(1993), “Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence”, Journal of Money Credit & Banking, Vol. 23(2), pp. 151-62, 159; Amtenbrink, F. (1999), The Democratic Accountability of Central Banks, Hart Publishing, pp. 11-17, 23-26; and Cukierman, A., Webb, S.B., and Neyapti, B. (1992), “Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effects on Policy Outcomes”, The World Economic Review, Vol. 6(3), pp. 353-98, 383. [7]For an early contribution on the notion of a nominal anchor in the context of monetary unions, see Issing, O. (1999), “  Currency Competition and European Monetary Union”, Annual Hayek Memorial Lecture, Institute of Economic Affairs, London, United Kingdom, 27 May 1999. On the same topic, see also Hoeksma, J. (2017), “The EU and EMU as correlated institutions beyond the State”, ESCB Legal Conference 2016, pp. 335-48. http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2017/html/sp170330.en.html[03.04.2017 15:53:14]  Central bank independence revisited [8]See Articles 127(2) and 128(1) of the Treaty on the  Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and Article 5 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (Statute of the ESCB). The ECB also has an advisory function and, in this regard, it must be consulted on any proposed Union act and draft national legislative provisions in its fields of competence (Articles 127(4) and 282(5) TFEU and Article 25.1 of the Statute of the ESCB). [9]Article 127(5) TFEU.
Our philosophy is to stimulate ownership of decisions and empowerment in the investment process – and that is appreciated by our managers. Moreover, the mere importance of the mission, as formulated by our Board, "... to safeguard and grow financial wealth for future generations through highly professional management coupled with strict integrity", is attracting resources in and of itself. To wed a business culture to a central bank, with its civil service responsibilities, has posed a challenge in terms of adapting the Bank's governance system to the increased importance of professional investment management. Elements in addressing this include a strengthened focus on accountability by a clear division of responsibilities and a system of checks and balances. Maybe the most important element in our governance system is the establishment of a high degree of transparency for the public by providing open information on performance, risks, costs and investments on a timely basis. All in all, we feel the challenge of managing the Fund has enriched the organisation by forcing the central bank to think outside of the box. And perhaps the central bank perspective and values have added to the depth and long-term horizon of the investment organisation. Let me round off this presentation by recapitulating some of the main insights we have gained in the decade the Fund has existed.