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In addition, imbalances risk being aggravated in economic upswings, which means that some measures need to be implemented in situations where there is probably a general resistance to them – what is usually compared to “taking away the punchbowl just as the party gets going”.16 Thus, the measures may also be politically difficult to implement in some cases. The extent to which this affects macroprudential policy in practice will of course depend on the institutional set-up chosen. Difficult target to define and assess The inherent difficulty in defining concrete targets for macroprudential policy may affect the ability to implement various measures. A common formulation for the objective of macroprudential policy is “to counteract risks to the financial system as a whole”, or something similar. Regardless of the exact formulation, it is difficult to specify what the target actually entails in practice. When has it been attained? Let us say that macroprudential measures are implemented over a couple of years and that no problems arise in the financial system. Have the measures then been justified or unnecessary? The only thing the general public can observe is a lack of problems, and there could thus be a risk that the need for macroprudential measures is questioned.17 Measures could be circumvented It could also prove difficult to design a system for macroprudential policy that functions efficiently enough, and which inventive market participants are not able to circumvent. In this situation, monetary policy may need to support macroprudential policy.