http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs173.pdf Brainard, W. (1967): “Uncertainty and the Effectiveness of Policy”, American Economic Review 57(2), 411425. Brooke, M., Bush, O., Edwards, R., Ellis, J., Francis, B., Harimohan, R., and C. Siegert (2015): “Measuring the Macroeconomic Costs and Benefits of Higher UK Bank Capital Requirements”, Bank of England Financial Stability Paper, 35. http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/Documents/fpc/fspapers/fs_paper35.pdf Brunnermeier, M. K. (2009): “Deciphering the liquidity and credit crunch 2007–2008”, The Journal of Economic Perspectives 23 (1): 77-100. Cesa-Bianchi, A., Eguren Martin, F., and G. Thwaites (2017): “Foreign Booms, Domestic Busts: the Global Dimension of Banking Crises”, Bank of England Staff Working Paper No. 644. http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/Pages/workingpapers/2017/swp644.aspx Caballero, R. J., and A. Krishnamurthy (2008),“Collective Risk Management in Flight to Quality Episode”, Journal of Finance, 63(5): 2195-2230. Campbell, J., Giglio, S., and P. Pathak (2011): “Forced Sales and House Prices”, American Economic Review, 105(5), 2108-31 Constancio, V. (2014), “The ECB and macro-prudential policy – from research to implementation”, speech at the Third Conference of the Macro-prudential Research Network, Frankfurt, 23 June. http://www.bis.org/review/r140624b.pdf Cont, R., and E. Schaanning (2014): “Fire Sales, Indirect Contagion and Systemic Stress-Testing”, Unpublished. 13  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  13  Crockett, A. D. (2000), “Marrying the micro- and macro-prudential dimensions of financial stability”, September. http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp000921.htm Danielsson, J., Macrae, R., Tsomocos, D., and J.-P. Zigrand (2016): “Why macropru can end up being procyclical”, VOXEu, 15 December. http://voxeu.org/article/why-macropru-can-end-being-procyclical Dynan, K. (2012): “Is a Household Debt Overhang Holding Back Consumption?”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring, 299-362.
The need for central banks to have a broad range of instruments, including macroprudential measures, to achieve financial stability policy objectives is now generally accepted. Focus has also been on the efficacy of different policy instruments that are needed to preserve financial stability, the structure and design of decision making frameworks and the accountabilities in regard to financial stability. For Asia, these considerations have been very much a part of the evolution of financial stability frameworks in the region in this recent decade, in particular following the Asian financial crisis. By virtue of being also responsible for bank supervision, the majority of Asian central banks have a clear mandate for financial stability, whether implied or explicit. In the case of Malaysia, this has supported the close coordination of the macro and micro surveillance functions, and more comprehensive assessments and analyses of the interactions between monetary and financial stability policies. Many central banks in the region also have considerable experience in implementing macroprudential measures, such as lending concentrations, loan-to-value limits and some form of “dynamic” reserving or provisioning policies. The intensification of regional monetary and financial cooperation among central banks in the Asian region has also served to strengthen regional surveillance and crisis management arrangements, as well as in the supervision of financial institutions with cross-border operations in the region. As Asia rises and expectations increase, the two billion Asians now at the margins of the consumption economy will radically transform global demand and supply for limited  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  resources.