The lenders expected that house prices would continue to rise, increasing the value of the collateral, an assumption which meant that the risk to the lenders was assessed as slight. The strong increase in the new forms of mortgages contributed to the overheating in the housing market. BIS Review 56/2009  1  Another factor that can also be assumed to have contributed to the housing market bubble in the United States is the US housing policy, which since the mid-1990s had become increasingly aimed at extending house ownership among households. For example, the semi-nationalised mortgage institutions Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae were to offer a particular share of their total lending to low-income families. This contributed to many households receiving loans despite having an uncertain ability to repay. The credit expansion that was seen in the United States can also be seen in a number of other countries. In autumn 2005 the housing market bubble in the United States burst and house prices began to fall. As the value of the households’ most important collateral fell, an increasing number of households could no longer renew their subprime loans at the same low interest rate. The lenders had tightened the credit terms. The interest rate shock that followed meant that an increasing number of households experienced problems in paying, which in turn pushed down house prices even further. This occurred as an increasing number of households and banks were forced to sell the houses at compulsory auctions at a lower price than before.
Without these measures we would probably have faced a financial meltdown. One sign that the crisis is no longer as acute is that what are known as TED spreads have fallen in Sweden, as well as the United States and the euro area. The TED spread is the difference between a three-month interbank rate and a three-month treasury bill rate. The spreads are now back at around the levels prevailing immediately prior to the worsening of the crisis in autumn 2008. But the financial markets are still functioning much less efficiently than normal. It is also still difficult for companies to finance themselves in the capital market. Moreover, the liquidity injection from the central banks does not solve the banks’ capital problems. For this reason it is not surprising that the international discussion is currently aimed more at solvency than liquidity. It would be very much appreciated if many countries could begin to distinguish bad banks from good ones in an effective and transparent manner. In Sweden, too, we have implemented a large number of unconventional measures to safeguard financial stability and mitigate the negative effects of the financial crisis. During the second half of 2008 the Riksbank increased its lending to the banks by more than SEK 450 billion. Almost SEK 200 billion of this was comprised of loans in US dollars. This has largely been financed by means of swap agreements with the Federal Reserve in the United States.