Conclusion The Scottish government has stated that in the event of independence it would seek to retain sterling as part of a formal currency union. All aspects of any such arrangement would be a matter for the Scottish and UK Parliaments. If such deliberations ever were to happen, they would need to consider carefully what the economics of currency unions suggest are the necessary foundations for a durable union, particularly given the clear risks if these foundations are not in place. Those risks have been demonstrated clearly in the euro area over recent years, with sovereign debt crises, financial fragmentation and large divergences in economic performance. The euro area is now beginning to rectify its institutional shortcomings, but further, very significant steps must be taken to expand the sharing of risks and pooling of fiscal resources. In short, a durable, successful currency union requires some ceding of national sovereignty. It is likely that similar institutional arrangements would be necessary to support a monetary union between an independent Scotland and the rest of the UK. I suspect you have reached your limits of endurance of the dismal science, so you’ll be relieved to know that economics can take us no further. Decisions that cede sovereignty and limit autonomy are rightly choices for elected governments and involve considerations beyond mere economics. For those considerations, others are better placed to comment. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  References Adrian, T., and D. Gros (2004), “The degree of openness and the cost of fixing exchange rate”, Economics Letters, Vol.
Of course, the Board has to be duly informed, and some of their members should have the necessary expertise to assess these risks. Needless to say, it is not only banks that need to “catch up”; we are also working at the Banco de España to adapt to this reality. I believe it is fair to acknowledge that this is all very new for everyone in the banking sector, including certainly Central Banks and Supervisors. What are we doing? Firstly, we have created an internal function entrusted with assessing the impact we as an institution have on the environment. The aim is to identify and coordinate the necessary measures to reduce that impact. Secondly, as a macroprudential supervisor, we clearly need to be able to assess and quantify the risks that the transition towards a more sustainable economy poses, both for individual banks and the financial sector as a whole. We must be able to perform stress tests for the financial system overall and define scenarios to be applied by banks individually. 4/5  Accordingly, we are designing internal governance structures and methodologies, actively participating in the cultural shift in the SSM supervisory model. Naturally, we are also evaluating the information and data requirements needed to address this challenge. Thirdly, as investors in the debt markets, we are working to include environmental risk assessment in our credit analysis. A fourth key element is our responsibility as supervisors. We must foster the implementation of these changes in the financial sector. We cannot wait for change to occur.