The Riksbank's former scientific adviser Eric Leeper said in a report that an excessively tight fiscal policy may have contributed to the Riksbank's problems in bringing up inflation after the global financial crisis.40 I think this shows that some form of information exchange between monetary and fiscal policy may be desirable in certain situations. I also note that the conclusions of the recent review of the Reserve Bank of Australia go in this direction.41  Scope for exchange of information In a speech to the Swedish Economic Association a few years ago, my predecessor Stefan Ingves raised the issue of exchange of information in cases where monetary policy's room for manoeuvre is limited by the policy rate being close to the lower bound.42 He gave two examples of how the exchange of information could take place. The Riksbank could publish scenarios in the Monetary Policy Report that illustrate both the limitations of monetary policy and the effects on inflation of a more expansionary fiscal policy. The Ministry of Finance can then decide to what extent they want to take the information into account. The Riksbank could also directly inform the Ministry of Finance if it considers that a more expansionary fiscal policy is needed to fulfil the inflation target without the need to take overly drastic monetary policy measures. The Riksbank conducts monetary policy independently to achieve low and stable inflation. This is important for maintaining confidence in the inflation target.
Purchases of private assets and assets other than government securities are primarily relevant when markets that are important to the financial system are threatened, and we risk an acute financial crisis, such as at the start of the pandemic. Under the new Sveriges Riksbank Act, the Riksbank can – under certain conditions – buy and sell Swedish securities issued by the government and private actors. Our monetary policy toolbox in this respect remains the same as before. However, the new act has a more restrictive view of when it may be relevant to purchase private securities. The Riksbank may only buy and sell such securities if there are exceptional reasons. This means in practice that, from a monetary policy perspective, we can only buy and sell private securities when we cannot achieve the desired effect on the economy by using other measures. The new act also gives the Riksbank a more explicit mandate than before to trade in securities, also within the scope of our task of contributing to a stable and efficient financial system. To counter serious disruptions in the financial system, the Riksbank may if there are exceptional reasons buy and sell financial instruments at predetermined prices to temporarily support the functioning of systemically important financial markets. An important task for the Riksbank is to be the lender of last resort for important credit institutions that have problems, but also, under certain conditions, to act to keep markets that are critical to the financial system going.