Last autumn, for instance, the then SFBC issued decrees imposing tighter capital adequacy requirements on the big banks. In future, the capital base at these institutions will have to exceed, in good times, the minimum risk-weighted capital requirements by 100%. As a complement to this, FINMA has also introduced a “leverage ratio”, i.e. a limit to the banks’ leverage. The SNB considers that leverage of over 20 in the banking sector is not prudent and thus is undesirable in good times. In other words, we consider that, in good times, the capital base should account for at least 5% of the balance sheet total. This is in line with FINMA’s requirements. FINMA expects the big banks’ “leverage ratio” to be well over 3% at group level and well over 4% for individual institutions in good times. To prevent the capital requirements from having a procyclical impact, two steps have been taken. First, there will be a long time delay before they are implemented. The new FINMA targets will apply as of 2013 at the earliest, and an extension would be an option for the big banks if compliance becomes impossible due to the situation on the capital markets or the big banks’ individual earnings position. Second, an anticyclical element is explicitly built into the new Swiss regulations. In bad times, the big banks will be allowed to fall short of the new targets. In other words, a capital cushion will be built up in good times to absorb losses in crises.
Bank lending to households and firms is growing at almost 6% per year. This is good news, but we must avoid excesses. There are thus several efforts to be made in 2018 to ensure the smooth financing of our economy:  Remain vigilant to ensure financial stability, first and foremost. At last December's meeting of the Haut Conseil de Stabilité Financière (HCSF – High Council for Financial Stability), we decided to take a macroprudential measure to limit the sharp rise in the debt of certain large companies, including bond debt. It will apply as of 1 July after approval by the European authorities. If credit cycle risks persist – i.e. growth that is significantly higher than that justified by economic fundamentals – we stand ready to act further at any time in 2018, including if necessary by implementing a countercyclical capital buffer. Promoting the attractiveness of the Paris financial centre in the context of Brexit, second: irrespective of the possible transition, the City will most likely lose its EU passporting rights. The Paris financial centre must continue to develop, notably in the area of the clearing of financial instruments, and promote its numerous qualities, enhanced by the arrival of the EBA, in order to become the main euro area centre for market activities. This is our collective challenge, over and above announcements of welcoming registered head offices. Lastly, better channelling our savings. Overall, the French economy has no lack of financing, thanks also to the soundness of its financial institutions.