The longer inflation is deliberately allowed to deviate from 2 per cent, the greater the risk that one begins to question what target the bank really has. We have seen elements of this in the recent debate on monetary policy in Sweden. This could also have significance for how the central banks’ principals perceive the way monetary policy is conducted, which can ultimately affect the banks’ mandate and position. The Riksbank has a mandate to work independently to maintain price stability and, without prejudice to this, to support the goals of general economic policy. On the one hand, this means that it is up to the Riksbank to determine which risks are relevant for its decisions. But on the other hand, the Riksbank is accountable to the Riksdag, which determines the Riksbank’s mandate. The Riksbank therefore needs to be able to show in a convincing manner that the trade-offs it makes are anchored in its mandate. And given the current mandate, it may be a problem if one accepts deviations from the inflation target over a long period of time. If the trade-offs in monetary policy are not clear and concrete, it will be difficult to assess whether it has been conducted in a reasonable manner and within the mandate. The costs are clear, but what have we gained?
Karolina Ekholm: Why Swedish monetary policy needs to be more expansionary Speech by Ms Karolina Ekholm, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at Almega (employer and trade organisation for the Swedish service sector), Stockholm, 15 November 2013. *  *  *  The views expressed in this speech are my own and are not necessarily shared by the other members of the Executive Board of the Riksbank. I would like to thank Björn Andersson who has helped in writing the speech. Accompanying charts can be found at the end of the speech. Interest in central banks and monetary policy has been greater than normal since the financial crisis. Here in Sweden, much of this interest has concerned the disagreement among the Executive Board on the level of the interest rate, where I have been one of those who has consistently voted for a more expansionary monetary policy. I have mostly voted for a repo rate that is 0.25 percentage points lower and a repo-rate path that rises more slowly. One might of course think that the difference between this and the repo rate and repo-rate path decided on is so slight that it would not have any effect on the outcome. However, behind this apparently marginal difference in the view of what the repo rate should be is a fundamental difference in the view of the role of the central bank and the route monetary policy should take in the new economic landscape emerging in the wake of the financial crisis.