International inflationary impulses are generated via prices for imported consumer and intermediate goods. These inflationary impulses will partly be influenced by developments in international commodity and consumer prices and by the exchange rate. Interest rates influence inflation through their impact on domestic demand and on the market for NOK. When interest rates rise, it is more profitable to save and more costly to borrow. This dampens consumption and investment and hence aggregate demand. Lower demand in turn curbs the rise in prices and wages. Higher interest rates make it more attractive to take krone positions and borrow in foreign currency. As a result, higher interest rates normally lead to an appreciation of the krone. This reduces prices for imported goods. In addition, a strong krone reduces activity and profitability in the internationally exposed sector. It is important to be aware of the relationships between employment, output and inflation. If there is a shortage of labour and other economic resources, a tight monetary policy stance will reduce inflation by affecting aggregate demand. Conversely, when unemployment is high, low interest rates stimulate demand, which will contribute to stable wages and prices. A monetary policy stance that is aimed at stabilising inflation will thus also contribute to stabilising aggregate output and employment. In the long term, monetary policy determines the average level of inflation. Output is determined by the supply of labour, capital and technology and by productivity growth. Attempts to increase output beyond the total capacity of the economy will lead to inflation in the long run.
While the capital controls are being removed, the risk-adjusted interest rate differential between Iceland and its trading partners must be sufficient to make ISK assets attractive relative to foreign currency alternatives. On the other hand, there are strong arguments for a considerable reduction in interest rates, provided that the capital controls keep the króna stable. Whether the interest rate at any given time is appropriate depends in part on the timing of the phased capital account liberalisation. Both the market and the Monetary Policy Committee face uncertainty about when, and in what stages, it will be possible to lift the controls. In line with transparent monetary policy implementation, the Monetary Policy Committee has explained how this uncertainty affects its decisions. To that end, the Committee has given an account of various factors that affect the prospects of continuing the phased capital account liberalisation that began in November 2009. Uncertainty about key Supreme Court decisions and the third IMF review increased the likelihood that the next stage of liberalisation could be delayed quite a while. The bond market appeared to interpret this delay to be more fundamental in nature than the Monetary Policy Committee intended to convey in its statement, thus contributing to the decline in yields that had begun somewhat earlier. The uncertainty had abated by the time the Monetary Policy Committee met in September, and the Committee explained this in its statement. Furthermore, the Committee implied that it would inevitably consider this point in its next interest rate decisions.