Eddie, Eddie glens, Eddie glens, Eddie glens, Eddie glens, Eddie glens, Eddie glens, I don't know all right I don't know who you are, but you asked a great question about that the transfer of stimulus control And you know what? I it's a great topic, and you probably noticed that in our regular videos We've kind of completely skipped over it. There's a particular reason. It's like cuz it just takes a really long time There's more than one joke embedded in that statement Really, I'm not trying to be too funny, but I am it's it's about The transfer of stimulus control is not something that's easy. It's not something that you can just pick up and have a checklist with You kind of got to feel your way through it. You got to find out if stimulus control is transferring Hold on I'm getting stimuli here You can cut this we're gonna cut this brief, but there'll be a little take here and we're gonna come back because It's a lot of time So my cameraman was doing this I'm going Is that a time loop, I don't know I'm so sorry Eddie So it can take a lot of time. It could be quick maybe if your learner is ready for it and has happened in the past with them maybe but It's just one of those things that as a behavior analyst I think especially a young behavior analyst what you want is A clear-cut procedure about how things work and what you forget and what you have maybe just haven't learned yet Is that being a good behavior analyst take shaping? In you You're not I don't mean that you need to shape me Eddie I mean that the world needs to shape you as a behavior analyst and over time you're gonna figure out how you a Method that's extremely effective for you to transfer stimulus control and then you're gonna realize that that method completely is ineffective on the next person family whatever you're working with It is something that is very challenging and in general There's no one procedure You do have to make sure that you have program for it And there are things that you can do for example if you're working with parents and a kiddo Getting them to handle some of the behavior management and techniques getting them But not all of them because there's some weird ethical boundaries in here And basically just having them take over certain pieces from you and you backing off and fading yourself out of that environment so I'm I'm humid and hawing because there's a lot more that we could get into here But I just think I want you to realize that it's something that takes time work at it Read about it and read about how others are doing it post questions here post questions and other Facebook places and see how people deal with their Transfer of stimulus control it might be something that you're great at it with one type of behavior But not another type of behavior and that's places where you can ask other BCBAs And other behavior analysts how they handle it So I know this probably doesn't answer your question as well as what you'd like But I took it as an opportunity for to remind you that you still need to be shaped as a behavior analyst The science of behavior analysis is sound the hard part is allowing the art to develop in you In other words, you need to experience the contingencies as a behavior analyst to figure out what's gonna work for you So what works for me probably won't work for you so on so forth. So anyway, I hope that's Hope that kind of doesn't answer your question in a way that satisfies you So did you like that behavior video behavior video and else video video Did you like that video behavior analysis? If you did then like subscribe share please please


Appalachian Wireless proudly brings you unlimited data. Unlimited data is only $80 a month for a single line. Four lines as low as $200. Better service? Bigger savings? That's today's Appalachian Wireless, an East Kentucky network company. Fiat of speed slowed at 25 gigabytes per line to 512 kilobits for phones and tablets. And 15 gigabytes for motors. See store for more details. A comprehensive research study conducted by the University of Tennessee and West Virginia University and funded by the Appalachian Regional Commission says that not only has the coal industry and its related industry suffered in coal's extended downturn but industries not related to coal and even those outside of coal producing areas have also been put at risk. And while the research and data is new, it's nothing local economic development advocates haven't known about the coal downturn for years. A summary released by the University of Tennessee of the study titled an economic analysis of the Appalachian coal industry ecosystem says the effects of coal's downturn have reached far beyond the industry itself. The summary also quotes researchers as saying that a diversified economy is needed to combat those effects. Sore Executive Director Jared Arnett said the Appalachian region, particularly Eastern Kentucky, is perennially lagging in having enough jobs for its workforce. 38 of the 54 counties that we work in are in the bottom 10 percent of the country economically. And they were that way before we lost the 12,000 jobs. So this work that we're trying to do, if you sit down and think about it can become very overwhelming, it's very complex. Arnett said sore and similar organizations have been working for years to diversify the region's economy and have also been busy responding to the long-term effects of the downturn in coal. And we have to be mindful of the fact that even when it was strong, we still had a lot of poverty. So the work that we're doing has tremendous merit to create a future for the next generation of Appalachian Kentuckians. Arnett said the UTWVU study, the first comprehensive study of its kind, can lend additional data to the efforts of organizations like SOAR to help attract new industries to Appalachia. Arnett said the study does not appear to shed any surprising new data on Appalachia's coal-producing regions, but he said it's good that there's comprehensive data supporting what many in the struggling coal fields already know. Some people could care less about data. They don't need to see that. They just need to see that their neighbors struggling. We know problems there, but when you're talking about public policy or investments into the region, many of those audiences want to see numbers. And that gives us that information to be able to share that story. In Pike County, Chris Anderson, EKB News.


I'm very pleased to share this session on foreign, for other FDI foreign agents and energy security. Particularly Chinese direct advancement overseas is actually a major joint effort between A&U and Beijing University and a number of other institutions that are in China under the leadership of Professor Peter Draske, I don't see him. We have been working on the project for a few years already and obviously we need to work more. In fact, later this week on Friday, as a part of the research project we are publishing a special issue on Chinese outward investments being an academic journal for the China and the world we are published by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. And you have a group of experts working on the subject here that we also have a group about Beijing. So this is the area we are going to continue to explore. But today we have three speakers for the session. I was told that probably I have one for one hour and which means I may have to remind you and find out just so please keep the shot. I will be very strict because otherwise I won't have lunch. And the three speakers, the conference organizers already distributed the bio for the speakers. So I'm not going to repeat them. Three speakers today, we are one from the Center for China and Globalization, I'm President Levera from here, I'm from Maryland University and then Andrew Kennedy. I'm from Australian National University. Let's try to limit the presentation stay around 10 minutes, not more than 12 minutes. Lastly, so let's move straight into the first presentation. Good morning, gentlemen. Actually, the section of this topic is very interesting. It's about China overall with the eye and also on foreign aid and manager security. And what I'm actually going to talk about is maybe about the China overall strategy of investing overseas. And I think that really is the area that we have to be more examination needed. And so this is the topic I'm going to present today and I'd like to share my thoughts and analysis. Well, first, why China is going global? Well, we all know that China has been opened up for possibly years and we had China, it should be present in all the growths as a previous speaker has mentioned. And also, we all know that China primarily grows in the past, there is some combination of exports and also massive infrastructure building and as well as better mining celebration. Well, particularly this year, the 10th anniversary of China joined the WTO and actually since China joined the WTO China, the foreign trade has increased by 5 fold, which is unbelievable, of course, and unprecedented. So that really created a way for China's going global. Basically, if you look at China opening up 30 years ago, you cannot really have China opened up without China going global, without China going global. So it has to be a two-way street in order to balance the growths. Now, why do we have to think about how China is going global? Is it as a traditionally multinational going global approach, is it different? Or is it really China is really championing the patterns or the trend or even the paradigm shift? Because as we all know that, as we remember, after World War II, the European-American company multinational was going global with a number of multinational coming up. And also, the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, we see a large number of Japanese companies going global and now in the 1980s Seoul Olympics, we see a Korean multinational going global, a large number of multinational. So that's really representative of multinational going global. Whereas in China, however, it's different, you know, we had a Beijing Olympics in 2008, yet today, coming in and out of China multinational, there's really not many going global. So China's going global is really in different models and different models as I can say that really China is the reason for adopting the approach that's very differently from the multinational traditional approach. So what are those approaches? I'd like to analyze that and share with you. So basically, based on China's unique situation in the United States, it's opened up not very long ago and also state sector, private sector, and China has adopted a very different global strategy and has the models and models differently than the traditional multinational. So for this point of view, I'd like to summarize some of China's going global models for the question and for the research. And this is also, probably we have to rewrite the multinational literature in terms of investing globally, so that's really interesting to look at. Now, I would like to first summarize China's going global as a higher model. Basically, it's the setting up workshop based overseas. I know when we're going to hire the big electric manufacturing China, but it's also practically overseas. Higher setup offices in USA, Italy, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Jordan, and other African countries. So basically, their approach is to set up manufacturing shops overseas. And this is not many companies in China that have done that. But higher has done that. Higher now is the top world top in terms of a refrigerator producer, actually top of the warm pool as the biggest refrigerator in the world. So their strategy is basically to set up shop overseas. And now the second model is the nanomotive model. I call it the buying, shipping, and sales of the sea, which is the Chinese saying, Jie Chuan Chuo. Well, nanomotive, as we know, was a PC division in 2005 and has actually used these product lines to expand in the global market. But this model of buying rather than multinational division and the reason I know of a new shift to sell of the sea and I know actually after they acquired IBM division for the PC computers, they ranked third largest PC division in the world. And that's really a short cut for the Chinese company very low. And this is actually since then, and always becoming the national world brand. Now the third model is basically the TCL model. It's a JV approach, John Branch approach. TCL and Thomson of France has created John Branch, and also the T-Nautus Avatar announced a mobile from John Branch. So TCL approaches this somewhat differently, basically about John Branch approach and then basically using a brand name, using the others technology as development. And also we have more examples like that, like the recent design of Genevieve bridges on the mobile reaching all the bridges of SAAPs and things like that. That's all happening with the JV approach. Now the fourth model I classify as a Huawei model, which is basically from rural to urban. I use the Chinese saying, also about which is basically. Huawei has been a technology leader in its field and has actually over 70% of its revenue coming from its national. It is the worst success of China's economy. And it is the only Chinese company that coming to the 4,500 companies is the World Market Competition. And so it actually started with the, in China it started with rural and small cities and then into big cities. And internationally it started with developing countries and then gradually to rural and non-Saharan and other developed models. So Huawei was actually quite successful and for example by this year, 2001, we have significant growth over this month and that probably rise to 3.6 billion US dollars, just for the revision figure. And other companies like Huawei, like ZTZ, have a lot of similar strategy as far as this global model. The first model I classify as single model. The reason I call it the single model is because in 2005 there were big projects of Unicode in the US, which wasn't very successful but that actually represents China's state of enterprise is going to acquire a large number of natural resources or energy related commodities. So this model has been really, I see it on the rising side, particularly with the investments with Australia that China has a lot of, many companies actually state of enterprise making acquisitions and on the natural resources. This probably will continue as China becomes the number two economy in the world. And of course, not only Singapore, but part of there is like China National Petroleum Corporation, China Petroleum Chemical Corporation, and China Green Meadows and many others. So this model actually is vital to China's future energy and natural resources security. It's not only the major focus of future China for this direct investment, but also it is also a potential economic conflict to have, down the road, and how to handle this model properly and constructively torporic approaches is really the most further research. Now the sixth model I call it the CIC model of China Investment Corporation. This is four to five years back. Basically what they thought was a strategy equity participation. And in recent years, with China 4 exchange reserve, which reached 3 trillion US dollars, China started to invest overseas on so long developed land names, firms. And China started to start with China to manage some of that China overseas investment equities. And that's really become, there's many part of China's country doing that as well. They usually take a small equity stake, 5 to 10 percent, and then remain a passive investor in the company that will avoid political hassles in overseas market. The sovereign funds, as we know, that sometimes can raise a lot of eyeballs while making investment. So for example, for the circular stake in Blackstone, and also 10 percent in Buenos Aires, and two others. There's many other companies doing that as well, like SAFE, ICTC investment in South Africa, and so this back to that, I believe it will continue, and China will increase foreign exchange for portfolios. Now the service model project and the taking model of China has really set a lot of companies overseas to take a project of some kind with its own financing, and we see a lot of particularly Middle Eastern and South Asian countries. Of course, China also had a lot of risk for that, for example, the recent losses in Libya where China pulled out and according to news of finance, China has lost 50 million in Libya and resulting in 80 billion US dollars. So this actually has some risk, but China has traditionally done this for a long time. When I was working in the Middle East 20 years ago, they had a quiet and heavily involved in this aspect of the business of China's taking contract overseas. Now number eight model which I call the Wenzhou model, which means China's private enterprise is going overseas. I see this model has a lot of potential because this is where you need and I have a lot of many individual zero firms from Wenzhou which presented in the Zhejiang province, but actually it applies to many smaller and medium enterprises in China in many other regions. As a matter of fact, according to a survey done by Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada which I have also seen in February, small and medium enterprise for the local will be a major trend in the future. And Chinese responded company with the investment into the capital, over 50% of our small enterprises and maybe 6% amount of Chinese. So this is actually a growing trend. I think it has also implications for Australia and other developed countries. For example, Wenzhou, according to a study one of my colleagues that I found a few years back, we found that the Wenzhou destination of the migration heavily concentrated in Europe like, you know, mostly in Taiwan, in France and Holland and Spain. So this actually continues and this momentum will be in the future. Now the ninth model is the IMD model and believe it or not, China has actually set out a lot of IMD centers overseas. For example, Huawei has set out 17 IMD centers overseas and a lot of companies do the same. And also we see a lot of Chinese companies are doing that and for example, the Johnson province has actually set out IMD centers overseas with its Johnson companies. So this probably is a good way to utilize the talents overseas and also cut down costs close to the market that China's companies serve. Now the final model which I'm going to talk about is the SIGON and which means that it's a pretty circulation approach. It represents a lot of returnees overseas Chinese and Chinese investors overseas. And also some of the technical industrial parts that China's set out overseas. And those actually become very interesting because a lot of returnees return back to China's set up of high tech industry, internet, biotech and all the rest and then actually those companies come again and invest in the US, for example in the US, in New York and NASA there were too many companies on this there made the primary issue of this pretty circulation SIGON approach. Now final thought, I think that the Huawei model will probably be more about the future as China is more capital and also will become more labor expensive labor costs at home to really to drive this approach and to also reduce trade matters. And also it's not easy to make the normal model happen because look at what happened in the normal is that I need to purchase the international market share at SIGON and actually get the other project right in the company and so because of human resource challenges and also because of the culture of communications. The Huawei model I think has a great potential because it has already shown the technology success among the Chinese firms and then that probably will continue to be more competitive in the future. The SIGON model is probably more challenging than I want to have because China is in the big map with natural resources and energy speed of growth but it's got to become more resistant for other big players already in the market. And this model has to find a way to SIG compromise with multinationalism and also to cover more developing countries. The SIG model we like to promote in the market because this is probably more suitable to Chinese which the passive stakeholders and the minority holders will thrive with companies together. The winter model is probably the most promising one and I think this will have a lot of problems to develop in the future because as more of an SME company has come out of China and it is probably will be a way of future investment in overseas. And the future we will try and the future entrepreneurs also will be a new way of investment. And this is the SIG format and the transformation and the circulation amount. So I think that's probably what I discussed with you because I think Chinese overseas investment strategy is quite different from traditional multinational approach and I think that was really the most further study and further research on this. Thank you. Thank you very much and thank you to the organizers of the conference for bringing me out the way here from Washington. Any other Americans in the room? Gosh We have a lot of responsibilities My presentation takes us outside of Down Under to Africa and I'm looking at Chinese development in Africa. This is based in part on the book I published a couple of years ago on the Dragon's Edge real story of China in Africa but also on current research that I'm doing and trying to see whether China is going to be a or is already a rule breaker or a rule taker or a rule maker in global development planning. So this presentation is about China's development in Africa what, where, why, and how much and I'm going to start off with a story that I told you yesterday so if you were listening to me yesterday I apologize for the repetition and don't tell what the punchline is. So once upon a time there was a large very poor resource-rich country just diverting from a period of intense conflict and they decided to focus on development. We need to modernize our infrastructure, they said. We need to develop our ports and develop our energy and our power and soon they had a visit from a wealthy Asian country that had already become a major consumer of their oil and this Asian country said to them, we'll make you a bargain we'll give you a line of credit where it's $10 million and these use this credit to import our technologies our companies can help you with your power plants and your ports and many of this poor country were very concerned about this offer it was quite controversial but nonetheless they eventually agreed to it and the work began. The thing I know which two countries are talking about one of them? Some people are saying China, you're right one of the countries was China and the other country was Japan and the time was more than 30 years ago when China was just emerging from the Cultural Revolution and when they first proposed this and started to discuss it Montenegro was still in power so you can imagine how controversial this was but there are two things that I want to pull out of this story that relate to China's Asian Africa and the first is that this deal was my guess it wasn't official development since it was on market terms, it was a commercial deal and it was attractive to China because China at that point was not credit worthy they couldn't borrow internationally and they had to come up with some other way to do it so it was a long-term trade agreement that helped finance imports from Japan but the second thing about this was that both Japan and China saw this as something of mutual benefit they each saw it but they had something to gain out of it and these are some of the deals that China is setting up in Africa now the very large ones that we hear about are structuring on similar lines but these do not qualify as foreign aid or official development system now let me go into this in a little bit more detail what one of the questions is what is foreign aid well if we're looking at development aid and we're trying to compare what China does with the rest of the world we tend to get our terms back and several of the terms that are used I'm pulling out of the OECD the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development they are a group that accept the global rules global and in as much as they're the ones most are the numbers and the names and norms for development systems so official development systems are ODA has very specific criteria it has to be concessional to a certain degree it has to be given with concessional intent so it has to be something that a government actually subsidizes it has to put actual regulatory resources into and then everything else that comes from governance other official finance I love that China so that would be non-concessional loan export credits which are credits that come primarily to support exports from your country you can't con those as official development systems even if they're concessional investment loans guarantee etc so here's a picture of global development finance and so we can see all of these different flows under here coming out of various countries including China private and official and within official the only things that count as official development systems are grants and concessional loans over there so all these other things coming out of the official flows don't count as official development systems or aid and most of what China is doing is in those other categories so it's so China developmental state abroad China operates not the same as Japan and we've heard about that with regard to China's foreign investment but in a simpler manner in that they have many instruments to promote their interests many more than we're normally used to in western countries where we have our fewer state directed instruments that's particularly the case in the United States where we tend to not support our companies with direct financial interventions for the government so China their instruments that would count as a loan zero interest loans and grants and concessional loans and these are the oil dipons these are mainly official development systems everything else that comes out of the various government the policy banks and the China's Ministry of Commerce doesn't qualify as official development systems and this would include the preferential export credits mixed credits the development bank loans coming from China development bank and all of these natural exports back loans that are done on commercial terms so where does China actually give its official development assistance what this is is a chart that I put together on the database that I have but I actually started collecting in the 1980s of Chinese development aid in Africa so if we're looking just at Africa this chart shows us several interest aid banks down on the slide we've got all of these are all of the countries in southern Africa ranked the year in which they formed diplomatic ties with Beijing and so you can see the pink squares are years in which they had diplomatic ties the white squares are years in which they did not and so most of those I had ties with Taiwan during that period and so across the top is from 1960s to 2007 and so what we can see here is these are the countries that are getting aid the black squares and circles are getting aid three months and the database is not complete it's often open sources but from about 1983 onward the sources are much better and so the data is much better from that period but you can see that there are a lot of years in which the Chinese are getting aid to a lot of countries and that is spread very broadly across the continent and the main criteria is whether or not you have diplomatic ties not whether or not you have natural resources and the quantity of aid follows those patterns if you look here the resource rich countries are the ones shaded and the ones that aren't resource rich are the ones that are left blank and this is again just also here and then the circles and squares again are aid agreements so these are just in two years 2006 and 2007 so we can see the pattern of aid is going all over to the countries again that have diplomatic ties not just the resource rich countries so why is China getting aid? well the drivers are three the first is strategic diplomacy and the most important factor there is the one China policy so aid is part of China's soft power portfolio and they use it in competition with Taiwan and Africa with its many countries and many small countries is one of the key places for this competition the South Pacific is another area that's been important and the Caribbean with lots and lots of little countries and can play out without too much money so this is right now again how it is we have a pause in this competition with the government in Taiwan being more friendly we're able to accept this idea of there being just one China and they just disagree about which one it is supposed to be so the second motivator is business and so we can see particularly the concessional loans I've never mentioned about driving business and as an entry point for a Chinese company particularly construction companies but also Huawei that we just read about and Zhongxi Telecommunications, CTE they have been fostered, their business has been fostered by concessional loans coming out of China Exit and these do qualify as additional development assistance and so the third area is China's wish to portray itself as a peaceful riser, as a responsible stakeholder and player of the global economy and so things like aid aid has started to the rhetoric for aid has started to be phrased much more along the lines of the Millennium Development Goals and the doubling of aid and the other things that the West has been saying about its aid, China's been starting to adopt some of the same rhetoric about peacekeeping forces and other forms of cooperation so these are the drivers of aid and I've given up so again showing how important it is to have this widespread engagement, these are, this is a picture of Chinese leaders' visits to Africa and these are only at the premier or the presidential level since 1995 and all of the countries in great way are countries that have been visited by the premier or president and so you can see it's pretty much across the board they're going everywhere and again it's not just the countries that are strategic in terms of natural resources so the only global, this is the business aspect and then here is a little more evidence on this construction of the interest and you can see that Chinese companies' revenues from engineering projects have gone enormously from 2002 you had 1.2 billion just a turnover that was reported to the Ministry of Commerce and by 2009 the turnover of Chinese engineering companies in Africa was 28 billion so that's an enormous increase and these are not being financed predominantly by Chinese aid these are being financed by a huge of variety of sources, the World Bank the Africa Development Bank African governments that have resources for example Nigeria has and I put this on in my paper in the book a number of Chinese companies have won an enormous number of contracts by large by the Nigerian government so how much aid is Chinese aid? well in terms of official developments the assistance is quite small these are figures that I estimated from 2008 and they fit in quite well with the various announcements that have come out from time to time from the Chinese government and most recently the official aid report in April 2011, these are disbursement figures in 2008 I estimated about 1.2 billion dollars which is quite small compared to even Japan 1.6 billion or Germany 2.7 and quite a bit smaller than the US so what about these other loans that I talked about in the beginning why are these not considered additional development assistance? they're widely called aid for example, China at this point has had almost $14.5 million in Angola in these resources back then but what these are are market rate lines of credit, they are tied to Chinese goods and services it's along this Japanese model and it's not a concessional and these are the terms of the bonds in Angola you can see China Exxon Bank $2 billion for the first tranche of this long line of credit it was at London Interbank Author Grade in Libor plus 1.5% with a 12 year maturity and the grace period they didn't start came back until the end of each project with the finance of the line of credit and the Washington Group Standard Chartered Consortium they gave that very same year $2.35 million to Angola also oil backed both of these were oil backed but the interest rate was 100 basis points different or 1 percentage point and the maturity was lower so in other words the Chinese loan was a better deal but it wasn't a good enough deal to be considered official development assistance and the Chinese loan was tied to all of these projects so this is how we think it's foreign aid because it's financing development projects but it's doing it to a different kind of instrument and this is something we need to understand better about how China engages overseas now if you are interested in understanding more about this and I have a blog so I welcome you to come and visit the blog and see some of the other updates of the book thank you very much I'm very happy to be here today I'm also well aware of my status at the last presenter before lunch today very important status to have so I'll keep this as short and sweet as it possibly can my chapter for the update is about China's approach to energy security and in particular its approach to what I call China's petroleum predicament or its increasing dependence on imports to meet its oil demand the chapter and this presentation are divided into three parts the first the first part they outline the dimensions of China's increasing oil imports and how that dependence on imports is growing over time in the second part they talk about what I call China's struggle for oil security and the specific measures that China is taking on the supply side to ensure access to imported oil supplies in the future and as you see from the presentation I basically argue that I emphasize the limitations of what China has been doing thus far and how it really needs to be rethinking this approach of it in the future and then lastly I lay out that I think China really needs to more of a catalyst to take a more multilateral approach and engage with other major oil imports so very briefly if you look at China's oil import profile over the next couple of decades it's clear that China is going to be relying on imports more and more in the future its domestic production is reductive decline over the next 25 years and its overall demand should increase substantially resulting in a fairly massive impact in imports in 2009 it imported about 53% of its oil requirement in 2035 the International Energy Agency projects China will be importing about 84% of its oil supplies so that's a substantial increase and I should emphasize here that China has fairly significant demand side policies in place in order to limit the growth but even with these demand side policies in place it's likely that China's dependence on imports is likely to increase in the future now surprisingly China is taking a variety of different measures in order to ensure that its oil supplies and imported oil supplies in the future are adequate, reliable and affordable and I want to focus on four different types of measures in the chapter and I just want to briefly go over each one of them here in the presentation first China has been helping its national oil companies or NOCS to go out and invest overseas we've already been talking about that in some of the earlier presentations here next it's been diversifying its suppliers and its supply routes it's also taking efforts to protect its supply lines in particular the sea lines of communication through which its oil shipments flow and lastly it's building a strategic control team so since the late 1990s China has been helping its NOCS to invest overseas and encouraging them to do so in fact the NOCS themselves is quite eager to do that and have already begun to do so they really need any encouragement and as a result of the overseas investments that we've seen over the past decade NOCS has not had operations in 31 employment countries with produce of oil over 20 countries around the world but most of that production is concentrated in just four countries Kazakhstan, Venezuela and Cuba and Sudan and this has been good this has been good for the NOCS it has helped them to increase their reserve holdings ahead of time the prospects of domestic production in China are not right and increase their sales and profits but the question remains whether this has been good for China whether it's been good for China's energy security for some time there's been a belief in China that oil produced by Chinese companies abroad is a more secure source of supply in China than that produced by foreign companies I think this is a questionable belief and this is the behavior of the oil companies themselves in the past few years the independence that they've shown with Beijing and really underlined the point that China isn't really enhancing its energy security simply by encouraging its oil companies to go out and invest overseas and in fact some of this behavior that I described in more detail in the chapter has actually raised questions in Beijing as to whether this has been an effective strategy for promoting China's energy security so this sort of first tactic I don't think has really been to enhance China's energy security if you look at China's efforts to diversify its sources of supply and its supply routes China has made some important progress in this regard in the mid 1990s China was relying on two Beaches of the World for about 90% of its oil imports the Persian Gulf and Asia and in Asia most of the oil has come from Indonesia over the next 10 years China's import increased dramatically but it has also succeeded in diversifying its imports and starting to import oil as a firm measure of the Americas and you get most importantly as you can see here from China as well but over the past 5 years this diversification has really flat-toed and it looks like China is going to be relying on the Persian Gulf and Africa in the future it's going to be dependent on supply lines running through the Indian Ocean and then walk us straight and this is likely to be the case now it will stand in some of the loans for oil deals that we've been seeing in recent years during the financial crisis I won't go into the details here for reasons of time but if you look at the chapter it's quite clear that the suppliers of Russia are not going to be supplanting the Persian Gulf in Saudi Arabia as China's primary oil supplier anytime soon so again this is a tactic that China has had some success with but there's still I think real limitations with further diversifying and sort of some supply if you look at efforts to protect supply lines obviously China's naval modernization has been getting a lot of attention especially with the development of this first aircraft carrier under getting underway this year and also an interesting building domestically constructed aircraft carriers which I look forward to is just recently gotten underway there's also a lot of discussion in China about the kind of overseas support network that we need to maintain the Blue Water Navy in places like I think the main question for questions of energy security and oil security in particular is the kinds of missions that this sort of emerging nascent Chinese Blue Water Navy is going to undertake and we'll emphasize more multinational cooperative efforts like we're seeing in the off the coast of eastern Africa anti-parasite missions that China has been contributing to for the past couple of years or will it tend to emphasize more unilateral missions which are designed to enforce China's territorial claims in the east and south China seas I think the more clarity from China on this one would be helpful and would be reassuring for the American community Lastly if you look at China's strategic patrolling reserve this is a very significant effort I think it has a lot of potential to contribute to China's energy security in the future the first phase is already complete and the next two phases will be completed by 2020 at that point it is currently projected that China's reserve will be able to cover about 100 days of net imports which is quite a substantial reserve the question here is how will China manage its reserve and to what degree will it coordinate with other countries that also have substantial reserves and this goes into my point and that is the need for greater multilateralism as opposed to energy security traditionally the forum for coordinating the actions of major oil importers in response to a supply and disruption has been the International Energy Agency China is obviously not a member of the IEA at present although it has developed an increasingly close relationship with the agency over the past few years its continuing absence is increasingly problematic as China becomes a bigger oil importer and it develops a very substantial strategic control and real fear within the IEA that it is going to become increasingly irrelevant or at least regain agency in the future as China and other countries become bigger and bigger players in the international oil market in the chapter I lay out several different barriers to China actually becoming a formal member and the most important of these are China's own misgivings about what it would mean for China to be a member of the United States but I think all of these can and should be overcome in the long run and I think that the positive president was set just recently when the IEA announced that its members would be releasing 60 million barrels on the international oil market China was apparently consulted about the decision before it was made and after it was announced China publicly said it supported and approved the decision so I think that kind of consultation and coordination is something we'd all like to see more of and I think would be in China's interest and the interest of other important countries as well Thank you Thanks to the IEA speakers we just had a very interesting presentation as you can see I'm not very good in managing my own time I'm very good at this we still have about 10-15 minutes left let's try to keep those questions and responses brief I would actually suggest if it's okay with the speakers that we collect three questions first and then we'll ask the speakers to respond if we still have time otherwise we're starting so I can see they're the one question at the back they're the one question here and they're the one question here so we already have sweet I was just wondering what China's response will be to the conflict in linear saying that they haven't done a lot to support the coffee machine and also to implement projects for the international construction so what do you think they as a country will do in response to what's happening Thanks for your presentation and thanks for speaking to us yesterday with regards to China's role in Africa I'm just wondering you emphasize that China's approach is different from Western France and also that China takes very decisive very much policy of non-reference as seen in China's anti-piracy operations and recent military use of military assets to evacuate its citizens do you think the People's Liberation Army might have more permission to play in protecting China's interest in Africa should those interests be put Yes, I have a comment but I really enjoyed the talks I have two questions for Professor Plotikam I'm going to ask you now I wonder whether you are able to express any message especially the visual expression of Africa and then the second question I feel the misunderstanding about China in Africa is a bigger problem actually about the understanding of China in general so I wonder will you try to promote the more important understanding of China in Africa and what are the challenges you face to spread the more important understanding I suppose if people have to give China or Africa they might be less informed so what's happening to Chinese or Western countries have a relationship Exactly Okay, if you want to respond I have a question about Libya and I agree that China has developed a lot to support Gaddafi China's relations with Libya have actually not been very close and we were just talking about this yesterday that Libya in fact recognized Taiwan for quite a long time so there hasn't been a long period of positive relationships between the Chinese government and the Libyan government under Gaddafi so what they have done is go after business there and this $18 billion that you saw from the Ministry of Commerce that looks like China's loss these are actually the value of lost contracts so they assigned contracts with $18 billion in Libya and that was I think around 2008-2009 and this was at that point was more than a third of the value of the contracts of Chinese companies that signed an Africa Engineering Project so this is this is a huge loss but it's more it's an opportunity cost not only a direct loss per say it's the lost value of that business so in terms of that it's related to the second question about non-interference what role will the PLA take in the future I think we're a long way from seeing a PLA that projects the way the United States Army projects the American interests abroad and we've seen very little examples of actual intervention there's been one example of the offer cuts to Somalia of Chinese to the Chinese Navy to try to protect the trade groups there along with other countries that are trying to do that as well and then the rescue operation so I think it'll be a much more defensive kind of thing rescuing people that are in the middle of the waters then intervening militarily or having military protections for Chinese investors in Africa I don't see that happening investors a huge difference to actually send your military there I think it's nice to be sensitive about that and in terms of the cover image I like that picture because I think there's a young African boy who's kind of to me show me show me what's going on what is the real story it's kind of skeptical and he's standing in front of this Chinese arch which is actually it's a gambling center in Zambia so it's a Chinese casino and I understand that after that picture was taken that casino was sold to an investor from South Africa a little place like that I'm not sure if that's true so I think the picture is not there as a I like that you mentioned and I proposed it to OUP but it's a kind of skeptical picture but also the future for traffickers and young people and they are the ones that need to see whether or not this relationship is going to turn out to be beneficial for them I am trying to promote a more informed understanding and I've been doing that by accepting a lot of invitations like this and while I'm here speaking to people in the government and to try to engage on the basis of a more in depth understanding of how it works as an age owner as a global and going global government so that's what I'm doing so I'm spending probably too much time that kind of thing for me it's something that I find just so fascinating there's so many things to look into so many things to try to dig into and that's why I have a blog because I just have more of what to say on this all the time there's so many rumors out there to track down the reality of it I'll just speak I think I just want to add on the first question I think that's precisely the recent chance of going global that I want you to refer to because you see that China traditionally reacted in Africa, Middle East and Libya was a good example so there's a lot of political racism there that if China's company all went there and invested heavily or taken too many forms but if not carefully China could end up taking a lot of heavy tolls that risks particularly in those countries so I think that's precisely an example of that in many states and enterprises but it has to be really following the business decision involved and going there on the world I would just add that I think the Libya case really underscores the uncertainty within China as to how it should deal with situations like this its behavior at the UN I think suggested a lot of uncertainty and unfamiliarity with this kind of issue whether or not it would be in China's interest to support the kind of action that's being taken and if it's not how do you what else do you do I just think that China has a lot of thinking through to do about how stability in Middle East and Africa and it's really a beginning of that process not yet anybody want to go for a second around there's a lot of classroom there and there that's all you're the first to Africa I understand that would once be a greater opportunity in this sense so it would be difficult to generalize but still there's a lot of classroom there actually that can aid you I was wanting to ask a question about the media coverage of China in the Middle East and Africa particularly domestically in Africa given that we've seen some interesting coverage in Australia domestically about China's investment in what are ownership and agriculture ownership whether that's getting to be in Africa or whether that's mainly reflected in western press coverage of the issue okay, Jen has the last question I'd like to take up Andy's point really the question on the issue of profits versus patriotism which is really a question of profits versus the party obviously very pertinent in Australia at the moment with the concerns about these state-owned enterprises investing in our resource and other sectors and the question is whether a vice-premier of the party who is also a CEO of a state-owned company can or will behave in the best interest of the profit-maximising interest of the firm versus the party and I think it's absolutely crucial to how we respond to this rise in Chinese investment now I'm not quite sure what sort of evidence you've got or how you demonstrate that they are being profit-driven rather than party-driven but I think if they're able to have some insight into that how we determine that outcome it will be critical for how we think about individual SOEs in Australia and elsewhere abroad and of course we'll observe very different behaviours it won't be, or again it will be kept from Geneva across them but if we can pick out and identify which of the profit-maximising amphibious a good way of alleviating concerns particularly for those firms in the Australian mother context Excellent we have a maximum of five minutes left and I'll ask the speakers to please Okay, the impact of China's ODA again ODA has been very limited because it's been small so there has been a lot of impact and just as with other countries foreign aid in Africa also we've seen very little impact with perhaps the exception of health most recently there has been in the HIV-AIDS I think you can see really significant impact but other areas we haven't done well in agriculture we haven't done well in infrastructure governance, a lot of problems with things we put money into but in terms of the in terms of the finance that's going in that's resourced back loans I think we're seeing a much more substantial impact on infrastructure and this is a huge deficit in Africa so they spent which Chinese finance can find creative ways of paying for infrastructure investments and future resources I argue that this is an agency of restraint in countries with poor governance and suffering from the resource curse to actually tie future exports on the resource to pay for development expenditures today, it's an interesting model so I think that the media coverage in Africa has been it's next because there isn't a very deep tradition of investigative journalism in Africa in most countries with some exceptions particularly in South Africa and Kenya and other places so you don't find a lot of really well informed reporting and a lot of it tends to reflect and reprint the stories that come out in the northern newspapers in the case of Australia this would be that's a very good story this is a good reporting so they do tend to repeat that there are exceptions for example he has a newspaper there where he's done much more interesting work and he's actually very positive about the Chinese puzzles and others in Zimbabwe there's very active debates going on in the papers pro-con and so on so there's a lot of variety there that's quite interesting to follow then in terms of I guess I'm going to make one quick point about the UN and Libya and I think the Chinese role here is fascinating we heard some points about that but one thing this is I think we're at a critical point where the coalition forces that have been pushing the military engagement in Libya have gone beyond what the original vote was in terms of the protection of the living people and this is important and the Chinese have been quite critical of this it's important because to keep the legitimacy of the UN and the Security Council as an institution it's important for all of its members to keep them in the boundaries of the agreements that have been made and I think that in this case it's the United States and France and the UK that are more responsible for maybe violating the norms for that kind of local institution which is out of the economy Thank you I'll just respond quickly to Jane's question I think it's an excellent one in terms of trying to figure out if there are loops in charge of some of these SOEs I was looking for instances where the interests of the party the interests of the corporate interests of the oil company diverged and where they diverged how did the company behave if they behaved in the way of the corporate interests did they get away with it I'll give an example of a number of examples of that in recent years an example I'll give in the chapter is a few years ago oil prices were even higher than they are today Chinese oil companies weren't able to pass on advice and costs to domestic consumers in China because the oil prices were regulated by the state in order to protect the economy from inflation what happened was the oil companies then reduced their refinement to China as a way of sort of protesting and resulting in fairly substantial shortages in China a lot which has been gassed for a long time so it was clear that they acted in their own corporate interests rather than the national interests in making oil available to the domestic market so that part of it is actually to liberalize oil prices within China so it actually seems like they got in the light on this one and it's clear in reacting in our own corporate interests rather than the national interests I think that whether it's a party or it's a company exchange of officials which I think is probably challenging or a bit unrealistic although that if the officials move to the companies or the government they help the Chinese actually the government run the business and as a matter of fact China if you look at 31 countries it's like a city of CEOs of large operation hundreds of municipalities hundreds of small CEOs so they compete amongst each other so that's where it made a difference but I think it has to be the future to realize business and government so it's a little bit different but right now it's China's situation Thank you When I advised one of my PhD students to choose this area for studying I said this is a new area this issue will be with us for very long time so for young people it's a good idea to choose an area for special analyzation I actually think it's the same for us and I mentioned that we're all working very hard on the leadership this will spend more time and we have other people working on these issues more people working on these issues but I think and I hope you all agree with me that we all benefit from this discussion during this session and so before you race to your lunch can I ask you to join me in thanking Mr. Dries Mr. Dries