For instance, we could set the necessary incentives through the remuneration of digital euro holdings, to make sure the digital euro is an attractive means of payment, not a form of investment.14  What next? Exploring design options, consulting the public and working together Our report also describes the design options we are considering. We will explore all aspects of different options: whether they are technically feasible, whether they comply with the principles and policy objectives of the Eurosystem, and whether they satisfy the needs of prospective users. But introducing a digital euro is more than a technical question. The value of money – in both physical and digital forms – is rooted in citizens’ trust. Acceptance by the public is crucial. For this reason, today we are launching our public consultation. We are seeking feedback on the design and on the financial and social issues surrounding the possible introduction of a digital euro. We welcome everyone’s views: citizens, merchants, the non-financial sector, professionals from the financial industry, technology companies, and academics. We encourage everyone to take part. After the public consultation and a period of preparatory work, the ECB’s Governing Council will decide – towards the middle of 2021 – whether to initiate a fully-fledged project that should lead us to define the specific characteristics of a digital euro and get ready for a possible launch. This journey will require prudence and perseverance. Conclusion Let me conclude. Since the introduction of the euro, the ECB has been responsible for preserving citizens’ trust in our currency.
This is a strengthening compared to the earlier agreement among the euro area countries, changing the requirement from targeting the cyclically adjusted deficit to targeting an improvement in the structural deficit. When deciding the adjustment path, public investment and structural reforms can be taken into account. If structural reforms are to be taken into account, they should have a large and proven positive effect on the economy and there should be a safety margin to the 3% deficit floor. My view is that there is a possibility to use the newly defined MTOs in a wise manner, more closely adapted to the situation of the individual country. However, the scope for interpretation is so large that there is a high risk of lax and uneven implementation. The experiences of the first year indicate that some member states have more ambitious MTOs than required by the Pact. This is often countries with their own national budgetary rules, such as Sweden, which comprise MTOs. At the same time,  2  BIS Review 88/2006  there are other member states who need to do more to achieve their MTOs. The measures are often postponed too far ahead and are not sufficiently explicit and concrete. Changes in the corrective arm The third part of the changes refers to what happens when a country has an excessive deficit. As before, exemptions can be granted if the country is suffering from a severe economic downturn that it could not foresee, so called exceptional circumstances.