This will be a way of correcting. OK, hello. Good afternoon. So today, we're going to go over some points from Megal and Jackson. And actually, just in doing this course, it really has come to seem to me that a lot of the basic problems here are about a kind of tension between imagination, recognizing the centrality of imagination in our ordinary thinking about the mind, and physicalism, the idea that physics gives you complete coverage of what's there in the world. In lots of different ways, what keeps coming up is that we seem to have imaginative understanding of a sector of reality of the mind in particular. And physicalism doesn't seem to make sense of why we need imagination to understand that sector of the world. If physics is the whole truth about everything, then surely, all understanding of the world is ultimately physical understanding. So why would you need empathy or an imaginative ability to project yourself into someone else's shoes in order to understand what's going on with our mind? But that does seem to be the case. So today, I want to try to set out one way of trying to reconcile these two. I'm not at all sure that it's convincing, but let me try it on you. Next week, we start out on personal identity, the identity of the self, with those readings from Locke and Williams on Tuesday and Thursday. But I want to start out with the question, well, what is physicalism? If we're going to think about what the idea that the world is purely physical has to do with imagination, then let's start out by just saying a bit more about what it takes for physicalism to be true, for it to be true that it's just one world and it's a physical world. So we've had three ways so far in the class of saying what physicalism is. So the way we started out with Descartes was physicalism says there's only one kind of stuff, physical stuff. What's the opposite of physicalism? Jewelism, very good. That's so rewarding. Jewelism being the view that there's two kinds of stuff, right, physical stuff and mental stuff. Another way of stating it, when you have a model like water is H2O, lightning is discharge of electricity, pain is C fiber firing, the idea there is every time you've got a psychological state like pain, you can find some physical state that's identical to it. So that property of being in pain is the same as the property of having C fiber firing. Being angry will be having a particular configuration of your amygdala, something like that. So maybe you could do that for every particular mental property. And then Jackson had still another way of saying what physicalism is. Jackson's formulation was all the correct information is physical information. If you get all the correct physical information, then you've got all the correct information that there is. That seems different. It's hard to know exactly what the difference is, but they all seem different, right? And if you say that all the mental properties are physical properties, presumably you're going to think there's only one kind of stuff. But if you thought that the mental properties are different to the physical properties, would that mean you thought there were two kinds of stuff? No? Be your hand up if your hunch is no. Very good. I think that's the right answer. If you think the right answer is yes, unless you forgot to want the questioners at this point. Let's see, what was the question? If you think that there are two kinds of properties, mental properties and physical properties, and those are different, does that mean you think there are two kinds of stuff? No, there might be just one kind of stuff with two kinds of properties. Stop me if this is getting too technical. Is that all right? There could be one kind of stuff with just two kinds of properties sticking out of it, if you see what I mean. And then Jackson, so these are different ways of saying what physicalism is. And then Jackson says, this is a different formulation. He says all the correct information is physical information. So that's different, right? And just to say the kind of thing that I have going through my head when I see this stuff, there's only one kind of stuff, physical stuff. I mean, I don't think that's actually a very good way to set things up, because it makes it seem like if there's problems with the idea that the mind is physical, we could solve them by postulating ectoplasm, a second kind of stuff. But if you really think that the problems about seeing how the mind can be physical are problems about reconciling an imaginative, viewpointed understanding of the world with an objective understanding of the world, then ectoplasm is just giving you more objective stuff. It's not really helping. So that actually doesn't seem like a very good way to set up the question. If you say that every mental property is identical to some physical property, then the problem there is variable realizability, right? You say pain is C-fibre firing, but here we have an octopus clearly in pain with no C-fibers, no C-fibre firing. So pain can't be C-fibre firing. That was the point about variable realizability. You don't get that one, one map from mental properties onto physical properties. Because for any mental property, there's a whole bunch of different physical properties a thing could have and still have that mental property. Is that familiar? I hope that's familiar rather than something you forgot long ago. Yeah, you can pause me. Does that make perfect sense? So what about this way of setting it up? All the correct information is physical information. Jackson doesn't discuss this formulation of physicalism very much. He just says, that's what physicalism is. And then he gets on with giving this example of Mary, who's got all the physical information, but doesn't know about the colors. That's what makes this example so powerful, because she seems clearly to be getting new information, when she sees the world of color, although she already had all the physical information. But that notion of information, this really came up in the discussion. You guys brought out a lot of this in the discussion. You have to make a contrast between getting information about some new aspect of the world as opposed to getting information about something you already knew a lot about, but getting it in some new format. Someone had the example of romantic love. You've read a whole lot about it in theory, but now it has you in its throes. In a sense, you're not really learning anything there. You're just getting the old information in a new format, information about all this old stuff that you knew about it already, is getting you in a new way. You see what I mean? So does that make sense? So if Jackson says, well, Mary is getting you information, we don't really know yet. Is she getting information about some new sector of reality when she steps out into the world of color? Or is it that she's just getting information about the same old things that she knew about already, but it's a new format for the information? So let me just go over that notion of a format. And I don't mean anything very technical here. All I mean is, if someone tells you all about their trip to Outer Mongolia, if someone tells you all about it, then you can get pretty much the same information from them telling you about it in great detail as you get from being there and feeling the wind on your back as a thunderstorm sweeps across the plains. So when you're there, you're not necessarily finding out anything that you didn't know about before. You're saying, yes, this is just what she told me it would be like. I knew it was going to be like this. So you're not getting information about new stuff here. You're just getting the information in a new format when you're actually there. Or if you look at a photograph and you say, well, yeah, that's just the way it was described to me. Or there could be fairly trivial changes in format, like getting it in lowercase text as opposed to using block capitals the whole way through. So is that reasonably intuitive, that idea of different formats you could get the knowledge in, whether it's what kind of type you're using, or whether it's reading it or getting a photograph, or whether it's being told about it or being there? It could be the same stuff you're hearing about in different formats. OK, so I want to have that notion of a format in place, a format of information. And then now here's another new friend. Supervenience. Supervenience. We haven't talked about supervenience, have we? You guys are usually way ahead of me in everything I say. I just want to take pleasure in this moment for a little. But OK, here is a new friend, supervenience. This is actually probably the standard way that philosophers have of saying what physicalism is nowadays. It says, suppose two possible worlds are the same in all physical respects. Then they're the same in all psychological respects. In fact, then they're the same in every respect, whatever. So if physicalism says, if you fixed all the physical facts, then you fixed all the facts there are. So again, here are some little green friends. Here are all the possible worlds. So there are different ways things could have been. If you, as you sit here, are thinking, by God, I wish I'd taken astrophysics, then I wouldn't have to be sitting through all this stuff about schizophrenia or God knows what. I could be finding out about the origins of the universe. Then what you're talking about here is, well, you're talking about what could have happened, what would have happened if only I'd done things differently, or what might happen in the future. So you're not asking questions about what could have happened so far as I know. I mean, sometimes when you say that something's possible, if you say, if I'm saying to you, well, where is Bill? And you say it's possible he's in the cafe, what you mean is so far as I know he's in the cafe, right?  Maybe this really is an astrophysics class. Do you see what I mean? If I'm thinking, boy, I wish I'd called in sick this morning so I didn't have to give this lecture. I could have been in a bus out of town, right? If I'm consumed with regret there, it's not that I'm thinking, hey, maybe I am in a bus out of town. Do you see what I mean? The whole poignancy is I could have done it, but it's manifest to me that I didn't. Do you see what I mean? I mean, these guys always know what I'm going to say before I say it anyway, so why? What is the profit? I could have been in that bus, right? So when you talk about worlds here, when I talk about worlds here, these are all ways things could have been, whether I know it or not, right? I mean, even if I know that this is, see, one of these worlds is a special. One of these worlds has got an A on it. Can you guess why? This is an A on it. That's where we are. That's right. That's the actual world, right? That's here, right? That's what's actually going on. All these other worlds are non-actual. There are ways things could have been. So when you express regret or relief, you're saying, boy, when I express regret, I'm saying that possible world is much better than the one I'm actually in, yeah? Or when you express relief, you're saying, hey, there's that world over there that was just terrible things happened to me. But thank God I'm in this world. You see what I mean? Yeah, so that's possible worlds. I mean, I put it in kind of emotional terms, but anyway, they are emotionally important. OK, so we're talking about what could have happened, even though you know it didn't, as opposed to what could have happened so far as you know, right? Regret relates to what could have happened, even though you know it didn't. So we've got three ways of formulating physicalism. There's only one kind of stuff, physical stuff. The only properties are physical properties or Jackson's. The all correct information is physical information. So Supervenience says, suppose you've got two of these possible worlds. And suppose that in two of these possible worlds, all the physical facts are the same. All the microphysics is the same. All the facts about the basic forces in the universe are the same. Everything like that is the same in these two worlds. Then are all the facts whatever the same in those two worlds? Does it follow? This is your question. OK, let me repeat the question. There are all the microphysical facts about this world. There are all the facts about the atoms or gluons or whatever they are. What are gluons made of? Are gluons made of something? Does anybody know? Are there any physics guys in here? Well, take it from me, then, that gluons are the basic building blocks of the universe. They're these fundamental particles and these fundamental forces. And they're the facts about the way they are arrayed in this world. So suppose you take another world in which all the basic microphysical facts are exactly the same. In that world, does everyone have the same psychological states? Does it follow that they have the same psychological states? Put your hand up if you think the answer is yes. Very good. And a lot of somewhat hesitant. And put your hand up if you think the answer is no. Wow, OK. That's slightly more yes than no, but not much in it. I would have said, OK. Did anybody care to explain their answer? Yeah? Oh, very good. Right, we need one here. Convenience seems to say a leap all part. Right. It's very good. Yeah. After a new world is created, they'll both be completely different. Right, there could be some indeterminacy in how it goes. You fix all the basic physical facts about the universe at one time, and it might unfold differently in different possible worlds later. Is that right? Is that what you're saying? No, that's absolutely fair enough. But OK, so in those terms, let me, I didn't say anything really explicitly about time here. But suppose we say that we have two worlds here that are exactly the same in respect of all the basic physical facts over a long period of time. Yeah, I mean, that could happen. That is possible, yeah. So suppose you've got two where everything did, in fact, unfold in the same way over a period of time. Then the question is, over that period of time, are all the psychological states of people in the two worlds the same? Like, if you have a headache, I mean, since all the basic physical facts about the two worlds are the same, then there's someone in this world, there's you in this world, and there'll be someone at any rate who looks exactly like you in this world, because they're particle for particle identical to you. So if you've got a headache, will your counterpart here have a headache? Yeah, does it just follow? That's the question I'm asking. Again, can you put your hand up if you think the answer is yes? We've got helpful clarification. And if you think the answer is no, OK, I think if I keep repeating it, the nose will keep going down. OK, anyone else speak up for the nose? Yeah? The same physical. For every fundamental particle, for every fundamental space time point, you've got a corresponding one in the other world with exactly the same physical properties. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Well, the same thing twice.  Yeah? Yeah? Yes? It's had the exact same history. That's right, they've had the exact same history, yes. There's no distinction, right? There's no distinction physically. The question is, does it follow? No, there's no distinction mentally. So I'm not trying to, it's not exactly what I'm trying to persuade you of anything here, it's that if physicalism is true, then it does follow. Do you see what I mean? It's a way of stating what physicalism is. I myself just find it very hard to believe that's not true.  But if you ask for a proof of this, Jackson? Well, I have a slide that says that's not so. So OK, well, what I was thinking was, I see what you're saying. You could have the physical stuff and the mental stuff. And when you fix the physical stuff, that causes the mental stuff to be the same. Yeah, you could say that. I agree, and a lot of duelists would say that kind of thing, I think. It's not an academic answer. Right. But remember, we're talking here about possible worlds. Now, how many possible worlds are there? Five? 10? A lot, yes, a real lot. I mean, usually people say there are infinitely many possible worlds. So this is only a small sample. And as you can see, some of them are nearer to the actual world than others.   You're going to admit that it's logically possible that I get knocked off my bike. But that world, you say, boy, that's way out here, that couldn't easily have happened. You see what I mean? So some of the worlds are closer in than others. So Jackson's point is, if you take two close-in worlds, and you say, all the physical facts are the same, that means all the mental facts are the same too, because the physical facts are going to cause the mental facts to be the same. That's fair enough, but full strength physicalism says, all you have to do is fix the physical facts. Now there might be some causal process by which the physical facts generate the mental facts, but there's going to be a possible world in which that process doesn't work. Something interferes with the causation of the mental facts by the physical facts. And then you'll have two worlds that have got all the same physical facts, but different mental facts. Am I going too fast? Plenty's a day. Is that OK? So part of the pleasure of this way of formulating physicalism actually is that once you get the basic idea, you can see lots of different ways. You could jig it. So Jackson's way would suggest saying, I think there's a kind of physicalism that says, as long as you've got two nearby worlds, two kind of sensible worlds, not worlds where cows suddenly speak or turn into gas or become neutron stars, you see what I mean? Kind of sensible worlds. Then if you fix all the physical facts, you fix all the mental facts. But the way I'm formulating physicalism is just the simple, full-strength version that says, if you've got any two possible worlds at all, however strange, however weird, however remote, then if you fixed all the physical facts, you fixed all the mental facts. So in that way of looking at it, there couldn't be two kinds of stuff, physical and mental. If there were two kinds of stuff, you could fix all the physical facts, but what's going on with the mental stuff is something else. So there'll be some possible world in which you get the same physical stuff, but you don't get the same mental stuff. And if you say, well, suppose you remember the kind of physicalist that says, pain is just C-fiber firing, the central state materialist. If you're a central state materialist and you say stuff like pain is just C-fiber firing, are you going to think the supervenience is true? Put up your hand if you think the answer is yes. Okay, if you say pain is just C-fiber firing, that's all there is to being in pain. And then you'd fix all the facts about C-fiber firing. Have you thereby fixed all the facts about whether people are in pain? Put up your hand if you think the answer is yes. Well, that is the correct answer. Very good. If you think the answer is no. Not that I'm trying to prejudice you here. Well, I'm not quite sure I can explain it anymore fully, but look, if pain is just the same thing as C-fiber firing, then if you set all the C-fiber firing facts, then you thereby have fixed all the facts about who's in pain and who isn't.  You see what I mean? But I suppose you get variable realizability. Suppose you've got octopuses who've got pain, but not C-fiber firing. Well, could it still be true that if you fix all the physical facts, you thereby fix all the mental facts? Yes, it could. Very good. Yes. Some people at the front were nodding intelligently. Does that make sense? These are very simple points. If it doesn't seem completely clear, I'm just not explaining it very well. But if you say there are lots of different ways of having pain, lots of different physical ways, there's what the octopuses have, there's the C-fibers, there's what the Martians with silicon-based body chemistry have. There are all these different ways of physically being in pain. So you can't define pain as C-fiber firing. It could still be true that your physics completely fixes whether you're in pain. You see what I mean? So this is part of what is so pleasing about this definition of physicalism. Now then, Mary. The question about Mary is, Mary's got all the physical information about the physical characteristics of the actual world. Mary knows all that stuff. But are there still different possible worlds about which that physical information could be true? That's to say, Mary knows all the physical facts, but are there different possible worlds where people have different kinds of mental lives consistent with Mary having all that physical information? So here's Mary sitting in the actual world. She's got all this knowledge about the physics of our world. Now in this world, people have one kind of psychology. They have one kind of color experiences. But are there going to be other possible worlds where the physics is all just the same, but the mental lives of people are quite different? Yeah, you see what I mean? Yeah. So if that's possible, if that could happen, that the physical information could be fixed, but all the mental stuff be quite different, then physicalism, the way I formulated it, is false. And Mary's finding out about some new sector of reality when she finds out about the colors. Again, every individual point I'm making here is very simple, so keep pausing me if any of it. If I don't explain it, it's something quite clearly here. They're physically set up in exactly the same way. We assume that all the physical information is complete and correct, yep. And if there are any indeterminacies, I mean, as you said, there are indeterminacies. We just factor them in. We just build in which way it went, yep, yep. Does she learn something new when she learns that it's this world rather than this one that she's in? I mean, that's not a very good way to put it. She's got all the physical information, so the question is, are there worlds in which the physical information is the same, but the mental lives of people are different? Physicalism says no, yep. So there's a sense in which Mary's getting nothing left to learn once she's got all the physical facts in, because that completely determines which world she's in. On the other hand, if the psychological life can vary, even if the physical stuff is all fixed, then Mary does have some new facts to learn. Does that make sense? Yep, oh, yep. No, it's not at all meant to disprove the existence of consciousness, yeah. Nobody on the board here, as it were, nobody we're considering is denying the existence of consciousness. We will later in the term discuss people who deny the existence of consciousness. Well, that's kind of an advanced topic, and we haven't got that yet, yeah. So everybody here agrees consciousness exists. The issue is, given it exists, is it physical? And at the moment, what we're just trying to do is pause in the question, what does it mean to say it's physical? Yeah, and very good. It's like, it's the same world. Not for the first time, you guys are making the point I was about to come on to, but if you say I can have possible worlds where all the physics is the same, but the conscious life is different, then that really does seem to lead you to the monkey and the tiger, because the clockwork of the physical world just keeps relentlessly unrolling in all these different possible worlds, so everything goes on just exactly the same. The variation in the conscious life is not something that's making any difference to what happens, yeah. People sometimes put that by saying there's causal closure of the physical.   So the billiard table is not a closed system. There are kind of inputs of energy from outside. The question then is the physical, is the brain a closed system like that? Well, the physical is a closed system because we have all these laws of the conservation of energy. If there was really a mind outside the system that was causally active, then it should be able for the mind to come in like a billiard cue and prod the neuron into life. For example, when there was no physical cause of that at all, yeah? Then suddenly the neuron starts firing. No physical cause, and not because it's indeterministic, it's because this jab came from outside, from the ectoplasm, yeah? Now, that just doesn't happen, it's just a datum that there are these laws that say that kind of thing doesn't happen, the physical is closed, yeah? So if you fix the physical, there are no jabs of input from anything else, then if you say consciousness is not thereby fixed, then consciousness must be an epiphenomenon, is making no difference to what goes on, yep? Okay, so suppose we have two different possible worlds about which Mary's physical information is correct, and suppose that in those two possible worlds, people have different experiences of red. If that were true, would supervenience be true? Very good, right, exactly right. So the mental doesn't supervene in the physical, if that's right, if you're gonna have the same, physical stuff, but different mental stuff. There is going to be a question why you say that the sensation of redness is being rooted in one pattern of cell firing rather than another, and the point we went over a couple of sessions ago is that there is a kind of unintelligibility about that. Why redness rather than greenness being correlated with this pattern of cell firings is not like the average speed of motion of molecules being correlated with water boiling. That's what makes it seem possible that the mental could come apart from the physical in the way it does. Actually, can I just take one last vote on this? Could you have two different possible worlds in which everything physical is the same but all the qualia are different? Put out your hand if you think the answer is yes. And if you think that, yep. Okay, let's just pause a bit. People are slowly, okay? And if you think the answer is no, and if you have no idea what the question is about, okay, and if you didn't understand the question perfectly well but you just don't know what the answer is, I would say it's not quite a third, a third, a third. Okay, yeah. Yes? What do you mean the same thing? Physically the same? Well, listen. Listen. I was hoping to take the answer from you, right? Yeah, but remember everything about them is physically exactly the same over a long period here, yeah? It's not just that they're watching the same movie. Their brains down to the finest level are exactly the same, yep. Identical tones of different personalities. Sure, yeah. That tells you that the identical tones tells you that everything could be physically very similar even though there's quite a lot of psychological variation, right, that's your point, yeah? Supervenous is saying something much more demanding. It's saying everything physical is exactly the same, right? It's not just identical, I mean, identical tones can be very similar. These are really, really similar, right? Every gluon isn't exactly the same, well, I don't really have the technical vocabulary to explain this properly, but every gluon is exhibiting exactly the same physical characteristics in those two twins, yeah. That's a much closer similarity than you'd get in real twins, yeah. I mean, one's got their arm in the air, the other's got their arm down. That's enough of a difference. One atom different and all the bets are off, they might be psychologically quite different so far as this kind of physicalism goes, yeah. So, okay, that's great, so it's very clear what that formulation of physicalism is saying. What makes people say you could have the same physical properties where different psychology is ideas like? Your spectrum, the spectrum of the person in one world might be an inversion of the spectrum in the person in another world, or you could have physically identical people in one world to another, where in the one world they're zombies, in any other case they're like you or me. But as this last question about one said, if everything physical is the same, then all the causal processes are going to be the same through all these possible worlds even though the qualia are different. So physicalism is false, the neti-phenomenalism is true, yeah. If the mental is not just physical, if the mental is not supervenient in the physical, then the mental can only be epiphenomenal, yeah. And the monkey and the tiger thing is right. Okay, yep, uh-huh. Which connection? The connection be- So the top thing is saying, suppose that you don't have supervenience, yeah. That's to say, suppose everything physical could be the same, even though the qualia are different. Then if everything physical is the same, the whole mighty machine of the universe goes on in just the same way, yeah. And that difference in conscious state is making no difference to what happens. So the difference in conscious state is causally inert, it doesn't do anything, it doesn't make anything different. All that's making a difference is the physical stuff. So if you say, the mind can't be reduced to the physical, the price you pay is that you buy into that picture of the monkey on the tiger, and you say the mind doesn't do anything. If the mind is physical, then of course the mind can be making stuff happen. It's just more physical stuff. Oh, it's part of the physical universe, it makes stuff happen, the way everything else makes stuff happen. Plain as day. So I think that's a better explanation of physicalism than anything we had so far. And that's how some of these questions about qualia look when you think of it like that. Okay, this is your last chance. Well, it's actually not your last chance. This is one of your many chances to raise questions about this. Imagination. Imagination. Okay, so imagination is the big puzzle for physicalism. Even put in terms of supervenience, imagination is the big puzzle. And this is Nagel. I think this is Nagel's great point. If the subjective character of experience is fully comprehensible from only one point of view, and that's the key thing, fully comprehensible from only one point of view, then any shift to greater objectivity, that is less attachment to a specific viewpoint. If you try to get an objective, scientific, or physical understanding of the thing, that doesn't take you closer to the real nature of the phenomenon, it takes you further away from it. And at present, we are completely unequipped to think about the subjective character of experience without relying on imagination, without taking up the point of view of the experiential subject. And the key word there, I think, is imagination. And that's what is so strange about the mind. If it's all physical, then surely we can understand it all objectively. How could there be a sector of the world out there that you can only access by way of imagination? But that's just the way it seems to be. I mean, that is actually, it seems to me that is completely the state of the current debate. On the one hand, there are people who say, it's got to be all physical. Of course it's physical. And then there are the people who say, but you can't understand it without relying on imagination. How could that be if it was all physical? There must be some other way of getting at it. I mean, we've got a bit of the world here. We've got the mind here. We can get at it by imagination. There must be some other way we can get at it, but we have no idea how to do that. That's the puzzling thing. How can that be? How could it be that we are trapped in relying on imagination to understand this? Well, here's one way to think about it. You might think imagination, well, what is imagination anyway? Imagination has to do with a format in which we have our knowledge. You could get the same facts presented in lots of different formats. So isn't imagination just one format among many? And you can have imaginative knowledge of someone else's mental states and you can have an objective knowledge of their physiology, the way they're functionally organized and so on. Couldn't that just be the same thing out there that you're getting knowledge of in two different ways? You're getting knowledge of it in two different formats, just as you might get knowledge of something by being told about it or knowledge of it by being shown a photograph. So you're getting the knowledge of the same aspect to the person. There's the same thing there. Only now you've got an imaginative understanding of it. Now you've got a physiological understanding of it. Let me give an example. Here's the imagination at work. Suppose I ask you, is that block on the left? Is that the same as the block on the right? Who said yes? Anyone else? Anyone else think it's yes? Anyone think it's no? Yes is the right answer. How did you do that? Yeah, right. Exactly. You did it in your head, right? I mean, there are really lots, I mean, let me just make the first of all the point. First of all, this is not an isolated example, right? You can really know that these are the same just by looking at it. And what you did was you kind of mentally rotated it, right?  There are lots and lots. You could have many happy hours with these diagrams. Yeah, is the one on the left the same? Is the one on the right? I make the top one the same. Is that right? Yeah. I make the middle one the, I think that's the same. Yeah, and I think the bottom two are different. Yeah, that one sticks out the wrong way, if you turn it around, right? Okay, so what are you doing there? You are using your imagination, right? I mean, these examples, you may know this, but Shepard who started the study of how people do these tasks, found a basic fact that there's the angle, when you mentally rotate, you have to mentally rotate this one to see if it's the same as that one, yeah? So with these diagrams, you can vary the angle of rotation, yeah? And Shepard found that the time it takes you to give the right answer is directly proportionate to the angle of rotation. Think about that. That means you're rotating the thing at a definite velocity in your mind, right? They also did stuff with, I mean, once Shepard found this, of course, hundreds of people started working on it and there are basic findings like, you ask people to imagine an elephant, now zoom in in the head, now zoom in on the foot. It takes you longer to zoom in on the foot because it's smaller, right? You're zooming in at a definite speed. Anyway, so that is clearly imagination, right? Now, you're getting knowledge of the world here and this is really important for just an everyday life. If I'm asking something like, how can I get out of the door quickly, yeah? Then I've got to imagine going this way or going that way. If you're just trying to park a car, you're using imagination in this sense. If you're trying to get a shopping cart through an aerospace, you're using imagination in that sense, yeah? It really matters. So that's one format in which you have your knowledge of the world, imagination. But in principle, you could have done that kind of task, sorry, this kind of task here. There are lots of ways you could have done it. You could have written down equations for those two shapes, yeah? And found if there's a transform of one shape into the other, you could have used analytical geometry. You could have run a computer program. You could have made physical models of those two shapes and turned one to see if it maps onto the other. So it's the same thing you'd be finding out about through imagination as through analytical geometry or running a computer program. Doing it in your imagination as you all demonstrated there, that's really fast, slick, efficient. If you're going for real world, real time, kind of get me an answer quick kind of procedures, that's much more efficient than doing analytical geometry. You'd have to be crazy to start writing down equations there, given that when you can do it so much better and faster using your imagination. But still, these others are all valid ways of finding out the same thing. So couldn't you make a similar distinction to that between having an imaginative knowledge of someone else's mind and having an objective description of someone else's mind? I mean, suppose that you think now not about geometrical shapes, but about two faces and you think, look at that sad, puzzled face on the left. Look at that happy, optimistic face on the right. How did you get from one to the other, right? You can use imagination there. You can say, what's the inner life there like? And as you said, do that thing where you flip your imagination to get the dynamics from the one state to the other. So you could think, look, imagining is just one format in which we have knowledge of other people. And just as with the blocks, there's that capacity for visualization and rotation. So similarly, you could say, how can you make that sad face happy? Yeah, how could you do it?  That's what your imaginative understanding of other people is for, letting you do that fast, efficient, real-time engagement. That's what you need for ordinary social interaction. I mean, just as with the analytical geometry, you could write down equations for these two things or you could do a physiological description here, but that is slow, laborious, inefficient. You'll get there in the end, it's valid to do it physiologically, but you have at your disposal, nature has given you a much faster, more effective way of getting the right answer quickly, yep. Yes, right, very good, yes, I agree. I strongly agree, but okay, so I mean, let me come clean and say that the situation in the left here is more complex than the situation in the right, it's not that simple, but I think this is nonetheless quite a good model that if you even think about turning the cubes, that's the kind of thing you get better at with practice. You recognize that there are trick cases that fool you and so on, yep. Similarly, with getting an imaginative understanding of other people, I mean, partly you wouldn't try and realize if you're doing this with a friend of yours or someone you know well, you know a whole lot more about the context and background than I've just shown you a couple of, I'm trying to show you evocative enough photographs that you can easily engage, you see what I mean. But in real life, you've got a lot more than that to go on. And of course, there are limits to your imaginative understanding of other people and it seems to me there are three levels in your imaginative understanding of other people. There's what you're born with, the kind of thing that even a child of a few months will have by way of picking up on distress or contentment in their caregiver. And then there's something you get from culture and learning like reading novels, presumably. I mean, people always say that reading novels is very good for you and very improving and why that should be is never really adequately explained. I mean, there you are navigating the ordinary social world and you need a whole bunch of books about people that never existed and that's supposed to help you understand other people better. How is that? How does that work? And it must be something like training the imagination. You're learning to expand. And a third level is the kind of thing I was talking about on Tuesday with psychiatric patients where you can start out thinking, I can't have any imaginative understanding of this person at all. Is it like a bat? It's so alien to anything from my background or my experiences, but you can do it. So I don't think, I see why you say you're confined because so often we're very aware of these limits and what we can empathize with. But I think the truth is that we're relatively elastic about that, we get a lot better at it over time. The third one, when you have that level of scientific expansion, like I was talking about last time with schizophrenic patients or with patients with delusional moods and the violins going off and the dopamine neurons and all that, you remember? That kind of thing was the third one, yeah, yeah. Yes, that's right. Well, I don't want to blur what I just said to the last questioner with what I'm saying to your questioner. What I was saying to the last questioner was, you can use the scientific results to improve your capacity for imaginative understanding. But the other thing you can do is treat it like analytic geometry. Just do the physiology, forget about the mental life, and that will still give you answers as to how you get from this face to that face. But they will just be very slow, inefficient and unreasonably detailed answers, your answers that are far more detailed about the biologizing you really wanted to know. They're not relevant. So what you've got, just as you've got a very fast slick way of finding whether this shape is that, you've got a very fast slick way in imagination of finding how you get from this state to that. But it's not that there's some new sector of reality here. It's not that what you're dealing with here when you visualize rotating this thing is dealing with a different sector of reality than analytic geometry deals with. You're both just talking about shapes. It's just the same thing. So it's just the same thing here. It's just the same physical system that you're dealing with. You just get two different formats in which you can represent information about it. So you could think of the analogy like this. Analytical geometry is the science of shapes. That explains why some transformations are possible and others are not. Why you can get from some shapes and whatnot. Imagining is just the fast slick folk way of doing it. If you really want to understand the nature of shapes, you have to do geometry. But so you could think, look, imagining is just our folk way of going about understanding the mind. If you want deep explanations here, then fair enough, you want to get beyond imagining. You've got to do scientific psychology. You've got to do functionalist psychology or maybe physiological psychology. Maybe both. Do all the boxes and arrows from a scientific diagram. Find out exactly what physiology is implementing those boxes and arrows. That's the real truth about what is actually going on. But imagining is this very fast slick way of getting at it. You see what I mean? So that's a fully physicalist picture that gives a role to imagining. The trouble from Nagel's point of view is, in this case, in the case of the blocks, the real truth, the real facts here are what analytical geometry tells you. You see what I mean? Some people are not very good at visualizing. Some people are really good at visualizing. If you're not good at visualizing at all, you could still know all about shapes and what they are. You just wouldn't have this fast, slick way of getting at when to shapes of the same. But if you apply that analogy here, then suppose you just don't have any empathy. You can't ever get behind someone else's point of view. You can't ever see the world from someone else's perspective.  Then you should still have a deep understanding of what's going on with them. It's not that, there's just this fast, slick way of getting at things that you haven't got. And I think imagining will be just our folk way of going about psychology, functionalism, or physical psychology. That will give the deep explanations about the mind. But that's when you see the force of Nagel's thing. The subjective character of experience, he's saying, is fully comprehensible only from one point of view. And if you try and be objective, if you try and move to objectivity, that does not take you closer to the real nature of the phenomenon. It takes you further away from it. So Nagel's picture is just the opposite of the one I just said, that imagining is just a fast, slick way of doing something that in principle you could do just as well, or even better, by doing physiology. Nagel's saying, imagining is what takes you to the real nature of the thing. And if you do physiology, you've just left the mind behind. So this way of thinking about things says that imagination, that's really something about the format. It's not telling you about a new sector of reality. It's not giving you information about something new. It's just giving you the information in a new format. Nagel's way of thinking about things is, no, imagining isn't giving you stuff just in a new format. Imagining is telling you about something that you couldn't even glimpse the existence of without the use of imagination. Can you put your hand up if your gut is on Nagel's side in this? It's really all about imagining in the end. And if you think, no, imagining is just a fast, slick thing. It's like the geometry, I guess. I was hoping for more on the side of the geometry. Is that it for the geometry, three? OK, well, I'm glad you're here, guys. OK, but that's important to me. I think this is a real issue. Austin, do you want to comment on that? Yeah? Yes. And that's what you're addressing. Referential paths converging. Yeah. What you're addressing, understanding of the same thing when it's got through these analytical, physiological, functional, we're still just understanding the same things. I don't see the sort of motivation for prioritizing one over the other. Right, if I say one's better than the other. Yeah, and there's a slide on here where it says, couldn't it be that the thing that we're understanding imaginatively is just the same thing that the scientists are saying. And the response to that is like, sure, that could be. And so that's a way of fending off the dualists from all of these arguments that we've been looking at. That's a way of fending off dualism, yeah. Right, but the thing, good on that. And it just seems completely unintelligible that what we learn about when we open a psychology textbook is the same thing, or when we crack open someone's skull and look at their brain, is just the same thing that we get when we sort of introspect and think about our own mental lives. And that's the baffling part. And so that's what Nagle's talking about when he talks about the pre-socratic philosophers with the matter and the energy. I think, sure, maybe this picture could be right, but we have no clue how it could be. Yes, yeah, yeah. That's right, I think if you bought my fast slick, my model of, my geometrical model here, then it would be intelligible. I think that would really help. Well, three of you thought that would really help. Anyhow, I find that a little bit helpful. I mean, at any rate in understanding how it might go, that, I mean, if you think about it from an evolutionary point of view, then it really makes perfect sense. Other people are very, very complex organisms. You've got to negotiate with other people. If you had to negotiate with other people, purely as physical organisms, you'd really be in trouble because they just don't behave predictably. Yeah, I mean, did you know I was going to do that?  If you just try and treat people physically, you would need such a fantastic amount of information about them and such high levels of computational ability to do all the math, to predict what they're going to do next, that it really would be impossible. You'd need far bigger brains than we have to do that. So instead, suppose we have this fast slick way, this ability to simulate or imagine other people, and we just use that to negotiate with them. Now, that's going to be, as you put it, a subordinate referential path. It's just what nature gives you is a way of coping with this very complex environment, all these other people. It's really subordinate, it has no authority because it's just, what should I say, it's just a collection of fast and dirty tricks that nature has given you to let you negotiate this complex physical environment. So I think from a theoretical point of view, this geometrical model makes perfect sense. And when you say, yes, but you've completely lost, you haven't, you know, Nagel's thing, you haven't got to the real nature of the mind when you shift to the physiology, that's what you're saying. The real nature of the mind is given to you with the imagination and is really puzzling how the mind can be anything else. Maybe that sense is just a hallucination, and maybe that's just, look, if you think about creatures of the kind I described, who are just using a collection of fast and dirty tricks to negotiate with one another, that nonetheless, that package of fast and dirty tricks plays such a big role in your life that you find it impossible to accept that is really just a way of thinking about physiology. You revere it. You know, it plays a big role in your own motivations and all that, but at the end of the day, there's nothing there but the physiology, and you taking yourself too seriously. Sorry, I don't mean you, I mean, one taking oneself too seriously. Yeah. Yes. Absolutely. Yeah. So just see how those two who have merged, yeah. Jackson. So we have this proposal that ways of getting at the very same thing, do us sort of some sort of synthetic pushes back by saying that it's actually unintelligible to think about like what's that, how these two different ways to be actually capturing, or these two different ways of getting at the same thing really could be getting at the same thing. And then I guess, I'm not quite sure I see what the problem is for the view at that point is, so I guess earlier, one of these slides you had something about, it's intelligible to us to talk about. Oh, sorry. It's intelligible to us to talk about how molecules moving at a certain speed gets you boiling water. Oh, yeah, yeah. But it's unintelligent, maybe on this dualist retort, it's supposed to be unintelligible how my experience of red is getting at the same thing that the wavelengths of light coming off the road. Yes, right, right. And I guess I wasn't sure it seems maybe, what's supposed to be a very intelligible about the contrast case? So here's the way to say that it's actually unintelligible. There's just two different properties, just boiling. Yes. And there's the average speed of the molecules. I can observe that this happens like I have described the relationship, but I don't know why this law holds. I don't know why, why is it that the universe is structured the way it is, it just is that way. Okay, yeah. Well, let me put it, suppose I talk about the hard-nosed evolutionist on the one hand, yeah? Does that make sense at this point in the discussion of I talk about the hard-nosed evolutionist? The hard-nosed evolutionist says, we're all just physiological systems, we're all just physiological systems, but we have to negotiate with one another successfully. And so evolution gives us this package of imagination and talk about the mind. As a way of simplifying our thinking about each other, just as we've got this ability to visualize shapes rotating, we've got this ability to put ourselves into the shoes of other people. It's just a way of getting on in a complex physical world. Now, let's call that an error theory. That says when you take the stuff about imagination in the mind very seriously and you think you're talking about the real nature of some phenomenon here, you're just taking yourself too seriously. It's as if you said the real nature of the shapes is given by visualization and imagination and what I can rotate, not by this so-called scientific analytical geometry. I don't hold with that at all. Then you'd be taking the folk stuff about shapes too seriously. Really, the analytical geometry does tell you the truth about shapes. On the other hand, there's the picture that Nagel has, that I think is the common sense one, that no, the stuff about imagination and empathy is really important. This is what matters most in life. Everything else only matters because it connects back to the psychological. That is where everything else starts. So how could the real nature of some physiological phenomenon be being revealed to you by imagination? That's what makes this unintelligible. Yeah, this real nature is given to you by the imagination but yet you can do this physiological thing. Does that help? That's how I was picturing it being set up. Okay, I really want to whiz through some stuff now. We have 10 minutes left. Is that all right? I have a sense of fatigue in there. Can you bear it if you whiz through some stuff? Should I just wrap up? Okay, fasten your seatbelts. Okay, I want to talk about another aspect of what imagining is. I mean, it really seems to be important in this discussion. And I want to think about how important the environment is in imagining. It's natural to think of putting yourself in someone else's shoes as getting inside their head, seeing the world from behind the furry brow from getting yourself inside someone else's mind. But I think that's not really the right way to think of it. Here's an example. Suppose you're a stage designer and your task is just to hammer together a set for a stage play. But suppose that the auditorium, suppose that work is being done in the auditorium so you can't get into the auditorium. You just have to imagine what the set's going to look like from different points of view, points of view. You have to imagine what's it going to look like from up here? Well, you've got a clear view from over here. Will it seem very cluttered if you're down here? If someone's standing over here, will they be visible from down here once I get the set going? Well, that's imagination, right? You're trying to imagine what people are going to see from different points in the auditorium. You're imagining how the set will look from different positions in the theater. And what you're doing there is, there's something in the real world, something in the physical environment, and you're trying to imagine of it how it will look to people from here or there, right? I mean, in my humble way, I think about this with the slides, right? How will that look from a distance? Will that be, is that text too small, right? We all do this the whole time. You're trying to do a drawing. You're trying to do a painting. You're imagining, how will that look to someone? You're just deciding how to wear, what to wear? How will that look to someone? So you can be imagining this from lots of different perspectives that you don't yourself occupy. Now, the set is there as an element in your imaginative exercise. It's not that you're trying to imagine that something elusive or hidden here. I mean, you're talking about people's relations to this external structure. First of all, you identify the thing in the world, and then you ask, how will all these people be related to it? Now, I think the way that we start to learn about our other minds is not really forced by getting inside other people's heads. What you find out about is, what's the environment that you and the other person occupy? There's Moll and Meltsoff in a recent paper talk about, these are developmental psychologists, talk about joint attention, joint engagement. It's this basic thing that young children do of getting to the phase where they around, what is it, 12 months? Yes, about a year. That they and the caregiver will both look at an object and the child in the caregiver loop backwards and forwards at each other and at the object. And this gives great pleasure to all concerned, right? Reference your reactions to the object and what you're doing with it. But this is the three mountains test developed by Piaget that this is about a yard square, blocked with three mountains on it.  And you show them paintings depicting what the child in the other side might be seeing. Do you see what I mean? And as an early stage, children will say, oh, is this painting with the red and the green and the gray visible that the child in the other side is seeing? They take it for granted that the child is seeing the mountains but they take it for granted that the child's perspective on the mountains is the same as theirs. This is like an earlier question. There is an early stage of which you literally assume that other people's perspectives in the world are the same as yours. So you're showing the painting, showing exactly what you see sitting here and you say, that's what the guy sitting on the other side is seeing. It takes a while, it's an achievement to liberate yourself to the point where. Now, the thing about that kind of task is you first of all get the bit of the environment that the other person is responding to and then you imagine what their take on it is. So think about the bat. If you're going to do that kind of exercise with the bat, then the first thing you have to do is know what things and properties the bat is experiencing. Then at level two, you have to know what perspective the bat has in those things and properties. So it seems to me the fundamental problem with bats, the reason bats are so weird is that you have no idea what it is in their environment that they're responding to. They seem to be seeing and responding to things that aren't even visible to you, right? I mean, they're going after bugs. What do you care about bugs? I mean, unless they're particularly big and scary, bats are really caring about bugs that are too small to be visible to humans. You know, if a bat comes into a room that does not see chairs as a relevant aspect of the scenery, yeah? So you can't even get to level one. Your trouble with the bat is not knowing what perspective it has on the things and properties in its environment. You don't even know what its environment is in the first place. You don't even get to that stage. So what you don't know about the bat is not something about what's going on inside its head, what you don't know about the bat is what's its environment? I mean, in principle, given a lot of time and study, you could laboriously write this down in real time. You could put, people do try to figure out what aspects of the environment the bat actually is responding to, but you wouldn't get something that you could use to interact with a bat in real time. I mean, with this kind of setup, what you're getting is something where you get the other person's take on it, and now you're at the point where you can engage in games with them. You can hide things from the other person. You can reveal things to the other person.  You first of all identify their environment, then their take on it, and now you can interact with them in that environment. You could have a social engagement in that environment. With a bat, it's not that you don't know what's going on inside its mind. It's that the thing about this picture here of the bat gazing at the flower is it looks like it's kind of sniffing it the way a human might be, but really, it may not even be seeing a flower at all. The salient thing for the bat may be a cloud of bugs, and the flower does something off in the background. Yeah, something unnoticed. You have no idea what kind of environment the bat's in. That's not a matter of what its perspective is, is getting to the stage of getting what the relevant objects and properties are in the first place. What's so alien and hard to understand about the bat is not what's inside its furry little head. What's so alien is what world are we in? What three-dimensional set of properties have we got here? So, in the last 60 seconds, Jackson's way of formulating physicalism was all the correct information is physical information, and there's a dear old Mary, okay. But what happens when Mary steps out? When Mary steps out, the first thing she finds out, and we spent some time in this in class, the first thing she finds out is kind of like the set or the mountains, the first thing she finds out is about the colors. The first thing she finds out about is not mental at all. She finds out a new fact about the non-mental environment, namely all the colors. She first grasps what the colors of all the objects are, and now she's got that scaffolding, that understanding of what the environment is, and then within that scaffolding, she can start to imagine the scene from different perspectives. But that suggests, it seems to me, that Mary may just be getting, well, the knowledge of what is like to see color wasn't part of her physical information, but what Mary's getting is just something about what the environment is, and what other people's perspectives are on it. I'm sorry, we're right on time, and I'm aware that you have other classes to go to, but let me see. You could think, what Mary's getting here is information in a new format about what she can do now. She's got the color, and now she can imagine other people's taking the color. But it's like this, it's like being able to play basketball either, being able to understand basketball either as a commentator or as a player, that what Mary's getting is a real-time ability to interact with other people using this fast, slick visualization of their experiences. She could have had that purely physiologically, but it would have been slow, laborious, and then effective. So the argument for staying with physicalism here is that you can think that what Mary's getting is information in a new format about something that she could have had otherwise. Okay, thank you, a bit hasty at the end, but that's the end of the message, thank you.


Dupika Dupika, Dupika, Dupika We just saw a girl named Dupika Dupika, Dupika, Dupika Here she comes Back to our super interaction feed It's Corbin, Rick, you can follow us on Instagram Twitter, Twitter, or juicy content Contents so juicy that sometimes I drink it in the morning for breakfast And today, they were so surfaced and I followed a Twitter account We're caffeinated It's a new trailer that I've been looking forward to for a long, long time Long time, since we saw the poster Sorry, we're a little late Yeah, well that's why we're refreshed and ready to go Yes, yes I think it dropped at like 1am Yeah, it did, and we didn't know the time because you guys know there's been trailers that have dropped 1, 2, 3 o'clock in the morning and we're on them because we knew that's when they were going to drop We didn't have a heads up for this In fact, you messaged me last night and said if this thing drops, I'll let you know, but we fell asleep Sorry, I was tired I have a child But it's called You actually get that not because of the pronunciation the accent on that This is called It's the one about the acid victim that Dominic is playing that I've been looking forward to because 1, I love to be an actress 2 It's a very important story that needs to be told Especially right now What is going on A ridiculous epidemic that needs to stop It's insane to me that this epidemic is so bad that there are actually non-profit organizations whose entire focus like SRK's is helping women who are the victims of this evil Anyway Lots of evil in the world, but I'm hoping this is going to be ridiculously good and hard to watch It's that type of story that should be hard to watch It's done correctly And it should be It should confront you and all that kind of stuff So here we go, let's go, I'm excited Please give me a case, madam Will you keep everything? I'm not a snake, I'm not a snake I'm a liar, where are you from? I'm from San Francisco Do you have a license? According to the police, you said that the property belongs to your girlfriend I didn't say that After the session I got a coat I'm going to wear a suit This case is going to take a lot of years I'm going to leave it I don't even want to read I don't even want to read I don't even want to read It's done There's a lot of fight going on How can you be so happy? I'm happy, what should I do? What I expected This is a story that I feel like everybody in the world should go and watch and learn about Because it's horrific It's one of those things that you're watching being world Can people do that because they want to study? I know Well Yeah There's a lot like that in the world including in my own country They won't just do that They'll walk onto a bus and they'll shoot a girl in the head for wanting to educate herself It's just as incongruent to me with a human being in terms of the fact that there's actually male species, I won't call them men We've talked about this before who will become sexually aroused at the thought of hurting and raping a woman Cannot comprehend that level of evil I can't comprehend this I saw it, it looked like and I hope this is the case It looked like they actually use some actual girls and women who are victims of the acid burn as part of the storytelling and the cast really hope it's the case I love I'm going to get emotional because this is having daughters but also loving women and not understanding My hope is that there are a lot of girls and women who've seen this who will love the fact that a woman who is one of the most beautiful women in cinema is wanting to empathize and portray them There'd be some people who would say you should have cast an actual burn victim and you and I would probably say she's an actor, let her do her thing That to me, I love the fact that a woman that is known for her beauty is diving into a role and she looks the makeup looks great I like that they've made it it staggered at the beginning stages of an acid burn and it kind of developed as you go on and I thought that looks really good so far to me you know, Depeche is going to bring it emotionally because it's going to be a very emotional story Yeah, my prediction my prediction is this is going to catapult her to another level for people who haven't yet recognized her abilities as an actor as an actor I wish this would I know it'll get released in the United States but it's not going to be huge in the United States sadly, but this is a story that could do really really well if United States just paid attention to Indian cinema and distributed it and marketed it like it should have been because this would do really, really well I'm guessing one about a terrible, terrible thing that happens to millions of women thousands at a minimum That minimum, too many and then it's also going to be about women empowerment her learning to also love herself in spite of the evil that happened to her in spite of the evil that happened to her and also to know that the true measure of a person's beauty isn't defined by their outward appearance that the true measure of a woman's beauty is defined by who she is inside and the I would love to share in America guys one of the reasons there's a couple of reasons among what you just stated as to why American audiences don't see Indian film the first one is Americans are so ego self centric that they don't pay attention to what's going on in the rest of the world the second one is there aren't enough theaters I think around the United States that play Indian content we get it here in Los Angeles because this is the cinema capital of the US so you would get Indian films and a couple of theaters here you're not going to get theaters to play on a big screen in San Antonio, Texas and Omaha, Nebraska in Des Moines, Iowa it's not going to happen but in a city like here where there's such a huge population of Indians I'm shocked that when we've gone to see movies on opening day big things whether you like this movie or not but like a movie like war with a box office sensation like Rithik nobody's there where are all the Indians here in Los Angeles supporting Indian film yeah but also they don't promote it as well and also Americans don't like watching subtitles that I get for me I would love to see something happen in the community here in Los Angeles there's millions of Indians here and there's only a few screens that play Indian film we've said this before we're looking forward to the day we go to see a movie out where we see it at the two theaters and we actually now Gully Boy's opening weekend went back a second time there was a good contingency that was in the theater but it should be full yeah it should be especially something like this this is the director she's a female so I'm glad she's a female telling a woman's story obviously we know India's been on that train for much longer than the United States has been females tell female stories it's not necessity but it's also it's usually nice especially something that's central female like this as a male sometimes you can't capture the emotion of a female if you don't know so it's nice but she also directed Rossi which was a great film again a movie from a woman's perspective and Talvar one we haven't seen but we hear good things about it's the yeah but it's your part and I believe no unless I'm wrong I might be wrong you were going to say Nawaz? yeah I thought Nawaz but it's not okay but yeah we've seen the trailer for that one but let's read this and I'm just real quick yeah this is the trials and triumphs of Malte is that her name right? Malte? M-A-L-T-I don't ask me how to pronounce it no I think it's Malte an asset attack survivor from the investigation of the attack to the court proceedings the medical treatment to the emotional healing Chapok is the story of the un quashable human spirit can't wait that's going to be does it say the length of it yet? no January 10th we will be there we will be there opening day this is going to be awesome my prediction is at least in world awards Indian awards you're going to win a lot of them I can just argue it's going to be one of those things that you do let us know what you thought right now on the top of the section below I think you just had some kind of manner you're into this one


Good morning, everyone happy Monday Monday, January 22nd 2024 and it's been a while since I done Led the live stream on a Monday. In fact, I was kind of going back and looking at Mondays not my favorite day to trade mighty nineties and runners So it's kind of like trying to refresh my memory on when Last time I traded on a Monday and led the live stream and goes all the way back to November 27th Actually, it was the last time I traded on a Monday Where I led the live stream So And I also was kind of going back and checking my results on Mondays and not the greatest so I'll probably be a little conservative today. Just being a Monday And I never know what the markets are gonna do after a weekend so Right now the indices have continued to push up after Really strong day Monday or I'm sorry Friday where I just grind it up all day So S&P hit all-time highs Friday Yeah, they're currently up a third of a percent Nasdaq It was really strong Friday. It's up another half percent. So Vicks interestingly enough is it's up just a little bit, but it's been coming down in Over the last Couple hours so just slowly kind of falling Want to see what today brings so try to get a couple these trades in and Call it a day on a Monday. There is the bell Also got to be cognizant of earnings. So that's all gonna be Starting up this week here Next couple weeks will be heavy with earnings First week of February last week of January Tesla has earnings on Wednesday February 1st is a big day for tech earnings Netflix has earnings on On Thursday, no tomorrow That's moral Netflix is tomorrow Last stocks pushing up here Nvidia cracked six hundred Except the 601 Pretty much all futures pushing up Met up one and a half percent Square up a little under four percent Roblox up three and a half Airbnb up two percent DKG up two percent Buy you week again I Do and Bob a man this those stocks have been Punished the last six months So make sure you got a good idea on your position sizing today This strength will be kind of interesting if we get The upside volume runners here the future really pushing up so building on the strength from last week in our second bar here now Microsoft Amazon all kind of flipped there Roku For the close of that first bar Figure there's gotta be a pullback at some point What always amazes me is You know you can go a week or so with Consistent down movement, but it's how quickly the market regains the losses In January started out real rocky man, but it didn't take long to Get everything back Right blockchain got a big volume bar here if you're on a smaller stock for an upside volume runner Snapchat growing another smaller stock When pushing down potential downside volume runner peat on Get some volume. So some smaller stocks Maybe providing some opportunity for some of you So nothing really catching my eye on stocks, you know that are that I would trade again All right, it's got a big bar here When looks like it's gonna get a big volume bar to the downside a lot times when has Wide strikes bid ask wide bid ask. Yeah, really really wide. So I won't be trade win So nothing shaking other than those ones I already mentioned Some of you that like smaller stocks and trade Some of those AMD coming down and AMD in the video have been so strong You figure there's gotta be some people booking profits and selling shares Vicks coming up that morning Ken. Yeah, so I think the antibiotics took my last one today took 10 days worth of antibiotics and so knocked out whatever I Was dealing with in the head cold man. It's Yeah, nice to not have to struggle to talk. It's Your voice is one thing really takes for granted So, oh, yeah, definitely take health for granted Now 178 NASDAQ of 77 S&P up 22. I thought we might see a little pullback today just because of that big push-up on Friday, but hard to have a bias when you There's strength free market and You know, so Just playing things careful on a Monday Yeah, there's the piton. I mentioned that and then riot Just big volume big volume bars, but yeah, it's kind of surprised. I hadn't trade I hadn't traded You know mighty 90 and runners Since November 27th on a Monday, and I think I did it I think I did two Mondays in November and a couple Mondays in October, so it was like Really since October only like four different days on them, you know, four different Mondays trading these strategies, so Now trying to stay strong NASDAQ has pulled back Part of your mindset is just not rushing into things Sometimes you know, it's natural to be like, oh man, I gotta be getting in a trade, you know, it's Letting time go by and not getting in anything. I gotta get in something You know sometimes when you rush and you force that's what Some problems arise. So don't ever don't ever Let yourself feel guilty or feel bad about not getting in something You know to start today. You'll be looking for some mighty 90s here Bar bigger than the previous with clear volume separation and Going in the same direction Roblox kind of looks like it wants to stay strong here.  I thought I was gonna Push up there But just seeing a lot of stairs stepping down, you know, you take a look at Netflix Amazon Metta just Steer step down Costco that's a stock too. That's just been ripping up over the last couple months Earnings season is gonna be interesting because You know, you had the holidays in there and Lot of stocks are getting up to all-time highs and so It'll be interesting to see if earnings continue to drive Stop prices up or or not There's nothing going on Pete on still trying to still pushing up as well all green and Pete on. Yeah, looks like targets got a little mighty 90 there for sure But I don't know that I'm gonna get in the way of it right now Yeah, I saw Uber kind of the same thing You know mighty 90 long Right there Gonna hold off on those Pete on another big bar That's some Pete futures coming up right to where it's been rejected Let's see if he gets rejected again or not Russell Russell through pre-market highs So yeah, Netflix potential mighty 90 here. There's time we got left about 30 seconds. So if it comes back down Wouldn't be a bad Mighty 90 there we use the 4 DTE Four days to expiration option chain. Well, those are expensive. Oh Moly It's when the Netflix becomes so expensive. Oh, yeah, yeah, that's right. So I'm gonna pass on Netflix But I mean, yeah, that's that's definite What would be nice is if it would push down one more time get down at the bottom Get in down at the bottom of the next candle And then have it right come up But don't know if it'll do that or not Roblox kind of had a mighty 90 short Check that in toss It's a 5% though. So yeah, it's definitely mighty 90 that bars If you ticks away from being go ahead and get short Roblox here Roblox really gotten cheap At the money puts 83 cents so I'm gonna pass on that one So SMP did push through highs of day Yeah, Boeing's already pulled back morning Cosmo. Yeah, Tesla just stair stepping down in volume. I Think this is kind of reminding me why why I'm not usually live on Mondays Zoom little mighty 90 short. I passed on it deox because the puts for an 89 cents But they keep in mind like you don't mean Anybody that's in the live stream like you don't have to pass on it I passed on it because the puts for 89 cents. I mean, I'm just I just don't trade under a dollar This is too cheap for me in any way, but like I said just because I'm passing doesn't mean you have to Also, also Roblox is up five and a half percent. So I want to get a short something that's Ripping to the upside right now Zoom not too bad.  Of course, the bar is getting pretty big. Nice, Krish Roku with a potential mighty 90 short Roku I would trade the 90 puts Build at 249 and we're in Roku So I would close half my Roku at 275 okay pushing up to that pivot. So maybe I should have waited one more. I'm gonna add to my Roku Build at 226 to add It's coming right up to a pivot there. So now I would I would close half at 250 Zoom's still going up. So zoom I'm gonna add to my zoom. That's a buck 35 Those are the buck 36.  So we close another Roku at 275 it's nice to I've gotten out of half and haven't even gotten a red bar yet Yeah, Roku. I don't know man. It looks like it wants to get through that pivot So I'm doing zoom is still zoom a zoom and meta coming down. Yeah, I really like that Tesla short though, but yeah, I don't know.  I moved it to 605 610 final offer build at 610. That was a 215 puts looks like I would have got filled at six You just never know So I'll close half at 670 Put that in case it comes down Builded a buck 50 to close half my zoom and a boy zoom So I got one red bar out of Tesla Barely Video coming down the lows of day Meta coming down through lows of day Amazon coming down the lows of day I'm trying to come back up like to get my two bars out of Tesla and get out in case it's a Day that it wants to rip. Yeah, things looking like they want to get strong again I just hope Roku doesn't get through that pivot S&P is kind of Kind of starting to chop a little bit You know Tesla pushing up to highs a day. It's not what I wanted to see So I'd like to see it get forced back down It may be a rip day for Tesla. I may have gotten in in the way of the wrong stock It's been beat up a little bit lately daily chart of Tesla see it's been it's been it's been a rough go Not quite sure what this market wants to do though That's the piece kind of just sitting where it opened really it's kind of went up down Zoom gonna try to give two bars maybe Well, you can kind of see where futures is just kind of It's kind of in chop mode really so might be getting a second red bar out of Tesla here and zoom So I will look to close those I just don't think I want to get in Tesla's way it could be Setting up for a It could be setting up for an upside continuation runner So I'm gonna close my Tesla Build at 635 to close Tesla. So not much of a winner, but I'll I'll take it and my zoom Builded a buck 53 Close zoom got me two red bars Roku See so I'm gonna You know hold Roku for two red bars though Apple kind of looking like it wants to continue higher push up. It's kind of consolidating hasn't really pulled back much Tesla's actually kind of setting up like an upside continuation to the upside Push up little three bar pullback So a good add to zoom up there. Yeah, Roku goes through here I may I may just close it without getting two red bars just to lower my risk Sometimes on a strong day, you just don't want to get in the way of stuff So the question is whether Roku, you know can get through that pivot or not and close my Roku Build at 224 so didn't really follow the rules there a couple reasons why Strong market It's a Monday Roku's appeared to be strong Apple, you know, like I said, it kind of looks like it wants to push through highs and Roku may it may It may not make it through that pivot. I just wanted to reduce my risk there Again, little cautious being a Monday as of right now. It hasn't made it through that pivot quite yet Tesla, you know, I got out, you know, it's still coming down But it could I could see it come down this pivot and then ripping See it and seeing it square a little three bar pullback bounce Roku kind of made it through there. Didn't it? Well, folks, I'm just I don't think I'm gonna get anything else here 915 central I mean kind of looks like another green day for the markets But if you wanted to keep keep trading, you know, Tesla comes down to this pivot You could get long and then if it pushes through the pivot, you could just bail, you know, it'll be a small loss Can I haven't even looked at it yet? Be honest with you because I've been doing this so I mean looking at futures It looks like it things have pretty much just chopped from the open. So Probably probably an entry anytime would be good. So but this one we'll look at now. So I'll have to take a look at premiums and all that but The other thing would be maybe to see if it pushes through This consolidation Yeah, see Roku broke the dead. Yeah, so That's just me being a little cautious on that one today and it could still It could still give two bars and come back down below, but it just looked like it was on a mission there So I was reducing risk. So All right, I will be back live I think he got Steve tomorrow and then I'll see you all I think Wednesday. Have a good one. Peace