To do so would be a violation of the Treaties. Article 11 of the TFEU provides that environmental protection requirements must be “integrated into the definition and implementation of the Union's policies and activities”. This imposes an obligation on the ECB to take into account and consider the objectives of the  Climate Law when performing its tasks. In addition, Article 11 could be understood as supporting measures which incorporate environmental considerations as secondary aims. This means the ECB could rely on Article 11 to support the climate neutrality dimension of measures falling within its monetary policy or supervisory competences. But it does not go so far as to establish an autonomous competence to adopt environmental measures. In addition, under Article 7 of the TFEU, the activities and policies of the ECB need to be consistent with Union law and therefore also with the Climate Law. We have diligently assessed how these provisions of the Treaty, together with the Climate Law, affect our tasks, always being guided by and staying within our mandate. The ECB is not an environmental policy institution. The ECB is a central bank and banking supervisor. As such, let me share with you what we have done to reflect these legal requirements in the common fight against the climate crisis within our mandate. First of all, when defining and implementing monetary policy, we need to take into account environmental protection requirements, such as the climate-neutrality objectives contained in the Climate Law. And that is what we have done.
However, beyond these basic principles, what is the appropriate monetary policy stance for achieving both financial stability and the dual mandate of maximum employment and price stability? With inflation running well below our 2 percent longer-run target and the unemployment rate still well above its normal long-term level, appropriate monetary policy dictates that low real interest rates should prevail until the economy is further along a sustainable path to its potential level and inflation is closer to target. Nonetheless, it is common to hear the  1  Because of some differences in product coverage and statistical methodologies, total CPI inflation tends to average 1/4 to 1/2 percentage points higher than total PCE inflation. Hence, the FOMC’s 2 percent target on total PCE inflation would translate to a 2.3 percent to 2.5 percent target for total CPI inflation. 2  I recently discussed the costs of too-low inflation and the implications of having a 2 percent inflation target in a January 15 speech; see Evans (2014). BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  argument that these highly accommodative monetary policies might sow the seeds of financial instability. The fear is that excessive and persistently low interest rates would lead to excessive risktaking by some investors. For instance, some firms, such as life insurance companies and pension funds, are under pressure to meet a stream of fixed liabilities incurred when interest rates were higher.3 (And perhaps these liabilities were offered at somewhat generous terms to begin with.)