However, we should be aware that at one point in the future their contribution will be overwhelmed and we will need to take appropriate action on time in order to impede any reverse effects. In the policy design and decision making process under the current dynamic environment, the strengthening of analytical tools and the enhancement of knowledge on the policy nexus are extremely important. The interplay of monetary, fiscal and macro prudential policies is a quite new area, seeking for deeper research work to support the decision making process at the central banks and other policy makers, to provide appropriate advices and policy recommendation and therefore, to prevent from underlying risks. The aim of our conference is to contribute towards building knowledge and exchanging views on the policy nexus issue. Having in mind the quality of papers that are going to be presented today, I truly hope that we will make our contribution towards this aim. I wish you a successful conference and fruitful discussion! Thank you. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
The goal is to enable banks to retain market access to capital and funding even when large losses occur or the banks are subject to other adverse shocks. The ability to retain access should enable banks to manage through their problems, avoiding the types of liquidity runs that led to the forced unwinding of positions and that pushed what might have been solvent institutions over the edge into insolvency. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  In addition to the Basel III standards for capital and liquidity, an international effort is underway to further reduce the probability of failure for systemically important financial institutions or SIFIs. The basic logic behind this effort is that the failure of a larger, more complex firm can have disproportionately large negative systemic consequences. As a result, such firms should be forced to hold additional capital in order to reduce their probability of failure below that of smaller firms. An additional capital requirement on such SIFIs would also help to level the playing field between larger and smaller firms by offsetting the funding advantage that accrues to the largest firms that stems from the perception that they are “too big to fail.” Although there are potentially other options, I believe that a SIFI surcharge could best be satisfied by requiring SIFIs to hold additional common equity above and beyond the Basel 7 percent Tier I common standard.