In fact, non-residents only hold 29% of government securities which should include the Sukuk or MGII. Furthermore, most of the outflows by non-residents arise from the sale of short-term bonds associated with short-term views while investors of Malaysia’s long-term bonds have remained steadfast in their investment holdings. We also observe since October 2015 the non-resident portfolio flows has becomes positive. In 2015, as part of our effort to improve transparency, we have embarked on an initiative to gather statistics on the ultimate beneficiary owners of Malaysian bonds and sukuks to give the market a clearer picture on the types and behavior of investors in our market. Preliminary data showed that of the total non-resident holders of Malaysian debt securities, 70–80% were stable long-term investors while the remaining minority was short-term investors. We are now looking at measures on how we can enhance the disclosure requirements of our bond holdings to be even more transparent so that our financial market would be on par if not better than the best practices adopted by advanced markets. Over the years, we have liberalized the foreign exchange administrative rules to promote competitiveness and reduce cost of doing business, attract foreign investors and create business opportunities for our local players. Ringgit bonds were allowed to be traded freely offshore, with some restrictions placed on ringgit funding and FX derivatives markets to contain speculation, with the aim to ensure financial stability. An unintended consequence of this liberalization was the emergence of offshore transactions relating to Ringgit such as NDF and NDIRS.
Moreover, Iceland’s investment-grade credit ratings from Moody’s and S&P were preserved throughout the crisis. This is why the sovereign has been able to tap international capital markets twice so far since the crisis struck. You can see from this that the key characteristics of crisis management and bank resolution in Iceland were that shareholders lost all their equity, unsecured bond holders were bailed in, vital infrastructure elements of the domestic banking system were preserved, and deposits were given preference over other unsecured claims. Today this seems in many ways a standard approach, but it was not universally well received at the time. On the whole, these measures were successful, which mitigated the effect of the banks’ failure on the economy. The domestic payment system functioned more or less seamlessly throughout, and there was continuous access to deposits and basic banking services in  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Iceland. International payment flows were seriously affected, however, not least because of the freezing order imposed by the British authorities on Icelandic banks, but also because of general distrust among foreign counterparties. Let me now turn to the macroeconomic part of the story. I will paint with a rather broad brush here, both because time is limited and because the issues are somewhat better understood.