In this context, despite high volatility of consumer prices and exchange rates in trading partners, including the sharp decline in oil prices in the second half of 2008 (one of the main fundamentals in Algeria’s economy), the REER has remained near its equilibrium level and the external financial position remains comfortable. 4  BIS Review 168/2009
Political processes are often protracted, but once a decision has been taken, results should be rapidly visible. to be available as soon as possible. By contrast, central bankers are able to take decisions very quickly, but the results of these decisions – whether good or bad – may not be evident until years later. It is precisely because this lag is often so long that the credibility of central bankers is essential. If central bankers are credible, economic entities will trust them. As a result, monetary policy is more effective. For instance, if inflation rises due to increasing commodity prices, employees will not immediately ask for higher wages because they are confident that the increase in inflation is only temporary. Thus independence is a necessary prerequisite for a central bank, in order to develop the credibility it requires for carrying out monetary policy. Mind you, independence is a necessary – but not a sufficient – prerequisite for successful monetary policy. Central bank independence in monetary policy is not a specifically Swiss achievement. In many countries it has helped to firmly establish inflation expectations in the long term. Consequently, monetary policy can react to shocks in the short-term, when necessary. However, with a view to certain characteristics of the Swiss economy, the independence of the SNB appears particularly valuable. Allow me to explain this briefly, using our experiences during the financial crisis as my example. When the extreme shock of the great financial crisis occurred in 2008–09, monetary policy was in a position to act rapidly.