But of course speculative situations cannot be ruled out either in the present ERM or in ERM 2, as is clear from developments in Finland in recent months. The Swedish position has been to avoid making the new exchange rate arrangement mandatory. Basically, we consider it would be better to achieve coordination in Europe with a single inflation target. We find the present construction of Swedish monetary policy satisfactory. But we can get along with the system that has been chosen. Cooperation will not be mandatory, which means that monetary policy can be conducted with an inflation target as well as with a fixed exchange rate with the euro. Still it is clear that there will be strong pressure on us to participate in ERM 2. It is also conceivable that a period of participation in the exchange rate mechanism will prove to be a condition for EMU membership. In any event, as a EU member state we have undertaken to conduct exchange rate policy as “a matter of common interest”. Changeover plan for the financial sector It is the Riksdag (Sweden’s parliament) that decides if Sweden should join EMU. The Riksbank has the task of helping to ensure that Sweden does in fact have a choice when the time comes to decide, so that Sweden is ready to join if a Riksdag majority so requires. The Ministry of Finance and the Riksbank each have an organisation for the euro’s practical introduction.
Reducing unemployment, which is at a very high rate despite the favourable developments in Social Security registrations and the reduction in registered unemployment, remains our major economic policy task. In this connection, wage bargaining must allow for the different situation of different firms and sectors to be taken into account, avoiding as far as possible the return to now-superseded wage indexation practices. Considerable progress has been made in correcting the fiscal imbalance, without forgetting the constraints that such a high level of public debt imposes. In the short and medium run,  6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  perseverance with fiscal consolidation on the basis of a growth-conducive revenue and spending mix that ensures compliance with the Budgetary Stability Law will be unavoidable. I should like to conclude with some thoughts on the challenges posed by long-term growth for the Spanish economy. In Spain, as in most of the countries affected, the crisis has had a large-scale impact on the level of output, as a result of sizeable capital and job destruction. The future growth of the Spanish economy will be influenced by how we manage to overcome these effects, but also by the capacity to raise productivity, whose low pace of growth has continuously affected us. Against this background, it is vital to continue with and deepen reforms that boost investment, lower the obstacles to competition and remove the barriers preventing a suitable reallocation of productive resources towards the firms and sectors with the highest growth potential.