The drafting of the Report took into account several constraints, two of which I would like to mention. 3/14  On one hand, the obligation to maintain the confidentiality of individual banks’ data. The Report contains ample information on credit institutions, including intervention processes and the public aid granted, but it cannot go into details linked to the supervision of individual institutions whose confidentiality is legally protected, or assess those matters that are currently the subject of proceedings initiated in the courts. As to the period studied, although 2008 is the year the crisis started, the analysis is from 2000, on the understanding that it is impossible to explain the crisis without reviewing its sources and causes, which go back to the previous decade. Moreover, the year 2014 has been chosen as the date to close off the period considered, bearing in mind that it was the end of this year that saw the start-up of the Single Supervisory Mechanism, and that the measures envisaged in the Memorandum of Understanding entered into with the European Commission in July 2012 may be deemed to be concluded. In short, the seven years from 2008 to 2014 match quite closely the period which saw the emergence and development of the crisis, its treatment and the start of the recovery. The Report explains the measures applied, which should be considered in their macroeconomic and financial setting, one which progressively changed over the period in question.
Bandid Nijathaworn: Challenges for central banks in the new globalisation Remarks by Mr Bandid Nijathaworn, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the Bank of Thailand International Symposium 2010 “Challenges to Central Banks in the Era of the New Globalisation”, Bangkok, 15 October 2010. *  *  *  I think it is clear from the discussion we had that the post-crisis global economy will not be the same as the one we remember three or four years ago. The global financial crisis was serious, causing much dislocation to the global economy, the banking sector and financial markets, and the process of regaining full normality will take time. Therefore, at least for the next few years, the post-crisis global environment will be characterized by a world of two halves: the advanced economies and emerging markets, each exhibiting different growth prospects, different economic challenges, and different policy stance. And it is this divergence in policies and performance that will drive uncertainty and volatility in global financial markets, accompanied by shifts in risk appetite, global asset allocation, and relative prices. This, in essence, is the context in which new challenges for central banks are being shaped. What implications will this post-crisis environment have on central banks’ roles and responsibilities in maintaining economic stability? To me, three implications are clear. The first is the need for central banks to expand their mandates to formally recognize both price and financial stability as their core policy objectives.