Page 5/13  Chart 4 shows the development of these surpluses and deficits as a percentage of global GDP over the past 20 years. Positive values represent a current account surplus; negative values a current account deficit. I would like to highlight trends in a few selected economies. Looking first at the countries which have a current account deficit, we see that the US is among them. It is represented by the blue section of the bar. The pink section denotes all the other current account deficits in the world. In 2016, this group comprised 106 countries. Let’s turn now to the countries that have a current account surplus. These are China, shown in red, Germany in orange, and Japan in green. Switzerland is depicted with a very small, dark blue bar. All other current account surpluses are aggregated in the light blue bar. This bar comprised 42 countries in 2016. The chart illustrates three facts. First, due to the small size of our country, the Swiss surplus is relatively insignificant in the global picture of current account balances. Switzerland’s contribution to global current account balances is small and did not play a role in the growth of global current account balances before the financial crisis. Second, the size and evolution of global current account balances is defined by four major economies. China, Germany, Japan and the US today make up almost half of global current account balances. The remaining 150 or so countries together make up the other half.
Underlying price pressures are expected to increase somewhat  Page 7 sur 9 this year, owing to short-term supply constraints and the recovery in domestic demand, although they remain subdued overall, in part reflecting low wage pressures. This assessment is broadly reflected in the baseline scenario of last March ECB staff projections for the Euro Area. It foresees annual inflation at 1.4% in 2023. There is today in the Euro Area no risk of lasting return of inflation. We will continue PEPP net asset purchases “until at least the end of March 2022 and, in any case, until [we] judge that the coronavirus crisis phase is over”. We still have ample time to judge and decide, well beyond our June meeting, as Christine Lagarde said last Friday. Let me today stress one obvious but sometimes overlooked truth: whatever the future decision on PEPP, we will still be able to play and enhance the full “quartet” of our unconventional instruments: asset purchases, negative rates, liquidity provision, and forward guidance. These unconventional instruments are here to stay, beyond Covid and its crisis tools, meaning that our monetary policy can remain as accommodative as necessary, for as long as necessary. And I would like to share some thoughts on each instrument of the quartet. Asset purchases are powerful and we still have room to do more if necessary. Reinvestments under the PEPP will remain significant, and net purchases will continue under the APP, possibly adapted.