Investors in schemes involving crypto tokens may also be exposed to a heightened risk of fraud. These schemes are often conducted online by operators whose authenticity and credibility are difficult to verify. Managing crypto risks The challenge for central banks and regulators is this: how can we harness the potentially transformative benefits of blockchain technology and crypto tokens while containing some of their risks? MAS has to-date chosen not to regulate crypto tokens directly. But we are: 3/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  focusing on the activities associated with crypto tokens, evaluating the different kinds of risks these activities pose, and considering the appropriate regulatory responses, all the while, seeking to ensure that we do not stifle innovation. The key risks MAS is monitoring in the crypto world are in the areas of financial stability, money laundering, investor protection, and market functioning. Financial stability MAS and other regulators are studying the nexus between the crypto world and the financial system to assess how risks to financial stability may be transmitted: market risk from the direct exposure of financial institutions to crypto tokens; credit risk through unsecured lending to crypto token businesses; and leverage when borrowers pledge crypto tokens as collateral to borrow and buy more crypto tokens. MAS assesses that the nature and scale of crypto token activities in Singapore do not currently pose a significant risk to financial stability. But this situation could change, and so we are closely watching this space.
commercial banks’ claims on the Riksbank, amounts to SEK 435 billion. The liquidity surplus would therefore be about SEK 70 billion even if the entire bond portfolio was sold. 17 Another argument sometimes put forward in favour of large bond holdings is that the central bank’s purchases would increase the supply of safe assets in the economy, and that there is otherwise a shortage of such assets. 18 The Riksbank’s bond purchases result in that government bonds with a specific maturity disappear from the market and are replaced by Riksbank certificates with a maturity of one week. 19 The Riksbank then takes over some of the maturity transformation that the market otherwise tries to achieve on its own, and helps to reduce the interest rate risk in the outstanding portfolio of government securities. This argument isn’t particularly convincing either. If it is considered important to have short maturity on the national debt in normal times, this should be dealt with when the government bonds are issued, and it is then a question for the National Debt Office. Furthermore, the conversion from government securities to Riksbank assets does not seem to increase the supply of safe assets in Sweden; the interest rate on (short-term) government securities is lower than the repo rate which means that the market price of government bonds is higher than the price of Riksbank certificates with the same maturity.