Good evening and thank you all for joining us this evening. My name is Arjun Dhar and with Julia we are speaker secretaries at the Cambridge University Law Society. Before we begin I would like to thank our speakers program sponsor Clifford Chance. Clifford Chance is a world-class law firm which values its relationship with the Cambridge University Law Society to secure some of the best and brightest future lawyers for the firm. Clifford Chance have opportunities for students from first year onwards. You can find out more by visiting their website. Now without further ado I'd like to hand over to Professor Allen. Good evening. My job is to introduce our two eminent speakers this evening. They're going to give us their views about the constitutional foundations of judicial review. They hardly need any introduction from me but as you know Professor Paul Craig is Professor of Law at Oxford. He is a very eminent authority on administrative law not only in the UK but as his recent hand-learned lectures show he's an expert on UK, EU and indeed global administrative law. Professor Christopher Forsythe was recently the Sir David Williams Professor of Public Law here at Cambridge and he is of course the current author of Wade Forsythe on administrative law. So I'm going to ask each of them to talk for just 15 minutes which will be quite a task and in that 15 minutes they'll summarize their understanding of the correct way to conceive of the foundations of judicial review. And I don't know who wants to begin. We haven't settled that. I thought Christopher was beginning. So Professor Forsythe will begin. I see the notes that I made from my Roman law lecture in this room earlier today which I see there are many attendees, first year students who came to my Roman law lecture and have now come to this lecture so you're probably going to have more than enough of me. I of course may get confused and start to like lecturing a spot of Roman law to keep us going. I was never that keen on ultra-viraries but I was driven to it and I was driven to it by what I've termed pragmatic reasons and also profound constitutional reasons. And the pragmatic reason really arises from the fact that I first learned administrative law a long way away from Cambridge in South Africa. And so I kept an eye on South African administrative law and knew there was a case called State President against the UDF. Before we go into this case I'll just say in South Africa there was a sovereign parliament no protection of human rights. This is before the political transformation. Sovereign parliament no protection of fundamental rights. And the state of emergency was declared by the state president in terms of his powers under the Public Safety Act of 1953 and claimants wanted to challenge some of the emergency decrees and the chief ground of challenge was that the emergency decrees were too unclear, too uncertain to be able to act as a guide to conduct. The trouble was there was an ask to clause. The ask to clause said no decree made in terms of this act shall be called in question in any court of law. So the challenge to the decree is made. And at first instance and on the first appeal there asked to clause argument losers on a classic administrative law reasoning. It said the requirement that the emergency decree should be clear is implied from the statute. It's something that parliament's taken to have in mind in enacting the Public Safety Act and the ask to clause that they're in. And therefore the unclear statute, sorry the unclear decree is made outside the powers of the state president under the act and so it's not made in terms of this act and so it's not caught by the ask to clause. It's classic reasoning based upon the English case of Anismanic that you should become familiar with if you're not familiar with now. When it got to the court that is now the Supreme Court of Appeal in South Africa it was called the Appellate Division in those days. There cunning lawyers had picked up that there was criticism being made in England of the ultra virus doctrine. And so the argument was put to the Supreme Court of Appeal that indeed the decrees had to be clear but that requirement came from the common law not from the ultra virus doctrine. And consequently they were made in terms of the act. They were introvirates, they were made in terms of the act and so they were not caught by the ask to clause. Sorry they were caught by the ask to clause. Professor Craig's criticism of the ultra virus doctrine was specifically referred to by the court and adopted. Professor Wade's defence of the ultra virus doctrine was considered and rejected by the court. And so they came to the conclusion that the emergency decree fell within the terms of the ask to clause. The unclear decrees were made in terms of this act and so the ask to clause prevented judicial review. That argument effectively made ask to clause as a work and judicial review in South Africa was completely eviscerated until the political transformation that you will be aware of. And I thought this is something that makes me think that you shouldn't throw out the ultra virus doctrine for fear of getting thrown out the baby with the bathwater. And that's my pragmatic reason why I found myself being driven into the ultra virus camp. I saw the dangers and I knew what could happen. The evisceration of judicial review with the result of Anisman it had been overturned. That's my first pragmatic reason. But my principled reason then flowed from the fact that we have a sovereign parliament. I don't want to be too dogmatic about that in the presence of such an eminent critic of the sovereignty of parliament as Professor Allen but there's no escape in it. Every single judge who heard the Miller case first instance and on appeal before the Supreme Court every single judge who heard the Miller case approved of Dicey's classic formulation that with us parliamentary sovereignty means that parliament can make or unmake any law at all. It's not a question of whether you like parliamentary sovereignty or whether you don't. You cannot wish it away. And given that we've got a sovereign parliament how does this fit in with first in the foundations of judicial review in the common law? Suppose a decision maker complies with every requirement laid down by parliament expressly or impliedly for the validity of his decision. Decision maker complies expressly or complies with every requirement for validity express or implied. Perhaps the common law comes along and says there's an extra requirement. Legal representation in this hearing is not required. That's what the common law says in these circumstances. Or perhaps the common law wants to change one of the requirements for validity. There doesn't have to be an oral hearing, for example. Perhaps the legislate having said that there doesn't need to be an oral hearing in these circumstances. The common law wants to make the hearing oral. Presuppose compliance with every requirement laid down expressly or impliedly by the statute. If the common law comes up and says there is an extra requirement to be added in it is challenging parliament's power to specify what the requirements for validity are. And so it is challenging the supremacy of parliament. So if you criticise that the ultra-virus doctrine and wanted to be abandoned, you must face up to the task that you have to criticise the sovereign parliament as well. And I'm pleased to say that Professor Allen agrees with me on that basis. At least in his 2002 Cambridge Law Journal article he says this, despite their protestations to the contrary, the common law theorists cannot reasonably object to ultra-virus in its very modest, modified version while continuing to accept absolute parliamentary supremacy. In this sense, Christopher Forsythe is right to maintain critical critiques about the sovereignty of parliament. Those that do not explicitly challenge the sovereignty of parliament are whether they intend it or not to transmute it into strong critics who do challenge the supremacy of parliament. Insofar as the common law basis for judicial review is offered as a viable and genuine alternative to legislative intent broadly understood, it entails at least a limited qualification of legislative power. I agree with every word of that. So you are driven to it. Abandoned ultra-virus, you have to abandon the sovereignty of parliament too. And that's what I'd like the late motif to be of this debate, although it seldom turns out that way. How do you reconcile the creativity of the judiciary in developing the principles and details and nuance of the principles of good administration? How do you reconcile the creativity of the judiciary in developing the principles of good administration with the supremacy of parliament? My answer is straightforward. The modified ultra-virus doctrine, you say, as is perfectly reasonable and plausible, that when parliament allocates a power to make a particular decision, parliament intends that that decision-making power should be exercised in a way that is fair and reasonable. And the judges then, when they say whether it is fair and reasonable on a judicial review or whatever, are doing what parliament intended. How do you reconcile the supremacy of parliament with the creativity of the judges? There is an inevitable tension in our constitutional order between the supremacy of parliament and the creativity of the judges. It seems to me that the modified ultra-virus doctrine is the best reconciliation of that issue so far declared. I'll end with one final point. I would claim one thing for my original article, Fig Leaves and Fairytale article that kicked off this debate. I would claim one thing for it. Before the Fig Leaves article, there was a buffet approach to the ultra-virus doctrine or the basis of judicial review. If you liked the ultra-virus doctrine, you could take it from the buffet. You left it there and you took the common law instead. And you took something else that you might like. Without regard to the constitutional consequences and the pragmatic consequences of abandonment. And with my Fig Leaves article, put those two issues on the table. And I think that that was a good thing for it to do. And that's undone until questions. Good afternoon, everybody, or good evening. It's a great pleasure to be here. There's a slight sense of deja vu all over again because Chris and I did this a few years ago. I can't remember quite how many, but probably before your generation of students. You won't be surprised to know that I don't agree with much of that. But I'm going to take us through a little slideshow at rattling speed because I've only got a limited amount of time to try and explain why, although I respect the argument, I don't believe it's correct, either pragmatically or in normal terms. So the foundations. We have a core claim that the precepts of review must be based on legislative intent since if this were not so such review would constitute a strong challenge to the sovereignty of parliament. That's the point that Chris has just reiterated. And that's supported. That's the cornerstone of the Altavari school. The advocates of the common law school reject it. They accept that if such intent exists, it will indeed be taken into account by the courts in precisely the same manner as in any other area where such intent may exist. They reject the claim that such intent must exist in order to prevent a strong challenge to sovereignty. So again, rattling through some of this stuff which is fairly well known. Of course, two different senses of intent, legislative intent, specific and general, specific intent. Parliament has intent as the meaning of how each particular head of review should apply in each statute and in that sense, if they did have it, could validly be said to be author or part author of the resulting doctrine. The model of general legislative intent by way of contrast is predicated on the following idea. Parliament is taken and again, Chris iterated this in his own talk a moment ago. Parliament is taken to intend that its legislation conforms to the basic principles of fairness and justice which operate in a constitutional democracy. However, because Parliament itself cannot realistically work out the precise ramifications of that general idea. It leaves or delegates power to the courts to work out how the precepts of JR, to work out the precepts of JR in accord with the rule of law. Now, again, as we heard at the tail end of Christopher's speech, the UV score is based primarily now on general legislative intent, GLI, not specific legislative intent, SLI, and it's also known as the Modified Ultravirus Doctrine. The general reason why most people have dumped the SLI model is that the empirical foundation for it is completely lacking. Parliament does not invent a specific legislative intent in relation to each and all the different facets of JR concerning each and every piece of legislation. It is a chimera and a fiction. Okay, just moving on very quickly just to clear the ground before we get into the really serious stuff. There aren't particular doctrinal consequences which flow from adherence to the two models. There are not, and I'm not claiming there are. There are constitutional implications but there aren't necessarily doctrinal implications. But the real reason why there are no doctrinal implications is actually the second reason, which I can jump to for exigencies of time. The Modified Ultravirus doctrine is a completely empty vessel. Actually, if I'm being more provocative, it's really actually a modified common law doctrine. That's what it's really about. It's really a modified common law doctrine. The real reason why, the real reason why there's not a difference between the common law model in terms of the... Seriously, the real reason why there's not a difference between the Modified Ultravirus doctrine in terms of ultravirus theory and the common law doctrine in terms of doctrinal consequences is that, by its own statement, the Modified Ultravirus model is an empty vessel. It is simply a wrong foie back to the common law to justify whatever the common law puts into the model at any point of time. It has no independent self-standing content of its own. Okay. Now, to the business end of business, the really important end of business. There's got to be a rationale for this claim. There's got to be a foundation for the claim that adherence to the common law model entails a strong challenge to the sovereignty of parliament. And there are three arguments which can be discerned, and they are what I've termed an analytical argument and an empirical argument and a theoretical or normative argument. Each of them is important, and I will look at each of them in turn. Now, the analytical argument is the one that Christopher iterated in his important Cambridge law journal article, and he repeated it a moment ago. And the analytical argument is the one that we have in front of us on this slide now. And it is a key argument, and it basically goes as I have set it out here. What an all-powerful parliament did not prohibit, it must be taken to authorize expressly or impliedly. Therefore, all elements of JR must be cloaked with legislative intent. If that were not so, the assumption would be that parliament did not intend the constraints on statutory power to exist, and therefore judicial imposition of such limits would amount to a strong challenge to parliamentary sovereignty that I think is a faithful explication of Christopher's argument. There are three central difficulties with this argument, any one of which will knock it out, but there are three. First, and actually really quite dramatically was people, and this seems to me really quite an important point, and people aren't locking on to it, and with respect, Christopher just glided over it in what he said. The argument only gets off the ground on a model of specific legislative intent. It makes, with respect, no sense in a model of general legislative intent to try and pose the question that you have on this slide in the context of a model of general legislative intent is simply not a meaningful question. It may be meaningful to ask in relation to a particular head of review. It might be meaningful to ask in relation to a particular head of review. Did in this statute parliament intend the course of substitute judgment on all questions of law? Then you run through this analytical argument on this slide. Or did parliament intend in relation to another statute for rationality review to be high intensity or low intensity?  It might be possible in relation to a third kind of statute to say did parliament really intend for there to be legal representation by barristers. And then you run through this argument again. The argument only makes sense if you're running a theory of legislative intent which is specific legislative intent. You cannot ask this question on a model of general legislative intent or the modified ultra bias doctrine. You just try and formulate that question in the context of the MUV model, formulate it, try and formulate it in a way which makes sense in the light of that analytical reasoning. You can't do it because the analytical reasoning itself is geared to the specific legislative intent model. So you can't buy both. The second reason is that the analytical argument is predicated on the assumption that parliament must have an intent about something one way or another. And that's simply not true. There's a lot of theoretical literature which tells us, and I don't have a chance to go into this theoretical literature, but there's very good legal and philosophical literature which says that there's lots of things that people don't have an intent about one way or another.  Why is that relevant in this context? Take the following example. Take a classic issue that we debate in a Ministry of Law doctrine the whole time, which is the test for review for error of law. We all know there's going to be some review for error of law, but what is the precise test going to be? Now, we have a range of possible tests which are set out on the second indent of this slide. And I think there are seven or eight possibilities. They quickly to run through them. You could say court should substitute judgment on all errors of law. Court should be able to substitute judgment on jurisdictional errors of law. They should substitute judgment on some issues and exercise rationality review on others. They should show greater deference to legal determinations made by tribunals but not by others. The intensity of review should be based on functional considerations or that there should be no distinction between review for law and fact. Now, the reality is that the legislature is likely to have absolutely no intent one way or another on those respective options. And the choice between them is the real doctrinal issue faced by courts in this country and in every other country. Why is this important for the consequence which is etched out on the third indent? It cannot be contended that legislative intent is necessary to prevent a strong challenge to parliamentary sovereignty since that argument is premised on the assumption that parliament has a definite or definitive intent on the particular doctrinal issue one way or another. If it does not and I repeat I think you're living in fairytale land if you think it does in relation to those previous aid options if it does not then the courts can choose between any of those available options without fear of infringing sovereignty. That's a second difficulty. Third difficulty is really important when we're liars to think outside the box and to think of the consequences of adopting a particular line of reasoning and see what its implications are more broadly. And this is something that with respect the outrovarious school has never woken up to. And this is the problem if the answer is if they're correct then it has the following consequence that legislative intent must equally be regarded as the foundation for all bodies of law including contract or cross property restitution and the like where the common law principles are read into legislation. Okay then you just have to go out and convince all the private lawyers that they've been thinking about the wrong thing the private law is not really based on dignity, equality or whatever else they want to argue about all day long but it's really based on legislative intent. Why? Why is this so? For the reason set out in that third indent legislation every day of the week private law legislation every day of the week is read subject to common law principles of contract or tour. Sale of goods legislation is read subject to common law principles of contract occupies liability legislation is read subject to tour principles straight private law stuff all the time. Okay, if the analytical argument is correct then we must equally cloak the application of such common law principles to statutes with legislative intent in all areas of the law. So with respect I don't buy the analytical argument and I do not accept that we have to buy into it in order to prevent a strong challenge of sovereignty. So actually we then move on quickly because there's an empirical argument and the empirical argument in effect goes like this while the SLI model the specific legislative intent model it was subject to the critique that it was empirically unrealistic fairytale land to assume that parliament had a specific legislative intent as to the application of JAR in a particular statute. General legislative intent and again Christopher put this eloquently a moment ago is said to be justified because it is empirically realistic that parliament could be regarded as having a general intent that administration should be subject to the general precepts or substantive and procedural legality. Okay, so there's two difficulties with this and again I've got limits of time so just to run through this very quickly the empirical argument firstly aligns approval and creation a general legislative intent could doubtless be posited for all manner of things including an end to child poverty international conflict economic recession and perhaps a no-deal Brexit but it could equally be posited for liberty, equality and human happiness. That does not mean that anything done by parliament necessarily had a causative impact including any of those things nor more importantly does it mean that its general approval was a necessary condition for the existence of liberty, equality and human happiness. So empirical proof of general legislative intent provides no evidence that the legislature had any role in the creation of the principles of JAR or that its approval was necessary for that creation the second difficulty mirrors the difficulty the third difficulty with the analytical argument. The argument proves too much it proves too much for the following reason if approval in this sense suffices for general legislative intent to be regarded as the foundation for JAR even if it played no part in its doctrinal creation the same must equally be true for all areas of the law. So we get all 630 members of the House of Commons we get them out into the fresh air we say top talking about Brexit for the moment come on to the commons in front of parliament tell us tell us now you really do accept that the administration should comply with the general precepts of the rule of law etc and they'll say yeah yeah yeah I think they should all be just and fair and all that and then they're all getting a bit cold it's a bit cold out there and they're all about to go in and you think great and then you call them out again and you say well do you think also that that the individuals in society should be subject to just principles of contract and tort and restitution and that equally you don't have time to make them so you delegate that power to the courts and they say yes of course we do of course we do the point I'm making here when I say the argument proves too much is that the empirical argument this idea that parliament would necessarily intend the precepts of good administration developed by the courts to be applicable you can make that argument equally in relation to what the common law courts do in relation to tort, contract, trust and any other body of law there is nothing distinctive about public law in that sense okay final, final part and then I'm done okay it is implicit in fact it's not implicit it's explicit in the ultra virus narrative that their view is necessary in relation in order to prevent a strong challenge of sovereignty now we've seen that the analytical argument I don't believe the analytical argument works for the reasons I said earlier but I also believe that the ultra virus model is based upon the conception of parliamentary sovereignty which is a possible conception but it just doesn't happen to be our conception of sovereignty you've got to distinguish between three different conceptions of sovereignty the classic continuing model of sovereignty is the one that we have okay it embodies the idea of legislative omnipotence in the sense of ability to change ability to change parliament has the last word and every parliament has the last word okay no substantive limits on parliament's power it can in theory legislate on any subject matter no procedural limits no 51% majorities or 2 thirds majorities or anything now note here the third part of this slide the consequence of this is that judicially created controls apply unless parliament has indicated otherwise in pursuance of its continuing sovereignty that's the implication and that's the model of JR with respect that we have worked with for 400 years that's exactly what the common law courts were doing in the 15th century onwards and that's how parliament viewed the courts the judicially created controls applied and if parliament in pursuit of its undoubted sovereignty if it wished to indicate the contrary then it could say so and over all or whatever what the courts were doing now the reality is that actually the whole argument from the ultra virus model is based upon a different model of sovereignty what I call monopoly and it doesn't constitute the model of sovereignty that we've had in the UK ever since the term sovereignty was worth coining the statutory monopoly model demands in addition in addition to what's in the first model it demands that an integral aspect of sovereignty is that any legal norm that impacts on legislation can only be legitimate if it has the approval of the legislature through some showing of legislative intent so it demands that parliament give prior approval to any limit or term read into legislation that's the condition of constitutional legitimacy the consequence here is that judicial power is contingent on finding such consent it does not suffice on this model that parliament can change reject or modify any conditions imposed by courts I don't have time to go through the parliamentary monopoly model it's even more far reaching now the ultra virus model is predicated on the assumption that sovereignty means the statutory monopoly model and the crucial difference between that and the classic continuing sovereignty model is this being all powerful in the sense of the continuing sovereignty model does not logically entail the conclusion that all constraints on legislation must necessarily be authorized by parliament ex ante in order to be constitutionally legitimate in the UK the constitutional reality as judged by history law and principle is adherence to the first continuing sovereignty model not the second and for that reason there is nothing at all odd unusual or normatively dangerous let alone normatively revolutionary in the courts through the common law based upon the rule of law developing and creating the tools of judicial review with parliament having the last word as it always does and of course let me make this clear when the courts develop those principles of judicial review then of course they are mindful of the legislation and of course they are mindful of fitting tools of judicial review into the legislation and into and take account of the relationship between courts and parliament underlies our constitutional democracy so it doesn't mean ignoring the legislation at all at the same time what it does mean is that it is perfectly legitimate in public law for the courts to develop those principles in exactly the same way perfectly legitimate for the courts of common law to develop principles of contract tort, restitution and trusts which are also read into legislation and the consequence there in those other areas is exactly the same as in public law if the court develops a principle of tortious liability or contractual liability and parliament doesn't like it either generally or in relation to that particular piece of legislation then it's entirely open to parliament to amend or repeal or overturn the particular doctrine. Thank you very much Thank you very much for those two expert summaries of some very complex arguments. We're short of time so I'm not going to say very much but I'll just say a few things to justify my being here Christopher says looking in my direction well Dicey told us that we have absolute parliamentary sovereignty Parliament can make and I'll make any law well that's true but Dicey said many other things as well and one of the things Dicey said often forgotten is that when the courts come to interpret the statute to decide what they mean very often the result is not to the liking of some of the MPs who voted for the particular bill in the first place in other words one question is who is the final authority of the legislator the other question is what does the legislation mean and the courts have the final authority on what a statute means and how it applies to a particular case whether you know Parliament has the last word it's a bit implausible because when it comes to a controversy the last word in a particular case is the courts word and the court has to interpret the statute in the light of constitutional principle so my own feeling is that maybe the gulf between these two positions we've heard tonight is not really quite as wide as it often seems at first sight I tend to think the talk of legislative intent here itself is rather unhelpful and misleading because it suggests that when we talk about legislative intent we're looking for some empirical historical intention that somebody may have held that we could discover if we look hard enough if we look perhaps hard enough in Hansard or whatever but that's a mistake I think because construing statutes is very complicated as we know and we have to try and set the statute in its constitutional context and nobody thinks the courts are not entitled to have regard to set a constitutional principle of course they have to try and make sense of the purpose of the statute but then that's often qualified by considerations of principle if I was actually the legislative intent is the product of our interpretation once we've interpreted the statute then we can work out what intent we attribute to the statute it's the end of our deliberations I think not some historical fact that we have to begin that we have to find to begin them so it's an interpretive construct I think and again the idea that the original I suppose the modified ultraviries theory was that Parliament had to have some special intention did each MP have to have an intention that particular kinds of controls in judicial review should be applied in relation to each particular statute well I don't think Professor Wade who was the main defender of ultraviries in his book ever thought like that Wade never I think thought that there had to be some specific intention of that kind so he must have had in mind something like what we now call the modified theory all along so I wonder whether this I'm sure will adhere me to my two friends here but I wonder whether we couldn't simply reconcile these two positions if we try hard enough why shouldn't we say that the ultraviries doctrine is really very useful at a technical doctrinal level because in cases like Anna's Minnick it enables us to explain really quite clearly I think why the ask the clause is not taken at face value too literally we know that we have to interpret the ask the clause in the context of the whole statute and we can say that a decision made completely outside the part ever granted by the statute to the public body is of course invalid a many reported determinations and no determination at all powers were never granted to do certain things and therefore we can see that an ask the clause can't be referring to that kind of decision so we can invoke the ultraviries doctrine and again it helps us to explain why we normally think that ultraviries decisions or invalid decisions are void there was never power in the first place to make that kind of decision so it's helpful at the doctrinal level but we can also see I think from cases like Anna's Minnick that it's the common law doing most of the important work here because it's the common law that decides how we should interpret the statute so what kind of weight we should give to ask the clauses how we should deal with them how we should make sense of the ask the clause but denying the point and purpose of the statute and granting the appropriate leeway to the public body so the common law and statute surely are working in harmony here I can't quite see why we shouldn't accept the ultraviries doctrine at the doctrinal level but say that it's underpinned by common law principle it's the common law constitution with the fundamental work and it's the common law constitution that tries to reconcile parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law the rule of law including I think all these fundamental common law principles and the idea that we could have a constitution an administrative law that didn't apply as some of these basic ideas about relevant considerations proper purposes and so forth principles of natural justice I mean these really are fundamental to the rule of law in the sense that they're basic to our idea of law there must be limits to the extent to which parliament could do away with such principles because if we really took absolute parliamentary sovereignty literally it would enable parliament to defeat the rule of law and that would undermine our very idea of law we wouldn't really have an administrative law at all so it's always a question of balancing these fundamental principles and why could perhaps see the ultramarious doctrine and the common law theory as simply illustrating aspects of this attempt to achieve harmony between parliamentary sovereignty on the one hand and the rule of law and the other now I will allow the two speakers to respond to me if they wish but they might prefer for me to ask questions from the floor since we're quite short of time do I really want to respond to what I've just said well I would like just to say that I'd like to get on to the questions I'd like the audience to have an opportunity to ask questions but I do want one thing to say I read a whole article from many years ago called heat and light an attempt of reconciliation and it was completely ignored so I welcome your attempt and I hope it isn't ignored so the way Ryan was Paul are you so I too very briefly I too want people to be able to ask questions the only one to make one comment is that in the way that you put it I think it reveals the duality about the use of the term alphavirus which is actually dangerous and unhelpful because it's being used in two different ways which is why I tend to refer to a legislative intent model versus a common law model let's be clear on Patrick Alliance the Court of the Bill judge pointed this out very clearly like 15 years ago and then reiterated and I reiterated it and in any event look the common law model of course accepts that there are boundaries to power so the idea that there are some things which are introvarious and some things which are outrovarious is not something which the common law model ignores or fails to accept of course we accept that the key difference between the two schools of thought is not whether there are boundaries to power which is why I think the actual Anne's Minnich argument in favour of the outrovarian model is actually with respect to Robert Bissau and actually doesn't work analytically but just to stick to the point at hand look in Anne's Minnich or in any case like Anne's Minnich but think of course there are boundaries to what you can do and what you can't do the key difference between the two schools of thought is whether you think or whether someone thinks that the nature of those boundaries can be and must be delineated through some invocation of legislative intent or whether those boundaries ultimately should be set through the instrumentality of the principle quite my viewpoint was that I think legislative intent itself in this debate is quite misleading I agree I think it's actually probably if it means ending at all that it's a construct which incorporates common law principle it's not something that's outside and beyond it so maybe the whole debate is premised on a false understanding of legislative intent but let's see if there are questions from our audience of sure there are yes please How do you respond to comments from the Supreme Court saying that if Parliament will attempt to abolish judicial review entirely that they wouldn't listen to it particularly Lord Stain Jackson for example because it seems like only Professor Allen would be able to accommodate such a thing if it were to happen but I think those those statements are mistaken again it's not a question of what one would like the constitution to be it's what the constitution is and if Parliament can make or un-make any law at all remove judicial review I as a great supporter of judicial review would never be in favour of a law of that kind if Parliament were to make such a law it would be valid and effective I disagree I disagree with that I disagree with that I disagree with that I disagree with that I disagree with that just to show that there's actually there really isn't any tension between me saying that I'm in trouble with this and anything I said about the common law model just to explain just to explain in this respect the common law model is predicated on the assumption that there's nothing inherent in the common law model which involves a strong challenge to Parliament in the way that we've been talking about however I also think that there can be the example you've posited from Jackson and Stain is an example of a situation where there would be a strong challenge to Solventy there would be a strong challenge to Solventy at Stain so if you have Parliament clearly and unequivocally passing a piece of legislation which impolishes the entirety of judicial review there would be a strong challenge to Solventy if the courts refused to apply that legislation there would be a strong challenge to Solventy and I accept that now my view about that and the reason I disagree with Christopher in terms of constitutional orthodoxy is that if you have that situation then what you have if you want to think about it in those terms if you want to think about it in those terms you have a situation where your ultimate legal principle your rule of recognition is up for grabs think about it in this way we work on the assumption that Parliament can do anything in life by simple majority substantially or procedurally and procedurally and then someone comes along and drops a nuclear bomb on this through the example of trying to do away with judicial review and then the players in the game including courts but not only courts but including courts have to work out how they're going to react now in that scenario if the courts as I would hope they would refuse to apply that particular statute ok then the ball would be bounced back to Parliament and Parliament would see how it reacted let's assume for the sake of argument the Parliament backs off that the courts exercise a lot of muscle and the Parliament thinks it's not worth a candle and let's assume that that comes hardened into the underlying social practice which underlies your rule of recognition or ultimate legal principle then it seems to me that your ultimate legal principle would have been refashioned to say Parliament can do anything like by simple majority substantially or procedurally except that it can't do certain extreme things like abolishing the entirety of judicial review I find nothing odd about that at all what is odd is to imagine that our orthodoxy or apparent orthodoxy about the ultimate legal principle is somehow static it's not that simply implausible normatively and it's implausible viewed historically the content of that top principle has onto the day of time what you're positing is a scenario, an example where it might shift again but why not? The Court might lose that tussle in which case the status quo would remain as it was before I'm not sure that the question is directed at me but I can't resist I can't resist just a brief comment I mean I'm allergic to talk of the rule of recognition because I don't believe in it and I don't believe there's one top rule that Pam Hull might give way if there's a power fight all the time courts are giving an interpretation to statutes including ouster clauses that try to find a harmony between the statutory objective and what they think is a reasonable legal response to it and courts don't ever say well we're just not going to accept that, that goes too far I know they said they might inject but what they say is well this says there can be a judicial review but then Parliament never contemplated this particular situation that's arisen and they couldn't possibly have meant there wouldn't be judicial review in this case because that would deny as John Law says in the Carter case parliamentary sovereignty entails judicial power simply to decide what the statute meant and see that it's informed so I would say that the scope for change and development if we see it from case to case that there's this constant tension between parliamentary and judicial power I think already with us so I wouldn't regard an extreme ouster as being very different from a more modest ouster which the courts are really quite good at dealing with but that's just my gloss can we have another question who else would like to come in sorry yeah please this is just about the two species of legislative intent which Professor Craig distinguished with specific legislative intent it's very easy to say when Parliament theoretically formed the intention because it would have formed the intention on passing the statute of concern but with general legislative intent which I think was explained as intending legislation to perform the basic principles of fairness and justice operating in the constitutional democracy does it not follow that that intention must always have been held by Parliament or if not is there a particular point in time at which that intention was formulated my problem is perhaps with looking back at Parliament's earlier centuries and attributing to them all that stuff about constitutional democracy and so on thank you very much for the incisive question I mean they are not sure that it's more not sure, well anyway you directed it to me so I'll have it not necessarily I did use you just to be clear the distinction is drawn by the ultra-virus theorists themselves and it was Mark Elliott who made the transition in particular in his notable work between the specific model of legislative intent and the more general model of intent and it then has passed into the kind of lexicon within this area and it's part of the debate and that's absolutely fine in relation to the specific direction of your question I think you are right clearly in the sense that if the content of a general model of legislative intent must itself be historically dynamic and not static because it does not withstand scrutiny otherwise in other words what a Parliament in the 17th century would have regarded as constitutionally axiomatic is not the same thing as what a Parliament in the 19th or the 21st century would have regarded as constitutionally axiomatic and I think that's absolutely right and that would have to be regarded as built into the model of general legislative intent though that would not undermine it I don't regard that as particularly problematic in itself I mean it's something that one would have to take into account and rightly so but one could still then say in the 21st century in the here and now we can work on the assumption that Parliament generally intends question more comparatively moment but we can work on the assumption that Parliament generally intends certain precepts of rights and good ministry behaviour etc but yes it's definitely historically dynamic has to be now any other questions we'd like to ask if not I agree with you sorry to the back so this is too early on surely to some extent it's a it's a bit of a stereotype of it because when we talk about the rules of prohibition of view no one can deny that in the Parliament we say that they also apply to non-statutory powers so prohibitive powers surely in the context of statutory powers it just makes so much more sense to think about the intention of Parliament so I would say general intent and to use an ultra-virus model in the same way as when we look at contracts and we try to ascertain what obligations have arisen under the contract we think about the intentions of the parties drawing reference to the body of background contractual rules it makes more sense when trying to ascertain what power has been conferred on the body mentioned in the statute to frame it in terms of the what was intended what power was intended by Parliament and then with reference to the rules of judicial review which have developed in the common law does it just not make more analytical sense to use this model I think there's not really much between it's just a case of what is what is or do you want to the key so with respect I'm not sure in what sense it is more helpful I mean no one is doubting the key issue here and I don't think we should take our eye off the ball the key issue here is as you yourself accepted it's pretty much everyone accepts that it's undeniable that the courts are actually the creators of these principles and they've been doing it hand over fist for 400 years or more so the argument then is I mean because I am actually and the older I get the simpler I get and the more straightforward I get the argument is assuming that that is so why should we not accept what is so as being so all right given another in other words of the courts have of their own volition created these principles what must there be there's got to be some reason to say oh well they created them but we've got to clothe them with some intent nonetheless now we had a reason given to us by the Alphavira school which was that you had to do that to stop there being a strong challenge to sovereignty I didn't believe that analytical argument works so either you think I'm wrong in which case that's fine in which case you rebut my rebuttal of the analytical argument or you come up with some other reason why it's regarded as better to or preferable in some way to invest what is going on or to quote it with legislative intent now I listen carefully to the way you put the question but at the moment I'm still searching for what that rationale is and remember that rationale has to be a rationale which says we've got to do it in public law but we don't do it in law and we don't do it in contract when contractual and torsion principles are read into statutes as they are every single day of the week with the statutory in duty the power conferred is determined by the legislator there is a statutory power whereas in torts the obligations that arise arise out of the common the obligations that arise arise out of the agreement made in different parties that's a nice point but it's not it's not what's going on that's just as it were doing an end run around the question the question is you've got a statute which is an act it's a sale of goods act it's a higher purchase act it's anything you like it's a statute which is about landlord and tenant and the torsious rules or the relevant contractual rules will be read into that statute to determine the respective liabilities of landlord to tenant or the respective ways in which a contract will be made by the parties subject to anything being specified in the statute to the contrary rather logic if you buy into the logic of the Artforvara's model and particularly if you buy into the analytical argument you cannot do that you cannot read those principles in because unless parliament either intended the rule on contract formation to exist and be read into the statute or it didn't the legislative intent to suggest that those rules on contract formation should be read into the statute then it's illegitimate to read them in in which case you've got to invest the reading in of those common law principles to write in private law with the same legislative intent as they're doing for public law now as I said nobody thinks that you talk to private lawyers and I talk to private lawyers in some detail about this and private lawyers just reason in the same way because they're not about this as I specified in relation to the third part of the analysis we're looking at sovereignty and the meaning of sovereignty they just say look there's the common law those principles are ready and if parliament doesn't like them for some reason it says so and it specifies that the rule should not be applicable in this context otherwise the default position is that the principles are applicable no need to find legislative intent in the circumstances can I just I'd like to say something on this the subject first of all I agree with the comment I think it makes a good point secondly several times this evening Professor Craig has raised the argument that the modified ultra-virage doctrine if adopted means that the law of contract becomes a question of implied legislative attention I think this is quite wrong and what it overlooks is the nature of public law constitutions are about the allocation of power are the judges to decide this issue or is it to be decided by politicians is this to be decided by the county council or is it to be decided by the district council constitutional law is essentially about the allocation allocation of power and so when one's talking about the modified ultra-virage doctrine when he's talking about it in the context of an allocation of power and that is where one determines implied limits on the power allocated and that's the difference between public law and the law of contract and the law of tort and so forth and it was good to hear you making it hearing that argument emerging from the body of the hall thank you very much could I just give one very quick to that just to make it clear I am not saying in any shape, manner or form there's no differences between public law and private law I'm not saying that at all that would be ridiculous what I'm saying and I'm not denying that constitutional law is about the allocation of power I'm not saying that at all of course that is true what I'm saying is parliament is equally sovereign when it enacts a sale of good piece of legislation as when an occupiers liability statute as when it enacts a regulatory piece of legislation dealing with equality or one of the other regulatory issues which form part of public law the parliament is not a different body it is the same sovereign body so if you believe my argument is a very simple one and it's not with respect I think met by your rejoinder if you believe that parliament must give must have give its advance consent to the statutory monopoly model as I mentioned it if you believe that it parliament must give its consent in advance to any precept before it's legitimate to read that precept into legislation and that is the argument then that same point must be applicable to all legislation there is in that sense no difference it's the same sovereign body in all contexts I mean do you think all the ultramarys could be used as a short half way of saying what you just said I mean it could be understood as a response to the argument well the courts imposing these controls in this particular case is somehow contrary to parliament's will because it fetters the discretion the freedom to decide of the public body and the response is no it doesn't because this is the right way to interpret the act the common law controls are not inconsistent with the duty imposed on the public body when the public body acts in this way it's acting therefore inconsistently with its power in that sense in parliament's instruction so it's a complex way of saying that there is in fact no threat to parliament so that way ultramarys will be used as a summary of what you just said about why common law control is not in fact a challenge to parliament's sovereignty that's the whole point of the modified ultramarys doctrine to enable common law principles to comply without challenging the supremacy but of course it doesn't deny that the common law principles are doing all the fundamental work it doesn't deny that at all it never has I mean the principles of the I thought we both together the principles of the interpretation of statutes of common law principles well maybe we bring to a little bit of agreement at the end I hope so I think it's time for we have gone well beyond our original time so I'd like to just end by saying a great thank you to our two main speakers tonight particularly to Professor Craig who's come all the way from Oxford tonight to hit this call so thank you very much to him and to all of you


In this video, I'm going to be covering a couple of the basics about how to copy overlays between scenes in e-cam live Hello, welcome to take one tech My name's Alec and this video is basically has come about because of a question that came up in office hours Doc Rocks office hours last weekend and It was to do with basically overlays and how you move them or copy them between Scenes and I realized that perhaps in a lot of my videos I haven't necessarily gone down into the sort of fine detail of these things So it's just a little thing a little video short video this one about how to copy overlays between scenes But hopefully it should all become clear by the end of the video exactly what I'm talking about So without further ado, I'm going to go straight on into my demo mode and what I've got here is I've got a series of scenes down the the left side and then I've also got my My overlays in this side here So first of all what I want to do is just talk about the overlays panel itself So the we've got show in all scenes So there's a heading there and then there's a couple of other grade headings Which is show in current scene and show in the background Now hopefully those should be fairly self-explanatory Show in all scenes are basically overlays that when they're toggled on and off and by the way You can see the little eye icons next to them And whether they are currently on or off and if they are on then you will see those in all scenes Whereas the ones that say show in current scene are specific to that particular scene Then you've got show in background which will appear in all scenes But in the background and they'll be behind everything else So that is basically the overlays panel itself, but the specific question was about copying overlays from one scene to another Now the scenes panel itself over on this side This just contains all of the different named scenes that you have So there is no overlays going to appear in here This is literally just the name of all the different scenes and I've got my my main scene here I've got another scene which is my screen sharing so this one so you can see that I've got that screen sharing I've got another one which is screen sharing, but the other way round I've got lots of other different Scenes that I've got set up But what I've done now is I've created two blank scenes So I've got this one and then just to differentiate the two I've created one with a completely different background So there we go. Those are two scenes Now what you'll notice about both of those scenes is in these cases there is nothing that is shown in the current scene It's just purely the background So what I'm going to do is I'm going to add a image to the an image to the The scene so you'll see if I drag this image in and drop it There you go. And by the way, this is something I'm currently doing for the month of September the great cycle challenge There's a team of us and we're riding a thousand a thousand miles not all in one go by the way It's a team effort as well A thousand miles to raise money for kids cancer So if you fancy checking that out and supporting it then head to take one tech I o slash ride And show your support there because it would be much appreciated. It's for a great great cause But now I've got an image that has been dropped into this scene So the image that's dropped into the scene as well has now appeared in this show in current scene But what I want to show you as well is if I just delete this out So I'll come to this scene come down to the little trash there I'll delete that out and now if I go to the the scene itself So this is just this new scene if I were to lock that scene Nothing can be added into it So if I were to now drop an image onto this window here and just drop it like that What you can see is this this is now appeared in the show in all scenes because you can't actually edit anything in the Current scene so that's just something to be aware of as well if you have locked your scene You won't be able to add any overlays into that specific scene And if you unlock the scene then the default behavior is that it's going to drop it into that scene Now if you want to You've dragged this in now say I did want this to appear in all scenes What you can also do is you can come down here and you can grab the overlay and then just move it up And you can see that it's reordering it so I could move it right to the top and now this will appear in every scene So no matter which scene I go to it's going to be there in this one It's going to be there in this one and it's going to be there in this one So that is now appearing in all scenes and that just because I've dragged it out But if I go back to that original one We may not may not want it to be in all scenes. We may just want it to be in this scene alone So I can drag it back down and I can make sure it says show in current scene So now it is not going to be in all of these ones But what if you wanted to copy this over to another scene? Maybe you only want it in one more So let's say I come over to this one and I did want it in here One way that you can do that and the easiest way you can do that is if you come over to the show in current scene Panel where the the overlay is and by the way, if I just come back to that other scene here You'll notice that there's nothing shown in current scene there at the moment. Okay So I'm going to come back to the original one and now what I'm going to do is I'm going to grab that overlay from that Show in current scene window there or the section there rather of the window and I'm going to actually drag the overlay Onto the scene that I want it to appear in so you can see that there's a little plus icon Toggled next to it. So that's showing that it's going to add it into that scene and when I let it go It hasn't actually moved physically into this panel However, if I click on that particular scene like this, we now do have that overlay is still there And if I come down to the bottom, it's now showing in the current scene of that scene as well So that is really the extent of this little demo It is to show how you can move things around and move overlays around Between scenes and how you can structure them and by the way all of these scenes that I sorry all of these overlays that I have You've got to think of them as a Stack basically and whatever is at the top of the pile will appear on the top of the the output. So If for example, I was to drag this and create another one Let me just do this quickly so now we've got two of these these images and Say I wanted this one to be behind then all you need to do is just remember that as I say they are if I fuck all this one Let me just make this clear which one this one is This one's currently the top And by the way, you can just double click and rename them and this one's the bottom Now if you want to swap them around then you simply just come down here and drag them and drag the one from below To above and then that will flip the order So just think of this as I say like layers basically in graphics programs So whatever is further down the list will be further down in the stack and will be in that therefore behind other things as well So as I say that is the extent of what I wanted to show you today But it has been a little segue into introducing this little graphic So if you do want to support me and the rest of the team then head over to take one tech Dot I o slash ride and that will take you to the actual website and my my page on the for the great cycle challenge where I Originally set myself the goal of 200 miles in the month But I'm already pretty much halfway there to be honest at day seven So I'm going to change that to I think 500 or something like that's put Anyway, it's all for a good cause so I'd really appreciate if you would head over there and and show your support In the meantime if you found this video useful, then don't forget to like and subscribe And I'll leave a link to some more e-com live videos over on the right hand side If I press the right stream deck button not my screen sharing button This is the one that I want I'll leave a link to some more e-com live videos over on the bottom right so until the next video have a wonderful day


Hello everyone. Welcome to this talk. I am Ritam Bhomek from India, Paris and today I'll be talking about our paper QCB, Efficient Quantum Secure Authenticated Encryption at Asia Crypt 2021. And this is joint work with Xavier Bonta, Andres Hayou, Gaito Lohan, Maria Nyablasensia, Andres Shrutan Lohan, and Yannick Soho. We begin with the block cipher, which is a secure, fixed-width encryption scheme. And we want to build, on top of it, an authenticated encryption mode. Now, what is an authenticated encryption mode? It takes in an initial value IV, a message M, and some associated data A, and it computes a cipher text C and the tag T. And it comes with two promises. One is a promise of confidentiality, that is, C is indistinguishable from some random function of M, or some random permutation of M. And the other is authenticity, that Ct should not be forcible. That is, an adversary who has not worried a particular triple IVMA should not be able to produce a Ct, which like such that IVMA encrypts to Ct. So this is an authenticated encryption mode. Now, one way to achieve it is to handle the encryption and authentication tasks separately, like in the encrypt NMAC paradigm, where we first encrypt the message securely into a cipher text C using some mode like the counter mode. And then we authenticate C with a secure MAC, like the NMAC or HMAC. And this gives us a secure A mode. But the problem is that it is not lightweight. It is read 2. That is, we need two block cipher calls for every message block. And what we want here is a rate 1 A mode. That is, it should only spend about one block cipher call for every message block. So that is the goal here. And a popular A mode which achieves this goal, which is rate 1, is the offset code book or OCB. And here we look at its present variant, OCB 3. What it does is it takes the design of the ECB electronic code book. But before and after each block cipher call, it adds an offset. And this offset depends on the IV and it depends on the block number. But the interesting thing about OCB 3 is that the IV of a certain block, like the offset delta of a certain block, like the delta IVI, is the XOR of two components, one which comes from the IV and one which comes from the block. Now we want to examine the quantum security of OCB. But before that, we would have to decide on a model. And in general, there are two broad models for examining quantum security or security against the quantum adversary. One is the classical query model, where the adversary is only allowed to make classical queries to the construction. But they can do offline computations on a quantum computer. And this is a very realistic scenario, but it's less powerful because you do not get any superposition access to the construction. And for some cases, in public encryption, such an adversary is powerful enough to completely break the system. But this is usually not the case in symmetric systems. And so far only quadratic speed-ups have been found or very recently a bit more than quadratic, but not something, not for instance, exponential speed-ups. So this is the classical query model. And more theoretical, but like more suited to this provable security scenario is the superposition query model, where the adversary can do quantum computations offline, but also can access certain registers of the system quantum as in superposition. And this can actually allow very powerful attacks on some symmetric systems, as we'll see. So in this paper, we consider this superposition query model. And as it turns out, OCB, which is, by the way, classically proven to be secure, is broken in the superposition query model. And so before going into that, we should specify that here we only consider the messages to be quantumly accessible. That is, you can, the adversary can query the construction with messages which are in superposition. But the IV is still considered classical because the IV is not generally not controlled by the adversary. So there can be a more general model where even the IV is quantumly accessible, but we do not consider that here. Here we consider the case where the IV is always classical. Now, again, if we are happy with rate two, if we do not want lightweight, then the counter plus N-MACH-MAC mode still works. It gives us an AE mode which is secure in the superposition query model we just described. But as mentioned before, we want a rate one model. And so we want some way to fix OCB to make it quantum resistant without spending extra black ciphercalls. And that is what we'll explore in the rest of this paper. So one of the very important tools in these superposition query models to attack and break symmetric systems is the Simon's algorithm. And what it does is that given a periodic function F, that is a function with some hidden period S such that F of X, X or S is always equal to FX. And given some superposition query access to such a function F, Simon's attack can recover the secret period S in polynomial time. And this is something that cannot be done in a classical scenario. And this gives us access to some new attacks, some very interesting attacks on symmetric systems. For instance, on OCB 3, now it's not unnatural that OCB 3 has cipher designed with classical adversary in mind. We have, we leave vulnerabilities such as hidden periods because it is usually not a vulnerability when the adversary is just classical. And as it turns out, in OCB 3, there are hidden periods everywhere. So for instance, in the ciphering part, if we take the encryption of the two equal message blocks and then XOR the outputs, it gives us an FX with a hidden period of delta 0, XOR delta 1. And this happens because this, this period would actually have been delta 0 IV, XOR delta 1 IV. But as mentioned before, this delta 0 IV is just the XOR of delta IV and delta 0. So the delta IV part cancels out from the two offsets. And we are just left with delta 0, XOR delta 1, which is not dependent on the IV. Thus, we can just repeatedly query this and then use Simon's attack to recover delta 0, XOR delta 1. And even if we do not look at the ciphering part, we can just look at the tag part instead and query it with an empty message and, and two equal AD blocks. And then we can see that FX, the output, the tag X is, has a component which is dependent on the IV, but then it has this function which is, the rest of it is this function which has this hidden period of delta 0, XOR delta 1. Now, this is not strictly periodic because if you cannot repeat the IV, then this function changes each time and for, for each different IV, but for Simon's attack, it's sufficient that the period is constant. And how it works is by sampling vectors orthogonal to the period. And so Simon's attack can still be used in this case to recover delta 0, XOR delta 1. And so just to mention that why is this an attack? Because once you have delta 0, XOR delta 1, it's very simple to make a forgery. We can just take any two blocks, A0, A1, which are, which do not XOR to delta 0, XOR delta 1. And then for some IV and some M, we can query IV, A0, A1, M to get some CT. And then we can swap A0 and A1 being A1 to the first block, A0 to the second block, but, and then add to each this difference delta 0, XOR delta 1. And it's easy to check that this is of, then CT is a valid forge for this particular triple IV and A1, XOR delta 0, XOR delta 1 is 0, XOR delta 0, XOR delta 1 and M. So with this, once this sum of offsets has been recovered, it's quite easy to attack OCB3. Now, it may seem that the real problem here is that this delta 0 IV, XOR delta 1 IV, is independent of IV, because the IV components get cancelled out. And one attempt to fix this could be just to make this delta 0 IV, just to make this XOR of the two offsets, IV dependent. For instance, we can take delta 0 IV to be I dot EKIV. And then this same attack doesn't work because IV changes each time. But we show in this paper that this construction is still vulnerable to a similar attack because we can, so in the same query, we can take these non-overlapping pairs, I1, I2, for instance, 1, 2, 3, 4, and so on, up 10 minus 1n. And take the same X there, so X1 equals, so M1 equals M2, M3 equals M4 and so on. And then we take this XOR, C1, XOR, C2, C3, C3, XOR, C4. And with this, we can find vectors, like using Simon's algorithm, we can find vectors, which are up to one or two, these differences here, the periods of these functions, C1, XOR, C2, and so on. And with this, we can find enough data to solve for EKIV. So this is one of the first results we find in this paper because the earlier attacks are already well known. So this is not enough to fix OCP. And what we can guess from here is that it is the offsets, which is the problem here. I mean, Simon is very powerful against many kinds of offsets, and it's quite difficult to fix this without changing this very structure of adding the offsets. We can turn instead to ThetaCB. So what is ThetaCB? So this is OCB3, but here we can abstract out this entire middle part of this XORing the offset and then passing through the block cipher pole and XORing the offset again. And we can say that this is a pre-cable block cipher where this offset acts as a tweak. And this is actually used. So this ThetaCB name is given by the authors of the OCB paper, and they use it as an intermediate construction for the proof of OCB3. But what we can say is that ThetaCB itself does not have so many problems, but so we can say that we use ThetaCB, but we do not use these offsets. We process the tweak differently. We do not use them as offsets, and that is the direction we look for trying to fix OCB. And so we come up with QCB, which is the construction we propose in this paper. And in the encryption part, this is actually similar to ThetaCB, and we assume for now this E tilde is a secure, quantumly secure tweakable block cipher, and I'll explain soon what I mean by that. So this encryption part of QCB is the same as ThetaCB, because I mean, this is secure enough. But for the tag part, there is an important change. In OCB3, we do not use the IV for getting the tags. They process these offsets, which are not dependent on IVs. But here, we need the IVs to go into the tweaks for processing the associated. So this is one important change, and so this is the QCB construction. Now we turn to proving it secure. And before that, we have to define its security, which is one of the tricky bits. So first, we need a secure TBC. Now, what do we mean by that? So ideally, a quantum secure TBC should withstand the following game, where the adversary is trying to distinguish EKT from a family of random permutations, PiT. And the tweak inputs are classical, but the messages are super post. But these classical tweaks can be chosen adaptively. So there is no restriction on that. This is the ideal TBC, ideal definition of TBC. And then with this, when we instantiate the QCB with this ideal TBC, we can make the following claims. In confidentiality, we can show an int QCPA security, what we mean by that. So in the int QCPA game, there is a query phase where the adversary makes Q encryption queries with adaptive classical IVs and some MA, which can be in superposition. Then there is a challenge phase where the adversary has to distinguish between the encryptions of two classical messages. This part is important. So in the challenge, the challenges have to be classical. And for authenticity, we use the Bones-Andre definition, where in the query phase, the adversary makes Q encryption queries with, again, with adaptive classical IVs and MA possible in superposition. And in the forging phase, the adversary must output Q plus one valid tuples, AIVCT. This is the Bones-Andre definition. And we can show that QCB achieves both these goals when instantiated with an ideal TBC. And how do you prove that? Well, first, we replace all the tweakable buck ciphers with ideal random permutations and which are independent for different tweaks. And then it's simple to argue, because in confidentiality, since the IVs are not repeated, when we move on to the challenge phase, and so the permutations which appear in the challenge phase do not appear in the query phase. And their outputs are independent of anything, any information the adversary may obtain in the query phase. So the adversary can never get better than random. And for authenticity, we can say that we actually classify this 4G attempt, this Q plus one tuple which the adversary submits as a 4G attempt. And we classify it based on whether it contains a new IV or a new ciphertext block or some new associated data. And in each case, we show that one of the two must be true, that either the adversary produces an input-output pair for some random permutation which it has never queried, or the adversary produces two input-output pairs for random permutation which has only been queried once. And we can claim that both of these are difficult to do better than a random guess. And this gives us a proof of the security of QCB with ideal TBC. But we want to make it, I mean, we want to go further because an ideal TBC may not be rated one. And for instance, there is a construction by Hoso Yamada and Iwata which needs three block ciphercalls for every TBC call. But this does not help us because if we instantiate QCB with a TBC which does not, which spends more than one block cipher call for every TBC call, then QCB does not remain rated one anymore. And our original purpose is to fit it. So, we want to look for a TBC which is rated one. And we found the key tweak insertion TBC where the tweak is just exorbed with the key. And this in many cases is not a very ideal construction for a TBC, but we find that it serves our purpose very well. But so now we need to prove the security of this TBC. But unfortunately, we will not prove its ideal TBC security which we promised before. And instead we prove its security under a slightly more restrictive condition, but the tweaks are non-adaptive. So, the adversary has to declare a set of tweaks beforehand and then the rest of the game is the same. But this is the only restriction we need. And since this is not an ideal TBC, we also modify the security goals of QCB accordingly. And in fact, in this TBC security definition, we make one other small claim, small change, but I'll come to that later. So, for the QCB security, the modified goals look as follows. There is this modified int QCPA where the IVs are either random or specified in advance. So, they are not adversary controlled. And the query phase and challenge phase are as before. And then for authenticity, we have the modified BZ definition where again the IVs are random or specified in advance. And then the query phase and fourth gene phase are before. So, we make these modifications to take into account our modified security goal of security def, I mean, our modified security of the TBC we are using to instantiate this particular QCB. So, here, just to clarify, you are talking about QCB when instantiated with the key-to-inconsertion TBC. And how do you prove this security? Well, it mostly follows the proof for the ideal TBC case. We can show that once, I mean, once we put this restriction on the IVs, it's we can just reduce it to the security of the TBC under our modified definition. But there is one caveat. And as we recall, for proof of BZ, we need, we need to verify the forging attempts. And for that, we'll need additional TBC queries and which may be with fresh tweaks which are not declared in advance. So, this is not strictly captured by the non-adaptive tweaks scenario we discussed before. But for this, we can just make a simple change that after the, in the TBC security game, after the quantum query phase, there is a classical query phase where there is a, where the adversary can ask a number of classical queries, non-adaptive, of course, because the forging attempts have to be made all at once. But these can use tweaks which are not predicted. So, it can be, which do not belong to the predicted list. So, we make this definition and with that, we can prove this modified is, like the modified BZ for QCB. So, that is the, that is all we find in this paper. So, in conclusion, what we show is that if the TBC is perfect, if it's ideal, then QCB has this full end QCB security and BZ authenticity. And it's also rate one. But we did not, we did not manage to instantiate it with some TBC because we could not prove this ideal quantum security for our TBC, our rate one TBC. So, instead, we show that with the modified definition where the tweaks are predicted, then QCB has this modified in QCB and BZ securities. And these, but these are, these all follow the, follow the ideal Cypher model. So, you do not have any results in the standard model. So, that is all we found in this paper. And there are several open questions. For instance, can we properly define in QCCA security for AE and then can we maybe explore in QCCA security of rate one constructions like QCB? And can we say something about the BU authenticity, which is the blind unforgeability and more recent definition, but can we say anything about BU's, BU unforgeability of rate one constructions? And of course, can we prove that the key tweak in session is like has full quantum security, like we don't know, we need the adaptive tweak case. And if we can show that then QCB is shown to be for linked QCB and BZ secure without the modifications. And finally, can we say anything without the ideal Cypher model? Like about the quantum security or the rate one, parallelizable. So, that is all. Thank you for listening to this recorded talk. And the full version of this paper can be found on ePrint. And maybe see you at AsiaPrint. Thank you.


Green line is on and we're under way. Madsen's made a great start, that gate number three really is tough. Bartosz-Smalsik just left there, hanging there with Rasmus Jensen, battling with Smalsik on the back. Julek's out in front, turns the bike very hard indeed.  Madsen coming on strong. Now Smalsik up the inside of Rasmus Jensen. Here comes Leon Madsen, working overtime. Julek hanging on, Leon Madsen mounting outside. Terrific effort from him, superb move. Julek coming back, but Leon Madsen delights the home crowd here. Leon Madsen coming through here. Round that last corner, what a ride from him. Walks away, takes her up and we're away with heat number eight and it's Yanovsky there from the outside. Roars into the first corner, the outside line just working a little bit better but Lambert coming back at him. But he then slams the door shut. Yanovsky as they go through, turns three and four on the opening lap. Freddie Linger, look at Lambert. Lambert coming up the inside, fine effort from him. Found the drive, took Yanovsky by surprise and Robert Lambert riding superbly well to get himself to the front. Last turn to go then for Robert Lambert who's ridden out of the top draw there. Really sparkling effort from him, comes through and wins the race. Heat number eight is his. Start initially from Doyle and so Dan Buley's made a fantastic effort around the outside, his neck and neck between Doyle and Buley. Then the back straight. Buley really has spots from Jason Doyle out in front. Lebedevs back in third place for Buley. Buley fires himself to the front. Right exactly where he wants. He's got the bike hooking up and going very, very quickly. Buley wins the race at a cancer at the end. Shot there for Leon Madsen. Heat 20 is with us. I think there may have been a fraction of movement from Bartl Smalslik but all of a sudden for Dan Buley charges the tapes and I would suggest that's the end of his night and that's a bitterly disappointing end. No, just jumped on his own I think. Yeah, I think it's just have a look to see if there's any movement. Oh, he just moves his shoulders. Yeah, there's body movement. Yeah, not the bike. No, just a little bit of body movement from Smalslik. What a start from gate number three that was. Madsen coming on strong in third place. Smalslik, but what a response. Great ride from Bartl Smalslik. Smalslik out in front. This is all but Dan. The world championship is getting ever closer. He wins here in Boyan's delight with a second place and Leon Madsen back in third and through there. He wins his second Grand Prix of the year and won the opening round of course in Croatia. Wins again in Boyan's superb effort from him.


Welcome to Nursing School Explained, and today's video on chest percussion. Remember that we always want to auscultate and percuss our patients when we have actually actual skin exposure, so we're going to go ahead and ask to remove the gown off of our patient. And there are two different techniques which are direct and indirect percussion methods, and I'll be demonstrating both. Hi, can we take down your gown, please? Sure. Thank you. So direct percussion only involves using one hand. It's a little bit more awkward to me personally. That's why I always use two, and the one-handed percussion technique basically just involves using your hand as a drum like this, and you kind of have to have a wrist flick. I personally always liked it better. My right hand is my dominant hand. I will use my left hand to have contact with the patient, and the most important part is that you actually find the intercostal space, so in between the ribs, and then I usually use my middle finger to place it flush with the patient's skin, and then use my dominant hand to use it as this percussion hammer that will allow me to listen what's underneath. So let's do this here. So this is pretty hollow, so this is that resonance that we're looking for. Now it sounds a little bit more dull, but that's because I've put my finger on the patient's rib, so I'll reposition here, find the intercostal space, and I hear this hollowness again. And so I want to stay away from the clavicles and the sternum here. Also, the breast tissue, it specifically comes into play in female patients because the breast tissue might be larger, and we want to basically use the same spots like I've drawn up here on our patient, both anterior and posterior, as we would in the auscultation technique. So you would start your way all up here, and then work your way down, and then remember to alternate left and right and compare the two sides, as well as march out all the way down here to listen what's going on underneath these lower lobes, specifically in the mid-axillary line on the patient's right side, because of that right middle lobe of the lung, we want to make sure that we don't miss anything. So please go ahead and practice the skill. So it can be a little bit daunting at first, but again, the most important part, place your non-dominant hand, probably the middle or index finger, flush to the patient's skin, make sure you're in the intercostal space, and then use your dominant hand as the percussion hammer. So this is that resonance, and then if I would put it over the sternum, it sounds much more dull because now I'm over the bone again like I was on the ribs, and that is the two different sounds that we expect to hear. And then hyper resonance would be the third sound, which would be for these hyper-inflated lungs that we might encounter with patients who are having COPD or an asthma attack. Once we complete the percussion in the front, we always want to percuss the patient's posterior chest, staying away again from the bony structures that underlie the chest or the torso, which are in the back, the shoulder blades as well as the ribs and the spine. But the same technique really applies, and the more you practice, the better you get at it. And once we're done with our procedure, we'll make sure we'll take care of our patients, getting them covered and comfortable, following all the other elements that we have to follow our nursing skills. Please also watch my other videos in the basic assessment skills playlist, as well as the one specifically on percussion, where I explain the different sounds that you hear on chest and abdominal percussion. Thanks for watching Nursing School Explained. See you soon.


So let's stand up and do it. You can't sit down doing this one. It has Senorita in it, so that's my contribution to multilingualism. I'm going to Kentucky, I'm going to the fair To see a Senorita with flowers in her hair Or shake a baby, shake it, shake it if you can Shake it like a milkshake and pour it in a can Or shake it to the bottom and shake it to the top And shake it round and round until it's time to stop So perfect one with babies. We do that with babies all the time.


Stevenson gets the 33-21 win over Ms. Ricordia on homecoming Glen Clark with head coach Ed Hoddle. Coach, I'm sure it was not the cleanest game that you could have asked for, but the heart that your team showed in the second half when they were faced with adversity to come away with this one. I imagine you're pretty proud of that. Yeah, proud of the effort in the second half. You know, we've just got to do a better job of getting ourselves mentally and emotionally prepared to play football games. You know, homecoming is a lot of distractions, a lot of things going on on campus, but you know, we still have a job to do and our job is to win the football game so everybody can leave the stadium happy.  All right, so let's go to fourth and goal from the 21, right? There's, what do you do in a situation like that? You got to throw for the end zone. I've seen a lot of plays here. I don't know that I've ever seen anything quite like that. Obviously completely flipped the game and for all the struggles that Nair had to make a throw like that, that was big time stuff. Yeah, I mean, it was tough down there that, you know, the wind was, you know, wasn't a constant wind, but it was tough, you know, I think throwing the football was obviously tough, kicking the ball today.  It was unbelievable. You redefined the word workhorse today. Louis set a new record for most carries ever for a Stevenson player with 43. Just kept going back to him, back to him. What, why was the day for him to just take on that entire workload?  And I don't know that I've ever met a running back that didn't want to touch the ball 43 times.   Screen was massive. And then Rukowski, right there at the end to close it out the way that he did. Coach Russ Myers, we're talking about like his journey to this point and how he's continued to do more and more things for this team to come away with two plays like that there. It was a pretty special day for him.    All right, so I hear there's a big game next week. I hear there's one that's pretty significant. What do you need from this team to step up and be able to be ready to go win a game like that on the road?  It's coach speak to say that. It is. But that's the reality of it, right? You know, you have to handle business one game at a time and, you know, that's a place we've never won before. So, you know, we've got to be mature. We've got to handle our emotions. We've got to go up and, you know, and play our best football. But that was today's goal, too. You know, was to play our best football. And so, you know, as we look at the week, we've got to, you know, manage the emotion of it. We've got to, you know, get on the road. We've got to be mature on the road and, you know, we've got to be able to handle the situation and, you know, be the best football team that we can be. All right, coach, appreciate you. Congratulations on a big win on homecoming. And we'll see you again here in two weeks. Thanks very much. It's coach Ed Hoddle. I'm Glenn Clark. Go Mustang Sports.tv.


From time to time, psychologists deeply study human behaviors and attempt to identify the various kinds of people in the world, using diverse methodologies and classifications popularly known as the Big Five Model. According to the Scientific American, this model was developed in the 1970s by two research teams led by Paul Koster and Robert McCree of the National Institute of Health and Warren Norman and Lewis Goldberg of the University of Michigan at N. Arba and the University of Oregon respectively. They discovered that the characteristic traits of humans fell into five dimensions and classified them according to how individuals perceive the world internally and our interaction with others. In today's video, I'll be showing with you the Big Five Model which forms the acronym OCEAN. Also, it describes the sub-six indicators for each of these traits, using questions which you must sincerely answer for you to detect your level of each of the five characters. If you're an entrepreneur or an ambitious person, we specially invite you to join our motivational channel which was designed to give you daily inspirations so that you will have the strength to pursue and achieve your most important dreams. We call this HUNT TV and you can join in the description box. 1. Openness to experience This group describes people who enjoy new experiences and arts. Individuals with high openness to experience are usually bored by rigid routines. They thrive in environments that allow them to explore their creativity adequately. They have a robust internal life and that is characterized by extended musings over concepts. They are curious people who ask questions a lot. Their imaginations and interests are vast. And often, they engage in traveling and meditative activities. Individuals with low openness usually perceive those with high openness as unpredictable and unfocused. If you fall under this group, you have a voracious appetite for learning new things and you are a lover of spontaneity. In contrast, low scorers have narrower interests and are more conventional. Researchers have discovered and disclosed that openness is the only personality trait that consistently predicts political preference. They are more likely to express their political views and are mostly in support of liberalism. The sub-six signs of individuals with high openness to experience are 1. Fantasy Do you have a vivid imagination? 2. Aesthetics Do you love art? 3. Actions Do you prefer variety to routine? 4. Ideas Do you like to prefer solutions for complex problems? 5. Values Are you a supporter of liberals? 2. Contentiousness This relates to organizational skills and ethics. People with high contentiousness are highly coordinated and well-organized. They are trustworthy and possess a high degree of self-motivation and as such, haven't find themselves in leadership positions. These set of people are initiative takers and they can bring out the best in other people by inspiring them to work. They are not easily distracted by other things and they would instead focus and complete a particular task than dabble with many. On the other hand, less contentious people are mostly spontaneous and careless. Unlike a less contentious person, an individual with high contentiousness cannot embark on a journey with just one backpack. They are planners and would endeavor that they have everything they need before embarking on any voyage. Highly contentious persons are most often seen by others as stubborn and obsessive. According to new studies, marrying a highly contentious individual will increase your chances of career success. The upshot in careers as a result of the fact that highly contentious individuals spur and help you to become more productive. The sub-six sign of highly contentious individuals are 1.  2. Order Do you get irritated by disarray? 3. Dutifulness How well do you abide by rules? 4. Engagement Striving Are you hard-working and result-oriented? 5. Self-discipline How much do you focus on a particular job? 6. Delibration Are you conscious of mistakes? 3. Extraversion The defining traits of extraversion are chairfulness and source of energy. Ability to easily communicate and socialize with other people is also a part of extraversion. Individuals who score high in extraversion are incredibly energetic and do not find it difficult in interacting with other people. They are talkative and outgoing. They are not bothered about being the center of attention. They can be said to be the life of the party and they always want to be in the spotlight. However, individuals who are low in extraversion are called introverts. They are usually reserved and more deliberate and submissive to regulations.  They tend to perceive those who are high as annoying and attention-seeking. Recent researchers have shown extraversion to be a reliable indicator of leadership quality. Also, men with a high level of extraversion have the firmest hand grip and are less erotic. This, however, may not hold for the females. The sub-six signs for these set of individuals are 1. 1. Warmth. Do you easily make friends? 2. Gregoriousness. Do you love to be large parties or gatherings? 3. Assertiveness. Do you motivate others? 4. Activity. Are you always busy? 5. Excitement-seeking. Do you often want to be around happy people? 6. Positive emotions. Do you possess a high level of energy? 4. Agreeableness. This trait describes empathy towards other people. The distinctions of a highly agreeable person are compassion, empathy and friendliness. They are evenly tempered, trustworthy and calm-headed. These set of individuals consider loyalty and generosity as an essential value. They often take part in volunteer jobs and philanthropic activities. Individuals who score low in the spectrum are shy, suspicious and egocentric. They have low expectations of others and as a result may portray sneaky characters. Many people view individuals with high agreeableness traits as naive and overly passive. According to concluded researches, those who are agreeable investors are less likely to lose money from risk trading. Hence, if you are seeking a financial advisor, you are advised to get someone who has this personality trait. Also, high scores of this trait tend to be happier because of their positive outlook towards life. The sub-six factors of highly agreeable individuals include 1. Trust. How much trust do you give to others? 2. Compliance. Do you find it appalling to cheat others or to pay your taxes? 3. Altruism. Are you hospitable? 4. Straightforwardness. Can you easily be pleased with others? 5. Modesty. Do you try to avoid being the center of attraction? 6. Remindedness. Do you often sympathize with the homeless and less privileged? 5. Neuroticism. This skill measures emotional stability. People who are high in neuro-kitism are usually very anxious and negative about situations. They feel unnecessarily vulnerable to frequent negative feelings such as anger, fear and sadness and are marked by low self-esteem which in most cases drives them into self-centeredness. Often highly neuroticism scorers are assumed to be insecure and unstable. They are volatile with their emotions and report a very high level of irritability. Those at the low end of this skill are confident, contented and calm. Unlike individuals who score high, the low scorers do not react irrationally during stressful situations. Studies have found that individuals that score high in neuroticism are less likely to post updates or comments on social media. This attitude is because they lack confidence and do not want to be controversial. The 6th sub-indicators for neuroticism are 1. Anxiety. Do you easily get worried over things? 2. Hostility. How often do you feel angry? 3. Depression. How often do you feel blue? 4. Self-consciousness. Are you easily intimidated? 5. Impulsiveness. Do you overreact? 6. Funerability. Do you easily panic? The character that you exhibit as a kid will most likely predict your personality as an adult. Although these traits remain stable over time, scientists agree that by determination, hard work and patience, they can be changed or improved upon. So, the reason for this video is so that you can think deeply about your personality and make relevant changes for you to be a better person. And just before you go. Watch other videos on YouTube. If you are an entrepreneur or an ambitious person, we invite you to join our Motivational channel. The objective of the channel is to give you daily inspiration so that you will have the strength to pursue and achieve your most important dreams. We call this channel HUNT TV and you can join in the description box. We love you.