Slide 22  FinTech enablers in Chile ▪  Last year, a bill was passed allowing for the issuance of prepaid cards by non-bank institutions o o o  The Law establishes integrity requirements for these issuers Restrictions on how the funds can be used Requires the Central Bank to issue regulations with the prudential requirements  ▪ The Central Bank took the opportunity to undertake a full revision of its retail payments regulation ▪ The new regulations not only set the prudential requirements o o  ▪  Narrows down the scope of regulated entities dealing with the processing of transactions Changes their capital requirements  These features give some ground for optimism on the potential contribution of FinTech not only to the democratization of financial services but also to price and financial stability and development in Chile  [SLIDE 22] These same factors have provided the basis for the most important step in the development of electronic retail payment services. Last year, a bill was passed allowing for the issuance of prepaid cards by non-bank institutions. Its objective is to foster financial inclusion and competition. Given the sensitive nature of deposit-taking, the Law establishes integrity requirements for these issuers, restrictions on how the funds can be used, and requires the Central Bank to issue regulations with the prudential requirements for this industry. 17  Central Bank of Chile 29 June, 2017  The Central Bank used this opportunity to undertake a full revision of its retail payments regulation.
The successful implementation of postpandemic measures, when the priority will be a return to economic and social normality as fast as possible, hinges on the extent to which macroeconomic stability is preserved. When I speak of independence I do not see the central bank secluded in an ivory tower, but working actively, and combatively, under the law, with the fiscal authority, with the government. Based on my experience, I do not think there is a better alternative to a balanced, coherent fiscal and monetary policy mix. And central bank independence implies accountability vis-à-vis the law, the mandate, the society. Or, in the words of 19th-century Romanian writer and politician Costache Negruzzi, the central bank needs to ‘stand accountant’ for what it does. By encroaching upon central bank independence, in favour of political decisions seeking shortterm electoral gains, the real costs will be borne from an economic and social perspective, in the long run, by the entire country. A recent study published by the European Central Bank, titled The Case for Central Bank Independence, shows that – while the de jure independence has largely remained intact – the de facto independence has deteriorated in almost half of the sample of central banks under review. This is a fact and, for me, it is a matter of concern. I shall not comment on it. Looking at central banking history that spans more than three centuries, I hope this is part of the long cycle of ups and downs in terms of central bank independence.