Welcoed o dweud o'r miglenau. Rydw i'w cwyrdd y bydd y busfrig. Dwi'n de否fodd am y gobeithio gyda'rweith. Ac rwy'n gobeithio a'r hollol yn dda. Gweithio, rwy'n gobeithio. Mae'r beth gwyllfa yma yn yr un bryd mwy o'r awdurdodol. Er un am dd pension, bydd yn ei gweithio g spinal, yn gyhoedd y Llyfrgoranc yng Nghymru, mae'r gêmio. Ond rydw i'n bwysoeth o'r Gweithio Llyfrwr i'r hoffa. Now, to get extra bcleenfydd ymolio gyda Handsight, should be incredibly important. Just to let you know, you will need your translation devices if you don't speak Arabic at a certain moments of this session, so please make sure you have that ready. As you know, we've got about 45 minutes for this session. It's on the record, I see. Yes, so keep that aware as well. Let me do a very quick introduction of the panelist that we have here. And then I'll come back a little bit to how we're going to run it and some of the topics we want to cover in this very tight 45 minutes for such a big subject. On my immediate left measure general, Adyrus Al-Sabaydi. Pleist o dda'n have you with us, Sir Vice President of the Presidential Leadership Council of Yemen. The internationally recognized government to his left to give Peterson, the UN Special Envoy for Syria. But as we were discussing earlier, he's had a lot of roles in the region, including the special representative for the government, sorry for the UN to Lebanon. Member of the Oslo negotiating team, being Norway's special representative to the UN, also Ambassador to China at one point as well. So he will get a lot of questions, I'm sure, and discussion here. I'm going to say my colleague, Dr Karen Von Hippel, as she is the Director General of the Royal United Services Institute, Lucy, but has a very important experience as concerns this topic. Used to work at CSIS in Washington, my own Alma Mater as well, and was Deputy Assistant Secretary for Conflict and Stabilization Operations in the US State Department. Chief of Staff to General John Allen when he was President's Envoy to Countering ISIL, and Professor Vallit Nasser, who is a Professor of the Paul Nitsa School, School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins, former Dean, author, and will really give us, I think, excellent insights, not just on the region but also obviously on Iran. I want to be able to move through this subject. Let me just do a frame setting two comments for all of you. The first would be, we've got this title, what is the end game? But I think the end game at the moment is, is this conflict spreading clearly, or is it escalating? Because a lot of the things that are happening at the moment, including kidnapping or taking of vessels, in the straitsoformers, these are things that have happened in the past. Yemen has been in a civil war for a very long time. But it's like all of these things are happening simultaneously. Is it spread or is it escalation that we really need to worry about? And I just wonder if you can keep that theme in mind. And then if we can get towards the end of this session to what is likely to be the end game, can we see a future that is stable? Can we see a future that is peaceful? Two very different kinds of end games. Because just a few months ago, prior to October the 7th, the sense was this was a region moving towards potentially longer term stability. So, with those points of mind, let me turn first to you, sir. Ysgolwyddi. Let's start with the first example of spread or escalation, which is the situation in Yemen. The US and some of its allies have done strikes against the Houthi rebels who've struck ships passing through the straits up through to the Red Sea. Do you think this is going to be successful? Is it raising the prospect of an escalation of the conflict in Yemen? Or is this going to hit a new normal where one just has to worry the Red Sea becomes a very unpredictable route? What's your sense of the current situation? And do you think these strikes are going to make a difference? Is it going to escalate or can we hit some type of stability? Ysgolwyddi. Thank you very much for what happened in Bab Al-Mandab, especially from the destruction of the Houthi kingship. It is a very dangerous issue and it affects the lives of the living and the human in Yemen. And I am going to cut the evidence because most of the population in Yemen lives more than 80% to 90% of the population from abroad. What's wrong is that it's an unworthy operation and the people who are doing this are doing this wrong. The response to the many crimes committed by the Red States, this is the correct operation, we demand it, And, as the saying goes, the more powerful military forces who are fighting for the Houthi. This is a great influence on the population in Bab Al-Mandab. Ydw'n n rhain oProdu거든요 y penedig rhaig. Ond mae'r ddechrau ac wedi faci'r doedd yn rhan ffianmu cwbeithl cyfuges gymonau arena yn oes. R Kosten lif22,'r oberparo'r ddechrau e It was notable that the UN resolution that took place just beforehand was unanimous. But there was abstentions from Russia, from China about being deeply critical of the actions of the Huttis, telling them to stop. But countries in the region, including Saudi Arabia or maybe UAE, seemed to be more cautious about the kind of military actions that the U.S. and the UK are taking.  Llywodraeth yn ddweud o'i cyd-fawr a wleddlu sy'n fещu ac yn dweud o'r cyfnodd. Yn y cwrs, yn adrodd. Mae'r gymor ar gyfer y gleithau, mae'r cynddingfyr bod sefydlu'r llong? Rwyf pan oedd bryd yn ddau. Mae'n ddeg-deg-deg-deg-deg-deg-deg-deg-deg-deg-deg-deg-deg-deg-deg-deg-deg-deg-deg-deg-deg-deg-deg-deg-deg-deg-deg-deg-deg-deg-deg-deg-deg-deg-deg. The implementation of the UN Resolutions to have a true buffer so it can move its citizens back to Northern Israel. How worried are you about sort of spread, where there is some violence, there is already shalling taking place or escalation? What is your take on that part of the world, and anything you want to say on the Yemen? Obviously we welcome. I am extremely worried. I think we have boats in spread and escalation. A oeddwn ni wedi'i gweithio y cyfnod ar hyn oedd y 7 o octobr, dwi'n credu sut rydyn ni'n credu y 7 o octobr, yw'r cyfnod y cyfnod ar hyn o isrwyddiad wedi'i gweithio ym Mhysbalol. Rydyn ni wedi'n credu'r cyfnod am ysgolau yn Syria. Rydyn ni wedi'n credu cerddur o'r ffordd o'r cyfnod o'r Gweithio'r Gweithio'r Gweithio'r Syria. rydych chi yn ei gynhwys mewn unrhyw dechrau sydd wedi'u fel gwahanol doedd ein banyiad a'i ff dangos eu bodi'r banyiad? Roedd unrhyw ddaid yn rhaid tynnu i ddweud rydych chi ymwneud. Ryddyn nhw fyddwn ni'n THERE mynd i ddweud yr ysgrifennu'r ddechrau. Ryddyn nhw'n ddweud ddych chi'n ddechrau'r ddysgrifennu Israeli a ddod yn llanfodir yn dawn. a'u gwirio eich gael ynghylch i'r gwaith yng ngyfrifnwyr a'u syrion cyflugiau yn Cyfridd, a'u cyfrifnwyr ynghylch i'r gael eich gael i'r gael o'r aelodau a'u gwirio i gyffredinol. Felly, mae'r gwaith yn cyfriddio, mae'r gwirio yn eu cyfrifnwyr. Yn y clyweddau, mae'n gwybod, mae'r gwirio. Mae'r myfyrdd, mae'n myfyrdd, ac mae'n myfyrdd. Mae'n myfyrdd. is that I do believe the Iranians do not want further escalation, I think they're playing with fire, I think it's pretty clear his polar do not want a full-scale war. As you alluded to, I was a UN envoy to Lebanon in 2006 and negotiated Security Council Resolution 1701, who is now sort of what we are discussing when it comes to the full implementation of that in Lebanon. Several details on that will not go into, but I think the question is what you said, and that is will the Israelis stop in Gaza or will it develop further? Again, my personal opinion, this is also very clear that the Americans do not want this, but the question is can the Israelis be contained? So I think for this to happen, we need a quick end to the war in Gaza. We need humanitarian assistance, and then we need to develop a strategy that is not only, and I know this is a tall order, but a strategy that do not only include Israel, Palestine, but the broader region, and later on I have several ideas when it comes to this. Well, wonderful if we can come back to this. Just one quick question. This whole language of proxies and not proxies of Iran, how do you read the sense of independence of action of Hezbollah today compared to, let's say, previous years? Obviously reinforced by the very important role they played in upholding the Assad government in Syria. You know, heavily armed and increasingly armed, involved in the government in Lebanon. How much do you feel that Hezbollah has room for manoeuvre separate from Iran? And to what extent is it having to uphold its own position as the axis of resistance to retain its credibility inside Lebanon? Now, is the escalation taking it beyond where it would like to go? You know, I'm dealing with Iranians more or less on a daily basis. I do believe that obviously there is a very close relationship between Hezbollah and Iran. I think Iran accepts that Hezbollah is in his own right also a political entity in Lebanon that needs to make its own decisions. But I do believe where we are now today, this is a decision whether to go to a full-scale war or not. It's not a decision Hezbollah can make alone. That has to do in my opinion with the fact of course that Hezbollah is also for the Iranians a deterrence. And the question is when do you use and when do you not use that deterrence? You certainly don't want to lose it if you're Iran and have it destroyed or hit. Thank you. Karen, let me come to you. You've got a lot of experience in the region. You've got a lot of experience on US policy making in the region and how they engage and do not engage here. Obviously the US involved almost in all aspects of this conflict involved in leading the military operation in the Red Sea, involved very much in what the future will be in Hezbollah situation, obviously involved in Gaza and trying to put pressure on Israel. How do you think they're managing these risks of escalation? Which are their biggest areas of concern? How are they prioritising them at the moment? Just share your thoughts on this. Thank you, Robin, and thanks for inviting me to join today. Look in some ways I think people overestimate what the United States can do in the region. Many people think that somehow Israel is like the 51st state. Of course it's not. It's an independent country and the US does what it can to put pressure on Israel. But it doesn't control what Israel does. I'm always surprised when I listen to the news and people say, well the US needs to do this, to tell Israel this and that. But there is a lot to be worried about. I know the Americans behind the scenes have been working quite hard on not just pulling the coalition together to fight the Houthis or to push back on and protect shipping in the Red Sea, but also to prevent a wider war in Lebanon later. I mean don't forget there are about 100,000 Israelis in hotels, Israelis who live on the border with Lebanon, and they will need security before they can go home. And this is why I'm concerned that Israel's plans are once the fighting with Gaza is over a bit of retrenchment. And then they will have to, if they feel that they're still insecure, they may feel they have to go to war at least on that border area. And so that is a big concern. I know that at the same time the US is playing a pretty significant role in trying to prevent that from happening diplomatically. The US forces that are dotted around the region have kind of forgotten that you have these elements still there unless you are an expert following what's going on in the region. Are they now almost hostages to escalation? Or do you think they're important touch points that allow the US to try to calibrate preventing escalation while managing spread, if you see what I mean? Yeah, I mean I see it as a deterrence. And if you listen to the language even yesterday with Jake Sullivan, he kept talking about deterrence and de-escalation. I agree with Gara that Hezbollah, Iran, the United States, none of them want to expand this war, but you don't know what might provoke a country to do more. I was even surprised this morning I woke up at 3am somehow and I wasn't even sure this was true, but Ovali will share that Iran sends a missile into Pakistan. That's a strange potential escalation. Anything like this could blow the region out of proportion and make it much more difficult, but at the same time let's not forget that, at least over the last decade, pretty much the majority of the countries in that region have been involved in some sort of civil war or regional war, whether it's Syria, Libya, Yemen, Qatar versus Saudi, Troubles within Lebanon, and all of those conflicts have involved external forces supporting militaries and militias inside, and yet none of those did spill over. So I do think everyone is very conscious of what war looks like because it wasn't so long ago that so many of these countries were dealing with that and no one wants to go back to that. Thank you, Karen. Ovali, so many questions about the Iranian thinking of position at a time of, yes, a leadership transition potentially coming down the pike in Iran itself, but it strikes me that with the deal that had been done under Chinese auspices with Saudi Arabia, Iran was heading to a sort of place where there was a different future, one in which it was passively observing the JCPOA to kind of limit its nuclear enrichment, in which maybe there was some type of economic future for itself connected to China, maybe to Russia, maybe in a more stable Gulf region. All of that is gone, it looks at the moment, or is it? So the question to you, is Iran welcoming? How is it able to use this moment? Is this a moment that it's trying to put the lid on because the old future is the one that they want to get back to, one of stability? Or is it a tiger they're having to ride that they have very little control over? How do you think the Iranians see the situation right now? I think their read of it would be, not only them, but also the rest of the access of resistance, but also I think other governments in the region, that the old order is basically shattered. October 7th essentially ended the order that Saudi Arabia was thinking about normalisation with Israel, was thinking about a shiny economic boom in the Gulf. That whole order has fallen apart. Before it ever emerged. Before it ever emerged, but if we went back to October 6th, as Gar said, we would see a very different Middle East. The new order isn't there, and I think the Iranians, everybody is trying to gain this. As you mentioned at the very beginning, and Gar put it very well, we're seeing both escalation and spread of conflict. I think the Iranians are trying to manage this. It's important to note what are they looking at and why they're acting the way they are. First of all, the war itself is escalating. So long as Gaza war is not ended, it's not de-escalating. The next shoe is going to fall when the humanitarian crisis really hits hard. So long as the United States and Europeans don't have any plan for ending this war and Israel is not ready to do it, we are in an escalatory mode. We shouldn't kid ourselves, the war is ongoing. It's going through phases. It's not bombing, it's not starvation. It's now humanitarian crisis. So that's escalating. Secondly, I know in the region it's very firm belief that the killing of the Hamas leader in Beirut essentially ended an unwritten agreement that existed between Hezbollah and Israel that they would not attack one another's capitals. So I think Hezbollah's view is actually coming for it in a very big way. So it's not about whether Iran pushes the button. Hezbollah itself is increasingly in a survival mode. So it's not about just acting on Iran's behalf. And we're also not out of the woods. I mean Prime Minister Netanyahu keeps saying that Hezbollah needs to go above the Letani River and then he's going to ask for more things. It's not like they're going to stop Hezbollah or even to go north of Letani River. As Gair said, we've seen much more direct US involvement in Iraq and Syria and in Yemen. I think we are on a path for US ending up in a war in Yemen. Blood has been drawn. The scale of attacks is there. The Houthis are not going to back down now. And we're heading in that direction. And also Iraq may end up in a war. I mean there's one of these missile exchanges between US and Iran that could go wrong and somebody can get killed and we're going to be in a very different space. And even if nobody gets killed, if these continue, I think the stability of the Iraqi government and the Iraqi system is now in question. That can Iraq survive an escalated Iran and United States confrontation? And then I would say it's not just that this conflict is spreading. And so in the past, since we arrived in Davos, Iran has hit Erbil. Iran has hit Pakistan. Just before we arrived, Iran captured the oil tanker on the Gulf and Iran's nuclear program is now going to accelerate. Now these are not technically, you would say Gaza, but definitely Iran is opening new fronts. And at the same time, there was also a massive bomb that went off in Iran, killing about 100 people. And even though officially, I think the Iranians accepted that it was ISIS, because that sort of gives them cover not to have to react. But I think they don't believe that this is coincidental that ISIS would carry out this attack in Iran right in the middle of the Gaza war. And so the question, the real question is what's their end game? And I think for Iran and Hezbollah and now increasingly Houthis, they don't want Israel and the United States to dictate the pace of the Gaza war. Israel finished Gaza on its own schedule and then decide what's going to happen after and then decide what they're going to do with Hezbollah and then what they're going to do with Houthis and decide the end game as you put it. So in a way, I don't think... Sometimes we could become prisoners of our own words to talk about escalation, suggest that you could also see one man's escalation in other man's deterrents and one man's escalation. I think the Iranians and Hezbollah want to deny Israel and the United States the ability to dictate what's the new order that's going to emerge in the Middle East. And I think they're opening as many fronts at the same time in order to deny Israel and the United States that capability. We constantly talk about Houthi-Iranian relationship, but it's very important to note that Houthis are very close to Hezbollah. In some ways, more close to Hezbollah than there are to Iran and that the Houthi escalation actually got into full gear after the Israeli assassination of the Hamas leader. Once Hezbollah came to a belief that an expansion of war into Lebanon looks imminent and Israel has now put aside the 2006 agreement, the Houthis opened the Red Sea Front. So there is a logic here more than just want an escalation. We can see it's going to be so difficult to do justice to all of these topics in the very limited time. I see we've got 20 minutes left and I do want to leave 10 minutes for some questions. So, please, those of you who've got some ideas, please have them ready and have them short and to the point, which would be very helpful. Let me turn back to you, Sazr Ubaidi, vice-president. Let's get to the end game question. What do you think this conflict is going to do to the future of Yemen? What will happen to the future of Yemen if, as we've heard from everyone here, situation sounds like we're still in the escalation ladder? What does this mean for the future of Yemen specifically? Yma, mae'ch gwybod a chai gafodd â unfщёw a llwyag. Yma, mae'ch gwybod a llwyaf. Mae'ch gwybod a chai gafodd â unf scroll, mae'ch gwybod a llwyaf cre bumps. Mae'ch gwybod a llwydwyr a chael traffodau a chael trofodol wedi cael yr amddangos. Mae'ch gwybod a llwyadau a llwyadau a llwydwyr Maen, a'ch greadio eraill os gynllanol? A llwyaf, mae'ch gwybod! Beant ymddangos, mae'r cydnod yn hollwethio'r llyfrwyr. Rwy'n meddwl yma, mae'r cydnod yn hollwyr', mae'n hollwyr'i hollwyr yn hollwyr夫. Mae'n hollwyr, ond ond yw'r cydnod, mae'r cydnod yn hollwyr deallu fe gwamau dyma. A gweld oherwydd yng nghanffas, mae cysylltu chi gynllun cyntaf gyda'r cydnod yw ymddangos gyda yn ymddangos gyda'r gyfer yr ystyried a'r gyfnodol, yma'r cyfnodol yng Ngazer? Gwelio'r cyffredig yn ymddangos gyda'r cyffredig? y Llyfanaeth, y Llyfanaeth i'r gwybod, ac mae'n dda i'r gyfnod o'r ddweud yma, y dyfodol Gair. Rwy'n gwybod i'r gweithio, mae'n ddweud hefyd. Gair, ddim yn ystod o'r cyffredin sy'n gyffredin israeli, Palastau'n. Rwy'n gweithio yng ngamau. Efallai'r gweithio? Mae'r ddweud, mae'n gweithio'r ddweud, ond mae'n gweithio'r ddweud. Mae'r ymddai sy'n fyddai dyma'r gwahanol ar y cyd-dweud o gyflu gyda'r cyfrifol ymdaint, y dyma'r ymddeunio am ychydig yma'r yma'r ymdyn nhw'n gyflawn. Dyn nhw y gallwch yn ein fflu'r bleiddau y dyma eich contradwyd ac mae'r rhannu am hanes yn y teimlo cyfeirio ar ôl y gyrraedd. Mae'r 7 ymddeun ar y llwyddon yn ddweud o'r pethau israelydd a'r cyfrifiadau erioed yn fawr yn unrhyw. So, if there is no two-state solution, then there is a one-state reality that will be an apartheid state. And I think that should not be acceptable to anyone. So, the point is, we need to make, you know, and here is a challenge to my American friends. We need to stop talking about that there should be a horizon towards a two-state solution. We need not to say there is no other way out of this than a two-state solution. And we've been waiting for 30 years. You know, my Palestinian friends that have been born after the Oslo records have been living in what they see as a one-state reality. Because of that, the belief in the possible two-state solution has been diminished. And I, you know, just an anecdote, when I lived in Jerusalem during the late 1990s and the beginning of 2000, at the time the support for Hamas was, yeah, let's say between 5% to 10%. And I remember in my discussion with my Israeli friends, they said, listen, start to take this seriously. If not, you will end up with Hamas as your interlocutor. Today, we have both Hamas and Fatah as realities, but we have other sentiments. The question now is, if we don't deal with this now, Hamas and Fatah may be history. There may be other things happening in Palestine that no one likes to see. And since this is my favorite topic that I'm not able to talk about every day, let me just add one other thing. Of course, for this to become a reality, settlement activities needs to stop immediately. And on this, there can't be any compromise. There needs to be a very clear, and we know there are limits to what the Americans can do, that on this there needs to be a very, very clear statement. And if this doesn't stop, we, basically what we're doing, we're undermining the possibility to see that the end game will emerge. And this is in no one's interest. Ask me about Syria a little bit later. Exactly. We'll see. Hopefully you'll get a question on that. All the things that gear hasn't been able to cover. Hopefully somebody will ask a question on that. So let me turn to you now, Karen. The big question is this, does it have a geopolitical spillover? Where does the US play this with China? Are you expecting China to step up? There's no sign of their desire to do that at all at the moment. Russia seems to be keeping fairly quiet at the moment. Do you think this is fitting at all into the calculus of the Biden administration? They've got so much on their plate. How do you see that? The US has been trying to pivot to Asia for some time all the way back to when I was in the Obama administration. And then, of course, it keeps getting distracted by events in the Middle East. I don't speak for the US government just to point that out. I worked for them years ago. But look, I think it's interesting to see that, you know, watching Russia insert itself since September 2015, as Gary remembers when they arrived in Syria militarily getting involved in the war, they made themselves indispensable in any conversations about peace in Syria going forward. China has been very involved in the region financially investments. And then, of course, they did this amazing rapprochement surprise really between Iran and Saudi Arabia. So it's quite interesting that neither of those countries are playing at least a role up front in terms of trying to push for a diplomatic solution to this challenge. I'm sure behind the scenes there's a lot going on that I don't know about, including I'm sure between the US and China in particular. But it is interesting that at the end of the day the US is still leading on diplomacy going forward. It's also interesting that as we've seen with the war in Ukraine, these wars are not contained, right? I mean, Ukraine has had a huge effect at the global level because of the spillover financially, because of, you know, food shortages, energy shortages, the economic challenges from that war. And then, of course, in Middle East because globally there's so much emotional investment in the region, in what's going on. We've seen protests all over the world, which you don't see for other conflicts. I mean, I don't know if anybody noticed, but in September, the Azerbaijanis basically pushed Armenia out of Nagorno-Karabakh, and I didn't see one protest in the streets about that. So, you know, these conflicts do have a global spillover effect. And I think the Americans are very aware of that, and they're working very hard. The question is how much leeway will they have, especially while Netanyahu is in power? And just on that, do you think the US election at the end of this year serves? Is there any kind of spur? Does that ever any kind of feed into US positions and the kind of action? Is this war still going on or some version of it? You know, we're heading into November, October, November. Do you think this is playing a toll out in Washington? You know, I think in this particular case it's different from Ukraine. Trump, you know, obviously thinks he has a very special relationship with Netanyahu and with many Gulf leaders. But I don't think in this case that that is a factor right now. It's certainly a factor in Ukraine because of concerns about continued weapons supplies being cut off. But I don't see it in the same way anyway. Vale, let me come to you, again, pick up any points you want. But you mentioned, I wouldn't say, well, I'm going to say it tantalisingly, the massive increase in Iran's nuclear program since October the 7th, enrichment up to 90% now. I mean, a real escalation of the situation compared to where it was before. What does this tell you about Iran's approach to future regional security? Have they now just decided any kind of relationship with the West, the future US government Europe is kind of, forget it, we now lean more on Russia, we lean more on China, we can pursue our own direction. Is that part of what's driving their approach to this conflict? Well, I think in the very short run, I think it's a way of, as I said, to spread the conflict. In other words, if we begin to read more news about 90% enrichment, then that's going to become also another topic the US would have to address. That doesn't worry them? No, because I think their calculation of how far escalation would go before there's an actually outright war might be very different from ours. I think right now, I think the view of this axis of resistance is that it's going to be much worse for them to end up living in a Middle East that is completely dictated by US and Israel than otherwise. So I think they're exploring the margins and it's very clear in their strategy that they are pushing attacks in Iraq, capturing tankers, working with their allies in the region and then the nuclear issue, all of which suggest that they're trying to push the US in all sorts of ways. One outcome of this is also to force the US to change its Middle East policy. 100% focused on supporting Israel's campaign in Gaza. So you have to see from their point of view, how are you going to get the US to change? I think their calculation is that the US would respond only when it faces a threat of war or it faces a grave situation. There's no diplomatic path between them and the US. But I also think that if they see a Middle East in which they're going to be in a much more aggressive posture with Israel, which I think is inevitable, that this war, if anything, has raised the possibility of a direct confrontation between the two of them in the next five years, several notches up, that having nuclear capability is now more important to them than it was before. I don't think the door on possibility of a nuclear agreement is 100% closed, but it's only a sliver of light left and nothing's going to happen in this year because it's election year. So I think their calculation, if there's going to be talks with the next administration in the US, it's much better if they have a lot more leverage at that point, more stockpiles of nuclear weapons, more centrifuges, et cetera. And Gaza is a perfect cover. Israel doesn't have a bandwidth to threaten bombing Iran right now and nor does the US, so they're taking advantage of that as well. Okay, bleak enough for everyone in the room. So let's take some questions. We've literally got eight minutes left, so please quickly introduce yourselves. I've got two hands going up. I might take them as a group, three hands before. Right, I might even have to stop there. So if you want to direct them to one of the speakers, obviously that would be helpful. Please say who they are. Very quickly say who you are as well and let's take it. So first the two ladies there, the one on the left, my left, and then I'll come to the gentleman here and then I'll come to the other lady next to you and then there was another hand somewhere around here. Sorry, you're first. Yep, you were the microphone. Yes, please. Hi, this question is for Karen. I'm a young person representing the global shapers community of young leaders. This is regarding the comment about Israel not being a 51st stage. I just wanted to comment. The US is still heavily funding the Israeli military, including a $14 billion aid package which largely funded weapons, contributing to the genocide. But US citizens, like you said, are marching throughout the country opposing this. And as a young person who hopes for a future of peace, what do you think the US government's end game is here for the war? As a young person we hope for a future without war and for peace and for a future where all young people can live in harmony. And so I just hope that you can answer this question for us. Thank you. And Karen, hold your thoughts. I'm replying that because that's a very important question and he's probably a bit of reflection on how you want to answer it. A gentleman here. Yep, please. So the microphone is going to come to you. Hi, the second lady. Oh, I'll tell you what. I'll take the second question there because the microphones can stay together. Sorry, I apologize. No problem. My name is Rana Dajani. I'm a professor from Jordan. I'm originally Palestinian and Syrian as most of the region. My question is to all the panelists. Following up on the earlier question, with all the disconnect from the whole globe marching against the genocide unfolding in Gaza, which is the root cause of all of this, by the way, and the loss of faith in international law and equality of human life demonstrated very much by Western governments supporting the Ukraine but not supporting Gaza, only coming to attack the Houthis when their concerns and powers is in question. So, and the stepping in of South Africa to file the complaint in the ICJ for the genocide, how do you see a shift of power in the world from the global north to the global south? And is this and bricks, and how is that going to contribute to the end game? Thank you. Thank you. Somebody could bring a microphone here to the front here. No, here it is. Here it is. Please microphone to that person. Thank you very much. So, my perspective is that a former Iraqi ambassador to the United States. I'm currently the climate envoy, which I'll now stand up. I'm older than the people who spoke, so I remember things having read about them. There is a precedent where the United States interfered forcefully to force Israelis to withdraw. That's a Suez crisis. Suez crisis? Yes. And what I'm surprised about is that nobody has picked this up. Many years ago, I had an argument with Flora Lewis, which really dates me about history, and she said Comparison and Parison. To her, I answered not necessarily. My question to you, to the panelists, is why can't President Biden be more like President Eisenhower and force a withdrawal of the Israelis? That's a big question, but very interesting one. I think as I can't see the fourth hand anymore, I'm very tight on time. Oh, very quick. Sorry, just there. If you can take it down to the front row. Very quickly, if you don't mind, sir. Actually, as I can see, this is a humanitarian issue, not a political thing. Endgame for the Palestinians. I think you asked the same. What is the endgame for the Palestinians? Because you're talking about when Israel ends the Gaza issue. Okay. What about the Palestinians? Thank you. Right. We've got big questions. Let me give an opportunity for each of you to say something, but I'm going to make it very, very difficult for you because at the end of your answer to the questions, I want you to give me a number. Okay? You have to give me a number. Number one is at the end of this year, we're still roughly in the situation we're in now. That is the endgame going into 2025. That's number one. Number two is actually there's a breakthrough. Some type of move towards greater stabilisation, including on the Palestinian issue. We've got some sort of ceasefire. That's number two. Number three is where value is taking us. Actually, the endgame of this is Israel versus Iran. At some level. I'll let you define how that is, but that escalates to a point where they each feel each other so insecure. That's number three. That has impacts, obviously, on the whole region. So sorry to put you in that position, Vice President. If you don't want to take a number, you don't have to. But I'll let you maybe answer that question and then some of the others have questions about Palestine and U.S. policy. And we only have two and a half minutes theory that we should do with it. That's why I'm giving you numbers. I agree with the speakers that the people of Palestine need to be able to go to the Arab countries and give them to the King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz, and he is the one who is able to go to the Arab countries in a small situation. Choose number two. I've got a tick next to two. Thank you very much. Please. I choose number four. And number four is the following. What we're seeing playing out in Gaza is basically the old world order some way or another coming towards an end. What we are seeing in Syria is that the new world order is not in place. But it's a place where no one can dictate the outcome. And I remind you, in Syria, there are five foreign armies. It's a place where the Iranians, the Russians, the Americans, the Israelis are on the same territory and they're not capable of working out a vision together on how to solve this. And I think of a message, as my message is and needs to be, is that none of you, when it comes to this world, can dictate the outcome of the conflict. There needs to be some kind of a compromise, some kind of working together. And I believe what we are seeing in Gaza is making that more difficult. And that's why we may have a spillover along the line that Wali was mentioning. But the point is, there is a way after this, if there is a political willingness. And on this we need another panel. That sounds like a two to me, but that's all right. I'm going to let you have your four. Briefly on these two questions that are very good questions, I think people always overestimate US influence when it gives countries money. And Wali can tell you better than anyone. US gave a lot of money to Pakistan over many years and had very little leverage on what Pakistan could do. So while you think it should be easier, it's not so easy to change the rules and withdraw the money. It gets very complicated. But they do have influence. They just don't have as much as people think. And then to your point, and I'm agreeing with Gary, I think you're absolutely right that the world has changed. We don't know what the new order is going to be. Neither of the United States nor China can tell countries what to do. And smaller countries are asserting themselves in ways we haven't seen before, which is very good actually for the global order. But we don't quite know how it will settle out. Finally, I'm a two only because I'm an optimist. And I read an article that said optimists live longer than pessimists. And optimists are happy until they're depressed. So I'm going to be happy until I get depressed. OK. Fally, over to you. Class words. So I would say to the questions that were raised here that for the first time, global public opinion is an actor here. I mean, that's one of the things that actually can force a change in the United States in Israel as well. And if you listen to Hasan Nasrallah's speech of January 3, you could see how much emphasis he was putting on global public opinion. Secondly, I would say that, as Gair said earlier, unless the United States looks beyond just Gaza and looks beyond what happens in Gaza and thinks about a much broader sense of regional security, then we're in number five. And I would also say that one conclusion of this panel should be that the job of managing all of this should be given to Gair. And what's your number? What's your number? One, two, five. I'm never going to try numbers again. That was a failure. But thank you very much. We covered an enormous amount of issues. We've only gone a minute and a half over time. And so could you please join me in thanking an excellent panel. Thank you for coming.