I would like to highlight some conclusions that can be drawn from this crisis: –  First, the crisis reminded us that not only does liquidity have a price and that this price could fluctuate greatly, but above all that liquidity cannot be taken for granted, irrespective of the price that some market participants are willing to pay;  –  Second, central banks rapidly and efficiently adjusted their operational frameworks to provide liquidity to the financial system, re-establish the normal functioning of the money market and restore confidence. But such measures must naturally remain exceptional, and central banks must be vigilant about the signals and incentives they give to the financial system. –  Third, due to its magnitude, the crisis has highlighted the risks associated with excessive maturity transformation when long-term assets are funded by short-term liabilities, or even funded overnight. This raises questions regarding both interest rate risk management and liquidity risk management. While these are distinct areas, they have close linkages. It is important not to have a short memory and relegate all this to ancient history. Indeed, at present, in an environment of ongoing extremely low interest rates, it is still possible to fund long-term assets at very low cost, with the risk of creating further asset price bubbles. In this respect, the example of the real estate sector seems telling. Housing loans have become highly important commercial product and could prompt certain institutions to slash their profit margins in order to win customer loyalty.
The greatest attention will be therefore required when assessing the impact of this standard on the financing of the economy. To back up this somewhat critical observation, I would like to stress three points: •  First, I wish to recall that central banks and supervisors are aware of the demands made on banks to implement the new regulations and we are regularly assessing with them the technical details of these standards. •  Second, a distinction must be made between the different measures set out in Basel III: –  those that are absolutely necessary, such as the increase of capital charges for market activities, securitisation and counterparty credit risk exposures, and,  –  those, such as liquidity ratios, whose impact on the real economy must be assessed ex ante. As regards the latter, a real observation period has been scheduled to allow for any necessary changes. The current arrangements should not be regarded as set in stone. •  Third, while the proposed rules may appear harsh, we will ensure that a level playing field is achieved for their implementation. However, French institutions are well-equipped to comply with them. The major French banks have no difficulties raising funds in capital markets: to date, thanks to their size, ratings and reputation they have maintained their funding capacity. II. What are the avenues for improving the management of maturity transformation risk?