BIS Review 126/2010  9  Table 2 Economic growth and inflation (annual change, percent) 2010 (f)  2011 (f)  GDP Domestic demand Domestic demand (w/o inventory change) Gross fixed capital formation Total consumption Goods and services exports Goods and services imports Current account (% of GDP)  2008 3,7 7,6 7,5 18,6 4,0 3,1 12,2 -1,5  2009 -1,5 -5,9 -2,8 -15,3 1,8 -5,6 -14,3 2,6  5.0-5.5 16,1 11,3 21,2 8,3 -0,3 26,3 -1,1  5.5-6.5 6,2 7,4 13,6 5,3 6,1 6,4 -2,5  Average CPI inflation December CPI inflation CPI inflation in around 2 years (*)  8,7 7,1  1,6 -1,4  1,7 3,9  3,3 3,2  Average CPIX inflation December CPIX inflation CPIX inflation in around 2 years (*)  8,4 8,6  2,8 -1,8  0,8 3,5  3,6 3,5  Average CPIX1 inflation December CPIX1 inflation CPIX1 inflation in around 2 years (*)  7,8 7,7  2,8 -1,1  -0,3 1,5  3,0 3,2  2012 (f)  3,0  3,1  3,0  (f) Forecast. (*) Inflation forecast to the third quarter of 2012. Source: Central Bank of Chile.
It will therefore be critical to ensure, in the context of the EMIR implementation, that information-sharing within the colleges will effectively address not only the micro-prudential concerns of authorities but also the need for appropriate macroprudential analysis. Second, another important concern regarding the institutional setting is the fact that global cooperative oversight arrangements for central counterparties are still lagging significantly behind what has been agreed in the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures. Indeed, the respective gap between the EU level and the global level is striking in this regard. In the European Union, given the introduction of legally binding requirements for central counterparty supervisors to cooperate and consult with all relevant authorities – including central banks, supervisors of major clearing banks and supervisors/overseers of interoperable infrastructures – cooperative oversight arrangements for all EU central counterparties, in the form of EMIR colleges are currently being set up. At a global level, however, virtually no progress in cooperative oversight or even in terms of pure informationsharing has been achieved for several major global central counterparties outside the European Union. This is a key concern especially in the field of OTC derivatives, given the global nature and interconnectedness of these markets. Indeed, if we want to ensure that the introduction of mandatory clearing is implemented in a way that ensures that central counterparties manage systemic risk effectively, it is not enough that they are supervised and overseen in their home jurisdiction.