The problems and challenges that the new member states will face are not any different from those that are faced by the “old” member states, such as implementing the new Basle Capital Accord, implementing the IAS, increasing cross-border cooperation, monitoring activities of large complex financial groups, evaluating new complicated financial products, understanding risk transfer among different financial institutions. The transition will greatly benefit from the hard work that has been done during the economic transition and during the preparatory stages for the EU accession. It will be smooth and I do not expect any disruption of financial service in the new member states, or in the EU as a whole. It could be said that the financial sector is already in the European Union. Useful links • pavel.racocha@cnb.cz • www.cnb.cz Czech National Bank • www.nbp.pl Polish National Bank • www.nbs.sk Slovak National Bank • www.mnb.hu Hungarian National Bank • www.bis.org links to other national banks  26  10  BIS Review 53/2003
Paul Tucker: Developing an EU cross-border crisis management framework Remarks by Mr Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor for Financial Stability at the Bank of England, at the Eurofi Financial Forum, Brussels, 30 September 2010. *  *  *  Thank you very much for inviting me to join you here today. It is terrific that the EU, and the Commission in particular, have been taking resolution really seriously as part of the programme for reforming the financial system. This is a domestic issue, an EU-wide issue, and a global issue. In introducing this session of the conference I’ve got five points, and I’m going to try to be quite crisp on those five points once I have made an introductory comment about resolution regimes in general. It may be helpful to say a few words about what resolution is. Resolution is what happens when we are in the “last chance saloon”. That is to say when supervision, however enhanced, has not prevented distress. When higher capital and liquidity requirements have proved insufficient. When any Cocos or other instruments have been converted or written down but have proved insufficient to absorb the distressed firm’s losses, and so the institution is still teetering on the edge of failure. That is we are talking about the point at which all the usual remedies have been exhausted, and the authorities face a desperate choice between taxpayer bailout or chaotic liquidation unless special resolution tools are available. All those other, essential measures are about reducing the probability of distress.