(b) From 1940–1974 the total assets of the 3 largest clearing banks are used from the Bankers’ Magazine and banks’ published accounts. Bank observations are linearly interpolated between observations. (c) Total UK assets of the three largest UK owned banks are used after 1974 from Bank of England data. Chart 8: Holding periods in bank equities  Source: Bloomberg and Bank calculations. Notes: Average holding period of equities for a sample of 30 banks. BIS central bankers’ speeches  23  Chart 9: Market-based measures of capital ratios(a)(b)(c)(d)  Sources: Capital IQ and Bank calculations (a) “Crisis” banks are a set of major financial institutions which in autumn 2008 either failed, required government capital or were taken over in distressed circumstances. These are RBS, HBOS, Lloyds TSB, Bradford & Bingley, Alliance & Leicester, Citigroup, Washington Mutual, Wachovia, Merrill Lynch, Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, Goldman Sachs, ING Group, Dexia and Commerzbank. The chart shows an unweighted average for those institutions in the sample for which data are available on the given day. (b) The “no crisis” institutions are HSBC, Barclays, Wells Fargo, JP Morgan, Santander, BNP Paribas, Deutsche Bank, Crédit Agricole, Société Générale, BBVA, Banco Popular, Banco Sabadell, Unicredit, Banca Popolare di Milano, Royal Bank of Canada, National Australia Bank, Commonwealth Bank of Australia and ANZ Banking Group. The chart shows an unweighted average for those banks in the sample for which data are available on the given day.
Andrew G Haldane: Control rights (and wrongs) Text of the Wincott Annual Memorial Lecture by Mr Andrew G Haldane, Executive Director, Financial Stability, of the Bank of England, Westminster, London, 24 October 2011. *  *  *  The views are not necessarily those of the Bank of England or the Financial Policy Committee. I would like to thank Evangelos Benos, Fergus Cumming, Jonathan Grant, Sam Harrington, John Lane, Iryna Kaminska, Priya Kothari, Fiona Mann, Vasileios Madouros, Roland Meeks, Joseph Noss, Peter Richardson, Victoria Saporta, Rhiannon Sowerbutts, Mervyn Tang, Matthew Willison and Peter Zimmerman for comments and contributions. Introduction It is a great pleasure and privilege to be presenting this year’s Wincott lecture. Banks are special. That has long been recognised in the design of their ownership, governance and regulation. This special status can have strange consequences. The historical distribution of risks and returns in banking is one. For a century, both risks and returns have been high. But while the risks have typically been borne by wider society, the returns have been harvested by bank shareholders and managers. The experience of the past two decades illustrates well this imbalance. In 1989, the CEOs of the seven largest banks in the United States earned on average $ million. That was almost 100 times the median US household income. By 2007, at the height of the boom, CEO compensation among the largest US banks had risen almost tenfold to $ million.