But the effect of monetary tightening on domestic demand is limited through the processes I have described, where long rates react weakly to the increase in the policy rate. In addition, firms and households increasingly borrow in foreign currency in order to avoid even those limited increases in domestic borrowing costs that take place. This foreign currency borrowing is intermediated by the domestic banking system, where the financing is more short-term than the lending. Thus the banking system has a growing balance sheet in FX, with a maturity mismatch but limited LOLR facilities to backstop it. In short, financial risks are accumulating, both in the financial sector and among firms and households. At the same time, the economy is increasingly in an unsustainable position, with an overvalued currency and big current account deficit. The  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  whole thing then comes crashing down when foreign financing comes to a sudden stop, heralding a currency crisis and even a banking crisis as well. Before I go further, let me warn you, though, that this is only part of the explanation of the financial crisis in Iceland. The offshore activities of the banks and old-fashioned macroeconomic mismanagement were equally important, if not more so. On this topic, I refer you to other speeches and publications by myself and others. 2 What can and should be done about the problems I have laid out?
Prudential limits on banks’ FX balance sheets, in the form of specific LCR and NSFR in FX, have been imposed. In practice, this will greatly limit the size of their FX balance sheets and the associated maturity mismatch that was the proximate cause of the demise of the old banks that failed during the crisis. Finally, a tax or other equivalent measure of the type I just mentioned is being contemplated. 3 Taken together, this will amount to a very different paradigm for economic management than the one prevailing before the crisis. History will tell whether it is sufficient to preserve monetary and financial stability in the rougher seas of freer capital movements that we intend to embark upon. In any case, we need to strike a balance between dynamism and freedoms, on the one hand, and stability, on the other. Thank you very much. 3  4  Further details on these proposals can be found in Central Bank of Iceland Special Publication no. 5: Monetary policy in Iceland after capital controls, December 2010, and no. 6: Prudential rules following capital controls, report of the Central Bank of Iceland to the Minister of Economic Affairs, August 2012. www.cb.is. BIS central bankers’ speeches