Sveriges Riksbank (2020a), “Financial Stability Report 2020:1”, Sveriges Riksbank Riksbank (2020b), “Monetary Policy Report November 2020”, Sveriges Riksbank Riksbank (2020c), ”Minutes of the monetary policy meeting in November 2020”, Sveriges Riksbank  27 [30]  Riksbank (2020d), “Monetary Policy Report April 2020”, Sveriges Riksbank Riksbank (2021) “Rapidly rising housing prices despite the coronavirus crisis”, article in Monetary Policy Report, April 2021, Sveriges Riksbank. Riksbank (2022), “Financial Stability Report 2022:2”, Sveriges Riksbank Stella, Peter and Åke Lönnberg (2008), “Issues in central bank finance and independence”, IMF Working Paper WP/08/37 Tobin, James (1958), ”Liquidity preference as behavior towards risk”, Review of Economic Studies 25(2), 65-86 Vayanos, Dimitri and Vila, Jean-Luc (2021), “A Preferred-Habitat Model of the Term Structure of Interest Rates”, Econometrica 89(1), 77-112  28 [30]  Appendix Table A1 lists the monetary policy meetings during 2015-2022, where the Riksbank decided on asset purchases. The amounts mentioned refer to nominal purchase volumes. Up to June 2019, coupons received and repayments upon the maturity were reinvested by the holder in addition to the amounts mentioned here (see, however, decision in December 2017). The Riksbank's holdings declined in 2019 and 2022, as the purchases then were less than the holdings that matured. Table A1 Policy decision meeting  Decision  (Link to meeting documentation)  My voting, if different (Link to the minutes)  February 2015  Purchase government bonds for SEK 10 billion during February-March 2015. Maturity 1-5 years. March 2015  Purchase government bonds for a further SEK 30 billion during March-May 2015. Maturity 125 years.
The liabilities side was therefore mainly not remunerated (we do not pay any interest on notes and coins), while we collected interest on government bonds. With interest rates around 4 per cent, the Riksbank could finance its current operations and yet deliver a surplus of several billion SEK a year to the central government budget. Today, the balance sheet looks completely different (see Figure 11). The balance sheet total now corresponds to 28 percent of GDP, and the liabilities side is dominated by debt securities. And since the debt has a very short maturity (overnight or one week) while the bonds on the asset side have long maturity, the interestrate risk is considerable.29 The rapidly rising interest rates recently therefore mean that the Riksbank will report a large loss this year. There are different ways of explaining how the level of interest rates affects the Riksbank's results. The easiest way is probably to use market values as a base: The Riksbank has purchased fixed-rate bonds. When interest rates rise, the market value of the bonds falls. Another approach is based on the Riksbank's liabilities side: On the assets side. the Riksbank has fixed-rate bonds. The return on bonds therefore does not change when interest rates rise. But our bond purchases have been financed by an increase in our monetary policy debt – the monetary base. In other words, we have paid for the bonds through the commercial banks having received a claim on the Riksbank.