Thus, today, the received wisdom is that central banks should follow clearly articulated policies aimed at a stable monetary environment. This in turn begs the question of how to define a stable monetary environment. BIS Review 135/1999  2  In Hong Kong, a highly open economy with no capital controls, we focus on stability of the exchange rate, but this regime itself requires a flexible economic structure and a sound banking sector. I believe that Hong Kong possesses those attributes, as demonstrated not least by the adjustment of the past two years, and that the peg remains the appropriate regime for us, but I would be the first to admit that it is may not suit others. From the point of view of investors, it is the stability and credibility of macroeconomic policy as a whole which probably determines, or ought to determine, investment strategy. As experience tells us, it can be a costly mistake to pay attention only to particular parts of the policy regime, such as the exchange rate, without scrutinising the wider context in order to be satisfied that the overall design is credible. And so it is my pleasure to help to launch this conference today, and to welcome those of you from outside Hong Kong. We pride ourselves in being a place which offers not only a wide choice of excellent conference facilities but also, more importantly, the critical mass of financial and ancillary services which issuers and investors require - and which many of you here today contribute to.
Markets expect quick, bold and “shock-and-awe” decisions on highly complex matters. They are exasperated that something can be agreed by leaders but take months to enter into force. Yet this is a necessary condition of operating in a system of 17 sovereign democracies. Decisions have to be explained, approval processes have to be followed, compromises have sometimes to be made. These dynamics were witnessed even in the US when Congress sent back the TARP in 2008. The net effect on the euro area, however, is that by the time decisions are eventually implemented the expectations of market have moved on. The impact of those decisions is then discounted. These market-democracy dialectics provide a second reason why a more integrated economic and financial union is so essential for EMU. The rationale for the original design of EMU – with centralised monetary policy, but decentralised economic policies – was linked to principles of subsidiarity and democratic accountability. This was consistent with the environment that prevailed 20 years ago. But these same principles now imply more Europe, not less. Subsidiarity is the principle that the centre should perform only those tasks which cannot be performed effectively at the national level. Can we really argue, in the current crisis, that the centre is not the more effective level to exercise, or at least coordinate, certain economic and financial policies? Democratic accountability is the principle that citizens should be able to hold their representatives responsible for decisions.