The tendencies that I have described can be problematic in their own right but in no way fatal, as the experience of New Zealand and others attests to. It is when they interact badly with other economic and financial risks that can face small, open and financially integrated economies – such as the global credit cycle, domestic financial vulnerabilities, policy conflicts, and asymmetric shocks – that we can have a lethal cocktail. This was the case in Iceland. To demonstrate this, let me take a stylised example which is, I admit, heavily influenced by the experience of my own country. A small, open, and financially integrated economy develops a positive output gap that is larger than in the rest of the world. The economy is booming and is seen as a good investment by outside investors. This occurs in a situation where the global credit cycle is in a strong upswing. The result is capital inflows and upward pressures on the exchange rate. The country has a floating exchange rate and has adopted a flexible inflation targeting regime. Monetary policy therefore reacts by raising interest rates due to the risks that the booming economy poses for future inflation. This, however, widens the interest rate differential vis-à-vis the rest of the world and sucks in even more capital through carry trade and other channels. The currency therefore appreciates further. This helps to limit inflation, both directly, through lower imported inflation in terms of domestic currency, and indirectly, by directing demand abroad.
But the effect of monetary tightening on domestic demand is limited through the processes I have described, where long rates react weakly to the increase in the policy rate. In addition, firms and households increasingly borrow in foreign currency in order to avoid even those limited increases in domestic borrowing costs that take place. This foreign currency borrowing is intermediated by the domestic banking system, where the financing is more short-term than the lending. Thus the banking system has a growing balance sheet in FX, with a maturity mismatch but limited LOLR facilities to backstop it. In short, financial risks are accumulating, both in the financial sector and among firms and households. At the same time, the economy is increasingly in an unsustainable position, with an overvalued currency and big current account deficit. The  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  whole thing then comes crashing down when foreign financing comes to a sudden stop, heralding a currency crisis and even a banking crisis as well. Before I go further, let me warn you, though, that this is only part of the explanation of the financial crisis in Iceland. The offshore activities of the banks and old-fashioned macroeconomic mismanagement were equally important, if not more so. On this topic, I refer you to other speeches and publications by myself and others. 2 What can and should be done about the problems I have laid out?