However, we differ from other countries in two areas in a somewhat disadvantageous way: first of all, we let a portion of the large-value transfers go through multilateral netting before being settled in Norges Bank. This is not common, but obviously contributes to less stringent liquidity requirements (this occurs in Germany and the US, among others). Second, in Norway we still make use of so-called “T-copying”, in which the payee receives information on payments before the settlement has taken place.9 This creates the risk of the payee bank crediting the customer before the bank has received the money. The payee bank may thus be exposed to a non-controlled risk relative to the payer bank. On the whole, however, we may conclude that we have come a long way relative to the systems some of us recall from 10-15 years ago. 3.2.2  Risk can be further reduced  In spite of the progress which has been made, I still think that risk in the Norwegian clearing and settlement system can and should be reduced. Allow me to point out three areas where I believe risk is still too high: Retail netting in NICS Turnover in this area has been high and on the rise. Average daily turnover is now NOK 28bn compared with about NOK 18.5bn in 1998. Turnover has reached up to NOK 76bn on certain days. 8 9  NBO: Norges Bank’s settlement system.
Often this is due to a lack of information about what the actual risk is to the customer, the bank and the entire payment system. In this respect, the banks have an important responsibility to identify and manage the risk in the payment system. Only then will it be possible to say that the risk is “known and understood”. Norges Bank also has a responsibility in this area, such as establishing a regulatory framework that provides better incentives than what the present system offers. We all have a common goal: a more efficient and secure payment system. BIS Review 7/2000  14