The recognition of losses was postponed and, as a consequence, capital continued to be allocated to investments with limited positive impact on Japan’s long-term growth potential, which some have called “zombie lending”4. Ultimately, this resulted in Japan’s “lost decade”, namely an extended period of anaemic growth (see Chart 3). A second lesson is that institutional and structural reforms are essential Early in the crisis, emerging Asian economies strengthened prudential regulation and supervision, together with bank governance and market transparency and discipline, in order to prevent further instability and bring domestic standards closer to the international norms.5 Furthermore, they generally acknowledged that their economic “miracle” before the crisis was not sustainable. It was driven by over-investment encouraged by Colbertist policies, implicit government guarantees, and too often, opaqueness and political interference in market mechanisms.6 As a result, at the macro level, growth was led by capital accumulation in the wrong sectors and not by a rise in total factor productivity. In Paul Krugman’s words, the Asian miracle was “the fruit of perspiration, not of inspiration”7. To address the root causes of the crisis, structural reforms aimed at improving governance and challenging vested interests, both in public policy-making and in the corporate sector,  2  See FRBSF Economic Letter (2011). “Could We Have Learned from the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–98?”, February 2011. 3  See Lindgren, C.-J. et al. (1999). “Financial Sector Crisis and Restructuring. Lessons from Asia”, IMF Occasional Paper, 188. 4  See Fukao, M. (2003).
Further on, Bank of Albania market interventions have been practically inexistent and the exchange rate 3/8  BIS central bankers' speeches  reflected the supply and demand situation in the market. Insofar results show that Bank of Albania interventions have accomplished the objectives. The appreciation pace of the exchange rate has diminished and the activity in the foreign exchange market has returned to normal parameters. In line with these developments, the Bank of Albania kept the direction and intensity of the monetary stimulus unchanged over the second half of the year. The policy rate remained unchanged at 1.0% while the financial market was supplied with the necessary liquidity and informed through the forward guidance on the future path of the monetary policy stance. The accommodative monetary policy implemented by the Bank of Albania has proven successful for boosting economic growth, inducing better utilisation of production capacities and building up inflationary pressures in the economy. The transmission of the monetary stimulus is noted in several aspects: First, the monetary stimulus has led to the reduction of financing costs for households and enterprises. Interest rates are close to historical lows, across all the range of financial instruments. Second, the accommodative monetary policy has led to the expansion of credit in lek, and to the reduction of existing debt service costs. Lek credit to the private sector increased at 6.7%, on average, in 2018.