In these circumstances, had we allowed the exchange rate to adjust to market pressures within the 15 per cent band, the currency would have appreciated. 5. You seem to be playing down the efficacy of the fiscal deficit and of exchange rate adjustment as a means of jump starting the economy. What would you suggest instead? As I have already pointed out, the domestic factors which are contributing to the economy’s anaemic growth record are largely microeconomic in nature. I have also explained why deficit financing and changes in the nominal exchange rate cannot correct these weaknesses, still less produce sustainable growth. Policy orientation must eschew short-term palliatives. Like our competitors we must learn to come to terms with globalization. Reflecting on one simple fact should help in understanding what this means: the hourly cost of labour of an electronics operative in Malta is around $ compared with $ in Singapore and $ in China. Neither more government spending nor a devaluation can narrow that gap. Against this background, maintaining external competitiveness in the long run depends on continued moderation in wage growth, faster increases in labour productivity and sustainable budget positions. I make no claim to originality in proposing this prescription; it is shared by the EU Commission, the ECB and the IMF. I shall first address the last objective. Given that taxation levels are already high, fiscal consolidation should be achieved by cutting recurrent spending.
So far this year, it has bought currency for 30 b.kr., as opposed to 21 b.kr. over the same period in 2014. If it maintains that pace, it will buy more currency in 2015 than in 2014. As a result, the reserves exceed the outstanding foreign-denominated loans taken to finance them – by 65 b.kr. as of the end of February. But we mustn’t rest on our laurels; we need sizeable reserves as we prepare to lift the capital controls. I mentioned uncertainty surrounding the estimation of potential FX outflows once the controls are lifted. But one thing is certain: if the failed banks’ estates were given a green light tomorrow and could convert all of their krónur to foreign currency, and the same happened with the offshore overhang, there is no way we could safeguard stability, let alone bolster confidence, except perhaps after a long time has elapsed. The Central Bank of Iceland has designed a model intended to assess the impact of various developments in the balance of payments over a long horizon, including capital account liberalisation measures. When applied to this instance, the model reveals that our entire foreign exchange reserves would be wiped out – and more besides – if they were used to shore up the exchange rate. This would never be done, of course, and therefore the currency would depreciate sharply.