This reform includes a strengthening of the corrective arm of the Stability and Growth Pact, with the setting of a ceiling on public spending and the introduction of greater coordination in countries’ budgetary processes. In the corrective arm, greater significance is accorded to the debt criterion and the sanctions system has been reinforced. Members are obliged to reform national fiscal frameworks and set up independent fiscal authorities, which must conduct public assessments regarding the implementation of national budgetary rules. Overall, the reform echoes the latest economic literature, which stresses that it is the design and not only the mere existence of fiscal rules that has a bearing on their effectiveness. However, the new framework of governance is now more complex and the room for discretionality in its application remains ample. Its effectiveness will thus depend on such application being strict. Full article available in Spanish: https://www.funcas.es/Publicaciones/Sumario.aspx?IdRef=1-01141 For more information on the reform of the economic governance in the Economic and Monetary Union see Caballero, García Perea, Gordo (2011) available in Spanish: https://www.bde.es/f/webbde/SES/Secciones/Publicaciones/InformesBoletinesRevistas/BoletinEconomico/11/Ene/Fic h/art5.pdf 6/9  coupled with and complemented by an appropriate balance in overall economic policymaking. Actually, beyond accession criteria, this notion was also enshrined on an ongoing basis through the Stability and Growth Pact and, later on, with the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure.
Yet allow me to emphasise that, in parallel, central banks have strengthened transparency by providing the general public with extensive information about the rationale behind these monetary policy measures within our existing mandates. In particular, in the case of the Governing Council of the ECB, the accounts of our monetary policy meetings are published and the President and Vice-president hold a joint press conference with a Q&A session after each decision. In addition, members of the Governing Council routinely engage in public events and deliver speeches to explain our decisions and the rationale behind them. And, of course, the President of the ECB regularly participates in sessions with members of the European Parliament as do governors of national central banks in their corresponding parliaments. I deem it essential to persevere in this direction to reinforce the democratic accountability of the central bank. In communication with the public, central banks should carefully balance the need for clarity and the intrinsic complexity of monetary policy decisions. To strike the right balance it is worth noting that transparency does not mean providing certainties on intrinsically complex issues but clarity on the inevitable uncertainties and trade-offs that affect monetary policymaking. An added difficulty in the euro area is having to communicate to citizens from 19 different countries in which public opinion sometimes focuses more on national affairs than on European issues. On top of high transparency standards, we should explore additional tools that could contribute to reinforcing the legitimacy of an independent public institution.