And if it happens again we will again risk destabilising international financial crises. From the other side, in the absence of mutual trust, there will be increasing pressure to break up the global capital market. Regulators and supervisors who cannot trust the implementation of standards in other jurisdictions will defend stability in their own jurisdictions by raising barriers. Ring-fencing of capital and liquidity, non-recognition of foreign firms, restrictions on activities and extra territorial rules are just some examples of what can happen. Such action minimises the risk of international crises. But the cost is the rolling back of financial globalisation with less effective and efficient intermediation of global savings. So without mutual trust, the danger is either slipping back into weak regulation and supervision and regulatory arbitrage risking further crises or fragmentation of the international financial sector – a rolling back of financial globalisation that will damage global growth. Mutual trust will not be easily achieved. It will require more than hope and faith in our fellow man. Perhaps one day it can be founded on international law and treaty. Until then, however, it has to be built on the institutions and machinery established by those initial G20 meetings in Washington, London and Pittsburgh in 2008 and 2009. And in particular, on the work by the Financial Stability Board and the IMF. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  The Financial Stability Board has already established peer review mechanisms to assess implementation in its members.
Finally, there was an emerging recognition of the potential for conflict between the central bank’s necessary concern with systemic financial stability (you cannot hope to deliver monetary stability if the financial system is crashing about your ears, while monetary stability is itself a primary condition for financial stability) and consumer or depositor protection, which if carried too far can itself undermine the strength of the financial system. These profound changes in underlying philosophy - which, as I say, spread across much of the political spectrum - were in our case fundamentally important in opening the way to a more clearly defined and distinctive role for the Bank of England and a necessary condition, in my view, for the delegation by the Government to the Bank of greater independent, technical, responsibility. Even so, although those changes were a necessary condition, they were not in themselves sufficient, and greater independence did not come all at once. As often happens, sadly, a big step forward came after a major setback. In 1992 after we had been driven unceremoniously out of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (following the boom and bust of the late 1980s / early 1990s), the Government of the day adopted an explicit inflation target as the nominal anchor for monetary policy. Interest rate decisions in pursuit of that target remained with the Chancellor of the Exchequer after consultation with myself as Governor and my senior monetary policy experts at the Bank. But the really novel feature of the new arrangements was their transparency.