But this technology means at the same time that bitcoin is very ineffective to use, as each payment requires large amounts of time and energy. Nor is there anything to limit the supply of copies of bitcoins in the form of other cryptocurrencies. So-called stablecoins are instead based on borrowing credibility from state money by promising full back-up in a state currency. 11 However, it is very difficult for a totally private currency to gain the same credibility as state money enjoys. What do all of these challenges and changes mean for us central banks? Well, we must also adapt our activities to the new environment. This is nothing new for an 9 This has also been done at EU level, for instance through the PSD2 legislation, which enables payment service  providers, which do not have their own deposit accounts, to offer payment solutions initiated from bank accounts. This increases the circle of companies that can offer payment products. 10 For further information on this, see the CPMI report “Non-banks in retail payments” (2014). 11 For more information on stablecoins, see Arner et al. (2020). 6 [35]  institution like the Riksbank, which has existed for more than 350 years. It is difficult to survive for so long without being able to adapt. But what is new this time is how quickly we may need to adapt.
This probably means that extensive bond purchases will play a larger role than before when we want to affect rate-setting in the economy and contribute to financial stability. It is therefore problematic that the Government’s proposal for a new Sveriges Riksbank Act suggests several restrictions to practical monetary policy. The Government’s proposal for a new Sveriges Riksbank Act is problematic Quite recently, the Government decided on a proposal for a new Sveriges Riksbank Act. The proposal is now with the Council on Legislation and later this year or next year the Riksdag will take a stance on the proposal. I note that a number of changes have been made with regard to the views expressed by the Riksbank in the consultation last year. This is good. However, I am still worried about the usability of the act in practice. This concerns above all an artificial division between our two core tasks of price stability and safeguarding the financial system. Our 23 [35]  tools for attaining these objectives are divided into two different chapters – despite this being a question of largely the same tools. This is problematic. It all comes down to how we use our balance sheet. Let me take an example from the financial crisis 2008-2009.