It should be noted that this does not affect the personal independence of the members of the ECB’s decision-making bodies, who remain protected from arbitrary dismissal under Articles 11.4 and 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB, irrespective of whether they exercise new tasks and functions that are conferred on the ECB. The Statute of the ESCB sets out http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2017/html/sp170330.en.html[03.04.2017 15:53:14]  Central bank independence revisited  explicitly the two grounds for dismissal and any interpretation leading to a different outcome would be contrary to the letter and the spirit of the Treaty. In practice, a dismissal from office would apply to all functions performed under that office and cannot be restricted only to the monetary policy and core central banking functions. Nothing would prevent a national legislator, however, from severing a national governor from national responsibilities in the prudential field. Fourth, the principle of financial independence applies to the ECB as a bank supervisor in order to have sufficient financial and human resources to perform its supervisory tasks. [45] To conclude on this point, when performing its supervisory tasks, the ECB is not shielded from external influences with the same level of independence as it is in its monetary policy function. While the ECB as a supervisor still enjoys a high degree of operational and financial independence, the ECB’s discretion in policy decisions and the use of supervisory tools is confined by the European and national legislators and regulators.
Let us seize the opportunity of a new Parliament and a new Executive to reflect further on how to develop the architecture of our EMU in order to enhance its functioning. In particular, I think there is a case for some form of common governance over structural reforms. This is because the outcome of structural reforms – a continuously high level of productivity and competitiveness – is not merely in a country’s own interest. It is in the interest of the Union as a whole. For example, one could consider embedding the process of undertaking necessary structural reforms in a common framework of convergence towards policies and institutions aligned to best practices. Honourable Members, as EU institutions, the central bank and the Parliament of the European Union are duty bound to maintain a close and fruitful relationship of cooperation. I sincerely hope that in this respect, we can continue in the same spirit as we left off three months ago. I am now looking forward to answering your questions. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches