The talks between the interested parties themselves and with the Fund did not however prosper. Accordingly, the Banco de España took action to avoid a crisis of confidence in CCM and market convulsion. On this point I should like to draw your attention to the reasons for adopting this decision with such urgency. Article 31 of the Law on the Discipline and Intervention of Credit Institutions authorises the Banco de España to take control of a credit institution or to resolve to replace provisionally its governing and management bodies when there is a situation endangering its own funds or its stability, solvency or liquidity. Since the directors of CCM had been unable to find a solution to prevent the problems worsening, it did not seem reasonable to delay the use of the precautionary measures provided for in the Law on the Discipline and Intervention of Credit Institutions in order to seek other solutions. Further, once the prospect of a merger had fallen through, there was an evident risk that, once the financial markets opened on Monday, 30 March, CCM would be subject to a crisis of confidence on the bond markets and further withdrawals of deposits from its branch network that could prompt a liquidity collapse. The delicate situation of CCM required the immediate activation by the Banco de España of the precautionary measure provided for in the rules governing the replacement of the Board and the appointment of new managers.
This very significant advance in terms of financial regulation should not obscure the progress that still needs to be made regarding the work underway, especially in the areas of market infrastructures (including for commodity markets), tighter regulation of activities included under the designation the “shadow banking system” and the behaviour of market players themselves. Once again, I underscore our collective responsibility, which is to ensure that all of the G-20 countries and, more widely, the international community as a whole apply international standards. Today’s discussions will be divided into four sessions. The first, chaired by Axel Weber, will examine the notion of disequilibrium after the crisis and will allow us to discuss the unpredictable evolution of global imbalances in the medium term, in the light of different assumptions concerning economic growth and savings trends in the different zones. Mario Draghi has agreed to chair the second session that will focus on questions related to supervision and coordination. As I have already said, the current context is characterised by the reform of global governance and regulation, a process given impetus by the G-20. Therefore, at this stage, it seems appropriate to explore topics such as the evolution of the role of international financial institutions and the accomplishments and future progress in harmonising global financial regulations. The third session, chaired by Michel Camdessus, should help us to gain further insight on what could, or should, be the role of central banks in a post-crisis environment.