On the other hand, Swedish banks are doing very well in other areas. I already have mentioned the very strong position enjoyed by Swedish banks in the market for long-term saving, compared with many other European banks. Another well-known Swedish example is the high Internet use of both companies and households in their dealings with their banks. Swedish banks have also been relatively quick to expand abroad. In relative terms, the Swedish banking system is one of the most European banking markets, along with the Belgian and Dutch systems. However, that only applies to the Swedish banking system’s “outward” Europeanization – Swedish banks’ expansion outside Sweden. As regards the presence of European banks in the Swedish market, ”inward” Europeanization, the Swedish banking market is one of the least integrated, beaten even by a “closed” market like the Italian one. Assuming that Swedish authorities have not discriminated against foreign players, this pattern could perhaps also be taken as a sign of Swedish banks’ high competitiveness. So it is not all that easy to answer the question of how competitive Swedish banks are in an international or European perspective. Nevertheless, there is much to suggest that their competitiveness is fairly good. To all appearances the Swedish banking system is efficient in its use of resources and it does not seem that this is being achieved through a poorer range of financial services – with possibly the low number of ATMs as an unusual but striking exception.
Second, some EU bodies are obsessed with the “all EU countries must be same” approach. While there may be some point to this, why insist on it in the case of the single resolution system, for instance, if it has been negotiated that the SSM only applies to euro-area countries plus volunteers? One can hardly expect non-euro area countries not participating in the SSM to jump at the single resolution system if it means sharing the burden with those inside the banking union without the same treatment in the area of a fiscal back-stop. At the same time, would you join the SSM if you did not have a clue how the single resolution rules were going to work? The CNB’s position was: let’s discuss the whole thing (BU) in one shot as a one compact and coherent package where the balance between powers, duties, responsibilities and money always remains assured. And negotiate everything as a single animal, so that illogical inconsistencies are not being produced all along. Sure, that would take much more time, but the final outcome might look better and we would not build up the house from the roof down. We are debating the supervisory part first, while burden-sharing (money) is being left for the future. The sequence of steps should ideally be exactly the opposite one. Why? My observation is that the way the various bail-outs and the SSM have been negotiated so far shows that the readiness and willingness even among euro-area countries to share money is declining over time.