Figure 12 Monetary impulse and fiscal packages 4.5 Korean Republic  Fiscal stimulus packages in 2009 (% GDP)  4.0 3.5 3.0 2.5  China Canada  Japan  Germany  1.5  Indonesia  1.0  Mexico  France  0.5  Italy  0  -200  Chile U.S.A.  Australia  2.0  0.0  Russia  India  -400  South Africa Argentina United Kingdom Turkey  Brazil  -600  -800  -1,000  -1,200  Current MPR versus maximum MPR during 2007-2009 (basis point) Sources: Central Bank of Chile, Bloomberg, International Monetary Fund and Finance Ministry. 12  BIS Review 9/2010  Table 1 Economic growth and current account (annual change, percent) 2007  2008  2009 (f)  2010 (f)  GDP National income  4.7 7.1  3.2 3.8  -1.9 -2.3  4,5 - 5,5 7.5  Domestic demand Domestic demand (w/o change in inventories) Gross fixed capital formation Total consumption Goods and services exports Goods and services imports  7.8 8.2 12.0 7.1 7.6 14.9  7.4 7.9 19.5 4.2 3.1 12.9  -7.4 -3.3 -16.1 1.5 -4.1 -15.7  8.9 4.6 8.2 3.5 5.4 14.3  Current account (% of GDP)  4.4  -2.0  2.1  0.6  (f) Forecast. Source: Central Bank of Chile.
For policymakers this has created enormous challenges, as it has for firms, which have had to adjust almost overnight. Technology – the internet in particular – has proved indispensable for remote working, commerce and education. Digital laggards have had to invest in appropriate technologies, such as video conferencing, and accelerate the digitalisation of their customer interfaces and supply chains. Because of this significant investment, remote work and e-commerce will probably remain more common after the COVID-19 crisis ends. The pandemic is thus likely to have accelerated the trend towards a digital economy. One obvious example, which is relevant for central banks, is payments. Although cash payments are still very common in Switzerland, online payments and contactless payments have significantly increased because of the pandemic. We can see similar trends in other areas of interest for central banks. For example, the rise of ‘big data’ and digitalisation is affecting the financial system and financial markets. Before turning to these developments and how they affect the work of the SNB, we would like to reflect on just how extraordinary the COVID-19 pandemic shock has been and how unconventional the policy responses have had to be. COVID-19: new shock, new crisis The COVID-19 pandemic triggered an unprecedented economic shock and extreme uncertainty. The need for social distancing and the strict lockdown measures required to contain infections resulted in a sharp drop in consumption and production around the globe.