429-448. [14] See Ruge-Murcia, F.-J. (2006), “The expectations hypothesis of the term structure when interest rates are close to zero”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 53, pp. 1409-1424. [15] See Lemke, W. and Vladu, A. (2017), “Below the zero lower bound: a shadow-rate term structure model for the euro area”, Working Paper Series, No 1991, ECB; Rostagno, M., Altavilla, C., Carboni, C., Lemke, W., Motto, R., Saint-Guilhem, A., Yiangou, J. (2019), “A Tale of Two Decades: the ECB’s Monetary Policy at 20”, ECB mimeo; and Bottero, M., Minoiu, C., Peydro, J.-L., Polo, A, Presbitero, A., Sette, E. (2019), “Negative Monetary Policy Rates and Portfolio Rebalancing: Evidence from Credit Register Data”, IMF Working Paper 19/44 and Wu, C., Xia, D., (2018), “Negative Interest Rate Policy and the Yield Curve”, NBER Working Paper W25180. [16] For a summary of the potential complementarities between negative rate policy, forward guidance, asset purchases and TLTROs see the respective matrix in Chapter 6 of Rostagno et al. (2019), op. cit. [17] See, for example, Ryan and Whelan (2019), “Quantitative Easing and the Hot Potato Effect: Evidence from Euro Area Banks”, Research Technical Paper, Central Bank of Ireland, Vol. 2019, No 1 on the hot potato effect. [18] For an overview on the working of TLTRO, see European Central Bank (2017), “The targeted longer-term refinancing operations: an overview of the take-up and their impact on bank Intermediation”, Box in Economic Bulletin, Issue 3.
Ravi Menon: Securing price stability as Singapore restructures Speech by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Asian Bureau of Financial and Economics Research (ABFER) Opening Gala Dinner, Singapore, 21 May 2013. *  *  *  Professor Bernard Yeung, Dean, NUS Business School, whose tireless efforts have brought to fruition the Asian Bureau of Financial and Economics Research, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, good evening. Interesting times again Monetary policy has become interesting again. The Great Moderation, beginning in the mid-1980s and spanning two decades, marked the triumph of monetary policy over the scourge of inflation. The formula worked brilliantly – independent central banks, with clear mandates to pursue price stability, and doing so with consistency and credibility, ushered in an era of macroeconomic and financial stability supporting steady economic growth and rising prosperity. Then came 2008/2009 – unleashing a financial crisis of unmatched scale and impact, and a global recession deeper than any seen since the Great Depression. We are still living in the shadows of these two shocks, with the global economy stuck in a hesitant and uneven recovery and financial market stresses resurfacing from time to time. Monetary policy in the advanced economies has entered unchartered waters, in a valiant effort to support economic growth, which was being weighed down by deleveraging. In the emerging economies, central banks and governments have had to be equally nimble in their policy responses, as they grapple with the spillover effects of these unconventional monetary policies.