My role today as the opening speaker is a privileged one. Like a university professor during exams, I can ask questions. Unlike a good professor, I am certainly not in possession of all the answers. I am confident, however, that the exceptional group of people assembled here will make a positive contribution to this difficult and complex debate. II. The problem  Arguably, much of the debate surrounding the international monetary system boils down to the following question: how sustainable is an international monetary regime, in which one national currency serves as the international reserve asset? Over the past few decades, this question has been examined under different perspectives. A first perspective was the so-called “Triffin dilemma”, discussed in the context of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate regime. This discussion highlighted that increasing indebtedness of the reserve-issuing country would in time undermine the very confidence that forms the basis for the reserve asset status. A second perspective refers to the alleged “exorbitant privilege” of the reserve-issuing country. It highlights the asymmetry in the adjustment to shocks, as the reserve-issuing country has the privilege of not being under much pressure to adjust to current account deficits, at least over the short and medium term. It is worth noting that part of Keynes’ goal in setting up the IMF was to try to create symmetry between the need to adjust for both deficit and surplus countries. More recently, the question appeared under the perspective of global imbalances.
The third panel, chaired by Duvvuri Subbarao, will take up the question of how to deal with these vulnerabilities. What are the appropriate policy responses, and what is the role for regulation and capital controls? One policy response has been the accumulation of reserves, which can provide a temporary shock absorber. However, reserve accumulation entails costs for the countries accumulating reserves as well as for the world economy as a whole. Our last panel, chaired by Masaaki Shirakawa, will discuss alternatives to self-insurance. An obvious question here is the role of IMF lending facilities. 2  BIS Review 65/2010  As already mentioned, the questions we address today are difficult and complex. Someone who played an important role in trying to address them over several decades was Jacques Polak. Sadly, he passed away earlier this year. Reflecting on the efforts to reform the international monetary system since the Bretton Woods conference, Jacques Polak once suggested that “those of us who toil at the international monetary system would do well to adopt Sisyphus as our patron saint”. In honor of Jacques Polak, let us then push the stone back up the mountain once more and start with our first panel. Thank you for your kind attention. BIS Review 65/2010  3