After all, information is a  2  BIS Review 2/2008  public good and rating agencies are the providers of this good. But the case for further regulation has not as yet been compelling. First and foremost, we should consider the contents of possible improvements. I would pinpoint three areas, among others, for consideration: first, greater transparency of rating methods and the overall role of rating agencies in the securitisation process. Second, a marked difference in the metric used for rating bonds and structured products, which would restore confidence in ratings. This could be done in two ways, which could also be combined: either by adopting another rating scale for structured products (with another symbol for example); or by including an additional measure in the credit rating, in particular on its volatility in times of market or liquidity stress. Third, a specific rating for liquidity risk. I am aware that rating agencies are considering this, despite the difficulties of such an exercise. We must hope that the discussions currently underway in international fora, such as the FSF and groups of central bankers in which the Banque de France is actively involved, will restore the integrity of the ratings system, given its prominent role in the development of modern financial markets. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much for your attention. BIS Review 2/2008  3
On the one hand, the central bank’s legitimacy among the general public could suffer if short-term interest rates have to move sharply, causing output to fluctuate widely while inflation is held stable and exactly on the target. Maximum stability in output could, on the other hand, result in sharp fluctuations in the rate of inflation and erode the credibility of the monetary regime. A point somewhere midway between the two extremes must therefore be found. Let me also stress the importance of central bank independence. In order to be successful with the implementation of an inflation target approach, the central bank must be able to act independently of day-to-day party politics and to set interest rates continuously according to the specified inflation target. Otherwise a credibility problem arises because it will be hard for policymakers to convince the general public of monetary policy’s long-term nature. Lack of credibility, in turn, means that the central bank has to set its interest rates higher than otherwise would have been the case. Looking ahead, I believe there are at least two major questions that central banks have to address more thoroughly. First, how should monetary policy react to asset prices, such as equity and/or real estate prices? We know from history that the development of asset prices can have a significant impact on both inflation and real economic activity.