Later, when the financial crisis became one of sovereign debt, and most especially, when it turned systemic in the summer of 2011, the ECB had to approve further non-conventional measures that reinforced its position as intermediary in the distribution of liquidity. It substantially lengthened the horizon of its loans, up to three years, when it injected more than € billion in gross terms in two auctions in December 2011 and February 2012. In sum, the financial crisis compelled central banks to adopt, along with robust monetary policy responses, exceptional measures and an unprecedented expansion in their balance sheets. Central banks have been decisive in preventing, even though not always with total success, the deflationary risks that characterised other major financial crises in the past. Measures in the regulatory and supervisory areas The financial crisis has triggered fundamental changes in the international financial system’s regulatory architecture. Since the first G20 meeting in November 2008 in Washington, work has advanced on many fronts. I shall refer to two in particular. First, the changes in the prudential regulation of solvency, the move from Basel II to Basel III. And second, the progress in what has become known as macroprudential supervision. As we know, the financial crisis especially affected banks and, in particular, certain global systemic banks. The response of international banking regulators has had to be commensurate with the dangers of the crisis and with the cost of the crisis to taxpayers.
Luis M Linde: Central bank monetary policy, regulatory and supervisory measures Closing remarks by Mr Luis M Linde, Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the V International Banking Conference/Grupo Santander, Madrid, 14 November 2012. *  *  *  Let me first thank Banco Santander, its Chairman Emilio Botín and its Chief Executive Officer, Alfredo Sáez, for inviting me to the closure of this fifth International Banking Conference. The first of these annual conferences was held in 2008. A review of the matters addressed that year, which now seems distant, and those on the agenda today, reveals a high degree of coincidence. We are still in the management of the post-crisis and the economic situation is, in some respects, worse than it was five years ago. It is worse in terms of growth or, at least, growth prospects, and worse in terms of unemployment or stock market capitalisation. The financial crisis, which began in 2007 in the United States and took on a systemic dimension in 2008, following the Lehman Brothers debacle, has confronted the developed countries’ central banks with great challenges. I wish to refer to the central banks’ response in two specific areas. Firstly, in respect of monetary policy. And secondly, in the area of banking regulation and supervision.