While this issue is at the heart of risk management challenges for the provision of credit more broadly, the rise in the relative size of the private leveraged fund sector and the rise in the importance of new derivative financial instruments may complicate the design of policies and risk-management practices to counteract these traditional frictions. Virtually all types of credit markets suffer from informational problems - consider the challenge faced by a bank in assessing the risk associated with lending to a small unrated company. But the complexity of new financial products, the rapidity with which positions can change, and the lack of a long time series of historical relationships seems likely to enhance these problems for leveraged institutions operating in new markets such as credit derivatives. Funds typically deal with several different banks and investments banks. The desire to maintain the confidentiality of their trading strategies has traditionally led firms to be quite opaque to outsiders and reluctant to give their banks sufficiently detailed information on a real time basis about the risk profile of the overall fund. Without that information, individual dealers or banks have a difficult time evaluating the probability of default of a leveraged counterparty and the potential covariance with other positions of the firm. Individual firms may also see only a piece of the hedge fund’s positions, and if their direct exposure to the individual fund is small, may perceive less need to worry about the overall risk profile of the fund.
Øystein Olsen: The role of monetary policy revisited – welcome address Welcome address by Mr Øystein Olsen, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the Norges Bank conference “The role of monetary policy revisited”, Oslo, 26 September 2013. *  *  *  It is a great honour and pleasure for me to welcome you all to this Norges Bank conference: The role of monetary policy revisited. In his famous 1967 presidential address before the American Economic Association, Milton Friedman set out to answer three interrelated questions. What should be the role of monetary policy? What can it contribute to achieving the major goals of economic policy? And how should it be conducted to contribute the most? Five years after the onset of the global financial crisis, these questions are yet again at the forefront of our minds. The crisis and subsequent recession have presented substantial challenges to monetary policy. Central banks have responded with great activism and have resorted to unconventional policies such as quantitative easing and an increasing use of forward guidance. And the crisis has led to a review of monetary policy frameworks. Successful as monetary policy has been in safeguarding low and stable inflation, many argue that it should take risks to financial stability into account. Moreover, a new set of macroprudential policy tools has been proposed to address systemic risks in financial markets directly. In Norway, inflation targeting was introduced in 2001.