Norges Bank can be of assistance in helping the industry to make the “proper” choices by providing a regulatory framework which maintains competition, while also encouraging that participants are faced with relative prices reflecting the real costs of the systems. Allow me to comment on these factors: 4.3.1. The importance of reliable information on risk and a clear division of responsibility  It is important that the banks provide more information on the actual risk in the payment systems, so that the risk is known and understood (see the second Lamfalussy minimum standard). Our knowledge of settlement risk in the Norwegian system is still insufficient. We know too little about exposure throughout the day, how it arises and the optimum approach to reducing it. We have to gain more insight into these factors, particularly since risk information will be an important element in granting licenses to interbank systems. Moreover, this information is also essential for the correct pricing of risk in payment services. In this connection, I would also like to point out what it means to specify the respective responsibilities of the netting provider and the participants (see the third Lamfalussy standard). I firmly believe that the law’s requirement that there shall be “one operator who is responsible for the establishment and operation of the system” may result in the necessary clarification of the division of responsibility in the payment system. For this reason, this requirement is not just a formality, but a real opportunity to create more transparency relative to the present system.
The recent financial upheavals offers the most striking evidence given that there was no disruption to the financial intermediation process, credit flows and transmission mechanism. There are, of course, pockets of risks in individual countries, inflation and property market bubble, to name a few, where different policy instruments could be used. Central to managing these challenges are macro-prudential tools, which have been deployed by Asian countries, to prevent, amongst others, price inflation in the real estate sector. A number of Asian policymakers recently had tightened lending standards by lowering loan-to-value ratio, imposing limits on non-owner-occupied property purchases and increasing transaction costs, as pre-emptive measures to temper speculative property investments and to manage or prevent excessive build-ups in household debt, at a time of fairly low interest rates and abundance of liquidity. At the regional level, safeguards have also been enhanced. Among the lessons drawn from the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis are the importance of early detection of cross-border risks and vulnerabilities, followed by a collectively cohesive and firm action to avert any potential crisis. Over the years, the region has developed an integrated surveillance and crisis management framework through various groupings such as the Executive Meeting of East Asia Pacific (EMEAP) members and the South East Asian Central Banks. For example, the EMEAP surveillance framework focuses closely on regional monetary and financial systems which also connect international financial institutions and member central banks’ reserves management and money market teams through the Dealing Room Network.