There were signs of that last week when the minutes from April showed that I had not voted with the Board’s majority. But as observers and market players become more accustomed to how we operate, such differences of opinion are likely to attract less attention. Still, monetary policy signalling clearly cannot be arranged in quite the same way as before and in this respect we will presumably become more like the ECB and the Bundesbank, where individual statements do not automatically constitute a collective signal from the central bank. For those who are interested in following us and our assessments, however, we strive to provide a good foundation by publishing — at intervals of approximately six weeks — either an Inflation Report or a lengthy press notice on the majority view of inflation prospects. Fiscal policies in the euro area Let me now turn to the conduct of fiscal policy in the euro area. A judicious monetary policy is not sufficient to ensure that the monetary union functions properly. The single currency will make the national economies more interconnected than before. The formation of fiscal policy in one country will affect the overall picture of economic prospects and thereby monetary policy. In the Maastricht Treaty the countries accordingly agreed on certain common rules for economic policy and these have been fleshed out with additional legislation and political agreements. Besides fixed and binding undertakings for each country, there are regular common processes for producing more general guidelines and standards for economic policy.
It means that all EU countries — and thus non-euro countries such as Sweden — are bound by the rules for fiscal policy and its surveillance after the move to Stage Three. Each country is to strive for budgetary positions close to balance or in surplus in the medium term. This is intended to allow the automatic stabilisers free play while keeping the government deficit inside the 3 per cent limit. In this way the Pact provides for some flexibility in fiscal policy, which may be particularly important when there is no recourse to exchange rate adjustments. If the budget deficit exceeds the 3 per cent limit, sanctions can ultimately be imposed on the country in question if the problems are not tackled. It is only in exceptional circumstances that this may not apply. A surveillance procedure has been established for monitoring developments; national stability programmes are to be presented at regular intervals, showing how the goals are to be fulfilled. This process is perhaps as important in practice as the threat of sanctions. The establishment of clear rules and sanctions is intended to support the forces in each country that favour a disciplined fiscal policy. The sanctions do not apply to non-euro countries and they submit convergence programmes instead of stability programmes. So what has happened so far? The assessment of convergence or stability programmes from all the EU countries this spring shows a mixed picture.