This is also the case in Switzerland. To legitimise its independence, the lawmakers have deliberately given the SNB a narrow and clearly defined mandate. They also place upon the SNB the duty of accountability of the fulfilment of its mandate. Pursuing objectives that go beyond the core task of monetary policy would undermine the legitimacy of the SNB’s independence and thus endanger it over time. Focus on price stability The institutional framework of the SNB is in line with both of the principles of regulatory policy I have described, namely independence from politics and a focus on monetary policy. In recent years, time and again these principles have been consciously or unconsciously questioned by some in politics and among the public. This has seen calls from politicians for the SNB to directly finance government tasks. For example, a popular initiative launched this spring seeks to amend the Constitution to give the SNB a direct role in financing the national pension scheme. Before I delve into why the direct financing of government tasks by the SNB is not in keeping with the principles of regulatory policy, it is helpful to first contextualise the SNB’s profit development. For it is likely that the increase in these desires is tied above all to the growth of our balance sheet and our high profits in the past few years. These high profits have led to an increase in our so-called distribution reserve. At the end of 2021, it amounted to CHF 103 billion.
When this is carefully done the Riksbank – say some of the critics – can use the expected higher inflation (that we ourselves have created) as an argument for making the interest rate increases we have wanted to make all along. This type of criticism was common last autumn, for example, when the BIS Review 14/1998  -8-  Riksbank spoke in various connections about its inflation outlook and explained that interest rate increases might be necessary. I have the following answer to these criticisms. To begin with, the Riksbank’s focus on inflation developments is entirely natural. It is undoubtedly our task to show clearly the reasons for our decisions. Without a candid accounting of monetary policy from the Riksbank’s perspective it would be more difficult for the political decision-makers and the general public to evaluate monetary policy and our fulfilment of our objective. Think what type of debate we would have and how monetary policy would be seen if the Riksbank only made its decisions without commenting at all on the outlook for inflation and without giving reasons for its policies. Thus the need for the Riksbank to speak about inflation is obvious. Naturally it cannot be ruled out that in doing so it will influence households and businesses in their views on price developments, however our influence should not be exaggerated. The cause-and-effect relationship is rather the reverse: the Riksbank reacts to inflationary developments, which in turn are determined by a great number of decisions by businesses and households.