There is another important reason, particularly when several countries are involved. If one is to create a framework to manage crises, one will unavoidably face the question of how the 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  costs are to be divided, and it is almost, if not completely, impossible to agree on this in advance. All crises are different. It may be possible to agree on how to act when the problem arises, for instance, who should negotiate and how. One can thus decide on “ex ante preparations for ex post burden-sharing”, but not on “ex ante burden-sharing”. Given this, it is interesting to note that with regard to the ECB there is actually a crisis resolution mechanism in the form of an implied agreement on “ex ante burden-sharing”. It is written into the Treaty on European Union exactly how the national central banks should recapitalise the ECB if this were necessary. If the securities the ECB purchased were to fall in value so that the ECB needed more capital, it is thus clearly stipulated to what extent the different countries shall contribute. It may be because of this that some countries do not want to allow the ECB to buy government bonds, while others think it is an excellent idea. So, paradoxically, it may be the actual crisis resolution mechanism that in this case leads to a deadlock that risks aggravating the crisis. Crisis management mechanisms equally important in the banking system Let me now change focus from countries to banking systems.
Table 2 Economic growth and current account (annual change, percent) 2010  2011  2012  2013 (f)  GDP  5.8  5.9  5.6  4.5-5.5  4.0-5.0  Domestic demand Domestic demand (w/o inventory change) Gross fixed capital formation Total consumption Goods and services exports Goods and services imports  13.6 10.3 12.2 9.7 2.3 25.9  9.1 9.4 14.7 7.9 5.2 14.5  7.1 7.3 12.3 5.8 1.0 4.9  6.1 6.1 7.2 5.7 3.1 5.9  4.9 5.1 5.5 5.0 3.8 5.0  Current account (% of GDP)  1.5  -1.3  -3.5  -4.4  -4.7  Mar.13 Report  Jun.13 Report  (f) Forecast. Source: Central Bank of Chile. BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  Figure 4  CPI inflation (*) (annual change, percent)  CPIEFE inflation (*) (annual change, percent)  10  10  10  10  8  8  8  8  6  6  6  6  4  4  4  4  2  2  2  2  0  0  0  0  -2  -2  -2  -2  -4  -4  -4  -4  07  09  11  13  15  07  Mar.2013 Report  09  11  13  15  Jun.2013 Report  (*) Gray area, as from second quarter of 2013, shows forecast. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute (INE).