A new liquidity regulation is currently in the test and calibration phase. This regulation takes into account all balance-sheet and off-balance-sheet items that are of relevance in liquidity considerations, and is based – as far as possible – on internal bank liquidity management principles. It makes the big banks more resilient to disturbances in the interbank market or larger-scale withdrawals of deposits. It promotes longer-term financing as well as higher-rated securities that are capable of generating liquidity even in a stressed market environment. The new regulation is due to come into force in the second quarter of 2010. These advances and the broad consensus achieved at the international level can certainly be regarded as positive achievements. However, so far they only apply to preventative measures. As mentioned previously, these measures serve to reduce the probability of a crisis, but cannot always prevent its occurrence. Another crisis is inevitable and we must be prepared for it. 3. Resolution measures needed; “too big to fail” is biggest challenge  Consequently, we need tools that will substantially reduce the costs of a crisis. The legacy of the current crisis is a banking system with large international institutions that now enjoy a virtual state guarantee. The fact that systemically important banks enjoy such a guarantee is now openly recognised to be a problem by the banking sector, too. A guarantee of this kind contradicts the basic principle of the market economy and presents us with a situation that cannot be tolerated.
For these reasons alone,  BIS Review 21/2005  3  the use of petroleum revenues may in periods deviate from the 4 per cent rule. Spending was also increased in response to the economic downturn. We can therefore safely affirm that the fiscal rule has been normative for fiscal policy. At the time of the introduction of the fiscal rule in 2001 projections pointed to a continued increase in the use of petroleum revenues. We had to expect this growth in spending to lead to weaker competitiveness in Norwegian manufacturing, either through higher wages or an appreciation of the krone. With wage growth in Norway higher than abroad, the competitive position of Norway’s manufacturing industry has weakened by about 15 per cent since the mid-1990s. Competitiveness is about 4 per cent weaker than the average for the past 30 years. The krone has been influenced by high oil and gas prices and prices for other Norwegian export goods. Monetary policy has also influenced the path for Norway’s relative costs, but the nominal value of the krone is about the same as 10 years ago. Strong growth in public spending and expectations of moderately higher growth in the use of petroleum revenues now seem to have been factored into the cost level. Over the past 30 years manufacturing has been scaled back in waves. The last wave occurred around the turn of the millennium, but a substantial decline also occurred in the period 1977 to 1984 and from 1987 to 1992.