In the discussion at Eidsvoll, Christian Magnus Falsen, a key member of the Constituent Assembly, said that no state can exist without a well-functioning monetary system. Another prominent member of the Assembly, Count Wedel Jarlsberg, insisted that the nation must have its own bank. The people’s elected representatives took responsibility for the monetary system, as stated in Article 75 of the Constitution: «It devolves upon the Storting to supervise the monetary affairs of the Realm». The Storting delegated the task of supervising the monetary system to Norges Bank, which was established in 1816. The king would no longer have the authority to print money at his own will. At its inception, Norges Bank’s head office was located in Trondheim, a twelve-day journey from the government in Christiania, and even farther from Stockholm, giving the central bank a geographical – and not just formal – distance from the government authorities. Much has happened since 1814. Norway no longer lags behind other western economies. Inflation is low and stable. We have established a clear division of responsibility for economic policy and well developed institutions founded on the Constitution written at Eidsvoll 200 years ago. Chart: Shift in the world’s economic centre of gravity In 1814, the great powers of Europe dominated world trade. The world’s economic centre of gravity has since then shifted westward. Today, in the 21st century, the centre of gravity is moving across the Pacific to Asia.
William C Dudley: Panel remarks at The Clearing House Annual Conference Panel remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at The Clearing House Annual Conference, New York City, 18 November 2015. *  *  *  Dianne Dobbeck, Robert Fitchette, Charles Gray, Joyce Hansen, HaeRan Kim, Kristin Malcarney and Joseph Tracy assisted in preparing these remarks. It is a great pleasure to have the opportunity to speak here today alongside my fellow Reserve Bank presidents, Loretta Mester and Dennis Lockhart. Today’s event comes almost exactly two years since I delivered a set of remarks at NYU School of Law that covered various aspects of what we know as the “too big to fail” problem. In view of some significant milestones that have occurred over the past two years, I would like today to briefly review my sense of the work that has been accomplished on this critical issue, and the work that still remains to be completed. As always, what I have to say reflects my own views and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve System. Broadly speaking, the regulatory reforms that the U.S. has adopted since the crisis have been designed to address the risks posed by large financial institutions in two related ways. First, our reforms are designed to reduce the probability that large financial institutions will fail by requiring those institutions to be more resilient to stress.