After all, on the other side of the ledger, the policy response following the crisis has been much more aggressive than is typical. On the monetary policy side, the Federal Reserve cut short-term interest rates close to zero, communicated that short-term rates were likely to stay exceptionally low far into the future, and undertook a series of large-scale asset purchases in order to ease financial conditions further. On the fiscal side, in 2009 the Congress and Administration enacted the largest fiscal stimulus program in history and some of these fiscal actions were renewed (e.g., extended unemployment compensation benefits) and new initiatives undertaken (e.g., the payroll tax holiday) once it became clear that the recovery was faltering. Also, there were significant  1  These lessons are evident in surveys of past financial crises and are examined in detail by Carmen Reinhart and Ken Rogoff in their superlative book, This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  policy actions taken to strengthen the banking system, including forcing banks to recapitalize so that they would have the capacity to sustain their lending. So why has the recovery disappointed? One possibility is that the negative dynamics of a post-bubble environment are even more potent than had been appreciated. Feedback loops may be more powerful and frictions may be larger. In the U.S. case, this is particularly germane with respect to housing and mortgage finance.
On the other hand, the realization of such projects enables strengthening of the cooperation between the central banks of the region and the central banks of the EU, which is inevitable in the process of integrating the entire region in the EU. Let me finally thank the ECB and the EU for enabling the NBRM to participate in this project. I wish success for all the institutions involved in the project in anticipation of even greater cooperation and I thank our hosts for organizing this event. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1