•  The expansion of the banks' aggregate balances, which became too padded out, exceeded the increase in the real economy. •  The structure of the liabilities excessively relied on the maintained availability of the so-called wholesale funding, the maturity of which was on a short-term basis. •  The discrepancy between the capital and liquidity on one hand and the risks on the part of liabilities, was constantly increasing. •  The financial innovations brought a lot of unknown-unknowns, together with the fast trend of globalization. It means that structural changes through financial innovations occurred. The best illustration for this is the so-called "originate-to-distribute" model, i.e. extending credits and claims distribution to chained financial intermediates and end-users, which replaced the socalled "originate-to-hold" banking model, i.e. issuance of credits and holding to their maturity. It really opened new possibilities for the financial system to broaden and manage risks and maturity mismatches. Some of the banks developed this model into a complete integrated business strategy and primary source of financing of their activities. They securitized the loans, transferred the risk to others in a short period of time, in order to borrow capital over and over again, in order to sell the claim again, and to benefit promptly, but it definitely lowered the lending standards. What should be the medium-term agenda of response to the fundamental problems in the financial sector as a lesson from what we have witnessed so far?
My final point, therefore, is that the authorities will have no excuse if they don’t solve the TBTF problem through resolution regimes and reforms. The necessary technology is clear. The necessary restructuring of firms is clear. The necessary degrees and forms of cross-border co-operation are clear. It is a matter of: just do it. 8  Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) and International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches