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Instead I want to discuss how to approach some of the challenging issues faced by many central banks as we seek to decide how best to organise our work and to allocate resources in order to promote financial stability. We need to be clear, accountable and transparent as to how we devote our resources in this area. And just as the financial system becomes more complex, so the judgements as to what we do and what we do not do are increasingly difficult. That is why we need a framework – a set of organising principles – that enables us to provide context and understanding to our endeavours, to provide a source of focus and rigour to our approach, and to motivate our people. The issues are, I believe, of general application. Though you will forgive me I am sure if I start by looking at the framework within which the Bank of England, as a non-regulatory central bank with a remit for system-wide stability, addresses the vulnerabilities. 2. Challenges in Creating a Framework  i)  Monetary Policy  I want to start by considering the governance of the Bank’s accompanying mandate, the conduct of monetary policy. This highlights the clarity of our accountability in the monetary policy arena. In line with many central banks, we have a mandate in statute – the Bank of England Act – to conduct monetary policy. The Government sets a target inflation level which we are required to meet.