompanied by two different people. The story is still unfolding and there are many, many questions pending investigation. Some of these pertain to exactly what happened in this impoverished, largely Afro-Columbian region of Columbia on the Pacific coast. With regard to the events themselves, the president called on Minister of Defense Juan Carlos Pinzon to explain why the general army commander Ruben Dario Alsate Mora broke all the security protocols and was in civilian dress in a red zone. Why were the general and his two travel companions, Captain Jorge Rodriguez Contreras and Gloria Orego, a civilian woman advisor for special army operations in the region, unescorted by bodyguards at the apparent insistence of General Alsate? Why did the general defy the advice of the boat's pilot who had cautioned him against traveling down the Atratto River into a known red zone? Something does not add up and I think it's important that investigations be done and that cool heads prevail before deciding that the peace process is diverted. I won't go into a lot of analysis. I think it's clear from what we've seen in other peace processes that a time of advance at the peace table often is the best time for saboteurs to come out of the woodwork and try to stop the process. And I think caution must be exercised. We must, the government of Columbia must and the negotiators must move carefully. And it's incumbent perhaps on the negotiators to continue some sort of dialogue, to try to come up with a solution to this. There are differences of opinion on all sides. The social media have been going wild. The press has been somewhat reserved today in the early morning hours at least. I haven't looked this afternoon. But I think we don't know yet what the story is. We know that Santos has announced a suspension of the talks. We, he asked his negotiators not to go to Havana today as they were scheduled to do. I think it's a good first step. Hopefully it won't last too long while he figures out what's happening. But even if the FARC were found to be guilty, I think it's important for all of us to recognize that the groups that are sitting at the table negotiating peace in Columbia do not represent monolithic groups, either one of them. And there are people who are opposed to the peace process on both sides of the table. And the important thing I think for the international community to do is to support those who are struggling for peace and to find a political solution to this crisis. USIP is here ready to help in whatever way we can. And I think our first contribution today is to open the floor to two people who have considerable experience with the demobilization process, which is the process that's being discussed currently at the table in Havana. Medium, first we'll start with Jose Aristisavo. You have his bio in front of you, but I'll just say he's the co-founder and coordinator, co-founder of the Corporacion Nuevo Arguiris in Columbia and coordinator of the Observatory on Armed Conflict and Post Conflict at that institution. Medium, Criado Rojas is the co-founder of a collective of demobilized women of the insurgency. She was a member of the EPL and demobilized in the early 1990s. She's a researcher currently at the National Center of Historical Memory. And finally, we'll have as a commentator, Dr. Mark Chernek, the director of the Center for Latin American Studies at Georgetown University, a long time follower of all things Columbia and related to the peace processes, going back as far as the 1980s and a tremendous resource to the Washington community for these discussions on peace processes in general and Columbia in particular. I would just mention one thing as well that both of our speakers today from Columbia have been under threat for a long time. Jose Aristisavo has, as well as his institution, have recently experienced death threats. Mr. Aristisavo, disculpa con el nombre, disculpa. Had to leave Columbia, had to leave Bogota first and then his hometown of Armenia and then traveled and lived in exile for 11 years in Spain. And within three months recently of returning to Bogota, he's again on the death threat lists. So I think many of the people that we know who are working for peace in Columbia do so at great risk to themselves. Medium has also been under threat. And I think I'd just like to say a word applauding the courage that they have to continue on the path, looking for peaceful solutions to the conflict in Columbia and to tell them that the international community is really seeking to see that your right to participate in politics and to support a peace process is protected. So now without further ado, I'll turn the podium over to Jose Aristisavo. Thank you very much, Jenny. I'd like to say hello to everyone here present. We certainly thank you all for being with us for this exchange of ideas in the peace process currently ongoing in Columbia. And we certainly hope that it will continue as should we get to sign all the agreements, hopefully. You would hope that we would start with the incident that we would just mentioned this morning. I'm sure everybody is waiting to see what our opinion is on this. Jenny has already mentioned it this morning and explained the situation. Something perhaps obviously to all of us, it's quite abnormal in a country where it's extremely difficult to foresee anything that's going to happen. It's an unpredictable situation in our country. And obviously the problems that we have, and especially with the negotiations throughout the conflict, trying to maintain the situation without a zone for peace or any of those issues. We knew beforehand that there have been armed conflicts that have continued, the attacks by the FARC to the armed forces and sometimes the civil society in Columbia, as well as the state facing off with the guerrilla forces, where there have been combats, where there have been all kinds of conflicts. With those conditions and the polarization through which Columbia is currently living on, situations this, the one that we have seen are very serious and we're not going to leave this incident aside, thinking that maybe it can just be easily resolved. But if we look at the principal tendency of where we have advanced so far, so that we don't have to make a moment, just a very short-sighted view of what's already happened. And I'm sorry that I'm trying to explain everything, but all the three points that have already been advanced on the peace agenda with signed agreements so far, the subject about victims, about the fact that there are military and guerrillas that are looking to see how we're going to set these weapons aside. The fact that Havana is in most of the military commands of people that are there, the ones that take political and military decisions for the guerrilla group, these facts have taken it to the point that a lot of analysts in our country think that the process is irreversible, that the process has already passed the equator. There's just very important factors that have to be decided, but there was a trust that the idea is that we were going to carry it forth. We believe that this situation has to be cleared up as quickly as possible. If the park or the authors of this events, they have to respond to those at the peace table as quickly as possible. The Frente 34 in Chaco, for example, the military commander of that unit is in Havana, and we certainly hope that this commander and all the others will be able to hopefully resolve the process so the peace process can go on. It's not something that the FARC or the government wants and they do not want for the situation to go on for several days. So we certainly hope and we trust that the situation will be resolved as quickly as possible in order to avoid more problems, more issues and more interruption to the peace process. We certainly don't want that to happen as well as the problems that already we have with the opposition that is very radical and that's one of the political groups in Colombia that have very extreme right positions where there's extreme polarization. They're hoping to try to stop whatever virtues that peace process has and to accuse the process saying that it's a violation of the constitution, that's a series of things which by the way are not even been confronted in the agreements, but it has caused a very different thought process and pedagogy in the process in the government in Colombia. We certainly hope that we get out of this conflict as quickly as possible, the situation and that hopefully we will head forward to have a peace between all of them, at least a ceasefire as far as the FARC is concerned and the ELN and hopefully they'll agree to a truce and this is something we've talked about but fortunately hasn't taken wings and has not gone forward with all the parties that are involved at the negotiation table, but we certainly hope that it will strengthen and that hopefully if we don't reach to a bilateral truce at least to have a unilateral truce on the part of the insurgents groups, so the FARC, the ELN and as far as the government's concerned they'll be ceasing to some of the activities that have repercussions in civil society such as indiscriminate bombing that affects not only the FARC and guerrilla areas but also the populations that are nearby where the insurgents are located. We would like to have this gesture towards peace by the guerrilla hopefully as it's being pressured by many areas of the society, but we'd also like to see that the government would also like to de-scale the conflict as far as possible. We certainly hope that this all helps to bring attention to all the parties that are sitting at the table as well as civil society to continue to this bilateral truce while we certainly finalize the agreements. I wanted to also mention that we wanna share with all of you so we can debate it here. What are the principal obstacles other than this incident that just occurred that are now in the midst of the negotiation? We certainly think that the most principal obstacle is the existence of a political elite that are local and regional in certain areas that either in or outside our country. Traditionally they have become allies to the military forces also regional and local and have become allies also with drug traffickers with the power of militaries as now to the Bacrim or these criminal groups or gangs that we have in our country. The Corporación Arcoiris has set out a lot of reports done a lot of research regarding these local and regional elite groups that have had links with organized crime, with illegality, with mafias and are trying to stop the development of democracy and to have the rule of law for it to work. They don't want institutionals that works the way it's supposed to work in many regions and municipalities of the country. Many of you know Columbia. Many of you have known or heard us speak of Tumaco where the institutions in the local institutions of the government have been co-opted by these illegal actors or politicians that are in within the law but they're allied with those sectors. They are from different parts of the, coming from different parts of the country with influence on those elites. Those are the most opposed to the peace process, not only a negotiation with that will be successful but a problem for the construction of the peace in the different departments and municipalities of the country. These are sectors who have accumulated very large military, political, economic power. They have appropriated from illegal rents in these areas. They are a very, very real obstacle for the peace process and this is an aspect that we consider. These are voices, the authorities of the United States would be able to contribute because they are principle online to this peace process. They have offered supported with military forces. It is important also that their signals, their something was sent from here so that the national government from the justice will be these local and regional elites will be transformed not only with the peace process but the construction of democracy in different areas of the country. The second point I want to address is the possible negotiations with ELN. In the history, in the 90s, there was de-mobilization of five guerrilla groups. After that, the de-mobilization of the AUC, the de-mobilization experience shows that when armed actor leaves that territory, that territory is immediately occupied by another guerrilla group. We negotiated with a FARC and there simultaneously, there is no negotiation with ELN. It's very possible that many territories where the FARC leaves, ELN will go into those territories and they will continue doing the armed conflict and all the problems that come from it. In Aroca, people were telling us recently, why do we need a de-mobilization? What's the use of de-mobilization process here if the ELN still exists? If the ELNs exist here, there will be no peace. There will be no possible transformation in the political, social, economic areas because ELN will maintain the conflict and the violation to human rights will go on and all the ramifications of the problems. It is known that ELN and the government have discussion, they want to have an agent, an agenda to sit at a negotiation table. They had press release that they have made progress in two subjects of the agenda that is of the victims and participation. Information that we have received in the Com- with a high commission for the peace, contacts with people that have close to ELN, the information we have received. There's a unit at ELN as to walking together towards a negotiation table. There is an internal discussion as to how setting down arms will be in those territories where how that is going to be carried out with the paramilitaries. There are internal discussions on that subject but in the negotiation table is to show unity. Where they are stuck, the exploration for the members of the negotiation table is to set the finalize the agenda for the peace process talks. It is difficult to come up with a agenda that is agreeable to everyone for the ELN, the government and the FARC. And there also some agreements have been already addressed to discuss them separately and come to the table with a finalize items that are the same for everyone. So we are sort of developing that agenda together. The discussion of the agenda has become public. Contrary to the FARC, it took them a year in internal private discussions. This one has become public. So our idea is that those negotiations, preliminary will also be public and open up to the country to prevent infiltration problems so that they don't have a percussions on the process. Given the conditions to open up the negotiation table, it is to expect that there have been unilateral truce treaties for Christmas, New Year's Eve. So we expect that this Christmas, this could have become a truce, a unilateral truce accompanied by some gestures from the government. From the Civil Society, there is a meeting for the peace. There are several initiatives, civil initiatives for peace, local, regional, from social, local, young women, women, youth, the city halls, many peace initiatives. But these are, they have very little disability. They're not linked, not connected to the activism in the capital to press these negotiations through the mobilization of social society. The idea is to organize a strong front for the peace. Many social movements have been in this period in the negotiating tables by the government, the indigenous groups, the national cultural groups that organized in 2013 great mobilizations and will be strengthened. This mobilization contributes so that the proposals, like the unilateral truth to advance, make progress in the negotiations, to finalize the negotiations in the short term, hopefully. Well, those are some ideas that we want to share with you this afternoon. Thank you very much. Thank you very much, Jose. Now we will pass the word to Miriam Crado. Well, thank you very much to the Institute for the Invitation to add my name. My name is Miriam Crado. I started at a time when the political militancy was urgent. That was a call, an international for work. It was different from what we have today. And in that perspective, sometimes one would seem to the youth today that were speaking Chinese. I feel free to talk to you. I have some slides to help me remember more than anything. I would like to talk to you about the experience of women, what it means to be ex-fighter, to be a woman, a woman who participates in an insurgent organization and the impact on the collective and individual life of the women. Colombia is a country of recycled wars, hasn't finished one when it's already on the verge of starting the next ones, a different organization of violence and the participation of women in policy, as well as in war has been in general terms, in traditional areas that are linked to that social participation. When women for a long time, for some say due to evolution, some creation, there's a hybrid also principle. We are the ones who continue this species. With that, there's a particular role for the women. And it was, she was put in a certain point, in a certain location in time. That has been broken. Then we realize a magnitude when we decide the women to link ourselves to the fight of the insurgency. At that time, that's when it's one for all and all for one is the logo in the RMS. There are no differences between women and men. We always speak in the masculine, but the functions generally are related to the cultural role. So they are functions, primarily education, health, construction of networks. And in some cases, the armies that combine policy and military, they are with them military, within with their certain functions within the military. That role, that work in the insurgency, it's a role that's seeking solidarity, liberty, dreams, but doesn't intervene. That political discussion doesn't affect the cultural. Some figures in the 90s, 90 demobilizations were done, some with men, women, some with less, but nine organizations had agreements with the government. 27% of the demobilized in the 90s, we were women. One woman signed the agreements with the front, Francisco or Nica, and one woman signed in 1998 the agreements with the national government. There's no more presence of women in the signage signing of agreements, but there's a presence of women in the structure that led to the negotiations. The model that is for negotiation established in the 90s, I think it's also being used today in the Habana. It's a model that relates the man links man with weapon, with the militias, with the weapons. And that includes a lot of people. So people like myself, we were not part of the militia, strictly speaking, but I was part of the party, of the political party. Most of the people participated in the negotiations, participating with me were outside the negotiation table. The quarter hour is given to the military officers and that model excludes the political proposal that includes insurgency, that involves the organizations, non-military, that support a certain change, but they are not included in the negotiation table. In the 2000s, the total is 34,000, that's closer to the demobilization of paramilitary. 10% were women and there was not one woman of the signed agreements. I don't call them self defense, out of the fantasy, because there is ruling, ruling by the Constitution Court that the groups in defense of the status quo of the state and in some sectors, they are called paramilitary. Initially, well, I'm gonna start a phrase, what means to be a woman before and after a process of demobilization that is a phrase by Elizabeth Odio from the Criminal International Criminal Court. It says, discriminate is not only to treat differently what is the same, but to treat the same what is different. And what does this mean and what is the importance for the negotiating table in La Habana? And that is that the setting down, this armament of women and reintegration of women has specific connotations, not only because of the experiences lived, not because the connotation of our gender gives us a different learning, but only because that is very complicated. It's the return is to what culturally was left is more difficult. In us exist and with us it lives a double transgression, a political transgression that led us to what some consider the extreme of politics, which is the insurgency, clandestine situation and transgression to the cultural that forces to maintain us private, not to participate and much less in exercises, in the wars and violence. The double transgression has a very strong connotation for women who return. I feel privileges and I feel different, but I can't stop to say that the strength and the courage necessary to return from the war and that your children don't want to live with you, to return from war and feel that one is a different woman. And not always they say with a positive connotation, but it's also different because she left, she went to the world of men and abandoned the family. Generally the family doesn't welcome the women who return from the war. The one who returns the man is a hero because did, and particularly us, we form part of the need for change and we feel that we have there's a paternity on the Colombian constitution that is a big success for the democratic process that we are seeking. But the men's return is seen as something courageous, but the return of the women is seen as unnatural and that's an additional difficulty to the conditions of the demobilization. There is a generalization to that return to the society in the 90s and either in the 2000s or there are no programs for reintegration disarmament for women and they have to consider some issues, women issues that was not contemplated. In fact, it's very hard for us, for our companions to think that what we women have our own rights because we were part, we have to make and they make decisions against our interests. To return and thank you again about it. On the, no solamente son las condiciones de seguridad, sino también las condiciones de participación, es complicado principalmente para las mujeres. Digo que hay un contexto general que ha permitido durante un tiempo que los demobilizados pudiéramos hacer parte de escenarios de participación en política vía las elecciones. Y la discusión y la competencia fue entre nosotros, hubo empezando el proceso en los 90, hubo dos cupos en el Congreso Nacional que nos permitieron tener allí. Basically to allow us to have several people present in the National Congress. From M19, for example, the most important spokesperson that we did have was Pérez Gravé. Ele had three spokesperson women at regional level. And if I am not mistaken, I believe there were no females participating currently. The lack of female voices also represents a weakness in the democratic construction that we all seek and hope to get. The reason fundamentally is because the political constitution, our constitution evidence is the fact how weak our democracy is. The constitution, the Magna Carta has to state that there are blacks, women, indigenous communities, organizations that are social in nature because the monopolies that had the power were just between the two parties, the liberals and conservatives. So just the fact that you like that bulb, that idea would force everyone to understand the differences so we can all see that there are differences between our groups that would give us more strength and our participation in the process. Today Vera Gravé, for example, is dedicated to academics and pedagogy and none of the three women that were part of the actual regional voice persons of ELN continue to do politics and work in the electoral process. I'm not sure of the ideas that women think that all of us should intervene in cultural issues but we all continued to work on politics but not as specific parties. What we've tried to do is to work on cultural construction. So what is the importance of gender? As far as I'm concerned, there was a before times and after times. I'm not extremely intelligent. I kind of make like I am intelligent but I think this subject of gender is something that comes later. I think about the gender issue 10 years after demobilizing and I ask the question that has to do with research and that's done with the University of Antioquia. I can tell you that I was part starting at the very lowest level of the party and I reached a national responsibility within the same party. And every time I went up and each time I had greater responsibility I would be sleepless for about three days. I was constantly worried and concerned am I gonna be able to do it? Why me? Why not someone else? And the question that finally helped me was do you think men think the same as I'm thinking now? And that to me was quite a revelation because I can recognize now that I met men that were not capable of doing anything. Men that were mediocre. Men that were scared. Men that I protected. And that question made me think that generally women stand back waiting for someone else to motivate us. And that produced a before and an after for me. I know that I began to understand the importance of feminist work and what it has represented for all of us in Columbia. I've met women authors like Nancy Frazier and Edie's Marion Young. After many, many years I'm now working with the academia. I'm finishing my master's in public administration. And that's the second debt that I have is I'm gonna be able to speak their language and I'll do that as quickly as I can. But these two women, Nancy Frazier and I are as Marion Young, proposed a thought that's different to just the fact that we're different. They basically say that women are a social group that have different interests. Consequently, public policy has to emphasize the fact not only to count how many women participate, but what they represent as their own interests are part of the process. In Columbia, for example, there's public policy that derives from the perspective of gender that only works on counting numbers.  I think that there is a very misleading idea that's not the concept and perspective of gender. Chantelle Mouff says that there are different situations. It says that not only are things the same. People evolve, humans evolve. And that's something basically I'm not saying right here, but the difference in the postures of people go together with the responsibility and the different positions that people attain. Women not only have to have a feminine identity, an identity of gender, but it also allows to adopt a position that's political in all arenas. And I think that based on what's going on in Havana, I think that's gonna sound even stranger there than speaking Chinese. Because I think that the feminist thought is to make it complex, to make an issue more complex what Jose has already mentioned, that this is the context, this is what Columbia's living through, and this is what women are saying, that all of that context has to go through the idea of gender. I've also brought with me the idea of a poster, Hotemekousti wrote this, and he talked about transgression, it's as if there would have been beyond, you'd gone through the wires and through darkness and transgression, you've gone through the barbed wire. Many women that were demobilized in the 90s are still crying about the situation because they're living clandestinely. They're not as submissive as I am, they're not as strong perhaps as I am or less submissive perhaps than I am, and that causes very, very painful situations for these women. There's a video that was a product of a study by the University of Antioquia, and I left a copy here with Jeanne, and it's women that have not been counted, mujeres no contadas. And you can identify in the video what it meant for some of them to be able to find the possibility of constructing democracy as I did, and for others, the defeat that they felt, the return back to their homes to a context that was very difficult to live, and the fact that they're still clandestine, that many of us are still called victims, and those that are called the ones that cause the victims, so they've been in order to reduce the comfort of the point where these two issues have to come together. The seriousness of what's happened in Columbia is that it's become invisible as far as the conflict that causes, and it's been determined that only those that participated in the war are the ones have to be responsible for the war, and I think that's the most serious issue of what's happening in Columbia. As far as women is concerned, as far as the challenges, the difficulties that we face, we have to look at three different specific issues that I am mentioning here. One is to go beyond the rivalry and the emergency of the group, the society of women. It's rivalry that has been ancestral in its nature. We learned to mistrust women. They were always, another woman wasn't always an arrival. We always had to try to beat the other woman. We have to construct organizations of women that are among the diversity of the people. And I also consider that validating my own experience and the experience of many of my fellow combatants that the experience has to be incorporated towards political participation, not just responsibility. In the perspective of Havana, I believe that it's very valid to think that we have to make the negotiations more visible as far as they're concerned. In contrast to the numbers that I gave you back in the 90s and the years 2000 in Havana, they talk about the fact that there are about 40% of the FARC are currently women.  And I think that's extremely important that from the negotiations that these revendication of women has to come forth. There has to be a political policies from DDR that expresses the vision and interest of women. And not only just genders of masculine and feminine, which also exist in the army and the military, we need to talk about the fact that our experience was a lesson learned that has to be overcome, that has to go beyond just the actors that are working now and that are feel perhaps threatened thinking that our experience is the only valid one. Let me end by saying and repeating that peace and war are products of the very same society. Organizations are products of society. And if we hate war and we're horrified by it, we have the same potential to build peace from different points of view and knowledge in order to end my remarks, let me say that my perspective is perhaps a bit different based on what's happened in the last few days. In the processes back in the 90s, we looked for truces and we agreed on different truces and different areas for peace. And we had very nonetheless serious actions that were taken the part of both sides. So it doesn't only just fall on the type of negotiations that are looked at now, I can think that the FARC has to say that they were the ones. It's areas where other military forces are in that area. And I think it goes against the FARC if they don't quickly say that they were the ones that carried out these actions or they weren't because in a country that is so polarized from one side to the other, not between left and right, but two different rights that want to make of war and peace their own battleground where we are trying to push for the idea of peace process because democracy is the most important issue and that's what we're expecting. The time has to go towards the FARC. They need to quickly tell us whether they were responsible for what happened and give back those individuals that are civilians that were held beyond the fact that they were not combatants. And through all the issues that we already set up that they brought them alive, we want them back alive. Thank you again so much. I certainly hope I have not superseded my time here at too much. Bon entes no sandado. Thank you very much, Miriam. I think our speakers have given me a lot of material to think about and it will have enough time to have questions and answer. But first we'll give the word to Mark Charnick of Georgetown and I'm going to ask you to limit yourself only to, well, maybe five to seven minutes, maybe till 3.30. I would like to start the floor for discussion. Maybe seven to 10 minutes. We're going to negotiate that. All right, please go ahead. I mean, Ginny, I think you all can appreciate how much wisdom we listen to and how much experience those people who have lived, two people who have lived through this experience and have much to share.  The rules of the game, which were established very early on at the negotiating table, was that nobody would get up despite the provocations. Everybody who's ever experienced past peace process in Columbia or peace process anywhere in the world knows that there will be provocations. There will be reasons to get up and leave the table. The two previous experiences with the FARC in Caguan, 98 to 2002 and in Tlaxcala, 91 and 92, both ended when the FARC or another griller group kidnapped a former minister in the case of Tlaxcala and hijacked a plane in the case of Caguan. And so everyone was prepared to saying, this will happen, we won't be provoked. There have been provocations over these last two years. In the run-ups to Havana, when negotiations were still secret, the armed forces killed the leader of the FARC, Alfonso Cano. If there was a time for the FARC to leave these negotiations, it was then and they didn't do it. And I simply say that the golden rule of negotiations has to be we will stay at the table, we will not be provoked. And when these things happen, we will resolve them. But we won't make the negotiating table hostage to all the events, particularly when the rules are, as they are in this case, to negotiate amid the conflict. No ceasefire. One answer, of course, would be a bilateral ceasefire or a unilateral ceasefire in the part of the FARC. I don't think we're gonna get that so easily, so I go back to the first. Okay, let me just comment very quickly Jose, just you all understand this, but I wanna make this quite clear. This conflict now is reaching almost its 70th year. Really, because you need to go back to the 1940s, that there's not been a day of peace in Columbia since the 1940s. And these negotiations, Havana, are the latest of almost 30 years of negotiations, mostly failed or with partial success. What has been achieved in Havana in these last two years is extraordinary. We've never come this close to success in negotiations with the FARC and potentially a comprehensive negotiations to the settlement, comprehensive negotiations to the war. And so, recognizing the big picture, it's hard to see how the FARC or the government who have shown so much commitment this time who have made so much progress could let this fall apart. Because be clear, this is the end of this model. This model looks like it will work. It's hard to imagine they would ever get back to a model that looks something like the table in Havana if this were to fall apart. And so really, it is essential that this go on. And all of civil society, the international community has to make all that clear. But I think the actors at the table and much of civil society in Columbia understands that too. There are enemies, which brings us to Jose's talk. He spent a lot of time talking about the LN. And it's true. And it's a very clear lesson that we learned from the past. When one armed group demobilizes, and there isn't a comprehensive peace and there's a power vacuum, others will move in. And he said, if we make peace with the FARC and you don't make peace with the LN, well, we're doing what we've done now for 30 years as we've made partial peace, but we haven't reached a comprehensive peace. And so it is essential to make peace with both. And I think it will. The ELN I think has been quite clear. They want to make peace. It's very difficult to make peace for both reasons of procedure. They want more conservation with civil society. And also the agenda. One thing that Jose emphasized the less was they wanna talk about issues of petroleum and mining and the government's reluctant to do that. But I suspect they will find a way. But let's say they do find a way. The FARC and the ELN, as we all know, the most complicated part of this process is the question of the existing paramilitary by cream groups. If you negotiate with the ELN and the FARC and you get a comprehensive peace with them, and there isn't a policy to systematically dismantle the bar cream and paramilitary, then it'll be hard for this piece to go forward. And that's something that's to be discussed at the negotiating table. It's really incumbent on the government to link successful negotiations in Savannah to a comprehensive strategy of dismantling the paramilitaries. That's what a comprehensive peace will look like. It'll be very hard if that doesn't happen. We will see an undermining of the process. And finally, the main subject of this talk is DDR. Miriam gave a very moving and eloquent analysis of the role of gender in the DDR process. We've learned a lot over the years. DDR, one in the early years, was simply, wasn't that systematic. It was about handing in arms, and the great emphasis was basically on how do you transform from an arm movement to a political party. And there was some success with the EPL and the M19, Kintin Lame. As DDR has developed in Columbia and around the world, there's been a lot more emphasis on individual DDR. What do you do with the ex-combatants? But that's mostly been placed within a narrow framework of male combatants. The one thing we've learned that now is DDR is a very complex issue. DDR not only needs to have a major gender element, why women in war, women returning from war, conflicts which are not just reduced victim and perpetrator, but looking at the entirety of the conflict and the role of gender within that. And from there, you can do the same analysis with indigenous people, with Afro descendants, with young people. All that's going to be very complicated. One gets the sense that the complexity of the DDR, both in moving from war to peace and in the post-conflict, in the multiple levels from the individual to returning to the family, to returning to the community, to returning to society, to entering politics, whom beyond politics. One gets the sense that up till now, the Colombian government hasn't fully appreciated that complexity, the existing structure, which was set up for the paramilitaries, was basically a seven-step process from war to peace and you get psychosocial training, you get job training, you get education. This is going to have to be a very different process and I'm hoping that we can discuss that as we move forward. So I thank you all very much. This was a stunning presentation. Thank you. Thank you, Mark, for your wide-ranging and really insightful remarks into our two speakers. I think we've got lots to discuss. I'd like to start with just one question to the two speakers before I open it up to the floor. And it's picking up on Mark's last point about what happens, what would you do with the current process? And I wonder if both Jose and Medium might mention a couple of particular things that you think need to be changed in the current DDR process based on what you experienced in your own demobilization process. Yes, I have several, several issues. One, the subcommission of gender in Havana has to be effective and there has to be a counterpart in Colombia that allows the rehabilitation of the ex-combatant women. That's first. That means that there has to be a dialogue, a discussion in dialogue with the women, the women from FARC that still have not, the gender issue has not been broached yet. The subcommission on gender in Havana is to produce some documents that have to be validated by the commanders. There is not a level of independence and a gender position. I think that's opens the way for later. A second issue that I mentioned briefly in my talk is that the negotiation model, I don't know if it can be modified or changed, but it has to widen the structure. Well, the FARC, that's the most similar to what we were. We were not a political, military organization. It was a march that had a structure party and it has an armed insurgency. When you only give the voice and the opportunity to the military man, it excludes two important areas that were a big loss for us, for the construction of the democracy. So I would ask for the Amazon. That door would open up and allow all these other, all these groups that are around this proposal can come in and that would be important. And Colombia does have 27 years of having started negotiations. It's a permanent demobilization for the last 25 years and in 2003, with the last issue, the national government at that time gave up, oh, open to the public, all the history of the negotiations, put it on an aisle, on a hall at the Ministry of the Interior and said whoever wants to take this can take it. And that is terrible. Now that I'm part of the National Center for Historical Memory, it's terrible because it seems that the country is condemned to repeat its history and repeating and the Adam syndrome doesn't work here. Well, we propose that reintegration should be better, would satisfy the aspirations of the former fighters and they have to take into account the regions where they return. This, what I mean is to, the evaluations made, this, what I mean is that the research on Central America, what they model is Salvador, show that there were very positive aspects, good results in the political arena. You know, Salvador, for example, today, but Puente Farahundo-Martín now has a majority in the parliament and has contributed to the transformation of the political arena of the, they have had success in the policy. In Colombia, the groups who demobilized in the 90s besides the National Constituent Assembly, we had an important role in trying to merge different groups, political groups to be strengthened. These groups at the end of the 90s, at the beginning of the 2000, within the political scenery of the country, governors, majors, they have come out from this peace negotiation. In the political arena, the experience of the demobilization has been positive, but in the economic arena, in the social life of the reinsertion for the ex-fighters and the communities that suffered the effects of these groups and these conflicts, the balance is negative. It's not positive. There were projects of collective insertions in cattle ranching in several corporations. The reality is that in a country with a high level of unemployment at that time with a not very solid economic structure, it was difficult to go back to the work with not very good skills, not training. That was difficult for these people. So we think that this situation, this re-entry in society, rehabilitation, led to all this, they go back to the insurgency. Some, a lot, some less, small, medium-sized groups, of these groups, of the ones that were demobilized, we went into the social life, so went back to the insurgency, it relapsed to their old ways, to the insurgency. With regard to satisfying the needs of the combatants, in order to be able to become socially rehabilitated, sometimes it's just a real problem between them, the government, private sector, companies, other social areas. It's a problem that has to be resolved between them, but no, it's a problem for society as a whole. So we have to create favorable conditions, public opinion, pedagogy of peace that allowed these people, after so many years, that were part of the insurgency, could have opportunities in the regular life and work of a country. As far as reconciliation in different regions of the country, these are guerrilla groups that, if we reach a peace agreement, are based basically from rural areas. The most sure thing is that they can return to the areas that they came from. And the idea there is, of course, of FARC to perhaps set up specific areas so they can represent in the House of Representatives so they can become an integral part of what we're talking about, maybe 11 or 12 national plans with different aspects of rural agricultural development. And there will be opportunities in those areas. We believe that the opportunity of transforming these groups into political movements will be forces in politics to be able to be a part of these political lives. It will help that these ex-combatants will be able to, with success, become part of society, politics, policies, et cetera, that they'll be able to work in the peasant areas where they will be able to have an important role or have other posts that are just as important in the rural development. So we believe we have to change these conventional ideas that have to be actually better. This type of conflict has to be improved. The model, the conventional model that we've had of the DDR has to be changed, has to adapt to reality of Columbia. Thank you very much. All right, now let's open the floor and... We'll turn to the audience now. Those of you who have questions, if you could please identify yourselves and your institution before asking the question. Natalia has a microphone. And I would also remind you that there are evaluation forms on your chair. So if you do, when you do leave, please be sure you leave us your feedback so that we can continually try to improve our events. Thank you. Can I do my question in Spanish? In Spanish or English is fine. Mi nombre es Andrés Alderriaga. Andrés Alderriaga, I'm a student, I'm a Colombian, and I'm studying Latin American Studies in Georgetown. My question is for medium creado. One of the elements of transitional justice is very important, particularly when you see examples like Argentina, Chile, Salvador, Guatemala is the truth of what happens. So we have historic memory in Columbia right now, but I've seen that the position of the government has a tendency to just go to be a restorative justice and not criminal justice. So within that context, what do you think the paper is of the Memorial Historic Center as far as a conflict is concerned, and particularly in the process of reintegration? Generally, these mechanisms are more orientated or towards the victims, but it could be a tool that could be used to promote dialogue, and it would be very important as far as the non-stigmatizing of the ex-combatance. If you could try to keep your comments short and your questions directed to the speakers, that would be great. Buenas tardes, mi nombre es Andrés Díaz. Good afternoon, Andrés Díaz from the mission in the OAS from Columbia. One of the problems of the problem has been the centralization of policy. The last two governments, Santos and Uribe, represent two of the political traditional elite. Are there now a space for a third party now in Columbia to function? We'll start with those two then. One more over there? Buenas tardes, mi nombre es Andrés. My name is Andrea, I'm a Colombian as well, and I'm working here at Latin American Youth Center. I work with the insertion situation. My question is yours particularly. How does this post-conflict situation, how can it link women into it so that they'll have social, economic, social integration with all of the agreements that are trying to be reached at this moment in Havana? We know that so far women have not been part of the peace process. So what's going to happen to this women? How can we link them into the process so we can understand that they should be included based on the differences of gender? Thank you. To work at the Historic Memory Center has allowed me to, well, let me explain. This center has four different offices, one for museums, one for research, another office for human rights issues, and one for the agreements for truth. In that unit is where I work. In that office is where we receive the stories from those that have been demobilized from the paramilitary groups with the idea to do some research and also to certify what they're saying. If the individual who comes and tells their truth, their memory, and it is part of the historic memories, then he is certified positively, and that has an impact on his legal life because he's condemned, but he's not going to go to jail. So it's sort of a give and take where instead of going before a judge or into a courtroom or the prosecutor's office and be quiet and not say what happened, in this case he's supposed to tell us what happened. Not too long ago I was interviewing these individuals, I was doing it face to face, they were telling me their story, and I had to confess that the first ones were very impactful for two conditions, first of all, because from an ideological point of view, the natural enemy was the paramilitary and to face the fact that what he had faced is a very complicated situation, but that a human experience allowed me today to be able to say that I find that there is something in common. And the fact is that through different ideologies, we've become the pawns of the same war where no one really knows or they don't know what the impact of their own participation was. And sometimes when they tell us about those stories, when they hear themselves speaking, there is a process that comes about that perhaps is a healing process. I've had some very strong experiences where the first part of the interview was very structured and then the second one goes more in depth and the first part has 110 questions and a man that was a soldier, for example, who's the big, strong man, who's still young, very young. And from the third question on he starts to cry. And he cries all afternoon long till four o'clock when it's over. It makes you realize the impact of war on an individual, on a person who supposedly was my enemy and on myself. So I think that's something that a question that's asked frequently, for example, to put it in perspective is what is that gonna help to tell the truth? Is that gonna help the victims? And I think that's very important when it comes to justice is concerned. We want the truth as a right to justice as part of justice, that's what we're asking for. And that implies that we not only need the reasons why they became part, but to guarantee that it's not gonna happen again because that's obviously another point of view. The interview ends with that. It makes that person think so that the next decisions that he makes as a political individual or someone involved in politics has to think in a different way and I think that's important. And it's a good thing. As far as the historic memory center and as a final step that's taken for all of these interviews, the center and the office of agreements has to provide a report on the most important subjects that came out during the interviews because it's a mandate that we need to do this. We have to exclude the claims. There is privacy that has to be guaranteed in order to know why the conflicts occurred, the reasons why they happened, the reasons and how it started. And from that point of view, the report has to be a result, a guarantee for justice as well because at least it's a mirror to be able to see what's going on in front of society and I think that's important. Now, what are they gonna do as far as negotiations? I really can't say for sure if what's coming is the very same way to assume the truth or assume memory. There are those that say that perhaps we have to think in a specific moment so we can think about what happened before demolition because this center for memory is a part of the subject of the victims issues and it basically is an element for justice when you talk about the victims and it only comes about between two presidencies now. For example, we've gone through four different periods, we're starting the fourth period now and it starts with the very first government by Dr. Santos and when this center was established eight, 10 years had already gone by so to call someone to come to us after all that time has been very complicated and we're trying to figure out how to view all this. There is a balance that everyone wants to see when we think about it and I agree with what Dr. Shamid said that we have not been able to achieve a great peace. We've had very small fragmented pieces. We've discussed the idea in different territories who has enough power, for example, to hold on to that area of the country of its peace or war and it would have, for example, it's something that perhaps might be one of the things that we have to talk about. What does it mean when we talk about territorial peace in the terms of political oppositions, the impacts that could occur in a specific territory, the fact that they are elements that have economic power in that area if you're looking at the perspective of political peace. So all of that are very complex issues to be able to be decided. That means that the third parties or forces in the area are going to be going against what we're doing because a country that exists today is different than Columbia of the 90s. I should say that there is nostalgia, the fact that the FARC and other groups did not come along with us when we set up the original assembly because at that point it was only 19% of us. It might have been much more than that. But I also remember that back in that time we couldn't talk about two issues, the economic model or armed forces. That was something we couldn't talk about back then. So that limited us in what we could do. So those third parties, the third powers, we basically really didn't have enough to be able to do everything and to bring everything together and to bring everybody down to the daily lives of people. That's an example of what could happen today because what they're talking about in Havana is not being forced on Columbia to discuss. And as Jose said very wisely that all of us have to say that we all gain from what's being signed there. And it has to be towards peace and it also has to be towards politics. All of that has to be accomplished. So there'd be a larger strength in favor of the changes that are required that it would be validated by the referendum so that all of the issues that are being covered in Havana have to be together, seen through all of these third, fourth, fifth powers in the country. And of course women in post-conflict are a group that have a lot. Not only are we almost 52% of Colombians population but those of us that have come can say very calmly that to actually transgress to these situations is not so bad, to break the mold isn't bad. That in that particular situation women, not only the ones that are coming in the future but those that are trying to construct peace through the resolutions from the United Nations or the mediators or the guardians of peace. There's a lot of ground that's already been covered and I certainly hope that the men will be very generous. And in order to broaden the idea of 30% of people who participate only as a quota, I think that's where we need to have solidarity from our male counterparts so that we all will win and we will new new battles particularly with the idea and the subject of gender. Jose, I'd like to add a little bit about this space for third political strengths in our country. We all know that Colombia has a restricted democracy and a very restricted participation as well. It has brought difficulties other than the issue, the internal situations, the leftist and the more democratic popular movements, regional movements, et cetera. Aside from these limitations, these restrictions have brought us to the fact that they do not have a force that perhaps is more than 10% of the electorate or the constituents of the country. So what we want from the piece is that these parties that are fighting the system that will be able to become political forces so that they will become political movements that are legal in nature, that they can contribute with alliances with other sectors that already exist or perhaps on their own means to be able to contribute to a new political life and a new democracy in Colombia. There are still difficulties that persist. The idea, for example, the money factor in campaigns, the corruption that exists in our country, the criminalization or stigmatization of political or protest from the people, for example, the growth of new political forces who represent traditional areas that have been excluded in the past, regions traditionally excluded from politics in our country. So there have been some conditions. There has been an area where we can talk about this with a lot of difficulty and limitations. What we hope with this peace process is to specifically create local, regional and national democracy that will impact throughout the country. But for this, what we need to do is we said from the beginning, if we don't work to reduce, to transform these regional elite groups that persist in an alliance to continue with siding with the mafias and the criminal groups, it'll still be very difficult for a lot of these regions, for these new political forces to come in and to become stronger and be more robust in a transformation on a social and political level in the country. So yes, there isn't an area for them. There are problems and difficulties, but we certainly hope that the peace process will make them broader, will make them better. My question is also for Dr. Artiste Sava. How do you explain the fact that this rehabilitation of system, talk about X number of percentage of people that will not go back to war? You're saying that the process now is very developed and has improved and it's not at all what it was like 20 or 30 years ago. So how do you explain that change? My name is Eida Rodriguez. I'm also from Columbia and I'm doing a central American. I'm working at Central American and where I'm working as an intern. I didn't understand your question. The fact that you're saying 36% are not coming back in? It's a much more positive change is what you were saying. You were saying that you haven't been able to get changes at the local level by businessmen, et cetera, but what the agency is saying that not too many people have come back because the process has been made for let's say for education of these people and until they can actually handle themselves economically. They become independent. And if this process lasts more than five or seven years, how does that work? That's my question. What do you think? All right, okay, we'll take one or two more questions and that'll be it. My name is Nira Mariano and I worked during four years in the agency for the rehabilitation. I was an agent for the coffee belt. So what do you see this process of rehabilitation and reinsertion that was so much different than what you said it was before? What do you think is best and what would you change? What are your proposals to make it better? Thank you, Jose Luis Ramirez from the OAS. My question is very personal, however. First of all, it's for Jose. The international alliances and groups that are with you from other countries is so important. How do you perceive this gonna happen in the demobilization that we hope will happen after the conflict? I had the opportunity of work with demobilization in Caragua, the ambassador, I believe, is present here. I think Luis was here, ambassador, good afternoon. It was an example, an excellent example of demobilization in Nicaragua at the time and it continues, I think, being an excellent example. We got, basically, we learned that after the situation they had groups of groups that came together and they faced each other and they came together later on in some actions of delinquency. So in Colombia, we had Pasi Libertad as a political movement and the YPEL, EPL allied with FARC and at some point, Esperanza Pasi Libertad had paramilitary movements so that they wouldn't be annihilated by ex-members and other guerrillas. So this is something that's quasi-marquiana and I think that's the reality in Colombia today. So how do you foresee or how do you establish at a determined amount of time in a armed group who is going to follow a political social activism and who is going to clearly be inclined to continue with their delinquency, their abuse and use of arms and illegal actions and mark the same question. But the vision that you have from the United States, what do you perceive, Mark, to be the reality and hear in Washington how things are moving in Washington and how that vision of the U.S., which obviously is an essential partner to all of us in this region, in the post-conflict and demobilization. Thank you. First of all, that 76% have now gone back to the war. That tells you that these processes, only minorities, as we said, have relapsed. But it's not also guaranteed that most of these former combatants have had a dignified rehabilitation that they can, they are fully integrated in the society in a democratic process. In a country where most employment is informal employment, in spite of the economic growth in the last years, it doesn't meant a reduction in the rates of informal employment. Groups of people coming out of these processes can achieve an important rehabilitation and economic, corporate rehabilitation has been successful in the political arena and the social issues in the strengthening of political and social strength, regional forces that support the democracy. But there has not been such a positive result in those and as to the international support, it has been very positive. There has been a very important support. There has been a consensus, basically, the European Union, Latin America, United States, they support the process. This will be very important for post-conflict, not only to make sure that all the agreements will be complied with, but also to carry them out in the different regions. When the negotiation process was started, the INP, the GDP was 4.6, while Columbia exports will be a reduction of the economy to be able to pay for the costs of the post-conflict, some have calculated 80, 100 million pesos, the cost of this post-conflict at a 10-year time. The tax reforms that are being transmitted, there is opposition from businessmen. It's not clear what taxes are going to be imposed in a country in which the leasers, the owners of land lease very little, and taxes are very low. So there has to be a major tax reform, because we have to stress the importance of the international support, but Europe is at the edge of another recession. The US economy is growing, but China, India, growth has slowed down, so demand has slowed down. It's not a very good economic situation in Columbia, as it is international. So we have to obtain the support, not only economical, but the political support, but we have to understand that the effort has to come from our own country. Well, I'm going to start by saying, I am reticent about the program, the DDR, because it started by saying that there has no been DDR in Columbia, but to deny that, it really affects me deeply. It's as if we didn't exist, and I refuse to accept that. Another issue is the program, the DDR program. It has a belief in the individual, as a self and not individual, as a society. And this is counterproductive. If you think of individuals who were part of an organization, and most of their life was lived within the organization, it was, there's a fear in contrast to Central America, where the organizations were allowed to continue Frente Faraundo collectively.   For that, you have a new name, and now you start with your own name. So, second, you have within a time, we have this sort of remuneration for an economic project. We, that was, it was not very much, but besides, they wanted us to be capitalists. They wanted us to invest. We, they wanted to establish businesses, to be economically successful. But there's a vacuum. There's things as simple as the following. A body movement continues to stay in movement unless there is a force that stops it. And if there's no physical laws, a body is not in movement, it will not start a movement.  I think that lack of knowledge to what the organization meant to the people, and that really affects me, that angers me. The fact of thinking that one of the perspectives of gender that they have is a fact that it addresses a woman individually. And just because it addresses one woman, so the full issue of gender is taken care of. What do I highlight and view of what's happening in Havana? They have tried, they have changed terms that in fact there were evidence of what was happening. They were called, they were not called demobilized side. They were not called the process of rehabilitation. They were called as participants and that's not a citizenship. So they were making it into a motivational category to be able to be part of the process. And those discussions, political discussions are important. That's our answer to the first question. The second one has to be with Urabá. That Urabá is the northwest of Colombia, that about Spanama where that's where the movement started. In Urabá, two important things happened in my view. One is that the same strength that the organization, the structures had to continue the war, there was a proposal for peace. For the war, a group led by the general commander, Francisco Caravaggio was left. They were united with a FARC and on the other side with a lot of strength, social and political strength was Esperanza, Paz and Libertad as a result of the negotiation process. When one or the other projects had to win physically and biologically, not ideological or political that would allow that discussion, but so the result was some pain. Frente popularo, that was our organization of the masses that started in 1984 with the troops at that time. And when Esperanza and Paz decides to structure the urban commandos and join the parallel military forces in that area in 93, we had had in only that region 1,000 dead and only were result of Union Portrotica, but also because Colombia, they understand only the rough ones, they only negotiate the ones who are armed and are in the streets. And there's a history of the spec for the people who live together and don't have a way to go to justice. That's one thing. There are two projects, two different projects. And that's when I said, let's talk about territorial peace because that can happen now. And Jose also mentioned it. So that's one issue, but there's no profile of who can stay and who can go back. There's a lot of, it's like a, many people scare. It's like a leap into the vacuum. There has to be a trust in society more than in the state. So the society is protects and that is one of the problems that I find. There's a strong opinion today in favor of the war than in the 1990s. And that led us to walk on walk, to go beyond the Alianza Democrática to try. But let me see if I can organize my thoughts. It's very likely that they don't relapse.  There is a bigger chance of relapse. You have to do the opposite. You have to make them feel like winners too. It's not generosity only. It's reconciliation. It's peace and it's planning for the future. There has to be more stabilization for democratization of the country. We were fighting for democracy and we have to do a stronger democratization. The constitution demands it. We have to do it. And there has to be a greater mobilization, not only for the ones who come back. So we are ready willing when we come in that condition but society also has to be mobilized. So there is greater support in that area and to have a greater political participation too. In different areas, including the electoral policy and I am going to highlight credibility and new ways that women can do politics. You have to stimulate those who come back to include women who are spokeswomen who can be mediators between the war and the organizations of the war and society. I'm talking first person. I beg your pardon. But I talk of myself. It's easier for women to explain and make ourselves understood than men in conditions of guarantees of relapse. And that task is not particular but you have to counteract the local powers, authorities, not only ones, the feudal lords with links with drug traffickers but the state after a long time having been cut up by the differences, the national front between conservatives and liberals got used to having that as their territory, their little plot of land. But it's a great responsibility that the government has. The government has to begin, I repeat, to make us feel that each one and all of us are winners with what is being signed in Colombia. Program, but I'm going to give Mark Chernick the last word and I'd like to just say a final word of thanks to the other organizers, Cristina Espinel who's here from the Columbia Committee for Human Rights and others who are here and Mark Chernick from the Center for Latin American Studies at Georgetown University. And on behalf of USIP I'd like to thank our speakers who have provided us with such rich material and I think such unique perspectives that are not often heard in this town and also all of you in the public who have taken a couple of hours this afternoon to learn more about what's happening in Colombia and what's projected for ahead and to think about all of our roles in how we can ensure that peace comes to Colombia soon and that we can minimize the costs of this war. Mark, Miriam. I'm sorry, I forgot something that's really important. That's why my heart goes out to Cecilia Lopez. In the negotiation processes back in the 90, demobilized women didn't have any right to have property, for example. And I say that to you because you've been so emphatic about that issue. When negotiations started and there's something that we have to keep in mind for the dialogues in Havana and when we talk about demobilization and everything that's coming in the future is that couples during the war are not necessarily couples afterwards and that's the first issue. With demobilization they granted property for a family wife. It was called each couple got some land and any couple that showed up as demobilized but when they broke up their property was retained by the head of the family which would have been the male counterpart. She would have to keep the children, he could keep the land. Obviously there was tremendous disparity. So I thank you Dr. Cecilia Lopez for the fact that you've insisted so strongly in this issue in the subject of agriculture, land, et cetera and that was what I forgot to say, sorry. Very important, thank you. Before I answer the question on international, let me say we did a study for USAID of ACR, the Climate Agency for Reintegration and I wanna just emphasize something that Miriam said. There's been a lot of learning within ACR but this was a program designed for the demobilization of the paramilitaries and then now for the individual demobilization of FARC and ELN fighters. It's an agency designed in the context of war. It's very good, it's gotten better at what they have the seven step process of taking a fighter out of combat and then integrating into society. Even as there's been a learning curve of the 50, more than 50,000 that have come through the program from the collective demobilizations of the paramilitaries and individual demobilization since, there's only been about 5,000, 10% that have completed the program. The rest have simply disappeared. They don't have a track. What's being discussed in Havana will be something which is quite different, I think. And the one thing that hasn't been done that ACR hasn't done, this is where I coincide completely with Miriam, there hasn't been an accounting of all these earlier experiences. The experience of the EPL, the experience of the M19, the experience of the sections of the ELN that came in and of Quintin Lame. There's a wealth of experience. And those focused more on the collective demobilization and the integration into society and into politics. And that's what is now back on the table in Havana is to recover those experience. It doesn't mean that all the learning was done in ACR about psychosocial counseling to combatants and the idea that gender and ethnicity will be part of it. But it's going to be a very different discussion going forward. International community. We are in a good moment, absolutely. For the first, and particularly from here where we're sitting in the United States, if you go back to the earlier peace processes, the United States really did not support any previous peace process. Sometimes they said they did, but they were fighting a drug war or they were fighting a terror war and the policies put in place really clashed more than helped or supported directly a peace process. Now the United States policy is often ambiguous and multifaceted and there'll be agencies supporting peace and there'll be others supporting drug wars and terror wars and all of that. But what you see now in this moment is clearly the United States is following the lead of the Santos government and they support the peace process. That is a very good moment. That's unique and it's so unique it may be comparable to the change we saw in Central America when the United States went from sporting war to supporting peace after the fall of the Berlin Wall. I think that's the moment here. I personally would like to see the United States get out more in front. I think the United States is interested in supporting particularly the post-conflict. There is a role they can play. Jose said this very early on when he talked about perhaps the greatest challenge to this whole process, that relationship between criminal bands, paramilitaries and regional elites. The United States played a very important role in demobilizing the death squads, in pressuring the armed forces to separate from the death squads and make a clean armed forces. And they could do that because they had the influence and the power and the leverage to do so. And that's the kind of contribution with the armed forces who were involved, with regional elites, with political elites. If the United States made a crystal clear that there will be no tolerance for these kind of relationships, all doors to the United States will be closed. That will have impact on the political elites, on the two rights, or the leading end to others. I think that's part of a strategy of, Havana is a first step for a broader peace. The United States could play the key role, not the key role, a very key role right there. They did that in Salvador. They brought the military along. And they don't have the same leverage in Colombia that they had before, but they still have leverage. Okay. I would just echo Mark's thoughts and add that I think the US government in particular and the international community needs to be terribly cognizant that this is a long-term process. That even if a peace accord is signed, peace will not magically appear in the regions of Colombia. There's a lot of work to be done. It will cost a lot of resources, a lot of investment. I think also there are other areas where the US could contribute such as truth-telling. The US has contributed in other peace processes around the world to declassifying documents. The US intelligence agencies have plenty of information on the kinds of human rights violations that have been occurring throughout these years. And it's really important that the US come out front and say we're willing to open our documents to in the name of truth in Colombia and peace in Colombia. So I think there are many, many things and we could have a discussion all day about what else might be done, but I would encourage you to all to think about what from your particular space you might be able to do to contribute to peace. Thank you so much for coming. We've gone over a bit, but I think it's been worth it. And I hope it has been for you as well.