On several occasions, the Eurosystem has voiced its expectations regarding SEPA for cards. In particular, the card schemes should offer consumer choice, operate in competitive markets  2  “The economic impact of the Single Euro Payments Area”, by Heiko Schmiedel, ECB Occasional Paper No 71, August 2007. 3  Payment and securities settlement systems in the European Union, Blue Book, fourth edition. 4  “The Costs of Paying – Private and Social Costs of Cash and Card Payments”, Mats Bergman, Gabriela Guibourg and Björn Segendorf, Working Paper No 212, Sveriges Riksbank (September 2007). BIS Review 134/2007  3  and avoid geographical segmentation. In doing so, the Eurosystem expects that the SEPA for cards offers high efficiency and low prices derived from current best practices. In my view, a clear long term strategy of a SEPA for cards is not yet developed. The Eurosystem expects at least one new European card scheme which can compete with the international schemes in the SEPA environment. I’ll address this issue more in depth in the following panel. What I would like to stress, however, is that the Eurosystem welcomes the progress that has been made towards standardisation for cards, which, when implemented, will lead to the creation of a European market for terminals and for cards acquiring. The Eurosystem also welcomes the efforts of the international card schemes in preparing for SEPA and the SEPA changes they have already announced.
Timothy F Geithner: Asia, the world economy and the international financial system Remarks by Mr Timothy F Geithner, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Economic Society of Singapore 2007 Annual Dinner, Singapore, 13 June 2007. *  *  *  Good evening. I am pleased to be able to join you tonight. The past decade has been one of remarkable achievement in Asia. This is a testament to the resilience and dynamism of this region, and yet the memories of the financial crises remain vivid and still exert a powerful influence on policy today. Tonight, I want to reflect on what policymakers learned from the crises, to review the extent of the progress since and to examine some of the challenges ahead. The Asian financial crises of the late 1990s were exceptional in many respects. Described at the time by some as the first crises of the 21st century, they were commonly regarded as without precedent and fundamentally different from previous emerging market financial crises. Here were countries with a remarkable record of rapid economic growth over several decades, substantial rates of investment, with low inflation and relatively strong fiscal positions. Most conventional indicators of economic performance and financial strength did not suggest acute underlying vulnerability. Yet the crises erupted with remarkable speed and force. The sudden collapse of confidence led to a sharp reversal of capital flows to the region.