With my assessment of the GDP gap, the repo rate according to the Taylor rule would instead have been around 6 per cent in the third quarter of 2008, but still considerably higher than the 4.75 per cent it reached before the crisis (see Figure 10). When I look back on the monetary policy conducted since I joined the Riksbank on 1 January 2006 up to the point when the financial crisis hit Sweden in September 2008, I therefore believe that monetary policy was too expansionary in the years preceding the crisis. Inflation increased and reached a level that was tangibly higher than the inflation target, Resource utilisation was higher than normal and there was a rapid expansion of credit. Despite this, the repo rate was lower than normal for most of the period leading up to the crisis. A more rapid increase of the repo rate would thus have been better. There are also two other circumstances that I for my own part believe were unfortunate. The first is that I did not enter a reservation in April 2006 when the Executive Board decided not to increase the repo rate, which I regretted afterwards. This would not have made any difference to the actual development of interest rates, but it would have been a good idea to make my view clear already at that time.
Page 1 sur 8  Asociación de Mercados Financieros Annual Financial Convention Madrid, 21 November 2016 François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Banque de France Europe facing a new political economy  Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, Thank you for your invitation. I am grateful for the opportunity to speak here in Madrid today with my friend Governor L. Linde, in the midst of the Spanish financial community, and in a country which has demonstrated its active commitment to the European project since it joined the European Union thirty years ago. We have come a long way in Europe and our common history and past success will help us look ahead in these challenging times. The Brexit referendum in June and Mr. Trump’s victory two weeks ago have indeed come as shocks for Europe: both have increased uncertainty and are raising questions about the European identity. How should we, as Europeans, react? Not by less Europe: this would clearly be a mistake if we want to collectively master our own destiny in this new world. But by a better Europe, a more focused and efficient one. In concrete terms, we need to adapt in two ways: first, by building actively on our economic and social assets – among them our single currency and monetary policy; second, by coming together around a few new select priorities – including tackling the current “investment crunch”. **  Page 2 sur 8 I. First, Europe’s assets in the new “political economy”.