By de-politicising the short run trade-off between inflation and activity, this arrangement has provided the grounds for the most successful monetary policy regime for the UK thus far. The MPC’s flexible inflationtargeting framework was further strengthened by the 2013 Treasury Review and the following Remit update which effectively ‘completed the contract’ by further specifying the relationship between the MPC’s primary objective for price stability, and its secondary objective to support jobs and growth. Though, having overseen the 2013 Review, I must declare an interest in judging its contribution. Since then, the Remit has explicitly acknowledged that, in exceptional circumstances shocks to the economy may be particularly large or the effects of shocks may persist over an extended period. In such a period the  1  Carney M (2017), remarks given at a conference to mark 20 years of the MPC’s operational independence, notes that Governor Eddie George once remarked that in the half century that followed the Bank’s nationalisation in 1946 it “operated under legislation which, remarkably did not attempt to define our objectives or functions.” 3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  3  MPC must balance the trade-off between the speed with which inflation is brought back to the target and the consideration that should be placed on the variability of jobs and economic activity.
Stefan Ingves: Evaluation of the Riksbank’s monetary policy and work on financial stability 2005–2010 Speech by Mr Stefan Ingves, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank and Chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, to the Riksdag Committee on Finance, Stockholm, 31 August 2011. *  *  *  The Riksdag (the Swedish parliament) and the people of Sweden must be able to see that the Riksbank is doing its job well. It is therefore necessary for them to have good insight into our work and for the Riksdag to be able to make regular evaluations of this work. The evaluations are also important for the Riksbank to be able to develop and improve its analyses. We have already said on several occasions that we consider it an excellent initiative by the Committee on Finance to regularly commission highly-qualified external experts to evaluate our work. Today, when we are to discuss the second evaluation of this type, I would therefore like to begin by thanking Professors Goodhart and Rochet for carrying out this work on behalf of the Riksdag Committee on Finance. We also welcome the Committee on Finance’s decision to give the evaluators the task not only of assessing how we conduct monetary policy, but also how we manage the task of promoting a safe and efficient payment system, that is, what we have interpreted as our responsibility for financial stability in Sweden.