This action was taken within a scenario where some of the risks foreseen in March had materialized, and others had dissipated. In particular, as I will review shortly, output grew above expectations during the first quarter, so we are revising upward its annual expansion rate from our March estimate. In contrast, commodity prices have shown a more benign behavior in external markets, as they ceased to increase and posted some declines in the margin for oil prices and some food items. In our June meeting (last week), we slowed the pace of MPR increases, taking it to 5.25 percent. In addition, we said that, in the most likely scenario, further increases in the MPR would be necessary, the timing of which would depend on the incoming information and its implications. Changes in monetary policy operate with lags on output and inflation. In the baseline scenario, which I will be presenting in a few moments, the full transmission of the monetary stimulus withdrawal will help in moderating the current economic dynamism and stabilize it near the growth rate trend, contributing at the same time to help inflation stand at three percent over the projection horizon. But the risks are still there. So let me describe the factors that shape our baseline scenario and the risks that might affect it. Macroeconomic scenario Headline inflation is still around three percent annually, while core measures, although on an upward trend, continue to be contained, both below March’s forecasts (figure 1).
Sabine Lautenschläger: Monitoring, regulation and self-regulation in the European banking sector Speech by Ms Sabine Lautenschläger, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank and Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board of the Single Supervisory Mechanism, at the evening reception at the Deutsche Aktieninstitut, Frankfurt am Main, 21 April 2015. * 1. *  *  Introduction  Dear Mr Baumann, dear Mr Engels, ladies and gentlemen, My topic today, “Monitoring, regulation and self-regulation in the European banking sector”, cannot currently be discussed without asking ourselves the following questions. Do we need to do more to make sure that we never have to experience another financial market and banking crisis like that in 2008–09, or have we done too much and thus prevented the European banking industry from being able to offer financial services to the real economy? After a long phase of deregulation, a comprehensive re-regulation has been in vogue since 2009. At the global, European and national level, we have tackled almost everything that can limit, reduce or prevent risks to and risks caused by banks. The general public, politicians, academics, supervisors and even bankers – simply everyone – called for comprehensive and tough rules for banks and for their close supervision. But the mood seems to have changed over the past year. In Germany and Europe, more and more people are complaining of overregulation. In the rest of Europe, a connection is being made between the words “credit crunch” and “regulation”.