Of course, this is not to say that financial sector weaknesses are not important, or sufficiently recognised. The broad Comprehensive Assessment that we have started reflects precisely the importance of balance-sheet repair. My point is rather that while the on-going deleveraging in the banking sector certainly plays an important role in the inadequate current levels of credit supply to the real economy, factors related to the demand side may play an even more important role. The weak demand outlook combined with the slack in industrial capacity is the most important explanation for the drop in private investment since the crisis, and the most relevant limiting factor for future investment. In addition, the protracted period of low inflation and consequent low nominal growth will increase the burden of the debt overhang of households and governments, further complicating the recovery process. The separation of banks from sovereigns As I mentioned before, the goal of separating the fortune of banks from that of the sovereigns and vice-versa through direct European recapitalisation of weak banks via the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) was present in the embryo of what later became the Banking Union project. Somewhat ironically, however, this widening of the focus caused the initial objective to become obscured. The question of European direct recapitalisation – for which a framework has still not been published– ceased to be the main focus of attention. In the view of many commentators, the SRM became the expected instrument to achieve the separation between banks and sovereigns.
The CRIB is totally dependent on these institutions for reliable information and given the objective of looking after its client institutions, the CRIB would fix negative labels on defaulting borrowers. The CRIB is not in a position to verify or go into details of the operations of any credit institution and establish the class, creed or social status of the customer. It only fix labels according to what is reported by the credit institution. On the other hand, the Bank Supervision Dept. and Non-Bank Supervision Dept. of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, within their own regulatory ambit, can detect the non-reporting by institutions to the CRIB, but these departments are not mandated to share such information with the CRIB or vice versa. Hence, the injustice continues and often some of the deserving borrowers are denied access to credit institutions. In such a situation, how can the CRIB ensure social justice and equity in terms of public policy? The CRIB can be fair only if the credit institutions resolve to report on all defaulting customers with no exceptions. This situation clearly indicates that the decision to groom, retain or eliminate a customer rests largely with the bank or the credit institution. The injustice begins when the reporting institutions do not report defaults of all segments of borrowers. The extent to which the banks and credit institutions have done a disservice to some of the deserving borrowers, is known only to the banks and credit institutions themselves.