The projection that total demand for domestic goods will remain relatively limited due to the negative contribution of the foreign demand, despite the stable increase in domestic final demand throughout 2006, underlies these findings (Graph 25). 18  BIS Review 67/2006  Graph 26. Inflation and Output Gap Forecasts (Constant Interest Rate) 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3  Forecast Range*  2 1  ± 2 Uncertainty Band  Output Gap  0 -1 -2 7:03  7:02  7:01  6:04  6:03  6:02  6:01  5:04  -3  * The probability of inflation staying within the forecast range is 70 percent. ♦ The path ‘consistent with the target’ which is announced in 5 December 2005 ‘’General Framework of Inflation Targeting Regime and Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy’ and constitutes the base for the principle of “accountability”. • 2006 end-year point target. ♦ The path consistent with the 2007 end-year target, under contemporary data set. In Graph 26, the forecasts that have been produced under a main scenario are presented - in which the current stance, the short-term outlook and the assumptions relating to the fundamental variables the framework of which are given above -are faithfully preserved; however, the policy interest rates are maintained as unchanged for one year starting from today. In contrast to the previous scenario, the path of policy interest rates has not been determined by a medium-term approach, but has been handled as an exogenous assumption.
The executive body consists of three members with equal rights who jointly carry out the tasks defined in article 46 of the National Bank Act and bear joint responsibility for them. First and foremost, the law describes these tasks as conceptional and operational monetary policy decisions. The Chairman does not have any special powers. Consequently, responsibility is shared. Transparency and accountability are crucial, particularly in times of crisis, when the information needs of the general public and financial markets, as well as other authorities, are increasing exponentially. We have responded to this need. For instance, information on central bank balance sheet items and SNB Bills has been stepped up, and our news conferences can now be watched on our website. During the course of the crisis, in particular, at the time of the measures to strengthen the Swiss financial system in October 2008, the number of appearances of Governing Board members before parliamentary commissions increased significantly.8 I would like to hazard a guess that the SNB has never been as transparent as it is today. In this respect, it also stands up well to international comparison. 7  This is also laid down in the Message on the revision of the National Bank Act with regard to art. 7 para. 1 NBA (6191), “The SNB’s decision-making autonomy must be retained because its accountability would otherwise inevitably come into conflict with its authority to act independently of instructions (under art. 6).” Consequently, the SNB bears “sole responsibility for the mandates described in art.