If we believe the above theories, and assume that regulations impose ultimately a cost on the consumer or taxpayer, it may be in the public interest to remove regulations and allow greater competition. This is the primary driving force behind current market deregulation policies prevalent in OECD markets. A recent example of the deregulation drive to “make markets work better” is the report of the Australian Financial System Inquiry (Wallis Report), whose recommendations seek to:create a flexible regulatory structure which will be more responsive to the forces for change operating on the financial system; clarify regulatory goals; increase the accountability of the agencies charged with meeting those goals; ensure that the regulation of similar financial products be more consistent and promote competition by improving comparability; introduce greater competitive neutrality across the financial system; establish more contestable, efficient and fair financial markets, resulting in reduced costs to consumers; provide more effective regulation for financial conglomerates which will also facilitate competition and efficiency; and facilitate the international competitiveness of the Australian financial system. On the other hand, a market without regulation also does not work. Free banking and frontier capitalism results in control by the Mafia, with huge losses inflicted on the innocent and unwary. The public interest theory argues that regulation is an attempt to correct for market failures, such as monopoly, externalities and lack of information. For example, the social cost of the failure of a financial institution may be much higher than the private cost to the institution itself.
As trading position can be transformed swiftly through the use of derivatives and hence may not be reliable, regulatory focus has shifted to assess internal risk models, rather than the instruments held at a point in time. In addition to external regulation, the Group of Thirty in its 1993 study of derivatives made recommendations at strengthening risk-management techniques and procedures. Another industry initiative was JP Morgan’s decision to release its own proprietary risk-management model for general use. In addition, changing consumer behaviour resulting from aging population, for example, calls for new and sophisticated products like pension funds and long-term debt instruments. Also, consumers’ expectations are likely to be higher as they now have access to more choices from more diversified markets. Finally, de-regulation has occurred because old regulations have not prevented the massive losses incurred by worldwide bank failures. In many countries, the losses caused by bank failures have been as high as 15% of GDP, with bank losses in Japan and France at an estimated 8% of GDP. In the light of these heavy costs, governments around the world have begun to look seriously at the cost of regulation. The latest initiative include the Japanese Big Bang, which would be complete by 2000. Should the Central Bank also act as the Supervisor? There are several arguments in support of the assumption of the supervisory role by the central bank. The first is efficiency consideration.