Most of the time this should not  8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  happen, as both aggregate demand and credit market shocks will tend to push the two policies in the same direction. Differential movements are more likely to arise in the face of supply disturbances. For instance, a beneficial supply shock will tend to push inflation below target, warranting a looser monetary policy, while it may also encourage a credit boom, warranting tighter macroprudential policies. But in any case, it is not clear that is such a problem. The instruments address different distortions, so one should expect them to move in different directions from time to time. Moreover, it is likely that the regulatory dials will be adjusted much less frequently than policy rates, so co-ordination should not be that significant an issue7. My concluding observations relate to the broader context within which macroprudential policies are conducted. Credit booms are times when everyone feels good and risks seem slight. Taking the credit punch bowl away before the party gets out of hand will be controversial, and banks and borrowers will be quick to claim “this time is different”. That is a good reason for delegation to a separate committee or agency with a longer perspective, much as we do with monetary policy. Even so, the pressures not to take action may be intense. Making macroprudential policies rule-based would be one response.
Looking at your coverage of our policy one might be inclined to think so. Between 2001 and 2005, for example, the Swiss National Bank was mentioned three times less in the Financial Times than in the period 1996 to 2000. However, let me emphasise that more transparency does not mean that monetary policy will always be simple to predict. Remember that the inflation forecasts published by central banks are always based on expectations of future economic developments. Hopefully, these expectations will be accurate most of the time. However, during certain periods of the economic cycle, particularly at turning points, our expectations will be prone to correction. I am therefore confident that, despite transparency, there will remain some news to report about monetary policy. I do believe, however, that central bank transparency may change the nature of media reports on monetary policy. In the old days of secrecy and unexpected monetary interventions, journalists obviously debated the objectives of central bankers and what this meant for the future. With increased transparency, such discussions have become obsolete, as objectives seem to be clear and future policy is easier to predict. In return, central bank transparency now gives journalists the opportunity to question the consistency of our monetary policy decisions with our stated objectives. This leads me to believe that, in future, media coverage of monetary policy may concentrate on scrutinising the congruency of our actions with our goals, rather than debating about what central banks are trying to achieve.