On the basis of this rationale, it is my view that regional financial cooperation should move progressively forward, with the process being further strengthened and the work becoming more focused, aimed at producing more tangible results. Let me now spare with you my thoughts on the way forward. On this issue, I should say at the outset that the points I am going to make here are not new, and some of them are probably already familiar to you. The first is the Chiang Mai Initiative or CMI. CMI was created conceptually as a short-term financing facility to help participating members manage their balance of payments shortfalls at a time of financial distress. Although the economies of East Asia are now much stronger than five years ago, CMI should continue to remain a key pillar of regional financial cooperation. This is because it is important for the region to have its own liquidity arrangement that can be called upon when the need arises. With the crisis now behind us, we do have time to think on how best to improve the existing facility. And, one way we can approach this is to look for ways we can credibly turn the existing arrangement into a facility that emphasizes a greater level of resource commitment by participating members. This is to say that requesting members should be in a position to count on this facility when the need arises. Looking at the improvement from this angle, I think there are three ways we can reflect upon.
William C Dudley: Unconventional monetary policies and central bank independence Remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Bank of Mexico international conference “Central bank independence – Progress and challenges”, Mexico City, 15 October 2013. *  *  *  It is a pleasure to be here today. Does the implementation of unconventional monetary policies pose a threat to central bank independence? My short answer, which I will elaborate on, is that while the threat is low, central bankers need to be cognizant of such risks, and clearly explain the motivations for their actions in order to mitigate such risks. The best way for central banks to maintain their independence is to use all their available monetary policy tools to best achieve their objectives. Because the use of our unconventional monetary policy tools has been in pursuit of our dual mandate objectives of maximum sustainable employment in the context of price stability, I do not see the use of these tools as creating significant new risks to our independence. As always, what I have to say today reflects my own views and not necessarily those of the Federal Open Market Committee or the Federal Reserve System. To start, it is important to be clear on what we mean by unconventional monetary policies.