Our scope of responsibilities and stakeholder groups have also expanded in tandem. In order to ensure continuous integrity safeguards, the Bank has refreshed its framework and guidelines to include the procurement process, project management and whistle blowing to mitigate current and emerging project risks. Third parties which are engaged by the Bank must adhere to ethical practices as outlined in the vendor code of conduct, to be made publicly available soon. In closing, I would like to express my deep appreciation to Assistant Commissioner Tuan Mohan and his colleagues from MACC. We are very privileged to have had the opportunity to benefit 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  from their insight and experience and it will help us do our part in combating corruption. May this occasion foster an even closer cooperation between the Bank and MACC, and herald many more joint events to come. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
I have since had reason to go through what happened when confidence was restored in the Swedish economy and economic policy. Despite the decision on budget consolidation essentially being taken by the Government and Parliament in autumn 1994, it took some time before various figures believed it would succeed. The first international recognition of our policy came from the European Commission in spring 1995. I accompanied Göran Persson to Brussels and gave an account of Sweden’s convergence programme to Giovanni Ravasio, who was one of the leading economists at the Commission. Each member state of the EU was to draw up a convergence programme that would show what policy they intended to conduct to achieve stable public finances, low inflation and low interest rates. The Swedish convergence programme was aimed at achieving balance in public finances in 1998, and had the broad support of all of the parties in Parliament with the exception of the Left Party. Ravasio was convinced that the programme was sustainable. 4  BIS Review 21/2006  It was possible to see in the financial markets that the interest rate differential between Swedish and German long-term bonds began to decline in spring 1995 when the Swedish convergence programme had been decided and even more so in autumn 1995, when it had been approved by the EU’s finance ministers. For the Riksbank it took until the beginning of 1996 before short-term interest rates began to be cut. The krona was still weak during 1995 and inflation was close to 3 per cent.