Figure 2 Changes in financial markets since December 2019 MP Report US dollar parities (1) (2)  Nominal 10-year rates (1)  (percent)  (basis points)  Russia  23.6  South Africa  23.3  Brazil  23.2  Mexico  21.6  Colombia  15.7  Ind onesia  15.7  Norway  15.1  Turkey  14.5  Australia  10.5  Hungary  8.4  N. Zealand  8.1  Canada  6.4  Poland  6.1  Chile  6.1  Ind ia  5.2  Sweden  5.2  Singapore  4.3  U.K.  4.2  Korea  3.5  Peru  1.5  China  0.9  Euro area  0.3  Denmark  South Africa Peru Colombia Brazil Ind onesia Hungary Russia Chile Portugal Poland Mexico Italy Spain Greece Japan Korea -13 Sweden -20 Euro area -21 Ind ia -28 Australia -31 N. Zealand -32 U.K. -40 China -51 Norway -52 Singapore -53 Canada -77 U.S. -109  0.2  Japan  -1.1  U.S. (3)  -4.6 -20  0  Stock markets (1)  20  40  -200  -100  (percent) 240 182 180 169  77 48 42 34 27 18 17 13 12 11 6  0  100  200  300  China N. Zealand Malaysia U.S. Russia Korea South Africa Japan Mexico Portugal Norway Canada U.K. Euro area Germany Australia Italy Hungary Chile Spain Ind onesia Poland Colombia Peru Ind ia Brazil Greece  -4.5 -14.5 -15.4 -15.6 -16.7 -17.9 -18.2 -18.9 -19.6 -21.7 -22.2 -23.2 -23.6 -23.7 -24.3 -24.5 -25.8 -26.3 -26.3 -27.3 -28.0 -28.2 -29.4 -30.6 -31.1 -31.5 -37.4 -60  -40  -20  0  20  (1) Green bars stand for emerging economies; orange bars for Latin America; blue bars for developed.
The tide will turn  An orderly reversal of the euro’s exchange rate will take place as a result of a triple narrowing. •  Narrowing of the growth differential between the United States and the euro area. This is because the current extraordinary growth rate of the United States is probably not sustainable in view of the widening of the external deficit. Euro area growth is well balanced, while the US economy is affected by imbalances. This will be progressively taken into account by the markets. •  A narrowing of the interest-rate differential as a consequence of the narrowing of the growth differential. •  Narrowing of the “restructuring differential” between the United States and the euro area economies. It seems to us that although corporate restructuring in Europe was lagging behind the United States a few years ago, we are now observing a catching-up process. This leads me to my last point: the undertaking (and speeding up) of structural reforms is a major condition for the euro to be a complete success. 4. The conditions for the complete success of the euro: sound macroeconomic policies and structural reforms  In this regard, the Lisbon European Council meeting last month can be viewed as a further important step towards the necessary medium-term strategy for structural reforms in the Union. The labour market has become much more flexible in the past few years in Europe.