As such, FSB reforms would amount to little if they did not represent the best collective judgement of our members on how to deliver efficient resilience. But because they are the product of the authority, expertise and shared objectives of its members, the FSB reforms create the foundations for an open, global financial system. We now have agreed common minimum standards that are being consistently and transparently implemented. The playing field for cross border activities is being levelled. Opportunities for regulatory arbitrage are being reduced. In short, a platform is being created for deference to each other’s approaches when they achieve similar outcomes. To seize this opportunity and to build responsible financial globalisation, authorities also need to share relevant information and work together to manage cross border challenges to financial stability. 9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  9  The FSB and Basel Committee have developed a number of information sharing guidelines to help foster trust and cooperation between international regulators. These include supervisory colleges and crisis management groups. One of the most critical elements of supervisory cooperation is understanding how each other will behave when things go wrong. In this regard, operationalising new “gone concern” regimes is critical. Best practice is captured by the FSB’s Key Attributes and involves resolvability assessments and regular crisis management group meetings for systemic firms.
Of course, since new forms of shadow banking activities are certain to develop in the future, FSB members will continue to monitor for emerging risks, and share data and analysis in order to support any future regulatory response. 9 The data refer to the UK, the US and the Euro Area, as of June 2009 (see Bank of England Financial Stability Report, June 2009). 5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  5  These include reforms to secure the tools and powers authorities need to deal decisively with failing banks. At the same time, major banks are required to make themselves easier to resolve, including by writing ‘living wills’. Most importantly, global standards now require that banks hold sufficient debt in life such that, in the event one fails, its successor can be recapitalised to support the continued operation of its most important activities. The combination of these initiatives and the determination of authorities to complete the job explains why the too-big-to-fail public subsidy for private systemic banks has fallen by 90% in the UK. Put simply, a decade on, market discipline is coming back. The system is also fairer because we are addressing the root causes of misconduct. In the wake of the crisis, a series of scandals ranging from mis-selling to manipulation undermined trust in banking, the financial system and to a degree markets themselves. The economic consequences have been enormous.