As the member responsible for monetary policy preparations, I am in a position to influence discussions and decisions, apart from those at Board meetings, mainly as chairman of the internal monetary policy group that is made up of leading members of the Bank’s competent departments. Matters on the monetary policy agenda are discussed by this group on a continuous basis. In the light of that discussion, at Board meetings I also present proposals about the direction of policy. However, all the members of the group attend Board meetings and are able to present their own views. The arrangements we have chosen for internal discussions and preparations build on experiences at other central banks. A proposal for the approach we have used since autumn 1999 was drafted by some of us after talks with colleagues at the Bank of England, the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve. There are some important differences, however. The officials who prepare the Board’s material are in a stronger position compared with other central banks. We ask them to produce a comprehensive assessment of inflation independently, whereas in the Bank of England, for instance, the counterpart to our Executive Board is involved in this work. And at neither the Bank of England nor the ECB are staff present at policy meetings. In other central banks, moreover, before the preparatory material is presented to the counterpart to our Executive Board, it has to be approved by the competent board member. So in all these respects our internal process is very open.
We have tried to avoid this, for instance by not arguing with each other in public. We have also refrained from evaluating colleagues’ arguments and proposals. Before choosing an approach to communication and transparency, we again tried to learn from other central banks. The main issue in the public debate seems to have been the minutes of our meetings. I believe the publication of minutes has advantages. The minutes provide a clear opening for the evaluation of what individual Board members contribute to the monetary policy discussion, besides facilitating the democratic control of and insight into our work. In my opinion, the arrangements we have chosen can promote a better understanding in society in general of the Riksbank’s policy and our deliberations. That is important not least in a small country where the discussion of stabilisation policy is not all that broad. 6  BIS Review 24/2001  Some conclusions Work on monetary policy has been arranged in ways that differ from country to country. This has to do with historical differences that stem from the society in which the policy is constructed. Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon countries require a greater degree of openness, for example, than countries in Central Europe. The duration and acceptance of low-inflation policies also play a part. A reluctance to change a winning concept was no doubt an important reason why the Bundesbank continued to adhere to money supply targets in its communication for so long even though academic studies showed that in practice its policy was being guided by inflation forecasts.