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For example, measures that exclude energy prices can offer a false impression of the underlying dynamics of inflation if energy prices are trending upwards. Clearly, policy-makers with a mistaken view of the conjunctural situation are liable to make policy mistakes. In a stylised Taylor-rule setting, errors in assessing inflation or the output gap will lead to flawed guidance on interest rate decisions. Such considerations may have led to overly accommodative monetary policy prior to the financial crisis. 20  See: A. Orphanides and S. van Norden (2002), “The unreliability of output gap estimates in real time”, Review of Economics and Statistics 84(4), pp. 569–583; and A. Orphanides and S. van Norden (2005), “The reliability of inflation forecasts based on output gap estimates in real time”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 37(3), pp. 583–601. 21  L. Bini Smaghi (2009), “Monetary Policy and Asset Prices”, Freiburg University, 14 October 2009. 22  Such as seasonal movements in food prices. 8  BIS Review 45/2010  Figure 3 Spring vintages (2002–2009) of US output gap estimates by the IMF (WEO)  Source: IMF (WEO) data Note: Output gaps are defined as the percentage deviation of actual output from potential output. To give one example, I have already discussed how the forces of globalisation at the turn of the century weighed on the prices of manufactured goods. This was an important factor underpinning the benign outlook for inflation. Yet the rapid growth of emerging market economies had other implications for global price developments.