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These reforms have enhanced the credibility and independence of public institutions and, in particular, the central bank’s role and independence. They were not guided by the wish and goal to join Europe, but rather to build a society similar to the European one. By achieving economic, political and social convergence in these countries, each of them hopes to become a worthy partner to the developed Europe, and adopt the euro as the final phase of this transformation process. From this viewpoint, the European integration process, European Commission and the euro became powerful external anchors for each SEE country. Current developments have diminished the anchoring role of the EU and the euro. Consequently, the European Commission and all European decision-making authorities should, in the future, pay greater attention to the characteristics of countries and regions aspiring to EU membership, and engage in closer cooperation with the respective national authorities. It is, however, important to emphasize an evident and indisputable fact to all of us: external factors cannot safeguard long-term stability if internal anchors are missing. The current situation in Europe shows that the integration process does not prove to be a sufficient anchor, be it both inside and outside the euro area, as long as the internal economic and political choices are not stable in the long run. This conclusion underlines the role and importance of internal anchors as warrantors for macro-financial stability and continuation of structural reforms that have brought our  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  economies to this point.