In fact, such an EU fund would be better diversified than the national funds are today, which all else equal would enable it to charge lower fees or hold a bigger risk-adjusted buffer. In the event of really large banks or several large banks failing, there could be an established system of committed drawing rights, where the EU fund has the right to raise funds through national governments’ ability to raise tax. Regarding liquidity support, the ECB would be given the role as lender of last resort. To convince national governments to commit such guarantees would of course demand very strict and well thought-out rules governing what actions the EU fund should be allowed to take in the case of a bank failure. These rules could be inspired by the US FDIC’s very strict mandate to always choose the least cost solution. Among other things, this would in some cases mean allowing shareholders as well as uninsured depositors and debt holders to lose their money. Since to my knowledge most EU countries lack the rules on how to handle large bank failures, it would also be very positive from a contingency planning and moral hazard point of view. With a strong legal framework, the EU would be able to let investors in even the biggest banks take full financial responsibility.
In short, more Basel III now, rather than a hypothetical and delayed Basel IV. However, there are two issues to consider: the increased speed of deposit withdrawals connected with digitalisation and social networks - raises new challenges. None of the ideas put forward on this subject are clear-cut, but none should be taboo. Moreover, the lack of liquidity and transparency in the single-issuer CDS market must no longer give rise to systemic risks: as a first step, we must ensure a better understanding of the transactions, the participants and the correlation risk with other financial instruments. Let me now turn to supervision. Why did Credit Suisse fail despite meeting the requirements of Basel III? The answer is clear: good regulation is necessary; but it is never enough. A Highway Code - regulations -, even the best one in the world, will only be effective if the traffic police - supervisors - are efficient. Risks generated by specific business models should lead to stricter requirements. This is precisely the spirit of "Pillar 2" of the Basel framework. Supervision can and must be responsive, intrusive - including with on-site inspections -, exercised by highly qualified professionals, and applied forcefully. This is not wishful thinking: this active supervision is one of the greatest success stories of our European Banking Union. The SSM demonstrates the benefits of bringing all players under one main authority only, rather than regional ones, with clearly defined responsibilities  and  coordination.