And by being clear about how we view future monetary policy we can also increase the efficiency of monetary policy (slide 1). It is not merely the current interest rate decision and the current level of the interest rate that are important to future inflation and demand in the economy. Households and companies do not base their financial decisions only on the current interest rates. Expectations of how the repo rate will develop over the coming years are at least as important. But there are also other reasons for the increased openness. As I mentioned earlier, public support and legitimacy are a fundamental requirement for monetary policy to work. We have freedom with responsibility and with this come demands for insight and accountability. Openness is also something that has long imbued Swedish public administration. The principle of free public access which means that public authorities' activities shall as far as possible be carried out openly, was established as early as the late 18th century, a time when few other countries had such ideas. So this is a long tradition we are maintaining. The fact that we are examined closely is also something that affects the efficiency of our work. The more open we are, the easier it is for a member of the Committee on Finance or any other member of society to evaluate how well monetary policy works. Clarity and increased openness outwards lead to a better discussion of monetary policy.
This transition in MP regime has been more pronounced in Latin America. While in 1994 twelve countries in the region had in place an ER anchor, and four others had a monetary growth anchor, by 2004 only three countries remained with an ER anchor. The transition of policy frameworks during 1994-2004 led to a significant rise in the number of Latin American countries with a floating regime (from three to twelve countries) and an inflation targeting framework (from one to five countries). 2. Chile’s transition to its current monetary policy framework  The macroeconomic institutional and policy framework of Chile has been transformed radically in the last 25 years, from one that made stabilization an exceptional result to one that has facilitated achieving price stability. Chile’s current macroeconomic framework is based on four pillars: (i) an autonomous Central Bank with the explicit mandate of safeguarding stability of prices and payments; (ii) a low public-debt to GDP ratio and a fiscal policy rule anchored to a structural fiscal surplus; (iii) a robust financial system, with a dynamic, competitive, and well capitalized banking industry, appropriately regulated and supervised; and (iv) a full-fledged inflation targeting monetary framework, complemented by a floating ER regime. Substantial progress was made in CBC autonomy since the 1980s, when autonomy was very weak, even at lower levels than in the average emerging economy. The granting of legal independence in 1989 through constitutional law, led to a much improved position in the international ranking of central bank autonomy.