This indigenous population growth has been reinforced in recent years by the phenomenon of immigration, and has been an essential explanatory factor of our recent growth. In addition to the foregoing causes, which can be quantified, there are others that are more difficult to measure since they refer to qualitative aspects, but which are equally relevant. Thus, for instance, Spanish trade unions have progressively adopted a bargaining strategy more in keeping with the requirements stemming from Spanish euro area membership and with the challenges posed by globalisation, and that has been conducive to employment generation and the growth of the Spanish economy in recent years. 2  BIS Review 32/2007  Something similar may be said of the substantial continuity over time of the broad thrust of economic policy, irrespective of the different governments that have successively been in power. Such continuity has also impregnated the natural debate under democracy between the various policy options. Underpinning this debate has been a degree of agreement on the importance of stability-oriented macroeconomic (fiscal and monetary) policies and the microeconomic policies geared to improving the workings of markets. And this is not something that is found in all developed countries. Specifically, continuity in privatisation and market liberalisation policies, which has placed Spain in a leading position in continental Europe and has contributed significantly to the growth in the past 20 years, would not have been possible without this underlying agreement.
As a famous economist once said, monetary policy seems to operate with “long and variable” lags. More significantly, the MPC isn’t concerned solely with inflation. It is also asked to avoid “undesirable volatility in output”. And occasionally – in particular following shocks to costs or supply – there are trade-offs between the two. These can lengthen the optimal time over which to bring inflation back to target. I think this had real relevance at the time I joined the MPC, in mid-2011. At that time, the economy looked a bit like the starting point of these simulations. After a tepid recovery there was still plenty of spare capacity in the economy. Companies said they were operating well below capacity; unemployment was still high. But thanks to a series of cost shocks, including the big depreciation of sterling’s exchange rate 2-3 years earlier, inflation was nonetheless well above target. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  In response, the MPC might have behaved like Committee A, ramming up interest rates to get inflation back to 2% as quickly as possible. But that would almost certainly have pushed the economy back into recession. Instead it took a more balanced approach. As I tried to explain in a speech I gave later that year, the MPC had arguably tolerated the (then) high rate of inflation for longer than it might have done because the real side of the economy was so weak. It signalled this choice more explicitly in early 2013.