But if one really thought that the repo rate should have been 0.25 per cent, it is difficult to understand why one would advocate a repo-rate path that did not turn down at all over the coming three years, but rose throughout the entire forecast period and reached 3.8 per cent in the middle of 2014.4 So what was the view outside of the Riksbank? At around the same time, in June 2011, the National Institute of Economic Research forecast that the repo rate would be 3 per cent at the end of 2012 and that at the end of 2014 – that is, around now – it would be just over 4 per cent.5 The NIER’s forecasts are often something of a benchmark for other analysts and on this occasion, too, they were a good reflection of how most analysts perceived the situation. The forecast for the repo rate was also fairly well in line with the Riksbank’s view (see Figure 2). This policy was considered compatible with a balanced resource utilisation in 2014 and a CPIF inflation rate close to 2 per cent in 2013–2015. It is thus obvious that this is a picture of a policy that was essentially governed by traditional monetary policy motives and where concern over household debt certainly did not play a major role. How did international analysts view the Swedish economy at this point in time?
Per Jansson: Swedish monetary policy after the financial crisis – myths and facts Speech by Mr Per Jansson, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the SvD Bank Summit 2014, Stockholm, 3 December 2014. *  *  *  “The Riksbank has in recent years conducted a monetary policy experiment where it has aggressively, using a high repo rate, attempted to prevent household debt from rising. The results have been more or less devastating for the Swedish economy. Eventually, the Riksbank has realised that its policy was wrong and has made a 180 degree turn.” This is roughly how some critics have described the monetary policy conducted in recent years. This description has received quite a bit of attention and been widely spread, and many who follow the monetary policy debate have probably gained the impression that this is actually what has happened. I argue that this description is wrong and I now intend to explain why. I shall divide the criticism into three different parts, or claims, and discuss them one by one. I will present these claims in the form of quotations, but this does not necessarily mean they are exact quotations. However, they capture the spirit of the criticism and I believe that those who have followed the monetary policy debate will recognise them. It is important to meet the criticism, for several reasons One question one might begin with, is why it is so important to respond to these claims.