The second change is that we will now hold press conferences in connection with all of the monetary policy meetings, and not, as before, only when we have adjusted the interest rate. The motives for keeping the interest rate unchanged are just as important as the motives for adjusting it. Together with publishing our own interest rate forecasts, press conferences after each monetary policy meeting will provide better and more regular information on the considerations we make. Finally, we Executive Board members will normally avoid implying prior to a meeting what interest decision might be made there, what is known as signalling. And by this I mean signalling above the interest rate forecast, press releases and minutes of meetings that have earlier been published. The actual need for signalling has declined, not least with the publication of our own interest rate path. Our assessment is that it is enough to communicate our intentions clearly in connection with the seven monetary policy meetings held every year. Moreover, we publish our own interest rate forecasts in connection with three of these meetings, when a Monetary Policy Report is published. On the other four occasions we will report a qualitative assessment of how the most recently published interest rate forecast relates to the new information received. I would like to point out that the individual members of the Executive Board will continue to express their own opinions in public.
In formal terms, the General Council may only severe a member of the Executive Board from his or her appointment if “…he no longer meets the requirements which are made on him to be able to carry out his duties or if he has been guilty of serious misconduct.” 2 The legislation strengthens the Riksbank’s independence and credibility for monetary policy. For example, it should not be possible for those in power to be able to groundlessly dismiss a member of the Executive Board for the purpose of appointing their “own” decision-makers. As the question of accountability is stated in law, it is not actually the Riksbank’s task to take a stand on how this should be achieved. However, what we can do – and also strive for – is to create the best possible conditions for accountability. We do this by being as open and clear as we can. This makes it easier for outsiders to critically examine how monetary policy is conducted and how well we live up to our principles. 1  Sveriges Riksbank Act (1983:1385), Chapter 8, Article 1. 2  The Instrument of Government, Chapter 9, Article 13. 4  BIS Review 62/2007  There are also certain formal requirements for providing information to our principal. Our tasks include, for instance, presenting a written report on monetary policy to the Riksdag Committee on Finance at least twice a year. In connection with this, the Committee also holds a hearing with the Riksbank Governor.