Notes: Data for French government debt between 1934 and 1948 is not available in the IMF dataset. 41  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  41  Chart 3: Compliance with EDTF disclosure 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Pre-EDTF Report  2012  2013  Aggregate implementation  2014  UK implementation  Sources: Progress reports of the Enhanced Disclosure Task Force from 2013, 2014, and 2015; Bank calculations  Chart 4: G-SIB and D-SIB Tier 1 capital ratios Per cent  16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total  GSIBs  DSIBs  Sources: S&P Capital IQ and Bank calculations Notes: Weighted average based on a sample of 189 banks which are systematically important as of 2016. Yearly is defined as the fiscal year of reporting of the individual banks. Tier 1 Capital Ratio = Tier 1 Capital/Risk Weighted Assets  42  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  42  Chart 5: G-SIB and D-SIB leverage ratios Per cent  8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total  GSIBs  DSIBs  Notes: Weighted average based on a sample of 189 banks which are systematically important as of 2016. Yearly is defined as the fiscal year of reporting of the individual banks.
Sixth, with respect to our own crisis mitigation tools, a lesson that we can draw at this stage is that the operational framework of the Eurosystem has proved able to cope with stressed market conditions. So far, the Eurosystem has been able to manage the turmoil in an effective and flexible manner. Two ingredients of its operational framework have been particularly important: The first is the clear separation between on one hand the ECB’s management of the aggregate liquidity conditions and on the other hand the setting of its monetary policy stance, which is signalled by the minimum bid rate in main refinancing operations. This separation has been extremely valuable under present circumstances. Looking ahead, and in line with its previous communications and actions, the ECB will continue to steer very short term interbank rates close the minimum bid rate. The second ingredient is the Eurosystem’s collateral framework. The broad list of eligible assets has ensured that a broad range of counterparties could access the credit operations of the Eurosystem during the turmoil. This has helped counterparties to effectively mitigate funding liquidity risk when interbank markets stopped functioning properly. As a side effect, the acceptance of ABS in the sizeable refinancing operations has allowed to address also asset refinancing needs of counterparties effectively. This has certainly contributed to a better functioning of the money market since counterparties know that they can turn to the Eurosystem to refinance these assets.