Before he does so, I would like to share with you my assessment of economic conditions on the mainland and in Puerto Rico. As always, what I have to say reflects my own views and not necessarily those of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) or the Federal Reserve System. National economic conditions The mainland U.S. economy has continued to slowly recover from the after-effects of the housing boom and bust and the financial crisis. But the recovery has been disappointing. Despite a monetary policy that has been extraordinarily accommodative by historical standards, the economy has grown only about 2 percent over the past year. After a brighter start to the year, economic momentum has slowed in the last few months. (This may partly be a payback for the mild winter, which brought forward some spending.) Employment growth remains positive, but has slowed considerably of late as the economy has lost forward momentum, and the unemployment rate remains elevated. The headwinds retarding recovery are well known. Many consumers have been deleveraging in response to the large losses in wealth generated mainly by the collapse in home prices. The supply of credit – particularly mortgage credit – to many families remains constrained, limiting the degree to which many households can fully benefit from low interest rates. Although there have been some positive signs in the housing market recently, housing activity nevertheless remains at very low levels.
They only move the time-consistency issue one step back - the policy rule may be abandoned, the central banker fired, the contract reinterpreted or rewritten.3 The other approach says that real central bankers do not and need not worry about time-inconsistency; they “just do it”, (Bennett McCallum, 1995). Central bankers should simply resist the temptation to deviate from the time-inconsistent policy, and private agents will eventually come to accept that resolve. Attractive as such a solution may appear to central bankers, it fails to answer the challenge posed by the game-theoretic result of Kydland and Prescott. And it fails to explain why it is that some countries in some periods just do it and others do not. Central bankers who have the determination and strength of purpose to “take the punch bowl away just when the party is getting going”, in McChesney Martin’s memorable phrase, clearly have the “right stuff” - so why don’t they “just do it”? 4 A deeper explanation of how this problem can be overcome requires an analysis of what might be called the “technology of collective decisions”. Individual agents can make contracts because they believe that the legal system is external to both parties to the contract. But it is difficult to write contracts that commit future collective behaviour. Collectively, we can either meet our previous commitments or we can ignore them.