Therefore, I would like to insist that a new European approach to smaller institutions is paramount. Now, having regard to the European nature of supervision and resolution, the Eurozone should move swiftly to sort out this unlevelled playing field. And, let me be clear on this, I would urge consistency in finalising the Banking Union, covering EDIS and smaller institutions. The disconnection between truly pan-European supervision and what still is, largely, a national burden is untenable. Finally, the coronavirus has, as I mentioned, fundamentally changed our lives within a short period. The current situation reveals our limited ability to deal with systemic risks. The pandemic will inevitably trigger widespread economic problems, and the health of the financial system will unavoidably be affected. The reforms made during the past decade seem to have increased the resilience of the financial system, which, helped by other 2  policies given the size of the shock, has continued to provide financing to the real economy. Obviously, lessons will emerge. This kind of shock is to some extent new, as it has not been generated by the financial system itself, and that will help us improve regulation. In this respect, several academics think that the current resolution framework is not wellequipped to deal with systemic crisis. And several elements could be adjusted in order to make resolution more efficient in these very specific circumstances.
In particular, the use of resolution tools like the bail-in when financial markets are in distress could exacerbate those turbulences and reduce the ability of other banks to obtain external financial resources. Or, in the case of the sale of the business, it could create a problem of fire sales that may additionally reduce the prices of the assets, generating losses for the rest of the institutions. In these circumstances, there should be a powerful, usable and credible backstop that could be activated even preemptively. The stability of the financial system and the potential for systemic risks to alter the functioning of that system have long been important topics for central banks, and I would like to encourage some additional consideration to this broader approach. Some episodes, including the Spanish experience during the Great Financial Crisis, suggest that the propagation of shocks is especially relevant for mid-sized entities and that the swift and orderly resolution of the problems is the vaccine against contagion. So, allow me to finish my presentation where I started: the current crisis management framework has been crucial in advancing the Banking Union and it has proven most useful in resolving very relevant events. However, the experience allows us to draw lessons that should be incorporated into the framework to contribute more effectively to maintaining financial stability and to ensuring the functioning of the Banking Union.