The idea was that, as there was no ex-ante commitment to possible public bail-outs, the risk of moral hazard in relation to risk management policies and investors’ decisions could be sufficiently contained. The recent crisis has however illustrated very clearly the limitations of this “constructive ambiguity” approach. Thus, during the crisis, and in particular after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the authorities have openly recognised that bank failures – even if they are not particularly large or complex – can seriously impair financial stability, making bail-out a natural policy response. As a consequence, there were widespread bail-outs of creditors of banks under stress. These rescues have obviously confirmed the existence of an implicit guarantee for banks’ liabilities which constitutes a serious challenge for fiscal balances and a substantial distortion of the system of incentives for bank managers and fund providers. There is now broad agreement that in order to restore the socially desirable incentives and minimise the use of public resources, it is not enough to work on preventing bank failures by adopting appropriate regulatory and supervisory policies, but rather it is also necessary to be able to deal with non-viable banks in an orderly fashion and obviate the perverse dilemma between two important public policy objectives: preserving financial stability and protecting taxpayers’ money. To that end, the constructive ambiguity approach must be replaced by clear resolution rules which can be credibly specified ex-ante and swiftly implemented ex-post.
June and the first half of July showed the first signs of weakening inflationary pressure, this is still not enough to speak of a steady decline in the inflation rate. In July, households’ inflation expectations continued to rise. In these conditions, even one-off factors might have a longerlasting impact due to their secondary effects. To prevent this, it is essential to create conditions that would encourage the propensity to save. For this, we need higher interest rates. We should not tolerate high inflation expectations in order to prevent their anchoring at this high level and avoid a more significant increase in the key rate that would be needed further on in this case. The second topic is the economy. According to our estimates, economic growth sped 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  up considerably in the second quarter. High-frequency indicators show that Russia’s economy has bounced back to its pre-crisis levels. Output in two-thirds of the major industrial sectors already exceeds pre-crisis levels, and this upward trend continues. Oil production has not restored yet. Output has also not recovered in international air transportation and hotel and restaurant business. However, this was due to remaining anti-pandemic restrictions, rather than insufficient demand. Moreover, the pandemic drastically affected the structure of demand and supply. In my previous statement, I mentioned the changes caused by the transfer of a significant portion of employees to work from home, as well as the elevated level of inventories now formed by companies.