Moreover, nor can we forget that an independent agency’s efficiency is not impervious to its surroundings. Accordingly, to preserve the independence and prevent overload of these institutions, it must be recognised that their performance also depends on actions taken in other economic policy areas.6 Monetary policy is an evident example of this, especially in a monetary union such as ours in which the single monetary policy coexists with each country’s own macroeconomic policies. Indeed, the governance of Economic and Monetary Union recognises the need for the single monetary policy to be accompanied by fiscal and structural policies consistent with economic stability. With this goal in mind, a wide range of coordination and supervision mechanisms have been put in place, such as the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure. Such considerations are also applicable to other areas of activity of independent institutions, such as financial stability and banking supervision in the case of the Banco de España. Indeed, these considerations justify central banks’ frequent calls for an appropriate economic policy mix. And it is in this framework of assurance of economic stability that citizens and politicians should place declarations by the independent monetary authority on economic policy conduct in general. In this respect, as I indicated earlier, the functions of the Banco de España include advising the Government and producing reports and studies. The present crisis provides us with a good example. The robust monetary policy actions of the ECB, necessary as they were, would have been insufficient had it acted alone.
Legal independence is represented in the institution’s own legal personality, which is different from that any other State or General Government agency may have. As a result of this personality, the Banco de España has the autonomy to assume contractual rights and obligations with third parties and to take decisions under its remit, which are legally binding for those concerned. Functional independence means that, under the principles of observance of the law and the general interest that govern its conduct, the Banco de España has the instruments needed to perform its function and the autonomy to decide on the internal resources and processes it deploys to fulfil the objectives assigned to it. This autonomy extends to its internal organisation (divisions, departments and posts, with their tasks and procedures). As an exception, a matter to which I shall return, there is currently the possibility of government review of some of its decisions in the supervisory sphere. Personal independence means that senior management, the Council members and employees of the Banco de España can do their work “independently” in the exercise of the functions entrusted to the institution. Here, independence means that in the decisions taken and in the attendant actions, members of the institution must be free from external interference and be guided exclusively by rigour and professional competence.