This is why, for instance, the minutes taken at the monetary policy meetings are normally published two weeks after the meetings. In addition, the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the General Council have the right, according to the Sveriges Riksbank Act, to attend the meetings of the Executive Board, which they normally make use of. 3 The purpose of this is in principle that they are monitoring that things are done correctly, on behalf of the Riksdag and the general public. We decided only a couple of weeks ago to make some changes in these areas. I shall return to this shortly. But let me first state another aspect as to why openness and clarity are so important to us. Target fulfilment – openness and clarity contribute to efficiency There are not merely democratic reasons as to why central banks have become more open and clear. Many central banks have seen greater transparency as a means of more easily attaining their objectives and of making monetary policy more efficient. Openness and clarity can even here enable us to better meet the requirements made by our principal. Firstly, openness and clarity regarding monetary policy make it easier for economic agents to be convinced that the interest rate decisions made are really intended to attain low and stable inflation. This contributes to greater credibility and to anchoring expectations around the target.
So allow me to briefly pause here and explain clearly my own intentions with regard to the next halfhour. The theme of my speech here today is how the Riksbank’s independent position, together with a high degree of transparency and efficient communication, contributes to long-term target fulfilment and credibility for monetary policy. Key words in this context are evaluation and accountability. It is these different pieces of the puzzle that I now wish to discuss in more detail. The Riksbank’s position – from bank crisis in the 17th century to independent central bank The fact that we are in this room today is actually rather appropriate. I can tell you an interesting fact here – that the Riksbank and the Riksdag had a fairly intimate relationship, in geographical terms, for over 70 years, from the early 20th century up until 1976. The Riksbank was then located in the building across the street, where the Riksdag now has its assembly hall. Riksbank officials thus sat almost side by side with the people’s elected representatives. Now I do not believe one should draw any far-reaching conclusions on the degree of independence for monetary policy on the basis of geographical location – other factors decide this. But for those who have any doubts, I can point out that the Riksbank is now at a more “suitable” walking distance from the Riksdag, a few blocks away. BIS Review 62/2007  1  The Riksbank is formally an authority under the Riksdag.