Ladies and Gentlemen, it is in this regard that the Bank of Zambia and Professor Collier with the support of the UK Department for International Development partnered to hold this international symposium whose objectives include: (i)  enhancing understanding of advantages of central bank independence among central bankers, Government, banks, non-bank financial institutions, the business community, academics and other stakeholders;  (ii)  drawing lessons and sharing experiences of central bank independence in developed, emerging and developing countries;  (iii)  appreciating the political, economic and legal aspects of operationalising greater independence for central banks; and  (iv)  exploring ways of enhancing fiscal and monetary coordination. Ladies and Gentlemen, the selection of papers to be presented and discussed at this Symposium will provide a platform for sharing ideas required for practical solutions aimed at improving the Bank’s service delivery. As we tackle issues of inflation, exchange rates, and other key macroeconomic indicators, let us use this forum to outline some of the past developments and challenges that lie ahead of us as we aim to taking Zambia’s financial sector to higher heights. Lastly, let me say that while we can all learn from what other central banks have done, each country should establish the legal framework for its central bank, and allow for its evolution, in ways which best fit that country’s own history and institutions. I have no doubt that the symposium will be thought-provoking and highly participatory.
Let me comment on some of these four aspects and touch on how we intend to fulfil our mandate to support the ESRB. Conceptual issues of systemic risk Systemic risk analysis is nothing new to the central banking community, including the ECB. One reflection of this fact is the series of triennial central bank conferences held under the G10 Committee on the Global Financial System between the mid-1990s and early 2000s. Even the European Monetary Institute, which was the forerunner of the ECB, contributed to systemic risk work in this context, alongside the US Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan and many other central banks. 4 For instance, from the outset, the ECB drew up a research agenda on financial stability and systemic risk. 5 In addition, in 2004 we started to publish a Financial Stability Report (FSR) twice a year. The main objective of this Report is to help identify, at an early stage, potential vulnerabilities and to raise awareness among market participants with a view to promoting preventive and remedial policies. Each issue also contains several special features offering a wealth of further insight into financial stability and systemic risk. This background suggests that the ECB is a logical choice as a provider of analytical support to the ESRB, but it should not obscure two major challenges we are facing. First, the phenomenon of systemic risk is extraordinarily complex.