Okay. Good afternoon. Thank you for coming. We have a self-selecting group of very hardcore Syria watchers. So congratulations to getting here on a very snowy day. I'm Peter Berg and I run the international security program here at New America. We're here to discuss a new book by the Amran Center for Strategic Studies. Centralization in Syria, the concept in practice. We have two of the leaders of the Amran Center here who are also partners in residence at New America and we frequently partner with them including on this event today. First of all, Amr Kaaf, who is the founder and executive director of the Amran Center. Next to him is Yasur Tabara, who is also a co-founder of the Amran Center and we also have Mona Yacubian, who is at the US Institute of Peace and had a senior job at USAID during the Obama administration and is an expert on the region. So the Amran team will talk about the findings of the report and then Mona is going to basically give some of her reactions to it and then we'll open it up to discussion with you. All right. Good morning everyone. Thank you very much for coming on this snowy day. Briefly, today we talk about our recent book at Amran, which initially started at the end of last year actually. So some of the analysis or some of the data might be from the first quarter of 2018. However, what we talk is the macro, the big picture of how Syria looks like. And I wanted to start with this nice map that we produce at Amran. Looking at the reality of today is a very fragmented Syria. It's a Syria that has multiple armies of different countries involved, has multiple local actors. Even though this may be three colors or four, I think within each of those regions, whether it's the northeast, the north, and the northwest or the south, there are also sub-regions that are uniquely different that have totally different set of actors and influencing partners. And so from this fragmented scene, we looked at Amran, the incentive for the 10 scholars that participated in the 10 chapters of this book, was to look at ways of how do we create a new legitimacy? How do we create a new page? How do you create something that brings back these pieces of the puzzle of Syria? And looking from a bottom up approach, at the same time, looking at the top-down approach, meaning we still need, and as Amran has always published before, the preservation of state institutions, we do need a strong central government, but yet how strong are we able to go back to the status quo ante of 2011? Or is that even possible? Is it technically possible, not just wishful thinking, but also technically and in terms of the state infrastructure, is it able to do that? And also what creates sustainability? What are the basic elements of a sustainable peace process in Syria? So we looked at the concept of decentralization and centralization, basically definitions, but also looking at experiments that took place in other countries, post-conflict countries, and also stable countries, much more stable countries, how they are able to create a, whether it's confessional, consociational, some sort of a consensus-building type of a relationship between the government and the people, between the center and the peripheries. In Syria today, we have 14 provinces or governments. Are these going to be the same? I mean, all the countries involved in Syria agree that territorial integrity, the unity of Syria, and I don't think any Syrian or non-Syrian disagrees on that. But how does that implement it? That's where everyone has a different analysis. As a Syria-focused think tank, we try to present the realities on the ground. And then how do we take these realities to create a new page in Syria? That is united, but also that recognizes the differences in every region and every part and the needs of the local populations. So we look at different, can I go, these are just the headlines of the chapters. The first one is basically conceptualizing the issues of definitions and how is it applied in multiple areas of conflict. Then we go into the different aspects, the functions of the state institutions in Syria or in any country, per se, and looking at these functions, how do they apply? How are they applied in all these different zones in Syria? So looking at the political functions of the state, the security functions of the state, we've published a book last year on the security sector in Syria and how does it function and how will it function in the future. Then looking into the financial decentralization, how does it look like? We looked at the, am I going in the right order? Sorry. The judicial and legal infrastructure, so is it going to be one judiciary? Is it going to be multiple levels of judiciary that will allow, is it going to be one law? I mean today we have multiple laws and that's very problematic. That creates this fragmentation. So how do we make sure that, these are the questions raised in the book and with some proposals actually, how do we make sure that at least the legal framework is the same between all these different zones? So you have the regime has a spoken set of laws and a practice set of laws. The opposition has adopted more or less the same regime laws but modified them in different ways, in different cities and villages in, again, different ways of implementation. The Northeast has adopted a completely borrowed and new set of legal frameworks and a new, you know, even governance system. So it's a one-sided self-declared federalism versus sometimes they call it the federation and then they adopted the, or before that it was the Democratic self-administration, autonomous administration and then they said the federation and then they went back and then they formed ministries and they formed judicial council. So if I can start since I started with the Northeast but that would be one of the main, one of the regions on the map in Syria, these are the last 10 chapters but just to give you an idea of how the book looks like. So in the Democratic, what's called or what they call themselves as the Democratic autonomous administration, there is a top-down approach of governance. They declare that they will form local councils but that has not yet been founded and they have like ad hoc type appointed by the political party, the Tev Dem, which is the movement for democratic society. That is predominantly controlled by the PYD. And so this, again, this top-down approach really forces the local actors to adopt something by the use of force and by the use of military wings and we also have published a study on the military structures of the PYD and the Democratic administration in the Northeast, really very fragmented within it, meaning they've adopted an anarchist, anti-state type approach but yet they try to form state institutions that are parallel with one another, that overlap with one another, that contradict one another and thus creating a lot of issues on the local population from all the sides of the local actors. So the lack of transparency in the financial administration, they've only announced budgets once in the Congress or what they call the mini, the Mejlis, the council that represents the Northeast. You have multiple layers of decision making that really sometimes the decision maker is actually not present in the Northeast. So you reach a certain level and then there's some hidden decision maker that's beyond the border. So it's a cross-national also institution. The multiple layers also we notice that they've first had the Democratic self-administration, Idara Datia, and then they said the Northern Federation and they kept both structures working at the same time. They've announced ministries, multiple number of ministries as the executive branch but a lot of them don't function so they re-emerge them together, they kept changing the names so there's no stability even in terms of how they label them and let alone the legal framework that doesn't adopt the same framework as adopted so the regime has a law 107 that was passed in 2011 that governs the local administration. They haven't adopted that and they adopted another law in 2016 for local administration and that was also not implemented. The other issue perhaps that I can say here is also the role of security forces infiltrating and using the use of force to implement certain policies against the will of the local population so the recent clashes maybe not too recent by now but a few months ago where clashes took place between the Christian population and the PYD administration in the Northeast because of the educational curriculum that was enforced upon them and they did not want, it was forced again by, they sent the military forces to the schools to force teachers to teach a certain curriculum. So that caused a lot of friction within local populations and then you have the issues of RACCA for example, a lot of the tribal figures there also having been clashed and recently the assassination of one of its leaders and the local council really not able to operate beyond just street cleaning and fixing potholes and maybe a few buildings but still the demining hasn't taken place, the really consensus building of the local actors of the community, the return of local residents has not taken place, you go to places like Deir ez-Zor, you have also a clash between the military council that is predominantly Arab from the local population and then a group resignation and then the PYD having back to come in to continue the fight against ISIS in that region and then you have the Northeast also so these are like at least three zones within the Northeast that I could outline. If I move to the regime side, the regime implemented or executed or held or conducted elections for local councils in September actually after we finished the book but the same theory still applies because we noticed out of about 18,000 vacancies in local councils across the country they had at least 40,000 nominations for these positions, over 95% of five million may quote correctly between 90 to 95 of those nominees came from the bath party so they did not even go through the traditional local so-called political parties that were allied with the regime so before we had something that's called the Jabhat al-Wataniya which is the national front which is basically a shell cover to say that hey we bring other parties under the wing of the bath party so not even that act, that play that you used to play against the Syrian people saying oh we allow political parties to participate they didn't even do that they just went straight to the bath party and then and so this is one feature of local governance basically the bath party taking over even though the constitution took that article that says the bath party is the ruling party for the government and state and society that was taken out but we witnessed an increased sense of infiltration of the bath party the number two feature in the north in the south and regime areas is the infiltration of the security forces much more than before so being involved in every single bit and piece of the governance of the local population the third I would say is the local administration law of 107 passed in 2011 first of all gives far more authorities to the appointed governor of the province so the governor has the right to use public properties to you know all the financial the administrative decision making and the elected bodies really have no say and actually we also monitored the budgets being awarded to local governance in regime areas very very little most of them did not get salaries for the last eight years only the ones that report to the governor are the ones that are getting the funding and the authorities and the governor is the also head of the local security committee so he also controls the security forces in those regions intelligence basically not the military and so in the regime areas I think those are probably the most the features of that there is a law that that was passed but it was never implemented so it's much more centralized however there are local localities of local militias that have been awarded geographical spots in Syria in in the regime areas to to basically giving them full rights of taxation and smuggling and controlling that region even in terms of governance we also noticed in the recent election of of in September a lot of your pro-Iranian figures that used to fight in militias whether they were given citizenship or not but more or less they were in a lot of those militias like the Bakr in the north went and ran for elections are now serving on the local council so we see also witnessed Iran seeping through the cracks in that sense I think I'm almost done with my time right but I'll finish with the opposition areas within the opposition areas went through several phases within the last eight years obviously so the experience now our numbers are about 458 local councils in the north there is almost you can say three zones within the opposition areas you have the Euphrates shield you have the olive branch or Afrin region and then you have the Idlib and the surrounding of Idlib so when you say Idlib which is the demilitarized zone today it includes parts of western Aleppo it includes also northern Hama so those also have some local councils and I think this this has some of the numbers if it's clear or not not sure but the numbers as we did a field study in May and these are the general numbers now there are discrepancies between the three zones as I said in terms of who is allowed to form a local council so the government initially in 2011 has about 1,300 and 33 or 37 administrative units so those are like cities towns you know the different sizes the three size of a village a town and a city basically with different rules of how it's governed now the regime in September 2018 changed that and created new entities and that's one of the ways that the regime is pre-empting the international community of when they hold whenever this constitution process begins even or ends that the regime is always ahead meaning okay international community come in do elections we're already gonna get the majority because they've broken up the gerrymandering the whole like redistricting of cities redefining how many councils per city you have small cities in the suburbs of Damascus that used to be represented by 10 and now they have a 10 times the population and they change the ratio of representation to allow those cities to be local loyalists to be rewarded basically by giving them extra seats now and in the future so the opposition areas have more and more relied on elections in our study in 2015 it was about 30% on elections in our study in 2006 17 of local councils at least two-thirds of them were either elections or consensus so also about a third that was based on general election the other when we say consensus it's usually basically someone running for election and not being faced with an opponent so then they would the election committee would actually go out and announce the list and say anyone from the residence has an objection on these people submit your objection by in within like a week or a few days and that's how at the end the election results are certified and says well so and so are the executive committee a lot of local councils to where we're faced by challenges obviously with security elements so you have Jabhat al-Nusra or HTS in Idlib also pushing you know posing a great threat on the local councils however also our study in 2000 in not 2000 this year in May says that only out of the 268 local councils in Idlib only 15% are self-proclaimed HTS followers meaning they fully willfully in their full free will say that we are part of that terrorist organization the rest operate within the region where HTS exists and terrorizes people but they continue to do the fight and I think that's one of the lessons that we we see that whenever local communities have a sense of ownership they're able to push these extremist elements out even though it's very difficult and very challenging I think that's been one of the main challenges in in the opposition area so other challenges in the opposition local councils has also been legal frameworks meaning what is the reference point about 30% adopt the law one of seven others have modified it in different ways adopted some parts of it but not necessarily the entire but but the overall structure there's a province and there are cities under the province at least as a structure the relationship between the provincial council and the city council has been fluctuating throughout the years meaning it's not very strong mainly because of funding but also that the process is not yet matured in my opinion I think I might have more during the discussion with questions and answers but in opposition areas most local councils that we we have talked or trained or worked with they view it as a bottom-up approach more than a central government trying to force something on them so this is the approach in the mindset of many of the actors within the local councils in the northeast it's more of the bottom the top-down approach in the regime it's a no approach it's basically a security services encroaching on everybody's lives so how do we restitch back and this is Yasser's copyrighted since he's the lawyer amongst us okay so how do we stitch back and in fact this is the yeah this is well you see the map with the stitches on it so I'll leave that for Yasser to expand thank you all let me start by by thanking no America and Peter Bergen for being such an excellent host and really paying very close attention to engaging authentic Syrian voices and injecting that voice into the larger discussion here in Washington DC so thank you so much for hosting us what I'm gonna try to do as as I'm alluded is to sort of set a larger context as to why this book why now and one of since I am a lawyer I have to throw some disclaimers one of the disclaimers and this is for sort of academic integrity I was not one of the researchers of the book so I think it's I'll be risked remiss to not mention that this book has been the the culmination of great effort of a number of Syrian researchers at the Amran Center which I'm a proud co-founder of and that that is directly supervised by Dr. Omar so these people their names are on the book and I think they they are worth a praise and mention as well in such an event this book has been the culmination of a way of thinking that we have been developing at the Amran Center for strategic studies which is by the way a member of a larger consortium of organizations under the umbrella of something called the Syrian forum both Ahmad and myself are co-founders of that and sit on the board of directors of that consortium and that is a consortium of organizations that directly engage with development and relief work on on the ground in Syria and also and you know providing very much needed services for Syrian refugees in Turkey mostly and other places in Europe as well so this is this is part a of a thinking direction that we've developed based on what we call these local governance experiments that have been taking place in Syria since really 2011-2012 where you had large swaths of Syrian territory that basically became void and vacant and there was a vacuum created in terms of state institutions when this the the Syrian regime basically lost control over these areas in these territories and a number of organic bodies started just coming together by locals to administer the basic affairs of these areas and these were initially committees and then they became into local councils and then local governing councils and as Ahmad was saying particularly on the part of the quote-unquote opposition held area mostly Idlib nowadays these councils came about through a lot of a lot of times through quasi-democratic practices, direct elections, direct elections, appointments, things of that nature so we followed that experimentation if you will over the past seven years and we found ourselves investing a lot of time and energy and effort in highlighting these these experiments because to us at the end of the day as Syrians at least the segment of Syrians that identify themselves with the pro-democracy movement that came about in 2011 as an extension of the Arab Spring to us essentially this is what it's all about it's about finding tools and mechanisms of deconstructing tyranny and that comes from local mechanisms of power sharing and and sharing the control of their resources the control of their faith the control of their own governance and so that to us was an extremely important experiment or experience to highlight and to bring about and to talk about now seven years in obviously we did not want to throw in a discussion or a book out there that is an academic exercise or is a result of a discussion between only Syrians among themselves although that is that has been a missing voice and that is an extremely thing important thing to do we also wanted to put something out there that is relevant to the political discussions and the political discourse that is taking place at the international level and so we wanted to talk about we wanted to talk to power brokers that that are controlling the the the faith or the direction of the political process in Syria if you can call it that at all at this point and so we started from the assumption that look that we do have a at the facto fragmentation of Syria at this point there are at least three distinct zones of influence as I'm always was talking about and these three distinct zones of influence have within them the fragmented as well or sub if you will zones or or or localities of governance and influence and these but but these three zones of influence have you know more or less common denominators within each of them that make each one of them a unique experience to the other and so we took that context and and and we basically thought that a discussion or the the combination of the information and the effort that we've been doing on local governance in general could be taken into consideration when we talk about how we can bring this this this picture back together everybody all international actors all international brokers in terms of at least in terms of discourse talk about preserving the territorial integrity of Syria everybody talks about the the woes and and dangers of the fragmentation and disintegration and and separatism within Syria but but really nobody is is talking about how a the current situation is exactly that and be how can we reverse that trend and so as Syrians we we thought the way to do that is to actually poke into these what some might see as taboo concepts decentralization is a taboo word for a lot of people I mean it immediately invokes the the thought of Kurdish separatism for example in Syria and we we decided to approach it from a completely different angle and and put the highlight on what has been going on locally in Syria on the local level over the past seven years in terms of governance experimentation and and then take that as an entry point into forcing a discussion if you will that is a Syrian led discussion based on Syrian authentic voices from the ground and put it on the table and say look we are ready to talk about a healthy form of decentralization and we think that the international community should pay attention to this and talk about this as well obviously we couldn't stay at the at the political discourse level we needed to authenticate what we talk about through studies and through documentation and so you see the sort of that the the time frame or the outline of the book discussing in depth you know on a conceptual level what decentralization and centralization concepts mean what have they meant to different political and your graphic context in the past to countries that have gone through similar conflicts or different conflicts and what we found out is that the question of decentralization is a spectrum is a spectrum concept it's not a binary concept so you you cannot either say we are hoping for a hyper centralized status quo anti model where you have a very strong central command in Damascus and that basically controls every inch of the territory with all of its with all of its components and at the same time which is really the wish and the behavior of the of the Assad regime right now and and the the behavior of its allies I mean at the end of the day and and and to be completely honest and without having to resort to conspiracy theories but you know the there there has been a lot of discourse on controlling or containing the violence and the the mayhem and the disruption within Syria so it does not spill into other areas and does not further state destabilize the regime and the larger area and a lot of Europeans and Western you know political fears have been talking about containing that by religion amizing and rehabilitating the Assad regime and granting that that regime the power to govern once once again in a central way the only issue is that this is not feasibly possible anymore even if your political agenda was to rehabilitate the Shah al Assad regime and go back to a hyper centralized model you are going to miserably fail just because the Shah al Assad and the regime do not have or have have completely lost any semblance of state functionality in terms of political control in terms of military control in terms of financial economic development all of these aspects that make a state a states are no longer available and these are also based on a number of studies that we've conducted in Omran over the over the years and we have a lot of them throughout the past year that actually point to the power discrepancies between the allies of the of the Assad regime and the Assad regime itself whether it's the Iranian militias or it's the Iranian indirect project of establishing a parallel states structure within Damascus and and and other urban centers that the regime has regain control of whether through the the the the Russian you know heavy investment in their presence militarily and otherwise and economically in Syria so that reality is no longer up for discussion I mean that that's that's hope of regaining a centralized model is no longer available for discussion and so you go then to the other extreme of of a decentralized model and this is again where we say that more or less that's our reality at this point and that's what as Syrians we do not want to see happen and so we talk about within the book and I really encourage everyone to I think we have enough copies of the book we've the book was originally written in Arabic like many of our Omran publications but we've for special publications we we put quite a bit of efforts and resources into producing it in almost an authentic version of English that is easily readable for for English consumers and so nearly from our perspective just just having forcing the discussion on decentralization from a Syrian perspective and and putting it you know introducing it to the to the political lexicon if you will of Syria from our perspective is an extremely important thing to do and that's what we have been attempting to do and I'll wrap up in a couple minutes so one of the things that we also discuss in the book throughout one of the themes that is discussed in the book is that a lot of the political discussions that are taking place right now focus on the top bottom approach so where you know everybody's talking about the the the constitutional committee and how it's going to be established and how that's gonna basically resolve the the political crisis and and then you know all parties will come to that constitutional committee and establish a constitution that will that that will bring us to a to a better result what we're saying is that that approach in of itself is as I said before is is flawed you want to engage those at the bottom at the level of local governance and and and and bring that those experiments up so they can bubble up to the top where they can meet that discussion that is taking place at the top and so it's not a top bottom approach nor should it be a bottom up approach it will be it should be a combination of both the some of the most important or some of the the the files that are basically discussed out there in terms of the political process right now including the constitutional committee including the issues that are most important for the US government and the Russians and and and other main actors in the Syrian file are the Iranian presence are the the the question of ISIS and countering violent extremism in Syria the question of reconstruction the question of refugee repatriation and I'll end here all of these all of these buzzwords all of these elements of discussion that are taking place at the at the high level needs a a Syrian I mean we have a crisis of agency of Syrians we have a crisis of legitimacy who's who speaks on behalf of who we really need to re-inject the the Syrian discourse or the Syrian point of view in all of this and when we're taught so when we're talking about questions of the Constitution we shouldn't only be talking about the what's this constitutional constitution constitutional committee should look like we should also talk about issues of content we should talk about how we could introduce and inject and ensure a model where you have a real power sharing as opposed to delegation by the by a central government to the peripheries we need to talk about how can we come up with mechanisms that guarantee the the the enshrining the rights of the periphery within the Constitution and to administering some of their their affairs and controlling some of their resources in order for that discussion to actually be a valid one in addition obviously to the general you know criticism that everybody talks about which are we cannot talk about just the Constitution we need to talk about mechanism of implementing the ideals of that Constitution I'll leave the other vials actually for the discussion because I think they are more appropriate for what is taking place right now in DC as as for the the American agenda in Syria and I think that would be more appropriate for questions and answers thank you thank you that's a great thank you so much thanks Peter in New America for hosting us and congratulations a modern yes or full and the Omran Center for I think a terrific book I commend it to all of you because I think it is actually an authentic very thoughtful and very thorough treatment of what I think is really the critical question honestly going forward for Syria if Syria is to find some sustainable path towards peace and that really is sort of the role of decentralization I want to be brief because I think it's important that we get the audience engaged in this but so I'd like to reduce my comments to basically four points the first really is about context and the context that we find ourselves in with Syria today which I think really underscores why this book is so important and why it's important now and the two key contextual points I would make is one that unfortunately as the conflict has evolved into now a complex multi-layered regional and frankly even global conflict Syrians are increasingly or the Syrian voice is increasingly left out of the discussion and I think both Ammar and Yasir have made very very important points here and I would underscore them how important it is to have a Syrian voice on this very critical issue of decentralization second contextual point is at the same time and somewhat ironically maybe we see the Syrian regime consolidating its control over parts of Syria in a way that underscore and I think the book lays this out the importance of decentralization when there is a regime and when when you have a country such as Syria a plural country that has gone through the trauma of the war that it has experienced that I think we are seeing increasingly the value and the importance of decentralization of devolving some degree of power away from the center and I would argue this is an important point in the Arab world more broadly where we should understand what's happened in Syria as part of a broader collapse of the social contract and where in different instances we see that decentralization actually is quite an important element of a sustainable path towards peace we see it in Iraq we see it faultingly or haltingly in Lebanon we may see elements of this in Libya and Yemen and I certainly think it's important in Syria and I think it's important particularly because of the nature of the current regime and particularly because of the history that Syria has had with authoritarian regimes and I would commend the book on many scores one of which is I think an excellent analysis of law 107 and the ways in which as currently constituted it is not fulfilling decentralization in the genuine sense so that's the first point second point is a much more positive one which is as both my colleagues have laid out there really is a I think fascinating and in many ways positive experiment that has gone on in opposition held Syria over the past several years with decentralization it is absolutely been bottom up it has been very organic I have the honor of working on those issues from my vantage point at USA aid and I continue to follow these questions and what I would underscore is this experiment has yielded I think some very positive experiences with local councils not only in their ability to deliver services which is important the delivery of essential services is important for communities but also the ways in which even at the level of service delivery that has provided an entry point to governance and I would really underscore that those two issues cannot and should not be disentangled that they are intimately linked I think the book a little bit sometimes makes that distinction I would not I think in particular I would focus I would say look at what happened in southern Syria where you had a fairly extensive period of relative stability it's all relative in in those areas in that on Konaetra I know we're in a different place now but I still think the experiment is important to understand where the entry point for building these local and eventually provincial councils was the provision of essential services but in ways that were responsive to the local population that were equitable and accountable and so I think that there is a lot to learn and we've seen other instances across Syria of ways in which these local councils have have built themselves up have become responsive to local populations have knit themselves together at the local level and have become also connected to provincial councils I think this is a very important experiment that should be studied that's why I commend the book that's often forgotten because of all the trauma and all the tragedy and all the hardship that we see in Syria there are though of course challenges as well and that would be my third point and again I think here too the challenges have been brought up certainly the difficulties that many of these local councils have had in contending with armed actors and the regime certainly in terms of the regime's barrel bombing and taking over of territory but even in opposition held areas we continue to see and idlib for example as Ammar was noting we see this struggle between armed actors and civilian governance structures and the difficulties that these that civilian local councils have in asserting themselves we see it as well in eastern Syria in areas that are that are controlled by the Syrian Democratic forces and so that I think is a is a continuing and very important challenge that needs to be needs to be understood I think the book rightly points out some very specific issues in Kurdish held areas particularly as you move down to Arab majority areas in in Raqqa and Derzor where you have still Kurds that are holding leadership positions that are actually calling the shots it's not so much the composition it's 50 percent Arabs it's 50 percent Kurds it's who's who actually has the power and here I think the book rightly points out some of the difficulties there the top-down approach of the lack of transparency challenges in the in the realm of education in particular issues with forced conscription these are all very very valid concerns and I think the book also raises something that we probably don't talk about enough in this town and that is the cultural divide again in the northeast between an ojalanist view of culture and society and a more sort of traditional Sunni Muslim maybe you sharia oriented perspective where there's a deep clash there and I think sometimes we don't here in Washington appreciate enough what that difference looks like and and so I would argue I think this is good reading for colleagues in the U.S. government for colleagues that are working with the counter ISIS coalition to understand some of the challenges that that we need to be thinking about as we think about not only stabilizing these parts of Syria but also deepening and improving local governance I would also add though I think and this is what I would have wanted to see more of in the book and that is a deeper treatment of what's happening in areas that are being protected by Turkish forces so the Euphrates shield area in particular a freeing which I think has a whole boatload of issues related to it but I think it would be important to understand better what are those local governance structures contending with what's working what's not I would hope that we could have frankly more sharing and more lessons learned across these various fragmented areas of Syria I think that's that's an essential and important step toward eventually knitting things back together as Yasser has talked about and that's probably a good sort of segue to my final point and that is really frankly the again to underscore the importance of this book and what I like about it is that you know I think one of the things we've learned in Syria is how quickly the situation evolves on the ground and how important it is not to wait we cannot wait for a political settlement in Syria we need to work with what we have on the ground now and I wholeheartedly endorse the idea that this bottom-up powerful model of local and provincial councils should be embraced should be supported and we should think about and understand how we can in fact use that as an entry point toward and the an ultimate sort of vision of what a politically stable and I hope ultimately democratic Syria will look like I think that again I think it's it's it's of critical importance so in particular to conclude I would say some of the things we need to be focused on and here I'm speaking as an American I'm speaking as someone who was formerly in the US government and who continues to think a lot about what our policies should look like I think we have to continue our efforts to strengthen and build the capacity of these local councils on the ground it's it's critical it's not just a security footprint a US security footprint on the ground I would argue frankly more important than that are is the building of the capacity with our Syrian partners on the ground of local governance structures I also think we need to understand and put much more time and thought into the political economy of assistance and governance who are the winners and who are the losers who is being ignored who is not gaining access to these local and provincial councils whose voices aren't being heard because I think this speaks to frankly the issues that brought Syria into this horrific conflict in the first place and they need to be addressed issues about you know sort of lack of lack of equality amongst various communities disparities in development and the book talks about this and I think it's really it's a really important point to address I am going to leave it there and look forward to further discussion and questions from our audience thank you thank you so Mona talked about US policy what is US policy in Syria right now and how do you see Ambassador Jeffrey kind of playing what role is he playing who are you directing that anybody it's that we actually had a shorter discussion backstage on this earlier and I think that's the US policy right now there has been a clear attempt to clarify certain points of position on you know a number of important files vis-à-vis this Syria issue and I think what Ambassador Jeffrey has been able to do is at least articulate that you know the US is interested in a number of very specific points when it comes to Syria and these points have to do with countering you know ISIS ISIS presence and making sure that it's eradicated and it's it's out of Syria and dealing with its you know consequences and making sure that there is some sort of a strategy to make sure that that's seen through the second most important point has to do with the Iranian presence in Syria and that is you know that is a point that is emphasized by this administration not just in Syria but in the larger region and and the third main point has to do with the type of government that the US would like to see function in Syria and I think there are those in the audience that you know are experts in the topic of the US administration current position on Syria but suffice it to say from from the perspective of this particular book that in order for you as the US administration to tackle these questions to talk about to seriously talk about ending the Iranian military presence in Syria or countering ISIS and or other violent extremist organizations in Syria or ensuring a government that does not that that commits to the non-violation of human rights and that commits to the question of accountability in all these things in order for you to take that you know those those points from a theoretical wishful thinking you know approach to a more realistic approach you really have to engage and and invest as when I was saying in in the local administration experiments that have been taking place over the years a lot of these entities and a market can elaborate on this as well have demonstrated over the past years specifically in concrete examples on how they you know local governance could actually fill in the vacuum where you have an area that is controlled by but violent extremists and the the the establishment of a local governance structure can can be a more of a sustainable way of you know fighting that that presence same thing with with you know the question on on Iranian influence or Iranian integration within within you know Syrian state structures I mean Ahmad was talking about the local administration elections in in regime held areas where 95% of the candidates were actually from the Baaf Party a very large percentage of those candidates actually came from personnel that were part of Iranian supported militias in some of these areas to integrate themselves within these local governance structures and so unless we talk about that level of whether we dissect the issue down to these very basic levels of governance then we're not going to be able to really deal with with with a problem as we see it as the administration here if you have a question can you raise your hand and wait for the mic and identify yourself we're very thorough problem solved hi my name is Jack Kropansky unaffiliated what about foreign policy in terms of the different groups have different interests with different neighbors so some you know in terms of how they want to relate to Iran versus Turkey for example and also with Kurdistan what about the aspirations of the Kurdish people for independence is that how can that be kept down I mean which I don't understand the first one about foreign policy but but starting from from the end how if I understand your question is how are these different parties related to the regional actors is that more or less your so how are the local actors in the different zones I mean in the opposition areas you have the the competing Russian and Iranian interests and even Chinese interests too in opposition areas you also have a lot of competing international but since there was a question on on Euphrates Shield I think we do need to focus more perhaps in the next year as we start this year I mean the 2019 to focus on on field studies in the Euphrates Shield we've done a little bit but maybe not in this book specifically I mean there are issues of concern in terms of how are these local government local councils being related relating to the international actors so who decides education policy in Jarablos or Azaz is it the local council president is it the interim government or is it the education ministry in Ankara there are issues at that stake and it's really not the same in every city in the Euphrates Shield so it's also varying degrees it's as if if I make you know try to understand the thinking of the policymaker either they're experimenting and they're testing the grounds or the I mean the security element is very high that a lot of these things are really overlooked so it's probably the local actors that are taking upon themselves to to decide on certain policies that are non-security related so I think it's the latter so I think it's in a lot of cases that we looked at where you had videos going on online of certain things that are objectionable to the local populations and we find out that it's usually some local actor that wants to you know prove his loyalty to the Turkish government and they would do certain actions on their own without being requested to do that's one type of relationships the other types of relationships that have to deal with infrastructure we know because we have a relief organization that operates in this area and a lot of the permits the licenses have to come from the governor of Kaziantap for Jarablos killis for this is the Turkish city across so so a lot of and that's also in terms of the long term it's really not creating capacity it's creating local councils that basically report to the authorities on the Turkish side so administratively there is a difference between administration and meaning governance and non-military non-security and security so the the governance all the service the public service delivery really the reporting the decision-making is coming from matching or or the the basically the government the Ministry of Education Ministry of Health in Turkey that is in charge across the border there has been elections in a lot of the local councils they do get some funding from the Turks and from other sources of funding but it's really not it's I mean maybe if you compare to other areas they're much more advanced but it's not the optimal case meaning there is a conversation going on in a lot of these areas of how how best we can restructure this relationship and I think this is where when when when there is an empowerment of a provincial local council by Turkey by even you know the international countries that are involved in this region that we we try we have a systematic approach of empowering a provincial or a regional council committee you know club could be anything that would at least unify the policy and strategy of these local councils so if there is 36 37 I think local councils minimum in the Euphrates Shield then how is the decision-making processes taken now all of these are usually are carried through by elections or by local you know consensus building types meaning they are technically at least technically not appointed by the Turks so they you know Turkey has not gotten itself involved in appointments per se but more or less you know that that process has not yet matured I think to to form like a unifying strategy among these local councils and empowering them it's a process I'm not saying it's not there and it's maybe you can go to certain councils that are much more advanced where really the Turkish authorities allow them and empower them and in other cities it's less so it depends on which which reason I don't know if I answered tried to answer as much as possible you know I think for that question you absolutely did and as you were speaking I thought boy I hope you have a sort of a concept paper out there for another lengthy report if not book on this topic because I think it's it's really of great importance could I maybe just say a word about the question because I think in a way your question the second part of your question about the Kurds and their aspirations I really think it sort of underscores the central tension around this issue of decentralization which is sort of decentralization but how far because I think this is the concern you know I think you guys correct me if I'm wrong but pretty much any Syrian you talk to will say they want a unified Syria they are not interested in a partitioned Syria fact that's supported by some of the polls that were conducted to about 450 local councils in the area exactly and I and I think for the Kurds you know there's I think there is a tension there but I also think that that Kurds ultimately see some sort of evolved semi autonomy within a broader Syrian context but it is a tension and it is a real challenge and for me you know I voice as an analyst I think about this is a central paradox which is in a way to keep Syria together you have to somewhat decentralize it and it's it's somewhat maybe doesn't make sense but that's exactly where I think the country needs to go but this will be again correct me if I'm wrong this will be years of deep thinking and negotiation over time as to what it looks like but ultimately a unified Syria likely will need to be a decentralized area and managing that balance will be a critical that raises the issue I mean here we sit here in the United States we had a sort of civil war that was something to do with some of the same issues in the sense of what level of decentralization and what level of independence and you could argue that we're still living with the kind of reconstruction took the did you know it was we're still living with some other fall out so when I hear everything that you've all said I've got to say it's very depressing I mean you know because you're trying to you know stitch this thing back together but you know I always thought the Afghan-Pakistan problem was very complicated because there's so many outside actors and so many ethnic groups but this seems much much harder and so I guess the first question is like I mean what if somebody from the regime was here and I presume no one from the regime is here and what would they say to this you're you're what you're what you're saying because I mean they won the war I mean it seems right I mean that seems uncontroversial and when you win the war you kind of like it's your way or the highway right so yeah I think I think yes I said that it would be very hard for them to go back to complete control but so realistically how do you make this happen in with with a sort of totalitarian state that basically thinks it's one and kind of has one I mean I I think the definition of winning needs to be yeah you looked upon because it depends who won first of all and what they won did they win Syria did they win the Syrian people did they win the 60% of the population that's outside of its areas and regions yeah is it Russia that one is it Iran that one is it Syrian businessman that profited from from process I mean it's it's the coalition with the the the the the cult around a Charlotte said has shifted has changed during the crisis meaning that cult that was there in 2011 is no longer holding the same power that it used to today at that time so it no longer holds the same power and so now you have new economic actors new business people you have new militias that control certain regions in the region regime areas you have a military institution that lost four fifth of its artillery of its equipment of its man power you have a military academy that has not graduated a single graduate in the last eight years you have you know a complete meltdown of ministries of local councils of local service delivery institutions within the state infrastructure that has not been funded meaning there are government institutions that have not paid salaries for a long time you have you know certain villages in in its own you know population in its own loyalist areas that really demand you know you have small protests relatively smaller but in areas in in Tartus or Latakia areas that have protested against oppressive regime practices and these are loyalists and have said how come the town ten kilometers or five kilometers away or in US miles so a few miles down the block have elections and we don't and this is why the regime was pushed to actually conduct the so-called elections of September 2018 and so you know that's that's one one side of it and so there is there is a lot of depression going on but I see the other side you know of the success of the progress and I see it not as a zero-sum game as a winning or losing but I see it as a process and I think that process has kicked in meaning there is no way back to the previous you know methods and tools and manners and approaches to governing these local populations even within the loyalist population so and when we go to the northeast there's also a very complex issues of how do you govern these areas how do you govern both the Arab tribes I mean look at the suedeh which is in the southeast of Syria it is it has been and it seems to be governed in a self-administration type governance structure and it seems that that is how and it's mainly predominantly Druze sect and so you know you see these these new experiences when we talk about local councils really as I mean Yasser has been in meetings in 2012 as early as early 2012 meeting with some of the local actors in Syria about local about how do you form local councils and skimming through these eight years since 20 or six years since then I think it has it has accomplished I mean for for in a full country called Russia to go in and bombard the entire regions of the opposition we still have 458 local councils we have at least 20 at least 30 displaced local councils so the governing council of Damascus suburb is still in operate it has an office in it live in the suburbs of it live in the north and it has it's now servicing it has civil records it has documentation of you know the right of return so trying to to advocate for the right of the demacine and suburb Damascus people to go back to their homes you know so it has a very much more expanded legal department talking about law number 10 and the housing and so there are a lot of challenges that are going on so I see that side of the of the aisle you know that I see a lot of more opportunities and this is where of these local councils taxing people a lot of them are I mean I think one of our findings has been that at least 30% of the local councils if not less I mean just a few percentage points less are self-sufficient meaning they have revenues that either bakeries or you know fees to to the services whether it's cleaning fees or you know stamp in the Middle East is very common to have a stamp for government document and a signature so the stamps it's basically like miscellaneous fees and taxes and so forth whether it's for civil records marriage documentation of real estate exchange and and so forth so there are certain a good percentage of and especially and maybe that's one of the I mean there are challenges but there are also a lot of positive things taking place in the Euphrates Shield is that because the security situation is relatively compared to many other regions more stable or less risky local councils have a much more stable environment to operate under now they are still once in a while being threatened by some of the armed groups even in the Euphrates Shield but it's not as bad as it is it's Turkish yes it's Turkish control Turkish army controls yes I mean the challenge with your taxation question is that is there a legal framework that basically brings all of this taxation into into place and and for it to make you know we make sense of a fiscal policy that that sort of governs and redistributes resources and determines development priorities and all that stuff and I think you'll see a lot of these local councils ready to sort of be plugged into a larger legal framework the challenge is how can we establish that common denominator of a legal framework across the entire three zones of the influence and I think this goes to back to your question earlier Peter is that you know yes I mean the challenge yes we were facing a regime that wants to go back to extreme centralization they don't have the tools to do it but but that doesn't seem to matter to them because from the very beginning they've been acting in a self-preservation mode and that's what motivates them primarily and decentralization for sure goes against that I mean that actually will be the end of that particular regime now how do you deconstruct that very complicated catch-22 and I think that's where international brokers people who have a say or countries who have a say powers who have a say in Syria need to start forcing that conversation that conversation has to be forced also from the top that's okay we need to start talking about decentralization as a solution and as tools of and really quickly I want to address the question of the gentleman or an aspect of the question of the gentleman that the front row in terms of loyalties of some of these areas to to foreign powers I mean that's that's one of the more interesting aspects of any decentralization model in Syria that you'll see that the zones of influence as as written in the in the map that Omar showed to not be commensurate with the the sectarian fault lines in Syria they're not we're not I mean the the the sectarian makeup of Syria is so diverse and so integrated that's for example the area that's you know that we call East Euphrates and that is controlled by the quote-unquote the Kurdish forces is majority Arab I mean population wise the you know the the area that is controlled by the regime is Majority Sydney and so it's you're not talking about so that layer of of sectarianism and and is not there so that's one less problem to deal with when it comes to the question of decentralization in Syria I think and that's something that probably now has a lot to say well if I could I just one quick point on your initial question Peter because I think and as Yasser has also just laid out I mean this regime absolutely is diametrically opposed to the notion of decentralization and you're right that the regime has largely prevailed certainly in the Civil War again bearing in mind there are several different conflicts going on at the same time but I would argue it's a Pyrrhic victory and this is a reason there is no return to the status quo anti there's no way to get that the genie back in the bottle this is a regime that has really been hollowed out that it's as as fragmented as things are in non-regime held Syria so too in regime held Syria the the sort of patchwork of militias that the regime is reliant upon for security is just one example the new actors the new sort of war lords and those who have benefited from this sort of war economy is another example economically and so the question though I think the key question that maybe you are alluding to is okay if this is if that is correct then what is the means by which to compel movement and to compel a political settlement toward you know that that that embraces this notion of decentralization is this something that has to wait until a post Assad Syria can we wait if not how to compel the regime what what's the leverage and how does one compel a regime that is wholly resistant to the notion of decentralization if I had that I'd be a much more highly paid I don't know I mean I think it's something we all have to this is what we should be grappling with yeah I mean now you're talking about now Russia is extremely interested in two taught in two files right now it's interested in the file of reconstruction and it's interested in the file of refugee repatriation and to the point where one would argue that that their support to the regime to their main to their ally is is somewhat contingent upon making some progress on these two on these two files I think that could be an entry point yeah I mean and recognition it's also looking for international recognition and therefore then if that recognition is withheld until there is a political settlement that is more reflective I mean there's a lot of academic research on why people come to the peace table right and you it's I think it's art man right it's a it's a mutual recognition of a hurting stalemate so the United States is in a hurting stalemate that has got it to the negotiation table with the Taliban despite the fact that three or four months ago the Trump administration wasn't even thinking about it so history would suggest that when you win a war think you won a war you're not going to do and compelling this regime seems the Russians I mean they have interest in reconstruction you say but are they they have very few clients and with particularly very few clients with access to a warm water port so I mean how much compulsion with the Russians really put on aside even if they think he's an unpleasant guy and they don't admire I don't know I mean it just seems like you know I mean the Iranians the Russians are the only groups the only countries that might be able to compel him some of the United States has very little influence of either of them so what I mean how what might change for the Assad regime to sort of recognize that some kind of deal is helpful I think it's going to be a long-term process I mean I think it's I mean and I think that look I there has been a lot of US support of of local government structures in the past but what's I think part of the point that you're making earlier is that more support needs needed there but what I would even argue that is that that support was never connected to to the larger political discussion and I think that missing link has to be has to be rectified so do you think the Trump administration is going to do a better job now of this I mean do it with Jeffrey and I mean for is it just I mean the problems are too big and they can just fiddle around the edges I mean what I mean I think one of the entry points is to talk about Iran and so far the policy the announced policy to to counter Iran Iranian influence in the region and and so forth I haven't seen yet a I mean other than the sanctions but I mean this is you know Saddam Saddam lived through 12 years of sanctions and survive has the ability to survive and Assad has perhaps a much more ability to survive types of sanctions I mean we have a total parallel economy in Syria even prior to 2011 meaning the transfer of money and so forth and his blood is another example of how it continues to survive so I mean I think one of the ways you can weaken and put pressure on the regime is to push out Iran through systematic approaches and I mean this is not a either a military or economic sanctions I think there are so many ways in between these two options and when we limit ourselves with Iran to just talk about these two it becomes problematic and depressing and clearly there's a dissatisfaction amongst Iranians about the cost of this expedition so that I mean because basically today our assessment of the regime areas is it relies heavily it's like completely in the hands of Iran and even on service delivery projects education sector health sector in Damascus in Derzor in Aleppo look at the number of schools built being built in Aleppo I mean I think this is one thing that perhaps is important I mean and we don't see these things happening in Raqqa or or in other areas that were liberated from ISIS meaning and that's a dangerous zone where the US was involved in in cleaning up these areas from ISIS but yet we don't have a new system look at the Euphrates shield we have new highways roads hospitals infrastructure that has allowed close to a hundred thousand Syrians to go back to those regions so and now you know Turkey is closing down some of the camps in Turkey I mean not pushing people out but perhaps saying there's no need to sit in camps I mean there there's a safe zone inside or you go and have jobs in Turkey but but and so you know you talk about reconstruction or refugee repatriation there is no I mean that's that's one of the things that you could you can put pressure and and then the first one was Iran putting pressure on Iran really puts pressure on the regime the regime has little budget and has little manpower okay so we're gonna take this gentleman and this gentleman and this gentleman and we're just gonna take them together because we've got two minutes latch so I just wanted to ask this to know can you tell me how much of our consensus the Syrian people all together including the regime have with respect to the Constitution is Syria is being recomposed or reconstituted but if it's such if it's about a constitution is much more serious but can you can you comment on this if the Syrian people is have a consensus around the Constitution including the regime or not and based on what you know now okay is there is a recomposition or a re-constitution this John my name is Roy Coleman I'm an intern at the Middle East Institute I was just wondering we've discussed a lot about Iran and Russia I wonder if you could talk just briefly about the role of other regional powers Saudi Arabia Israel Egypt who have an interest in countering Iran's influence who might be looking to flex their influence a little bit and what role they might play in helping bring about this vision you have for Syria okay David Harari from the Center for Development and Strategy curious whether you guys touch upon environmental quality and resource insecurity water food and those kind of things especially with trade pertaining to these councils as well okay and then this gentleman here and we're gonna it was water I mean basically a question about water water and food security yeah thank you all for your great insights when talking about the local councils in the opposition areas you describe the one that you describe as the only bottom-up model what is the direct impact of the US and EU pulling aid away from those local councils and what is the long-term impact if we continue on this trajectory especially from stabilization and countering extremism okay and don't feel like you have to answer all four of those questions each because that's a 12 answers and we're basically out of time so just like whatever you think of the kind of key question you want to address I'll go very quickly and I'll answer I'll answer two of the questions the one on foreign influence in Egypt Saudi and Israel and their their roles in this I think Egypt and Saudi Arabia frankly their Egypt has never really played a significant role in Syria and Saudi Arabia's interest has really diminished significantly as it is pivoted and turned its attention much more toward Yemen with an asterix that the Saudis have provided as part of the Trump administration's attempt at burden sharing have provided now I believe a hundred million dollars in in stabilization assistance Israel I think the the issue for Israel is Iran primarily or completely and there I think though we're at a very dangerous time because I think the Israelis for them this is it sounds like to be an existential issue they had been working somewhat cooperatively with the Russians that cooperation diminished recently but I won't go into events have happened I think we're at a moment where for me what's more concerning is that that there could there could be unintended escalation between Israel and Iran in a way that really redounds badly for Syrian civilians on the ground in Syria the last question I will take which I think is a critical one and I thank you for asking it because it gives me a chance to make my point that I think US commitment to stabilization funding in Syria is essential and as I said before we should we hope we have learned the lessons from Iraq I hope we understand that if we are seeking the enduring defeat of ISIS or any sort of extremist group it is essential that we provide assistance both stabilization assistance and overtime governance assistance to local Syrians on the ground to ensure there is no vacuum that is opened up and that is often filled by extremist groups instead I think it we frankly we owe it to Syrians given the amount of devastation that has occurred particularly in Raqqa which is 80 percent destroyed as a result of the counter ISIS strikes it is imperative that we be there that we stay for the duration with respect to some degree of stabilization funding I think with regards to the Constitution if I may answer that one one of the problems is I think the regime has and with Iran actually with a deep state parallel state structure they're able to to get away with any type of constitution so you can put the best constitution they remove the article 8 in 2012 six years ago what happened in Syria nothing the bath party is now still controlling the police forces the you know promotion the acceptance into the police academy the all the government lower government and this is this is not per the Constitution but per laws that are executive basically decrease in proclamations and so forth that allow the bath party to come back into becoming the the main force in the process the other issue with the Constitution is that the discussions now going on about the Constitutional Committee and so forth I think there's no framework for their operation there's no and it's always a share and this is the last chapter in the book that the approach is always a sharing of not a sharing of power but a sharing of government seats of a government so a unity government so basically the the the best scenario for the international envoy I'm gonna talk about the former one I haven't seen yet the actions of the new one but is is a sharing of seats in the unity central government and that's it and that doesn't create stability at all I think that what what is needed there is more of a power sharing of a true devolution of powers whereby local elected officials have the higher say to any other appointed official meaning they govern a so-called governor position in the 14 provinces should be elected governors that report to the people down so they report downwards not upwards to the to the central government and that's been one of the and that the regime is resisting to will always continue to resist to well we want to thank you very much Alma yes sir and Mona for a brilliant presentation