Technically speaking, this means we cannot determine an optimal commitment period for our investments. In point of fact, our investment horizon is usually relatively long-term, although it can be abruptly shortened in the event of a crisis. Finally, we also pay special attention to reputation risks when engaging in specific investments. One of  BIS Review 123/2006  1  the SNB's most important assets is its good reputation and its credibility. Damage to its reputation could also have a negative impact on monetary policy. Consequently, in cases of doubt, we avoid investment classes and instruments that may be expected to have a damaging impact on our reputation. We are also very risk-conscious when it comes to potential conflicts of interest. For instance, all staff engaged in practical investment activities are shielded from confidential monetary policy information. Effective risk management requires that all relevant risks be identified and assessed regularly, in a manner that is as unbiased as possible. Experience has shown that technical failure is seldom at the root of serious losses. The greatest losses result from a lack of risk consciousness, from a total failure even to recognise significant sources of risk. This danger exists when risk assessment is restricted exclusively to easily measurable quantitative risk variables, excluding areas such as processes or legal risks, which are referred to as 'operational risks'. For this reason, we also include operational risks in our assessment. However, while pursuing this broader route, we certainly do not neglect the regular quantitative measures for assessing financial investment risks.
We ask firms to plan on the basis that operational disruption will occur, and so the focus of our work has been on the ability of firms, FMIs , including CHAPS - run by the Bank, and the sector as a whole not only to prevent, but to ensure that they can respond to, recover and learn from operational disruptions. 8  Financial Policy Summary and Record (March 2019). Available at: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financial-policy-summary-andrecord/2019/march-2019 9 Key elements of the 2019 stress test (March 2019). Available at: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/2019/march/key-elements-ofthe-2019-stress-test 10 Building the UK financial sector’s operational resilience. Available at: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/prudentialregulation/publication/2018/building-the-uk-financial-sectors-operational-resilience-discussion-paper 4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  4  Innovation and resilience of the Bank’s own operations  The Bank, and other authorities, can provide a platform for innovation through the hard and soft infrastructure it provides. The Bank’s biggest piece of hard infrastructure is RTGS; settling around £ every day, RTGS is at the backbone of UK payments, and a piece of critical national infrastructure. RTGS eliminates settlement risks; claims between banks and other participants are able to be settled in central bank money – the ultimate liquid asset. And RTGS plays an important role in the post-trade system. CREST11 and CLS12 both settle through RTGS, enabling us to deliver safe settlement in central bank money to post-trade infrastructure. The Bank’s operation of CHAPS and RTGS contributes to meeting its financial stability remit, and our renewal of the RTGS service is another of the Bank’s strategic goals13.