However good the policies may be, if the capacities of the institutions implementing these policies are not matching the rigour of the policies, the policies will not be able to deliver what expected of them. If I am to repeat myself once more, in the light of the structural transformation in the Turkish economy during the last five years, I can easily say that Turkey is a clear example of the view that governments need to assume a leading role in changing and reforming the existing institutions and in setting up 10 brand new ones . In this respect, newly established independent authorities charged with regulating markets from competition to public procurement and to energy matters might be cited as good examples. However it goes without saying that the most prominent institutional change that took place is the amendment of the Law of the Central Bank of Turkey, which made it independent. The manifestations of the independence of the Central Bank in the form of greater transparency and accountability together with the inflation-targeting regime contributed to the implementation of a rulebased monetary policy. After the thirty-year period of high inflation, we have experienced single-digit inflation rates. An independent central bank has constituted and will continue to constitute a corner stone for the structural transformation towards good governance and good institutions in Turkey.
Such recovery plans should: •  Identify actionable options that the firm can take in response to financial weakness that will restore the confidence of the firm’s counterparties in the firm without the need for extraordinary official sector support;  •  Incorporate processes that analyze the root causes of their problems and identify longer-term strategies that will need to be employed as other recovery options to restore capital and liquidity are being executed; and,  •  Be regularly tested and updated to ensure they remain reasonable. For some types of firms – like financial market utilities, recovery planning is actually an even more important issue. Because FMUs provide critical services to the industry, experiencing a major disruption that could lead to resolution – or dissolution – is unacceptable. It is important, then, that a CCP be structured in a way, and develop and have tools available, to enable it to recover from losses and continue operations under extreme scenarios. Simply put, the debate on ‘less complex’ for financial market utilities is much more about recovery than it is about resolution. Steadfast resiliency may include casting a more critical eye on the resources needed for a single CCP to withstand a plausible, severe shock. Conclusion While there is still work that needs to be done to make financial institutions more resilient, better managed and less complex, we have also made a great deal of progress.