The IMFC Deputies group could also be strengthened by convening also in between the annual and the spring meetings. It is important that all  4  BIS Review 43/2005  countries participate at a high level (today, many countries participate with their Executive Directors). One likely reason that the BIS functions more smoothly, a part from the fact the issues discussed are of a less political nature, is that those who take the decisions on the domestic front are the same people that meet in Basel. 6. Overhaul the IMF's internal organisation. As multilateral surveillance becomes more important, the country departments should work (even) closer with the departments that possess knowledge of institutions and institution building. It is also reasonable that the IMF’s current resource base, which primarily consists of economists, be broadened with people that have a financial background and practical experience of policy work and institution building in their own countries. Concluding remarks To sum up: •  The IMF’s overall objective is still valid;  •  The IMF’s instruments for reaching this objective – surveillance, lending and technical assistance – are, in general, functional and effective, in theory;  •  In practice, however, many of the IMF’s member countries do not allow the Fund to play the role that it could have. The IMF has untapped potential, not least in the area of surveillance;  •  The untapped potential is closely related to political issues.
The problems are not a consequence of shortcomings in the borrowing instruments. I do not see any immediate need for new types of lending instruments, such as non-borrowing programs or a reintroduction of Contingency Credit Lines. There are already surveillance methods in place to deal with such situations, and today's borrowing instruments are sufficiently flexible to meet the existing requirements (and demand). Nor do I believe that the problems to any great extent are due to incorrect analysis or erroneous assessments, even though the situations faced by the Fund are often difficult and the advice given has been open to question from time to time. Nonetheless, there are a number of things that can be done in this area. Shortcomings still exist, as I mentioned earlier, as regards the Fund's participation in crisis resolution. There is scope for further development of those instruments that exist today. The reason why this has not happened is because some countries oppose it for political reasons. This brings me into the role that “political considerations” play for the IMF to work well. In my view, the central problems of the IMF are often political in nature. These problems exist at several different levels: •  Individual countries are sometimes for political reasons not willing to take the sometimes bitter medicine prescribed by the IMF’s staff and Executive Board and engage in serious dialogue.