Capital account liberalisation led to entrust international financial markets with the “disciplining” function. When it became apparent that the discipline could often lead to abrupt capital flows reversal and crisis, the international community attempted to strengthen the IMF surveillance and develop its facilities so as to pre-empt such shocks and make them more manageable. That is, basically, where we are today. Everything must be done to ensure that IMF surveillance works. But, like any “disciplinary” approach, it meets with three essential difficulties: first, diverging interests between countries; second, enforcement problems (the IMF has naturally more leverage on countries that need its help than on others). Finally there is a perception of asymmetry in IMF surveillance; it may be compounded by a more fundamental and natural asymmetry between surplus and deficit countries, when it comes to implementing adjustment measures. And, some would say, there might also be a de facto asymmetry between reserve and non reserve currencies, although, as I shall mention later, the situation is more subtle. These difficulties were apparent during the last part of the 20th century. But what makes the “disciplinary” approach almost impracticable today are the changes that have occurred in the world at the turn of the 21st century. The world today stands in stark contrast with both the Bretton Woods era and the period that followed immediately:   The first – and most obvious – difference is the number of countries that are active participants to the system and have a stake in its functioning.
We have expected that the import pattern would gradually become more stable, but if the shift continues, the price-dampening effects of increased imports from low-cost countries in Asia and Central and Eastern Europe may persist longer than assumed. The change in China’s exchange rate regime in July, with a 2 per cent revaluation of the Chinese currency, may over time have an impact on price developments for imported consumer goods. The global economy Economic growth among trading partners appears to be somewhat lower this year than in 2004. In the years ahead, growth is expected to be relatively stable. The outlook for growth in different regions indicates that the imbalances in the global economy, with a large deficit in the US and large surpluses in a number of other countries, will persist. There are particularly large imbalances both in the US balance of trade and current account. Persistent trade deficits have pushed up US foreign debt to a high level. This is partly due to the federal budget deficit. Moreover, US households have a high level of consumption and a low level of saving. This may be related to a more rapid rise in the US population than in other OECD countries. This suggests in isolation that saving in the US is somewhat lower and investment somewhat higher, but the impact is now considerably greater than implied by demographic factors alone. The imbalances may persist, and may increase. International capital markets are deep and liquid with an ample supply of credit for US borrowers.