One positive recent surprise has been the greater dynamism of investment, especially in machinery and equipment, which outperforms GDP growth in our projections for the period 2018-2020. The greater contribution that is foreseen for mining investment stands out, in line with the near 40% growth that it showed in the first quarter of this year. The new five-year plan announced by Codelco is added as background. In any case, generating conditions for the development of larger projects remains a challenge if we are to sustain high growth rates. This is especially relevant if one considers that the observed and projected currency depreciation in the baseline scenario will reduce spending on tradable goods, and that an important part of this greater investment is explained by capital replacement needs. On the construction side, activity shows more limited dynamism. With this, GFCF as a percentage of GDP—in both nominal and real terms—will reach 21.7% this year and will border 22% next year (Table 1). Regarding fiscal policy, our working assumption is that in 2018 the economy will receive a fiscal impulse consistent with the current budget. From then on, we assume that the structural deficit will follow the path of gradual reduction defined by the authority. Although the CBC is an independent organization and does not coordinate its monetary policy decisions with the government, it does need to anticipate the evolution of the fiscal position as part of the macro framework within which it makes its decisions.
The CBC is governed by the principle of transparency in exercising its public function, enshrined in Article 8 of the Constitution, the bylaws of its own Constitutional Organic Act and the relevant legislation that has expressly included the CBC, such as Law No 20285 on Access to Public Information (2009), Law No 20730, which regulates the lobbying and management of private interests (2014), and Law No 20880 on public service probity (2016). Still, the Board has added several transparency standards that go beyond the aforementioned norms. For example, last March we made available to the public a total of 96 minutes of past monetary policy meetings held during the period 2000-2007, a practice that will continue into the future years. We have also included as passive subjects of transparency all division directors, area managers and heads of departments that may have relevant decision-making powers, and we have supplemented the obligations of the Lobby Law with the publication on the CBC’s website the weekly agenda of the Governor and all Board members. In addition, we have established an external Audit and Compliance Committee and an internal reporting channel to denounce situations of harassment or abuse. From the perspective of using the powers inherent to an autonomous institution to strengthen transparency in more specific areas that are not covered by general legislation, the CBC is preparing some additional initiatives to implement over the next twelve months. One, we want to raise the levels of information and guidance we give to the community regarding monetary policy decisions.