Admittedly, our objective as regulators remains relatively simple: it should be primarily to ensure that financial institutions, infrastructures and markets properly do their job of smoothly and efficiently channelling savings into productive investments. Yet our task is difficult as finance constantly evolves as a result of technological advances or as an answer to regulatory changes. This should prompt us to be both resolute and cautious in dealing with many questions such as whether there is an optimal mix of bank and market financing. The financial crisis has indeed revealed at least three major failures of our financial systems, be they bank or market oriented: excess leverage, excess complexity and excess opacity. Corrective actions have been implemented in these three areas. First, over the past few years, Basel III and various national or regional initiatives have led to a sizeable recapitalization of the banking system and especially SIFIs [systemically important financial institutions]. In the euro area, the Comprehensive Assessment of the balance sheets of 130 major banks shows how much progress has been made. Second, major reforms have been undertaken in order to facilitate the orderly resolution of large and complex financial institutions, thus providing better incentives ex ante to these large financial conglomerates. Such progress can be seen both in Europe, where the Banking Union is a major step forward, as well as abroad. Last, the scope of regulation has been extended to products and markets that remained too opaque in spite of their systemic relevance, such as some major classes of OTC derivatives.
This means that banks are able to lend through severe economic downturns, insurers can maintain underwriting capacity in the face of a wide range of severe shocks, and financial markets are able to function, as they adjust to shocks, including the infrastructures in markets that are at the heart of the financial system in the post-crisis reforms, notably clearing houses. Much of that functioning also relies on the second plank of resilience, namely structural measures which are not designed to vary in a counter-cyclical manner, but instead apply equally at all times. For banks, this means minimum capital and leverage ratios on top of which sit buffers which are there to be used counter-cyclically in times of stress. Consistent with the idea of resilience, there are two key questions to ask about the buffers: are they sized consistent with the financial stability objective; and are they in practice usable in times of stress? We have to keep both of these questions under almost continuous review. Post-Brexit, it is necessary that we review and, where appropriate, revise the regulatory system to make it consistent with our UK specific objectives. When I say UK, however, we must recognise – as TheCityUK does – that we are a leading global financial centre. So, our financial stability objective is a global public good, as the IMF has previously noted. We must therefore continue to be closely involved in shaping international standards, and then implement them properly. I can assure you that we are doing both of these.