Financial Globalisation Beyond international trade, financial globalisation has also expanded tremendously. Cumulative global bond and equity market flows are now more than 80 times larger than that in the year 2000 and far exceeded trade flows. There is no doubt that financial integration, if properly managed, can catalyse a more efficient allocation of productive capital and know-how transfers, with the intended benefits. However, financial globalisation has also been accompanied by highly-volatile short term portfolio flows, which frequently led to major disruptions to emerging economies’ financial markets. At the extreme, global financial flows can lead to the build-up of domestic vulnerabilities, such as currency mismatches, external indebtedness and broader financial imbalances. When financial globalisation becomes in itself a source of shock, financial markets can be easily overwhelmed. In Malaysia, two-way capital flows have increased by almost three-fold in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis. Similar to other emerging economies, we have also experienced several episodes of sharp capital flow reversals. Supported by firm macroeconomic fundamentals, our deep and broad financial markets were able to intermediate these flows in an orderly manner. The experience of emerging economies in dealing with capital flow volatility underscores the need to always keep our “own house in order”. While this is necessary, it is not sufficient. Often, we have seen how external developments that are beyond our control, such as the Taper Tantrum and trade tensions, could trigger periods of sharp capital flow volatility in emerging economies with severe consequences. There are “innocent bystanders”.
In fact, it has to be recognised that around the world domestic authorities have been putting in place defensive measures, mostly below the radar of commentators, over the past few years. This comes back to the use of public money. A world in which public money is used to bail out banks or dealers, is a world in which balkanisation is likely because the authorities that deploy public money are accountable to domestic tax payers – people with votes in their jurisdiction – and to nobody else. But by delivering the FSB’s global agenda – not only on resolution, but more widely – we will significantly reduce, if not remove, the need for some of those balkanising tendencies. By making finance safe and orderly failure possible, I think we can take off the stage the most basic force towards balkanisation. The stakes are high. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5