Question 40 of Summa Theologica, Pars Prima, Trinity and Creation. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. This recording is by Jim Ruddy. Summa Theologica, Pars Prima, Trinity and Creation by St. Thomas Aquinas, translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province. Question 40 of the persons as compared to the relations or properties. We now consider the persons in connection with the relations or properties and there are four points of inquiry. Whether relation is the same as person. Whether the relations distinguish and constitute the persons. Whether mental abstraction of the relations from the persons leaves the hypothesis distinct. And whether the relations, according to our mode of understanding, presuppose the acts of the person or contrary-wise. First article, whether relation is the same as person. Objection one, it would seem that in God, relation is not the same as person. For when things are identical, if one is multiplied, the others are multiplied. But in one person there are several relations as in the person of the father, there is paternity and common-spiration. Again, one relation exists in two persons as common-spiration in the father and in the son. Therefore, relation is not the same as person. Objection two, further, according to the philosopher, nothing is contained by itself. But relation is in the person, nor can it be said that this occurs because they are identical, for otherwise relation would be also in the essence. Therefore, relation or property is not the same as person in God. Objection three, further, when several things are identical, what is predicated of one is predicated of the others. But all that is predicated of a person is not predicated of his property. For we say that the father begets, but not that the paternity is begetting. Therefore, property is not the same as person in God. On the contrary, in God what is and whereby it is are the same, according to Boethias. But the father is father by paternity, in the same way the other properties are the same as the persons. I answer that different opinions have been held on this point. Some have said that the properties are not the persons nor in the persons, and these have thought thus owing to the mode of signification of the relations that do not indeed signify existence in something, but rather existence towards something, whence they styled the relations assistant as above explained. But since relation considered as really existing in God is the divine essence itself, and the essence is the same as person as appears from what was said above, the relation must necessarily be the same as person. Others therefore considering this identity said that the properties were indeed the persons, but not in the persons, for they said there are no properties in God, except in our way of speaking as stated above. We must, however, say that there are properties in God as we have shown. These are designated by abstract terms being forms as it were of the persons. So since the nature of a form requires it to be in that of which it is the form, we must say that the properties are in the persons and yet that they are the persons. As we say that the essence is in God and yet is God. Reply to Objection 1. Person and property are really the same but differ in concept. Consequently it does not follow that if one is multiplied the other must also be multiplied. We must, however, consider that in God by reason of the divine simplicity a twofold real identity exists as regards what in creatures are distinct. For since the divine simplicity excludes the composition of matter and form, it follows that in God the abstract is the same as the concrete as Godhead and God. And as the divine simplicity excludes the composition of subject and accident, it follows that whatever is attributed to God is His essence itself. And so wisdom and power are the same in God because they are both in the divine essence. According to this twofold identity, property in God is the same as person.  But the non-personal properties are the same as the persons according to the other reason of identity whereby whatever is attributed to God is His own essence. Thus common inspiration is the same as the person of the Father and the person of the Son. Not that it is one self-subsisting person but that as there is one essence in the two persons so also there is one property in the two persons as above explained. Reply to Objection 2. The properties are said to be in the essence only by mode of identity but in the persons they exist by mode of identity not merely in reality but also in the mode of signification as the form exists in its subject. Thus the properties determine and distinguish the persons but not the essence. Reply to Objection 3. Notional participles and verbs signify the notional acts and acts belong to a suppositum. Now properties are not designated as supposita but as forms of supposita so their mode of signification is against notional participles and verbs being predicated of the properties. Second article whether the persons are distinguished by the relations. Objection 1. It would seem that the persons are not distinguished by the relations or simple things are distinct by themselves but the persons are supremely simple for they are distinguished by themselves and not by the relation. Objection 2. Further a form is distinguished only in relation to its genus for white is distinguished from black only by quality but hypothesis signifies an individual in the genus of substance therefore the hypothesis cannot be distinguished by relations. Objection 3. Further what is absolute comes before what is relative but the distinction of the divine persons is the primary distinction therefore the divine persons are not distinguished by the relations. And Objection 4. Further whatever presupposes distinction cannot be the first principle of distinction but relation presupposes distinction which comes into its definition for a relation is essentially what is towards another therefore the first distinctive principle in God cannot be relation. On the contrary Boethius says relation alone multiplies the trinity of the divine persons. I answer that in whatever multitude of things is to be found something common to all it is necessary to seek out the principle of distinction. So as the three persons agree in the unity of essence they must seek to know the principle of distinction whereby they are several. Now there are two principles of difference between the divine persons and these are origin and relation although these do not really differ yet they differ in the mode of signification for origin is signified by way of act as generation and relation by way of the form as paternity. Some then considering that relation follows upon act have said that the divine hypotheses are distinguished by origin so that we may say that the father is distinguished from the son in as much as the former begets and the latter is begotten. Further that the relations or the properties make known the distinctions of the hypotheses or persons as resulting therefrom as also in creatures the properties manifest the distinctions of individuals which distinctions are caused by the material principles. This opinion however cannot stand for two reasons. Firstly because in order that two things be understood as distinct their distinction must be understood as resulting from something intrinsic to both. Thus in things created it results from their matter or their form. Now origin of a thing does not designate anything intrinsic but means the way from something or to something as generation signifies the way to a thing generated and as proceeding from the generator. Hence it is not possible that what is generated and the generator should be distinguished by generation alone but in the generator and in the thing generated we must presuppose whatever makes them to be distinguished from each other. In a divine person there is nothing to presuppose but essence and relation or property. When since the persons agree in essence it only remains to be said that the persons are distinguished from each other by the relations. Secondly because the distinction of the divine persons is not to be so understood as if what is common to them all is divided because the common essence remains undivided but the distinguishing principles themselves must constitute the things which are distinct. Now the relations or the properties distinguish or constitute the hypotheses or persons in as much as they are themselves the subsisting persons as paternity is the father and filiation is the son because in God the abstract and the concrete do not differ but it is against the nature of origin that it should constitute hypothesis or person for origin taken in an active sense signifies proceeding from a subsisting person so that it presupposes the latter while in a passive sense origin as nativity signifies the way to a subsisting person and as not yet constituting the person. It is therefore better to say that the persons or hypotheses are distinguished rather by relations than by origin for although in both ways they are distinguished nevertheless in our mode of understanding they are distinguished cheaply and firstly by relations when this name father signifies not only a property but also the hypothesis whereas this term begetter or begetting signifies property only for as much as this name father signifies the relation which is distinctive and constitutive of the hypothesis and this term begetter or begotten signifies the origin which is not distinctive and constitutive of the hypothesis reply to objection one the persons are the subsisting relations themselves it is not against the simplicity of the divine persons for them to be distinguished by the relations reply to objection two the divine persons are not distinguished as regards being in which they subsist nor in anything absolute but only as regards something relative hence relations suffices for their distinction reply to objection three the more prior a distinction is the nearer it approaches to unity and so it must be the least possible distinction so the distinction of the persons must be by that which distinguishes the least possible and this is by relation reply to objection four relation presupposes the distinction of the subjects when it is an accident but when the relation is subsistent it does not presuppose but brings about the distinction for when it is said that relation is by nature to be towards another the word another signifies the correlative which is not prior but simultaneous in the order of nature third article whether the hypothesis remain if the relations are mentally abstracted from the persons for that to which something is added may be understood when the addition is taken away as man is something added to animal which can be understood if rational be taken away but person is something added to hypothesis for person is a hypothesis distinguished by a property of dignity therefore if a personal property is taken away from the person then the person is taken away from the property of dignity therefore if a personal property be taken away from a person the hypothesis remains objection two further that the father is father and that he is someone are not due to the same reason for as he is the father by paternity supposing he is someone by paternity it would follow that the son in whom there is not paternity would not be someone mentally abstracted from the father he still remains someone that is a hypothesis therefore if property be removed from person the hypothesis remains objection three further Augustine says unbegotten is not the same as father for if the father had not begotten the son nothing would prevent him being called unbegotten but if he had not begotten the son there would be no paternity in him therefore if paternity be removed there still remains the hypothesis of the father as unbegotten on the contrary Hillary says the son has nothing else than birth but he is son by birth therefore affiliation be removed the son's hypothesis no more remains and the same holds as regards the other persons I answer that abstraction by the intellect is twofold when the universal is abstracted from the particular as animal abstracted from man and when the form is abstracted from the matter as the form of a circle is abstracted by the intellect from any sensible matter the difference between these two abstractions consists in the fact that in the abstraction of the universal from the particular abstraction is made does not remain for when the difference of rationality is removed from man the man no longer remains in the intellect but animal alone remains but in the abstraction of the form from the matter both the form and the matter remain in the intellect as for instance if we abstract the form of a circle from brass the remains in our intellect separately understanding both of a circle and of brass now although there is no universal nor particular in God nor form and matter in reality nevertheless as regards the mode of signification there is a certain likeness of these things in God and thus Damascene says that substance is common and hypothesis is particular so if we speak of the abstraction of the universal from the particular the common universal essence remains in the intellect if the properties are removed but not the hypothesis of the father which is as it were a particular but as regards the abstraction of the form from the matter if the non-personal properties are removed then the idea of the hypothesis and persons remains as for instance if the fact of the father is being unbegotten or remaining be mentally abstracted from the father the father's hypothesis or person remains if however the personal property be mentally abstracted the idea of the hypothesis no longer remains for the personal properties are not to be understood as added to the divine hypothesis as a form is added to a pre-existing subject but they carry with them their own supposita in as much as they are themselves subsisting persons thus the father is the father himself for hypothesis signifies something distinct in God since hypothesis means an individual substance so as relation distinguishes and constitutes the hypothesis as above explained it follows that if the personal relations are mentally abstracted the hypothesis no longer remains some however think as above noted that the divine hypothesis are not distinguished by the relations but only by origin so that the father is a hypothesis as not from another and the son is a hypothesis as from another by generation and that the consequent relations which are to be regarded as properties of dignity constitute the notion of a person and are thus called personal properties hence if these relations are mentally abstracted the hypothesis but not the persons remain but that is impossible for two reasons first because the relations distinguish and constitute the hypothesis as shown above secondly because every hypothesis of a rational nature is a person as appears from the definition of Boethias that person is the individual substance of a rational nature hence to have hypothesis and not person it would be necessary to abstract the rationality from the nature but not the property from the person reply to objection one person does not add to hypothesis a distinguishing property absolutely but a distinguishing property of dignity all of which must be taken as the difference now this distinguishing property is one of dignity precisely because it is understood as subsisting in a rational nature hence if the distinguishing property be removed from the person hypothesis no longer remains whereas it would remain were the rationality of the nature removed for both person and hypothesis are individual substances consequently in God the distinguishing relation belongs essentially to both reply to objection two by paternity the father is not only father but is a person and is someone or a hypothesis it does not follow however that the one is not someone or a hypothesis just as it does not follow that he is not a person reply to objection three Augustine does not mean to say that the hypothesis of the father would remain as unbegotten if his paternity were removed as if in natiability constituted and distinguished the hypothesis of the father for this would be impossible since being unbegotten says nothing positive and is only a negation as he himself says but he speaks in a general sense for as much as not every unbegotten being is the father so if paternity be removed the hypothesis of the father does not remain in God as distinguished from the other persons but only as distinguished from creatures as the Jews understand it fourth article whether the properties presuppose the notional acts objection one would seem that the notional acts are understood before the properties for the master of sentences says that the father always is because he is ever begetting the son so it seems the generation precedes paternity in the order of intelligence objection two further in the order of intelligence every relation presupposes that on which it is founded as equality presupposes quantity but paternity is a relation founded on the action of generation therefore paternity presupposes generation and objection three further active generation is to paternity as nativity is to filiation but filiation presupposes nativity for the son is so called because he is born therefore paternity also presupposes generation on the contrary generation is the operation of the person of the father but paternity constitutes the person of the father therefore in the order of intelligence paternity is prior to generation I answer that according to the opinion that the properties do not distinguish and constitute the hypothesis in God but only manifest them as already distinct and constituted we must absolutely say relations in our mode of understanding follow upon the notional acts so that we can say without qualifying the phrase that because he begets he is the father a distinction however is needed if we suppose that the relations distinguish and constitute the divine hypothesis for origin has in God an active and passive signification active as generation is attributed to the father and the son taken for the notional act is attributed to the father and the son passive as nativity is attributed to the son and procession to the Holy Ghost for in the order of intelligence origin in the passive sense simply precedes the personal properties of the person proceeding because origin as passively understood signifies the way to a person constituted by the property likewise origin signified actively is prior in the order of intelligence to the non-personal relation of the person originating as the notional act as piration precedes in the order of intelligence the unnamed relative property common to the father and the son the personal property of the father can be considered in a twofold sense firstly as a relation and thus again in the order of intelligence it presupposes the notional act for relation as such is founded upon secondly according as it constitutes the person and thus the notional act presupposes the relation as an action presupposes a person acting reply to objection one when the master says that because he begets he is father the term father is taken as meaning relation only but not as signifying the subsisting person for then it would be necessary to say conversely that because he is father he begets reply to objection two this objection avails of paternity as a relation but not as constituting a person reply to objection three nativity is the way to the person of the son and so in the order of intelligence it precedes filiation even as constituting the person of the son but active generation signifies a proceeding from the person of the father presupposes the personal property of the father the end of question forty question forty one of summa theologica pars prima trinity and creation this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org this recording is by Jim Ruddy summa theologica pars prima trinity and creation by saint Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province question forty one of the persons in reference to the notional acts we now consider the persons in reference to the notional acts concerning which six points of inquiry arise whether the notional acts are to be attributed to the persons whether these acts are necessary or voluntary whether as regards these acts a person proceeds from nothing or from something whether in God there exists a power as regards the notional acts what this power means and whether several persons can be the term of one notional act first article whether the notional acts are to be attributed to the persons objection one it would seem that the notional acts are not to be attributed to the persons for Boethius says whatever is predicated of God of whatever genus it be becomes the divine substance except what pertains to the relation but action is one of the ten genera therefore any action attributed to God belongs to his essence and not to a notion objection two further Augustine says everything which is said of God is said of him as regards either his substance or relation but whatever belongs to the substance is signified by the essential attributes and whatever belongs to the relations by the names of the persons or by the names of the properties therefore in addition to these notional acts are not to be attributed to the persons and objection three further the nature of action is of itself to cause passion but we do not place passions in God therefore neither are notional acts to be placed in God on the contrary Augustine says it is a property of the father to beget the son therefore notional acts are to be placed in God I answer in the divine persons distinction is founded on origin but origin can be properly designated only by certain acts therefore to signify the order of origin in the divine persons we must attribute notional acts to the persons reply to objection one every origin is designated by an act in God there is a two fold order of origin one in as much as the creature proceeds from him and this is common to the three persons and so those actions which are attributed to God to designate the proceeding of creatures from him belong to his essence another order of origin in God regards the procession of person from person where for the acts which designate the order of this origin are called notional because the notions of the persons are the mutual relations of the persons as is clear from what was above explained reply to objection two the notional acts differ from the relations of the persons only in their mode of signification and in reality are all together the same whence the master says that generation and nativity in other words are paternity and filiation to see this we must consider that the origin of one thing from another is firstly inferred from movement for that anything be changed from its disposition by movement evidently arises from some cause hence action in its primary sense means origin of movement for as movement derived from another into a mobile object is called passion so the origin of movement itself as beginning from another and terminating in what is moved is called action hence if we take away movement action implies nothing more than order of origin in so far as action proceeds from some cause or principle to what is then from that principle consequently since in god no movement exists the personal action of the one producing a person is only the habit of the principal to the person who is from the principal which habit are the relations or the notions nevertheless we cannot speak of divine and intelligible things except after the manner of sensible things once we derive our knowledge and where in actions and passions so far as these imply movement differ from the relations which result from action and passion and therefore it was necessary to signify the habitudes of the persons separately after the manner of act and separately after the manner of relations thus it is evident that they are really the same differing only in their mode of signification reply to objection 3 action so far as it means origin of movement naturally involves passion but action in that sense is not attributed to god once passions are attributed to him only from a grammatical standpoint and in accordance with our manner of speaking as we attribute to beget with the father and to the son to be begotten second article whether the notional acts are voluntary objection 1 it would seem that the notional acts are voluntary for hillary says not by natural necessity was the father led to beget the son objection 2 further the apostle says he transferred us to the kingdom of the son of his love but love belongs to the will therefore the son was begotten of the father by will objection 3 further nothing is more voluntary than love but the holy ghost proceeds as love from the father and the son therefore he proceeds voluntarily objection 4 further the son proceeds by mode of the intellect as the word but every word proceeds by the will from a speaker therefore the son proceeds from the father by will and not by nature objection 5 further what is not voluntary is necessary therefore if the father begot the son not by the will it seems to follow that he begotten by necessity and this is against what Augustine says on the contrary Augustine says in the same book that the father begot the son neither by will nor by necessity I answer that when anything is said to be or to be made by the will this can be understood in two senses in one sense the ablative designates only concomitance as I can say that I am a man by my will that is I will to be a man and in this way it can be said that the father begot the son by will as also he is God by will because he will be God and wills to beget the son in the other sense the ablative imports the habitude of a principle as it is said that the work man works by his will as the will is the principle of his work and thus in that sense it must be said that the God the father begot the son not by his will but that he produced the creature by his will when in the book it is said if anyone say that the son was made by the will of God as a creature is said to be made let him be anathema the result of this is that the will and nature differ in their manner of causation in such a way that nature is determined to one while will is not determined to one and this because the effect is assimilated to the form of the agent whereby the latter acts now it is manifest in one thing there is only one natural form whereby it exists and hence such as it is itself such also is its work but the form whereby the will acts is not only one but many according to the number of ideas understood hence the quality of the will's action does not depend on the quality of the agent but on the agent's will and understanding so the will is the principle of those things which may be this way or that way whereas of those things which can be only in one way the principle is nature what however can exist in different ways is far from the divine nature whereas it belongs to the nature of a created being because God is of himself necessary being whereas a creature is made from nothing thus the arias wishing to prove the son to be a creature said that the father begot the son not by will taking will in the sense of principle but we on the contrary must assert that the father begot the son not by will but by nature wherefore Hilary says the will of God gave to all creatures their substance but perfect birth gave the son a nature derived from a substance impassable and unborn all things created are such as God willed them to be but the son born of God lists in the perfect likeness of God reply to objection one this saying is directed against those who did not admit even the concomitance of the father's will in the generation of the son for they said that the father begot the son in such a manner by nature that the will to beget was wanting just as we ourselves suffer many things against our will from natural necessity as for instance death old age and like ills this appears from what precedes and from what follows as regards the words quoted for thus we read not against his will nor as it were forced nor as if he were led by natural necessity did the father begot the son reply to objection two the apostle calls Christ the son of the love of God in as much as he is super abundantly loved by God not however as if love were the principle of the generation reply to objection three the will as a natural faculty will something naturally as man's will naturally tends to happiness and likewise God naturally wills and loves himself whereas in regard to things other than himself the will of God is in a way undetermined in itself as above explained now the Holy Ghost proceeds as love in as much as God loves himself and hence he proceeds naturally although he proceeds by mode of will reply to objection four even as regards the intellectual conceptions of the mind a return is made to those first principles which are naturally understood but God naturally understands himself and thus the conception of the divine word is natural reply to objection five a thing is said to be necessary of itself and by reason of another taken in the latter sense it has a twofold meaning first as an efficient and compelling cause and thus necessary means what is violent secondly it means a final cause when a thing is said to be necessary as a means to an end so far as without it the end could not be attained or at least so well attained but the nature of these ways is the divine generation necessary because God is not the means to an end nor is he subject to compulsion but a thing is said to be necessary of itself which cannot but be in this sense it is necessary for God to be and in the same sense it is necessary that the father begot the son third article whether the notional acts proceed from the notional acts do not proceed from anything for if the father begets the son from something this will be either from himself or from something else if from something else since that whence a thing is generated exists and what is generated it follows that something different from the father exists in the son and this contradicts what is laid down by Hilary in them nothing diverse or different exists if the father begets the son since again that whence a thing is generated if it be something permanent receives as predicate the thing generated there from just as we say the man is white since the man remains when not from white he is made white it follows that either the father does not remain after the son is begotten or that the father is the son which is false therefore the father does not beget the son from something but from nothing further that whence anything is generated is the principle regarding what is generated so if the father generate the son from his own essence or nature it follows that the essence or nature of the father is the principle of the son but it is not a material principle since in God nothing material exists and therefore is as it were an active principle as the begetter is the principle of the one begotten thus it follows that the essence generates which was disproved above objection three further Augustine says that the three persons are not from the same essence because the essence is not another thing from person but the person of the son is not another thing from the father's essence therefore the son is not from the father's essence objection four further every creature is from nothing further the son is called a creature for it is said in the person of the wisdom begotten I came out of the mouth of the most high the first born before all creatures and further on it is said as uttered by the same wisdom from the beginning and before the world was I created therefore the son was not begotten from something but from nothing likewise we can object concerning the holy ghost by reason of what is said by the lord who stretches forth the heavens and layeth the foundations of the earth and formeth the spirit of man within him and according to another version I who form the earth and create the spirit on the contrary Augustine says God the father of his nature without beginning begot the son equal to himself I answer that the son was not begotten from nothing but from the father's substance for it was explained above that paternity, filiation and nativity really and truly exist in God now this is the difference between true generation whereby one proceeds from another as a son and making that the maker makes something out of external matter as a carpenter makes a bench out of wood and begets a son from himself now as a created work man makes a thing out of matter so God makes things out of nothing as will be shown later on not as if this nothing were a part of the substance of the thing made but because the whole substance of the thing is produced by him without anything else whatever presupposed so were the son to proceed from the father as out of nothing then the son would be to the father what the thing made is to the maker where to as is evident the name affiliation would not apply except by a kind of similitude thus if the son of God proceeds from the father out of nothing he could not be properly and truly call the son whereas the contrary is stated that we may be in his true son Jesus Christ therefore the true son of God is not from nothing nor is made but begotten that certain creatures made of God out of nothing are called sons of God is to be taken in a metaphorical sense according to a certain likeness of assimilation to him who is the true son when as he is the only true and natural son of God he is called the only begotten according to John the only begotten son who is in the bosom of the father he has declared him and so as others are entitled sons of adoption by their similitude to him he is called the first begotten according to Romans whom he foreknew he also predestined to be made conformable to the image of his son that he might be the first born of many brethren therefore the son of God is begotten of the substance of the father but not in the same way as man is born of man the part of the human substance in generation passes into the substance of the one begotten whereas the divine nature cannot be parted once it necessarily follows that the father in begetting the son does not transmit any part of his nature but communicates his whole nature to him the distinction only of origin remaining as explained above reply to objection one when we say that the son was born of the father the preposition of designates a consubstantial generating principle but not a material principle for that which is produced from matter is made by a change of form in that whence it is produced but the divine essence is unchangeable and is not susceptible of another form reply to objection two when we say the son is begotten of the essence of the father as the master of the sentences explains this denotes the habitude of a kind of active principle and as he expounds the son is begotten of the essence of the father that is of the father who is essence and so Augustine says when I say of the father who is essence it is the same as if I said more explicitly of the essence of the father this however is not enough to explain the real meaning of the words for we can say that the creature is from God to his essence but not that it is from the essence of God so we may explain them otherwise by observing that the preposition of always denotes consubstantiality we do not say that a house is of the builder since he is not the consubstantial cause we can say however that something is of another if this is its consubstantial principle no matter in what way it is whether it be an active principle as the son is said to be of the father or a material principle as a knife is of iron or a formal principle but in those things only in which the forms are subsisting and not accidental to another for we can say that an angel is of an intellectual nature in this way then we say that the son is begotten of the essence of the father communicated by generations subsists in the son reply to objection 3 when we say that the son is begotten of the essence of the father a term is added which saves the distinction but when we say that the three persons are of the divine essence there is nothing expressed to warrant the distinction signified by the preposition so there is no parity of argument reply to objection 4 when we say wisdom was created this may be understood not of wisdom which is the son of God but of created wisdom given by God to creatures for it is said he created her in the Holy Ghost and he poured her out over all his works nor is it inconsistent for scripture in one text to speak of the wisdom begotten and wisdom created for wisdom created is a kind of participation of the uncreated wisdom the saying may also be referred to the creature assumed by the son so that the sense be from the beginning and before the world was I made that is I was foreseen as united to the creature or the mention of wisdom as both created and begotten insinuates into our minds the mode of the divine generation for in generation what is generated receives the nature of the generator and this pertains to perfection whereas in creation the creator is not changed but the creature does not receive the creator's nature thus the son is called both created and begotten in order that from the idea of creation the immutability of the father may be understood and from generation the unity of nature in the father and the son in this way Hillary expounds the sense of this text of scripture the other passages quoted do not refer to the Holy Ghost but to the created spirit sometimes called wind sometimes air sometimes of man sometimes also the soul or any other invisible substance fourth article whether in God there is a power in respect of the notional acts objection one it would seem that in God there is no power in respect of the notional acts for every kind of power is either active or passive neither of which can be here applied there being in God nothing all passive power as above explained nor can active power belong to one person as regards another since the divine persons were not made as stated above therefore in God there is no power in respect of the notional acts objection two further the object of power is what is possible but the divine persons are not regarded as possible but necessary therefore as regards the notional acts as regards the divine persons proceed there cannot be power in God objection three further the sun proceeds as the word which is the concept of the intellect and the Holy Ghost proceeds as love which belongs to the will but in God power exists as regards effects and not as regards intellect and will as stated above therefore in God power does not exist in reference to the notional acts on the contrary Augustine says if God the Father could not beget a co-equal son where is the omnipotence of God the Father power therefore exists in God regarding the notional acts I answer that as the notional acts exist in God so must there be also a power in God regarding these acts since power only means the principle of act so as we understand the father to be principle of generation and the father and the son to be the principle of spirations we must attribute the power of generating to the father and the power of spirations to the father and the son for the power of generation means that whereby the generator generates now every generator generates by something therefore in every generator we must suppose the power of generation and in the spirator the power of spirating replied to objection one as a person according to notional acts does not proceed as if made so the power in God as regards the notional acts has no reference to a person as if made but only as regards the person as proceeding replied to objection two possible as opposed to what is necessary is a consequence of a passive power which does not exist in God hence in God there is no such thing as possibility in this sense but only in the sense of possible as contained in what is necessary and in this latter sense it can be said that as it is possible for God to be so also it is possible that the son should be generated replied to objection three power signifies a principle and a principle implies distinction from that of which it is the principle so we must observe a double distinction in things said of God one is a real distinction the other is a distinction of reason only by a real distinction God by his essence is distinct from those things of which he is the principle by creation just as one person is distinct from the other of which he is the principle by a notional act but in God the distinction of action and agent is one of reason only this action would be an accident in God and therefore with regard to those actions in respect of which certain things proceed which are distinct from God either personally or essentially we may ascribe power to God in its proper sense of principle and as we ascribe to God the power of creating so we may ascribe the power of begetting and of spirating but to understand and to will are not such actions as to designate the procession of something distinct from God either essentially or personally where for with regard to these actions we cannot ascribe power to God in its proper sense but only after our way of understanding and speaking in as much as we designate by different terms the intellect and the act of understanding in God whereas in God the act of understanding is his very essence which has no principle fifth article whether the power of begetting signifies a relation and not the essence objection one it would seem that the power of begetting or of spirating signifies the relation and not the essence for power signifies a principle as appears from its definition for active power is the principle of action as we find in metaphysics but in God principle in regard to person is said notionally therefore in God power does not signify essence but relation objection two further in God the power to act and to act are not distinct but in God begetting signifies relation therefore the same applies to the power of begetting objection three further term signifying the essence in God are common to the three persons but the power of begetting is not common to the three persons but proper to the father signify the essence on the contrary as God has the power to beget the son so also he wills to beget him but the will to beget signifies the essence therefore also the power to beget I answer that some have said that the power to beget signifies relation in God but this is not possible for in every agent that is properly called power by which the agent acts now everything that produces something by its action produces something like itself as to the form by which it acts just as man begotten is like his begetter in his human nature in virtue of which the father has the power to beget a man in every begetter therefore that is the power of begetting in which the begotten is like the begetter now the son of God is like the father who begets him in the divine nature wherefore the divine nature in the father is in him the power of begetting and so Hilary says the birth of God cannot but contain that nature from whence it proceeded for he cannot subsist other than God who subsists from no other source than God we must therefore conclude that the power of begetting signifies principally the divine essence as the master says and not the person only nor does it signify the essence as identified with the relation so as to signify both equally for although paternity is signified as the form of the father nevertheless it is a personal property being in respect to the person of the father what the individual form is to the individual creature now the individual form in things created constitutes the person begetting but is not that by which the begetter begets otherwise Socrates would beget Socrates so neither can paternity be understood as that by which the father begets but as constituting the person of the father otherwise the father would beget the father but that by which the father begets is the divine nature in which the son is like to him and in this sense Damascene says that generation is the work of nature not of nature generating but of nature as being that by which the generator generates and therefore the power of begetting signifies the divine nature directly but the relation indirectly replied to objection one power does not signify the relation itself of a principle for thus it would be in the genus of relation but it signifies that which is a principle not indeed in the sense in which we call the agent a principle but in the sense of being that by which the agent acts now the agent is distinct from that which it makes and the generator from that which it generates but that by which the generator generates is common to generated and generator and so much more perfectly as the generation is more perfect since therefore the divine generation is most perfect that by which the begetter begets is common begotten and begetter by a community of identity and not only of species as in things created therefore from the fact that we say that the divine essence is a principle by which the begetter begets does not follow that the divine essence is distinct from the begotten which would follow if we were to say that the divine essence begets replied to objection two as in God the power of begetting is the same as the act of begetting so the divine essence is the same in reality as the act of begetting or paternity although there is a distinction of reason replied to objection three when I speak of the power of begetting power is signified directly generation indirectly just as if I were to say the essence of the father wherefore in respect to the essence which is signified the power of is common to the three persons but in respect to the notion that is connoted it is proper to the person of the father sixth article whether several persons can be the term of one notional act objection one it would seem that the notional act can be directed to several persons so that there may be several persons begotten or spirated in God for whoever has the power of begetting can beget but the son has the power of begetting therefore he can beget but he cannot beget himself therefore he can beget another son therefore there can be several sons in God objection two further Augustine says the son did not beget a creator not that he could not but that it behooved him not objection three further God the father has greater power to beget and has a created father but a man can beget several sons therefore God can also the more so that the power of the father is not diminished after begetting the son on the contrary in God that which is possible and that which is do not differ if therefore in God it were possible for there to be several sons there would be several sons and thus there would be more than three persons in God which is heretical I answer that as Athanasia says in God there is only one father one son one holy ghost for this four reasons may be given the first reason is in regard to the relations by which alone are the persons distinct or since the divine persons are the relations themselves as subsistent there would not be several fathers or several sons but unless there were more than one paternity or more than one affiliation and this indeed would not be possible except owing to a material distinction since forms of one species are not multiplied except in respective matter which is not in God where for there can be but one subsistent affiliation in God just as there could be but one subsistent whiteness the second reason is taken from the manner of the persons where God understands and wills all things by one simple act where for there can be but one person proceeding after the manner of word which person is the son and but one person proceeding after the manner of love which person is the holy ghost the third reason is taken from the manner in which the persons proceed for the persons proceed naturally as we have said and nature is determined to one the fourth reason is taken from the perfection of the divine persons for this reason is the son perfect that the entire divine affiliation is contained in him and that there is but one son the argument is similar in regard to the other persons replied to objection one we can grant without distinction that the son has the same power as the father but we cannot grant that the son has the power thus taking generosity as the gerund of the active verb so that the sense would be that the son has the power to beget just as although father and son have the same being it does not follow that the son is the father by reason of the notional term added but if the word generosity is taken as the gerund of the passive verb the power generosity is in the son the power of being begotten the same is to be said if it to be taken as the gerund of an impersonal verb so that the sense be the power of generation that is a power by which it is generated by some person replied to objection to Augustine does not mean to say by those words that the son could beget a son but that if he did not it was not because he could not as we shall see later on replied to objection three imperfection and the total absence of matter in God require that there cannot be several sons in God as we have explained wherefor that there are not several sons is not due to any lack of begetting power in the father the end of question 41 question 42 of Summa Theologica Parse Prima Trinity and Creation this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org this recording is by Jim Ruddy Summa Theologica Parse Prima Trinity and Creation by St. Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province question 42 of equality and likeness among the divine persons we now have to consider the persons as compared to one another firstly with regard to equality and likeness secondly with regard to mission concerning the first there are six points of inquiry whether there is equality among the divine persons whether the person who proceeds is equal to the one from whom he proceeds in eternity whether there is any order among the divine persons whether the divine persons are equal in greatness whether the one divine person is in another and whether they are equal in power first article whether there is equality in God Objection one it would seem that equality is not becoming to the divine persons for equality is in relation to things which are one in quantity as the philosopher says but in the divine persons there is no quantity neither continuous intrinsic quantity which we call size nor continuous extrinsic quantity which we call place and time nor can there be equality by reason of discrete quantity because two persons are more than one therefore equality is not becoming to the divine persons Objection two further the divine persons are of one essence as we have said now essence is signified by way of form but agreement and form makes things to be alike not to be equal therefore we may speak of likeness in the divine persons but not of equality Objection three further things wherein there is to be found equality are equal to one another for equality is reciprocal but the divine persons cannot be said to be equal to one another for as Augustine says if an image answers perfectly to that whereof it is the image it may be said to be equal to it but that which it presents cannot be said to be equal to the image but the son is the image of the father so the father is not equal to the son therefore equality is not to be found among the divine persons Objection four further equality is a relation but no relation is common to the three persons where the persons are distinct by reason of the relations therefore equality is not becoming to the divine persons on the contrary Athanasius says that the three persons are co-eternal and co-equal to one another I answer that we must needs admit equality among the divine persons for according to the philosopher equality signifies the negation of greater or less now we cannot admit anything greater or less in the divine persons whereas Boethius says they must needs admit a difference who speak of either increase or decrease as the Aryans do who sunder the trinity by distinguishing degrees as of numbers thus involving a plurality now the reason of this is that unequal things cannot have the same quantity but quantity in God is less than his essence wherefore it follows that if there were any inequality in the divine persons they would not have the same essence and thus the three persons would not be one God which is impossible we must therefore admit equality among the divine persons reply to objection one quantity is two fold there is quantity of bulk or dimensive quantity which is to be found only in corporeal things and has therefore no place in God there is also a quantity of virtue which is measured according to the perfection of some nature or form to this sort of quantity we allude when we speak of something as being more or less hot as it is more or less perfect in heat now this virtual quantity is measured firstly by its source that is by the perfection of that form or nature such is the greatness of spiritual things just as we speak of great heat on account of its intensity and perfection and so Augustine says that in things which are great but not in bulk to be greater is to be better for the more perfect a thing is the better it is secondly virtual quantity is measured by the effects of the form now the first effect to form is being for everything has being by reason of its form the second effect is operation for every agent acts through its form consequently virtual quantity is measured both in regard to being and in regard to action in regard to being for as much as things of a more perfect nature are of longer duration and in regard to action for as much as things of a more perfect nature are more powerful to act and so as Augustine says we understand equality to be in the Father Son and Holy Ghost in as much as no one of them either proceeds in eternity or excels in greatness or surpasses in power reply to objection too where we have equality and respect of virtual quantity equality includes likeness and something besides because it excludes excess for whatever things have a common form may be said to be alike even though they do not participate in that form equally just as the air may be said to be like fire in heat but they cannot be said to be equal if one participates in the form more perfectly than another and because not only is the same nature in both Father and Son but also is it in both in perfect equality therefore we say not only that the Son is like to the Father in order to exclude the error of Eunomius but also that he is equal to the Father to exclude the error of Arius reply to objection 3 equality and likeness in God may be designated in two ways namely by nouns and by verbs when designated by nouns equality in the divine persons is mutual and so is likeness for the Son is equal and like to the Father and conversely this is because the divine essence is not more the Fathers than the Son therefore just as the Son has the greatness of the Father and is therefore equal to the Father so the Father has the greatness of the Son and is therefore equal to the Son but in reference to creatures Dionysius says equality and likeness are not mutual for effects are said to be like their causes in as much as they have the form of their causes but not conversely for the form is principally in the cause and secondarily in the effect but verbs signify equality with movement and although movement is not in God there is something that receives since therefore the Son receives from the Father this namely that he is equal to the Father and not conversely for this reason we say that the Son is equal to the Father but not conversely reply to objection for in the divine persons there is nothing for us to consider but the essence which they have in common and the relations in which they are distinct now equality implies both namely distinction of persons for nothing can be said to be equal to itself and unity of essence since for this reason are the persons equal to one another that they are of the same greatness and essence now it is clear that the relation of a thing to itself is not a real relation nor again is one relation referred to another by a further relation for when we say that paternity is opposed to affiliation opposition is not a relation mediating between paternity and affiliation for in both these cases relation would be multiplied indefinitely therefore equality and likeness in the divine persons is not a real relation distinct from the personal relations but in its concept it includes both the relations which distinguish the persons and the unity of essence for this reason the master says that in these it is only the terms that are relative second article whether the person proceeding is co-eternal with his principle as the son with the father objection one it would seem that the person proceeding is not co-eternal with his principle as the son with the father for arias gives twelve modes of generation the first mode is like the issue of a line from a point where in his wanting equality of simplicity the second is like the emission of rays from the son where in his absent equality of nature the third is like the mark or impression made by a seal where in his wanting consubstantiality and executive power the fourth is the infusion of a good will from God where in also consubstantiality is wanting the fifth is the emanation of an accident from its subject but the accident has no subsistence the sixth is the abstraction of a species from matter as sense receives the species from the sensible object where in his wanting equality of spiritual simplicity the seventh is the exciting of the will by knowledge which excitation is merely temporal the eighth is transformation as an image is made of brass which transformation is material the ninth is motion from a mover and here again we have effect and cause the tenth is the taking of species from genita but this mode has no place for the father is not predicated of the son as the genus of a species the eleventh is the realization of an idea as an external coffer arises from the one in the mind the twelfth is birth as a man is begotten of his father which implies priority and posteriority of time thus it is clear that equality of nature or of time is absent in every mode whereby one thing is from another so if the son is from the father we must say that he is less than the father or later than the father or both objection to further everything that comes from another has a principle but nothing eternal has a principle therefore the son is not eternal nor is the holy ghost objection three further everything which is corrupted ceases to be and so everything generated begins to be for the end of generation is existence but the son is generated by the father therefore he begins to exist and is not co-eternal with the father objection four further if the son be begotten by the father either he is always being begotten or there is some moment in which he is begotten if he is always being begotten since during the process of generation a thing must be imperfect as appears in successive things which are always in process of becoming as time in motion it follows that the son must be always imperfect which cannot be admitted thus there is a moment to be assigned for the beginning of the son and before that moment the son did not exist on the contrary Athanasius declares that all of the three persons are co-eternal with each other I answer that we must say that the son is co-eternal with the father in proof of which we must consider that for a thing which proceeds from a principle to be posterior to its principle may be due to two reasons one on the part of the agent and the other on the part of the action on the part of the agent this happens differently as regards free agents and natural agents in free agents on account of the choice of time whereas a free agent can choose the form it gives to the effect as stated above choose the time in which to produce its effect in natural agents however the same happens from the agent not having its perfection of natural power from the very first but obtaining it after a certain time as for instance a man is not able to generate from the very first considered on the part of action anything derived from a principle cannot exist simultaneously with its principle when the action is successive so given that an agent as soon as it exists begins to act thus the effect would not exist in the same instant but in the instant of the actions termination now it is manifest according to what has been said that the father does not beget the son by will but by nature and also that the father's nature was perfect from eternity and again that the action whereby the father produces the son is not successive because thus the son would be successively generated and this generation would be material and accompanied with movement which is quite impossible therefore we conclude that the son existed when so ever the father existed and thus the son is co-eternal with the father and likewise the holy ghost is co-eternal with both reply to objection one as Augustine says no mode of the procession of any creature perfectly represents the divine generation hence we need to gather a likeness of it from many of these modes so that what is wanting and one may be somewhat supplied from another and thus it is declared in the council of Ephesus let's splendor tell thee that the co-eternal son existed always with the father let the word announce the impassibility of his birth let the name son insinuate his consubstantiality yet above them all the procession of the word from the intellect represents it more exactly the intellectual word not being posterior to its source except in an intellect passing from potentiality to act and this cannot be said by God reply to objection two eternity excludes the principle of duration but not the principle of origin reply to objection three every corruption is a change and so all that corrupts begins not to exist and ceases to be the divine generation however is not changed as dated above hence the son is ever begotten and the father is always begetting reply to objection four in time there is something indivisible namely the instant and there is something else which endures namely time but in eternity the indivisible now stands ever still as we have said above but the generation of the son is not in the now of time or in time but in eternity and so to express the presentiality and permanence of eternity we can say that he is ever being born as origin said but as Gregory and Augustine said it is better to say ever born so that ever may denote the permanence of eternity and born the perfection of the only begotten thus therefore neither is the son imperfect nor was there a time when he was not as Ari as it said third article whether in the divine persons there exists an order of nature objection one it would seem that among the divine persons there does not exist an order of nature whatever exists in God is the essence or a person or a notion but the order of nature does not signify the essence nor any of the persons or notions therefore there is no order of nature in God objection to further wherever order of nature exists there one comes before another at least according to nature and intellect but in the divine persons there exists authority nor posteriority as declared by Athanasius therefore in the divine persons there is no order of nature objection three further wherever order exists distinction also exists but there is no distinction in the divine nature therefore it is not subject to order and order of nature does not exist in it objection four further the divine nature is the divine essence but there is no order of essence in God therefore neither is there of nature on the contrary where plurality exists without order confusion exists but in the divine persons there is no confusion as Athanasius says therefore in God order exists I answer that order always has reference to some principle wherefore since there are many kinds of principles namely according to sight as a point according to intellect as the principle of demonstration and according to each individual cause so are there many kinds of order now principle according to origin without priority exists in God as we have stated so there must likewise be order according to origin without priority and this is called the order of nature in the words of Augustine not whereby one is prior to another but whereby one is from another reply to objection one the order of nature signifies the notion of origin in general not a special kind of origin reply to objection two in things created even when what is derived from a principle is co-equal in duration with its principle the principle still comes first in the order of nature and reason if formally considered as principle if however we consider the relations of cause and effect or of the principle and the thing they're from it is clear that the things so related are simultaneous in the order of nature and reason in as much as the one enters the definition of the other but in God the relations themselves are the persons subsisting in one nature so neither on the part of the nature nor on the part of the relations can one person be prior to another not even in the order of nature and reason reply to objection three the order of nature means not the ordering of nature itself but the existence of order in the divine persons according to natural origin reply to objection four nature in a certain way implies the idea of a principle but essence does not and so the order of origin is more correctly called the order of nature than the order of essence fourth article whether the son is equal to the father in greatness objection one it would seem that the son is not equal to the father in greatness for he himself said the father is greater than I and the apostle says the son himself shall be subject to him that put all things under him objection two further paternity is part of the father's dignity but paternity does not belong to the son therefore the son does not possess all the father's dignity and so he is not equal in greatness to the father objection three further wherever there exists a whole and a part many parts are more than one only or than fewer parts as three men are more than two or than one but in God a universal whole exists and a part for under relation or notions several notions are included therefore since in the father there are three notions while in the son there are only two the son is evidently not equal to the father on the contrary it is said he thought it not robbery to be equal with God I answer that the son is necessarily equal to the father in greatness for the greatness of God is nothing but the perfection of his nature now it belongs to the very nature of paternity infilliation that the son by generation should attain to the possession of the perfection of the nature which is in the father in the same way as it is in the father himself but since in men generation is a certain kind of transmutation of one proceeding from potentiality to act it follows that a man is not equal at first to the father who begets him but attains to equality by due growth unless owing to a defect in the principle of generation it should happen otherwise from what precedes it is evident that in God there exist real true paternity infilliation nor can we say that the power of generation in the father was defective nor that the son of God arrived at perfection in a successive manner and by change therefore we must say that the son was eternally equal to the father in greatness hence Hillary says remove bodily weakness remove the beginning of conception remove pain in all human shortcomings then every son by reason of his natural nativity is the father's equal because he has a like nature reply to objection one these words are to be understood of Christ's human nature wherein he is less than the father and subject to him but in his divine nature he is equal to the father this is expressed by Athanasius equal to the father in his godhead less than the father in humanity and by Hillary by the fact of giving the father is greater but he is not less to whom the same being is given and the son subjects himself by his that is by his recognition of paternal authority whereas creatures are subject by their created weakness reply to objection two equality is measured by greatness in god greatness signifies the perfection of nature as above explained and belongs to the essence thus equality and likeness in god have reference to the essence nor can there be inequality or humility derising from the distinction of the relations where for Augustine says the question of origin is who is from whom but the question of equality is of what kind or how great is he therefore paternity is the father's dignity as also the father's essence since dignity is something absolute and pertains to the essence as therefore the same essence which in the father is paternity in the son is filiation so the same dignity which in the father is paternity in the son is filiation it is thus true to say that the son possesses whatever dignity the father has but we cannot argue the father has paternity therefore the son has paternity for there is a transition from substance to relation for the father the son has the same essence of dignity which exist in the father by relation of giver and in the son by relation of receiver reply to objection 3 in god relation is not a universal whole although it is predicated of each of the relations because all the relations are one in essence and being which is irreconcilable with the idea of universal the parts of which are distinguished in being person likewise is not a universal term in god as we have seen above where for all the relations together are not greater than only one nor are all the person something greater than only one because the whole perfection of the divine nature exists in each person fifth article whether the son is in the father and conversely objection one it would seem that the son and the father are not in each other for the philosopher gives eight modes of one thing existing in another according to none of which is the son in the father or conversely as is patented to anyone who examines each mode therefore the son and the father are not in each other objection two further nothing that has come out from another is within but the son from eternity came out from the father according to he is going forth is from the beginning from the days of eternity therefore the son is not in the father objection three further one of two opposites cannot be in the other but the son and the father are relatively opposed therefore one cannot be in the other on the contrary it is said I am in the father and the father is in me I answer that there are three points of consideration as regards the father and the son the essence the relation and the origin and according to each the son and the father are in each other the father is in the son by his essence or as much as the father is his own essence and communicates his essence to the son not by any change on his part hence it follows that as the father's essence is in the son the father himself is in the son likewise since the son is his own essence it follows that he himself is in the father in whom is his essence this is expressed by Hilary the unchangeable God so to speak follows his own nature getting an unchangeable subsisting God so we understand the nature of God to subsist in him for he is God in God it is also manifest that as regards the relations each of two relative opposites is in the concept of the other regarding origin also it is clear that the procession of the intelligible word is not outside the intellect and as much as it remains the nature of the word what is also is uttered by the word is there in contained and the same applies to the Holy Ghost reply to objection one what is contained in creatures does not sufficiently represent what exists in God so according to none of the modes enumerated by the philosopher are the son and the father in each other the mode that most nearly approaching reality is to be found in that whereby something exists in its originating principle except that the unity of essence between the principle and that which proceeds therefrom is wanting in things created reply to objection two the son's going forth from the father is by mode of the interior procession whereby the word emerges from the heart and remains therein hence this going forth in God is only by the distinction not by any kind of essential separation and reply to objection three the father and the son are relatively opposed but not essentially well as above explained one relative opposite is in the other sixth article whether the son is equal to the father in power objection one it would seem that the son is not equal to the father in power for it is said the son cannot do anything of himself but what he sees the father doing but the father can act of himself therefore the father's power is greater than the son's objection two further greater is the power of him who commands and teaches than of him who obeys and hears but the father commands the son according to John as the father gave me commandment so do I the father also teaches the son the father loveth the son showeth him all things that himself doth also the son hears as I hear so I judge therefore the father has greater power than the son objection three further it belongs to the father's omnipotence to be able to beget a son equal to himself for Augustine says were he unable to beget one equal to himself where would be the son cannot beget a son as proved above therefore the son cannot do all that belongs to the father's omnipotence hence he is not equal to his power on the contrary it is said whatsoever things the father doth these the son also doth in like manner I answer that the son is necessarily equal to the father in power and the son in action is a consequence of perfection in nature in creatures for instance we see that the more perfect in nature the greater power is there for action now it was shown above that the very notion of the divine paternity infiliation requires that the son should be the father's equal in greatness that is in perfection of nature hence it follows that the son is equal to the father in power and the same applies to the holy ghost reply to objection one the words the son cannot of himself do anything do not withdraw from the son any power possessed by the father since it is immediately added whatsoever things the father doth the son doth in like manner but their meaning is to show that the son derives his power from the father of whom he receives his nature hence hillary says the unity of the divine nature implies that the son so acts of himself that he does not act by himself reply to objection two the father's showing and the son's hearing are to be taken in the sense that the father communicates knowledge to the son as he communicates his essence the command of the father can be explained in the same sense as giving him from eternity knowledge and will to act by begetting him or better still referred to Christ in his human nature reply to objection three as the same essence is paternity in the father and filiation in the son so by the same power the father begets and the son is begotten hence it is clear that the son can do whatever the father can do yet it does not follow that the son can beget for to argue thus would imply transition from substance to relation where generation signifies a divine relation so the son has the same omnipotence as the father but with another relation the father possessing power as giving signified when we say that he is able to beget while the son possesses the power of receiving signified by saying that he can be begotten the end of question 42