[3] Kydland, F. and E. Prescott (1977), “Rules rather than discretion: The inconsistency of optimal plans,” Journal of Political Economy, 85, 473-490. [4] See e.g. Blinder, A., M. Ehrmann, M. Fratzscher, J. De Haan, and D. Jansen (2008), “Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence,” Journal of Economic Literature, 46(4): 910–945.
[5] Blinder, A.S., Goodhart, C., Wyplosz, C., Hildebrand, P. and Lipton, D., 2001. How do central banks talk?. Centre for Economic Policy Research. P66 [6] Blinder, A. (1998), Central Banking in Theory and Practice, The MIT Press; originally delivered as the 1996 Robbins Lectures at the London School of Economics.