In formal terms, the General Council may only severe a member of the Executive Board from his or her appointment if “…he no longer meets the requirements which are made on him to be able to carry out his duties or if he has been guilty of serious misconduct.” 2 The legislation strengthens the Riksbank’s independence and credibility for monetary policy. For example, it should not be possible for those in power to be able to groundlessly dismiss a member of the Executive Board for the purpose of appointing their “own” decision-makers. As the question of accountability is stated in law, it is not actually the Riksbank’s task to take a stand on how this should be achieved. However, what we can do – and also strive for – is to create the best possible conditions for accountability. We do this by being as open and clear as we can. This makes it easier for outsiders to critically examine how monetary policy is conducted and how well we live up to our principles. 1  Sveriges Riksbank Act (1983:1385), Chapter 8, Article 1. 2  The Instrument of Government, Chapter 9, Article 13. 4  BIS Review 62/2007  There are also certain formal requirements for providing information to our principal. Our tasks include, for instance, presenting a written report on monetary policy to the Riksdag Committee on Finance at least twice a year. In connection with this, the Committee also holds a hearing with the Riksbank Governor.
They indicate that Swedish companies can compete in the global marketplace, but their operations are such that they do not require very much labour, at least not in Sweden. Different assessments have been made of how large a percentage of total unemployment is cyclical and in turn how much of this cyclical unemployment can be affected by monetary policy. The serious assessment attempts that I have seen usually end up with only a small fraction, according to some estimates only one or a few tenths of a percentage points, of total unemployment being affected by monetary policy. Those are calculations that are highly uncertain and should be taken with a large pinch of salt. However my point is that it is a gross exaggeration when, in the present debate, the Riksbank’s decision to lower or not lower the interest rate is presented as having momentous consequences for unemployment in Sweden. This kind of claim is not compatible with any serious assessments or forecasts. 2  BIS Review 41/2005  On the whole, the reason for the problems in the labour market is not poor demand – on the contrary, lending is growing at a rapid pace and companies have ample liquidity – but these problems are rather related to structural factors.