In its August 2021 communication, the MPC judged ‘that the impact on monetary conditions of a reduction in the stock of purchased assets, when conducted in a gradual and predictable manner and when markets are functioning normally, is likely to be smaller than that of asset purchases on average over the past’. Mechanically, selling assets in well-functioning markets implies the market functioning channel of QE transmission should not be relevant. If market dysfunction were to take hold, asset sales could, if necessary, be paused. Moreover, undertaking sales in the background as I have described implies a weakening of the signalling channel of QE transmission. Thus the design for a gilt sales programme I have described here is likely to deliver an outcome in line with last August’s MPC statement. But that is not to deny that asset sales have the potential to tighten monetary and financial conditions. I would expect them to do so. [19] The staff study I mentioned a moment ago concludes that asset purchases – and thus probably also their unwind – largely work via their impact on asset prices. [20] As long as we undertake any gilt sales programme in a predictable and well-communicated manner, the impact of these sales will be – indeed, already may be – ‘priced into’ financial prices, notably gilt yields. These are observable and are used to condition our regular MPC forecasts and other analysis.
In particular, the FPC is charged with ‘the identification of, monitoring of, and taking of action to remove or reduce, systemic risks with a view to protecting and enhancing the resilience of the UK financial system’, but this does not ‘require or authorise the Committee to exercise its functions in a way that would in its opinion be likely to have a significant adverse effect on the capacity of the financial sector to contribute to the growth of the UK economy in the medium or long term’. 7 This approach, of proposing and testing, is similar to the notion of ‘discursive governance’ proposed for independent regulatory agencies by Gehring (2004) and discussed in the financial stability context by Demekas (2019). 6  7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  7  Together, these three ingredients mean we have a clear mandate to follow but, at the same time, we have the flexibility that’s needed to manage financial stability efficiently and effectively. An example – resilience of major banks Our approach to how resilient major banks should be to economic shocks captures all of these ingredients. We started with Parliament’s preferences: resilience but not at the expense of growth over the medium to long term. Using all the evidence available, we’ve balanced the benefits and costs. On the benefit side of the ledger: the fact that the system will not magnify severe downturns.