They are the ways we contribute to an economy that works for everyone, above and beyond the high-level levers of interest rates and asset purchases. Conclusion I’ll conclude where I began. As a policymaker I’m constantly weighing up the dual mandate, thinking about how we keep the economy on track, and balance maximum employment with low, stable inflation. But these decisions don’t affect the kinds of jobs that are created or who benefits from growth. The type of growth we have, where it manifests, and who benefits from it play a huge role in shaping both the fabric of society and the lives of New Yorkers. That’s why our community and outreach programs are so important to me. I’d like to close by reemphasizing my gratitude for your commitment to this city. Community development work is complex, challenging, and never done. But it’s essential for building healthy communities that support everyone to reach their full economic potential. Thank you. I look forward to your questions. 1 See Economic Press Briefing on Wage Inequality in the Region, August 10, 2017. 2 See Community Reinvestment Fund, USA and U.S. Bank Partner to Expand Access to Credit for Small  Businesses, Business Wire, January 8, 2018. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches
The Bank of Japan (BoJ) responded by reducing overnight interest rates from a peak of more than 8 percent in early 1991 to ½ a percent by the fall of 1995.2 Most studies of this period suggest that policy was generally appropriate given economic forecasts at the time, but too tight relative to the actual outcomes.3 Economic forecasts for Japan – both by the official community and by private sector agents – were consistently more optimistic than the actual outturns. It is noteworthy that as late as January 1995 – on the eve of deflation – 10-year Japanese Government Bond (JGB) yields were still at 4.7 percent. With the benefit of hindsight, we now understand that the disinflationary consequences of the asset price bust and financial stress where vastly more powerful than was widely realized at the time. As we later saw in the U.S., the forces of contraction and disinflation operated through many different channels – not just directly on household wealth, for example, but also through the impact of the asset price bust on the health of financial intermediaries and the supply of credit to households and businesses. Over time, the Japanese banking system came under mounting stress. This was a slowmotion crisis, as the assets were mainly loans that were not marked-to-market. Accounting practices and regulatory forbearance allowed banks to delay charging off bad loans and recapitalizing at the cost of impairing the availability of credit to new potential borrowers. A full-blown banking crisis finally materialized in 1997.