Norway’s export revenues and government revenues can be expected to be very high as long as production remains high, and as long as the global market allows producing countries to extract substantial economic rent. At the same time, we know from experience that revenues may vary sharply from year to year. As a result of the high level of earnings and fluctuations in these revenues, the most important contribution fiscal policy can make to stabilising the Norwegian economy is to provide a sound, long-term plan for the use of petroleum revenues. Attempts to use the central government budget to fine-tune economic activity may, at worst, have a destabilising effect if these attempts are perceived as being a departure from the long-term plan for the phasing in of petroleum revenues. It is necessary to show that fiscal policy can be applied symmetrically in periods of economic expansion and contraction. A year and a half ago, the Government and the Storting adopted new guidelines for economic policy, which call for an annual use of petroleum revenues equivalent to the expected real return on the Government Petroleum Fund. At the same time, the Government issued a new operational mandate for monetary policy. Norges Bank shall set the key rate with a view to maintaining low and stable inflation. Monetary Policy Regulation (1) • Monetary policy shall be aimed at stability in the Norwegian krone's national and international value, contributing to stable expectations concerning exchange rate developments.
However, the rise in salaries for white-collar workers may also reflect weak cost control in enterprises and organisations following a long period of expansion. A precondition for interplay that functions well is that monetary policy is known and remains firm. The best thing Norges Bank can do to contribute to good interplay between the various components of economic policy and wage formation is therefore to be transparent about its analyses and assessments of economic developments. 3  Various game situations between fiscal and monetary policy are described in the literature. Some of these games are discussed in Kai Leitemo (2000): “Samspillet mellom penge- og finanspolitikken under et underliggende inflasjonsmål for en liten åpen økonomi” (The interplay between fiscal and monetary policy under an underlying inflation target for a small, open economy) in Norsk Økonomisk Tidsskrift No. 2/2000, and in Erling Steigum (2000): “Samspillet mellom penge- og finanspolitikken ved et inflasjonsmål” (The interplay between fiscal and monetary policy with an inflation target) in the book Perspektiver på pengepolitikken (Perspectives on monetary policy), edited by Jan F. Qvigstad and Øistein Røisland. 4  This is the game theory known as the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. 5  Cf. descriptions in the Stackelberg equilibrium game theory.