Indeed, in terms of financial stability, the development is welcome news as any additional stimulation would only have aggravated imbalances on the mortgage and real estate markets. The third notable aspect relates to developments in the public sector, where the volume of outstanding bonds has fallen over the last ten years. Although the volume issued by the cantons and municipalities increased, that issued by the Confederation declined markedly. While public debt levels rose substantially around the world in the wake of the financial crisis, the Confederation has managed to reduce its debts over this period, thanks to regular budget surpluses. In the context of the Swiss franc bond market as a whole, however, the decline in the volume of outstanding Confederation bonds is comparatively inconsequential. So, in contrast to the domestic segment, which has grown overall, the foreign segment began contracting as far back as 2011. This is principally due to the fact that the financing needs of European banks have tapered off significantly since the financial and debt crisis. In the foreign segment banks are by far the most important issuers of bonds, as can be seen in chart 5; this applies particularly to European banks, which account for 70% of all issues. And in recent years, foreign banks have gradually withdrawn from the Swiss franc capital market. Another possible factor behind the contraction in the foreign segment could be FX swap market distortions.
Simon M Potter: Some observations and lessons from the crisis 1 Remarks by Mr Simon M Potter, Executive Vice President of the Research and Statistics Group of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Third Annual Connecticut Bank and Trust Company Economic Outlook Breakfast, Hartford, Connecticut, 7 June 2010. *  *  *  Introduction Among the many important lessons coming out of the global financial crisis that started in the summer of 2007, possibly the most important revolve around how complex the global financial system is, how quickly confidence in that system can deteriorate, and how difficult it is to come up with simple and robust solutions to stabilize the system in real time. My remarks today will break the progression of this crisis into four distinct phases. In doing so, my intention is to highlight some of the actions taken by the Federal Reserve to manage the crisis, and to offer what at least in retrospect seem to be clear lessons on how to promote financial stability outside the heat of a crisis.