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As to the source, a possibility would be to create a process of periodic general allocation of SDRs, according to a predetermined schedule. Those SDRs, however, would not be immediately available for use by their beneficiaries. Rather, they would be “frozen” and unblocked only in pre – specified circumstances (Landau, 2009). Criteria for use would not be defined on the basis of individual countries’ situations, but on consideration of the conditions prevailing in the global economy and international capital markets. If properly constructed, such a scheme may provide, for no cost, the kind of insurance that countries are currently seeking by building excess reserves. How would countries access to this new source of liquidity? The traditional approach would allocate contingent liquidity to countries according to their quota shares in the IMF. However, those are very imperfect representations of countries’ liquidity needs especially in times of crisis. Taking inspiration from the contingent capital literature, one could imagine that countries could “buy” the access to contingent liquidity in crisis times by paying, in normal times, a premium to the issuer (the IMF?). This could prove less costly than accumulating excess reserves. Going one step further, and transposing an idea from Caballero and Kurlat (2009), the IMF could issue tradable instruments giving access to contingent liquidity once it  6  BIS Review 120/2010  has been activated. If broadly traded between public entities, the price of such instruments would give a useful indication of underlying systemic tensions in international financial markets.