Inclusive recruitment  To support our objectives, we have introduced diversity targets that are reviewed and challenged by Court. Specifically, we aim to triple both the proportions of women in our senior roles, to 35% by 2020, and of BAME employees in these roles to 13% by 2022. As a first step, we are fishing from a larger pond and removing perceived barriers to entry. xviii  We want to  make the Bank a more obvious career destination for a wide range recruits: young school leavers who want to develop their skills as apprentices to graduates looking for their first full-time job, people who wish to return to work, or experienced professionals who are considering a career change and want to contribute to public policy. In our last graduate round, we hired from over 40 UK universities (four times as many as a decade ago), attracting students from a range of socio-economic backgrounds. Two fifths of the 2016 intake were female and a quarter came from a BAME background. Only half studied economics. The remainder were plucked equally from the sciences, business and the humanities. 15% of our graduates were hired from Oxbridge, and a fifth were from lower socio-economic backgrounds. In contrast, 21% of fast track hires to public service are from Oxbridge and only 4% are from lower socio-economic backgrounds. xix  While we are casting a wider net, the reality is, the nature of our work means that we will always need to hire technical experts.
One might also ask whether inflation targeting, even if it should have succeeded in anchoring long-term inflation expectations, can become better than it is today at facilitating the formation of expectations in the near and medium term? This relates to an issue that is addressed in several of the contributions, namely how we should best communicate our expectations and plans regarding the future conduct of policy. Recently, a number of central banks have begun to depart from the assumption of an unchanged policy rate in their forecasts, choosing instead to work with paths for future interest rate developments. What kind of interest rate paths should we use in that case - “exogenous” paths based on implied forward rates or “endogenous” paths that reflect the central bank’s own expectations and plans, and what are the advantages and disadvantages of both options? And could, for example, an excessive degree of openness and detail as regards the central bank’s own expectations risk increasing market volatility instead of facilitating economic agents’ planning? These are just a handful of the issues that are addressed in the contributions to the conference and that I hope will provide the basis for a rewarding discussion. Once again - you are all very welcome! 4  BIS Review 45/2005