I will end with some final remarks. Economic growth and natural resources One paramount issue in our country’s development is its concentration of natural resources and, very specially, of copper ore. The world evidence shows that there are major differences in growth rates among natural resource abundant economies. One example is Botswana, rich in diamonds, which early this decade could account for nearly 40% of GDP (Acemoglu et al., 2003). This country’s per capita GDP grew by an average 6.6% per year between 1960 and 2007, which meant that in 2007, its per capital GDP was 19 times the one in 1970. An example to the contrary is the case of Nigeria, rich in oil, yet virtually stagnant. Its per capita  BIS Review 106/2009  1  GDP increased by an average 1.2% per year over the same period, which meant that in 2007 Nigeria had barely 1.5 times its per capita GDP of 1960. It has been found that, on average, countries rich in natural resources grow less than those that are not (figure 1). Based on this evidence, much research effort has been devoted to unraveling the link between economic growth and natural resource abundance, and that is what I intend to briefly cover now. International evidence and discussions on the relationship between natural resources and economic development are varied. Some economists, mainly Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997, 2001), have argued that rather than a blessing, abundance of natural resources is a curse.
The CBT foresees that inflation will follow a fluctuating course significantly above the target and then reassume a decreasing trend in the last quarter of the year once the temporary factors taper off and come back to levels consistent with targets in the first months of 2011. In the last part of my speech, I would like to mention about the general framework of the monetary policy exit strategy that we shared with the public yesterday. As you all know, recently, one of the most discussed issues in monetary policies has been “exit strategies”, which include the withdrawing measures taken during the global crisis and normalization operations of monetary policies. We believe that the exit strategy of the CBT will be simpler and easier as no need for radical measures arose and the balance sheet structure was not damaged during the crisis period. I would like to handle the exit strategy of the CBT in two groups as foreign exchange and Turkish lira. The basic principle of the CBT on foreign exchange liquidity is that the Central Bank, which is the lender of last resort for Turkish lira and has broad flexibilities related to Turkish lira liquidity management, is not be considered as the lender of last resort for other currencies. For this reason, the banking system has to be much more discreet and prudent in its management of foreign exchange liquidity.