But as a general rule banks should not be prevailed upon against their better judgement to be providers of economic aid or social services, whether domestically or internationally, unless there is the political consensus that taxpayers are willing to fund them in that role. The internet Turning now to the internet, I believe that this has some relevance to the overall theme of this symposium, not so much because of questions about the availability of banking services to those who need them, but rather because of possible implications for the location and structure of banking activity. Let me begin by observing that, ever since the telecommunications and IT revolutions began substantially to impact on banking – and that, depending on how exactly one defines the terms, was at least two or three decades ago – some commentators have been forecasting the imminent demise of financial centres as such. The argument is that all the humdrum work will be carried out in computer centres and call centres in low wage countries, while the high value adding executives can locate where they wish – depending on their preferences for recreation, culture, climate and so on – and tele-conference one another when necessary. The former – the migration of routine operations to lowcost places – has happened to a degree, but the latter has not. Even if colleagues within a bank can sometimes substitute a conference call for a meeting, their customers have been less eager.
There is huge overlap between the areas of interest of, and information required by, and available to, both the supervisor and the central bank. Second, rescue or liquidity crisis will normally involve and require the immediate BIS Review 55/1997  -8-  provision of liquidity, which can only be done by the central bank. This is facilitated by internalising the supervisory body within the central bank. Others argue the reverse. First, since the finance of any large rescues involves government funding, the politicians have a direct interest and involvement in financial regulation. This may undermine the independence of a central bank if it also plays a supervisory role. Second, it is argued that an independent central bank in its conduct of monetary policy and being responsible for banking supervision may be perceived as too powerful. Third, the failure of a central bank in its supervisory duties will harm its credibility in its conduct of monetary policy. There is an inherent conflict between supervision and monetary policy. Central bank assistance to bail out problem banks tends to be inflationary on the money supply. The arguments are finely balanced. Whether the regulatory power should be centralized or diffused will depend very much on the legal, constitutional and historical background for each financial system. Conclusion Regulation is an art, not a science. It involves complicated trade-offs between competing interests. As Walter Bagehot said over 120 years ago, money will not manage itself. The regulation of money will be debated in the years to come.