It could also similarly arise from a determination that there is no realistic prospect of a successful auction to return to a matched book or that the CCP’s own rules to allocate losses or tear up contracts are either not yet available to it or will undermine financial stability or the objective of continuity through full tear-up and closure of the service. So – in line with the Key Attributes – it needs to be possible to place the CCP into resolution before its loss allocation rules are exhausted. These are all examples of entry into resolution caused by clearing member default. But nondefault losses could also bring a CCP down and it is certainly possible that a breach of a CCP’s regulatory requirements with no reasonable likelihood of replenishing its capital would present a trigger point for intervention. I have mentioned the incompatibility of full-tear up with the objective of continuity. But an intervention by a resolution authority cannot by itself guarantee a successful auction. To do so, may still require partial tear-up and forced allocation and these would seem to be necessary tools in any resolution toolkit for a CCP. How losses are then allocated upon tear-up again  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  goes to the question of the timing of intervention and whether the tear-up takes place before the resources available to a CCP have been exhausted or after it.
Loss absorbing capacity for CCP resolution Let me start by discussing the loss-absorbing capacity needed for CCP resolution. The use of a bail-in tool on a bank unlocks the loss absorbing capacity of the non-equity part of its balance sheet, the part that would otherwise only bear loss in insolvency or in a voluntary restructuring. Applying this concept of going and gone concern resources to CCPs is a less straightforward task. Unlike a bank, a CCP’s own loss absorbing resources sit both on its balance sheet as margin and default fund and off it in the form of contingent claims on its members. Consistent with the PFMIs, these arrangements are intended to be comprehensive at least insofar as they cover losses that could arise from clearing member default. That begs a question as to what additional loss absorbency the resolution of a CCP can currently unlock that recovery cannot unlock already. The question of loss absorbency is one that the FSB is looking at. Do we need additional resources in the waterfall beyond existing funded and unfunded resources? If additional resources are required, should the initial margin held by a CCP be made available if it would have suffered losses in insolvency? Or should CCPs hold other resolution resources instead? BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  I will not prejudge that debate here. However, I do think there is value in clarifying what is meant by the expression “TLAC for CCPs”. Total loss absorbing capacity is not simply shorthand for subordinated debt.