Indeed, this gap in the regulatory framework has been demonstrated in the recent period of financial turbulence, where a number of countries have found it necessary to take extraordinary measures with regard to banks and other financial institutions in order to maintain financial stability. Today, I will try to sketch the broad features of such a resolution framework. In brief, it is a question of finding a system that makes it possible to close banks quickly and efficiently at a low cost to the deposit guarantee system, while making shareholders and uninsured creditors bear the responsibility for their investment decisions. But it must also allow for special measures to be taken in the exceptional situation where the failure of a bank risks destabilising the financial system as a whole. Also in such situations the government needs to have a strong negotiating position against the shareholders. But, first, how did I arrive at this conclusion? Well, from an analysis of the role of the banks in the economy and the safety net which has been built up around the sector. And from some  BIS Review 62/2008  1  experience from dealing with real crises. To get the right perspective, I think it is useful to start at this end. What is so special about bank failures? Bank failures have always been a problematic issue for governments.
This will be the theme of the round table in the third session that will close this symposium. *** I thank you for your attention and hand the floor to Antoine Frachot who will assume the role of moderator for the first session. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3