Risks  In the last part of my speech, I would like to provide some information on the risks regarding the inflation outlook in the upcoming period and the prospective monetary policy strategies to be implemented should these risks materialize. By influencing commodity prices and external demand conditions, global economic activity would continue to be the main factor driving inflation dynamics and the monetary policy outlook. In this respect, the timing and the extent of monetary tightening to be implemented during 2011 under the baseline scenario may change depending on the course of economic activity. Recently, rising concerns regarding debt sustainability in several euro area countries and the spillover effects to the financial system have led to renewed turmoil across financial markets, underscoring the downside risks to global economic recovery. Furthermore, ongoing problems in credit, real estate and labor markets in advanced economies, with little policy options left in case of further disruption in global economic activity, suggest that downside risks regarding the pace of global growth are likely to persist for some time. Should the global economy face a longer-than-anticipated period of anemic growth, which would consequently delay domestic recovery significantly, the monetary tightening envisaged in 2011 under the baseline scenario may be postponed towards the end of 2011. Moreover, an outcome whereby global economic problems intensify and contribute to a contraction of domestic economic activity may trigger a new easing cycle. By contrast, monetary tightening may be implemented in an earlier period during 2011, should the recovery in economic activity materialize faster than expected.
They will benefit all member states in the single market. However, they will take time to design and longer to implement, and they will have no impact on the burden of the debt overhang that already exists. For complete solutions to both current and potential future problems the sharing of fiscal risks is required. It is no coincidence that effective currency unions tend to have centralised fiscal authorities whose spending is a sizeable share of GDP – averaging over a quarter of GDP for advanced countries outside the euro area (Table 1). I have already discussed how parts of the UK have benefitted from fiscal risk sharing. The euro area also stands out from federal systems like the US, Canada and Germany. In those systems, the impact of localised shocks to income is reduced by between one tenth and one fifth by centralised fiscal transfers (Chart 6). Without this risk sharing, the euro area finds itself in an odd position. As the Presidents of the European Council, European Commission, Eurogroup and European Central Bank argued in their report, European Monetary Union will not be complete until it builds mechanisms to share fiscal sovereignty. Possible options for sharing fiscal risks range from a transfer union to a pooled employment insurance mechanism. The latter would appear to be an opportunity to combine the current enthusiasm for labour market reform with the longer term imperative to build elements of an efficient transfer union. And it would ensure risk sharing was based on cyclical, rather than structural, labour market positions.