For if risk is spread more broadly, shocks should be absorbed with less trauma. Moreover, the system as a whole may be less vulnerable to distortions introduced by the moral hazard associated with the access that banks have to the safety net. A second issue we need to consider stems from the complexity of the new credit instruments, the challenges they present in terms of valuation and risk measurement and their short history of experience in times of stress. Even the most sophisticated participants in the markets for these instruments find the risk management challenges associated with these instruments daunting. This raises the prospect of unanticipated losses. Default rates are harder to predict where there has been a substantial change in the financial attributes of borrowers. The prices of instruments may not respond as expected to a given change in losses or in the value of the assets underlying these instruments. Hedging strategies may prove to be less effective than expected. Similarly rated instruments can behave very differently in stress events. The response of prices and volatility to the downgrades in the automobile sector in the spring of 2005 and the recent experience in subprime mortgages and related asset-backed securities and credit derivatives illustrate different types of surprises faced by the participants in these markets. They are a reminder of the dimensions of uncertainty that exist about the shape of the distribution of potential returns. This is particularly true of what we might call the adverse tail, or the negative extreme.
•  Fourth, lack of anti-money laundering practices in a bank may also affect it’s relationships with correspondent banks because reputable international banks would not want to be associated with banks that do not practice basic anti-money laundering techniques, and therefore be a threaten to their own operations. •  Fifth, money laundering compromises the corporate governance structure of banks. This is an area of concern especially among the small banks when it comes to deposit mobilisation and customer selection. Mr Chairman, the increasing integration of financial systems means that money launderers can now make use of the financial system to hide the proceeds of the illegal activities easily. Launderers are now able to quickly move illicit money between national jurisdictions, therefore complicating the task of tracing and confiscating these assets. Further, differences in money laundering legislation and in the implementation of international standards such as, know your customer regulations, customer identification and secrecy laws have led to regulatory arbitrage. This has worked to the advantage of money launderers because they can move the proceeds of their activities to less regulated territories where there are lax laws. Therefore, to avoid launderers from taking advantage of the weaknesses in the application of international law, many governments have decided to co-operate in order to combat money laundering. In this regard, the most notable international initiatives/responses to money laundering include: •  First, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).