In the west, technological developments and a desire to reduce systemic risks have been drawing central banks like ourselves into greater involvement in payment and settlement services, especially in the provision of real-time gross settlement. No doubt the central banks in the transition economies will feel the same pressures before long. (v) Branch networks On the last of my five metrics of central bank functions - the size of the branch network (which I use as a convenient proxy for the extent of their involvement in straight banking activities and in note distribution) - the transition central banks occupy an intermediate position. The extensive branch networks of the monobanks went largely to the savings banks, and in some case they have been turned into commercial banks. The result has been surprisingly consistent across central and eastern Europe, with one branch remaining for every ½ - 1 million people (except for the Bank of Estonia which has no branches, a scrupulous qualification). Some of the new central banks are even now questioning, as we have done, whether they need branches - as distinct from regional agencies - at all. Following the setting up of a State Treasury, the Hungarian central bank has closed more than half its branches. Obviously the political structure and geography of the country is material. In the USA and Germany, the maintenance of a branch network reflects the federal structure of the state.
Legislation in 1942 followed the then German model, particularly in making the Bank of Japan subservient to the Ministry of Finance; and after the war, there was American influence. 1 Rosa Maria Lastra, “Central Banking and Banking Regulation”, LSE Financial Markets Group,  1996, page 285. BIS Review 33/1997  -3-  In Figures 1 and 2, I have attempted to capture some of the distinctions between these leading central banks. (Because I am concentrating on distinctions, I have omitted common tasks - such as the issuance of banknotes and acting as banker for government - which are carried out by virtually all central banks.) Figure 1 shows the UK’s “scores” in five areas, while Figure 2 adds in, by way of comparison, the other G5 countries. Mapping the distinctions is not an easy task. For instance, though in Germany a government office is responsible for banking supervision, it is central bank staff who undertake much of the day-to-day work of monitoring individual banks. In France, supervision is the responsibility of the Commission Bancaire, but its secretariat is effectively part of the Banque de France, and the Governor chairs it. And in Japan, the central bank closely monitors the large banks, though the responsibility for supervision formally rests with the finance ministry.