In this respect, the BCBS, which I have the honour to chair, has resolved to delay by one year (from 2022 to 2023) the implementation of the revised methodology of identification of global systemically important institutions and also the full implementation of Basel III. The BCBS has also postponed the end of the transitional period for capital requirement floors for banks using internal models to 1 January 2028. In any event, the BCBS has confirmed that all jurisdictions are committed to the full, consistent and timely transposition of the Basel III regulations in accordance with the new calendar. Second, in the accounting sphere, certain aspects relating to how the existing regulations should be applied to calculate credit risk have been clarified, to ensure that potential temporary delays in loan repayments by borrowers are not treated as if they were a case of permanent impairment of loan quality. The latter would lead to an immediate and abrupt correction in credit ratings and, therefore, to an increase in the provisions required, which  3  See P. Aguilar, Ó. Arce, S. Hurtado, J. Martínez-Martín, G. Nuño and C. Thomas (2020), The ECB monetary policy response to the COVID-19 crisis, Occasional Paper No 2026. Banco de España. 12  would ultimately lead to a decline in credit extended by banks. In exchange, especially should the crisis become prolonged, it is necessary to ensure that misuse of this flexibility does not lead to inappropriate accounting practices that may translate into delayed recognition of actual quality impairment of some credit exposures.
Occasional Paper No 2014, Banco de España, and Box 3.4 of the Annual Report 2019 of the Banco de España for a discussion of the role of a fiscal policy coordinated at European and international level in the current context. 18  receive from the fund over this period is some € billion (around 12.5% of Spain’s estimated GDP in 2020), of which almost half would take the form of direct grants, with the rest in the form of loans. These funds, appropriately channelled towards projects with the ability to transform the Spanish economy and raise its potential growth, will be fundamental to strengthen the economic recovery and reduce the possible permanent consequences of the crisis. In fact, according to Banco de España estimates,8 this fund has the potential to become an important element of support for the recovery and, especially, a unique lever to raise the Spanish economy’s low potential growth rates. Nonetheless, we would be making a huge mistake if we were to think that mere receipt of the funds will be sufficient for our country to extract the greatest possible benefit from them. First, we need to establish the capacity to design and develop a sufficient volume of new projects, so that the funds are not used to finance spending that would have taken place in any case, or to finance projects with limited added value. Second, prompt execution of these projects would help make the Spanish economic recovery more robust, once the constraints imposed by the pandemic are lifted.