See https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/14636256/2-31052022AP-EN.pdf/3ba84e21-80e6-fc2f-6354-2b83b1ec5d35  [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/14636256/2-31052022-APEN.pdf/3ba84e21-80e6-fc2f-6354-2b83b1ec5d35] . 6. See ECB (European Central Bank) (2022). 7. See Knöbl, Sutt and Zavoiceo (2002). 8. See https://www.eestipank.ee/en/annual-report-1993-estonian-economy-1993 [https://www.eestipank.ee/en/annual-report-1993-estonian-economy-1993] . 9. See Hansson (1993). 10. See https://www.dashboarddeutschland.de/#/themen/konjunktur_wirtschaft/preise [https://www.dashboard-deutschland.de/#/themen/konjunktur_wirtschaft/preise]. 11. See Hansson (1993). 12. See Eesti Pank (1999). 13. See Hanke, Jonung and Schuler (1992) and Katsis (2017) for a more recent discussion. 14. See Hansson (1993). 15.
As a matter of fact, the crisis failed to validate the decoupling hypothesis, as all EMEs were affected, admittedly to different extents. What the crisis, in fact, reinforced is that the economic prospects of advanced economies and EMEs are interlinked through trade, finance and confidence channels. 5. Let me now move on to specific issues.