On the other hand, the concerns that were raised about the sustainability of the currency peg system deepened the lack of confidence further and the Turkish authorities decided to allow the lira to float freely on 22 February 2000, in order to avoid further damage in the economy. It is interesting to note here that, the turbulences occurred in November 2000 and in February 2001 differ from each other as regards their starting points. The crisis in November 2000 was started by the banks’ failure to meet financial obligations, and then was followed by a liquidity crisis that increased pressure on exchange rates. On the other hand, the crisis in February 2001 directly manifested itself as a direct attack to domestic currency, with the increased financial vulnerability after November 2000. An analysis of the fundamental reasons behind the failure of the disinflation program implemented in 2000 reveals that the problems in the banking system should have been resolved well before the implementation of the program. It was natural that, pursuing a monetary policy similar to a currency board, forced the Central Bank to pay less attention to the liquidity needs of financial markets compared to previous years. Moreover, this practice reduced the flexibility of the monetary policy against external shocks. The continuation of problems in banking sector in 2000 put pressure on the rule-based monetary policy based on rule.
Emerging economies are better prepared than in the 1990s to absorb these shocks, but we do not expect the subsidy coming from the commodity windfall. One final point about China  China has become a source of stability in the world economy in the last few decades (isn´t this the role China played after the Global Financial Crisis in 2009 and 2010? ), but it has become more interconnected with the rest of the world, and it is also subject to pressures on the capital account and its balance of payments. The very same risks that emerging economies face from US rate increases are relevant for China, too. This time, a bumpy process of monetary normalization in the US could become amplified rather than ameliorated, depending upon how China is able to adjust to it. And this time, the room looks smaller.