In particular, it is important that the measures are first and foremost designed to correct false incentives and to guide them in the right direction so that, first, unprofitable financial institutions leave the market of their own accord and, second, potential losses are borne by these institutions themselves, and not by the state. Consequently, in my opinion, measures such as a ban on proprietary trading or the introduction of a narrow banking system, that intervene too strongly in banks’ business models, are not very suitable. Such measures neither target the objective nor are they in line with the basic principles of the market economy. With regard to the TBTF issue, this principle has prompted the committee of experts appointed by the Swiss Government to draw up proposals including the creation of incentives for banks to become less systemically important overall, thereby reducing potential costs for the economy. At the same time, the committee of experts’ proposal will allow for improved resolution in the event that insolvency appears imminent, and this will significantly alleviate the TBTF problem. Are the measures “structural”? A second criterion is that the measures should not just address the specific circumstances of the most recent crisis. In other words, fighting the last war will not win the next one. At the same time, the lessons of history show us that certain basic mechanisms repeat themselves in every crisis. Consequently, it is very important that we recognise these general patterns and include them in regulatory considerations in order to improve our crisis prevention.
This prevention is geared to establishing instruments whose effects are as broad-based as possible, in other words, instruments that are independent of the specific causes that lead to crises. One general pattern in financial crises is that market and investor confidence plays a central role. 2 In general, when a bubble is being formed, soaring price trends are initially explained in “rational” terms. In the recent crisis, for instance, developments in the US housing markets were, for a long time, regarded as a logical and unproblematic consequence of state support measures or of innovation in the form of new financial products, as well as the constant inflow of capital from Asia. 3 However, when the first symptoms of a crisis become evident, the focus moves directly to other aspects. Which market participants are exposed? How heavily are they exposed? How can one’s own assets be safeguarded in the best possible way? The irrational optimism of the previous period is followed by a rapid loss of confidence and then by a flight to security. A broad-based loss of confidence of this kind can sometimes result in serious liquidity problems, even for fundamentally well-backed banks, thereby triggering far-reaching second-round effects. 4  2  Cf. Akerlof/Shiller (2008): Animal Spirits. 3  Cf. Reinhard/Rogoff (2008): Is the 2007 U.S. Sub-Prime Financial Crisis So Different? An International Historical Comparison. 4  Cf. Acharya et al (2009): Manufacturing Tail Risk. A Perspective on the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009.