Similarly, the Circular will determine the circumstances in which bank foundations will be compelled to diversify their investments and, if appropriate, to relinquish control of the credit institutions which they own through the corresponding divestment. I trust that the period for public consultation of the Circular will open shortly. Second, the new European framework of resolution is already prompting, in most national jurisdictions, reflection on the institutional architecture of bank resolution. In the past, resolution agreements have required close collaboration between the various authorities involved in the process; namely, the supervisor, the resolution authority, if any, and the governments concerned insofar as the resolution has habitually required the use of substantial public funds. The experience in our country has been no exception. The current distribution of functions between the Banco de España and the FROB – whose Governing Committee includes representatives of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Competitiveness, the Ministry of Financial Affairs and Public Administration, and the Banco de España – has required that the two institutions were intensely involved in the resolution processes. Thus, while the supervisor is responsible for initiating the resolution process of an institution and approving the resolution plans, the FROB must prepare these plans, put them into practice and, in sum, manage the State’s ownership interest in those institutions that received financial aid, including any future divestment. Consequently, the coordination between the Banco de España and the FROB has been pivotal in ensuring effective management of the crisis.
These APSs, therefore, involve a cost that depends on the actual losses incurred whose real amount will only be known at the end of the period over which the guarantee is in force. In any event, the expected value of this cost shall be regularly evaluated by independent experts so that the guarantor agency (the FROB or the DGF) may make the related provision in its financial statements. Finally, the third type of public aid comprises State-backed guarantees of debt issues by certain banks and the extraordinary credit facilities offered to provide liquidity to the sector. As regards these guarantees, no loss from these contingencies is expected to arise for the State, which will in turn receive revenue in the form of fees and commissions. Currently,2 69% of the guarantees granted have been returned and the termination process is expected to continue in accordance with the redemption of the issues. Likewise, all amounts drawn down on the credit facilities were duly repaid and the other available facilities have been settled following the recapitalisation or, where appropriate, disposal of the recipient banks. As of today, therefore, the public assistance granted is essentially in the form of the capital contributions made and the guarantees offered. That said, not all of the public assistance granted that I have described involves a direct cost to the taxpayer, since the banking industry has also contributed via the DGF.