Our forecasts of inflation and other components, like the interest rate decisions, are based on a forecast of the future repo rate path. These forecasts change as new information is received, but we report our current views of the future every time we publish a monetary policy decision. The Riksbank is governed by an Executive Board The year 1999 is a natural starting point when describing the process for monetary policy decision-making. This was when the price stability target was prescribed by law and the Riksbank was given a more independent position with regard to our principal, Sveriges Riksdag (the Swedish parliament). This entailed a major change with regard to our decisionmaking and the way we work in relation to the General Council of the Riksbank. As you already know, the work at the Riksbank has been headed since 1999 by an Executive Board consisting of six members, one of whom is Governor of the Riksbank and Chairman of the Executive Board. The members are appointed for a period of six years at a time. Normally the periods of office for the different members overlap to create continuity in the work of the Bank. Previously it was the Governing Council of the Riksbank, whose members are appointed by the Riksdag, who governed the Bank together with the Governor. Today the General Council has more of a controller function. They appoint the members of the Executive Board, but do not have any influence over, for instance, the decisions on the repo rate.
The more daunting problems we face of bringing our healthcare and social security commitments and resources into balance come later and are less acute than those facing most other large mature economies. These facts provide some perspective but they are not a compelling argument for deferring policy action to address them. Another argument for perspective is that our current account deficit reflects in part the relative attractiveness of the United States as a place for the world to invest its apparently ample present supply of savings. It is true that much of the cause of our imbalance seems to lie in optimism about future U.S. economic performance reflected in the willingness of non-Americans to put their savings to work here rather than in their own countries or in Europe or Japan. In this sense, our external deficit may reflect relative strength, rather than weakness. This argument would be more reassuring if we were facing a lower and more sustainable current account deficit. And it would be more powerful if the capital inflows that are the counterpart of our  2  BIS Review 25/2005  current account imbalance were going to finance private rather than public investment, and if a larger share of those flows were private rather than official. Another argument that is important to weighing the risk in running an external imbalance of this magnitude is the very large increase in the share of the world’s savings that now seem to move more comfortably across borders.