Good afternoon to our friends in America. Good afternoon to our friends in Europe. Good evening to those of you who are in Asia. My name is Alexander Karnier. And on behalf of the organizing committee composed of Jacques Trimaire, Daniel Erschoff, and Paul C. Bright, I'm very happy to welcome you to this 14th edition of the TSE Digital Economics Conference. By now I'm assuming that most of you have seen the program and even though circumstances prevent us from holding this event in Toulouse, we are very excited by the program of these next two days. The format of this conference is a bit unusual, but we hope it will be conducive to interactive sessions. So presentations will be shorter than usual. And so let me remind you that most presenters have also submitted a 15 video of their presentation available on the conference website. The organization of this event would not have been possible without the extraordinary work of our administrative staff, in particular, Florence Chauvet and Christophe Rocher, who have been of great help with all the logistics for an unusual format. Thank you. We also thank the various partners of TSE and of the Digital Center. This conference will be recorded. So before we put anything online, we will ask the various presenters for their approval. Our first event is the Susan Scotchmer Memorial Lecture, which is going to be given by John Vickers. We're very honored to have John. And the session will be moderated by Jean Thierryle. So without further ado, John, I'll see you. Thank you, Alexandre. Welcome, everybody, to the Susan Scotchmer Memorial Lecture. We all remember our fantastic research and being such a great human being. It's always a pleasure to honor our memory. I couldn't think of a better person to give that lecture than John Vickers. So John is a professor of economics at Oxford and the warden of Osall's College. He has at least two lives, probably more, but the life as an academic was done very pioneering research in industrial organization and regulation and banking. And personally, I've learned a huge amount from his work and actually have used it. Actually, most recently, the Vickers rule my last paper, published paper with Emmanuel Fari was partly on the Vickers rule, actually. And he has also had a life as a very important policymaker. Again, in many fields, he was head of the Office for Fair Trading. He was a chief economist of the Bank of England. He was part of the member of the Monetary Policy Committee, also the Bank of England. He was a chair of the Independent Commission on Banking. And despite all this, he's still doing terrific research. Often when people go and do other things, they stop doing research and John is still doing fabulous research as you'll notice today. So without further ado, I would like to, we don't have that much time. I could speak for hours about John, but I think it's much better to listen to him. John, the floor is yours. You're going to talk about patterns of competition, information and price dispersion. And thank you so much for doing it. We are very honored. Thank you so much, Jean and the organizers for giving me the opportunity to speak at this event. And in particular, to give the lecture named for Suzanne Scotchma. Let me pull up slides if I can and outline what I plan to talk about in the time we have ahead. But first, I want to, this is all conferences about digital, but I'm going to begin with a picture of how the world used to be before digital economics. This, if you don't recognize it immediately, is the cathedral, the Duomo in Siena. And it is a place where I received some particularly important career advice, and it was from you, Jean. I don't know if you remember this. It was the second of December 2004, which I know because I found in a pilot paper the program for the then second annual conference of the Association of Competition Economics, which many of you belong to and know, and it brings together economists from universities, from the competition agencies, and from consulting firms and so on. And the first session had the two of us in it, together with David Evans, well-known in Toulouse and elsewhere. And I was coming to the end of my time at the Office of Fair Trading when this conference happened. And before that, I'd had two and a half years at the Bank of England, as you had mentioned. So I had this sort of daunting prospect in front of me. I said, how on earth did I get back productively into academic life? And because I saw us on the program together, I asked for the huge favor. Could we meet on the steps of that cathedral at noon and have lunch before the three o'clock start of this conference? And my question was, what have I missed in IO, particularly IO theory? And you said many things, but the two of the two of the core remarks were very relevant to our topic today were that two things that had happened were economics of two-sided markets, which had got underway at that turn of the century phase. That was one. And the other was bounded rationality meets industrial organization. Now, 2004 digital was there, but it was nothing like what we've seen in the last decade and a half. Now, at almost exactly the same time as that, and I do want to mention this, was the Suzanne Scotchman book, I think, was published November 2004. So almost exactly that. And her body of work and others work on innovation and incentives is, of course, hugely pertinent to the issues about the digital economy that are the subject of this conference. It's also an area that I used to work on as game theory models with Chris Harris, and we teamed up with Philippe Baguio subsequently. But that's not the aspect which I want to talk about today. I do, however, want to pay tribute to Suzanne's work in this area, which I think has had a huge influence on all of us, and an especially admirable part of that. And I did notice, as we were gathering in the, on this call is Stephen Mora, who was a co-author of some of the chapters in there. It's not just economics that you get from her work and from this book, but it's also economics together with the historical and legal context. And I think that combination, which very few people successfully bring together, she is a shining light in many ways, but in part for doing that. So let me now try and zoom in on some of the issues I do want to talk about. On this slide, I'm not going to cover this whole agenda at all. In fact, I'm not going to talk explicitly about two-sided markets, which was one of Jean's two points that he mentioned to me in that Sienna discussion 16 years ago. But the other two were the bounded rationality point. And I think of this more generally as imperfect consumers, consumers who are not like economics 101 textbook consumers. They have limitations, they have limited awareness of what's on offer, and they perhaps search, do or don't search around to try and find better deals. And one of the points about digital, I mean, this isn't specifically for digital, but it's relevant to digital, is that search technology for consumers and of course for businesses has enormously improved. So on the one hand, we have a transformation, positive transformation in the ability consumers to become more aware and to search around. But on the other hand, and this is the third block here, the information that sellers have about consumers is also enormously expanded. And so too, in conjunction with that, have the opportunities, if permitted, for various kinds of tailoring deals, price discrimination, and so on. And this isn't in a standard pure monopoly setting where most the earliest work on price discrimination happened, it's in more competitive settings. So what I want to talk about a little aspects of the second and third of those elements there and put it into the wider theme of the information structure of markets, which is quite a hot search here at the moment, as indeed some papers later in this conference will illustrate. So I'll talk about those things and the plan I'll begin by talking about the notion of prominence and linking that to price dispersion. Price dispersion we see very much all around us, quite diverse prices, often for exactly the same product or service, despite the digital transformation. So how can that happen? Why does that happen? Sometimes happens in markets which on the supply side look reasonably competitive, not brilliant, but not terrible. And prominence has, if you like, become more prominent with digital because the way information is presented to consumers, particularly search engine results, the framing of the choice structure seems to be tremendously influential. So the economics of search and prominence seems one good topic. Then I'll talk a little bit about an aspect of price discrimination where firms, sellers, can identify who doesn't have much choice and who does, so against captive customers. Then third on this list, give a sketch of some work underway with Mark Armstrong on patterns of competitive interaction, how patterns of consumer awareness relates in theory models to patterns of pricing, and again the good deals, bad deals point. Then fourth talk about some work we've got underway now, multi-brand firms. And of those four things at the top there, the first two are published and I'll say where. The third one is available in a working paper form and the fourth one is unwritten. Now I underline and highlight just how important Mark has been to the collaboration on all these strands of work. This is joint work that I'll talk about and some of it is also with Mark's former student but now at Yale, Zhigong Xu. So triple underlining of thanks to them and in particular to Mark. Okay so begin with provenance and price dispersion and I want now just to mention and give a sketch of two issues that surfaced in the literature 10 plus years ago. I should stress I am not giving a balanced literature review. This is all very selective, enormous bias in favor of focus of work that Mark and I have been doing. It's just one angle into this much wider set of issues and I want to try and convey the essence of it and what seem to be the key points coming out of our current work. So let me begin with with provenance and price dispersion. As I've mentioned and this is an old point I mean in the economy centuries ago some sellers would be more prominent than others in marketplaces but with digital with search engine results presentation of results prominent seems ever more important. So a good question I think a good set of questions is whether prominent firms which often seem to charge different prices from less prominent firms do they tend to give good or bad deals? Now ultimately that's an empirical question and I'm not going to be talking about the empirical side of things today but I want to draw out two underlying points that go in different directions that bear on that. For a general survey of this of ordered consumer search I recommend Mark's Marshall Lectures of European Economic Association 2016 which appeared in GIA 2017. So to try and see what the underlying economics is let's take a super simple setting where there's a bunch of sellers and let us suppose that one of them is prominent it's seen before other firms and let's say that's true for all consumers to keep it really simple. You could obviously generalize to other settings. So Mark Shadong and I had a paper came out in round general 2009 in which in a model with that key asymmetry between sellers but otherwise with but with symmetry among consumers particularly with respect to search costs it turned out that the prominent firm the one that everybody goes to first offers a relatively good deal a better deal than the other firms because of the following economic effect. I won't spell out the details of the model because of the time pressure that we we all have but the basic idea was symmetric consumers a sequential search model so each consumer can pay an amount s and it's the same for all consumers to have a look at one more firm down the the list of firms let's say. It's a match utility model I need to go into the details here but the upshot was that if the only asymmetry is the prominence asymmetry among the sellers turns out that the prominent firm has more elastic demand than firms further down the queue so tends to price lower and be a better deal relative to the others so that in a sense made the search order that everybody going to that firm first a rational thing to do because chances were you get a somewhat better deal from the first firm than the later firms. What's the intuition and this is the point I want to try and get across I think it's best conveyed in the two firm case the two firm case the people that go to the second firm by their revealed behavior didn't much like what was on offer at the first firm that gives the second firm a kind of market power over the people that eventually get to it even though they might just be a minority of consumers and that that less elastic demand causes a higher price to be the equilibrium outcome for that firm than the prominent firm and what determines what's prominent well in the otherwise symmetric model it could be arbitrary any firm could be prominent and that would be self-reinforcing the the search order that could prevail but of course there are differences between firms in fact some might have better value underlying better brand value or lower costs than others and in the main line of analysis in the paper I just mentioned it's sort of fairly benign result those firms would have more incentive to become prominent than others Mark and Chidong sometimes we had a paper on paying for prominence in that line however a completely different effect contrasting effect I want to say more about in what is to come first by reference to a paper by Albert Skyros around journal a couple of years earlier and here was a very different kind of asymmetry it was asymmetry among search costs across consumers and here you got the opposite kind of result from the different kind of asymmetry here and she described it as as consumers go into the bizarre the sellers near the entrance which even the consumers with relatively high search costs would sample and sample first they would give a relatively bad deal because as you go deeper into the bizarre or down the list of search results then the high search cost means that the high search cost consumers that only sample the early firms those have less elastic demand and they will tend to get relatively bad deals relative to the others so that's a very different point and we're going to pick up echoes of it in some of the models to come later on so this is a sort of hold the point for now in that ran journal paper Mark Chidong and I did have an example of the Albert Skyar type which chimes with what I'm about to talk with just next so let me say a little bit about that an extreme example of different asymmetry among consumers with respect to search costs so here's suppose um fraction lambda of consumers have no search costs at all they can look at all the offers no problem at all no cost whereas other consumers can only see the first firm they come to and suppose that firm is common to all consumers then if you've got three or more firms you get this very very stark result which is that the prominent firm in a sense just rips off the non-searchers those for whom search is prohibitively costly all the other consumers no search costs they have consumers competing perfect competition to supply them so they all get great deals so even though no firm is discriminating in that simple little story that parable it is equivalent to a model and I'm now going to come to an explicit model like that of perfect discrimination against the captive customers that is to say those who have the prohibitively high cost of searching beyond the first firm that they all come to and that's going to be the next topic and I want to talk about some of the simple welfare economics of discrimination against captive customers so as I mentioned in the introduction price dispersion variation among of price among firms or even single firm charging very different prices apparently for the same product to different consumer groups that seems a pervasive feature of markets digital transformation has not banished that phenomenon at all there's good reason to think that in a number of settings it has exacerbated it so what what economics can can we think about in terms of economics of price dispersion either between different firms or and or by one firm for essentially the similar or same varieties of the same product well one place to look and this is what I'm going to focus on today is that consumer awareness of what deals are on offer seems to vary greatly and there's an empirical literature documenting this too so the line of work I'm going to talk about is one where consumers differ consumers groups differ in respect of their so-called consideration sets some consumers might easily be able to see all the offerings in the market their consideration set is all the offers in the market other consumers think of them as the captives they can only see an extreme start form the offering of one firm and there are clearly a whole range of possibilities in between so how all these consideration sets relate to each other and what that means for market outcomes that seems to us a potentially interesting research topic where there's a literature from about 40 years ago which makes a very good start into that and I'll mention a few papers in passing as we go but what Mark and I are trying to do is to push the envelope a bit further in the line of that literature so forms of discrimination of that kind they seem pretty common there are some examples there are some UK competition inquiry examples loyalty pricing you see that in many markets for example again with more time I could document more and more examples of that and a very natural response of policy makers when they see the captive customers the vulnerable customers those who don't shop around those who appear to be disengaged from the marketplace getting poor deals a very natural responses to say well why don't we ban discrimination even though it's a more or less competitive market in general why don't we say that firms can't charge higher prices to the vulnerable than the others they've got to have a kind of constraint that firms do not discriminate on the basis of vulnerability or lack of shopping around activity of those who are disengaged from the market and there's clearly some appeal to that including if the vulnerable tend to be poorer consumers including on distributional grounds as well as efficiency grounds but kind of warning is that the literature on price discrimination in oligopoly and I mentioned a couple of papers at the bottom of that slide does show that banning discrimination can quite easily soften competition to the detriment of consumers in general so there's not a there's not a no-brainer here so in a paper published a year or so ago in AER Insights Mark and I looked in a very simple model with these consideration sets at some of these issues about discrimination on the basis of captivity and I want to link that to this wider set of work which many are engaged with and I'll mention just one or two examples looking at how information structures in markets that's what firms know about consumers what consumers know about firms how these patterns of information can can play into market outcomes in quite strong ways let me sketch and this is only going to be sketch and headlines and intuitions let me sketch the framework that we look at in that paper so let's suppose we have a representative consumer where you can generalize it to heterogeneous consumers provided that dimension of heterogeneity is independent from whether consumers are captive or not let's normalize cost to zero going to do that in everything I talk about henceforth just for simplicity let's suppose that profit per consumer so that's this profit function here assume that is single peaked up to the monopoly price so we've got downward sloping demands it's all very standard and we're going to suppose for most of the analysis that it's going to be duopoly though I'm going to state one result a bit more some things come true more generally so consumers either consider just one firm could be firm one they look at could be firm two each of those firms in general have some captives and then some consumers will look at both so if the fraction sigma i consider firm i then the others fraction one minus sigma i those are going to be captives to the other firm to firm j let's label firms so that firm one is the larger of the two though they might be symmetrical and then a key thing to hold on to in all these models is row i that is the captive to reach ratio of firm i and given that firm i is the larger firm that has the higher ratio that than does firm j so is it a good thing or a bad thing for consumers for welfare to allow firms to discriminate on the basis of captivity if they can so the extreme form of price discrimination would say firms can identify precisely who their captives are they can charge rip them off charge them the monopoly price so then those consumers would get surplus v of p star whereas if they're doing perfect price discrimination the non captives those are going to get a great deal because there'll be virtual competition for their custom between the firms price will be driven down to cost zero and you'll get this much higher surplus level and in that world if perfect price discrimination on the basis of captivity is both possible and allowed then each firm will get its captive profit that's the monopoly profit on the fraction of consumers alpha i which are captive to it now what happens in the other environment where firms either cannot observe his captive or they can but they're not allowed to discriminate on the basis of captivity here we're in the world of mixed strategy equilibrium in prices the literature of 40 years ago roughly which is a taking off point for this would include the papers in the review economic study symposium 1977 butters for example it would very much include Hal Varian's model of sales AER 1980 and then a very important paper in this line is Burdett and Judd econometric 1983 on equilibrium price dispersion price dispersion the very term which is the centerpiece of what i'm talking about today so what happens there is that you have mixed strategies both firms will price in this interval P naught up to the monopoly price where P naught meets this condition the profit per consumer at that price is equal to the monopoly profit per consumer times the larger firms captive to reach ratio and in this world in this environment the larger firm gets its captive profit in expectation so exactly the same as it would have got with price discrimination whereas the smaller firm does better than with perfect price discrimination the intuitive reason is that the larger firm doesn't want a price too low because it would do better just by gouging its captives and this kind of holds a price umbrella up over the smaller firm which allows that firm to make more profit than it would have done otherwise so what's the deal for consumers well the firms are making more profit except in this metric case when uniform pricing happens on the other hand with uniform pricing consumers get more similar deals to each other you still get price dispersion because in general the firms will charge different prices but you won't get the stark difference in the deals that consumers get under price discrimination so obviously if you're a captive you do much better with uniform pricing if you're a contested consumer you do much worse which way does the overall effect go and the key point here this is the kind of a heart of the paper is don't think about prices directly but think about consumer surplus as a function of profit so whereas consumer surplus as a function of price is convex with demand curve slope down consumer surplus as a function of profit is not entirely generally but pretty broadly a concave function so one way to think about that is consumers are risk averse about profit variation if I didn't know whether I was going to be a low profit consumer or high profit consumer I'd be risk averse about that under a mild condition on demand in particular it's the condition that demand elasticity with price defined net of cost is increasing with price and what the thing that corresponds to risk neutrality is unit demand where not sloping down but just the vertical demand so this brings out the trade-off and really quite clearly firms cannot gain from this form of price discrimination pricing on the basis of captives we established that earlier but for consumers if we have a very symmetric more or less symmetric market consumers are harmed by discrimination because the profit gained to firms is small whereas the riskiness lost to consumers under the stated assumption is high on the other hand with sufficiently asymmetric markets under mild conditions it goes the other way the profit benefits to firms from discrimination which is a loss to consumers outweighs this riskiness point so what that paper is about is to compare the levels effect with the risk effect when one flips between the discrimination regime and the uniform pricing ratio what we do towards the end of the paper and this takes us into this burgeoning literature now on information structures is to say well look that's very stark that form of price discrimination can't we look more generally at information structures in markets and discrimination based on whether somebody is captive or not there could be many other kinds of discrimination less perfect we could think of partitioning consumers into submarkets let's say it's public signals with firms able to condition their pricing strategies on those public signals what happens then and then you have a link to the work on monopoly by bergamot and others and very much to their their recent work and I think there are papers later on in this very conference which are in this line on search information and prices and the analysis can be expanded to more than two firms to private signals as well but just to explain with a simple example in the setting mark and I looked at if you start off with a symmetric overall market and of course that's a strong assumption then any segmentation of the market into partitions is going to be bad for consumers that's good for firms can't be bad for them and it's bad for consumers now if the market as a whole starts off high in a highly asymmetric way you can get the opposite so a lot of this is about moving between symmetry and asymmetry but let me give an example of what I'm sorry to call it a theorem it's so pompous I meant I couldn't work out how to call it a proposition in the software but anyway um here's an illustration of it if you look at that picture um the these to pick consideration sets and let me tell a story as though these are regional monopolists in let's say an energy market which is a an issue we had a long inquiry competition inquiry in the UK so suppose we start off um with uniform pricing and there's a northern firm which is the upper circle and a southern firm which is the lower circle so the consumers diagrammatically here are captive to the northern firm the ones down here are captive to the southern firm and the ones in the middle are contested so if you pretend you've got equal density of consumers in each of those four areas that would be captive to reach ratio of each firm of one over three because those are the northern captives and these two areas with the dotted line are the contested but imagine firms now can discriminate on the basis of geography whether consumers are in the north or the south above the equator or south of the equator if they can do that kind of segmentation then in each sub market in each of these partitions captive to reach ratio is now a half and we end up less competitive uh in that situation in this example prices rise for all consumers and all consumers lose a hand from that form of price discrimination so this example is no more than an appetizer and there's this much wider literature and I think there are some very good questions about what are the maximally and minimally profitable or the maximally and minimally um good for consumers information structures in markets so my point in all this in a way is just to sell that question um which only in a way in toy examples did mark get into in that paper and the work by bergamot brooks morris and and many others now is looking at questions of that kind it's not specifically digital but it very much relates to it now let me move on i want to move away for a moment from questions about price discrimination by firms to look at issues about price dispersion with as it were in inter firm uh variation of prices different firms supplying different prices and talk more about this patterns of competition point i'm not going to delve into the details of the modeling i am going to come back to the prominence point which i flagged earlier but i really want to give more of flavor again by way of appetizers of um this line of work so now assume each firm does uniform pricing at the end i'm going to change that assumption but hold that for now suppose it's unit demands so we get away from that convex point we just had earlier one can generalize this but it keeps it simple let's look at this consideration set model so each consumer is going to buy from the lowest price firm in her consideration set it's going to be exogenous which offers which consumers see and notation is going to be that an exogenous fraction alpha s of consumers see precisely the firms the offers in set s so let me hop forward to a little diagram this is a three firm example then diagram so these people alpha alpha one they see only the offer of firm one likewise alpha two alpha three these people here they see both one and two but not three and these people in the middle see all three offers so you could draw these diagrams in all sorts of different ways but i hope that conveys the general idea now it will be lovely to have these sets endogenous whether by search behavior advertising by firms word of mouth or whatever um we could build a story about that but to make progress to begin with let's ask the question of how the patterns of consumers might relate into enterprise outcomes um as i indicated earlier this is in in a line of literature that goes back to those papers and i highlight specifically howls and the burlett and jud econometric of paper so the sort of question we ask is how do the range of prices that different firms offer how how do those relate how do the resulting market outcomes relate to the underlying patterns of consumer consideration and how would things like entry by new firms exit by firms mergers of firms how might that change those outcomes again we're in the world of mixed strategies we know that there's a mixed strategy equilibrium from uh desktop to masking what do those equilibrium outcomes look like well it took um us a long time to arrive at what we now think is the key to this problem and the key to the problem we suggest is this variable here gamma s which is a measure for each set of firms set of products s of um the intensity of interaction between the um uh the firms how much they interact within that set so what it is it's that gamma is the proportion of consumers that see the firms that's in in that set and possibly other firms too divided by the product of the overall reaches of each firm in that set so it's hard initially to get a grip on it for um any any singleton set that gamma is one it's also one if we have the um setting of independent reach whether it's um independent probabilities about whether a consumer will see particular products and the literature in this line and there are some 1990s papers um many of them assume independent reach which is which is a very elegant setting if the firms in this set compete more than averagely intensely they interact particularly strongly then that gamma variable um parameter is greater than one in the opposite extreme of disjoint reach if there are no consumers who see both firm i and firm j then then it is zero so let me sketch how this comes into play we say that a market has symmetric interactions if that parameter gamma s depends only on the number of firms in that set this class includes essentially all the models looked at in the 80s and 90s line of literature in this area it includes duopoly including asymmetric it includes symmetric models it includes independent reach and so on however it's broad enough to allow firms to be um quite entirely different from each other in size what happens if we have a setting like this well in fact equilibrium and payoffs i'm not going to detail what the mixed strategies are it is really quite simple and intuitive so under the stated assumptions of that theorem which i think are mild we have a unique equilibrium each firm mixes use mixed strategy from the same common minimum price p0 up to the firm i pi where that p0 is the captive to reach ratio of the largest firm and each firm's expected profit is that p0 multiplied by its reach the maximum prices they are in an increasing sequence so the largest firms they price all the way up to the top uh the monopoly price under remember this is inelastic demand up to um choke price one smaller firms don't go so high so this in another way is how the larger firms kind of the more prominent ones on average charge higher prices than smaller less prominent firms those seen by fewer consumers so it's a kind of stochastic thing but all the firms are competing with each other in some of the price range so it's head to head competition among everybody comparative statics for exit and for merger i won't do more than give you the headline which is they're what you would expect exit of the firm raises the base price raises profits bad for consumers a profitable merger again does the same raises the base price raises everybody's pricing and in this setting reduces consumer surplus but what if we are away from that world of symmetric interactions what if the Venn diagram instead of anything like the earlier one looks like this this is sort of darts players model so this is the case of nested reach this corresponds if you like to audit search again takes us back to the prominent point you can think of people going down results on a internet search results page and the idea here is that um in this simple picture there are some consumers those in the entirety of the big circle um sorry what there's one firm that everybody sees then there's a smaller firm that not everybody sees only a medium group of consumer see and then the smaller firm is a smallest firm is seen only by a subset of consumers so here the only captives there in the outer ring they are captives to the larger firm and the smaller ones don't have any captives at all because anyone that sees them also sees firms larger than them so this is a radical departure from what we had before again one could tell a story about prominence and search results here we get something that can be completely different so what happens here is that each firm prices in a price interval but there's a sort of potentially a ladder that goes up that the larger firms even though the underlying product is identical cost structure is identical they price higher than the um uh than the smaller ones and while it might be that all firms price at the at the bottom so they're competing head to head what you could easily get is this almost partitioned price structure which we call overlapping duopoly so if the increments of the reaches are increasing as in that inequality chain in the middle of that proposition stated there then we get the pattern we call overlapping geographies in which each firm as it were competes with its neighbor in size but not even with its next door but one neighbor so each firm uses a price range and it's sort of duopolistic competition but the larger firms price in an entirely different upper bit of the price range than the smaller ones so the head to head competition is only between neighbors and not between those who are other than next door neighbors the comparative statics when we move away from symmetric interactions can also be entirely different from what we had before and from earlier intuition so here and it's a particular information structure but I think it has some intuitive appeal imagine that diagram at the top without the entrant to begin with symmetric duopoly then suppose we have an entrant who comes into precisely the contested area it doesn't compete for any of the captives firm one or a firm two it's only in the contested area in this class of models that form of entry is bad for consumers because it does nothing to dent the profit of the erstwhile incumbents the entrant makes positive profits so it's bad for consumers so what's going on here is that the entry causes the erstwhile incumbents to retreat back towards their captive segments and I mentioned it here not as sort of again these are all little toy models toy examples but to get across the point that the information structure the patterns about which consumers can see which firms can drive results in a simple setting like this entirely contrary to the intuition that one might have in other settings finally this is the work in progress multi-brand firms so I talked about some of the above but in the my eerie lecture at the end of august and one of the comments in emails afterwards came from at Andrew Rhodes who's probably on on here was well okay that's all very well for mergers but why assume the merged firm charges just a uniform price why don't you allow firms to charge if they're multi-brand firms allow them allow them to charge different prices so that's what mark and I working on now is the same framework as just discussed but now ij and so on those areas in the in the Venn diagram think of them as distinct brands and allow the possibility that some of those multiple brands are co-owned by the same firm what what happens then very basic question is would such firms want to use discriminatory pricing or not if they had the freedom to do so now potentially this is quite complicated because this is could be multi-dimensional mixed strategies we're a little bit offshore from the desktop to mask an existence theorem so we can't even be sure that equilibrium exists though and we've been in touch with power that we think it does but let's take this question will they use discriminatory prices or not what would what's your guess i think a natural guess so it turns out to be wrong you might think well it's only in a knife edge case would affirm want to use uniform pricing if it had the freedom to discriminate that in fact turns out to be wrong and i want to illustrate why so again i'm going to talk about captive to reach ratios and here this is just the same definitions before for firm a row a is the portion of consumers captive to a divided by the proportion of consumers that see firm a in some form who see at least one of firm a's brands so here's a very simple result to get started you get this one for free if each firm has the same overall captive to reach ratio then with uniform pricing where they can't or don't do the price discrimination each firm's payoff will equal its proportion of captives if you allow firms to do price discrimination then they can do at least that well just by gouging their captives so they can clearly do equally or better and this is just like the earlier result um from that bit of the a our insights paper where the overall where an overall market gets segmented more generally though um there are more interesting things that one can say so let me take um a two firm case some of this generalizes some we don't know how to generalize let's suppose that firm a is a two brand firm and now define a kind of modified captive to reach ratio row i this is for the for brand i its consumers captive to firm a the owner of brand i divided by the reach of brand i the number of consumers who consider that brand let's think about firm a's best response to firm b under the assumption that firm b the other competing firm is pricing uniformly it might be a one brand firm so it has to price uniformly or it might be a multi-brand firm that is doing uniform pricing will firm a want to do uniform pricing charge its two brands the same price or might or will it want to go different for the two prices maybe have a high price one and a low price one even though they're intrinsically the same well the answer is that uniform pricing is the best response if and only if the condition in that proposition holds for both brands it is a very very simply stated condition and if it does not hold if the some brand or both brands for whom it's not true that inequality then intuitively that brand in isolation has more elastic demand in effect than brad then firm a does overall if it prices the brands the same so brand a would want so a would want to price the two brands apart whereas if the condition in the theorem does hold firm a would not wish to price them apart it would do better by gluing them together so this is a kind of do the elasticities go the right way or the wrong way kind of a point so if we now have brand B as a two brand firm as well then if that condition holds for both brands of both firms then we have a uniform pricing equilibrium but what if it doesn't what does equilibrium look like first I should say though what does it hinge on whether that condition holds it's partly to do with whether the probability of a consumer that sees both my brands whether the chance of that consumer being captive to me is greater than for a consumer that just sees one of my brand that's one point up at the top the second issue is the asymmetry between brands if my own brands are asymmetric there is more chance of that condition in the theorem failing and then we know we don't have the uniform pricing equilibrium forgive me racing ahead but given the time I have to so one type of equilibrium that you get quite often when that condition for uniform pricing fails we call segmented equilibrium where each of a again two brand firms each firm prices one of its brands high and what in a high interval in the range and one of its brands low so even though there's no intrinsic difference between the two brands in terms of quality or cost one is a kind of fighting brand essentially aimed at the consumers who have a lot of choice and the other is a high price brand aiming at those who have less choice so this is a kind of intra firm price dispersion price discrimination but there are a number there are many settings where you get neither that form of equilibrium nor the uniform pricing equilibrium you might get a kind of mixture of those two pricing strategies or and there isn't time to explain it today you can get some quite well to us surprising things which are neither of the above we have found some equilibria which are neither the segmented pricing just described nor the uniform pricing I should end with concluding remarks the meta theme of all this has been that one of the many things the digital transformation has done is to enhance both consumers ability to discover and compare different deals and sellers ability to discriminate among consumers I think it's highlighted how the way that information about market offerings is presented can be tremendously important determinant of market performance price dispersion is clearly highly pervasive has not been eliminated by any means by digital developments and we see many markets whether which are not monopolistic whether sort of some competition at least where we get dispersion discrimination going on which has all sorts of effects which are a priori non-obvious I think it makes information structures a very good research topic I've been running through some theory lines of theory literature largely toy examples but trying to give the flavor of a research agenda and of course it will be wonderful to make all these things endogenous but that is for another day thanks very much


A shooting at a university in Prague on December 21 had 14 victims and injured 25 people — 10 of them seriously, Prague's police chief Martin Vendroszek told reporters police had earlier said more than 15 people were killed in the shooting at the university in central Prague, including the gunman who was a student at the school. Police chief Martin Vendroszek said authorities were tipped off earlier in the day the man was likely heading to Prague from his town in the Kladno region outside the capital with the intentions of taking his own life. Shortly after that, the shooter's father was found dead, police evacuated a Charles University faculty of arts building where the shooter was due to attend a lecture, but then were called in at the faculty's different building, arriving within minutes after reports of the shooting came in, Vendroszek said. Police asked not to reveal the man's identity, but his name was reported by some Czech media matched a police search report and an account on a social network where its owner talked about being inspired by a mass shooting in Russia. Police chief Martin Vendroszek told reporters about the shooting at the beginning of the day, because the information that the student is a student of the Faculty of Physics and the evidence that he should or shouldn't have a lecture, we did it ourselves, and the lecture and his lecture was supposed to be held today at 14 o'clock, but in the whole street. Police chief Martin Vendroszek told reporters about the shooting at the social network. At the moment, I don't know what the motive is, but I'm talking here about the inspiration of one person to come up with the information we have, the primary student, with various factors in the world. The entire profile and the advantage of this information is really very fast.


Hello, my name is Catherine Barnard, and I teach EU law to graduates and post graduates. I'm Albertine Albus Lawrence, and I also teach European Union law to undergraduate samples graduates in the faculty. We want to talk a bit about how we teach EU law and what's in the course. For a lot of students, they approach EU law with a degree of ambivalence because they've heard lots about it on the news, some of it correct, some of it incorrect. So they're really a bit apprehensive about what they're going to face. So what we're going to talk to you a bit about is content of the course. We're going to tell you a bit about how we teach it. Now we're going to start with a really very prosaic example, and that is, let's think about a situation where there's a decision that there should be a limited amount of noise that lawn mowers can make. Now, if you think about that, who do you think can best regulate that? Should this be done at EU level or at national level? Just think about it for a moment. And you're probably thinking, well obviously that should be done at national level. What has the EU got to do with something like the amount of noise that lawn mowers can make? But now let's think about it a different way. As far as EU is concerned, they might say, well we actually do need to regulate the amount of noise lawn mowers can make. Because if I'm a lawn mower manufacturer, I want to have one standard, one set of noise that lawn mowers can make, and then I can sell my lawn mowers right across the European Union. And so the first part of the course looks at this question, not at lawn mowers as such, but we look at this question. Does EU have the power to act? And we can tell you the answer to that question is yes. Secondly, should it act? And that's known as a subsidiarity question and that's a big vexed political question. And what looks like something that should be done at national level is actually something which is increasingly done at EU level for the reason of trying to attain a single market. And then the third question is, has that legislation gone further than is necessary? So the very first part of the course is about looking at these fundamental constitutional questions, look at the institutions who are actually adopting this legislation. Then later on in the course we move on to see, carrying with the example that Catherine has just set out, when it will be possible for those who are, for example, and happy with this EU legislation to mount a challenge before the Court of Justice to question the validity of that legislation. So in the second part of the course we look at all the avenues and procedural routes that can be brought before the Court of Justice to challenge legislation. Later on, I'm moving on to what can be done when member states do not comply with EU rule. Following the same example, you may have a situation of someone who perhaps will be very disturbed by the noise of lawnmowers. So imagine that you have a member state that has not implemented this legislation into national law, the person who really wants this legislation to be put into effect may try to challenge that failure of the member state to comply with EU law and that raises the question of how EU law can be used by private parties before the national courts, the remedies that they have and ultimately the possibility even of suing member states in damages when they do not comply with EU law. So these are sorts of things we look at in the first term. And while at first sight you might think well what's that relevant to me, actually it's really interesting because it raises these fundamental points of constitutional importance. Now in the second term we move on to look at more substantive issues and we look at two main areas, free movement of goods and free movement of persons. We'll start with looking at free movement of goods. Now that's the sort of situation where goods are manufactured in one member state and sold in another. The problem comes is that the host state often is not very keen on having those goods coming into the country because they threaten the domestic industry. So just imagine the situation where I manufacture, I produce fantastic British wine. It's absolutely groundbreaking, everyone wants it and I want to try and sell it in France where you imagine the French are not best pleased and so they try and make it as difficult as possible for me to sell my wine. So for example they try and impose customs duties on my wine as they enter France or they try and tax my wine at a higher rate than French wine or they try and inspect my wine for quality, just imagine how you do that. As a goods coming into France of course that slows the goods getting onto the market or they say actually you can only sell your wine in certain shops which means it's not widely available. So in the second term what we do is we look at situations like the one I've just described and see if they're compatible with EU law and basically you'll discover that customs duties aren't permitted at all, taxation which is discriminatory isn't permitted and obstacles based on testing of the product or setting standards are often also unlawful but occasionally can be justified and restrictions on sale also raise really quite big legal issues. Following in that theme the final substantive area of law that we cover in the course is the free movement of persons which is an area of EU law that very much carries through the principles that have been set out in relation to free movement of goods. So when we talk about free movement of persons the idea is that if you are a national of a member state for example if you are a British national it should be as easy for you to work in Birmingham as it is to work in Rome or in Madrid. Indeed for example in my case I will be a living example of that free movement of persons in the European Union. I was born and brought up in Spain. I came to the UK as a student and then I stayed as an academic. So I am an example of the exercise of that free movement of persons which is guaranteed by the treaty. The same applies to companies that want to provide services across the European Union and following from that free movement of persons a very important concept that I'm sure you've come across in newspapers or in the television is the idea of union citizenship a principle that carries with it a panoply of rights that are becoming increasingly more important in EU law. So I hope you've got a taste of what we try and teach to undergraduates the way we teach is we do a series of lectures 40 and all throughout the academic year and then they are supplemented by 10 supervisions and the supervisions broadly follow on from the lectures and we find I think that the students really enjoy the course and it makes them think about EU in a very different way to the way that they started thinking about although some of their prejudices and preconceptions that they had before they began their course and they certainly begin to appreciate that the EU is a more complex and subtle and sophisticated entity than perhaps you understand from reading some of the British tabloid press.


I've got one watching. Hello? I'm going to save every 1,000 monkeys here. There's monkey. Hi, Monk. Hey! Watching the car. Yeah. She's downloading, uh, voice box app on her phone. We're going to go over here at the tree house, and I lost them.  What about this time last night? We heard them. Does that give you that option? Yeah, because we can always put that back on, I mean, or plug your phone in if we need to use it. Besides, that's Bluetooth anyway. That's Wi-Fi. Thought it was Bluetooth. Oh, I got another one back. I'm gonna go grab me a Coke.  I'll be right back. Do you need something? Grab me a Coke. Hi, Bruno. Hi, Bruno. He's staying here. So, how you doing tonight? Hope everybody's okay. I don't hear him tonight, so, yeah, I just didn't want to scare a bunch of kids. You got it? I guess you got it, so. Ah, it's time for a minute. If anything else goes wrong, we got one watching. Hi, monkey. Hi. Dear monkey, make sure the light's charged. Yeah, I have a backup. Uh-huh. Wonder what you can turn the lights on on these, on our phones. Don't give me that option. I'm saying. Oh, when you're on there? Yeah. But I got mine. Oh, it says enable flash. Oh, you got it? Yeah. I wonder what happens if I turn it around. That's right. Wait. Hang on a second. It might. Let me do this. Enable flash. There we go. You right now. See when I'm spinning around, it shuts it off. Uh-huh. And then I gotta turn it back on, so. Right. There we go. Yeah, that's pretty cool. Yeah, all right. I think 10 years. I should do a 10-year anniversary thing. Pretty sure I'm coming up on 10 years this year. I think it was 2010. I'm not. I'll have to check. I think I'm pretty close to 10 years. I have to do something special for now. I'll finish this one. We'll take a stroll through the woods. I'll spin the camera around so you guys can see the house. I think it's haunted? No. No? You think this house is haunted?  It's the land. Cafe. Yeah, I think so. Because all the, well, there's what, two seminal waters around here. I mean, they passed right through here to go to Dade and there to Dade Battlefield, you know? And this house, the Cinder Block. A lot of concrete here, the driveways, sidewalk, uh, you know, sand. Yeah. Yeah, good conductors of energy. So, you did get you out? Yeah. Kicking on to it real quick. Kicking on to it real quick. No, don't worry about it. There's some traffic noise, but not like usual. It's usually real hard to pull out down there too. Usually, I got to sit there and wait five minutes to get to pull out and ran to the store today and followed this a little while ago. She wanted ice cream. I got some popsicles and it pretty much pulled right out, huh? Streets are dead. Yeah. None for anybody to do. I had pretty much to show how many people eat at restaurants and go to bars. We've got, that's all we've got around here is restaurants and bars. Yeah. Party time, huh? Yeah. Once they retire, it's time to party, I guess. That's all right. We're gonna hit the open road. Hit the superflabs and be gone, huh? Positive, positive thinking. The police gives me the willies. What was that on it? Okay, I just asked. Sorry. Getting like a rustle. Just ask what that was. Okay. Armandillo? I lost a viewer. I think I'm scared. He's gonna move or unless somebody shows up on here. Well, I think you gotta wait a little longer. Like, I think a lot of them wait until nine in the morning. I don't know why. It's almost nine now. Yeah. It's my life's dream, you know? Police creeps me out, though. You should go over by yourself sometime. That's really interesting. No, thank you. Let's come if we should go over to the tree house. Anybody there? Anybody there? Anybody there? Should we go over to the tree house?  That's very strange. Almost nine. Well, we got one back. That's freaking creepy. I keep pushing the camera in. Oh, okay. Is that what it said? It's low real good. Maybe he's the one flattening our tire. I don't know. Something. There's several times a day not one car went fast. Fire up the camera, buddy decides let's go do something and drive down this street. They bear monkey's house. I think he said I'm at the tree house. You're at the tree house. She talks into that. What did it say? You're at the tree house. She's talking into it again. She talks into the phone. They communicate through the phone, honey. He's not in there. We're talking into it. Did you get any toilet paper? That's disrespectful. That's someone dead. We're talking to a Toyota dead guy. Well, it ain't Jerry. He drove a Ford's. Are you walking in the flesh? He's walking in the flesh. Are you walking in the flesh? Instead of us walking in the flesh. Spear in the flesh because flesh. Well, we're not in our birthday series. We got clothes on. No, I mean we're people. We've got flesh. They have spirit. They don't have flesh anymore. No, we don't have to have a bath anymore either, then I guess. Huh?   That's true. Huh? Something gets mad at us tonight, dammit. And we're not even a full moon. We've got a crescent moon. Crescent moon. I don't know if they can see that. Well, nobody's watching anyways. I keep saying nobody can see that. Maybe everybody's sick. God, I hope not. Me too. I love my viewers. Love you guys. There you go. I don't let anybody know. Sometimes I send out personal messages via messenger. But a lot of times they ask. This is weird. First time I ever went live my life in this. I don't know. It's almost night. Well, it's night in here. Where are you? Well, should we uh, should we go over to the tree house? Do we have enough? We got one. Who is it? Anybody we know? I don't know. Anybody talking? No. Did that just say you wussies? So what that just said? What are you wussies? Owl? Why are you over there? One keeps popping in and out, so. Maybe they're having trouble. Because there is a lot of people on computers right now. Well, we're not having a problem and we're using your phone. Stay tuned. Don't get them spirits mad. Another spirit's around here. Very quiet. There's no tree frogs. Is there supposed to be a star incoming? No. I don't know where of. It's just down on the trip. A couple warm minutes and we don't get anybody. I'm sure there could be a lot of other people doing live streams too. Oh yeah, because they can't go anywhere. Because they can't go anywhere. So they want to make it up by doing live streams at night. Taking away from the little guy once again. Of course, that's all you listen to and talk about. You got to give it a break. Well, I was in somebody's home when I had it. I understand that. I mean. Well, I could have it too then. Yeah. But you can't let it run your life. If any of people have more of it. So are they just not getting any symptoms? Because they're carrying it? I don't know. Are we carrying it? Maybe. Okay, nobody's going to die. See, that's what's so much because that's all you think about. You got to just, you know, if it happens, it happens. You know, I don't want to do it. Damn. I mean, what are you going to do? Sit and worry about it. Get all serves and, you know, you can't do that. I feel like being a person. Would you rather be dead? No. Okay. Well, look on the bright side. We're still alive. There's people behind me because of that. People's loved ones are dying. You know, so we're kind of lucky. Well, we got one back. Got one back out demon. I think that was a bullfrog. There's one animal lurking tonight. Just eerily quiet. I know it's why it's eerie.  Well, I'll give it about three more minutes and I'll take this one clear down, too. 1986 Toyota Supra. What do you want with it? What are you going to do with that? How do you fix it up? In 86. Yeah. Toyota Supra. Yeah. Fix it up for what? To drive. What are we going to haul our camper with? What's that joy ride? I can't forget, but when we get one, maybe we'll just get a tiny motor on. No, we ain't going to pull it. The only bad thing about that is the campsite, if we got good somewhere, gets on. Ah, we've got an idea. We'll get a scooter to take with us and then we can scoot, scoot on the scooter to the store out there in the campsite or something. That would be fun. And then if we were in tight spots or something, we'd take the scooter up in the mountains and stuff. Wouldn't that be fun? Or down the canyon? You could tow a bar of the truck, tow the truck behind it. Pull a lot of gas though, don't it? A lot of gas pulling the camper, too. Oh, I feel that you need to have something. I think a scooter would be perfect. If it would be broke down, at least you could take the scooter to go get help or whatever. And push it out in the desert. You got a mechanic, we'll be all right. But if we didn't have any gas, or if you had to have a part, then you wouldn't get it. Usually when you're getting out in the desert, there's signs last stop for gas. You know, apps or whatever. Just have to be prepared. Got one back. But I mean the little mini camper to be safe, I think. Got a vintage one. Yeah, got one on my little Toyota camper. My aunt had one though. It blew up though. Little camper. It was cute. Who had it? My aunt Linda. They use it a lot. She doesn't know it blew up. How did it blow up? It had engine issues. It blew up. And how does a camper blow up? So it's like an RV? Yeah, it's a little camper. Just a mini, it's like taking a little camper and boating on the back of your truck is really, but yeah. I've heard of the find anymore, the full-defined vintage one like that. Good sheep. Jesus, you scared that a lot of me.  Tellin' me. Don't be screamin' over there. Well, I get scared too. I don't scream. When I scream, I'm really scared. Run. That one time I ran. You can't run. I'm scared.   I do not run you down. That one night, she did. She was like, I'm okay. We got two attractions. Welcome to Shiver 1000. Get ready to cross the road and go to the treehouse. Nancy's on. Hi, Nancy. She's takin' a drink of water, but she is waving. Hey, Nancy. Oh, you two. Die behind us. She was at her layout playing. Playing, yeah. Playing. She was on playing. Playing. Oh, she was playing her train. Playing with her little, oh, her steam train. Oh, cool. Did she have any problems with it? No, she's playing with it. Playing with my little steamer train. Makes noise and everything. Oh, they're on lockdown. Yeah.  Seattle's really bad. Yeah, I heard Seattle was getting bad. Well, I shoulda do. They go to, I have been. I did go to the store.  But it don't matter what I do, you can catch it. Right. At least I'm not galley-happy. Galley's been galley-happyin' around. Yeah, she did an hour inside time for her layout. Well, that's good. Yeah.  And I do little things around here, too. She may actually get those mountains pain. I can't wait to see the mountains. So, make sure you let us know. Well, just in case we don't get notified, I want to see them. Yeah. So you can stay busy. Oh, she's got plenty of ideas. You get in them trains, man. I mean, there's no limit. Right. Yeah, there's just always, you're never done. You're never done now.  Okay, she says she'll do videos. A helicopter. Yeah. One good thing, they can't land here.  Too many trees here. They'd have to land up at the park in that field. Yeah, they could do it there. I see a helicopter going down. I'm going that way. Unless you're in a granny. Just run me out the street and let me go. Right down the hill as far as I can ride it. You're funny.  Because we're a ways away from people. Well, I did go to the store earlier, but there wasn't that many people.  So twice a week now. Twice a week now. Was three times. That was hard, but they did minimize. Yeah. But so, you know, other than that, I'm pretty well stuck in here. I'm kind of self quarantined on myself or whatever. Because they said, anybody with heart lung issues, anybody over 60, you know, they was asking to try to what's to call, I can't remember nothing. Yeah. You don't have to like stay inside. Like you can be outside, but they don't, you know, to not to be around people. So I haven't been other than, like I said, today I did. We did go up to the store. We had gone about 15 minutes. But you can't get it with. Yeah, but I still don't want to be in a chance, you know. But it has to be five minutes or 10 minutes. So yeah, I have been in the house. Well, this past, this past week or last week, I couldn't talk. Yeah, I had the energy. Last week, I think it was. For what? Yeah, for whatever reason. I had some kind of energy. I just, there's only a couple of days and then I got back, yellow Bruno, not her. Yeah. That kicked him back in again. Cause he took off running after an armadillo and he was heading for the street because it scared me. You know, he'd come right back, but then I was like the military there. They can't go outside or nothing. They have to have permission. Okay. I hear something over here. It's an armadillo. I just see. It's an armadillo. Okay. So the monkeys put her on the porch and things make a lot of noise, huh? Yeah. Yeah, a couple of them. That was crazy. She's laughing because you were using her hot spot.  So I'm like, come over. She's like, oh, I turned around here. Up there by the door. Get ready to shag. Oh yeah. Okay. So we'll stick with me. Stop moving around so much. She said, stop moving around so much. We're buffering. You're not going to get bit. We've got to at least make it to the tree house. Jesus. So we've got to make it at least to the tree house. What do you think yellow? See, there it is right there. Huh? Don't worry. The man won't get you. This place creeps me out every time I'm over here. That's right over there. House over there. We got bored. Shoot. That's an owl. First, make sure there's nothing in there. It's the owls. Does she hear them? Is a chair up there? Yeah, the chair's up here. Are you? That's a monkey. Yeah. There's a monkey or there are two with the owls. Will they attack? What? A monkey? I don't know. I doubt it. I'm like down here and you're up there. Despite. Who? The monkey. The monkey's not going to put the chair up here. Well, we ain't going to be up here alone. Nope. Browns over there. Dad, please. You did it. I did not. You did it. I didn't do it. Candy. So they've got to be kids. Yeah. There's my kids up here. Yeah. Yes. All right, let's do this. You ready? Are you? Are you going to have a hot talk? Let's talk. Is there anybody here like us right now? What did it say? I don't know. I wish it was the cord. Do they see us? They see us. I don't know, man. I didn't ask them. I got the lights off. And you keep moving that thing around. So. Well, freaking out. Is there anybody here with us right now? Remember, this is just an app on our phones. So take a look at the green salt. Do I tell you? Tell me what? Man spirit chill. What? Now there's a given question we can ask. Overhead. What? He's overhead. Over who's head? I didn't hear nothing. I don't like sitting here like that. You know, I didn't hear nothing. He said be quiet. I just don't know the words like maybe. Maybe if we'd be quiet we'd hear it. You're moving around. I can't keep your focus. I think you came out. What's your name?  Hmm?  Let me see if I can hear me. You know, she had to spit it out already. I'm angry. Yeah, so it's like. Turn that on. Like a gunshot. No. That's what it sounded like. I'm a hunter, I know. She said, oh my god, she must have heard it too. Think we should go?  I'm not. Where should I come in? I've got to do a 3 a.m. challenge up here tonight. Go right ahead. I won't be behind yet. Well, no, that's the challenge to be by myself. War. It's hot in here. Yeah. It'll be great in the winter. It'll fall on me. She said, so this is the perfect place to put that creepy dough in. True. I should bring the dough up here at 3 a.m. Something do a live stream. What kind of camera on it? And just leave it up here and watch it on from this house. Something I'm gonna do that. I don't have any water as cameras. Or I can just bring it up here with me and film it with the camera over in that corner and I'll sit in this corner right there. I kick it on one more time. Is there somebody here with us right now? She needs to see that.  Oh, yeah. 3 a.m. by myself and filming. Yeah. Anybody here? Can you tell me your name? Do you live in the tree house? That's about it. What do you think? Do you like to play in the tree house? The tree house is maybe not a thing. Do you see kids playing in the tree house? Do you live close by here? Oh, that's good to question. Can you just touch the back of my head? I can touch you. What does that say? Freaking me out from the camera. Can you speak louder, please? Careful, you're 10 feet up. You wanna go first or do you want me? Well, we had a good armabillo scare. You'd like to go over and check it out. But you wouldn't come with me. You didn't want to come with me this time. I'm scared of that car unless he runs off to her. This is why we do what we do, folks.  You make me go first so I can clear out the cobwebs for you. Parked straight there, didn't you? Yeah. Look at that. I'm turning right on. Dear. Nervy. For a second. I was a little nervous there. I have a creepy tree house. Yeah, it's creepy. All right. It shakes. What a tree house. What do you call it? Well, it's not mounted in trees. It's not a deer house. Say. I mean, it's entry. It's like a clubhouse, really, right? Yeah. Yeah. But it's entries, but it's not mounted in a tree like a tree house, per se. It's, you know. It's cool. But it's still cool. It's hot up there, though. Where's me alto? Really, really hot. Do the 3am challenge. How about next weekend? Up to you. I'll take the bell up there. Have a good time. What do you think? Have a good one. No, it's, of course not. That's why it's a challenge. I know. I'm going by yourself. 30 minutes alone in a tree house. With the doll. With the doll. Next Saturday? If you want, yeah. We still need to go to your parent's house. We need to investigate that. I like to go up there and spend the night, though. You want to go up there next weekend? Yeah, we could spend the night. There's some creepy stuff up there at my mom's house. That would be fine monkey.  I know when to bail. I heard somebody talking, too. But I think it was a neighbor over there. Because you can see their house from the tree house. They might have seen lights over there. They might have. That's why it's like, well, maybe we should go before they call a cops or something. Right across the street, so. I just tell them, look, we're live streaming. We're doing a spooky one for YouTube. No, if you want, we can walk up down the street there in the middle of town. Yes, we'll do one of the two next weekend, for sure. Yeah, we'll try to do one of the two. Because her mom and dad's house is supposed to be haunted. Yeah, my mom. You can turn around here and you can watch your eyes. My mother sees a lady and she goes into the kitchen and she walks back and forth in the kitchen. And she also, she has woken up and seen her standing at her end of her bed. But she doesn't go no further in the house. She doesn't go in the living room. She doesn't wander any further. And in the kitchen. I just see an orb fly past you. Yeah. Cool, you can see our lights from the video cameras. Yeah. Yeah, so does she say what she's wearing? No, no. Looking back and forth, she's seen her do the dishes. Like thinking she's doing dishes. Really? But no dishes are being moved. No.  She says she's still, I don't know if my glasses, still have ghost in my kitchen that I like to cook. Yeah. Remember that, she's telling us about that. Yeah. That's cool. Yeah. Well, I mean, that's what she does basically. And I thought she, she just stays in the kitchen a lot. And every once in a while, my mom will see her at the end of her bed. Looking at her. She don't say anything. She don't do anything. She just stands there. She gets in there and plays with the pots and pans. Wow, it's a guy ghost. We get out west. We'll have to head up in the northern section. Huh. Yeah. Go up to Washington. I'll go to Seattle. Yeah. Yeah, we'll go. That boy's wanting to go there. Swing a pass there. Yep. I'm gonna go to Colorado too. Yeah, Colorado. Hey, so there we go. Yep. There we go. One night he... Scary adventure. Knock out the... One night he knocked out the... I can't see. My glasses is over there. One night he knocked out the pans from the cupboard.   Were you scared? That's freaky. That would freak me out. I don't know. I don't know if I could blow there.  Yeah, but still, you know, that's about it. It's an unseen force moving stuff. I just seen a flashlight behind you. Over the grudge. Oh, it might have been your glasses. Okay. She's just putting them on your head. Yeah, that's pretty interesting though. Mm-hmm. I'm gonna wave today, but... All the parts are closed. Yeah. The park I want to go to is really cool looking. That'd be a really good video. I wasn't scared because I am pretty used to him. I told him that if he did it again, he would not be allowed in here. Okay. Well, I like that. At least you told him.  And a lot of times that'll calm it down. My mother also sees people at the nursing home. Yeah. My mother can see people. Yeah, she's always been like that. Yeah. Yeah. And my mother would make it better for anything. She really sees these people. Yeah. She had one that was sitting on her bed and... Yeah, she sees them. She's been able to do it for a long time. Yeah. If I was a kid, I could, but not as much now. I wonder if she's ever seen anything in here, but didn't want to tell us. What, in here? Yeah. I don't think so. No, she would have told me. You sure? Yeah. Yeah, I don't think she's seen anything. Well, there's something around here. I don't think the house itself is haunted, but there is something around here. Yeah, I think there's something on the land, like you say, that walks around in here. I remember when we first got together, when we was missing, when I was living with my sisters.  Yeah. I said, is there a house on it? You said, I don't think so, but I hear stuff. I'm like, well, like what kind of stuff? I don't know, maybe it's animals. I was like, in the house? You're like, I hope not. I would wake up two, three o'clock in the morning, and then I couldn't go back to sleep. I remember a couple of times you messaged me. I'm like, what are you doing still? Wait, you said, well, I could ask you that. Well, I was watching YouTube. I'm up late anyway. It was like four o'clock in the morning. I knew she had work. That's when she was working like all day, every day. And she said she was hearing stuff. And it made her feel better to talk to me. Yeah, I didn't sleep much in those days. But I don't think anyone's ever died in this house. I don't think it's the house itself. I don't, I really don't. It could be your bed. It was a, I got it lying from a girl who moved to Orlando. And she had stuff here in Ocala in a, you know, storage place. And it was her grandmother's bed. And she used to use it, but she put it in storage when she moved. And she just wanted to sell it right of it. Then her grandma buy it new. Yeah. And it was from what, 74? Yeah, it was something. Remember, I got the, I got the, the date off the back. Remember when I was working on that. So it's all furniture. So yeah, it's fairly old.  I was born in 69. So I'm 51. So she didn't say her grandma died in the bed or anything. Well, she's not going to tell you if she's wanting to sell it. But she could have just been attached to it. Oh, yeah. We watched TV. You hear that? That was a good shot.  And, you know, I do a lot of work on the computer. So, you know, she comes in with me. And unless we're cooking or something, should be. That's not Bruno. That's the neighbor's dog. But I heard that gunshot. I heard it earlier over there. Wasn't that far away? I mean, who's shooting this time of night and why? I mean, out in the country, you can see it because we used to do that all the time. One, two o'clock in the morning, we'd be out shooting guns. But hell, we was out in the middle of nowhere. You know, we're on, we're on the outskirts of it. Regular. I'm going to be in the house and then we'll chit-chat some more, if you want. Second, guys. I don't know, you missed the good one. You coming up with me, Bruno? Want to do the challenge? Let's ask if you were working. Yes. I am. Well, very slow. Yeah. Here, let me get you. I did pick up this week, first time in a while. So, I worked every day this week. I had, like, maybe two patients on one day, three on another, you know, four on another. But most of the time, I'd just been working Tuesday and Friday and making those two days full days. And that was the best. To do a patient and then drive back an hour. And sometimes it only takes less than half an hour to do a patient. It doesn't really pay, you know.  Well, I have to wear my whole outfit. I had a patient that I had to be careful with. I'm not saying they have it, but they were sick enough that they were being tested for it. So, we're waiting for the test results. But I had my gown and gloves and booties on and everything. They told, the officers told us that they won't be taking anybody that has it. But if we already have the patient, then we have to take care of that patient if they get it. So, we've been lucky so well. But technically, you can reuse. Yeah, you're just a favor. But yeah, but one of my companies doesn't have me on all week. So, I think she wanted to shut down the office. But I think it was the headquarters that was keeping everything open. And because everybody's being quarantined into their houses, it's very busy, very busy. So, it could. So, we'll see. I just want to do it at a time. Hey, we can turn the lights down. There goes what's in here. Yeah. Want to? Come on. All right, she says. So, it's quiet, though. Yes, ma'am. Yes, hon. Go ahead. No, go ahead. No, fine. Shabery, you be extra careful. You hear me? Yeah. Yeah, like I said, I shouldn't went to the store today, but I just had to get out for a few minutes. I have to get out. And I've been out all week. Keeping for the drive. I mean, just we're thinking about taking a drive tomorrow, kind of like out in the country. You know, doing a little vlogging just to get out. But don't want to be around a lot of people because you never know who has it. You know, so. No, in all the parks and they got most of the beaches here, all closed now, finally. But there are like Daytona Beach. I don't know if they closed it, but what I read, they've closed ramps. Well, they did that last week. Yeah, they haven't completely closed the beach in Daytona, though, but like Miami area, Dake County and stuff like that's all closed. Cocoa Beach is closed now, so it's getting bad. I'm getting grocery delivery. My doctor told me no going out for anything. Yeah, that's a good idea. Yeah, if you can get it, that's the best way to go. You're too compromised here. You could get it very easily. So now. And all reason we're going to chiropractors because it's small, it's a family thing. So, you know, and they've even cut down a little bit. So we go early in the morning. We don't go in the afternoon. Yeah, they're only having three days a week. Yeah, so they're, we're like one of the first patients in there in the morning. So we're in and out pretty good. Yeah. They do pretty good for me. But that was it. Every time we walk in till the time we walk out, it's less than a half an hour, usually. That's counting everything. And my mom's sister, her son, and their family were quarantined because their son got very sick. He had high temperatures and stuff and they were tested. Their test results still have not come back, but they are better. They are 100% better. So I think they just got a touch of the flu. So they're okay. Everybody's okay that I know of and our neck of the woods. Yeah. Hanging in there. Bruno's getting a lot of love and he won't know what to do. If I, yeah. Okay. Oh, he loves you being here. He loves you being here. Oh. There's Bruno. See, there he is. Say hi. There's a box session here. Okay. It'll stand up like that. It doesn't want to. Tighten the middle part. There you go. I can do this. I know. Here we go, guys. Play, people. Prop this up. Let's wait. I got a gun. Prop this. Is there anybody in this house right now by the camera more? Yeah. So I'm trying to get it over by the camera more. I really can't. He's just fine. Boy, you can't see the needle. Ah, he came there a little bit. What are you doing? What? Just in case.   That one's not paranormal, guys. That was just say bear. Well, let me take it off of this. Come on, guys. Bear with me. I'm going to get this heavy light off of it. So I get screwed on the way. I can just thing all cobbled up. It's crazy. Now it shouldn't fall unless I knock it over again. Something happened. Oh. I flipped the camera around. Okay. What's my name? What's your father? My father's buckled brief. I'm the son of the room Pokemon. My dad's dad. Half for me. Where did you return it? Okay, I'm just saying it keeps going. Get off at something and if so, why? Something move or knock. I understand you. I don't know about where are you. Bear, it's here. Yeah, it did last night, too. Did you turn on the back light? It's a motion detection light. I didn't kick it on. I said make something move. Did you make the light turn on? It was on the door. I understand you. I have low tone to the ground. Maybe it wasn't going to do it. Do you like puppy? His name is Bruno. She said why are our friend Nancy wants to know why are you here? Do you have an attachment to the house?  It's out of focus. Yeah. You see that? Yeah. What did she say? Keeps going out of focus. And it's on the tripod. Is there something we can do to help you? How can we help you? Who are you? Are you tired? Are you here because you're not at peace? Yes, I did. I don't want to focus again. I gotta move this to get at the focus. I don't want to focus now. You're just desperate? Why are you desperate? Do you have some unfinished business before you can be at peace? And they slow motion? I saw that. He was like, ah, got one the other night too. That's a bad, because it's no rain. Did that say 37? Did you say 37? And if so, why are you throwing out a number? We are interested to understand that. She might have talked. Had to buff. Is that how old you were when you died? Did you die here in Citrus County in 1937? What happened to you? That comes up a lot on this thing. I don't know if there's any significance or just in the database. Did you live nearby here? You can get them when you play that. Well, I can slow them down. Yeah, I seem to work better for whatever reason. All right, we're going to let you rest, okay? Can you say goodbye? Wish you went away.  We're going to let you rest now. Bye-bye. Can you say goodbye? Jeez. Rubbed it against my leg. Oh my god. Bye. She said bye, spirit. We're friends of bye. We're going to let you rest now. Interesting, huh? Nice talking to you, spirit. Interesting. From off the ground. I think we're going to call tonight. Yep. Wow, he's mad about something.  Well, I don't know if it's evil, but upset. Yeah. Yeah. So, 1937. Do some research. Maybe we can find something. Okay, you two, take care. All right, it's good. You too, Nancy. Yeah, be safe. It's good talking to you. Keep in touch. Let us know how you're doing, okay? Okay, we will. You do the same and keep us posted on your layout. And we'll do something next Saturday. I don't know if I'll be over there or we'll go to my parents' house. All together. Yeah, we'll do something. All right, bye, Nancy. Bye.