The financial results accumulated over time are therefore not quite as negative as indicated by the change in value this year.32 Table 2 and Table 3 show the accumulated financial results broken down by the different phases of the purchase programme and the different assets purchased.33 Table 2. Financial result of the Riksbank's purchases in the various phases Phase 1 (decisions 2015-2019) −5 Phase 2a (decisions March 2020 – June 2020) −24 Phase 2b (decisions November 2020 – June 2022) −19 Total −47 Note. SEK billion. Refers to total results since the start of the purchases and is based on market valuation on 30 November 2022. Most of the losses that now occur can be linked to purchases during and after the pandemic (phase 2). Government bonds have fallen more in value than covered bonds this year, despite the fact that the holdings were about the same at the beginning of the year. This is because government bonds, especially those purchased in phase 2, have a longer maturity and are therefore more sensitive to changes in interest rates. Otherwise, the losses in Table 3 reflect approximately the proportion of our holdings accounted for by each asset class. Table 3. Financial results of the Riksbank's purchases of different asset types Government bonds −20 Municipal bonds −6 Covered bonds −21 Corporate bonds 0 Total −47 Note. SEK billion. Refers to total results since the start of the purchases and is based on market valuation on 30 November 2022.
The arguments against a possible Swedish membership of the EMU have often touched on the opportunity to pursue an independent stabilisation policy. The starting point for this is that the Swedish economy could for one reason or another find itself out of synch with economic developments in the eurozone, what is known as an asymmetrical shock. Having an independent monetary policy and currency would then give us the opportunity to stabilise our economy ourselves - act as a form of shock-absorber, which we will lose if we have a joint monetary policy governed by the prospects for inflation and the business climate throughout the eurozone. This was also the primary reason why the Calmfors Commission's report on the consequences of 1 Swedish membership in the EMU came to the conclusion that Sweden should wait until its labour market and wage formation showed sufficient flexibility to deal with a serious disturbance. However, it should be noted that the Commission was envisaging a “small” eurozone with around 6 countries taking part, whereas now we are talking about 12 countries, representing 40-50 per cent of Sweden's trade. Moreover, in practice the Swedish business climate has rarely come seriously out of synch with the eurozone. When Sweden has done so, it has mainly been the result of mistakes in Sweden's own economic policy and not due to any unforeseeable external disturbance that has afflicted the Swedish economy.