Page 7 sur 8  The impacts of the climate transition could last throughout the decarbonisation of our economy. If we looked through it, we would overburden fiscal policy in cushioning these shocks. 3. Market alignment >>> signalling through Central Banks’ operations - Third, appropriate market incentives are necessary. This is where carbon pricing is needed, as I mentioned earlier, to align firms’ behaviour and private financing, but also (and maybe primarily) a fair pricing of climate risk on financial markets. This is where central bank operations and their greening have a key role to play, giving the right market signals and inducing changes. With Christine Lagarde, we at the ECB are already implementing a greening of our corporate sector purchase programme, as well as adapting our collateral framework. 4. Funding green investments >>> solvable through blended finance - Last but not least, if these conditions are met, the question as to how to finance investments is solvable. Different estimates have been computed, and their amounts may look impressive especially when presented in gross and absolute terms, for instance around EUR 500 billion per year in the EU until 2050. viii. However, when you consider net and relative financing needs, which represent between 2% and 3% of current GDP be it for the EU or France ix  Page 8 sur 8 according to the reports quoted, this turns out to be manageable.
Employment has also risen somewhat since the start of the year, and if economic activity strengthens as we are expecting, the demand for labour will rise. Then unemployment will fall and the employment rate, that is, employed as a percentage of the population, will attain roughly the same level as before the financial crisis. When the labour market situation improves, we will also see gradually higher wage increases. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Even if the situation is currently uncertain, we thus see signs that economic activity will gradually strengthen, both in Sweden and abroad, and thus companies will have greater scope to raise their prices. However, we believe that one condition for growth, employment and inflation to rise in accordance with the forecasts is that we continue to hold the repo rate at a very low level. This forecast for the repo rate – what we call the repo-rate path – is, however, a highly uncertain forecast, at least with regard to the end of the forecast period. This relates to something as self-evident as the fact that we live in a world full of uncertainty, not least with regard to the preconditions for monetary policy – for example, developments abroad, inflationary pressures, the level of unutilised resources in the economy and coming measures in the field of economic policy. Here there are many factors contributing to making our forecasts uncertain and our repo-rate decisions difficult, and I shall touch on some of these problems.