I am therefore most thankful that the Thai Bankers’ Association has invoked this noble tradition, with the intent of giving it a permanent legacy. This year marks the second year of the new tradition, and I have taken this opportunity to ask all members of the Board of Directors of banks to join us. I would like to extend my deepest appreciation and thank you for being here with us. Ladies and gentlemen, I have specifically requested that members of the Board of directors be present here today as I would like to have the opportunity to directly share with you some thoughts and understanding. I believe these would be valuable in enhancing your role as Board members. First of all, let me say that I empathise with you for the significant changes and adjustments which bank directors have had to make since the crisis. On top of that, the Bank of Thailand has also issued regulations which put further burden on your oversight responsibility. These can easily irritate directors especially in light of the heavy responsibility which you undoubtedly carry given your prominent role in Thai society. The intention was not to add to the burden of the Board, but simply to ensure that the Board can fully carry out its duty of care. I would therefore like to take this opportunity to address the key duties and responsibilities of directors.
We at the Riksbank has also used one such model to better understand the interplay between the two policy areas – mainly because macroprudential policy could have effects on economic activity that monetary policy may need to take into account.10 The conclusion from this exercise so far is that there are no easy answers and that the benefits of coordination may vary, depending on which shocks are driving the economy and making the authorities take action. How have the roles been allocated in reality? So how have different countries in reality chosen to organise monetary policy and macroprudential policy? As usual, it is difficult to draw straight lines between theory and reality. One country that comes fairly close to model A with regard to coordination is the United Kingdom, where the Bank of England has been given responsibility for macroprudential policy. The decisions on monetary policy and macroprudential policy are taken by two different committees in the bank, the Monetary Policy Committee and the Financial Policy Committee, which is more in line with model B, but there is nevertheless an explicit aim to coordinate, for instance, in the way the committees are composed.11 In Sweden we have chosen a solution that in institutional terms is closer to B, in the sense that Finansinspektionen has been given the main responsibility for macroprudential policy tools. Now, I do not believe that the differences in the practical solutions chosen in different countries should be exaggerated.