Article 130 prohibits the ECB and the members of its decision-making bodies from seeking or taking instructions from Union institutions or bodies, from any government of a Member State or from any other body when exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by the Treaties. In addition, under Article 130, Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, and the governments of the Member States undertake to respect this principle, and not to seek to influence the members of the ECB’s decision-making bodies in the performance of their tasks. [11] This is a very strong concept of independence from the perspective of its content (double prohibition), its legislative source (Treaty level, meaning that it is very difficult to modify), and the judicial protection granted in the event of violation (individual governors have locus standi against their Member States). The concept of central bank independence has four features institutional, instrument, personal and financial independence. [12] In view of the broadened scope of the tasks performed by http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2017/html/sp170330.en.html[03.04.2017 15:53:14]  Central bank independence revisited  central banks, they have to be viewed through a functional lens in order to be in line with the rationale of the Treaty provisions on independence. Institutional independence refers to the prohibition of the influence of third parties on the structure, functioning, decision-making, and exercise of powers of the central bank. Institutional independence implies that the central bank has a “broad discretion”[13] when making policy decisions.
For instance, if the Committee decides the interest rate on one-week maturity repo auctions is to be 16.25 percent, then it will remain as 16.25 percent unless the Committee changes this. b. In the case of liquidity shortage due to unpredicted reasons, thus leading to a decision for an intra-day repo auction, such auctions will be held at the interest rate set by the Committee via the quantity auction method. c.  Each bidder shall make an offer at most for the amount announced for that day and the funding amount to be raised via the auction will be distributed to participants according to the ratios of their bids to the auction amount..  d.  Other guidelines governing the auctions and transactions shall remain unchanged. (iv)  In the case of a temporary liquidity surplus, instead of one-week repo auctions, the Central Bank will hold reverse repo auctions with a one-week maturity subject to the same conditions and with the interest rate announced for the repo auctions. (v)  Fixed rates will be applicable only to repo and reverse repo auctions with a oneweek maturity. Repo and reverse repo auctions or other auctions with maturities longer than one-week that the Central Bank may hold within open market operations will continue to be held under the traditional method and the price/interest will be formed under market conditions.