During the Global Policy Forum in Kuala Lumpur last year, the 121 members of AFI have adopted the Sasana Accord to set quantifiable and measurable financial inclusion indicators as national targets. It is also encouraging to know that 28 OIC members have direct membership in AFI, while 4 others are indirectly affiliated through regional central banks. Further, financial inclusion solutions typically involve cross-disciplinary collaboration. Policymakers could consider a national coordination mechanism, for example, in the case of Tanzania and Mexico to effectively identify policy priorities and allocate the right resources in implementing the policies. Third, data and technology are key enablers of innovative policy solutions Robust data collection and gap analysis help policymakers to connect with realities on the ground and identify real needs for intervention. Data also facilitates monitoring and impact assessment to determine if a particular policy is achieving its intended outcome. Technology plays a critical role as it provides low cost, scalable channels to deliver financial inclusion solutions. It is particularly effective in overcoming geographical barriers to financial inclusion. The Malaysia’s experience in agent banking shows how data and technology enable innovative policy solutions. It also helps to make an informed decision on resource allocation. In 2011, the Bank conducted the Financial Inclusion Demand Side Survey to complement supply side data collected from financial institutions. Data highlighted that there was a lack in the provision of access points, as only 46% of 837 sub-districts with a population of more than 2,000 have at least one financial access point.
Unlike its peers, the leverage ratios in Turkey stayed at moderate levels  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  during the period of excess global liquidity, thanks to prudent policies of the Banking Regulatory and Supervision Agency and the Central Bank of Turkey. In fact most of those policies implemented in Turkey since 2002 are incorporated into the Basel III principles, such as countercyclical buffers (banks in Turkey are not permitted to expand unless their ratio is at least four percentage points above the legal minimum) and liquidity ratios (both in local and foreign currency). Debt level of the public sector was also reduced significantly thanks to a quite ambitious fiscal discipline. The real strength of the economy, however, came from the management of foreign exchange risks, which is the most critical aspect of a small, open economy. Thanks to prudent regulations and oversight, the overall FX position of the Turkish banking sector was balanced. Households carried a long position in FX, limiting their exposure to curreny shocks. Although the corporate sector carried a significant FX position, their debt was mainly in long term. All these factors contributed to the resilience of the Turkish economy to the global crisis, which in turn provided ample space to the Central Bank of Turkey to implement front-loaded and aggressive monetary easing without compromising price stability objective. No rescue package was needed to support the banking system. Thus, the government was able to enact modest but still quite effective counter-cyclical fiscal policies in the midst of global turmoil.