9  Note that when explaining the configuration of the Banco de España the preamble to the Law of Autonomy of the Banco de España states the following: “In sum, the law makes the Bank a special institution within the administration; it is subordinate to the government in general terms but nonetheless enjoys full autonomy in the area of monetary policy, so as better to defend the objective of price stability set out in the law itself.” 10  This is an issue that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has highlighted on several occasions. See, for example, Technical Note on Supervision of Spanish Banks, No. 17/345, IMF, November 2017, in which the IMF concludes: “The MdE (Ministry of Economy) is the appeals body for submissions by aggrieved parties against BdE (Banco de España) decisions, including sanctions. Such an appeals mechanism has the potential, at least in theory, for government interference.” 8  administrative appeals against its decisions may not be lodged at the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Digital Transformation. Of course, such decisions could still be contested in the courts. This change would equate the Banco de España’s supervisory decisions, which generally refer to less significant institutions, with those of the ECB in relation to significant institutions. In tandem with greater Banco de España independence in the supervisory realm, it could be useful to strengthen the governance of decision-making in this arena.
10  In countries where supervisory competences lie with an institution other than the central bank, a representative of the latter can also attend meetings, although only one vote per country is counted. 11  To prevent conflicts of interest between monetary policy and supervisory powers, the ECB ensures a separation of objectives, decision-making, processes and tasks. This includes strict separation of the Governing Council’s meetings. 12  This procedure does not apply to ECB decisions relating to its general framework, which are adopted by the Governing Council in accordance with the ECB’s standard procedures, following a proposal of the Executive Board. Nor does it apply to macroprudential decisions, which are proposed by the Supervisory Board and may be approved, rejected or amended by the Governing Council. 5  draft decision (which has not yet been the case), it is returned to the Supervisory Board, which will examine the Governing Council’s reasons and submit a new draft decision. To resolve any differences of views expressed in this interaction, the SSM Regulation provides for the creation of a Mediation Panel, on which each Member State has a representative chosen from among the members of the Governing Council and the Supervisory Board. This mediation process is activated at the request of one or more NCAs, when they fail to agree with the rationale for the objection raised by the Governing Council.