In a longer perspective, openness can also be vital to create a political pressure for change in individual countries. In the same way, openness with regard to current imbalances lends support to change in different countries and for considerations in the financial markets. I myself would very much like to see more transparent application and assignment procedures for posts at all levels within the IMF. The best candidate should get the job regardless of the applicant’s country of origin. 2. For the IMF to have enough weight, it is necessary that the key issues for the world economy really are discussed at the IMF’s table and not at others. Those who wishes to strengthen the IMF – and are serious about it – could therefore not create new forums outside the IMF with a view to discussing matters that fall within the IMF’s mandate. If this is done, the organisation will, in practice, be undermined. 3. One way of reducing the need for creating new fora, and, at the same time, in a pragmatic way approach issues of representation, would be to work more actively in the Executive Board with various (small) committees/subcommittees (similar to those in many national parliaments and in the Executive Board at the World Bank).
For example, there could be a committee for global exchange rate issues, in which the large currency blocs are represented; another committee focused on poverty issues, where poor countries and major donor countries have a high representation; and a committee for crisis resolution, in which creditors have a strong position, etc. Reforms in this direction could also increase the efficiency of the Executive Board. It could also imply that a small increase in the number of chairs would be manageable. The problem that a number of countries would end up outside some of the discussions, should not be exaggerated particularly if the consequence of total changes is that IMF gets a more central role in the international discussion than today. To the extent that the problem remain, it should be possible to manage through a high degree of openness. 4. The role of the Executive Board should be stronger and more clearly defined in relation to the IMF’s management. The current principle whereby the IMF’s managing director is both chairman of the Board and responsible for executing the Board’s decisions is open to question. With a more clear division of responsibilities, the IMF management could be more effective and, in practice, possibly stronger. It is also vital that the Board is represented at a high enough level with full confidence from the capital level in order for the Board to be able to become an effective arena for central policy discussions. 5. The IMFC could be reinforced.