Estimates of equilibrium unemployment are uncertain, however, and it is important that the Riksbank’s monetary policy does not unnecessarily hamper decreased unemployment. All the other information about labour market tendencies has to be considered as well. A deeper analysis is needed as a foundation for any conclusions that the economy is approaching full capacity utilisation. When an economy is moving closer to its capacity ceiling, certain statistical phenomena can be expected to occur more clearly and frequently. The same applies to anecdotal information in such a situation. This can take the form of, for example, bottleneck problems in the labour market and signs of difficulties in recruiting skilled labour. Other signs are an increased propensity to resort to labour disputes, either regular strikes or wildcat behaviour. Moreover, firms may have to compromise over job qualifications and take on less skilled personnel in order to cope with demand for their goods and services. Some such signs have been observed in recent months. Firms are already finding it difficult to recruit computer consultants, for instance, as well as some other categories of personnel. The situation in some parts of Sweden is also more strained than elsewhere. This suggests that firms will find it increasingly hard to keep up with demand for their products. In other words, a situation where demand is rising too rapidly. To date, however, the bottleneck problems are fairly limited.
At the end of that process of realising the assets in the rump, the Deposit Insurer learns how much it has lost. I want to stress that the DI typically incurs losses but discovers how much ex post. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Now imagine that the commercial bank subsidiary in question is big and complex. The realisation of the assets via a standard rump-administration is liable to destroy a lot of value, increasing the Deposit Insurer’s losses. And in any case that strategy may not be consistent with maintaining stability (or containing disorder). A way of cutting through that would be to bail in the Deposit Insurer. Rather than the Deposit Insurer waiting until the end of the process of a potentially destructive realisation of the assets, it would hear up front how much it had lost. In the scenarios I have described, its losses should be smaller that way. That approach could, if necessary, be applied in different regions to different distressed subsidiaries of the group. In the world of real banks, the firms have uninsured as well as insured deposit liabilities, and they typically combine deposit taking with some bond issuance. That means that, after equity and subordinated debt holders were extinguished, losses would be shared amongst the DIS and those bonds etc that could be bailed-in. Whether they got bailed-in together or in sequence (bonds first) would depend on whether a jurisdiction operated depositor preference in its insolvency regime.