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Another element is to ensure banks have sufficient loss-absorbing liabilities which can be “bailed-in” in the event of failure, to prevent losses being shouldered by tax-payers. The Financial Stability Board has agreed standards for such Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) for global systemically-important banks (G-SIBs). These standards are to be phased-in over coming years, to reach a minimum level of 16% from 2019, and 18% from 2022, of the resolution group’s risk-weighted assets, as well as 6% and 6.75% on a leverage exposure basis, respectively. Macroprudential Reform  These new or augmented microprudential standards have been supplemented with a set of new macroprudential measures. These focus on safeguarding the stability of the financial system as a whole (Tucker (2009), Bank of England (2009, 2011)). The most significant of these reforms have focused on three areas: macroprudential capital buffers; stress-testing; and shadow banks. Historically, capital standards have been static requirements. As part of Basel III, a new time-varying component of banks’ capital was added – the counter-cyclical capital buffer (CCyB). This recognises that 4  And a number of countries, including the UK, introduced leverage ratio capital requirements in the aftermath of the crisis. 5  For LCR, see BCBS (2013a): http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs238.pdf; for NSFR, see BCBS (2014b): http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d295.htm 5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  5  risks to the financial system vary over the credit cycle, typically being highest at its peak and lowest at its trough.