The common objective of all these efforts is to identify possible measures for improving the safety, efficiency and integrity of the regional payment systems. 7.4 The most demanding factor, common to all, is the rapidly changing global payment system infrastructure that is challenging the existence of domestic and regional payment systems, which are lagging behind. Given the increasing sophistication of cross-border transactions, the need to mitigate risks involved in using outmoded infrastructure has to be given priority. The SAARC payment system development strategy should therefore be designed to cater not only to the region’s present needs, but also its future demands. 8. How does the SAARC Payments Initiative work? 8.1 Let me briefly set out the proposed institutional structure of the SAARC Payments Initiative. 8.2 By consensus, Hon. Governors of the SAARC central banks requested the Central Bank of Sri Lanka to take the lead in this effort. We are happy to be the catalyst and promoter, but hope that at an appropriate time, this Initiative will be driven by the other SAARC member central banks. In consultation with the SAARC Governors, we have already appointed a SAARC Payments Council (SPC), which is composed of the chairpersons of the National Payments Councils (NPCs) in each of the SAARC member countries or by senior officials appointed by the Governors of central banks in countries which do not have NPCs.
This has been justified by saying that it might cause more confusion than clarity about the grounds for the policy. That has not been the Riksbank’s experience. Our view of inflationary pressure in the Swedish economy is published on a quarterly basis. The clear presentation gives observers a chance of understanding and questioning our assessments. As new information becomes available, moreover, they are in a position to relate it to our earlier assessment and continuously form a fairly good picture of how interest rates are likely to move in the future. BIS Review 76/1999  2  The publication of our inflation assessments has also facilitated decisions in recent years to raise or lower interest rates. In that the grounds for our actions are clearer, there is less risk of our being accused of heeding extraneous considerations, a worry that featured in the European discussion last autumn. It is my belief, however, that the ECB will become more open about its economic assessments as it settles more comfortably into its forecasting process and inflation assessment. Another difference in transparency concerns access to discussions at the decision-making meetings. The ECB has chosen not to publish any minutes. An important argument for this policy - and one that I find understandable but debatable – is that minutes disclosing how individual members voted might occasion a greater element of national considerations.