So let me conclude by mentioning some other changes in fields where retailing is not directly involved. Other changes: Securities  BIS Review 41/1997  -6-  The countries in the euro area may, and should, denominate new sovereign issues in euro. A country wishing to convert its outstanding debt into euro will be allowed to do this, too. We can also pass national laws enabling, for instance, the Stockholm Stock Exchange, OM and the Securities Register Centre (VPC) to switch to euro right from 1999. Many institutions and agents are in favour of this. The above institutions as well as participants in the Swedish securities market, banks, financial institutions and others unanimously recommend a big-bang solution - a quick, concerted changeover from kronor to euro right from the beginning of 1999. With a single monetary policy and no exchange risk, the only factor behind interest rate differentials for sovereign securities will be the credit risk. The market for Swedish government paper will be more or less integrated with the euro market for government securities. Given a reasonably similar debt situation, government bonds issued by different countries can then be handled in a similar way. Banks. During 1996 the banks have worked on strategies and routines for changing over to euro. It has been agreed that during the changeover period banks, the postal giro, the bankgiro and the private giro will handle kronor as well as euro.
All those concerned must of course also solve any problems they encounter as a consequence of EMU. For the Riksbank, a highly important task in Sweden's preparations is information about and consultations with the financial sector on matters to do with the changeover. To this end we have formed a consultative group (SIFS) and five sub-groups to work on the practical preparations together with the financial sector. This collaboration has led us to conclude that the financial sector can cope with a changeover to euro on 1st January 1999. We also consider that in some respects joining later would make the preparations more difficult. The worst alternative would be a long period of uncertainty about our participation, what we usually call a "soft no". Costly double systems would then be required in several areas. We have also observed concern in the financial sector that staying outside the euro area would entail increased costs, competitive disadvantages and risk various forms of discrimination. "Wait-and-see" may be less attractive A common opinion at present seems to be that a soft no is not unlikely and would not involve appreciably higher economic costs than participation from the start. Deferring participation for some years would not exclude us from the euro area for good. In our cooperation with the financial sector, however, we have seen that uncertainty about participation is causing many financial agents to make preparations for handling euro as well as kronor.