(2021), “Demand for central bank reserves and monetary policy implementation frameworks: the case of the Eurosystem”, Occasional Paper Series, No 282, ECB, September. 5. ibid. 6. See Schnabel, I. (2021), “Monetary policy and financial stability”, speech at the fifth annual conference of the European Systemic Risk Board, Frankfurt am Main, 8 December; and Schnabel, I. (2021), “Monetary policy and inequality”, speech at a virtual conference on “Diversity and Inclusion in Economics, Finance, and Central Banking”, Frankfurt am Main, 9 November. 7. See, for example, Cavallo, M. et al. (2019), “Fiscal Implications of the Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet Normalization”, International Journal of Central Banking, Issue 61, pp. 255-306. 8. See also Arrata, W. et al. (2020), “The scarcity effect of QE on repo rates: Evidence from the euro area”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 137, Issue 3, September, pp. 837-856; and Brand, C. et al. (2019), “From cash- to securities-driven euro area repo markets: the role of financial stress and safe asset scarcity”, Working Paper Series, No 2232, ECB, January. 9. The latest adjustment on lending limits against cash took place on 10 November 2022. 10. These concerns were related to additional cash inflows from the Eurosystem’s non-monetary policy deposits, as the remuneration of these deposits was initially unclear. Ultimately, however, net inflows to  repo markets were limited during the episode of market strain, suggesting that behavioural factors have played a predominant role. 11. The remuneration of deposits held under the Eurosystem reserve management services framework was adjusted accordingly. 12. See, for example, Schnabel, I.
Lars Heikensten: The Riksbank and stabilisation policy Speech by Mr Lars Heikensten, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at a discussion seminar of LO (the labour organisation), Stockholm, 24 May 2005. *  *  *  Let me begin by thanking you for the invitation to attend this seminar. I look forward to an interesting and rewarding discussion. The invitation to the seminar contained a list of questions for discussion. I intend to structure my contribution in terms of working my way down the list and giving my views on these questions. Before I do so, however, I would like to take this opportunity to say that I appreciated the section on stabilisation policy’s possibilities and limitations in the LO economists latest “Economic Prospects” report. Although I do not agree with everything – which will become clear later – I perceived the article to be serious and searching in a positive way. Is stabilisation policy important? My answer to this question is (of course): Yes, stabilisation policy is important. One only needs to look at our experiences in the 1970s and 1980s to realise this. What happened then was that the policy conducted could not sustain an adequate balance in the economy. The policy conducted was often too expansionary, which created an environment where it was difficult to keep price and wage increases at a reasonable level. The rapid increases in wages and prices were repeatedly in collision with the fixed exchange rate.