Commercial banks around the world have begun to find the technology to tackle such challenges profitably. However, there must be rewards to financial innovation and risk management capability that encourage financial institutions to address these segments of the markets profitably since a financial undertaking which looses money over time is not sustainable. The adoption of the New Accord, therefore, must ensure that the financial need of the dual economy is served. Secondly, while the Bank of Thailand can help foster the infrastructure for risk management, we must avoid the problem of taking away the incentive for, and accountability of, the private institutions to manage their own internal database that could be used for their own models in the long run or to manage their own risks. If a regulator oversteps the bound, there may be risk of moral hazard. Much difficulty will go into walking the thin line in overseeing safety of a system and to avoid "approving" the risk model or risk management system. I hope that this seminar will shed light on the experience in other countries. These challenges are complex and difficult in nature, but we must tackle them successfully to ensure that the Thai financial institutions are strong members of the global financial community. The market risk seminar today is a strong indication of this intention to meet the challenges. Back in 1996, the Bank of Thailand had already embarked on the study and preparation for the adoption of the '96 Accord on Market Risk.
See ‘Lambda’, speech by Mark Carney at the London School of Economics, 16 January 2017. 16 Each observation shows the central projection for spare capacity or excess demand at the end of the second year of the forecast period (the 'Year 2' point) on the horizontal axis against the central projection for four-quarter CPI inflation at Year 2 on the vertical axis from successive Inflation Reports. The left-most observation (labelled "Aug. 2016 no stimulus") is a counterfactual version of the August 2016 Inflation Report forecasts with the effect of the MPC's Bank Rate cut, Term Funding Scheme and Asset Purchases removed. See ’Lambda’, speech by Mark Carney at the London School of Economics, 16h January 2017, for further details and discussion. 17 See Table 4.C in the May 2018 Inflation Report, available at www.bankofengland.co.uk/inflation-report/2018/may-2018. 12  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  12  Chart 7: Trade-off in successive Inflation Report projections at Year 3 3.0  Inflation (%)  August 2016 2.5  November 2016  February 2017 August 2017  May 2017 November 2017 February 2018  2.0 -1.0  August 2016, no stimulus  -0.5  May 2018  Excess demand (%)  0.5  1.0  0.0  Preferred trade-off if λ=0.1  1.5  Preferred trade-off if λ=1 1.0 A Guidance Stocktake As the UK enters the most critical phase of the Brexit negotiations, it is useful to take stock of forward guidance and its potential role during the upcoming period.