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Paul Tucker: Remarks on “Making Monetary Policy by Committee” Discussant remarks by Mr Paul Tucker, Executive Director and Member of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England, on “Making Monetary Policy by Committee” by Alan Blinder, at the Bank of Canada Conference “International experience with the conduct of monetary policy under inflation targeting”, Ottawa, 22-23 July 2008. * * * Central banking involves a lot of learning – by doing, by thinking, researching, and by comparing ourselves with our peers. At the core of that learning process is exchanges amongst central bankers themselves, much of it in Basel. The other rich seam is the academic literature. But relatively few turn (or return) to scholarly reflection after periods of alternatively practising and theorising about central banking. Alan Blinder has therefore provided a signal service, since stepping down as Vice Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, through his series of papers on monetary policy practice and how it both draws on and fuels theory. Today’s paper, on the role of committees in the making of monetary policy 1, places central banks into categories Blinder first set out a few years ago: single decision taker; autocrat-led college; genuinely-collegial; individualistic. It is especially interesting to the Bank of England, where for just over a decade we have operated a one-member/one-vote system for deciding our policy rate. As Blinder rightly says, comparatively speaking, this is clearly at the ‘individualistic’ end of the spectrum, and is a rare example of the species.