How large a stake these strategic investors will be allowed to take will depend on what they are able to contribute to the exchange in terms of business alliances, technology or other ways of supporting the business and infrastructure of the exchange. Fund managers In addition, SGX has received indications from fund managers that they would like to hold more significant stakes in SGX than is currently permissible under the 5% cap. Fund managers are key institutional players on the buy-side of the capital markets, and will, as shareholders, add to the diverse range of groups with an interest in SGX's business. MAS will therefore generally allow fund managers who invest pools of customer funds to hold SGX's shares beyond the 5% limit. They will have to apply to MAS for approval first. The combined holdings of such a fund manager will be capped at 10%. A fund manager, however, cannot expect to be represented on the SGX Board unless it has a substantive, strategic relationship with the Exchange. Proposed changes to the prospectus registration regime The Companies Act requires every company seeking to raise funds via a public offer to issue a prospectus to inform potential investors of the financial status of the company, its business plans, the risks of investing in the company, and all other material information which will enable them to make informed investment decisions. Currently, companies submit their draft prospectuses to the Registry of Companies and Businesses (RCB) to be vetted for compliance with the Companies Act.
There is a generally-accepted principle that looking a few years ahead, CPIF inflation is the relevant operational measure of inflation. The reason for this is that in the short term, CPI inflation is affected directly by the Riksbank’s own repo-rate adjustments and monetary policy should not react to these temporary effects. CPIF inflation does not include these effects. In the longer run, these effects largely cancel one another out, and then it is CPI inflation that is relevant. 4 The point of using CPIF inflation as the operational measure is thus to best stabilise CPI inflation in the longer run. In the longer run, monetary policy should therefore be assessed with regard to how well it stabilises CPI inflation around the target and unemployment around a long-run sustainable rate. 3  The employment gap is equal to the labour-force gap (the “participation” gap) minus the unemployment gap, where the “gap” refers to the difference between the actual rate and the long-run sustainable rate. If the labour force gap is not so small that it can be ignored, the employment gap can be stabilised by more precisely stabilising unemployment around the sustainable unemployment rate minus the labour force gap. 4  This is entirely in line with the recommendations in the assessment made by Goodhart and Rochet (2011), and which the Riksbank agreed with in its consultation response.