We cannot afford over the long run a new “whatever it costs” phase if we want to preserve our capacity to invest in decarbonation and energy sovereignty in the future and not to overload future generations. To put it clearly, as a benchmark, the public share in the distribution of the cumulative burden in 2022 and the following years should not exceed current levels and reverse towards zero within let’s say two to three years. The remaining share of the burden should be distributed fairly between firms and households according to their energy consumption shares. It seems logical that a more significant share falls on firms since they are the largest ex ante consumers of energy. But the issue remains of the distribution of the burden between in particular the energy companies on the one hand and the other sectors on the other, starting with the most energy dependent. Households cannot be completely and permanently exempted from their share in this distribution. This is not easy to say, and even less easy to do; and it is essential to address the difficulties of the most disadvantaged, in particular households in rural areas who consume relatively more energy. So we need to quickly better target those who need it most. And we need to gradually but steadily reduce general support schemes which we cannot afford and do not give the right incentives over the long, or even medium, term.
These results have guided changes introduced to questions in the survey, which have gone some way towards reducing the commonly observed upwards bias in surveyed consumer inflation expectations. Conclusion  18. To conclude, inflation dynamics and expectations are important underpinnings of the macroeconomic dynamics confronting the region in the period ahead. The organisations represented here are at the forefront of analysis into the various aspects of these developments. I am sure there will be interesting insights and perspectives from this Seminar. [1] See for example, Crust, E, Daly, M, and Hobijn, B (2020), “The Illusion of Wage Growth”, Federal  Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Economic Letters, 2020-26. [2] International Monetary Fund (2021), “Chapter 1. Global Prospects and Policies”, World Economic  Outlook: Managing Divergent Recoveries, April. [3] See for example: Shiller, R. J. (1981), “Do Stock Prices Move Too Much to be Justified by Subsequent  Changes in Dividends?”, American Economic Review, Vol. 71(3), pp.421 – 436; Akerlof, G. A. (1970), “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 84(3), pp.488 – 500. [4] Akerlof, G. A. and Shiller, R. J. (2009), Animal Spirits, Princeton University Press. [5] Gennaioli, N. and Shleifer, A. (2018), A Crisis of Beliefs, Princeton University Press. [6] Representativeness entails a judgement error of overestimating the likelihood of representative  attributes which appear with higher relative frequency in a class. See reference in note 4. [7] Agarwal, S. and Yeung, B, (2021), “Inflation Expectations and Household Consumption”,  Macroeconomic Review, Vol.