For example, 70 per cent of respondents in the Riksbank's financial market survey believe that the securities purchases have contributed negatively or very negatively to the functioning of the market. However, the costs of such negative side effects are hardly comparable to the value of avoiding a prolonged recession. The losses in the first purchasing phase are offset by gains for the state Nevertheless, I would like to try to evaluate the narrower and more direct effects of our purchases of government bonds, purchases which were largely decided prior to the pandemic. In Flodén (2016) I tried to make such an evaluation of the initial purchases.34 My calculations then indicated that the purchases of government bonds in phase 1 led to the government's costs for new borrowing via treasury bills and government bonds falling by approximately SEK 7 billion in 20152017. The reason was that the rate on these securities was pushed down about 0.3 percentage points below the policy rate. 34 Kjellberg and Åhl (2022) present this type of update, based on market prices in April 2022. Their calculations  indicate that the overall effects on government finances will be positive, despite the losses on the Riksbank's balance sheet. In a similar assessment, the Reserve Bank of Australia notes that while their purchases during the pandemic are now leading to substantial financial losses and probably a negative capital for the Bank, the total value of purchases is nevertheless higher than the costs (Bullock, 2022).
House prices in Sweden and abroad Annual percentage change and index respectively, 2019-12 = 100  Note. Housing prices refer to the HOX Sweden price index for tenant-owned apartments and detached houses. Sources: EUROPACE, Lloyds Banking Group, Real Estate Norway, S&P Global and Valueguard. Phase 2b: Extended purchases with greater elements of broad economic stimulus The aim of the Riksbank's measures was thus to prevent problems on the financial markets from further exacerbating the country's economy in the middle of the pandemic, which was thus successful. On the other hand, the ambition was not to completely eliminate risk premiums in the financial markets, nor to contribute to rapidly increasing asset prices. It is therefore hardly controversial to note that the effects of the overall support measures were greater than intended. As I have already pointed out, developments in the housing market in particular were surprisingly strong. It was, of course, important for the housing market that the rise in risk premiums was interrupted so that credit provision was sustained and interest rates on household mortgage loans did not start to rise. The fact that the risk premiums for covered bonds in addition were lower than prior to the pandemic may have contributed to the rise in housing prices, but this was hardly the most important factor.