One prospect is that ageold ideas that have shaped most of our history are revived, such that the prosperity of some cannot be achieved without the poverty of others; international and supranational organisations lose their relevance as places for negotiating and finding compromise solutions; the affirmation of 7 / 10  BIS central bankers' speeches  the self, of the identity, becomes the first requirement of every policy. In such a world, freedom and peace become accessories which can be dispensed with as needed. But if we want these values to remain essential, fundamental, the path is a different one: adjusting existing institutions to change. This process of adjustment has so far encountered resistance because the inevitable national political difficulties always seemed to be above such need. This reluctance has resulted in uncertainty about the capacity of institutions to respond to events and has strengthened the voice of those who want to pull down these institutions. There should be no doubt: this adjustment will have to be as deep as the phenomena that revealed the fragility of the existing order, and as vast as the dimensions of a geopolitical order that is changing in a way that is not favourable for Europe. The European Union wanted to create a sovereign where there was not one. It is not surprising that in a world where every point of contact between the great powers is increasingly a point of friction, the external challenges to the existence of the European Union become increasingly threatening.
10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 9 Average capital flows to and from emerging economies (*) (percentage of GDP) 15  15  10  10  5  5  0  0  -5  -5  -10  -10 80  82  84  86  88  90  92  Inflows  94  96  98  Outflows  00  02  04  06  08  10  Net flows  Source: Central Bank of Chile based on IMF data. (*) Includes Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Egypt, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, Morocco, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand, Taiwan and Turkey. Figure 10 Capital flows to and from Chile (*) (percentage of GDP) 20  20  15  15  10  10  5  5  0  0  -5  -5  -10  -10  -15  -15 86  88  90  92  Inflows  94  96  98  Outflows  00  02  04  06  08  10  Net flows  (*) Up until 1995, it shows foreign direct investment and portfolio investments from or in a foreign country, in the capital account (excluding reserves) of the balance of payments. From 1996 onwards, it shows assets and liabilities of the financial account flows (excluding reserve assets). Source: Central Bank of Chile.