The first two ingredients provide efficiency in monetary policy, in the sense that private agents knowing the central bank’s assessments and reaction function can respond appropriately to economic developments. The third ingredient contributes to a better understanding of the objectives of monetary policy and the link between objectives and policy. This could underpin the credibility of the reaction pattern, and is also important for democratic accountability. In addition, the reaction function could change over time, for example due to a change in how the economy works or an improvement of the understanding of economic mechanisms. The criteria could then give some guidance to the public on how and why the reaction function might change. Let me briefly explain how Norges Bank communicates the three ingredients of our communication, and let me start with the forecasts. Chart 1 shows the forecasts of the key variables. The uncertainty bands are based on model simulations and reflect estimated variances of the different shocks. (Note that there is also a fan chart for historical values of the output gap, since there is also uncertainty about potential output in retrospect.) Communicating uncertainty through fan charts in the inflation reports was introduced by the Bank of England in 1997. While the fan charts for inflation illustrate that inflation cannot be controlled perfectly by the central bank, this argument does not apply for the policy interest rate.
This time round, the strong credit market from 2003 to 2005 have lulled investors into placing big bets in high-yielding structured credit instruments, on the assumption that such favourable credit conditions will continue unabated. The second point is on proper risk assessment. Back in 1997, lenders were providing funds without executing necessary scrutiny or appropriately balancing the risks against returns. Likewise, the recent credit turmoil has highlighted the importance of assessing risks. The  BIS Review 11/2008  1  distribution of risk through leveraged structured vehicles or conduits, and complexities in the structures have made it extremely difficult for investors to disaggregate the risks in times of stress and volatility. As a result, over-reliance has been placed on financial models and ratings without full comprehension of the risks of the product and misunderstanding the scope of the ratings that measures default risk. Third, excessive leverage in both crises has exacerbated the problems triggered by the mounting default rates. Excess liquidity led to massive domestic lending; at the same time, investors geared up aggressively and bet on continually rising asset prices as collateral. When the crisis broke, the use of leverage accentuated the losses, which led to widespread risk aversion and uncertain market sentiments. The loss of confidence along with the repricing of credit risk have intensified the volatility in the financial markets; and this contagion spread rapidly beyond the structured credit space and across markets. So what does all this mean for Asia?