For example, there may sometimes be a little too much focus on the potential antagonism and differences of opinion within the Board – and in the worst case on a person rather than a policy. But one positive effect that people perhaps do not think about is that topical and important issues, often those in the forefront of academic research, are quickly implemented in the Riksbank’s practical work. The fact that the Executive Board publicly debates what role the policy rate should play to influence household debt means that the Riksbank’s analysis apparatus is activated on this issue to a greater extent than would have been the case without this open discussion. Although I would not say that there are any more concrete results yet, there is definitely a lot of deliberation being put into this issue. I do not believe that this would have been the case – at least not to the same extent – if all of the Board members were agreed that the repo rate should be held slightly higher to subdue household debt. In other words, the open debate hopefully helps us to move forward in this field. References Armelius, Hanna and Hans Dillén, “The relation between household saving and falls in house prices”, Economic Commentary no. 4, 2011, Sveriges Riksbank. Assenmacher-Wesche, Katrin, and Stefan Gerlach (2010), “Monetary policy and financial imbalances: Facts and fiction”, Economic Policy 25, pp. 437–482.
This means that the discussions conducted by the Executive Board take place on an open stage, almost, through the publication of the minutes from the monetary policy meetings and through the speeches held. In many other central banks these differences of opinion never see the light of day. 27  Svensson (2012a). The estimate is of course uncertain. As shown in Svensson (2012a), a 95-per cent confidence interval for the estimate 1.3(=1/0.75) percentage points gives an interval between 1/1.1= 0.9 percentage points and 1/0.4=2.5 percentage points, corresponding to a confidence interval for the estimate 65,000 unemployed between 45,000 and 125,000. An estimate using the Riksbank’s model Ramses, in accordance with the effects of various repo-rate paths as described in Svensson (2010), leads to roughly the same estimate of 1.2 percentage points. 28  If 3 percentage points lower unemployment corresponds to around 10 per cent higher housing prices, then 1.3 per cent higher unemployment will give roughly 1.3*10/3 = 4.3 per cent higher housing prices. 29  With even higher inflation and an inflation rate above the target, which according to Qvigstad’s (2005) criteria is justified when unemployment is higher than the long-run sustainable level, unemployment could have been even lower, and housing prices marginally higher. BIS central bankers’ speeches  13  This openness naturally has consequences, and not all of them positive.