All the more, ad hoc policy meetings based on ad hoc policy documents should be minimized. This not only helps the central bank in its communication with the public, but also helps the decision-making body to maintain internal discipline. Separateness emphasizes that special attention should be paid to monetary policy in the central bank’s agenda. In order to avoid any attempt to displace the policy agenda by any other ‘extremely  1  For further details see Lombardelli, Proudman and Talbot’s article ‘Committees Versus Individuals: An Experimental Analysis of Monetary Policy Decision Making’, published in International Journal of Central Banking, Vol. 1, No. 1, May 2005. BIS Review 88/2005  1  important’ issue, separate meetings should be established for policy discussions. Indeed, a policy decision is worth a special ‘policy day’, split into: (i)  a staff presentation, when staff present the outcome of their analysis (based on a standard set of policy documents)  (ii)  a discussion of the analysis  (iii)  the policy decision  (iv)  communication of the decision to the public  Staff independence should protect the members of the decision-making body from the filtering of undesirable information which can occur whenever a particular decision maker directly manages the ‘Economic Department’. Although such behaviour is, with high probability, not intentional, this member can influence the interpretation of the ‘staff’ analysis in a way convenient to his own opinions. It could happen that the rest of the decision-making body members receive a biased analysis.
All this confirms my main contention that the current environment, per se, creates no reason for delay. Conclusion Let me conclude. The economic outlook for the euro area is brighter today than it has been for seven long years. Monetary policy is working its way through the economy. Growth is picking up. And inflation expectations have recovered from their trough. This is by no means the end of our challenges, and a cyclical recovery alone does not solve all of Europe’s problems. It does not eliminate the debt overhang that affects parts of the Union. It does not eliminate the high level of structural unemployment that haunts too many countries. And it does not eliminate the need for perfecting the institutional set-up of our monetary union. But what the cyclical recovery does achieve is to provide near perfect conditions for governments to engage more systematically in the structural reforms that will anchor the return to growth. Monetary policy can steer the economy back to its potential. Structural reform can raise that potential. And it is the combination of these demand and supply policies that will deliver lasting stability and prosperity. BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  11  12  BIS central bankers’ speeches