The European Central Bank, meanwhile, indicated towards the end of the year that further extensive monetary policy easing measures would be necessary in the euro area. Against this background, the US dollar began to appreciate and the euro came under strong downward pressure. Because of the minimum exchange rate, the Swiss franc also depreciated against the US dollar. This caused pressure on the minimum exchange rate against the euro to rise very substantially and made increasingly large interventions necessary. Instead of broad-based Swiss franc strength, we were faced – to an ever greater degree – with pronounced euro weakness. In this fundamentally changed environment, the minimum exchange rate was no longer sustainable. Had the SNB attempted to maintain the minimum exchange rate, it would have lost control of its balance sheet and, with it, monetary conditions in Switzerland, because of the increasing magnitude of the interventions. Consequently, on 15 January 2015, the SNB discontinued the minimum exchange rate. To cushion the upward pressure, the SNB simultaneously lowered the interest rate on sight deposits to –0.75%. It also stressed that it was willing to intervene in the foreign exchange market as necessary. These were no empty words, as can be seen from our foreign currency purchases, which amounted to more than CHF 86 billion last year. A large portion of these occurred during the period immediately before and after the discontinuation of the minimum exchange rate. The Swiss franc initially shot up after the discontinuation, but then stabilised. Since May 2015, it has weakened again slightly.
Further development of this framework promises to support financial and macroeconomic stability, within an overall strategy focused on achievement of our primary objective: price stability. Such considerations, in concert with the development of a new framework for macroprudential oversight, should permit to reduce the frequency, duration and economic impact of financial crises. These are themes that will be discussed in depth in the course of today’s colloquium. We have to make sure that the global financial system, as well as continental and national ones, are made much more resilient. Yet, it would be unrealistic to believe that financial crises can be eliminated. Recent experience has also demonstrated the need for central banks to be timely and agile in managing financial crises without ever – in any circumstances – losing their sense of the medium to long-term orientation to price stability. As regards the ECB, in the face of financial crisis, monetary policy was eased significantly through conventional means in late 2008 and early 2009, with key interest rates being reduced significantly. Moreover, non-standard measures, in the form of the ECB’s enhanced credit support were introduced. These aimed at maintaining an efficient transmission of monetary policy by supporting market functioning. Such measures were instrumental in the maintenance of price stability, since, in the face of downside risks to price stability, they ensured that the easing of the monetary policy stance was transmitted into a broader easing of financing conditions.