*** To conclude, let me briefly recap: (i)  The lack of economic coordination has a high growth cost for Euro area citizens, of several points of GDP  (ii)  Between complete integration – monetary policy type – and solely “monitored” national policies – as at present –, the missing link is a full coordination of fiscal and structural policies  (iii)  This full coordination can only be achieved by setting up a legitimate decision-making institution, embodied by a Finance Minister of the euro area, in charge of elaborating its “collective economic strategy”. Robert Mundell, father of the theory of optimal currency areas, did acknowledge that the euro area was far from optimal. Yet he remained confident, saying: “it will be achieved because, for Europe, it isn’t just the best game in town, it’s the only game.” Economic policy as a whole, not central banking alone, is indeed the only game in town. Of course, we always face the risk of failure when conducting far-reaching reforms. Yet we cannot afford another missed opportunity and we have to act swiftly without losing a longer term view. For EMU, for its citizens, 2016–2017 is the decisive time to act. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches
The second error to avoid is to tackle the effects deriving from a supply shock, like that connected to the increase in the oil price, with policies to stimulate demand. If the increase in oil price and other commodities is protracted, anticyclical policies simply postpone the adjustment by several months, making it more expensive. From the first oil shock – in the mid-1970s – it is possible to gain very clear insights that ought not to be forgotten. The comparison between the experience of Germany, which avoided using monetary and fiscal policy to compensate for the loss in purchasing power caused by the increase in oil price, and that of Italy, which instead sought to stimulate domestic demand is illuminating. The German economy and that of other countries which followed the same path emerged stronger from that difficult phase of adjustment than countries like Italy which followed the illusions of Keynesianism and only engineered a higher inflation rate. 1 The depreciation of the exchange rate did not allow to increase market share on a sustainable basis. Italy is still paying for that error, with a public debt above 100% of GDP and a debt burden that weighs heavily on taxpayers. The third error that history invites us not to repeat is to put up protectionist barriers to stop or impede the economic and financial integration under way at global level. Experience shows that such measures damage economic growth and tend to worsen crises. The 1929 crisis  1  See Figures 1-4 in the Annex.