Transition risks – which stem from the adjustment to a low-carbon economy – are longer term and therefore less visible. To better assess these risks, we need to both measure exposures and perform forward-looking stress tests. We also need to develop the considerable opportunities associated with the financing of the transition to a low-carbon economy [Slide 5] – this involves finding close to USD 90 trillion by 2030 – while preventing the risk of greenwashing. A major work programme for the Central Banks and Supervisors Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS), which was launched by the Banque de France in December 2017 and now counts close to 40 members and entities 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  about to join. Conclusion To conclude and summarise my speech, the diversification of sources of financing holds the promise of improving the financial system’s ability to support innovation and sustainable economic growth, as long as this diversification is encouraged and its risks are well managed. Given this promise, the slow pace of change, the modest progress towards a capital markets union, the complexity of the challenges of digitalisation and green finance should encourage us to continue to act with determination, patience and perseverance. On the way, we can seek support and comfort in this quote by the former President of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Havel: “Hope is not the conviction that something will turn out well, but the certainty that something makes sense, regardless of how it turns out". Thank you for your attention.
In framing this question, I asked my team to identify the cascading elements of supervisory guidance, oversight requirements, compliance regimes, and maturity frameworks with which we must contend related to risk management and information security. Their list in reply included 17 elements, admittedly some of which are self-induced and at different states of maturity and implementation. All are well intended, all are well designed, and all seek to address different and meaningful dimensions of the control environment. At the same time, compliance across this waterfront has become a consuming pre-occupation, and arguably one that if we are not careful can intrude upon the more tangible actions, and commitments, to increase the resiliency of our infrastructures and enhance the security of our networks. Make no mistake: some form of risk management and control framework and corresponding policy and oversight guidance is absolutely essential to ensure a necessary discipline and accountability. This is not a call for a collective policy/supervisory/industry confab to craft a consolidated and harmonized uber-framework applicable to all parties in every circumstance— that would be as naïve as it is impractical. Indeed, the proliferation of frameworks can serve as a useful prism to ensure that no stone is left unturned in the development of an FMI’s resiliency and security regime. It is an appeal for awareness among standards bodies, supervisors, directors, and other organizational hierarchies that their individual actions, as rational and defensible as they may be, can have a suffocating effect in the aggregate.