Our global coordinators were amazed by our determination to create an innovative “Tap Facility” to allow the continued block creation of more Tracker units from the remaining portfolio of shares. Also we insisted on not giving any discount to the public at launch of the IPO and instead we offered an innovative back-end loaded incentive scheme in the form of a loyalty bonus. From the Government perspective, we had by April 2001 recouped more than the $ billion used by the Exchange Fund in the stock market operation. In total, we sold $ billion worth of shares into Tracker, received $ billion from dividends on our shareholdings and still retained $ billion in the Exchange Fund’s long term equity portfolio when the "tap" into Tracker was terminated. We could not have achieved this without the dedication and support of our highly professional project team members: Tracker Fund’s manager and custodian (our hosts tonight), the three global coordinators, the lawyers, the Marketing & PR Firms, colleagues at  BIS Review 142/2009  1  the SFC, HKEx & CCASS, and of course the Chairman (Mr TL Yang), all the directors and fellow staff of EFIL. If one were to mark the Tracker Fund as an exit strategy, I think it deserves a fine report card. We did dispose of the shares with minimal disruption to the market.
The ECB’s entire range of instruments, characterised by a wide corridor between the interest rate on the marginal lending facility and the rate on the deposit facility, weekly repurchase agreements, the acceptance of a large number of counterparties and a wide range of collateral, is based on the money market functioning. If the money market doesn’t work, the mechanism for transmitting monetary policy doesn’t work. The only solution remaining for a central bank at this point is to stand in for the market and perform the role of the banks, even by lending directly to the private sector. Maybe this solution is the most preferable? I don’t believe so. In my opinion, the functioning of the market is a statutory objective for a central bank. It should therefore intervene to guarantee the liquidity of the market. It should be remembered that every injection of liquidity is guaranteed by the collateral deposited by the counterparty banks. This means that banks’ assets are made liquid. It’s obvious that without such a liquidity intervention, the market would collapse, taking the banking system with it. This is always true for last-resort interventions whose objective is to keep a solvent but illiquid system alive. It is at the heart of the role of central banking, particularly in times of systemic crisis. There can be no doubt that the ECB had to take on this role and I believe it has done so in an appropriate way.