I don’t know, and I do not have to know, national initiatives in a national context in this respect. On the central bank side we have sanctions at national but also at European level. You’re referring to the case of the Latvian bank ABLV... The Latvian subsidiary. I read in the media that the supervisory side of the ECB informed the 2/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  national authorities of what happened and suggested to them to use the tools they have at their disposal. Since the way the national tools were used is now the subject of a court case, I cannot comment further on it. Let the court decide. The national central bank for its part took its own measures. And they suspended the bank. The ECB did not suspend the whole group [from monetary policy operations] until later. The Banque centrale du Luxembourg (BCL) suspended the group before the ECB because they have the possibility to do so at national level. Would you have another example? There are some investment funds which ought to provide information and statistics to the national central bank, which then reports to us. But some funds don’t do it. We have asked the BCL several times to initiate sanctions because we consider that the local authority has clear knowledge of the matter. I think they are now ready to do it. I would not say centralisation is better per se. Sometimes proximity leads to higher efficiency.
Under the law, the New York Fed does not have the authority to provide what I would characterize as a “naked” guarantee – one that would be unsecured and not limited in amount, and would put the U.S. taxpayers at risk for the entirety of Lehman’s trading obligations. As Chairman Bernanke has observed, “the Federal Reserve has done, and will continue to do, everything possible within the limits of its authority to assist in restoring our nation to financial stability and economic prosperity….” 6 In this case, Lehman had no ability to pledge the amount of collateral required to satisfactorily secure a Fed guarantee, one large enough to credibly withstand a run by Lehman’s creditors and counterparties. As events subsequently played out, several weeks after Lehman weekend, on October 2, 2008, Congress passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA), which provides the U.S. Treasury Department with legal authority to issue a guarantee. 7 Again, the Federal Reserve did not then, and does not now, have such authority. Even if it had been legally possible, a Government guarantee would have also placed the taxpayer at enormous risk because it would have undermined deal certainty. It is important for the acquirer – and not a third party – to issue the guarantee because it gives the acquirer a strong incentive to close the deal and assume control of the target. For example, J.P. Morgan Chase, which proffered the guarantee needed to merge with Bear Stearns, negotiated a host of provisions from Bear Stearns that assured deal certainty.