This issue matters considering that, compared to our September 2019 estimates, the damaged caused by the social crisis and the Covid-19 crisis combined will add up to a loss of almost 10% of GDP by 2022 (Figure 14). This is complemented with the fact that these two crises combined have caused dismay among the economic agents, whose equity position has worsened as they have used up their slack and reserves. Thus, from September 2019 and through this year to date, companies increased their indebtedness by 16 points of GDP; the capitalization of the stock market fell by nearly 25 points of GDP; the government has used its sovereign wealth funds and issued new debt to raise it in net terms by almost 8 points of GDP, and households will have reduced their pension savings by about 10 points of GDP when the second withdrawal of funds is completed. All of this makes these agents more vulnerable to future stressful scenarios. The impact of these factors is already apparent in our economy. Our currency, for example, recovered only partially the parity and stability of before the social outbreak, reducing some of its capacity to cushion our capital market from external shocks. The long-term rates, which used to be more stable than those of comparable countries, are now more volatile, bringing home the changes in external financial conditions (Figure 15).
Second, the perception that the central bank will always “pick up the pieces” might give incentives to excessive risk-taking and high leverage. Even in good times that perception could discourage sound fiscal policies and prudent financial behaviour. In the design of non-standard measures and in its communication, the ECB has taken great care not to give such adverse incentives to either banks or governments. The following elements, among others, serve as proof:   The non-standard measures are temporary in nature. Some of them will expire automatically, if not renewed. On top of that, we have all the necessary instruments to reverse the current situation of abundant liquidity provision.   The mandate of the ECB as stipulated by the Treaty has an unambiguous focus on price stability. In combination with the ECB’s monetary policy strategy it provides a clear guidepost and has proved effective in anchoring inflation expectations over time.   The monetary policy strategy gives a prominent role to the monetary analysis which captures money and credit developments and ensures a symmetric reaction to financial forces.   The design of the tool called Outright Monetary Transactions creates the right incentives for governments to improve their performance with respect to fiscal prudence and structural reforms. I will expand a bit further on this fourth point. OMTs will only be activated in cases where the benefiting country has signed up to strict and effective conditionality attached to an appropriate European Financial Stability Facility/European Stability Mechanism (EFSF/ESM) programme.