It could be said that the Riksbank acted as an intermediary in the sense that the banking system was able to borrow at longer maturities in order to invest in a secure and liquid asset in the Riksbank. Image 7a: The Riksbank’s balance sheet 30 June 2008 (before Lehman Brothers) Assets Gold Currency reserve  26 Banknotes & coins 158 Fine tuning  108 0  Lending USD  0 Riksbank certificates  0  Lending SEK  4 Debt to Fed  0  Other  4 Equity  59  Other  25  TOTAL  10  Liabilities  192 TOTAL  192  BIS Review 41/2009  Image 7b: The Riksbank’s balance sheet 31 December 2008 (after Lehman Brothers) Assets Gold Currency reserve Lending USD Lending SEK Other  TOTAL  Liabilities 30 Banknotes & coins 200 Fine tuning  112 207  196 Riksbank certifikates  49  262 Debt to Fed  189  7 Equity  59  Other  84  700 TOTAL  700  If we compare the balance sheets at the end of June and the end of December 2008 – that is before and after Lehman Brothers applied for bankruptcy protection – we can see that lending in Swedish kronor increased by approximately SEK 260 billion. This is reflected on the liabilities side by the increase in the Riksbank's fine-tuning facility, where the banks deposit their surplus liquidity overnight, as well as the increase in Riksbank certificates with a maturity of one week.
May I also again urge governments to implement decisively the structural reform agenda, both within the area of fiscal expenditures and revenues and in labour and product markets. Such action is needed to enhance potential output growth over the medium term. At the same time, the prompt implementation of structural reforms would contribute towards strengthening confidence in the euro area and thereby support economic growth in the short term. We are now at your disposal for questions. 2  BIS Review 64/2002