Chapter 17 of A Short Life of Abraham Lincoln A Short Life of Abraham Lincoln by John G. Nicolay Chapter 17. General Scott's Plans Criticized as the Anaconda, the Three Fields of Conflict Fremont appointed, Major General, his military failures, Battle of Wilson's Creek, Hunter ordered to Fremont Fremont's proclamation, President revokes Fremont's proclamation Lincoln's letter to Browning, Surrender of Lexington Fremont takes the field, Cameron's visit to Fremont Fremont's removal The military genius and experience of General Scott from the first pretty correctly defined the grand outline of military operations which would become necessary in reducing the revolted southern states to renewed allegiance. Long before the Battle of Bull Run was planned he urged that the first 75 regiments of three months militia could not be relied on for extensive campaigns because their term of service would expire before they could be well organized. His outline suggestion therefore was that the new three years volunteer army be placed in 10 or 15 healthy camps and given at least four months of drill and tactical instruction. And when the Navy had, by a rigid blockade, closed all the harbors along the seabird of the southern states the fully prepared army should, by invincible columns, move down the Mississippi River to New Orleans leaving a strong cordon of military posts behind it to keep open the stream, join hands with the blockade and thus envelop the principal area of rebellion in a powerful military grasp which would paralyze and effectually kill the insurrection. Even while suggesting this plan however the general admitted that the great obstacle to its adoption would be the impatience of the patriotic and loyal union people and leaders who would refuse to wait the necessary length of time. The general was correct in his apprehension. The newspapers criticized his plan in caustic editorials and ridiculous cartoons as Scott's Anaconda and public opinion rejected it in an overwhelming demand for a prompt and energetic advance. Scott was correct in military theory while the people and the administration were right in practice under existing political conditions. Although Bull Run seemed to justify the general West Virginia and Missouri vindicated the president and the people it can now be seen that still a third element geography intervened to give shape and sequence to the main outlines of the Civil War. When at the beginning of May General Scott gave his advice the seat of government of the first seven Confederate states was still at Montgomery, Alabama by the adhesion of the four interior border states to the insurrection and the removal of the archives and administration of Jefferson Davis to Richmond, Virginia toward the end of June as the capital of the now eleven Confederate states Washington necessarily became the center of union attack and Richmond the center of Confederate defense. From the day when McDowell began his march to Bull Run to that when Lee evacuated Richmond in his final hopeless flight the route between these two opposing capitals remained the principal and dominating line of military operations and the region between Chesapeake Bay and the Potomac River on the east and the chain of the Alleghenies on the west the primary field of strategy. According to geographical features the second great field of strategy lay between the Allegheny Mountains and the Mississippi River and the third between the Mississippi River the Rocky Mountains and the Rio Grande. Except in West Virginia the attitude of neutrality assumed by Kentucky for a considerable time delayed the definition of the military frontier and the beginning of active hostilities in the second field thus giving greater momentary importance to the conditions existing and event transpiring in Missouri with the city of St. Louis as the principal center and the third great military field. The same necessity which dictated the promotion of General McClellan at one bound from captain to major general compelled a similar phenomenal promotion not alone of officers of the regular army but also of imminent civilians to high command and military responsibility in the immense volunteer force authorized by Congress. Events rather than original purpose had brought McClellan into prominence and ranking duty but now by design the president gave John C. Fremont a commission of major general and placed him in command of the third great military field with headquarters at St. Louis with the leading idea that he should organize the military strength of the northwest first to hold Missouri to the Union and second by a carefully prepared military expedition over the Mississippi River. By so doing he would sever the Confederate states reclaim or conquer the region lying west of the great stream and thus reduce by more than one half the territorial area of the insurrection. Though he had been an army lieutenant he had no experience in active war yet the talent and energy he had displayed in western military exploration and the political prominence he had reached as candidate of the Republican Party for president in 1856 seemed to fit him preeminently for such a duty. While most of the volunteers from New England and the middle states were concentrated at Washington and dependent points the bulk of the western regiments was for the time being put under the command of Fremont for present and prospective duty but the high hopes which the administration placed in the general were not realized. The genius which could lead a few dozen or a few hundred Indian scouts and mountain trappers over desert plains and through the fastnesses of the Sierra Nevada that could defy savage hostilities and outlive starvation amid imprisoning snows failed signally before the task of animating and combining the patriotic enthusiasm of 8 or 10 great northwestern states and organizing and leading an army of 100,000 eager volunteers in a comprehensive and decisive campaign to recover a great national highway. From the first Fremont failed in promptness in foresight, in intelligent supervision and above all in inspiring confidence and attracting assistance and devotion his military administration created serious extravagance and confusion and his personal intercourse excited the distrust and resentment of the governor's and civilian officials whose counsel and cooperation were essential to his usefulness and success. While his resources were limited and while he fortified St. Louis and reinforced Cairo a yet more important point needed his attention and help. Lyon, who had followed Governor Jackson and General Price in their flight from Booneville to Springfield in southern Missouri found his forces diminished beyond his expectation by the expiration of the term of service of his three months regiments and began to be threatened by a northward concentration of Confederate detachments from the Arkansas line and the Indian territory. The neglect of his appeals for help placed him in the situation where he could neither safely remain inactive nor safely retreat. He therefore took the chances of scattering the enemy before him by a sudden daring attack with his 5,000 effectives against nearly trouble numbers in the battle of Wilson's Creek at daylight on August 10th. The casualties on the two sides were nearly equal and the enemy was checked and crippled but the Union Army sustained a fatal loss in the death of General Lyon who was instantly killed while leading a desperate bayonet charge. His skill and activity had, so far, been the strength of the Union calls in Missouri. The absence of his counsel and personal example rendered a retreat to the railroad terminus at Rolla Necessary. This discouraging event turned public criticism sharply upon Fremont. Loth to yield to mere public clamor and adverse to hasty changes in military command, Mr. Lincoln sought to improve the situation by sending General David Hunter to take a place on Fremont's staff. General Fremont needs assistance, said his note to Hunter, which it is difficult to give him. He is losing the confidence of men near him whose support any man in his position must have to be successful. His cardinal mistake is that he isolates himself and allows nobody to see him and by which he does not know what is going on in the very matter he is dealing with. He needs to have by his side a man of large experience. Will you not, for me, take that place? Your rank is one grade too high to be ordered to do it will you not serve the country and oblige me by taking it voluntarily? This note indicates, better than pages of description, the kind, helpful, and forbearing spirit with which the President, through the long four years of war, treated his military commanders and subordinates and which, in several instances, met such a generous return. But even while Mr. Lincoln was attempting to take responsibility, Fremont had already burdened him with two additional embarrassments. One was a perplexing personal quarrel the General had begun with the influential Blair family, represented by Colonel Frank Blair, the Indefatigable Unionist Leader in Missouri and Montgomery Bear, the Postmaster General in Lincoln's Cabinet, who had Hithertube and Fremont's most influential friends and in addition, the father of these, Francis P. Blair Sr., a veteran politician whose influence dated from Jackson's administration and through whose assistance Fremont had been nominated as Presidential Candidate in 1856. The other embarrassment was of a more serious and far-reaching nature. Conscious that he was losing the esteem and confidence of both civil and military leaders in the West, Fremont's adventurous fancy caught at the idea of rehabilitating himself before the public by a bold political maneuver. Day by day, the relation of slavery to the Civil War was becoming a more troublesome question and exciting, impatient and angry discussion. Without previous consultation with the President or any of his advisors or friends, Fremont, on August 30th, wrote and printed as Commander of the Department of the West a proclamation establishing martial law throughout the State of Missouri and announcing that, quote, All persons who shall be taken with arms in their hands within these lines shall be tried by court-martial and, if found guilty, will be shot. The property, real and personal of all persons in the State of Missouri who shall take up arms against the United States or who shall be directly proven to have taken an active part with their enemies in the field is declared to be confiscated to the public use and their slaves, if any they have, are hereby declared free men, end quote. The reason given in the proclamation for this drastic and dictatorial measure was to suppress disorder, maintain the public peace and protect persons and property of loyal citizens all simple police duties. For issuing his proclamation without consultation with the President he could offer only the flimsy excuse that it involved two days of time to communicate with Washington while he well knew that no battle was pending and no invasion in progress. This reckless misuse of power President Lincoln also corrected with his dispassionate prudence and habitual courtesy he immediately wrote to the general, My dear sir, two points in your proclamation of August 30th give me some anxiety. First, should you shoot a man according to the proclamation the Confederates would very certainly shoot our best men in their hands in retaliation and so man for man indefinitely. It is therefore my order that you allow no man to be shot under the proclamation without first having my approbation or consent. Second, I think there is great danger that the closing paragraph in relation to the confiscation of property and the liberating slaves of traitorous owners will alarm our Southern Union friends and turn them against us. Perhaps ruin our rather fair prospect of Kentucky. Allow me therefore to ask that you will, as of your own motion, modify that paragraph so as to conform to the first and fourth sections of the act of Congress entitled An Act to Confiscate Property Used for Insurrectionary Purposes Approved August 6th, 1861 and a copy of which act I herewith send you. This letter is written in a spirit of caution and not of censure. I send it by a special messenger in order that it may certainly and speedily reach you. But the headstrong general was too blind and selfish to accept this mild redress of a fault that would have justified instant displacement from command. He preferred that the President should openly direct him to make the correction. Admitting that he decided in one night upon the measure, he added, quote, If I were to retract it of my own accord, it would imply that I thought myself wrong and that I had acted without reflection which the gravity of the point demanded. End quote. The inference is plain that Fremont was unwilling to lose the influence of his hasty step upon public opinion, but by this course he had deliberately placed himself in an attitude of political hostility to the administration. The incident produced something of the agitation which the general had evidently counted upon. Radical anti-slavery men throughout the free states applauded his act and condemned the President, and military emancipation at once became a subject of excited discussion. Even strong conservatives were carried away by the feeling that rebels would be, but properly punished by the loss of their slaves. To Senator Browning, the President's intimate personal friend who entertained this feeling, Mr. Lincoln wrote a searching analysis of Fremont's proclamation and its dangers. Quote, Yours of the 17th is just received, and coming from you, I confess it astonishes me, that you should object to my adhering to a law which you had assisted in making and presenting to me less than a month before is odd enough, but this is a very small part. General Fremont's proclamation, as to confiscation of property and the liberation of slaves, is purely political and not within the range of military law or necessity. If a commanding general finds a necessity to seize the farm of a private owner for a pasture, an encampment, or a fortification, he has the right to do so, and to so hold it as long as the necessity lasts, and this is within military law because within military necessity. But to say the farm shall no longer belong to the owner or his heirs forever, and this as well when the farm is not needed for military purposes, as when it is, is purely political, without the saver of military law about it, and the same is true of slaves. If the general needs them, he can seize them and use them, and when the need is passed, it is not for him to fix their permanent future condition. That must be settled according to laws made by lawmakers and not by military proclamations. The proclamation and the point and question is simply dictatorship. It assumes that the general can do anything he pleases, confiscate the lands and free the slaves of loyal people, as well as of disloyal ones. In going the whole figure, I have no doubt would be more popular with some thoughtless people than that which has been done, but I cannot assume this reckless position, nor allow others to assume it on my responsibility. You speak of it as being the only means of saving the government. It is itself the surrender of the government. Can it be pretended that it is any longer the government of the United States, any government of constitution and laws wherein a general or a president may make permanent rules of property by proclamation? I do not say Congress might not, with propriety, pass a law on the point, just as General Fremont proclaimed. I do not say I might not, as a member of Congress, vote for it. What I object to is that I, as president, shall expressly or impliedly seize and exercise the permanent legislative functions of the government. So much as to principle, now as to policy. No doubt the thing was popular in some quarters and would have been more so if it had been a general declaration of emancipation. The Kentucky legislature would not budge till that proclamation was modified. And General Anderson telegraphed me that on the news of General Fremont having actually issued deeds of manumission, a whole company of our volunteers threw down their arms and disbanded. I was so assured as to think, it probable, that the very arms we had furnished Kentucky would be turned against us. I think to lose Kentucky is nearly the same as to lose the whole game. Kentucky gone, we cannot hold Missouri, nor, as I think, Maryland. These all against us, and the job on our hands is too large for us. We would as well consent to separation at once, including the surrender of this capital. End quote. If it be objected that the president himself decreed military emancipation a year later, then it must be remembered that Fremont's proclamation differed in many essential particulars from the president's edict of January 1st, 1863. By that time also the entirely changed conditions justified a complete change of policy, but above all the supreme reason of military necessity upon which alone Mr. Lincoln based the constitutionality of his edict of freedom was entirely wanting in the case of Fremont. The harvest of popularity which Fremont evidently hoped to secure by his proclamation was soon blighted by a new military disaster. The Confederate forces which had been united in the battle of Wilson's Creek quickly became disorganized through the disagreement of their leaders and the want of provisions and other military supplies and mainly returned to Arkansas and the Indian territory whence they had come. But General Price with his Missouri contingent gradually increased his followers and as the Union retreat from Springfield to Rolla left the way open, began a northward march through the western part of the state to attack Colonel Mulligan who with about 2,800 federal troops entrenched himself at Lexington on the Missouri River. Secession sympathy was strong along the line of his march and Price gained adherence so rapidly that on September 18th he was able to invest Mulligan's position with a somewhat irregular army numbering about 20,000. After a two-day siege the garrison was compelled to surrender through the exhaustion of the supply of water in their cisterns. The victory won, Price again immediately retreated southward losing his army almost as fast as he had collected it made up as it was more in the spirit and quality of a sudden border foray than an organized campaign. For this new loss Fremont was subjected to a shower of fierce criticism which this time he sought to disarm by ostentatious announcements of immediate activity. I am taking the field myself, he telegraphed and hoped to destroy the enemy either before or after the junction of forces under McCulloch. Four days after the surrender the St. Louis newspapers printed his order organizing an army of five divisions. The document made a respectable show of force on paper claiming an aggregate of nearly 39,000. In reality however being scattered and totally unprepared for the field it possessed no such effective strength. For a month longer extravagant newspaper reports stimulated the public with the hope of substantial results from Fremont's intended campaign. Before the end of that time however President Lincoln under growing apprehension sent Secretary of War Cameron and the adjutant general of the army to Missouri to make a personal investigation. Reaching Fremont's camp on October 13th they found the movement to be a mere forced spasmodic display without substantial strength transportation or coherent and feasible plan and that at least two of the division commanders were without means to execute the orders they had received and utterly without confidence in their leader or knowledge of his intentions. To give Fremont yet another chance the Secretary of War withheld the President's order to relieve the general from his command which he had brought with him on Fremont's insistence that a victory was really within his reach. When this hope also proved delusive and suspicion was aroused that the general might be intending not only to deceive but to defy the administration President Lincoln sent the following letter by a special friend to General Curtis commanding at St. Louis quote, dear sir on receipt of this with the accompanying enclosures you will take safe, certain and suitable measures to have the enclosure addressed to Major General Fremont delivered to him with all reasonable dispatch subject to these conditions only that if when General Fremont shall be reached by the messenger yourself or anyone sent by you he shall then have in personal command fought and won a battle or shall then be actually in a battle or shall then be in the immediate presence of the enemy in expectation of a battle it is not to be delivered but held for further orders after and not till after the delivery of General Fremont let the enclosure addressed to General Hunter be delivered to him end quote the order of removal was delivered to Fremont on November 2nd by that date he had reached Springfield but had won no victory fought no battle and was not in the presence of the enemy two of his divisions were not yet even with him still laboring under the delusion perhaps imposed on him by his scouts his orders stated that the enemy was only a days march distant and advancing to attack him the enclosure mentioned in the president's letter to Curtis was an order to General David Hunter to relieve Fremont when he arrived and assumed command the scouts he sent forward found no enemy within reach and no such contingency of battle or hope of victory as had been rumored and assumed Fremont's personal conduct in these disagreeable circumstances was entirely commendable he took leave of the army in a short farewell order couched in terms of perfect obedience to authority and courtesy to his successor asking for him the same cordial support he had himself received nor did he by word or act justify the suspicions of insubordination for which some of his indiscreet adherents had given cause under the instructions President Lincoln had outlined in his order to Hunter that General gave up the idea of indefinitely pursuing price and divided the army into two corps of observation which were drawn back and posted for the time being at the two railroad termini of Rola and Sedalia to be recruited and prepared for further service End of Chapter 17 Chapter 18 of A Short Life of Abraham Lincoln This is a LibriVax recording All LibriVax recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVax.org Recording by Jude Cader A Short Life of Abraham Lincoln by John G. Nicolay Chapter 18 Blockade Hatteras Inlet Port Royal Captured The Trent Affair Lincoln Suggests Arbitration Seward's Dispatch McClellan at Washington Army of the Potomac McClellan's Quarrel with Scott Retirement of Scott Lincoln's Memorandum All Quiet on the Potomac Conditions in Kentucky Cameron's Visit to Sherman East Tennessee Instructions to Bewell Bewell's Neglect Hallock in Missouri Following the fall of Fort Sumter The Navy of the United States was in no condition to enforce the blockade from Chesapeake Bay to the Rio Grande declared by Lincoln's proclamation of April 19 Of the 42 vessels then in commission nearly all were on foreign stations Another serious cause of weakness was that within a few days after the Sumter attack 124 officers of the Navy resigned or were dismissed for disloyalty The number of such was doubled before the 4th of July Yet by strenuous efforts of the department in fitting out ships that had been laid up in completing those under construction and in extensive purchases and arming of all classes of vessels that could be put to use from screw and side wheel merchant steamers to ferry boats and tugs a legally effective blockade was established within a period of six months A considerable number of new warships was also placed under construction The special session of Congress created a commission to study the subject of iron clads and on its recommendation three experimental vessels of this class were placed under contract One of these completed early in the following year rendered a momentous service hereafter to be mentioned and completely revolutionized naval warfare Meanwhile, as rapidly as vessels could be gathered and prepared the Navy department organized effective expeditions to operate against points on the Atlantic coast On August 29, a small fleet under command of flag officer Stringham took possession of Hatteras Inlet after silencing the forts the insurgents had erected to guard the entrance and captured 25 guns and 700 prisoners This success achieved without the loss of a man to the Union fleet was of great importance And it did the way for a succession of victories in the interior waters of North Carolina early in the following year A more formidable expedition and still greater success soon followed Early in November, Captain Dupont assembled a fleet of 50 sail including transports before the Port Royal Sound forming a column of nine warships with a total of 112 guns the line steamed by the mid-channel between Fort Beauregard to the right and Fort Walker to the left The first of 20 and the second of 23 guns each ship delivering its fire as it passed the forts Turning at the proper point they again gave broadside after broadside while steaming out and so repeated their circular movement The battle was decided when on the third round the forts failed to respond to the fire of the ships When Commander Rogers carried and planted the stars and stripes on the ramparts he found them utterly deserted and everything having been abandoned by the flying garrisons Further reconnaissance proved that the panic extended itself over the whole network of sea islands between Charleston and Savannah permitting the immediate occupation of the entire region and affording a military base for both the Navy and the army of incalculable advantage in the further reduction of the coast Another naval exploit however almost at the same time absorbed greater public attention and created an intense degree of excitement and suspense Ex-Senators J. M. Mason and John Slidell having been accredited by the Confederate government as envoys to European courts had managed to elude the blockade and reach Havana Captain Charles Weeks commanding the San Jacinto learning that they were to take passage for England on the British mail steamer Trent intercepted that vessel on November 8 near the coast of Cuba He was the rebel emissary's prisoner by the usual show of force and brought them to the United States but allowed the Trent to proceed on her voyage The incident and alleged insult produced as great excitement in England as in the United States and the British government began instant and significant preparations for war for what it hastily assumed to be a violation of international law and an outrage on the British flag Instructions were sent to Lord Lyons the British minister at Washington to demand the release of the prisoners and a suitable apology and if this demand were not complied with within a single week to close his legation and return to England In the northern states the capture was greeted with great jubilation Captain Wilkes was applauded by the press His act was officially approved by the Secretary of the Navy and the House of Representatives unanimously passed a resolution that was brave, adroit and patriotic conduct While the President and Cabinet shared the first impulses of rejoicing second thoughts impressed them with the grave nature of the international question involved and the serious dilemma of disavowal or war precipitated by the imperative British demand It was fortunate that Secretary Seward and Lord Lyons were close personal friends and still more that though British public opinion had strongly favored the Rebellion the Queen of England entertained the kindliest feelings for the American government Under her direction Prince Elbert instructed the British Cabinet to formulate and present the demand in the most courteous diplomatic language While on their part the American President and Cabinet discussed the affair in a temper of judicious reserve President Lincoln's first desire was to refer the difficulty to friendly arbitration and his mood is admirably expressed in the autograph experimental draft of a dispatch suggesting this course The President is unwilling to believe he wrote that Her Majesty's Government will press for a categorical answer upon what appears to him to be only a partial record in the making up of which he has been allowed no part He is reluctant to volunteer his view of the case with no assurance that Her Majesty's Government will consent to hear him Yet this much he directs me to say that this Government has intended no affront to the British flag or to the British nation nor has it intended to force into discussion an embarrassing question all which is evident by the fact hereby asserted that the act complained of was done by an officer without orders from or expectation of the Government But being done it was no longer left to us to consider whether we might not to avoid a controversy or even unimportant though strict right because we too as well as Great Britain have a people justly jealous of their rights and in whose presence our Government could undo the act complained of only upon a fair showing that it was wrong or at least very questionable The United States Government and people are still willing to make reparation upon such showing Accordingly, I am instructed by the President to inquire whether Her Majesty's Government will hear the United States upon the matter in question The President desires, among other things to bring into view and have considered the existing rebellion in the United States the position Great Britain has assumed including Her Majesty's proclamation in relation there too the relation the persons whose seizure is the subject of complaint bore to the United States and the object of their voyage at the time they were seized on board for the voyage the place of the seizure and the precedents and respective positions assumed in analogous cases between Great Britain and the United States upon a submission containing the foregoing facts with those set forth in the before mentioned Dispatch to Your Lordship together with all other facts which either party may deem material I am instructed to say the Government of the United States will if agreed to by Her Majesty's Government go to such friendly arbitration as is usual among nations and will abide the award the most practiced diplomatic pen in Europe could not have written a more dignified, courteous or succinct presentation of the case and yet under the necessities of the movement it was impossible to adopt this procedure upon full discussion it was decided that war with Great Britain must be avoided and Mr. Seward wrote a dispatch defending the course of Captain Wilkes up to the point where he permitted the Trent to proceed on her voyage it was his further duty to have brought her before a prized court failing in this he had left the capture incomplete under rules of international law and the American Government had thereby lost the right and the legal evidence to establish the contraband character of the vessel and the person seized under the circumstances the prisoners were therefore willingly released excited American feeling was grievously disappointed at the result but American good sense readily accommodated itself both through the correctness of the law expounded by the Secretary of State and to the public policy that averted a great international danger particularly as this decision forced Great Britain to depart from her own and to adopt the American traditions respecting this class of neutral rights it has already been told how Captain George B. McClellan was suddenly raised in rank at the very outset of the war first to a major general ship in the three months militia then to the command of the military department of the Ohio from that to a major general ship in the regular army and after his successful campaign in West Virginia was called to Washington and placed in command of the division of the Potomac which comprised all the troops in and around Washington on both sides of the river called thus to the capital of the nation to guard it against the results of the disastrous battle of Bull Run and to organize a new army for extended offensive operations the surrounding conditions naturally suggested to him that in all likelihood he would play a conspicuous part in the great drama of the Civil War his ambition rose eagerly to the prospect on the day on which he assumed command, July 27 he wrote to his wife I find myself in a new and strange position here President, Cabinet, General Scott, and all deferring to me by some strange operation of magic I seem to have become the power of the land and three days later they give me my way in everything full swing and unbounded confidence who would have thought when we were married that I should so soon be called upon to save my country and still a few days afterward I shall carry this thing on guard and crush the rebels in one campaign from the giddy elevation to which such an imaginary achievement raised his dreams there was but one higher step and his colossal egotism immediately mounted to occupy it on August 9, just two weeks after his arrival in Washington he wrote I would cheerfully take the dictatorship and agree to lay down my life when the country is saved while in the same letter he adds with the most naive unconsciousness of his hallucination I am not spoiled by my unexpected new position coming to the national capital in the hour of deepest public depression over the bull run defeat McClellan was welcomed by the President the Cabinet and General Scott with sincere friendship by Congress with a hopeful eagerness by the people with enthusiasm and by Washington's society with adulation externally he seemed to justify such a greeting he was young, handsome, accomplished genial and winning in conversation and manner he had once manifested great industry in quick decision and speedily exhibited a degree of ability in army organization which was not the only officer during the Civil War under his eye the stream of the new three years regiments pouring into the city went to their camps fell into brigades and divisions and were supplied with equipments horses and batteries and underwent the routine of drill tactics and reviews which without the least apparent noise or friction in three months made the Army of the Potomac a perfect fighting machine of over 150,000 men with more than 200 guns recognizing his ability in this work the government had indeed given him its full confidence and permitted him to exercise almost unbounded authority which he fully utilized in favoring his personal friends and drawing to himself the best resources of the whole country in arms, supplies and officers of education and experience for a while his outward demeanor indicated respect and gratitude and devotion and liberal favors bestowed upon him but his phenomenal rise was fatal to his usefulness the dream that he was to be the sole savior of his country announced confidentially to his wife just two weeks after his arrival in Washington never again left him so long as he continued in command coupled with his dazzling vision however was soon developed the tormenting two-fold hallucination first that everybody was conspiring to thwart him and that the enemy had from double to quadruple the numbers to defeat him for the first month he could not sleep for the nightmare that Boregaard's demoralized army had by a sudden bound from Manasseh seized the city of Washington he immediately began a quarrel with General Scott which by the first of November drove the old hero into retirement and out of his pathway the cabinet members who wittingly or unwittingly had encouraged him in this one weeks later stigmatized as a set of geese seeing that president Lincoln was kind and unassuming in discussing military questions McClellan quickly contracted the habit of expressing contempt for him in his confidential letters and the feeling rapidly grew until it reached a mark of open disrespect the same trait manifested itself in his making exclusive confidence of only two or three of his subordinate generals and ignoring the counsel of all the others and when, later on Congress appointed a standing committee of leading senators and representatives to examine into the conduct of the war he placed himself in a similar attitude respecting their inquiry and advice McClellan's activity and judgment as an army organizer naturally created great hopes that he would be equally efficient as a commander in the field but these hopes were grievously disappointed to his first great defect of estimating himself as the sole savior of the country must at once be added the second of his utter inability to form any reasonable judgment of the strength of the enemy in his front on September 8 when the Confederate Army at Manassas numbered 41,000 he rated it at 130,000 by the end of October that estimate had risen to 150,000 to meet which he asked that his own force should be raised to an aggregate of 240,000 with a total of effectives of 208,000 and 488 guns he suggested that to gather this force all other points should be left on the defensive that the Army of the Potomac held the fate of the country in its hands that the advance should not be postponed beyond November 25 and that a single will should direct the plan of accomplishing a crushing defeat of the rebel army at Manassas on the first of November the President yielding at last to General Scott's urgent solicitation issued the orders placing him on the retired list and in his stead appointing General McClellan to the command of all the armies the administration indulged the expectation that at last the young Napoleon as the newspapers often called him would take advantage of the fine autumn weather and by a bold move with his single will and his immense force outnumbering the enemy nearly four to one would redeem his promise to crush the army at Manassas and save the country but the November days came and went as the October days had come and gone McClellan and his brilliant staff galloped unceasingly from camp to camp and review followed review while autumn imperceptibly gave place to the cold and storms of winter and still there was no sign of forward movement growing in patience as well as that of the public the President about the first of December inquired pointedly in a memorandum suggesting a plan of campaign how long would it require to actually get in motion McClellan answered by December 15 probably 25 and put aside the President's suggestion by explaining I have now my mind actively turned toward another plan of campaign that I do not think at all anticipated by the enemy nor by many of our own people December 25 came as November 25 had come and still there was no plan no preparation no movement then McClellan fell seriously ill by a spontaneous and most natural impulse the soldiers of the various camps began the erection of huts to shelter them from snow and storm in a few weeks the army of the patomic was practically if not by order in winter quarters and day after day the monotonous telegraphic phrase all quiet on the patomic was read from the northern newspapers and northern homes until by mere iteration it degenerated from an expression of deep disappointment to a note of sarcastic criticism while so unsatisfactory a condition of affairs existed in the first great military field of the Liganes the outlook was quite as unpromising both in the second between the Liganes and the Mississippi and in the third west of the Mississippi when the Confederates about September 1, 1861 invaded Kentucky they stationed General Pello at the strongly fortified town of Columbus on the Mississippi River with about 6,000 men General Buckner at Bowling Green on the railroad north of Nashville and General Zolokoffer with six regiments in eastern Kentucky fronting Cumberland Gap up to that time there were no Union troops in Kentucky except a few regiments of home guards now however the state legislature called for active help and General Anderson exercising nominal command from Cincinnati sent Brigadier General Sherman to Nashville to confront Buckner and Brigadier General Thomas Dick Robinson to confront Zolokoffer neither side was as yet in a condition of force and preparation to take the aggressive when a month later Anderson on account of ill health turned over the command to Sherman the latter had gathered only about 18,000 men and was greatly discouraged by the task of defending 300 miles of frontier with that small force in an interview with Secretary of War Cameron on him on his return from Fremont's camp about the middle of October he strongly urged that he needed for immediate defense 60,000 and for ultimate offense 200,000 before we were done great God exclaimed Cameron where are they to come from both Sherman's demand and Cameron's answer were a pertinent comment on McClellan's policy of collecting the whole military strength of the country at Washington to fight the one great battle for which he could never get ready Sherman was so distressed by the seeming magnitude of his burden that he soon asked to be relieved and when Brigadier General Bewell was sent to succeed him in command of that part of Kentucky lying east of the Cumberland River it was the expectation of the president that he would devote his main attention and energy to the accomplishment of a specific object which Mr. Lincoln had very much at heart ever since the days in June when Lincoln had presided over the Council of War which discussed and decided upon the Bull Run campaign he had devoted every spare moment of his time to the study of such military books and leading principles of the art of war as would aid him in solving questions that must necessarily come to himself for final decision his acute perceptions retentive memory and unusual power of logic enabled him to make rapid progress in the acquisition of the fixed and accepted on which military writers agree in this as in other sciences the main difficulty of course lies in applying fixed theories to variable conditions when however we remember that at the outbreak of hostilities all the great commanders of the Civil War had experienced only as captains and lieutenants it is not strange that in speculative military problems the president's mature reasoning powers should have gained almost as rapidly an observation and criticism as theirs by practice and experiment the mastery he attained of the difficult art and how intuitively correct was his grasp of military situations has been attested since in the enthusiastic admiration of brilliant technical students amply fitted by training and intellect to express an opinion whose comment does not fall short of declaring Mr. Lincoln the ablest strategist of the war the president had early discerned what must become the dominating and decisive lines of advance in gaining and holding military control of the southern states only two days after the battle of Bull Run he had written a memorandum suggesting three principal objects for the army when reorganized first to gather a force to menace Richmond second a movement from Cincinnati upon Cumberland Gap in East Tennessee third an expedition from Cairo against Memphis in his eyes the second of these objectives never lost its importance and it was in fact substantially adopted by indirection and by necessity in the closing periods of the war the eastern third of the state of Tennessee remained from the first stubbornly and devotedly loyal to the Union at an election on June 8 1861 full of 29 counties by more than two to one voted against joining the Confederacy and the most rigorous military repression by the orders of Jefferson Davis and Governor Harris was necessary to prevent a general uprising against the rebellion the sympathy of the president even more than that of the whole north went out warmly to these unfortunate Tennesseans and he desired to convert their mountain fastnesses into an impregnable patriotic stronghold had his advice been followed it would have completely severed railroad communication by way of the Shenandoah Valley, Knoxville and Chattanooga between Virginia and the Gulf States accomplishing in the winter of 1861 what was not attained until two years later Mr. Lincoln urged this in a second memorandum made late in September and seeing that the principal objection to it lay in the long difficult line of land transportation his message to Congress of December 3 1861 recommended as a military measure the construction of a railroad to connect Cincinnati by way of Lexington, Kentucky with that mountain region a few days after the message he personally went to the president's room in the Capitol building and calling around him a number of leading senators and representatives and pointing out a map before them in the east Tennessee region said to them in substance I am thoroughly convinced that the closing struggle of the war will occur somewhere in this mountain country by our superior numbers and strength we will everywhere drive the rebel armies back from the level districts lying along the coast from those lying south of the Ohio River and from those lying east of the Mississippi River yielding to our superior force they will gradually retreat to the more defensible mountain districts and make their final stand in that part of the south where the seven states of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina Georgia, Tennessee Kentucky and West Virginia come together the population there is overwhelmingly and devotedly loyal to the union the dispatches from Brigadier General Thomas on October 28 and November 5 show that with four additional good regiments he is willing to undertake the campaign and is confident that he can take immediate possession once established the people will rally to his support and by building a railroad over which to forward him regular supplies and needed reinforcements from time to time we can hold it against all attempts to dislodge us and at the same time menace the enemy in any one of the states I have named while his hearers listened with interest it was evident that their minds were still full of the prospect of a great battle in Virginia the capture of Richmond and an early suppression of the rebellion railroad building appeared to them altogether too slow an operation of war to show how sagacious was the president's advice we may anticipate by recalling that in the following summer General Bewell spent as much time money and military strength in his attempted march from Corinth to East Tennessee as would have amply suffice to build a line from Lexington to Knoxville recommended by Mr. Lincoln the general's effort resulting only in his being driven back to Louisville that in 1863 Burnside under greater difficulties made the march and successfully held Knoxville even without a railroad which Thompson with a few regiments could have accomplished in 1861 and that in the final collapse of the rebellion in the spring of 1865 the beaten armies of both Johnston and Lee attempted to retreat for a last stand to the same mountain region which Mr. Lincoln pointed out in December 1861 though the president received no encouragement from senators and representatives in his plan to take possession of East Tennessee that object was specially enjoined in the instructions to General Bewell who was sent to command in Kentucky it so happens that a large majority of the inhabitants of Eastern Tennessee are in favor of the Union it therefore seems proper that you should remain on the defensive on the line from Louisville to Nashville while you throw the masses of your forces by rapid marches by Cumberland gap or Walker's gap on Knoxville in order to occupy the railroad at that point and thus enable the loyal citizens of Eastern Tennessee to advance while you at the same time cut off the railway communication between Eastern Virginia and the Mississippi three times within the same month McClellan repeated this injunction to Bewell with additional emphasis Senator Andrew Johnson and Representative Horace Maynard telegraphed him from Washington Our people are oppressed and pursued as beasts of the forest the government must come to their relief Bewell replied keeping the word of promise to the ear but with his ambition fixed on a different campaign gradually but doggedly broke it to the hope when a month later he acknowledged that his preparations and intent were to move against Nashville the president wrote him of the two I would rather have a point on the railroad south of Cumberland gap than Nashville first because it cuts a great artery of the enemy's communication which Nashville does not and secondly because it is in the midst of loyal people who would rally around it while Nashville is not but my distress is that our friends in East Tennessee are being hanged and driven to despair and even now I fear our thinking of taking rebel arms for the sake of personal protection in this we lose the most valuable stake we have in the south McClellan's comment amounted to a severe censure and this was quickly followed by an almost positive command to advance on eastern Tennessee at once again Bewell promised compliance only however again to report in a few weeks his conviction that an advance into east Tennessee is impracticable at this time on any scale which would be sufficient it is difficult to speculate upon the advantages lost by this unwillingness of a commander to obey instructions to say nothing of the strategical value of east Tennessee to the union the fidelity of its people is shown in the reports sent to the confederate government that the whole country is now in a state of rebellion that civil war has broken out in east Tennessee and that they look for the reestablishment of the federal authority in the south with as much confidence as the Jews look for the coming of the Messiah Henry W. Halleck born in 1815 graduated from West Point in 1839 who after distinguished service in the Mexican war had been breveted captain of engineers but soon afterward resigned from the army to pursue the practice of law in San Francisco was perhaps the best professionally equipped officer among the number of those called by General Scott in the summer of 1861 to assume important command in the union army it is probable that Scott intended he should succeed himself as general in chief but when he reached Washington the autumn was already late and because of Fremont's conspicuous failure it seemed necessary to send Halleck to the department of the Missouri which as reconstituted was made to include in addition to several northwestern states Missouri and Arkansas and so much of Kentucky as lay the Cumberland River this change of department lines indicates the beginning of what soon became a dominant feature of military operations namely that instead of the vast regions lying west of the Mississippi the great river itself in the country lying immediately adjacent to it on either side became the third principal field of strategy and action under the necessity of opening and holding it as a great military and commercial highway while the intention of the government to open the Mississippi River by a powerful expedition received additional emphasis through Halleck's appointment that general found no immediate means adequate to the task when he assumed command at St. Louis Fremont's regime had left the whole department in the most deplorable confusion Halleck reported that he had no army but rather a military rabble to command and for some weeks devoted himself with energy and success to bringing order out of the chaos left him by his predecessor a large element of his difficulty lay in the fact that the population of the whole state was tainted with disloyalty to a degree which rendered Missouri less a factor in the larger questions of general army operations then from the beginning to the end of the war a local district of bitter and relentless factional hatred and guerrilla or as the term was constantly employed bushwhacking warfare intensified and kept alive by annual roving confederate incursions from Arkansas in the Indian territory in dulcetory summer campaigns End of Chapter 18 Chapter 19 of A Short Life of Abraham Lincoln This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Recording by Jude Cater A Short Life of Abraham Lincoln by John G. Nicolay Chapter 19 Lincoln Directs Cooperation Halleck & Bewell Ulysses S. Grant Grant's Demonstration Victory at Mill River Fort Henry Fort Donaldson Bewell's tardiness Halleck's Activity Victory of P. Ridge Halleck receives General Command Pittsburgh Landing Island Number 10 Halleck's Corinth Campaign Halleck's Mistakes Toward the end of December 1861 the prospects of the administration became very gloomy McClellan had indeed organized a formidable army at Washington but it had done nothing to efface the memory of the Bull Run defeat On the contrary a practical blockade of the Potomac by rubble batteries on the Virginia shore and another small but irritating defeat at Ball's Bluff greatly heightened public impatience The necessary surrender of Mason and Slidell to England was exceedingly unpalatable Government expenditures had risen to two million dollars a day and a financial crisis was imminent Bewell would not move into East Tennessee and Halleck seemed powerless in Missouri Added to this McClellan's illness completed a stagnation of military affairs both east and west Congress was clamoring for results and its joint committee on the conduct of the war was pushing a searching inquiry into the causes of previous defeats To remove this inertia President Lincoln directed specific questions to the western commanders Our General Bewell and yourself in concert he telegraphed Halleck on December 31 and next day he wrote I am very anxious that in case of General Bewell's moving toward Nashville the enemy shall not be greatly reinforced and I think there is a danger he will be from Columbus It seems to me that a real or feigned attack on Columbus from upriver at the same time would either prevent this or compensate for it by throwing Columbus into our hands Similar questions also went to Bewell and their reply showed that no concert arrangement or plans existed and that Halleck was not ready to cooperate The correspondence started by the President's inquiry for the first time clearly brought out an estimate of the Confederate strength opposed to a southward movement in the west Since the Confederate invasion of Kentucky on September 4 the rebels had so strongly fortified Columbus on the Mississippi River that it came to be called the Gibraltar of the west and now had a garrison of 20,000 to hold it While General Buckner was supposed to have a force of 40,000 at Bowling Green on the railroad between Louisville and Nashville For more than a month, Bewell and Halleck had been aware that a joint river and land expedition southward up the Tennessee or the Cumberland River which would outflank both positions and cause their evacuation was practicable with but little opposition Yet neither Bewell nor Halleck had exchanged a word about it or made the slightest preparation to begin it each being busy in his own field and with his own plans Even now when the President had started the subject, Halleck replied that it would be bad strategy for himself to move against Columbus or Bewell against Bowling Green But he had nothing to say about a Tennessee River expedition or cooperation with Bewell to affect it except by indirectly complaining that to withdraw troops from Missouri would risk the loss of that state The President however was no longer satisfied with indecision and excuses and telegraphed to Bewell on January 7 Please name as early a day as you safely can on or before which you can be ready to move southward in concert with Major General Halleck Delay is ruining us It is insensible for me to have something definite I send a like dispatch to Major General Halleck To this Bewell made no direct reply while Halleck answered that he had asked Bewell to designate a date for a demonstration and explained two days later I can make with the gun boats and available troops a pretty formidable demonstration but no real attack In point of fact Halleck had on the previous stage on January 6 written to Brigadier General U.S. Grant I wish you to make a demonstration in force and he added full details to which Grant responded on January 8 Your instructions of the 6th were received this morning and immediate preparations made for carrying them out also adding details on his part Ulysses S. Grant was born on April 27, 1822 was graduated from West Point in 1843 and breveted captain for gallant conduct in the Mexican war but resigned from the army and was engaged with his father in a leather store at Galena, Illinois when the Civil War broke out Employed by the Governor of Illinois a few weeks at Springfield to assist in organizing militia regiments under the President's first call Grant wrote a letter to the War Department at Washington tendering his services and saying I feel myself competent to command a regiment if the President in his judgment should see fit to entrust one to me For some reason, never explained this letter remained unanswered though the department was then an afterward in constant need of educated and experienced officers A few weeks later however Governor Yates commissioned him colonel of one of the Illinois three years regiments from that time until the end of 1861 Grant by constant and specially meritorious service rose in rank to Brigadier General and to the command of the important post of Cairo, Illinois having meanwhile on November 7 won the battle of Belmont on the Missouri shore opposite Columbus The demonstration ordered by Halleck was probably intended only as a passing show of activity but it was executed by Grant though under strict orders to avoid a battle with a degree of promptness and earnestness that drew after it momentous consequences He pushed a strong reconnaissance by 8,000 men within a mile or two of Columbus and sent three gun boats up the Tennessee River which drew the fire of Fort Henry The results of the combined expedition convinced Grant that the real movement in that direction was practicable and he hastened to St. Louis to lay his plan personally before Halleck At first that general would scarcely listen to it but returning to Cairo Grant urged it again and again and the rapidly changing military condition soon caused Halleck to realize its importance Within a few days several items of interesting information reached Halleck In eastern Kentucky had won a victory over the rebel general Zolokoffer capturing his fortified camp on the Cumberland River annihilating his army of over 10 regiments and fully exposing Cumberland Gap that the Confederates were about to throw strong reinforcements into Columbus that seven formidable Union ironclad river gun boats were ready for service and that a rise of 14 feet had taken place on the Tennessee River greatly weakening the rebel batteries on that stream and the Cumberland The advantages on the one hand and the dangers on the other which these reports indicated moved Halleck to a sudden decision When Grant on January 28 telegraphed him with permission I will take Fort Henry on the Tennessee and establish and hold a large camp there Halleck responded on the 30th Make your preparations to take and hold Fort Henry It would appear that Grant's preparations were already quite complete when he received written instructions by mail on February 1 for on the next day he started 15,000 men on transports and on February 4 himself followed with seven gun boats under command of Commodore Foot Two days later Grant had the satisfaction of sending a double message in return Fort Henry is ours I shall take and destroy Fort Donaldson on the 8th Fort Henry had been an easy victory The rebel commander convinced that he could not defend the place had early that morning sent away his garrison of 3,000 on a retreat to Fort Donaldson and simply held out during a two hours bombardment until they could escape capture To take Fort Donaldson was a more serious enterprise That stronghold lying 12 miles away on the Cumberland River was a much larger work with a garrison of 6,000 and armed with 17 heavy and 48 field guns If Grant could have marched immediately to an attack of the combined garrisons there would have been a chance of quick success But the high water presented unlooked for obstacles and nearly a week elapsed stretching itself cautiously around the three miles of Donaldson's entrenchments During this delay the conditions became greatly changed When the Confederate general Albert Sidney Johnston received news that Fort Henry had fallen he had held a council at Bowling Green with his subordinate generals Hardy and Beauregard and seeing that the Union success would if not immediately counteracted render both Nashville and Columbus untenable resolved to use his own language to defend Nashville at Donaldson An immediate retreat was begun from Bowling Green to Nashville and heavy reinforcements were ordered to the garrison of Fort Donaldson It happened therefore that when Grant was ready to begin his assault the Confederate garrison with its reinforcements outnumbered his entire army To increase the discouragement the attack by gun boats on the Cumberland River on the afternoon of February 14 was repulsed seriously damaging two of them and a heavy sortie from the fort through the right of Grant's investing line into disorder Fortunately General Halleck at St. Louis strained all his energies to send reinforcements and these arrived in time to restore Grant's advantage in numbers Serious disagreement among the Confederate commanders also hastened the fall of the place On February 16 General Buckner to whom the senior officers had turned over the command proposed an armistice in the appointment of commissioners to agree on terms of capitulation To this Grant responded with a characteristic spirit of determination No terms except unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted I propose to move immediately upon your works Buckner complained that the terms were ungenerous and unshivalric but that necessity compelled him to accept them In Grant telegraphed Halleck on February 16 we have taken Fort Donaldson and from 12 to 15,000 prisoners The senior Confederate Generals pillow and Floyd and a portion of the garrison had escaped by the Cumberland River during the preceding night Since the fall of Fort Henry on February 6 a lively correspondence had been going on in which General Halleck besought Buil to come with his available forces assist in capturing Donaldson and command the column up the Cumberland to cut off both Columbus and Nashville President Lincoln scanning the news with intense solicitude and losing no opportunity to urge effective cooperation telegraphed Halleck You have Fort Donaldson safe unless Grant shall be overwhelmed from outside to prevent which letter will I think require all the vigilance, energy and skill of yourself and Buil acting in full cooperation Columbus will not get it Grant but the force from Bowling Green will They hold the railroad from Bowling Green miles of Fort Donaldson with the bridge at Clarksville undisturbed It is unsafe to rely that they will not dare to expose Nashville to Buil A small part of their force can retire slowly toward Nashville breaking up the railroad as they go and keep Buil out of that city 20 days Meantime Nashville will be abundantly defended by forces from all south and perhaps from here at Manassas Could not a cavalry force from General Thomas on the upper Cumberland dash across almost unresisted and cut the railroad at or near Knoxville, Tennessee In the midst of a bombardment at Fort Donaldson I could not a gunboat run up and destroy the bridge at Clarksville Our success or failure at Fort Donaldson is vastly important and I beg you to put your soul in the effort I send a copy of this to Buil This telegram abundantly shows with what minute understanding and accurate judgment the President comprehended military conditions and results in the West Buil, however, was too intent upon his own separate movement to seize the brilliant opportunity offered him As he, only in a feeble advance followed up the retreating Confederate column from Bowling Green to Nashville Alec naturally appropriated to himself the merit of the campaign and telegraphed to Washington on the day after the surrender Make Buil grant and Pope major generals of volunteers and give me command in the West I ask this in return for Fort's Henry and Donaldson The eagerness of General Alec for a superior command in the West was, to say the least, very pardonable A vast horizon of possibilities was opening up to his view Other campaigns under his direction were exciting his liveliest hopes Late in December he had collected an army of 10,000 at the railroad terminus in Rola, Missouri under command of Brigadier General Curtis for the purpose of scattering the rebel forces under general price at Springfield or driving them out of the state Despite the hard winter weather Alec urged on the movement with almost preemptory orders and Curtis executed the intentions of his chief with such alacrity that price was forced into a rapid and damaging retreat from Springfield toward Arkansas While forcing this enterprise in the Southwest, Alec had also determined on an important campaign in southeast Missouri Next to Columbus which the enemy evacuated on March 2 the strongest Confederate fortifications on the Mississippi River were number 10, about 40 miles further to the south To operate against these he planned an expedition under Brigadier General Pope to capture the town of New Madrid as a preliminary step Columbus and Nashville were almost sure to fall as the result of Donaldson If now he could bring his two Missouri campaigns into a combination with two swift and strong Tennessee expeditions while the enemy was in scattered retreat he could look forward to the speedy capture of Memphis But to the realization of such a project the hesitation and slowness of Bewell were a serious hindrance That general had indeed started a division under Nelson to grant assistance but it was not yet in the Cumberland when Donaldson surrendered Alec's demand for enlarge power therefore became almost imperative He pleaded earnestly with Bewell I have asked the president to make you a major general Come down to the Cumberland and take command The battle of the west is to be fought in that vicinity There will be no battle at Nashville His telegrams to McClellan were more urgent Give it, the western division to me and I will split secession and twain in one month and again I must have command of the armies in the west Hesitation and delay are losing us the golden opportunity Lay this before the president and secretary of war May I assume command Answer quickly But McClellan was in no mood to sacrifice the ambition of his intimate friend and favorite General Bewell and induced the president to withhold his consent and while the generals were debating by telegraph Nelson's division of the army of Bewell moved up the Cumberland and occupied Nashville under the orders of Grant Alec however held tenaciously to his views and requests explaining to McClellan that he himself proposed going to Tennessee That is now the great strategic line of the western campaign and I am surprised that general Bewell should hesitate to reinforce me He was too late for Donaldson Believe me general You make a serious mistake in having three independent commands in the west There never will and never can be any cooperation at the critical moment All military history proves it This insistence had greater point because of the news received that Curtis energetically following price into Arkansas had won a great union victory at P. Ridge between March 5 over the united forces of price and McCulloch commanded by Van Dorn At this juncture events at Washington hereafter to be mentioned caused the reorganization of military commands and president Lincoln's special war order number three consolidated the western departments of Hunter, Alec and Bewell as far east as Knoxville, Tennessee under the title of the department of the Mississippi and placed general Alec in command of the whole Meanwhile, Alec had ordered the victorious union army at Fort Donaldson to move forward to Savannah on the Tennessee river under the command of Grant and now that he had superior command directed Bewell to march all of his forces not required to defend Nashville as rapidly as possible to the same point Alec was still at St. Louis and through the indecision of his further orders through the slowness of Bewell's march and through the unexplained inattention of Grant the union armies narrowly escaped a serious disaster which however the determined courage of the troops and subordinate officers turned into a most important victory The golden opportunity so earnestly pointed out by Alec while not entirely lost nevertheless seriously diminished by the hesitation and delay of the union commanders to agree upon some plan of effective cooperation When at the fall of Fort Donaldson the Confederates retreated from Nashville toward Chattanooga and from Columbus toward Jackson a swift advance by the Tennessee river could have kept them separated but as that open highway was not promptly followed in force the flying Confederate detachments found abundant leisure to form a junction Grant reached Savannah on the east bank of the Tennessee river about the middle of March and in a few days began massing troops at Pittsburgh landing six miles further south on the west bank of the Tennessee still keeping his headquarters at Savannah to await the arrival of Bewell in his army During the next two weeks he reported several times that the enemy was concentrating at Corinth, Mississippi an important railroad crossing 20 miles from Pittsburgh landing the estimate of their number varying from 40 to 80,000 All this time his mind was so filled with an eager intention to begin a march upon Corinth and a confidence that he could win a victory by a prompt attack that he neglected the essential precaution of providing against an attack by the enemy which at the same time was denying the thoughts of the Confederate commander General Johnston General Grant was therefore greatly surprised on the morning of April 6 when he proceeded from Savannah to Pittsburgh landing to learn the cause of a fierce cannonade He found that the Confederate army 40,000 strong was making an unexpected and determined attack and force on the Union camp whose five divisions numbered a total of about 33,000 The Union generals had made no provision against such an attack no entrenchments had been thrown up no plan or understanding arranged A few preliminary picket skirmishes had indeed put the Union front on the alert but the commanders of brigades and regiments were not prepared for the impetuous rush with which the three successive Confederate lines began the main battle On their part they did not realize their hope of affecting a complete surprise In the nature of the ground was so characterized by a network of local roads alternating patches of woods and open fields Myree-Hollows and abrupt ravines that the lines of conflict were quickly broken into short disjointed movements that admitted of little or no combined or systematic direction The effort of the Union officers was necessarily limited to a continuous resistance to the advance of the enemy from whatever direction it came that of the Confederate leaders to the general purpose of forcing the Union lines away from Pittsburgh landing so that they might destroy the federal transports and thus cut off all means of retreat In this effort although during the whole of Sunday April 6 the Union front had been forced back a mile and a half the enemy had not entirely succeeded About sunset General Beauregard who by the death of General Johnston during the afternoon succeeded to the Confederate command gave orders to suspend the attack in the firm expectation however that he would be able to complete his victory the next morning But in this hope he was disappointed During the day the vanguard of Buell's army had arrived on the opposite bank of the river Nightfall one of his brigades was ferried across and deployed in front of the exultant enemy During the night and early Monday morning three superb divisions of Buell's army about 20,000 fresh well-drilled troops were advanced to the front under Buell's own direction And by three o'clock of that day the two wings of the Union army were once more in possession of all the ground that had been lost on the previous day while the foiled and disorganized Confederates were in full retreat upon Corinth The severity of the battle may be judged by the losses In the Union army killed 1754 wounded 8408 missing 2885 In the Confederate army killed 1728 wounded 812 missing 954 Having comprehended the uncertainty of Buell's successful junction with Grant Alec must have received tidings of the final victory at Pittsburgh landing with emotions of deep satisfaction To this was now joined the further gratifying news that the enemy on the same momentous April 7 had surrendered to the war in date number 10 together with six or seven thousand Confederate troops including three General officers to the combined operations of General Pope and Flag Officer foot Full particulars of these two important victories did not reach Alec for several days Following previous suggestions Pope and foot promptly moved their gun boats and troops down the river to the next Confederate stronghold Fort Pello extensive fortifications aided by an overflow of the adjacent river banks indicated strong resistance and considerable delay. When all the conditions became more fully known, Halic at length adopted the resolution to which he had been strongly leaning for some time to take the field himself. About April 10 he proceeded from St. Louis to Pittsburgh landing and on the 15th ordered Pope with his army to join him there which the latter having his troops already on transports succeeded in accomplishing by April 22. Halic immediately affected a new organization combining the armies of the Tennessee of the Ohio and of the Mississippi and to respectively his right wing center and left wing. He assumed command of the whole himself and nominally made Grant second in command. Practically however he left Grant so little authority or work that the latter felt himself slighted and asked to leave to proceed to another field of duty. It required but a few weeks to demonstrate that however high were Halic's professional acquirements in other respects he was totally unfit for a commander in the field. Grant had undoubtedly been careless and not providing against the enemy's attack at Pittsburgh landing. Halic on the other extreme was now doubly overcautious in his march upon Corinth. From first to last his campaign resembled a siege. With over 100,000 men under his hand he moved at a snail's pace building roads and breastworks and consuming more than a month and advancing a distance of 20 miles. During which period Beauregard managed to collect about 50,000 effective Confederates and construct defensive fortifications with equal industry around Corinth. When on May 29 Halic was within assaulting distance of the rebel entrenchments Beauregard had leisurely removed his sick and wounded destroyed or carried away his stores and that night finally evacuated the place leaving Halic to reap practically a barren victory. Nor were the generals plans and actions any more fruitful during the following six weeks. He wasted the time and energy of his soldiers multiplying useless fortifications about Corinth. He dispatched Buell's wing of the army on a march toward eastern Tennessee but under such instructions and limitations that long before reaching its objective it was met by a Confederate Army under General Bragg and forced into a retrograde movement which carried it back to Louisville. More deplorable however than either of these errors in judgment was Halic's neglect to seize the opportune moment when by a vigorous movement in cooperation with the brilliant naval victories under flag officer Farragut commanding a formidable fleet of Union warships he might have completed the overshadowing military task of opening the Mississippi River. End of chapter 19. Chapter 20 of A Short Life of Abraham Lincoln. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Jude Cader. A Short Life of Abraham Lincoln by John G. Nicolay. Chapter 20. The Blockade. Hatteras Inlet. Roanoke Island. Fort Pulaski. Merrimack and Monitor. The Cumberland Sunk. The Congress Burned. Battle of the Ironclads. Flag Officer Farragut. Horts Jackson and St. Philip. New Orleans Captured. Farragut at Vicksburg. Farragut's second expedition to Vicksburg. Return to New Orleans. In addition to its heavy work of maintaining the Atlantic Blockade, the Navy of the United States contributed signally toward the suppression of the rebellion by three brilliant victories which it gained during the first half of the year 1862. After careful preparation during several months, a joint expedition under the command of General Ambrose E. Burnside and flag officer Goldsboro consisting of more than 12,000 men and 20 ships of war accompanied by numerous transports sailed from Fort Monroe on January 11 with the object of occupying the interior waters of the North Carolina coast. Before the larger vessels could affect their entrance through Hatteras Inlet captured in the previous August, a furious storm set in which delayed the expedition nearly a month. By February 7 however that and other serious difficulties were overcome and on the following day the expedition captured Roanoke Island and thus completely opened the whole interior water system of Albemarle and Pamlico sounds to the easy approach of the Union fleet and forces. From Roanoke Island as a base minor expeditions within a short period affected the destruction of the not very formidable fleet which the enemy had been able to organize and the reduction of Fort Macon and the rebel defenses of Elizabeth City, New Bern and other smaller places. An eventual advance upon Goldsboro formed part of the original plan but before it could be executed circumstances intervened effectually to thwart that object. While the gradual occupation of the North Carolina coast was going on two other expeditions of a similar nature were making steady progress. One of them under the direction of General Quincy A. Gilmore carried on a remarkable siege operation against Fort Pulaski standing on an isolated sea marsh at the mouth of the Savannah River. Here not only the difficulties of approach but the apparently insurmountable obstacle of making the soft, unctuous mud sustain heavy batteries was overcome and the fort compelled to surrender on April 11 after an effective bombardment. The second was an expedition of nineteen ships which within a few days during the month of March without serious resistance occupied the whole remaining Atlantic coast southward as far as St. Augustine. When at the outbreak of the rebellion the Navy Yard at Norfolk Virginia had to be abandoned to the enemy the destruction at that time attempted by Commodore Paulding remained very incomplete. Among the vessels set on fire the screw frigate Merrimack which had been scuttled was burned only to the water's edge leaving her hull and machinery entirely uninjured. In due time she was raised by the Confederates covered with a sloping roof of railroad iron provided with a huge wedge-shaped prow of cast iron and armed with a formidable battery of ten guns. Secret information came to the Navy Department of the progress of this work and such a possibility was kept in mind by the Board of Officers that decided upon the construction of three experimental iron clads in September 1861. The particular one of these three especially intended for this peculiar emergency was a ship of entirely novel design made by the celebrated inventor John Erickson a swede by birth but American by adoption a man who combined great original genius with long scientific study and experience. His invention may be most quickly described as having a small very low hull covered by a much longer and wider flat deck only a foot or two above the waterline upon which was placed a revolving iron turret 20 feet in diameter 9 feet high and 8 inches thick on the inside of which were two 11 inch guns trained side by side and revolving with the turret. This unique naval structure was promptly nicknamed a cheese box on a raft and the designation was not at all inept. Naval experts at once recognized that her seagoing qualities were bad but compensation was thought to exist in the belief that her iron turret would resist shot and shell and that the thin edge of her flat deck would offer only a minimum mark to an enemy's guns in other words that she was no cruiser but would prove a formidable floating battery and this belief she abundantly justified. The test of her fighting qualities was attended by what most suggested a miraculous coincidence on Saturday March 8 1862 about noon a strange looking craft resembling a huge turtle was seen coming into Hampton roads out of the mouth of Elizabeth River and it quickly became certain that this was the much talked of rebel ironclad Merrimack or as the Confederates had renamed her the Virginia. She steamed rapidly toward Newport News three miles to the southwest where the Union ships Congress and Cumberland lay at anchor. These saw the uncouth monster coming and prepared for action. The Minnesota, the St. Lawrence and the Roanoke lying at Fortress Monroe also saw her and gave chase but the water being low they all soon grounded. The broad sides of the Congress as the Merrimack passed her at 300 yards distance seemed to produce absolutely no effect upon her sloping iron roof.  Then backing away and hovering over her victim at a convenient distance she raked her decks with shot and shell until after three quarters of an hour's combat the Cumberland and her heroic defenders who had maintained the fight with unyielding stubbornness went to the bottom in 50 feet of water with colors flying. Having sunk the Cumberland the Merrimack next turned her attention to the Congress which had meanwhile run into shoal water and grounded where the rebel vessel could not follow. But the Merrimack being herself apparently proof against shot and shell by her iron plating took up a raking position two cables length away and during an hours firing deliberately reduced the Congress to helplessness and to surrender her commander being killed in the vessel set on fire. The approach the maneuvering and the two successive combats consumed the afternoon and toward nightfall the Merrimack and her three small consorts that had taken little part in the action withdrew to the rebel batteries on the Virginia shore not alone because of the approaching darkness and the fatigue of the crew but because the rebel ship had really suffered considerable damage in ramming the Cumberland as well as from one or two chance shots that entered her port holes. That same night while the burning Congress yet lighted up the waters of Hampton Rhodes a little ship as strange looking and as new to marine warfare as the rebel turtleback herself arrived by sea in tow from New York and receiving orders to proceed it once to the scene of conflict stationed herself near the grounded Minnesota. This was Erickson's cheese box on a raft named by him the Monitor. The Union officers who had witnessed the day's events with dismay and were filled with gloomy forebodings for the moral while welcoming this providential reinforcement were by no means reassured. The Monitor was only half the size of her antagonist and had only two guns to the others 10 but this very disparity proved an essential advantage with only 10 feet draft to the Merrimack's 22 she not only possessed superior mobility but might run where the Merrimack could not follow when therefore at eight o'clock on Sunday March 9 the Merrimack again came into Hampton Rhodes to complete her victory Lieutenant John L. Warden commanding the Monitor steamed boldly out to meet her then ensued a three hours naval conflict which held the breathless attention of the active participants and the spectators on ship and shore and for many weeks excited the wonderment of the reading world. If the Monitor's solid 11 inch balls bounded without apparent effect from the sloping roof of the Merrimack so in turn the Merrimack's broad sides passed harmlessly over the low deck of the Monitor or rebounded from the round sides of her iron turret when the unwieldy Rebel Turtleback with her slow awkward movement tried to ram the pointed raft that carried the cheese box the little vessel obedient to her rudder easily glided out of the line of direct impact. Each ship passed through occasional moments of danger but the long three hours encounter ended without other serious damage than an injury to Lieutenant Warden by the explosion of a rebel shell against a crevice of the Monitor's pilot house through which he was looking which temporarily blinding his eyesight disabled him from command at that point the battle ended by mutual consent the Monitor unharmed by a few unimportant dents in her plating ran into shoal water to permit surgical attendance to her wounded officer on her part the Merrimack abandoning any further molestation of the other ships steamed away at noon to her retreat in Elizabeth River the 41 rounds fired from the Monitor's guns had so far weakened the Merrimack's armor that added to the injuries of the previous day it was of the highest prudence to avoid further conflict a tragic fate soon ended the careers of both vessels owing to other military events the Merrimack was abandoned burned and blown up by her officers about two months later and in the following December the Monitor foundered in a gale off Cape Hatteras but the types of these pioneer iron clads which had demonstrated such unprecedented fighting qualities were continued before the end of the war the Union Navy had more than 20 monitors in service and the structure of the Merrimack was in a number of instances repeated by the Confederates the most brilliant of all the exploits of the Navy during the year 1862 were those carried on under the command of flag officer David G Farragut who though born a southerner and residing in Virginia when the rebellion broke out remained loyal to the government and true to the flag he had served for 48 years various preparations had been made and various plans discussed for an effective attempt against some prominent point on the Gulf Coast very naturally all examinations of the subject inevitably pointed to the opening of the Mississippi is the dominant problem to be solved and on January 9 Farragut was appointed to the command of the Western Gulf blockading squadron and 11 days thereafter received his confidential instructions to attempt the capture of the city of New Orleans thus far in the war Farragut had been assigned to no prominent service but the patients with which he had awaited his opportunity was now more than compensated by the energy and thoroughness with which he had super intended the organization of his fleet by the middle of April he was in the lower Mississippi with 17 men of war and 177 guns with him were commander David D Porter in charge of a mortar flotilla of 19 schooners and six armed steamships and general Benjamin F. Butler at the head of an army contingent of 6,000 men soon to be followed by considerable reinforcements the first obstacle to be overcome was the fire from the twin forts Jackson and St. Philip situated nearly opposite each other at a bend of the Mississippi 25 miles above the mouth of the river while the city of New Orleans itself flies 75 miles farther up the stream these were formidable forts of masonry with an armament together of over 100 guns and garrisons of about 600 men each they also had auxiliary defenses first of a strong river barrier of log rafts and other obstructions connected by powerful chains half a mile below the forts second of an improvised fleet of 16 rebel gunboats and a formidable floating battery none of ferrigate ships were ironclad he had from the beginning of the undertaking maintained the theory that a wooden fleet properly handled could successfully pass the batteries of the forts I would assume have a paper ship as an ironclad only give me men to fight her he said he might not come back but New Orleans would be one in his hazardous undertaking his faith was based largely on the skill and courage of his subordinate commanders of ships and this faith was fully sustained by their gallantry and devotion porters flow till of 19 schooners carrying two mortars each anchored below the forts maintained a heavy bombardment for five days and then ferrigate decided to try his ships on the night of the 20th the daring work of two gunboats cut an opening through the river barrier through which the vessels might pass and at two o'clock on the morning of April 24 ferrigate gave the signal to advance the first division of his fleet eight vessels led by captain Bailey successfully passed the barrier the second division of nine ships was not quite so fortunate three of them failed to pass the barrier but the others led by ferrigate himself and his flagship the Hartford followed the advance the starlit night was quickly obscured by the smoke of the general cannonade from both ships and forts but the heavy batteries of the latter had little effect on the passing fleet ferrigate's flagship was for a short while in great danger at a moment when she was slightly grounded a huge fire aft fully ablaze was pushed against her by a rubble tug and the flames caught in the paint on her side and mounted into her rigging but this danger had also been provided against and by heroic efforts the Hartford freed herself from her peril immediately above the forts the fleet of rebel gunboats joined in the battle which now result itself into a series of conflicts between single vessels or small groups but the stronger and better armed union ships quickly destroyed the confederate flotilla with the single exception that two of the enemy's gunboats rammed the Varuna from opposite sides and sank her aside from this the union fleet sustained much miscellaneous damage but no serious injury in the furious battle of an hour and a half with but a short halt at quarantine six miles above the forts ferrigate and his 13 ships of war pushed on rapidly over the 75 miles and on the 4 noon of April 25 New Orleans lay helpless under the guns of the union fleet the city was promptly evacuated by the confederate general level meanwhile general butler was busy moving his transports and troops around outside by sea to quarantine and having occupied that point in force forts jackson and saint philip capitulated on April 28 this last obstruction removed butler after having garrisoned the forts brought the bulk of his army up to new orleans and on may one ferrigate turned over to him the formal possession of the city where butler continued in command of the department of the gulf until the following december ferrigate immediately dispatched an advanced section of his fleet up the mississippi none of the important cities on its banks below vicksburg had yet been fortified and without serious opposition they surrendered as the union ships successfully reached them ferrigate himself following with the remainder of his fleet arrived at vicksburg on may 20 this city by reason of the high bluffs on which it stands was the most defensible point on the whole length of the great river within the southern states but so confidently had the confederates trusted to the strength of their works at columbus island number 10 fort pillow and other points that the fortifications of vicksburg had thus far received comparatively little attention the recent union victories however both to the north and south had awakened them to their danger and when level evacuated new orleans he shipped heavy guns and sent five confederate regiments to vicksburg and during the eight days between their arrival on may 12 and the 20th on which day ferrigate reached the city six rebel batteries were put in readiness to fire on his ships general halak while pushing his siege works toward corinth was notified as early as april 27 that ferrigate was coming and the logic of the situation ought to have induced him to send a cooperating force to ferrigate's assistance or at the very least to have matured plans for such cooperation all the events would have favored an expedition of this kind when corinth at the end of may fell into halak's hands fort's pillow and Randolph on the mississippi river were hastily evacuated by the enemy and on june 6 the union flotilla of river gun boats which had rendered such signal service at henry donelson and island number 10 reinforced by a hastily constructed flotilla of heavy river tugs converted into rams gained another brilliant victory in a most dramatic naval battle at memphis during which an opposing confederate flotilla of similar rams and gun boats was almost completely destroyed and the immediate evacuation of memphis by the confederates thereby forced this left vicksburg as the single barrier to the complete opening of the mississippi and that barrier was defended by only six batteries and a garrison of six confederate regiments at the date of ferrigate's arrival before it but ferrigate had with his expedition only two regiments of troops and the rebel batteries were situated at such an elevation that the guns of the union fleet could not be raised sufficiently to silence them neither help nor promise of help came from halak's army and ferrigate could therefore do nothing but turn his vessels downstream and return to new orleans there about june 1 he received news from the navy department that the administration was exceedingly anxious to have the mississippi opened and this time taking with him porter's mortar flotilla in three thousand troops he again proceeded up the river and a second time reached vicksburg on june 25 the delay however had enabled the confederates greatly to strengthen the fortifications and the garrison of the city neither a bombardment from porter's mortar sloops nor the running of ferrigate ships past the batteries where they were joined by the union gunboat flotilla from above suffice to bring the confederates to a surrender ferrigate estimated that a cooperating land force of 12 to 15 thousand would have enabled him to take the works and halak on june 28 and july 3 partially promised early assistance but on july 14 he reported definitely that it would be impossible for him to render the expected aid under these circumstances the navy department ordered ferrigate back to new orleans lest his ships of deep draft should be detained in the river by a rapidly falling water the capture of vicksburg was postponed for a whole year and the early transfer of halak to washington changed the current of the western campaigns end of chapter 20


This training is very very nice. We learned about the criminal system in the Portuguese art and how to use the database to separate the suspicious and the other passenger. At the Phuket International Airport, we have a passenger totally 20,000 a day and increase every day. And all the criminals, they all look like the tourists. That's why we don't know how to separate the criminal and the other passengers. The equipment of the airport is called my right. It makes me easier to separate the criminal and makes me serve it comfortably for tourists and make our city safety. We look forward to the airport recently again and we intend to share this knowledge to the other immigration for safer regions.