Thank you, John, and thank you very much for the opportunity to be here at the seminar and to join everybody for this. I know how important this seminar has been for more than a decade and a half, and I'm appreciative for the seminar and the pre-court center for this opportunity. Obviously, it's timely. It's timely in one sense because of those terrible forest fires that all of you on the West Coast are suffering for, and all the issues that that brings to the fore. And also, of course, because energy and climate is going to become one of the major issues or is one of the major issues in the presidential campaign. So it's timely for that. It's also time, as you say, because my book is being published slightly less than five hours from now. So this is the first opportunity I have to really share and to talk about it and to talk about the themes that I've been wrestling with for the last few years to come out with this book, New Map, Energy Climate, and the Clash of Nations. It's a privilege to discuss it here. When I use the term The New Map, it's primarily metaphorical because I talk about the new map of energy and geopolitics, but it's also literal because geography is really part of this story. In fact, books called The New Map, and eight or nine months ago when we're getting closer to finishing it, I said to the publisher Penguin, well, I got to get to work on the maps for the book. And they said, why do you need maps? I said, well, a book that's called The New Map has to have some maps, not too many, and there are not too many in the book, but the maps do help to frame the discussion. The maps, you know, what I'm going to do today is try something new in a way to talk about it, not to provide a lesson on geography, but to use the maps in the book as a launchpad for the themes to highlight the important issues and help provide a framework. But just as openers, John mentioned, you know, as an author, and many of you will know two of the books, energy books I've done, one called The Prize, one called The Quest. But in a sense, I don't know if others find this academics, but how all of your work comes together, because two other books that I've done also really resonate for me when I was working on this book. One is called The Commanding Heights, and it was the battle for the world economy, which was about state and market, and how the pendulum was swinging towards markets, and now it's swung back. And another book that goes back even farther to when I first met John, which is called Shattered Peace, which was a book about the origins of the Soviet American Cold War. I never expected to be writing another book about an origins of Cold War, but as I was finishing this book over the last year or a year and a half, I really did feel that I was writing a book about Cold Wars, and I think it's become even more so. And I'll talk about that, but different kind of Cold Wars, but with both Russia and with China. And just to give a little framework, as I was working on this, I was thinking that, you know, what did people think from when China entered the WTO in 2001. And it was a kind of WTO consensus that the integration to China would be a positive for the world economy would be a positive for the United States. Even before Trump became president, that consensus was eroding. And now where it's really an era of great power, rivalries of language, strategic competition. And kind of an underlying question of the book is where does that energy is an important part of it. Where does it lead? And where does it lead strategically, as between the world's two largest economies? And where does it lead economically as we see the supply chains which were taken for granted, now under pressure. And, you know, Deng Xiaoping famously said about Hong Kong, now we're taken by events, one country, two systems, are we headed to one world, two systems. And other countries, I find, when I could travel now, not traveling, but the question, don't want to be caught in the middle, don't want to be, have to choose. So that's kind of an overriding framework. So let's go to the first map. And this is a map of U.S. shale, not all shale, it does include the Bakken, the Tite oil and the Bakken, but this is the revolution. This was a highly disruptive technology that disrupted the world oil market. The textbook said it couldn't work. It did work and it has worked on a scale that hasn't been imagined. Before all of that was happening, the U.S. was importing 60% of its oil.  Today, the United States is the largest producer of the oil and gas. And that's changed a lot of things. It's changed the dynamics of the market. It used to be OPEC versus non-OPEC. Then it became OPEC Plus in 2016. Now it's really big three, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the largest producer of all the United States. And that was demonstrated last April when it was United States that stepped in and brokered the deal between Saudi Arabia and Russia and stabilized the oil market, pulled it back on that bizarre situation of negative prices. This revolution has had many impacts that I think are not well recognized. Over $200 billion in manufacturing investment, a couple of million jobs, supporting manufacturing in the Midwest, balance of payments, but revenues for governments. But it's also brought flexibility in U.S. foreign policy. It's evident whether you wanted the Obama approach to Iran, the Trump approach, or what will be the Biden approach, it would be very different if the United States was not the world's largest producer. Iran didn't think that the Obama sanctions would work because they thought the world can't do without their oil. It turned out that it could. And it's also given us the United States degrees of influence and flexibility. I'm a member of the think tank for the Indian government on energy. And I can see that there's a whole different element, positive element to the relationship between India and the United States because the United States is exporting both oil and natural gas to India. But I mentioned, we saw what the Trump presidency did last April in the big three. We'll have to see if it's a Biden presidency, how different that big three will work. And in the book I said, you know, it could be quite different. We can have the second map now. This is the map of some of the really controversial pipelines, putative and actual that were built to tie supplies to new markets to new supplies to the market. In a way, these illustrate the divisions in the country between those who see this infrastructure is very vital as a better way to move oil and natural gas to markets, and those who don't want to go ahead. I have a great picture in the book of Barack Obama, dedicating the lower third of the Keystone XL pipeline, when gasoline was close to $5 a gallon. Very different today, and that battle will continue. There's also the battle over the Dakota access pipeline, which is essential for moving oil from North Dakota to mark other markets in the United States. If you don't do it. Don't use pipelines and the oil moves by trains, very long trains, adding to the costs and also adding to environmental impacts on scale. But I think that when we talk about the environmental challenges to pipelines are really political challenges to prevent them from going forward and to choke off. And there was a very interesting piece written by Jason Ford off the center for global energy at Columbia, where he, he pointed out that the same approach that can be used to prevent infrastructure. And the pipelines could also be used against renewable infrastructure. So something to keep in mind. That's the US. Let's now turn to the third map, which is Ukraine. And this shows the Russian pipelines going through Ukraine. Of course, it was not a problem when Ukraine and Russia were the same country, and the friendship pipeline to run through Ukraine. They are the brotherhood pipeline, but they're not brothers anymore. And there have been continuing crises with between Russian Ukraine over the flow of gas of the price of gas, what the price will be, who's taking the gas and that sort of thing. Particularly in 2006 2009, and very important geopolitical impacts, because in response to them, there's really a pre dramatic change in the structure of the European gas market. And what the Europeans did is built much more flexibility into their system that they can move gas in one direction or another. And secondly, of course, was the development of LNG of which the US is an important part. And so today, Europeans, whatever leverage might have existed in the past, the Europeans have choices. So in one sense, we think it's less political. But of course, in a minute, I'll say why it's become more political. But, but that has meant that the, that there's less power, you know, if Russia were to withhold gas because Europeans have choices they have alternatives. The Russians have responded by seeking alternatives to building alternative pipelines. The issues are unresolved and the underlying question is of course the relationship between Ukraine and Russia and the relationship between Ukraine and the West. And really, more than anything else at the dispute over Russia over Ukraine is really at the heart of what is the center of the this new Cold War with the United States it's what sort of promoted it. And the next map. This is a map that shows the Russian pipelines coming into Europe and, you know, you see them coming forward like that. About 35% of Europe's gas comes from Russia about 10% of its energy. So to say that the Europe is wildly dependent upon Russia is not correct. So what is that recurring question of political liver leverage, which goes back like 6070 years about Russian exports to Europe. Does that give them a chokehold or in some, or is, or for Russia is it that they need the markets. And it kind of become more quiet but Nord Stream to since the tension between Russia United States, the Nord Stream to pipeline now has become the focus of great controversy. It's an $11 billion project. The last December was weeks away from being heated when sanctions were put on by the United States, which stopped activity on it. And the premise and there are more sanctions that are threatened premise is that it threatens us national security. I'm a little, I don't see how that pipeline threatens us national security, particularly because the notion that you're going to prevent Russian gas from going to Europe isn't correct it's just a question of how that gas is going to get there. You know, are we actually hurting our security more by hurting the relationship with Germany. The Germans talk a lot about extra territoriality in terms of our sanctions. Obviously, this is changed it's a poisoning of Navalny, the Russian opposition leader, and certainly in Germany attitudes of change to. There's new efforts to even put sanctions on a German port, because the Russian chips and the people who work in that German port, the Russian chips use that raises larger question of course which is, is our policy towards Russia only sanctions, or do we have any other policies as well. And I included in the new map a comment by Secretary of State George Schultz in one of these earlier controversies in the 1980s, where he said sanctions are a wasting asset. I think, I think we see that again and again and indeed what those sanctions have done to have this pushed Russia and China even more closely together. So it's not an easy problem of how to address relations with Russia. But the same week, within weeks that we put our sanctions on Nord Stream to in a very elaborate ceremony. Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping had a ceremony where they opened the power of Siberia pipeline, which is a very large pipeline that carries Russian gas to China. The other thing to just keep in mind about sanctions and of course, it isn't just about energy, a lot of other things and in particular it's about the US presidential election in 2016 and 2020. You know, I think people who follow this closely think if that pipeline really doesn't go through, and maybe it won't go we'll see how these sanctions work out. There will be a response in ways that aren't anticipated. I think one other thing to say at the notion of stopping this pipeline is that Russian pipeline gas has a new competitor in Europe as well. It's not only LNG, it's not only Norwegian gas in general, but it's Russian LNG. These were the Russian LNG projects were in the Arctic, people said, you know, they couldn't make it work. It is going to work. And probably what it means is an LNG market that looked like it was going to be dominated by a big three of the United States, Qatar and Australia actually be the big four. And Russia will be a big player in LNG as well as in pipeline gas. If I could have the next map. Now switching to China. And this map is the nine dash, nine dash line map describing the Chinese claims on the South China Sea. This may be the most dangerous map in the world, because of the issues about who controls who owns the South China Sea, or is it freedom of seas. There was some work in the French archives to find out how this all came about. And it all started in the early 1930s when the French Empire in Indochina was falling apart. And three ships were sent out to claim nine little islands in the South China Sea. And this, they had a ceremony and they blew trumpets and they left little things on the island. And there were reached Beijing, and led to a sort of uproar, hardly led by the geographers who were very much involved with talking about Chinese national identity. A particular name by me true at a 1930 done a map called the Chinese national humiliation map about the century of humiliation European powers, taking different areas in China, and setting up their own basically communities and control. And so in response to the French in 1936 he drew a map for the new China construction Atlas, which is basically that nine dash line map. The nationalists adopted it more strongly after World War two. And then when the nationalists were checked in what to Taiwan, the Chinese government adopted is their, their map. But it didn't really become significant until the last 10 or 12 years. There is an energy dimension to it. Some people think it's about the oil and gas resources. The South China Sea today produces less than 1% of world oil production, our own geologists at IHS market and the company geologists we talked to do not think actually despite what you hear that it's very perspective of oil. At all, there may be gas there, and it'll be expensive and hard to produce. The biggest significance of the South China Sea is that it is the most important body of water for World Trade, and it is the body of water through half the world's oil tankers past and 75% of Russia of China's oil is important. There are some courses from Russia and other places, but a large part in the Middle East and from Africa, and the fear there is that the US Navy, in the event of a standoff or confrontation over Taiwan would interdict that that oil. Certainly one of the strategic reasons that the Chinese have been so vociferous about the South China Sea. They've reclaimed 3200 acres turned some of these islands and reclaimed territory into stationary aircraft carriers. It was kind of quiescent under the Obama administration, the pushback against it has become much stronger now in the last three years, the number of missions of freedom of sea missions, freedom of passage missions have increased, and we've heard Secretary Pompeo and others advocate in the Indo Pacific community and Japan, India and the United States kind of tri-part group kind of pushing back against this. There's no obvious resolution to this at all. And finally, I conclude in some variant of mutually assured destruction, which is called war, maybe the only answer will be mutually assured ambiguity, but it is, as I say, it's been several near collisions. And in this kind of increasingly tense atmosphere, one worries that if there was a real actual collision of ships, what how it would be controlled and what the consequences would be. Let me turn to the next map. And this is the six belt, the belt and road map. You can see this shows the various routes for the Chinese belt and road strategy. But by the way, this is not all there is to it. There's been this question of what countries can be part of the Belt and Road. President Panama asks President Xi Jinping, could Panama be part of the Belt and Road, not exactly in Central Asia. And his reply was yes, because it's all about connectivity. That's the connection. The question is this an economic initiative? Is this a geopolitical initiative? Is it both? What it certainly would do is further embed China in the world economy. The numbers rooted about for it are, you know, one trillion to $1.4 trillion, which in real terms would be about seven times the amount of the Marshall Plan after World War Two. Energy is a very key element of it, along with providing markets for Chinese goods and Chinese growth, securing energy all along the route. But there's been backlash in some countries against it. Discussion, some of you will know about the debt trap that the loans that the Chinese are providing cannot easily be paid back, particularly given what COVID-19 has done to emerging market countries. This is also, the Belt and Road is also through the mobilized Japan and India. There was recently shots exchanged between India and China, but kind of some pushback. Although it is noteworthy that the Asian Infrastructure Bank, a single country that's gotten the most loans from it so far, is actually in India. So let's pivot now from Asia to the next map and to the Middle East. This is the Sykes-Picot, the famous Sykes-Picot map that was drawn up in late 1950 and the beginning of 1916 during World War Two by Mark Sykes, kind of author and amateur diplomat, and George Francois Pico, who was a French diplomat. And it was basically trying to deal with the issue of the imminent collapse of the Ottoman Empire. What do you do about it? Something had to be done. The Russian Empire, by the way, was a party to it for a time that then came the Bolshevik Revolution. Lena Trotsky published the secret treaties, and that was partly the response where Woodrow Wilson came out with the 14 points in democracy and self-determination. Now, it was not just the Sykes-Picot Treaty. There were two treaties after World War One, but this is the origin of the nation-state system in the Middle East. And I don't have the map. Well, I'll have another map that will say something about the oil part of it. The three villiants or eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire were yoked together to form Iraq, which was really contrary to those provinces. As then, then and to some degree now, don't have a great deal of connection was done hastily when Prince Faisal was installed as king in 1921 as king of Iraq by the British. Iraq didn't have a national anthem, so one of the little details I found is they played God Save the King as the national anthem. But the resistance to the nation-state system in the Middle East, by the Muslim Brotherhood and much more extremely, of course, by Al Qaeda and ISIS, is a resistance. In the chapter on this, I start with a video that was up on the internet. I don't think it's there anymore, showing ISIS militants on the border between Iraq and Syria, having set the border posts on fire, stomping out the border and saying, there is a Sykes-Picot Pico who is now dead. And so it has a metaphor that extends beyond what the map itself represented and what the map represented. I didn't explain it, it was a division between the French and the British over who would have which area and which areas ultimately they would have mandates over. The next map is the Persian Gulf. It shows, you know, where oil was discovered in different regions and, you know, obviously transformed that region. It also is a geopolitical map, Abqaq is on it. Abqaq was the 7 million barrel a day Saudi oil processing facility that was hit by Iranian drones 13 months ago. And, you know, if something like that had happened a few years earlier, there would have been panic in the world oil market. There was panic for at most a couple of days. Partly the Saudis repaired it very quickly. Partly the fact is that that lack of panic reaction reflected the change brought about by the Shale Revolution in the United States. And suddenly there is this very large production coming from the United States that is a huge stabilizer and source of security in the global oil market. And I, at least I thought about the fact that there wasn't a panic reaction. I had a lot to do with us shale. But with this map also points to the reality of Iran versus Saudi Arabia for hegemony in the region for dominance, but I would add, add to that Turkey. It's really a tripartite balance and it's striking to see Turkey under a president Erdogan invoking to recall it's Ottoman vocation. But this shows up to in what is a major new area of oil and gas development, which is the Eastern Mediterranean. Another place where people said they'll never find any oil or gas, and now a very large development of natural gas in Israel, which will make Israel. And so I think one thing to watch is a kind of geopolitical controversy related to these new play in the Eastern Met. Another point to mention is just a great significance is the recognition of mutual recognition of the United Arab Emirates and Israel. Maybe it's been overshadowed by other news that talk about reshaping the map that is a new element in the new map for the Middle East. Well, at this point, my publisher said enough with maps I ran out of maps so I have two last pictures to kind of explain the rest of the story. If I can have the next one, this shows on the left is Thomas Edison, his electric car, and on the right, the reincarnation of Thomas Edison as Elon Musk. In 1900, there were more electric cars in New York than gasoline powered cars. And Thomas Edison bet heavily on electric cars, and but there was range anxiety, but once Henry Ford's Model T's rolled off the assembly line. The days for the electric car were numbered. They last they became known as ladies cars, and then they became known as doctors cars in the 1920s. Apparently doctors like to make house calls in St. Louis and other cities. Well, it's really an amazing achievement with Tesla has done to bring back the electric car. A question of how fast as it moved into the overall fleet at IHS market, we have about 800 people who do research on the automotive market and the automotive industry. And at least our baseline scenario is that today's 1.4 billion cars will be about 2 billion by 2050, and about 600 million of them will be EVs. And the rest will be still either gasoline powered or hybrid cars gasses and battery powered. But if more government pressure, and in Europe, there'll be fines on the automobile companies who don't move more towards electric vehicles fast enough that number could be higher. But it still hit me as I was, as I was writing this that these at the end of the day are still cars, but what would be really revolutionary is what I call in the book the triad. That is, if you take electric cars, if you take ride hailing, and you take self self driving cars, then you have a very different kind of industry where you have electric cars used 24 hours a day or 18 hours a day. And you'll have large fleets of cars that can be centrally charged. And that would be that would be really the revolution in mobility. And I think people in this audience will probably have different views about the timing of that. But we'll see how that plays out, but it would be a different game. So my last picture, the Paris Climate Conference of 2015. And here they are when it's been just been announced that the deal has been made it's been accepted, the negotiations are done, and the Paris Climate Agreement. And as I thought about it for the book, it really seemed to me that we can now divide energy Europe between the Paris and after Paris. And it is remarkable to see how Paris this agreement has really become the benchmark policy for governments. It's also become the benchmark for financial institutions evaluating companies, asking how their strategies with Paris, the Paris objectives, and certainly for companies themselves, including energy companies, how do you adopt adapt to the Paris benchmark. This is, and it's going to unfold and it will unfold more could unfold more after January 20. And I think one of the questions one of our major research projects now is about the supply chains for a zero carbon future, as that has become the nomenclature of the target. And you look at the numbers. And one of our scenarios about getting to that target, you have to add in terms of capacity between now in 2050 solar and wind capacity that would be double the entire existing capacity of the world power in 2050. So these are very big numbers. The question is how fast they can be done. So before turning it back to john. Let me sort of end on the question, which is the question is how does cover COVID-19 change things. Well, we certainly know and if you kind of customary to say that six years of digitalization in advance has been compressed into six months that, you know, for so many people, you know, working in a distributed way as now possible. And companies have found that they could in our own company, our CEO used to like it that everybody had to be in the office by 8 or 830 in the morning. I really kind of likes the idea of kind of everybody working in a very dispersed way. And by the way, not having to commute. So, you know, coming out of this question is how much will the office of the future be at home. Big question for Stanford and many other institutions. What's the future of education after distance learning. Well, we see that much less community now, because people can work more flexibly. And what will that do the demand. On the other hand, and I think we see this in China, my colleagues who work in China tell me this is the case. People preferring to use their private cars because they're concerned about going on public transportation, at least for now. And we've seen that upsurge in in sales of used cars. I brought forward the year of big three that I talked about in terms of oil, because it was really, you know, would not have imagined the US brokering the deal between Saudi Arabia and Russia, who were really mad at each other, except that we had the cloud to do it. But really, the Trump administrations thought that the this shale industry, the oil industry's existence was very much threatened. I think another thing that's really hit me is that it's, it's kind of brought forward again the role of plastics. There's a lot of, you know, criticism of plastics, California, the forefront of it. But we've seen now the importance of plastics for food and sanitary needs. A hospital operating room, I have a, you know, an article about how much of a hospital section of the operating room depends upon plastics. Of course, the n 95 mass that much desired and 95 mass, and all that plastic that you see in stores, so that you can go in and people can shop. And the big question is, what does covert night 2019 mean for the energy transition. Does it speed up the changes for the reasons that, you know, build backs stronger and so forth, or does it retarded because the staggering amounts of debts that governments will have in the depths of the economic blues. So that's a question, you know, probably this time next year will have a better idea of that. That's a question from the seminar to. And with that, john, I will turn it back to you. Great. Okay, Dan, that was a fantastic tour through this world that I think only you see well and that is the combination of energy environment and national security, including superpower relations and emergence. For transition, I'm just going to ask one or two quick questions, some of which overlap with the long list of audience questions. And as you know, we kind of intersected in Cambridge mass in the late 70s on energy independence oil security. We met in Mexico City for a memorable event on oil security, and then the fast forward and get more up to date. In Riyadh, Saudi Arabia at some palace and a big oil center sponsored conference right about when the book the quest came out, which I think got you into clean tech and non fossil energy. With that background, I'm curious from my own personal point of view and I'm sure the audience is, why did you write this particular book in this particular way frame this particular way at this point in time, you've already given a little bit of an indication of why that might be. But I thought I would ask it more directly just to kick things off. I would say that, even when I did energy future at the Harvard Business School, you know, around the time we first met, had a big section on renewables it was way ahead of its time and expectations. I think in this book, you know, it's interesting how, at least for me, when I, the new map was not mapped out as a book, I mean it really sort of organically developed. And but what I was doing for myself and I hope for readers was creating a framework so you can see how all these pieces fit together as we go as we enter as we move through this era, energy transition. But keeping in mind that the world still uses 84% of its energy comes from coal, but a natural gas and oil. And there are a lot of other issues all these geopolitical issues that are tied up with it. So that, you know, so it's trying to put it all into context, and not be monochromal, but see a framework and how they fit together. And that's what I was trying to do. I had another objective, John, however, also, which was to make it shorter than the prize in the quest, because the age of Twitter, and you won't see you won't see a five on the page numbers in the book. So I have to lend the actually of the prize to my amazement. I just looked at it the other day. So, following on this and syncing up with a number of audience questions. I know you get paid big money to do this, but to the extent you're willing to share with us in public what advice would you give world leaders, particularly a new US administration, and folks like those in the. Let's just limit it to US oil majors and US electric utilities at this point in time. Well, I think we have to kind of divide it I think for, you know, for government. And really the combination of both the reality of what we have today. It's important in the economy. It's important to energy security and some ways I've described. And that's very important. It was interesting with Joe Biden was in Pennsylvania. He said, I'm not going to buy ban fracking. So, let me repeat, I'm not going to ban fracking. I mean, if we did if we wanted to went away the reality is, we would just import a lot more oil. I mean, given the structure of our economy is not going to change wind and solar are not going to really change the oil balance. So, I mean it's dealing with that reality. And at the same time, moving forward. And I think that the real answers around environment around climate, nor going to be technology answers. And, you know, consistent spending, and that's that takes time, Ernie Moniz and former energy secretary and I did a head of a report for breakthrough energy coalition, Bill Gates Foundation on the kind of technologies that you need. And the answer is that the technology so I think the commitment to science is very important. I think we do when you look at the companies you really do see a difference between the European companies and the American companies. And I think part of it has to do with the local cultures, which say, the pressures are feeling. And also, of course, pressure from investors. On the other day, I chaired a session for the Edison Electric Institute, which is the CEO group of the industry. And I had Ernie on it I had the head of NRDC, the head of environmental defense fund and utility executive. And, you know, the electric utilities are generally moving as they are in California to low carbon. Big point of debate or contention is what's going to be the role of natural gas versus renewables. But I think the goals of sort of net zero carbon are very much in playbook for a lot of electric utilities. So would you also come away with a sense that they need, you know, you need additional technologies. Actually looking at the remaining questions there's a couple of things that come up and I know some of them are in the book because you're kind enough to share a pre publication version. What one is, how does this pick how is this picture affected in your mind by two things polar opposites one is the move towards nationalism. And two, this is a student question. How is it affected by the recent, do you think by the recent state of storms and fires. In particular here in the US sitting in the US, Western US where the air is almost unfit to breathe at this point it gets worse as you go up the coast. How do you think those things will factor in. The second one, the second one is clear. I think the hurricanes have been recurrent and and have had, you know, big impacts and I think the Gulf Coast is bracing itself for another hurricane. I think the forest fires, you know, this apocalypse moves climate change debate and climate change issues even more forward in the discussion and you can see that, you know, the dual between Biden and Trump, did I see Biden, I think, called Trump a climate arsonist and Trump said the problems forest management so I think this I think this is going to make climate even a bigger issue in the campaign and it was already a big issue. On the nationalism question. That is, that is this fragmentation. What is due to markets. And it's an issue that comes up in terms of renewables because, you know, as you maybe saw the article I had on Saturdays Wall Street Journal, and I took go much more in depth into it. In the book about the supply chains for renewables, particularly lithium batteries in for solar run through China and so in a, you know, we now have a chip or does this extend further and how are they, you know, going to fashion, how are they going to respond to the current circumstances. So I think, I think if we put it in those terms, and of course renewables give us degree of self-sufficiency. It's interesting when you look at China, half of the wind half of the solar is in China, but China still building three coal fire plants a month. So, quite appropriately, I think there are a number of hours starting to get a lot of student questions regarding what advice you would give them. And this ranges for international relations fields to get into technology fields, all the way up to kind of how can we be like Dan how can we get to where you are in terms of framing the debate and influencing world world leaders. You know, I fell into this just because I became obsessed and totally interested in it and Well, maybe that's advice in itself right. Yeah, become obsessed. I was very fortunate I had a two year postdoctoral grant and known with supervising me so I just followed my interest without thinking that I was, I didn't have. Should I not have a map for the new map I didn't have a map for my life I just you know one thing led to another. And in a way I think in a sense when I write to the where that on one hand, you know there are big forces of work but you know also a lot of things happen because of contingency because of this happening or that happening. I was thinking the other day of Richard Nixon had answered an ad in a newspaper in the late 1940s to run for Congress. You know, wouldn't have been president.  So, but I think that, you know, I think it's what your students do is that I think the single most important thing you can do is participate in a seminar over over the year or two years and because of the knowledge and the exposure you'll have to a lot of different thinkers and different approaches, but obviously the base of it is his education and research. I think there, let's see how you just follow on in a way. There's a lot of emphasis in the student community here and elsewhere to kind of send the right message by doing the right thing locally. You know, if, how can we preach to the rest of the world if we can't run the Stanford campus just for one example sustainably you probably here and see a lot of this. What would be your advice to those folks about the priority you would put on them doing that as opposed to working more with people in some of the other industries and region say, Well, I think that, you know, you have to ask what is a real carbon footprint. What is the impact. I think what has impact. You know, I, in the new map I have a chart that just shows where the carbon emissions are coming from. And, you know, I think it's really the, you know, the big issues are, are emissions in the, in the emerging markets. I think it's China, it's India. That's where you have real impact. I mean, it's striking to me that US carbon, you know, CO2 emissions are down to the levels beginning 1990s, although our economy is doubled and a lot of that's because we replace coal with natural gas. So, you know, I think being engaged is, is important and it's motivating and it, and it get involved in it.  Yeah, back to the storyline related to that we do get a large number of students interested in quote unquote international relations are now more interested in energy environment so a general question from your point of view maybe a final one is how worried are you about the deterioration of all the old international alliances. I quite a lot of concern about it. I think one of the United States, I know you have a very, very international student body but one of the strengths of the United States has been its alliance system its relationship with Europeans with Japan, newly developed relationship with India. And I think for those to do, I think that's a real source of stability. I think the weakening of international organizations is a separate to concern the way they, the lack of national collaboration on COVID-19 is a very good point of a not working. And then these growing rift between China and the United States.  I mean, I always thought, you know, the factor of 362,000 Chinese students in the United States was a good thing because it tied it together obviously. One reads now that some of them, you know, were there, they disguised in the fact they were from the People's Liberation Army or they had other missions, but I think they will kind of break down of that relationship is quite worrying and it's not where it is now but where is it going to be in two or three years. How do you stabilize that relationship. And you look at historical analogies and it is concerning. As I said, you know, I went back to that element of contingency. You know, what happens if ships collide. What happens if there's some kind of exchange like happened between Indian and Chinese soldiers a few weeks ago in the South China Sea. How do you control that given polarization. So I am by temperament and optimist and positive thinker, but I think what does have to be realistic about these risks and asked, how do we manage them, and not just assume that they can go on so I think for the students of international relations people focused on that. It's there. And of course there are whole new ways of countries to be at war and combat with each other beginning with cyber war. And we've got some taste of that. And so their vulnerabilities there so I think, you know, I think that's where I would caution and you know, I concluded and you know I think people find a lot of positive messages and content in in the new map but I do say that, you know, just looking at what's happened since 2001. How many surprises and unexpected developments have happened from 2001 financial crisis. COVID, and I do have a section on a chapter called the plague that looks at the question of why, you know, why did this come as such a surprise this situation we now find ourselves in. I would say that they're, you know, be surprised, but I think there are two constants out there. One is wrestling with issues of climate. And the other is in fact the clash of nations. And so I think it's important to see how these all fit together. And I've tried to do that and do it in a in a narrative way as well as an analytical way to kind of give a framework at a time of great change. I'll wrap up. I lied at one more question just to be fair to the economist. I'm interested how you think about the advocacy of taxing carbon or taxing greenhouse gases, which we hear even our beloved colleague and inspiration George Schultz favors that as a main solution. What role do you think greenhouse gas or carbon taxing will play and a solution to these problems as we go ahead. Well, I think, you know, I think that other book I mentioned commanding heights I came out of it, you know, how should I say with a lot of respect for actually prices is as little pieces of information that tell you what to do. And so I think rather than Jerry build system of regulations and and mandates that, you know, that don't allow a lot of room for flexibility adjustment and innovation. I think the carbon tax or carbon pricing would be, you know, a very efficient way to go about it.  Some people think maybe it'll be easier now because the government will need a lot of money. Of course, it's aggressive but George Schultz and others say, you know, we recirculated back to people. So I think that using a price is would be a probably the most efficient way to do this and the one that would promote the most innovation and maybe the fastest adaptation. Great. Well, at this point, we're a little bit over time. In fact, so I'd like to thank you for presenting this work so eloquently and impactful and giving us a sneak preview on your latest Magnus Opus and tour de force so congratulations. Congratulations on another successful achievement. And if this one doesn't win a Pulitzer Prize, it should. The system is right back. Thank you. Thank you so much. We owe you a trip out here at some point. Right. Exactly. Not too distant future. But thank you. It was very meaningful for me because of the seminar. I have a chance to do this.  A group of lucky students, a small group of lucky students are going to get a chance to right now to chat with you for maybe 20 minutes longer. Thank you. Thank you for that as well. So thanks once again. We owe you a lot both as an audience and as citizens of the world.