The successful implementation of postpandemic measures, when the priority will be a return to economic and social normality as fast as possible, hinges on the extent to which macroeconomic stability is preserved. When I speak of independence I do not see the central bank secluded in an ivory tower, but working actively, and combatively, under the law, with the fiscal authority, with the government. Based on my experience, I do not think there is a better alternative to a balanced, coherent fiscal and monetary policy mix. And central bank independence implies accountability vis-à-vis the law, the mandate, the society. Or, in the words of 19th-century Romanian writer and politician Costache Negruzzi, the central bank needs to ‘stand accountant’ for what it does. By encroaching upon central bank independence, in favour of political decisions seeking shortterm electoral gains, the real costs will be borne from an economic and social perspective, in the long run, by the entire country. A recent study published by the European Central Bank, titled The Case for Central Bank Independence, shows that – while the de jure independence has largely remained intact – the de facto independence has deteriorated in almost half of the sample of central banks under review. This is a fact and, for me, it is a matter of concern. I shall not comment on it. Looking at central banking history that spans more than three centuries, I hope this is part of the long cycle of ups and downs in terms of central bank independence.
One field where this is all the more obvious, because it has to do with competition on the global market, is the management of forex reserves. In principle, they ensure – especially in the case of emerging economies – the resources to overcome external imbalances and to safeguard a relative stability of the domestic currency’s exchange rate around economic fundamentals. The reallocation of reserves for discretionary use and their monetisation strongly erode these essential equilibria, significantly impairing market functionality and the credibility of the central bank and of any government, ultimately to the detriment of society itself. Maintaining and managing an adequate level of international reserves, through the competence and professionalism of the central bank, shelter the country from terrible crises; take this right away and the country is left to the mercy of the winds. For all these reasons, in the context of extensive debates internationally on the importance of central bank independence – debates that I am aware of and I am not contesting –, I plead for the independence of central banks, but also for an institutional balance between central banks and fiscal authorities, as parts of the executive power. Macroeconomic stability – a key prerequisite for sustainable economic and social development – is ensured when there is a balance between the monetary policy and the fiscal policy. Altering the well-established institutional rapports, in times of crisis, may pose a serious risk for the future.