Second, financial instability can impair the linkage between monetary policy and financial conditions. The central bank may move to a much more accommodative monetary policy stance, but this may not lead to much improvement in financial conditions. We see this clearly in spreads and risk premia during periods of financial stress. Depletion of capital in the banking system or the interaction of frictions and market failures may also lead to constraints on the availability of credit following a financial shock. As a recent U.S. example of the second issue, households with lower FICO scores have had difficulties in refinancing  1  Krishna Guha, Marc Saidenberg and others on my staff contributed to these remarks. 2  As always, what I have to say here today reflects my own views and not necessarily those of the FOMC or the Federal Reserve System. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  their mortgages or in obtaining new mortgages to purchase a home. This stems from worries by lenders about put back risk – that such mortgages might be put back to them by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac should the mortgages become nonperforming. For any given reduction in mortgage rates relative to normal levels, this reduces the support for the housing sector and consumption. Thus, another lesson of the crisis is that monetary policymakers need to be more attuned to how the condition of the financial system influences how monetary policy changes affect financial conditions. Third, the linkage between financial conditions and aggregate demand may also be impaired.
Across the market, reserve releases continue to run at high levels by historical standards.   Insurers may be underestimating risks, particularly on new business. For example, they may be too sanguine about catastrophe risks, such as significant weather events.   Terms and conditions are loosening.   Insurers may be tempted to expand into new lines of business with apparently more attractive returns. But these may fall outside their knowledge and expertise. Over the course of 2017, we will carry out a number of supervisory initiatives to deepen our understanding of how individual insurers are being affected by these conditions. Our overall expectation remains that firms (and their Boards) are the first line of defence and accountable for the risks written on their balance sheets, regardless of distribution channel used. Where insurers participate in delegated underwriting arrangements, we will expect them to retain the ability to understand the impact of business written through these channels on their overall risk profile. Our specific work this year includes:   Reviews of underwriting and exposure management for selected lines of business at a number of large London Market insurers. In the course of these, we will seek to understand how changes in terms and conditions are carried through to planning, reserving and capital assessment. Where these insurers delegate aspects of underwriting through broker facilities, managing general agents or other arrangements, we will also assess whether they have sufficient information and control to manage their risks effectively.