The effect of the interest rate differential on the krone has been amplified by developments in international capital markets. Part of the appreciation in 2002 may also be due to higher oil prices. In a highly uncertain situation and with fears of war in Iraq, the Norwegian krone, buoyed by a relatively high interest rate and oil wealth, may have been regarded as an attractive alternative. Investment in NOK may have been considered a good hedge against a downturn in the world economy as a result of fears of war and high oil prices. Since December last year, the interest rate differential between Norway and other countries has narrowed by  2  BIS Review 38/2003  about 3 percentage points. Since the beginning of 2003, the krone measured in terms of the trade-weighted exchange rate index (TWI) has depreciated by 11 per cent. At the beginning of the 1990s, the Norwegian economy was in a deep recession. Production was far below capacity. When growth in the economy picked up, capacity utilisation increased. The output gap shows the difference between actual GDP and the level indicated by trend growth - estimated at close to 2½ per cent in Norway. Around 1996, there was full capacity utilisation, and the output gap, as we normally measure it, closed. Subsequently, costs increased and prices for goods and services produced for the Norwegian market accelerated. The upturn peaked in 1997, with GDP growth approaching 5 per cent.
The arguments for establishing a committee for monetary policy and financial stability are weaker, in Norges Bank’s view, if the GPFG is separated from Norges Bank. Without responsibility for the GPFG, the Board’s range of responsibilities will be substantially reduced. In addition, dividing responsibility for central banking matters between the two bodies will pose challenges, particularly with regard to the division of work and reporting. The central bank’s core functions are closely intertwined and must be viewed as a whole, as experienced during the financial crisis. A solution where responsibility must be transferred from the board to the committee in critical situations, as proposed by the Commission, could give rise to a lack of clarity and conflicts of competence. An important point in this context is that in the implementation of the committee’s tasks, the Governor will not be responsible to the board, but will report directly to the Ministry of Finance on central banking matters. If the management of the GPFG is removed from the aegis of Norges Bank, the Bank’s function will be to exercise authority with regard to monetary policy, financial stability and the payment system. A board with broadly the same composition as at present would then function well. Combining responsibility for central banking matters and administrative matters in this board will place responsibility with the same body in both normal and crisis times. The consideration of central bank independence also points towards this solution.