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This approach clearly showed its limits during the financial crisis. The financial fragmentation of EMU during the financial crisis was partly a result of the initial choices concerning EMU’s institutional architecture – to be precise, its minimalist design which left economic and financial policies mostly at national level. This was maybe due to an overriding faith in the efficiency of financial markets that – even though not shared by all of EMU’s founding fathers – prevailed in Maastricht. It has to be acknowledged, however, that over the following years, financial market integration in EMU and at global level, accelerated at a speed that was hard to grasp in those early days after the creation of Monetary Union. The introduction of the single currency gave a major impetus to financial integration in the euro area. Financial integration was impressive in terms of quantitative indicators but it was not sustainable – it proved to be shallow and reversible. In fact, it even contributed to the rapid contagion in the early days of the crisis.1 We learned the hard way that a single currency requires a financial system that is sustainably integrated and, indeed, as single as possible. Much has been done to correct the initial design failures of EMU. Along with the introduction of the euro, the EU’s Financial Services Action Plan was launched to provide an overall framework for the integration of financial services in Europe.