First, are we reasonably confident that the largest U.S. banks could weather a period of stress, and, in the more remote event they could not, that they would no longer present the  13  Early assessments include Macroeconomic Assessment Group (2010), “Assessing the Macroeconomic Impact of the Transition to Stronger Capital and Liquidity Requirements: Final Report” (Basel, Switzerland: Bank for International Settlements, December), www.bis.org/publ/othp12.pdf; and Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010), “An Assessment of the Long-Term Economic Impact of Stronger Capital and Liquidity Requirements” (Basel, Switzerland: Bank for International Settlements, August), www.bis.org/publ/bcbs173.pdf.
More recent assessments include William R. Cline (2016), “Benefits and Costs of Higher Capital Requirements for Banks,” Petersen Institute for International Economics Working Paper, no. 16-6 (March), https://piie.com/system/files/documents/wp16-6.pdf; and Ingo Fender and Ulf Lewrick (2016), “Adding It All Up: The Macroeconomic Impact of Basel III and Outstanding Reform Issues,” BIS Working Papers No. 591 (Basel, Switzerland: Bank for International Settlements, November), www.bis.org/publ/work591.pdf.