Another relatively low-hanging fruit would be a common stabilisation fund equivalent to 1 to 2% of euro area GDP, which could provide us with a proper macroeconomic stabilisation capacity. I note that this largely converges with the Commission’s proposal to create a macroeconomic stabilisation function for the euro area. This common stabilisation fund would be used under efficient rules – but not conditional to an adjustment program, contrary to the ESM – to support, through loans, Member States’ counter-cyclical policies when they are faced with asymmetric economic shocks. The fund itself would be financed by borrowing. To definitely succeed in this ambition, the euro area will need a common keystone: an institution that fosters confidence. Because, as Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa put it: “ complete and systematic consistency of [national] policies achieved without any institutional infrastructure is a dream"8. This is why the new French President has proposed creating a euro area “finance minister”, which probably requires modifying the existing Treaties. This finance minister would embody and bring to fruition the shared commitment of our Member States. As I also mentioned this idea before9, let me share some personal views on the issue.
The global economic recovery might also be delayed reaching the region, increasing the likelihood that the crisis may cause more persistent economic effects. Despite this difficult situation, remittances have proven pandemic-proof1 and have behaved countercyclically in most of the region’s countries, assuming a more important role as a source of external financing. This subject is crucial to Spain, since it is the second-ranked issuer country of remittances to Latin America. Some of the topics we will address today (such as the growing importance of digital money remittances, the role of fiscal stimulus measures in the resilience of remittances and the function of the informal economy) are key to understanding the behaviour of the flow of remittances in this crisis. Undoubtedly, today’s event will allow us to better understand these developments and – I hope – 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  to draw some useful conclusions on how to tackle them from the central bank standpoint. Thank you for your attention. Remittances barely fell by 1.6% in 2020, compared with their 4.8% decline during the 2008 financial crisis. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches