06  07  08  Sources: The NIER, Statistics Sweden and the Riksban  Figure 8. Repo rate with uncertainty bands Per cent, quarterly averages  7  7  90% 75% 50% Outcome  6  6  5  5  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1  0 Jun-02  0 Jun-03  Jun-04  Jun-05  Jun-06  Jun-07  Jun-08  Jun-09  Jun-10  Source: The Riksbank  BIS Review 111/2007  9  Figure 9. Expectations of the repo rate according to implied forward rates Per cent  8  8  Repo rate Implied forward rates  7  7  6  6  5  5  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1 0  0 99  00  01  02  03  04  05  06  07  08  09  10  11  12  Source: The Riksbank  Figure 10.
The reasons for this could be a combination of unclear communication on our part and a willingness among some market agents to read too much into what was actually said. The more our new policy of not signalling between monetary policy meetings becomes established, the better the communication will work. We Executive Board members will of course assess new information continuously and have instantaneous opinions on where we are heading. All those who make forecasts know that one’s opinion of how the future will look like varies over time. But one day one must put one's foot down. It is mainly the result of this sometimes convoluted process that is the interesting factor, although the journey also has some information value. For us Executive Board members each monetary policy meeting is the final point of one such process and it is not until then that we make our collective assessment. Thank you! BIS Review 111/2007  5  Figure 1. Labour market had tightened Per cent of labour force  12  12 Open unemployment Total unemployment  10  10  8  8  6  6  4  4  2  2  0  0 00  01  02  03  04  05  06  07  08  09  10  Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  Note. The broken line refers to the Riksbank’s forecast in MPR 2007:2. Figure 2.