As we've heard, you're arguing that Donald Trump with thought bubbles and mistrust of alliances and lack of a clear foreign policy is likely to have a greater impact on our region than elsewhere. So perhaps you could tell us why you think that's the case. Sure. Let me start, Joan. Thank you for that. By congratulating Jonathan and Maury, this is a publication that we needed and so thank you very much for providing us with that and we really wish it every success possible. So I think if you look objectively at our region, at the Asian region, it's reliance on American power to keep the peace, to hold the ring has been much proportionally greater than pretty much any other region. The Asian region combines a number of attributes and the main ones really are the enormous power and potential power of the states here. You could argue that there are other regions in the world where some of the rivalries run just as deep, if not deeper, but the states aren't as big and powerful as they are here. Secondly, ancient rivalries and animosities run very deep in this part of the world. It wouldn't take much for some very significant powers in this region, many of them nuclear armed, some of them potentially nuclear armed to start going at each other in fairly serious ways. The last one is that institutions have never mattered much in this part of the world, unlike in Europe where NATO, the EU, the United Nations are taken very seriously and the rules of the road that are set down are taken very seriously. In Asia the command power of the state is much more important than external obligations to rules or institutions. So those three things mean that this is a very, very conflict prone region potentially and what has kept it from being conflict prone has been the overwhelming, particularly maritime power of the United States and the willingness of most countries in this region to accept that it's simply not worth taking each other on, that they were better off simply becoming prosperous. And secondly, up until probably the turn of the century, the unwillingness of serious powers in this part of the world to challenge US supremacy. And I would argue that that is the condition that has most changed. Because we've already pointed out that the dynamics of this region is different to see. But in your article as Jonathan has indicated, you also suggest that the way in which these countries in the Asian region perceive power is different from how we imagine, therefore their response to Trump may be different to ours. So can you expand on that a little bit? Yeah, if I can be an amateur historian, Joan. I mean, it's one of my pet theories that Westerners tend to see history as a straight line phenomena of human affairs just get better and better and better and humans get more and more sophisticated, whereas I think most Asian traditions tend to see history in a much more cyclical way of the rise and fall of power, the rise and fall of empires. And I think that one of the mistakes we make is that we just assume that they see history and progress in international affairs in the same way we do. I think one of the things we've got to do in this country is realise that they see these things in very different ways. We look at American power, I think, as simply the culmination of a tradition of advancing democracy and liberalism and market forces and everything else. That's why we become so outraged when we perceive American power being misused. I think that's less the case in our region. I think American power is seen in much more pragmatic, dispassionate ways. America has simply, or has been the latest of millennia of the rise and fall of powers, and American power is receding in the region, Chinese power is rising, and that is simply factored into a very cyclical view of history. Thank you. Huge topics there, but we are going to move on to the second paper for the moment. As we've heard, this paper will suggest that there is a quite serious prospect of war as a result of the crisis surrounding North Korea, or at least a realistic prospect of war. I think you suggest that Trump's threats, where they sound a bit like the school yard, are genuine. I wonder if you'd like to tell us, what do you think might be President Trump's motivation for so clearly, at least in terms of rhetoric raising the stakes? And whether this might have something to do with domestic politics, or just tell us more about what you think President Trump's possible objectives. Well, let me start by saying I share your concern, and Jonathan's expressed concern about the dreary outlook that we outlined in the paper, and I had hoped that by the time that article came to print that things would have changed. Over the last couple of weeks, we've seen this cheerleading team from North Korea and South Korea, the Delphic smile of Kim Jong-un's sister, the first of the Kim family to be South of the demilitarized zone in the last 25 years, and I thought, well maybe that might be a breakthrough. I had a chance to reread the article that Kim and I did together right before coming out here, and I'm alarmed to say that it holds up too well. Some things you want to change, but unfortunately the underlying dynamics there, let's go to the root of your question. I've spent the better part of 30 years working on North Korea, and during that time I've become quite accustomed to North Korean behavior, and an alarming trajectory inside North Korea itself, and so I don't want to suggest for a second that there isn't something that the entire world community should be deeply concerned about in terms of the increasing range of North Korea's missiles and their nuclear capabilities. Those are a challenge for the entire world, but I think what was at the core of our article was not that trend, which has been relatively trackable for 30 years, but rather the unpredictability of the U.S. response to that trend. And in the decades that I've been working on this issue, I have always been able to rely on the core assumption that whatever mistakes they might make elsewhere, that on the Korean Peninsula the United States would be the adult in the room, that they would have a very clear de-escutory strategy off-ramps to avoid any escalation in that process, that they would carefully factor in to account the interests of our allies in the region, as well as the potential impact of any conflict on allies in the region, and the wishes of our allies in the region. I hope all those things remain true. I cannot say with great confidence that they do, and I can say with relative confidence that they are not primary considerations in the mind of the United States President at this time. And so as to what's driving him particularly, he was told from the very outset in the briefings, the very few that he actually paid attention to from President Obama that this was going to be a major problem, and that was based on that known trajectory of the North Korean programs. He approached it in a typical way with a tweet in January of 2017 that said, this will not happen, period. Unfortunately, it has happened. And so the response to that is one in which there is a real concern about how measured the U.S. response will be, how coordinated the U.S. response will be, and an apparent growing consensus within the White House of the need for some type of a preventive, preemptive war. And it is that growing consensus in that community, I think, that really drove the alarm that Kim and I felt and focused on. Now what we didn't address because it seems to delve into the conspiratorial is domestic politics. It's the classic wag the dog scenario, which you don't want to go into the realm of Hollywood movies. But in an environment now where there is a U.S. president who's coming under increasing pressure and anybody who's followed domestic politics in the U.S. for the last several months and looks ahead at what the Mueller investigation is doing with Russia, one can anticipate that pressure will only increase. You don't have to be overly conspiratorial to think that there will be at least a temptation for action, which was, again, justified on its own rights from a U.S. America First perspective to be tied into domestic politics. So that's sort of a concern for sir. So Kim, if that doomsday scenario eventuates, what would be the implications for Australia? How might we, our government positions itself, if the conflict were pushed to the point of actual armed conflict? Well, how the government positioned itself would be the least of our problems. Were the calculations that many in the American military now have that they could do either a disarming first strike or a register, they don't use the term bloody nose, it's a journalist, but an exemplary demonstration say against a test that it would not break out into a general exchange on the Korean Peninsula ultimately involving nuclear weapons. And while it's absolutely certain Kim does not have nuclear weapons capable of hitting the United States, he probably does in relation to Japan, South Korea and maybe Guam. So these, if you didn't actually get everything and that seven or eight of these things were cut loose, we would cease to have viable trading partners. And the effect of that on our economy and the rest of it would be as nothing compared with whatever element of armed force we managed to commit. I don't actually think commitment's a big issue for us in the sense that the Americans and the South Koreans have exercised this till hell froze over which happened a few weeks ago and the, or seems to be happening in Pyeongchang, but the effect, I can only think of one element of our order of battle that might in any ways be useful to them and I won't go into that but we'll talk about it later. So I don't expect that anything other than support would be sought from us but the consequence of the calculation of being wrong would be enormous. I know nothing really about Korea but I got alarmed enough about it when I was in Washington towards the end of last year. I noted the fact that I was in the same centre as probably the scholar amongst the top half dozen in the world on North Korea in Gordon and so I went through my particular take on the American military and political elements I met when I was there and it had been preceded by a debate I had in another forum with a U.S. general, very senior ex-U.S. general in which he argued that the United States was already mobilising and that this would come to pass and in which I argued the other way and said that Trump wouldn't have the bottle for it. When I eventually got to Washington I found it was true. The United States was mobilising forward positioning of munitions, putting themselves in a situation where if a conflict emerged they'd be likely to be ready for it and therefore one needed to take it all seriously and look more deeply. There's three characters really in the American administration are critical here. One, McMaster, who's the principal adviser on strategic matters in the White House. The other, Dunford, who is chairman of the Joint Chiefs and Mattis, who is the Secretary of Defence. Of the three of them you'd say that McMaster and Dunford leant heavily towards the possibility of an outbreak. If it was necessary to their minds, in the case of Mattis exactly the opposite that Mattis has determined to get a position developed that permits the U.S. to do that but he himself is desperate that there should be a conclusion because while he has assured the President that he has a plan that would minimise the possibility of damage in South Korea and Japan he probably thinks that it might not work and the consequence of that would be devastating. So Gordon came on board and that's it. Shades of August 1914 sort of hover around us miscalculations and inability to control the logic of the forces you set in train. But over to Andrew now and your paper has a slightly different focus but it talks about Australia's defence position and particularly the possibilities of self-reliance and how we should be positioning ourselves particularly in terms of some of the President Trump's statements about allies having to do more to look after their own defence. Perhaps you can tell us really what your conclusions about the prospects of self-reliance are. We've already heard they know. You can say more on that subject. There are motions of self-reliance that need unpacking there. The Trump administration has been lecturing its European allies in particular that he wants them to be more capable, wants them to spend more. That doesn't necessarily mean that he wants them to develop their own internal defence sectors and in fact I think he'd be quite delighted if they spent more on more American equipment. I think that would be win-win from Washington's point of view. And Australia has largely escaped any of that sort of criticism largely because A, we are spending more. We've been on an upwards trajectory for about the last four years now and we're about to take off on a very much steeper one. And secondly we do buy a lot of American equipment. But the sort of self-reliance that I think that Washington is looking for is they want coalition partners and allies who can turn up to the fight and provide for themselves. Somebody who turns up, runs up the flag and then says where's the American intelligence support? Where's the American logistics support? Where are the American battlefield helicopters to move us around? And we did a little bit of that in Afghanistan. We had forces there with insufficient mobility. We had to rely on NATO or American forces. And there's a political usefulness to having coalition partners turn up but if they can turn up and look after themselves provide for themselves so much the better. How realistic is that an expectation of our defence forces that they can perform that kind of role? Well, we're patchy I think is the way I describe it but if you look at the Air Force that went to Iraq and Syria in the last few years we turned up there with our own air-to-air refuelling tankers our own airborne early warning aircraft and in fact there were days when Australian tankers and Australian control aircraft were essentially running the air war and supporting other coalition allies. So we turned up with the whole package and when you turn up with those assets that other people can use it's like a multiplier effect. So you become a very valuable ally indeed. So as I said it's patchy. I think there are parts of the Australian force structure where we would still rely on the support of others but there are elements where we can pretty much do it ourselves. What we can't do and what was the main thrust of my piece is design, build and support all of the equipment with Australian indigenous industrial resources. A country the size of ours with the natural advantages we have and the disadvantages we have in an economic sense simply doesn't have the economy of scale to do those things and if you look at Europe, most European countries don't either the trend in the last 20 years has been towards consolidation. Europe as a whole now produces a combat aircraft rather than Germany, France, Italy, Britain all producing their own they produce them in consortium. Has the British wing fallen off perhaps? Well, I'd like to now just give the panel a few minutes just to sort of bounce off each other's ideas. I don't know if any of you would like to respond to it. Yeah, look I might ask Kim and Gordon a question about the Trump foreign policy. I mean you went through in great detail Kim about who's in charge and everything. One of the things that I was in Washington a couple of weeks ago one of the metaphors that one of the people used to describe what was going on was that Washington is actually two governments at war with each other. That you've got the traditional administration, the people on the ground in the Pentagon in the State Department in the intelligence community who are keeping things more or less moving along on dependable tracks and then you've got the White House soap opera and I wonder if you both could kind of reflect on who's winning and who's losing and what would be the scenario of that doomsday or that bad thing happening. What is the capacity of the underlying Washington to resist? Let me start off with this because it's a really important question. Shortly after the inauguration probably two months in I wrote a short article which I entitled Follow the People because I having lived through 25 years in Washington and seen many transitions was very much focused on who ran what office because the U.S. system is very different than Australia. In Australia, again, given a parliamentary system and giving remarkably skilled and qualified bureaucracies that kind of carry forward the policy, whether it's a change of government or not there will be some changes of emphasis largely driven by the government, so to speak. Whereas in the United States, we have remarkably talented bureaucrats but they're all structured in such a way as to follow the lead from politically-affointed officials. So normally in a normal administration some 4,000 politically-affointed officials that come into a position of those approximately 565 or so are senior officials that are said to have confirmed. When I wrote the Follow the People article there had been only a handful, 20 of them confirmed. We are now over a year into this administration, assuming it's one term, a full quarter of the administration and I believe less than 200 of those 565 positions have been filled. So it's really unfair to characterize it as a war between two administrations because there isn't one other than one exception and that is the Pentagon. Because the Pentagon has one, I think many of us viewing the administration a year ago, I'll thank goodness for the adults. That has been modified from the plural to thank goodness for the adult. And those people who are interested in foreign policy, international relations, international security really put an awful lot of weight in Mattis because he has the full weight of the bureaucracy of the Pentagon behind him and that's enabled them to put out strategic documents which have been well-received in the region because they have the capability to do that. But if you look at the State Department, Commerce Department, all the others, they're very much at war with their own secretaries who have the explicit task of dismantling those organizations. So it very much is real, it exists, but one final thing that I'll point to that comes back to the topic of our paper and that really heightens my anxiety is that when you look at the people in that process, in December 9th of this year, Randy Shriver, remarkable Asia Specialist of the Great China Expertise, was finally confirmed to be the assistant secretary of Defense for East Asia and the Pacific. He now is the sole Senate-confirmed political official in the entire Trump Administration with an Asia background or Asia expertise. That's it. There's a couple of other people who have been politically appointed in relatively junior spots, but that's it. And so there really is nobody at home. So the last part of this play played out as Kim and I were writing our article. A close friend and acquaintance of both of ours, Victor Cha, a professor at Georgetown University, had been long presumed for the better part of a year to be the U.S. Ambassador to South Korea. Professor at Georgetown University had served in the Bush White House, one of only two people that I know, he and Randy Shriver, in the foreign policy Republican community who didn't sign on the never Trump letters, and so he was eligible. Well, he was knocked back, I think primarily because of his opposition to the idea of renegotiating the Korea-U.S. Retrait Agreement, but largely because of his opposition to the sad-bloody-nose approach. And so if you look at, again, across the entire political spectrum, and even if you look at just at Republicans, you'll find a widespread consensus of the risks associated with a preventative or preemptive attack on North Korea. And yet those people are not in the administration. Kim, do you want to comment on what Andrew said about Australia's capacity in defense terms? Well, what he said about the situation in the Iraq-Syriac conflict, now I'm absolutely right, we took all our stuff to the party. What used to infuriate me as ambassador is we had the capacity to do that in Afghanistan as well, and we'd damned if we'd do it. And so it wasn't an absence of kit that meant that we couldn't support our people in country with choppers to move them around and were so dependent on American and other enablers, that was our choice. And the thing that Obama loved about us is that we would come to the party with a full capability that we were not a flag. And I remember Tony Abbott, I was petrified when he turned up in D.C. because he's the anti-Obama. And I saw the briefing books that came out of DFAT and Prime Ministers, I was even more worried because I thought that Obama was going to give him a big workout. And so I spent a night writing weasel words to give the Prime Minister to use and what I thought would be a full court press on him.  And he said, fine. And we get over there and you see it's the full court press. Generally it's just the President, Secretary of State and the National Security Advisor. And then a few second line individuals. It was the President, the Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of State, United States Trade Representative, National Security Advisor. And he knew that we're about to be done over. And Obama begins an immensely erudite, charming, beautiful five minutes. And you could see the little hooks in each of things he said that you knew he was going to take up from global warming onwards. And he sort of said, oh God, this is going to be awful because normally you sit next to a Minister and you keep writing while the other side's talking and keeps pushing notes across in front of him or her. You can't do that in the Oval Office. It's out of your control and reach. And then Obama finishes and he says to Abbott, is there anything you want to say, Tony, before we get into the detail of this discussion? And Abbott responds and he says, yes, yes, Barack, there is. Most people come here with a list of complaints. I've got no complaints about you. Or they come here with a list of things that they want. I don't want anything from you. I just want you to know that I think you're about to get into a lot of trouble in the Middle East. And when you do, we will be there in numbers. And there was a sort of, ah, back in the room when he came out and said that. It's one of the giant falsehoods of reporting on the Australian-American relationship, that the Americans initiate and demand things of us and we respond. My experience had only ever happened once. Mostly it's the other way around. And until there's a settled agreement, the Americans will never write your letter because if you're going to say no, they won't write. And this was, but it was what Obama valued of us that we could do what Andrew said.


Hello, welcome to yet another session of our NPTEL on non-linear and adaptive control. I am Srikanth Sukumar from Systems and Control IIT, Bombay. We are now well into the third week of our course on non-need adaptive control and we are already well underway into learning the concepts that will help us analyze autonomous algorithms that drive systems such as what we see in our background. So without delay any further, let me sort of recap for us what we were looking at until last week. So last time we sort of tried to complete this example of a system which is a classical example by Masera, which is solved in the book by VPS Arvind. And for this particular system we show that it is stable, but it is not uniformly stable. So this is a rather interesting sort of system and we did a little bit of nice bit of work and analysis in order to try to see what kind of choice of delta must one make in order to remove the dependence on the initial time. And what we concluded, this is sort of the highlight of last time. What we concluded was that we are required to choose the smallest possible delta out of all the deltas that we get for different initial times. And that's what we need to do in order to make delta independent of zero and obtain uniform stability. We also sort of looked at this sort of very, very briefly looked at what is this van der Paul oscillator. So what we want to do is of course complete discussing this van der Paul oscillator system in a little bit more detail today before we go ahead. So what is this van der Paul oscillator? We already said last time that this is a very, very sort of classical nonlinear oscillator system. It's also immensely popular because we want, because there are certain scenarios in which we want to construct systems which have an oscillatory model, for example, pacemakers that are used in parts of individuals who have sort of arrhythmia and other inherent issues. All right. So what we want to do here is to look at whether it's stable or uniformly stable or unstable. So this is what we want to do. And the van der Paul oscillator system is given by this equation 1.6. And here we have the handle of choosing this particular mu. We can choose this constant mu and sort of defines or changes the behavior of the van der Paul oscillator. All right. So the first thing we of course do is write this 1.6 in the standard state space form. And for this we of course choose states x and y, as always. And so this equation 1.7 is what we will analyze. The first thing to observe is that 00 is an isolated equilibrium, right? So this is an isolated equilibrium point for this system. Okay. Once we do that, if you remember what I had suggested was that we just make phase plane plots, all right? We are not going to really try to solve this because it is rather difficult to write a closed form solution for this system. Okay. So what we do is we simply make a phase plane portrait of the system. And this is what is shown in 1 and 2, figures 1 and 2. So although it says for every mu, here it is plotted for particular value of mu, the phase plane portrait. And it so happens that for any initial condition your system actually converges to this sort of a limit cycle. You know this thing that you see here. This is the oscillatory behavior of the system if you may. Okay. For any oscillator the behavior is always such that it follows some sort of a periodic limit cycle at the end. Okay. There is a periodic limit set. And this is called limit cycle. Okay. So we already know, well, we have not already defined it yet. But anyway, so this is called a limit cycle behavior because it is a cyclical behavior in the phase plane. Right. So this is what happens. Wherever you start, it doesn't matter where you start. You will always end up into this following this sort of a limit cycle. And this is true for most values of mu. Okay. It's true for most values of mu. So now if I want to talk about stability of the origin, what do I require? I require that given any epsilon positive, I must be able to find a delta such that if initial conditions are within delta, then my solution lies within an epsilon ball of the equilibrium. Right. Now, if you, now we stated very carefully here, we say that if you choose an epsilon which is smaller than the sort of the radius of the limit cycle. Okay. And this is given by an example here. Right. So the limit cycle is this A set A, which looks something like this. And if we choose an epsilon ball, which is this guy, right, you can see that every solution is eventually converging to this cycle A. Therefore, it doesn't matter how small a delta I make out here. My solution is definitely going to get out of this epsilon ball and converge to this set A. And because of this, you know, sort of unusual behavior, the equilibrium zero zero is in fact unstable. Okay. Because I can choose any epsilon ball smaller than this, right. It has to lie inside the limit cycle, of course. So if I choose any epsilon, which lies inside the limit cycle, there is no possibility of finding a delta because for every initial condition inside this ball, you will always go to the set A. All right. And this is a problem. Okay. In terms of, I mean, it is a problem not in general, but it is a problem in terms of how we have defined stability. Okay. How we have defined stability. Right. So for stability, they require that if the user gives me any epsilon, right, it can be anything arbitrarily large, arbitrarily small, it doesn't matter for every possible epsilon that the user gives me, I must be able to you know, give or provide a delta says that initial conditions inside the delta ball will remain inside the epsilon. Now, in this case, this is absolutely not as you can see.  And we know that delta cannot be larger than epsilon. Right. That's obvious. Excellent. Right. So equilibrium 00 is in fact unstable. However, this is a very nice system. Right. I mean, this is a very nice and well behaved system in the sense that all trajectories seem to go to the limit cycle. In fact, trajectories for certain values of mu trajectories outside also go to the limit cycle. Okay. For certain values of you, the trajectories outside the limit cycle also converge to the limit cycle. And for all the values of mu trajectories in starting inside the limit cycle will converge to the limit cycle. Okay. So this is a rather nicely behaved system, but it is not stable in the sense of Lyapunov. Okay. So remember that although we have painstakingly defined these notions of, you know, stability in the sense of Lyapunov and all, but it is not, you know, the final poly grid. I mean, there are systems which behave nicely, which do not exhibit stability in the sense of Lyapunov. Okay. This is rather nice. Yeah. Of course, this might also lead us to thinking about more general definitions of stability. Right. This might, but then of course we don't look at that in this course. But yes, it does make sense to think about more general definitions of stability, etc. Okay. Great. Great. So now that we sort of have a decent handle on what is stability and uniform stability, we want to look at more additional properties that the dynamical system might possess. Yeah. And we've already sort of seen in this Bob Lutz Lemme analysis that we are very interested in convergence. And we always want things to converge to zero, functions to converge to zero. Right. So this is a property that we are rather really interested in. Right. So now this convergence property is formulated in systems theoretical language as attractivity. Okay. So this is the notion of convergence for dynamical systems. Right. So suppose, you know, in order to talk about attractivity, what I do is I assume that my equilibrium is in fact, at the origin. Right. It's not such a, you know, difficult assumption to satisfy. This does not happen. I simply do a change of coordinates, such as this. And once I do this change of coordinates, yeah, it should be, it will become evident to you that this equilibrium in this y coordinates is in fact, the origin. Okay. This is just to make our notation easy. Yeah. That's, and it's very standard practice. Yeah. So it's not something crazy. It's just very, very standard. It's not even a big deal. All right. We always consider origin to be our equilibrium. Yeah. All right. So what does it mean for the origin to be attractive? It means that for all initial times, there exists a delta depending on this initial time, only the initial time, such that initial conditions within the delta wall result in all state trajectories converging to zero as T goes to infinity. Okay. So this is essentially convergence. Essentially convergence the way we know. The only thing we have done is we have fixed some initial time and initial states. Yeah. So for attractivity, I require, I'm required to find a, you know, initial condition ball of size delta. This delta is of course, allowed to depend on T zero. Yeah. Unlike the stability case here, there is no epsilon. So there's no epsilon dependence. Right. But T zero is of course there. So it can depend on T zero. Right. And we require that if the initial conditions are within this delta wall that we have provided, then all my solutions, my solutions, the state trajectories in fact converts to zero as T goes to infinity. As usual, we also have the notion of uniform attractivity. Okay. So what is uniform attractivity? It is that for all T zero, there exists a delta. Now this delta doesn't depend on T zero either. Therefore, yeah.  So here delta positive. Similarly, delta positive. This is important. Okay. Let's not miss this. So we need the delta to be of course a positive quantity. Now here the delta cannot depend on T zero either. So it's just a constant. Right. So for uniform attractivity, you need to be able to find a positive constant delta such that initial conditions within the delta ball guarantee that your state trajectories converts to the origin as T goes to infinity. Okay. So as before, as in the case of the definition of stability versus uniform stability, here too, the uniformity is with respect to the initial time. Okay. That is what we mean by uniformity in a system theoretic setting. All right. So I hope that's clear. Excellent. So now that we have these two new notions, why don't we test these for the example by Masera that we have already seen? Okay. So if you look at what I'm going to do is for the Masera system, I'm going to write this solution out again. Okay. So I will write out this solution again. So let's see if I can in fact do that. If I can copy it. Right. So it doesn't let me copy it. So I hope it lets me paste it too. Right. So here you go. So this was, I guess, and this was our example. Right. I mean, this was, yeah, this was the example for Masera example. Yeah. So this is what is our, was our solution. And what do we want to do? We want to sort of understand whether this is attractive and slash all uniformity attractive. Okay. So let's see. Is this an attractive system? So in this case, I just need to find a delta. Okay. So I just need to find a delta. Right. So find delta or convergence. All right. So that's all I need to do. I need to find a delta for convergence. Now the question is what sort of initial conditions are allowed? So let's note something. Okay. Let's notice something. So once I fix this t zero, right. So in fact, it doesn't matter whether I fix t zero or no, but, but let's notice something. This is, this is some value here, right. Some, you know, constant, right. Similarly, gamma is also some constant. Yeah. After t zero x zero fixed. Okay. For a particular choice of t zero and an x zero, it doesn't matter what these choices are in fact, but once I've chosen this t zero and x zero, these two are in fact constant quantities. All right. They're not changing with t. Like, notice, they're not functions of t. So there's no t dependence in either of these. t appears only here. And what do I know about this term? I know that this is going to be exponentially decaying. It's going to be exponentially decaying. Okay. So this guy, once t zero and x zero are fixed for a particular t zero and x zero, these two are fixed quantities. This guy is definitely exponentially decaying. So as t goes to infinity, this is going to zero. And then rather fast. It's an exponential decay, right. And therefore, it doesn't matter what these quantities are. And the important thing is they don't change with t. And because they don't change with t, this entire thing is going to go to zero as t goes to infinity. Therefore, I hope you believe me when I say that delta is infinity. So what I can say is for all x zero in Rn, I have limit as t goes to infinity, norm x t is in fact zero. Okay. All right. So in fact, it is not just, well, it is definitely uniformly attractive. That's for sure. It's uniformly, but it's also globally attractive. Okay. It's not just uniformly, but also globally attractive. And this is what, right. So this is anywhere from the previous example. This is what is our next definition. Globally uniformly attractive. That is for all t zero and x zero, limit as t goes to infinity, norm x t is zero. This is in fact our next, was our next definition. Okay. This was in fact our next definition. So this is a rather strong property, rather strong property that this Messera system that we were considering was globally attractive or uniformly globally attractive. However, you want to say it. Okay. So it was not just this, but something more because there is the delta can be pushed to infinity. So it's a rather powerful property. Yeah. Excellent. Excellent. Excellent. So this picture, I mean, I know we didn't sort of discuss this, but this is a illustration of what happens when for the Van der Poel oscillator, just spend a minute on it before going further. Yeah. For the Van der Poel oscillator, we had this phase plane for a particular mu, right? But for all muses, this is the only difference that happens is as you change mu, this limit cycle sort of seems to change in shape a little bit. Yeah. Otherwise, all trajectories starting at origin still converge to the limit cycles. Okay. So the only thing that changes is the shape of this limit cycle. So the origin continues to remain unstable as we stated before for the Van der Poel oscillator. All right. Excellent. Excellent. So this is, yeah. So as it's mentioned here, the limit cycle begins as a circle and with varying mu becomes increasingly sharp at the corners here. And here you see it becomes sharp. Okay. As you increase the mu. So the nature of the limit cycle changes. So depending on your application, you may choose a particular mu, but the fact that the origin is unstable continues to be as is. Okay. Excellent. All right. So we've already seen stability, uniform stability. And now we have seen three attractivity properties. There was no notion of notice that I want to say this note. No such thing as global stability. Yeah. As far as the stability definitions go, there is no such thing as global stability. We saw stability. We saw uniform stability. So two different definitions. Yeah, because we are always requiring us, we always are required to choose an epsilon and correspondingly get a delta. Okay. So and delta cannot be greater than epsilon. We've already know that. So therefore it's not possible to say that delta can be arbitrary. Delta cannot be arbitrary. Delta definitely has to be less than or equal to epsilon. Okay. So delta spanning all of RN is not allowed. Right. Therefore there is no such notion as global stability. It doesn't make sense at all. Yeah. However, in case of attractivity, we saw three different definitions. We saw attractivity. We saw uniform attractivity. And we also have global uniform attractivity. Okay. And that is what is this definition. Okay. That is, it doesn't matter what your initial condition and initial time are. Their trajectories do converge to zero st goes to infinity. And we in fact, saw that the mass error system that we have is globally uniformly attract. Okay. So now we'll continue to look at this mass error example and talk about each. Now the rest of the definitions are rather straightforward. The rest of the definitions are rather straightforward and incrementally strong. Yeah. So let's look at asymptotic stability. What is asymptotic stability? It is simply combining stability and attractivity. Okay. So we already know that, for example, about the mass error system that this table, we already know that it is attractive. Therefore, mass error system is asymptotically stable. Okay. So the mass error system is in fact asymptotically stable. Okay. Let's go to the next one. The next one is uniform asymptotic stability. So we have added the qualifier uniform. So therefore, the qualifier uniform also goes into both of these definitions. Okay. That is it is uniformly stable and uniformly attractive. Now the question is, is the mass error system uniformly stable and uniform? Is it uniformly asymptotically stable? The answer is no. The answer is no. Why? Because it is uniformly attractive. Sure. It just proved that it is uniformly attractive because there is no delta and delta is infinite. Right. But it is not uniformly stable. It is only stable. Therefore, the mass error system. So this I will, I mean, I will start to make these acronyms asymptotic stability, uniform asymptotic stability, exponential stability, not, so the mass error system is not uniformly asymptotic stable, asymptotically stable, because it at the origin of course. So whenever I say something is stable, uniformly asymptotically stable, and I don't mention the equilibrium. Yeah. I'm just trying to shorten the sentence. Okay. Whenever you're talking about any of these notions, you're always talking about a particular equilibrium. Okay. So the mass error system is asymptotically stable at the origin. The mass error system is not uniformly asymptotically stable at the origin. So when I write it out formally, I have to write the whole sentence. Okay. Please keep this in mind. You have to write out the whole sentence. I'm not saying the whole thing occasionally because it's clear from the context that I'm talking about the zero equilibrium. Okay. So the mass error system is not uniformly asymptotically stable because it fails on one count. And we need both of these. Okay. Let's skip this exponential stability and go to the, because exponential stability is the strongest property. In fact, so it should come in the end. So this is the next property is global uniform asymptotic stability. Okay. And what does it require? It requires global uniform asymptotic stability. So it requires uniform stability and global uniform attractivity. Okay. Now it should be obvious to you that because the mass error system is not uniformly asymptotically stable, it cannot be globally uniformly asymptotically stable either. Okay. However, there is of course a definition somewhere in between, which is not really mentioned here, but I will still put it for a reference. Well, let me put it say here, global asymptotic stability. So this is G. So this is also, this is G A S. And what does this require? It requires stability because there is no uniformity plus globally attractive. Okay. Stability plus globally attractive. Okay. And you will note now that mass error system is globally asymptotically stable. Yeah, because it is stable. And it also is globally attractive. So this is not the best property. So whenever we have a system, we're always trying to find the best property that is satisfied out of all of us. Okay. So asymptotic stability, yes, as their system is asymptotically stable, but it is something more because the system converges from any initial condition to the origin. That is something stronger than just asymptotic stability, which is a local notion. Therefore, this notion of global asymptotic stability also exists, which is that this mass error system also satisfies this, that is that the origin is stable and also globally attractive. Right. So the mass error system is in fact a globally asymptotically stable system. All right. I hope that is clear. Excellent. Excellent. So we've done some interesting things today and we sort of try to summarize what we have done today. So we of course started off with talking about the Van der Paul oscillator. We saw its face plane portrait to sort of judge whether it's stable, uniformly stable or unstable. What we found was that for different values of mute, the limit cycle shape changes. But overall, the stability question has the same answer. That is the origin is always unstable. It's neither stable nor uniformly stable. Okay. Then we went on to talk about additional definitions beyond stability and these are related to convergence. And so these properties are called attractivity properties. Okay. So we talked about attractivity. We talked about uniform attractivity, global uniform attractivity, global attractivity. Then we talked about asymptotic stability, global asymptotic stability, uniform asymptotic stability and global uniform asymptotic stability. So we will sort of do this again a little bit next time. But what we were able to conclude for this mass error system, this example that we've been talking about the whole lot is that it is the best property that it satisfies is that it is globally asymptotically stable. That is, it is stable and it is globally attractive together. All right. So that's it folks. So we will meet again next time. So thank you.


Paving is the last step in the construction process. It's when you lay down that concrete or asphalt ribbon that's going to be your lasting mark on the landscape. It will serve as a continuing reminder of the work you put in and the tolls you paid in getting the job done. To a lot of people, paving on a new grade is a breeze. There seems to be lots of room, and it's not so busy. But look again. There isn't as much room as you think when you're working close to powerful forces. Paving equipment is powerful, and it's always moving. That means you can get hit by flying debris or by the equipment itself. Loading and unloading equipment can be scary. Most pavers, rollers, and other heavy equipment are top heavy. They'll overturn real easy on a steep slope. If you're driving a truck, you too might think you have plenty of room. But don't forget, you're coming into pedestrian territory, and you can't see much around you, especially people who are close to you. And between the grade and the haul road, there's not much standing room for a pedestrian. Use a spotter to make sure you're not going to run over anybody. If you're working on the ground, you better know that that driver can't see much. A truck has lots of blind spots. And even if you can see the driver, the driver probably isn't going to be watching out for you. Like I said, this equipment is big. It's not going to stop unless it hits something bigger than itself. If you're a pedestrian, it'll be unforgiving. That's why backup alarms are there. Even if you hear them all the time, don't ever take them for granted. Like most people, you're probably thinking about your job and what you're going to do next. But if you don't know what's going on around you, you can get yourself into real trouble. That's why if you don't have to be around traffic, then stay away from it. The paving operation moves slowly and constantly. You're doing a lot of the same things over and over again, mile after mile. It can get so boring, you think you can do it in your sleep. Wake up! Don't try to save a few steps by cutting under the conveyor belt. Get into the habit of giving it the room it deserves because it will take it if you're there or not. Like I said, it's not going to stop unless it hits something bigger or the operator stops it. But what do you think your chances are of it stopping if the operator can't see you or hear you? Remember, it's noisy out there and the operator can't see much that's close to the pavement. If the constant repetition and boredom can be hazardous, so can the opposite. Rushing to save your work from a thunderstorm can make you do things you'd never think of doing under normal conditions. And just being out in the lightning on top of steel equipment can be scary enough.  Walking in mud isn't so bad. What you don't want to walk on is the product you're working with. For example, asphalt is hot as much as 350 degrees hot. Tennis shoes won't protect you from this kind of heat. Portland cement will burn you too, not because it's hot but because it's caustic. You might not feel it right away, but if you wear the same clothes the next day, it'll tell you it's there. And you definitely won't like it. Wear clean clothes every day, especially your socks. PC dust can be very painful, so wear a mask and eye protection. Noise is a safety problem too.  They're both critical to your safety. If you can't hear what's going on around you, you've cut your safety margin in half. And if your vision is obstructed too, you're really stacking the odds against you. Besides coping with the equipment, the trucks, the noise, and the endless repetition, there's another factor that can distract you from knowing where you are and what you're doing. It's the heat and humidity. It can drop you like a rag doll. Drink lots of water, even if you're not thirsty.  Paving around traffic really complicates things. You still have all the hazards of paving, but now you're in a public area where people are used to driving fast with lots of room to maneuver. When you cut off a lane of interstate, you double the traffic on the open lane. They're going to be cramped for space. And so are you. It's not a healthy situation for anybody. That's why traffic control is so important. You've got to let them know you're there and to keep them from killing themselves. And you. Drivers can enter your work area at the bat of an eye. Don't give them a reason to follow you in. And if you're not careful, you too can get caught crossing the line. It's easy to forget when the line is imaginary. Night. As if you didn't have enough problems with everything else. Now the odds of getting into an accident are really stacked against you. First, visibility is minimized, both yours and the driving public's. Then the public doesn't expect you to be there in the first place. So for them, you are out of sight and out of mind. That could lead to a disastrous situation. As the night wears on, the solitary vehicle can sometimes be more dangerous than a steady string. Because this is when drivers can fall asleep. They're tired and there's no other traffic around to keep them alert. So how do you know if that next driver realizes that you're out there? How do you know if he or she is asleep or has been drinking? If you're not awake, you're just a sitting duck. You can survive out there, but you need all the help you can get, including effective traffic control. With flaggers far enough ahead who can manage the traffic before it gets to you. Visibility for you, for drivers delivering product and for the traveling public. And responsibility. Ultimately, your safety is up to you and your ability to know what's going on around you. Since you don't have eyes in the back of your head, every once in a while take a second to look around. Check out what's going on around you and around your co-workers. It's all a matter of reducing the odds of being caught off guard. Because in the end, that finished pavement will be a constant reminder of the job you did. It could remind you of a job well done. Or it could remind you of that friend or co-worker who wasn't paying attention.


Thank you. So, it's a pleasure to be here. I'm very grateful for your chance. I'm particularly happy that the traffic didn't prevent us all from getting here, so I feel in that sense very lucky. Why would one build a startup around free software? Well, I guess I would begin this way. If you're going to make an automobile company, should you have to begin by inventing a wheel, what justifies the extraordinary importance of free software or open source software in the culture of business in the 21st century is that we have one net. One set of ways to think about that net of the protocols and APIs that make it possible for us to interact with one another. And about 30 years ago, people, mostly my client and friend and comrade Richard Stallman, decided that in a world of software that controls us, we should control it. The fundamental proposition is that users of software have rights. Among the rights they have are the rights to understand, study, improve, fix and share, which really is, after all, what businesses do. They study and understand the market, the products and the things that can be done to improve them, and then they fix, improve and share. Now, obviously, the question who owns and who gets paid, that is also very important. But as we have been learning in the human race since the 17th century, science is better conducted by sharing, though it enables lots of businesses, than it would be by owning. You can imagine what would happen in the business world if mathematics were owned by people.  And then when you run out with math, you have to buy an upgrade and all of you know. And along that seems completely absurd to us. In the first era of software, from the invention of the transistor to the onset of free UNIX that everybody could use, that really was how software worked.  This is not a good environment for the rapid development of small, aggressive businesses with a point to make and customers to serve, which is probably why by the maturity of the old principle, the largest, most deeply funded monopoly in the history of the earth had some 96, 97, 98% of the market for software for small computers that really worked for people. The two largest governments on earth, the United States government and the government of the European Union, attempted to break that monopoly or discipline it or in some fashion bring Microsoft into keeping with the general understanding of how competitive markets ought to work and they failed. The United States government gave up the European Union, soldiered on on the question whether you want to be able to choose the browser that you get with Windows and a whole bunch of entrepreneurial activity based around free software did the job that the governments couldn't do. It's true that a big, rich company, Google, had an awful lot to do with that, but Android's just a piece of free software and the era of Android as a semi-closed, semi-proprietary form of FOSS is over. Big companies and small ones all around the world have figured out that Android is FOSS and you can just change it to maybe do what you want, including maybe have somebody else in the search box or something, maybe even something a little more radical than that. And in the meantime all around the world hardware is developing in very important ways which make the idea of the proprietary development of software more or less can be obsolete. There is no large producer on earth with proprietary software who isn't also largely dependent on FOSS. That Microsoft cloud that stares back at me in every airport I visit around the world, curing cancer, taking care of forest fires and that wonderful stuff it does, can of course not exist without deployments that cover workloads that don't have anything to do with Windows. Microsoft Azure cloud doesn't do a better job of having Linux workloads pretty soon. It will begin to rain over there and let me know what will happen to them. Similarly, my friends at Redwood Shores who make the most wonderful proprietary database on earth or at any rate the one that you all have to pay service charges on, they are also the largest licensor of GPL, the database software in the world. And without MySQL the Oracle plan for its strategic future would be quite different from the one that I see Mr. Ellison now has. In other words the idea that software is really science and it proceeds according to the rules of openness and fair exchange and complete understanding and reproducibility and incremental improvement. The idea that software is a science and the people making, using and improving it have rights has dominated now and Trump not completely but very strongly. The idea that software is a product under shrink wrap and the company that makes it owns all of it through and through from top to bottom and don't even ask how it works. We have in other words graduated to a much more sophisticated and scientific view of how software is made and that more scientific view, that better understanding that we are really engaged in learning and sharing has also transformed the business world. Why in particular does startup culture need faucets so much? To which the answer is that startup culture is always a form of insurgency in business. It's always a form of guerrilla attack on entrenched forces. My friends in capitalism are very fond of saying how much they like competition. But they're lying in their teeth. The capitalism dislikes as much as it dislikes competition and it is always trying to bring it to an end. History is always supposed to end with my incumbency whether I am the IBM that first employed me in the late 1970s or the VM where it is about to create her tomorrow. Incumbency is always what startup culture is designed to interfere with. And the major problem, the one that the incumbent, whatever the incumbent his loves best, is the steep curve you have to climb in order to compete with the competition. The competition where it calls barriers to entry. The purpose of FOS then is to lower barriers to entry if possible to an actual latitudinal flatness. Everybody can learn, can understand, can study, can fix, improve, innovate, reuse and share. There isn't therefore a better way of organizing the technology for startup culture than to universalize demand for free and open source software and let the best program win. But we don't do that work mostly. We advise startups because we're lawyers and we like helping people make money so they will give us money. But our practice primarily concentrates itself, which is in mine, at least in North America. It primarily concentrates itself on the care and the feeding of what are, from my point of view, invisible software companies. Software companies have enormous reach of power and technical dare that have no external presence in the world. They don't own real estate, they don't have patents, they rarely but not never have trademarks. They go out into the world for the purpose of making and distributing software. My friends at the Red Hat Corporation have an extraordinarily good business and they do it very well and I have nothing bad to say against them. But my clients at Debian produce a perfectly coordinated, integrated, well configured, used on any hardware in the world collection of 33,000 and some odd packages, which dwarfs the contents of Red Hat Enterprise Linux and which runs on a broader variety of hardware intended to serve a broader variety of purposes than anybody's commercially integrated FOS, let alone anybody's proprietary software will ever do. The technical work obviously doesn't involve lawyers, we're not integrating, but sometimes in our spare time we do a little bit of that. What we're doing is trying to figure out how the legal and structural activities of a software company that big can be reduced to the point where no money has to be paid for them, no enterprise or headquarters, a central has to be created. And where the statesmanship and diplomacy necessary, and there is quite a good deal of it, can be performed by Rishi sitting at her desk in New York or flying off to see businessmen somewhere without the kind of entourage and the kind of heavy weight that none of our lovely professionally organized organizations that so generously support SFLC can throw at anything. We have to participate in standards organizations where we can't afford to pay people salaries to sit quietly with their hands bowed for months waiting for the other guy to speak first. We have to deal with patent defense without having a bunch of patents of our own to throw back, which is one without our close alliance with Keith and the OIN, we'd be in trouble. Our activity as lawyers and as business diplomats is really about handling the residual part of making software in the thinnest possible sense that for which most of our competing profit making organizations must devote a lot of their resources. And the great, if I may be permitted to say so myself, the great innovation that I've been working on for the past 25 years is really how to take all the lard out of the headquarters functions of these invisible software companies. Only enough this really does put us in a pretty good position to buy startups, which are after all of a different kind, free software projects like our own in many senses. What they require is the ability to exist in that world of complexity that is business. Finance, intellectual property portfolio management, the use of patent and trademark and copyright licensing systems in order to provide safety to do and the ability to distribute and we are insurgents. We're not as much insurgents as we were back when Mr. Gates and Mr. Bowman called us a cancer on American society when that's what they're calling you, you really aren't insurgent, there's nothing you really have to plead guilty to at least some form of insurgency. And now in a funny way we aren't incumbents too, not maybe at Debbie and not maybe at the Apache Software Foundation, certainly not a rich installments free software foundation, incumbents is hard to say even as FSF approaches its 30th birthday. But our relationships with the IT industry in the world and with governments and other parties who consume large amounts of software, our relationships have reached maturity. People understand who we are, they understand we understand who they are and when we sit down at the table, whether it's a CTO or a CEO or a partner in a major law firm working on behalf of enterprise IT companies, nobody has to be told, now what is this free software stuff again? How does all this work? They may not understand the licenses, we spend a fair amount of time explaining to the GPL to well educated lawyers who have never had to twist their head around in the funny way that FOSLA assumes to them when they first encounter it. But they're growing more and more remorseful but they don't understand. They're growing more and more aware that this is something which probably is important to their businesses and they should understand it. And so whether we are working for a deeply principle focused freedom activist organization that also makes a C compiler, or whether we are working for a startup that has a good idea about how to discharge Facebook if only it had a little money, or whether we are working as, for example, I have been working for the last 18 months with Martin Fink, the CTO of Hewlett Packard, to discuss how software will change when hardware changes fundamentally. Everybody understands why we have a seat at the table. This is good. It doesn't mean that they always want to give us a seat at the table because incumbents like tables that people can pay to sit at. And there is no part of the legal system around software which is more like that than the patent system, where paying for a right to have an opinion about things is a pretty serious part of the landscape. The open invention network and the relation between defensive patent pooling and FOS is therefore absolutely individual. We've been living in the middle of a patent war, simulated primarily by the handset part of the IT market, but by no means limited to it. We've been living in the middle of a patent war for the last five to seven years, which has consumed tens of billions of dollars. It has wasted, I should say, tens of billions of dollars on litigation and on raising the price of patent armaments and many other elements that were pure debt weight loss to the economics of the IT industry. They contributed nothing to the growth of inventing. They contributed nothing to the... But they made bounce backs rolling somebody's property. We can't, we can't invent freely. We can't do what we do as insurgents, whether we are non-profit, non-commercial, free software makers or startups. We can't do what we need to do if the patent system allows the weight of money to strangle inventing. And therefore we, Keith, I, others have been around the world pressing hard with whatever tools were available to create a safe space for all this inventing, all this science that has gone on. Here too, I suppose we could say that we have reached maturity in a sense when Keith's predecessor at OIN was building the organization first. He was building it by going around and buying patents that Microsoft might otherwise buy. And I watched Keith come in and inherit that system and then begin to revolutionize it. To provide in the same way that we provided, and our clients provided, new and inventive solutions to the problem. How to make the social frictionless inventing that startup culture needs, that our non-profit clients need. And that the biggest of enterprise IT firms are in the room also now. How to make that frictionless inventing safe for everybody. It's a testament to the importance of what we do, the way we do it. That OIN has been remarkably successful not only in getting people to take licenses, but in getting very large companies to put a very large amount of money to create safety for everybody else. I too live at SFLC at any rate on the generosity of companies that understand why paying for other people's lawyers in this very unusual political economy of ours is really in their profit interest. Mission are maintained non-profit tax exempt organizations both in India and the United States. But a lot of the people who make it possible for us to do our work don't take this off on their taxes as charity. It's a business expense. It's a business expense because preventing one school lawsuit or one vast patent mess or one any serious problem every couple of years is well worth everything that they pay for it. And they understand as businesses like IBM and Nokia may at rest in peace learn at the end of the 20th century that free software is really best thought about from economic terms within an enterprise like that as a renewable resource. They began to understand that software wasn't a commodity raw material we bought by the time and put in the products and then you had another ton to buy. Free software was really a renewable resource like forest goods or fisheries and what they wanted was management of those resources so that nobody pulled too much from the scene nobody burnt down the forests that they needed and nobody got ahead of them up in there playing some tricks or other with the catch up or with the lumber tank. And so they began to understand that what they needed was people who knew how to take care of these that laid golden eggs. And there are people who know how to take care of these that laid golden eggs and I'm a law teacher and I'm a day job and so I could also produce more people who know how to take care of these that laid golden eggs. And that's an ecosystem. It's not just one there's many bumps and there's months when we have chicken and there's months when we have feathers to eat but by and large what happened was that a system of software making which assumed that every tub stood on its own bottom and every bite you sold you beg, borrow or stole from someone else was replaced by a system which said software is a science we all share and teaching young brains how to do it is how we grow. Now we live in a world in which some very large things have been created. One kid surveils a billion people by a simple process of being the man in the middle attack on everything they say to one another. This is not good technology. There's nothing nice about it. It's a really crappy way to do social sharing and very soon it will be replaced and everybody will remember Facebook as one of those things that was really big. But nonetheless what it has done is to show people how the nature of human life is changing and how many opportunities there are to bring people together in ways that they find absolutely useful in their lives. FOSS connects people in the 21st century the way copper filaments connected people in the 20th. Software is the 21st century economic life what coal and steel and rare earth metals were at the end of the 20th century. They are how the human race technologically holds itself together. The lawyers who do that work like the businessmen and the IP managers who do the work of making all that connection possible and keeping the free nature of that inventing. We had no analogs in the 20th century industrial society. The 20th century industrial society built strong U and M form firms in which everybody worked for it. The IBM I went to work for in 1979 had 368,000 wonderful employees and it kept itself to itself pretty much with respect to everything it invented and employed. There will never be another organization like that. Because everybody understands that we're in it together to a significant extent what made that happen? The form of human social interconnection we call the internet which made everybody interdependent on everybody else. So we have moved to a world of industrial interdependence in which small and large are indistinguishable functionally for the most of the time. When Richard Stallman and I set out to make GPL3 we knew we were going to need to have a very large public discussion process because you can't change something at the bottom of so many people's businesses without checking with them. And the primary goal that I had in the development of the process for changing the license was that we could create a social process in which individual developers had as much right to talk and not heard just as loudly as the largest terms in the world. Well I segmented all of that and I created a committee carefully known as Committee B in which all the big patent holders sat. Which was rarely negotiated in the kinds of patent piece that we could negotiate within the terms of one rule of software license. By no means could this ever have substituted for the sort of broad defensive coverage of freedom to invent that all I am presented. But we wanted to make a single point which is there's a common. So you're in it. If you're helping to build software in it you can't swing your patent claims around here. And we were able to get the basic working agreement of 35 of the 36 largest patent holders in the IT industry. I'm not even thinking about Microsoft. It was Mr. Jobs who was unable to come along. But doing that work which I spent about 14 months on in 2006 and 2007 very much helped me to understand just how deeply the principles of interdependence were going to run. Now in India we're about to see another layer. Government acquisition policy here is open to acceptance of 21st century realities. I don't know that that means that acceptance is certain or that it will be perfect. But as the current government of India and the deity move towards a decision that every E-governance project that it buys should use funds we will be moving to a new stage of understanding about what that interdependence means. Because the very nature of the relationship between citizens will come to be mediated by selective people can invent, understand, fix, modify and improve. And an enormous ecosystem will grow up around doing exactly that. A kind of public-private partnership and the improvement of government and its services which is far more useful than most of the forms of public-private partnership that came to be talked about in the developed world at the end of the 20th century. Everybody and I do mean everybody has a stake and a success in that policy. Many of my very warmest friends around the world with big companies with small names are at the moment in a commissioned rejection. They're working against us on this policy as once upon a time they suddenly didn't need fossil. They'll come to a different outcome that I am confident. Because the biggest market for both the making and consuming of software in the world will be here. Because the science done here will dominate global software making and because it will define how the internet works it will define global society. And once again you can't develop the largest society on earth by reinventing the wheel. Government is going to understand that only the sharing of knowledge and the sharing of the forms of inventing that young minds can do and only by that will the kind of largest society on earth develop itself freely and take its place in the forefront of digital humanity. That's what's at stake in digital India. It can't mean anything other than we use fossil here every way we can. We make the best of everything we have, we invent on top of it, we bring it to the net and therefore we bring it to the world. That's digital India in paragraph as far as I can see. And anybody who says oh no there's another way to do it that way is not ready yet. Is it ready for digital India? So what I think I would say here in this room to people know this way better than I do is that fossil turned out to be about developing human brains. It turned out to be about using human intelligence in software better. Because if you were an engineer studying Windows it was like studying a car with a hood welded shut. Because you couldn't really look inside because you really couldn't understand because you really couldn't learn that well. And research universities and the engineering colleges and the various research institutes of the world became the greatest manufacturers of fossil. Now that's not true anymore. Businesses large, medium and small are the greatest manufacturers of fossil. And the communities that Michie and I represent are their downtown. They take everything. They use it from there. I don't know any place on earth where if you say analytics to a businessman nowadays he or she doesn't chirp right up. Yes, analytics. We need analytics. What are analytics? Our Apache Software Foundation clients know the answer to that question.  My ambition is to hope that there will come a time not very long from now when basic data science is taught in Indian secondary school. Because it's simple math and you can teach it to people and the software is free and all the big data sets are public and you can play with them. And a nation of a hundred million data scientists. Rolls the board. Thank you very much.


Hey everybody, this is Alan. I'm up here on the top of Quandary Peak, 14,260 feet. This is my third 14er here in two days. I did beer stat yesterday morning and Grace Peak yesterday afternoon. As you can see, it's absolutely beautiful up here. I think it's about 9.30 in the morning. You know, I'm training for op-a-mayo. It's about 20,000 feet down in Peru. I'm leaving two weeks from Thursday. It's a very technical climb using dual ice axes to get up to the top. It's going to be a lot of fun. So I hope you follow along. But remember, the reason I'm doing all this is so I can get your attention so I can talk about Alzheimer's. And that's what it's all about. So please check out my pages. Find out how you can make a donation to one of the three nonprofits where 100% of your donation goes to those organizations. Nothing ever to me. So climb on. This is Alan. And remember, memories are everything.