The interest rate in the overnight interbank market is now even lower, close to zero. Second, we have acted to prevent an abrupt reduction in the supply of credit to the real economy. We have given banks unrestricted access to central bank funding in all our refinancing operations. We have extended significantly the average maturity of these operations. We have broadened the set of eligible collateral. This assurance of funding to banks has prevented disorderly deleveraging in the financial sector and averted a collapse in money and credit, with potentially severe implications for price stability, and thereby employment and growth. All these decisions have ensured price stability and stabilised inflation expectations during an exceptional period. Naturally, the ECB is aware of the challenges arising from a protracted period of low policy rates and ample liquidity. Let me elaborate on the three main challenges. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  The first is that low interest rates may affect the ability of savers and investors to generate returns. This is especially the case for institutions targeting nominal returns, such as insurance companies and pension funds. Yet, by ensuring price stability throughout the crisis, monetary policy has contributed to more stable financial conditions. This is central to the interests of savers and investors: there can only be sustainable returns in a stable environment. The second challenge relates to incentives. A protracted period of low interest rates and ample liquidity facilitates rolling-over loans at very low costs.
The establishment of a Single Resolution Mechanism Let me turn to your second chosen topic, the establishment of a Single Resolution Mechanism. The Single Resolution Mechanism should be centred in a Single Resolution Authority with a European Resolution Fund at its disposal. I welcome the European Council’s December statement that during the course of 2013, the Commission will submit a proposal for such a mechanism for Member States that are participating in the Single Supervisory Mechanism. The ECB shares the European Council’s view on timing for the Single Resolution Mechanism, namely that it will be required once bank supervision is effectively moved to the Single Supervisory Mechanism. We therefore welcome the European Council urging the co-legislators to examine the proposal as a matter of priority with the intention of adopting it during the current parliamentary cycle. There are four main reasons for a Single Resolution Mechanism, with a Single Resolution Authority at its centre. The first reason is that only a Single Resolution Authority will ensure timely and impartial decision-making focused on the European dimension. In a situation where a cross-border resolution is required, the Single Resolution Authority would avoid national focus and pursue the optimal resolution strategy, thus mitigating coordination problems. The second reason is that the Single Resolution Authority would credibly pursue the least cost resolution strategy, assessing possible cross-border spillover effects and systemic concerns, and ensuring that resolution costs are first and foremost borne by the private sector. It would thereby minimise resolution costs without recourse to taxpayer money.