Take up of the IMF’s liquidity lines has been disappointing in large part because of stigma. As a country with a sound balance sheet, but concerned about potential liquidity problems arising from spillovers from shocks in the rest of the globe, what signal does requesting liquidity support from the IMF convey? Some members of the IMF have resisted more widespread use of these liquidity facilities because of concerns about moral hazard. Is there a way to address both the stigma and moral hazard issues? 6. Lessons from central bank liquidity insurance  These are precisely the issues the Bank of England has had to deal with in the context of central bank liquidity insurance facilities. The Winters Review 10 conducted into the Bank’s published liquidity facilities highlighted the risk of these facilities becoming stigmatised – usage being taken as a signal of fundamental solvency problems. If that led banks to self-insure against extreme “tail” liquidity risks, that would be inefficient for the financial system as a whole. The Bank has reduced the stigma associated with its liquidity facilities by offering greater predictability of access on more favourable terms. This improved access to liquidity has been enabled by the fact that supervision is tougher on capital and liquidity requirements, banks undergo regular stress testing, and credible resolution tools (including ring fencing to protect depositors and bail-in to protect taxpayers) are being put in place. These reforms are recent and not yet fully tested under the most difficult circumstances.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  Charts and Tables Chart 1: Evolution of the global financial  Chart 2: Composition of IMF resources  safety net as a percentage of external liabilities (1980–2014) Per cent of global external Per cent of global external liabilities liabilities 14 3.5 Regional Financing Arrangments Swap Lines  12  3.0  IMF Temporary  10  2.5  IMF Permanent Self Insurance: FX Reserves (LHS)  8  2.0  6  1.5  4  1.0  2  0.5  0  1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012  0.0  Sources: IMF, central bank websites, RFAs, Lane and MilessiFeretti (2012) and Bank calculations. GAB – General Arrangements to Borrow NAB – New Arrangements to Borrow Source: IMF and Bank calculations. Chart 3: Regional FX over- and underinsurance (2014)(a)  Sum overinsurance  Sub-saharan Africa  Middle East and North Africa  Latin America  Central and Eastern Europe  Sum underinsurance  Asia  $ billion 1000 900 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0  Sources: IMF and Bank calculations. BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  (a) Degree of insurance is measured against the standard IMF metric. Chart 4: Access to regional financial arrangements bigger than 0.5% of regional GDP (2014)  Sources: National Sources, IMF and Bank calculations. 10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  References Brooke, M et al (2013) Sovereign default and state-contingent debt, Financial Stability Paper No. 27.