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52 For example, Dauth, Findeisen, Südekum and Woßner (2017). 53 IMF (2017). 49  13  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  13  technology than their positive longer-term effects on pay, productivity and the demand for new goods and jobs. It is the balance of these two effects, each large in gross terms, which will ultimately determine where unemployment will settle. 54  No one could say with confidence today the long-run net effect will be. What can be said with confidence is that the scale of gross displacement may be larger than ever-previously. This means that, if technological unemployment is to be avoided, positive effects on productivity, goods and jobs will also have to be commensurately larger. That has led some to argue that technological unemployment is more likely this time around. 55  Even if it is avoided, the societal costs of transition could well be larger, in terms of rising wage inequality, a falling labour share and damage to social cohesion. And if that recessionary impact of technological change on individuals and societies is sufficiently large, it could well call into question the merits of having pursued the creative course in the first place. Or that, at least, is the lesson of history. What experience since the Industrial Revolution has taught us is that this risk can be mitigated by an appropriate institutional response.