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But we are carefully monitoring inflation developments. If ever inflationary pressures should turn out to be long lasting, we would have the means and the willingness to anchor inflation at 2% in the medium term. III. Some reflections accordingly on our instruments This brings me to the last part of my talk, about the use of our instruments consistent with the new strategy and the inflation outlook. Some of our instruments were designed to be temporary and to respond to specific risks associated with the pandemic, such as the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP). The Governing Council will probably decide on the future of its monetary policy instruments in December. So we have significant time left to monitor economic and financial data; and one shouldn’t give too much credit to rumours and speculations floating at present, including on an allegedly earlier calendar of ECB rate hikes. However, I would like today to dispel some misperceptions about how our instruments might evolve and mention some of the lessons I tend to draw from our successful crisis management. 1. The transition out of temporary anti-crisis measures is not the end of our  accommodative monetary policy Let me start by recalling that the transition out of the PEPP itself is different from our other instruments because it is conditioned on the end of the coronavirus crisis rather than on the inflation outlook, which guides our other instruments.