This compares with a 1.5 percent year-over-year rate for the PCE deflator and 1.4 percent rate for the core PCE deflator, which excludes food and energy prices. Low and falling inflation is a problem for several reasons. First, low and declining inflation makes it harder to accomplish needed balance sheet adjustments. That is because, all other things being equal, lower inflation means slower nominal income growth. Slower nominal income growth, in turn, means that less of the needed adjustment in household debt-toincome ratios will come from rising incomes. This puts more of the adjustment burden on paying down debt. 1  Chairman Ben S. Bernanke, Addendum: Addressing the Financing Needs of Small Businesses, Monetary Policy Report to Congress, July 21, 2010. 4  BIS Review 127/2010  Second, and even more importantly, low and falling inflation can cause inflation expectations to decline. This is important because inflation expectations are an important factor that influences actual future inflation. Moreover, when inflation expectations decline, the expected real cost of credit increases – a subject I will return to in a moment. So what could the Federal Reserve do? As I see it, there are two potentially complementary avenues. First, we could take steps to make our current highly accommodative stance of monetary policy more effective in stimulating economic activity by providing additional guidance about what we are trying to achieve today and in the future. Second, we could find ways to increase the amount of stimulus we currently provide via our balance sheet.
In addition, lower long-term rates would reduce the cost of capital for businesses, thereby fostering higher levels of capital spending for any given economic outlook. In considering the limits to balance sheet expansion, there are two constraints – one major and one more minor. The first constraint is the risk that the balance sheet expansion might cause inflation expectations to become unanchored, leading to higher risk premia. This risk is presumably greater in a period in which budget deficits are high, as they are today. 6  BIS Review 127/2010  If exit concerns were to rise as purchases increased, then a rise in inflation risk premia would offset at least some of the expected fall in interest rates. In contrast, the more credible the ultimate exit strategy, the less likely it is that inflation risk premia would go up and the more effective purchases would be in lowering long-term rates. Also, the more credible the ultimate exit plan, the more confident investors would be about the Fed’s willingness to do what is needed to accomplish its objectives. This is important because it would help stabilize longerrun inflation expectations at levels consistent with the dual mandate. The FOMC should be able to assure investors that it has both the means and the will to exit when – but not before – the time is right. That is because the Federal Reserve has the tools to control financial conditions and credit creation even with an expanded balance sheet.