The difficulties that may arise, not only when reforming but also in opening the debate, may lead some to ask why, without reforms and, in particular, without modifying our labour market institutions, Spain won’t be able to grow as in the past. From what I’ve said already you can imagine my reply. It is possible that Spain may be able to grow as in the past, but it is highly unlikely. And I say that it is possible solely because, following the general failure of most of the forecasts that have been made during the current crisis, we should all be more humble when postulating about the future. Honestly, though, it is more difficult to imagine today how, without reforms, the Spanish economy can perform as favourably in the future as it has done  6  BIS Review 18/2009  in the last few decades. Moreover, what do we gain by refusing to learn from others about what can reduce the rate of unemployment and raise labour productivity and real wages? Even if our economy can grow again as it has in the past, with low productivity and with higher unemployment and lower wages than our neighbours, that would not seem to be preferable to the strategies for growth that they apply. Allow me one final consideration on an argument occasionally deployed, when there are no other arguments left, for not adopting structural measures.
Mr Trichet gives an address on the risks and challenges of the international financial scene Text of the Third Hong Kong Monetary Authority Distinguished Lecture delivered by Mr Jean-Claude Trichet, Governor of the Banque de France, the central bank of France, in Hong Kong on 8 July 1999. It is a great pleasure to be here in Hong Kong and I am greatly honoured to have been invited to deliver the Third Hong Kong Monetary Authority Distinguished Lecture. So I would like to thank you for giving me the opportunity to express my views on the challenges and opportunities of the international financial scene. The international financial scene has been faced with two major changes over the last quarters: í  the recurrence of financial crises, originating generally in emerging or transition economies, which has emphasised the need to reform the architecture of the international financial system;  í  the introduction of a new currency, the euro, which should contribute to a balanced international monetary system. FINANCIAL CRISES AND THE REFORM OF THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM Two major explanations of the recent financial crises have been put forward: í  one which can be called the “fundamentalist” view argues that Asia’s healthy macroeconomic indicators – low inflation, fiscal balance, low government debt, high rates of savings and investment – offered a misleading picture. This view points out that many Asian governments provided implicit guarantees to the banking sector, which often engaged in borrowing abroad and in reckless lending to unqualified borrowers.