Unfortunately, I cannot readily assess the level of support for the particular option which the Government have now chosen, since the researchers did not ask you to assess it - which is certainly a tribute to the new Government’s ability to surprise the market. But in these surveys I am always fascinated by the outlying views - the small minorities who express a contrary opinion. For example, when asked about the most appropriate regulatory structure 2 per cent of those asked said they thought the best option would be to abandon the SIB and the SROs, and the Bank of England, and that regulation should be carried out directly by the Treasury. I would be very grateful if that 2 per cent of you could stay behind afterwards, assuming they have not been institutionalised since the study was conducted. BIS Review 67/1997  -2-  The strongest message to emerge, though, was the need for regulators to consult the market effectively on both structures and on rules. I am certainly prepared to undertake here and now that we shall do so. We are charged by the Government to produce an over-arching framework pretty quickly, so our discussions with the market will need to start now. But, thereafter, we will consult intensively on the way in which the new structure will affect day to day regulation. I give you my firm undertaking on that point. But, as I said, today I am not speaking to you as the Chairman of the SIB.
Such consolidation would permit small and medium-sized banks to attain sufficient scale to undertake the IT investment necessary to meet the challenges of the digital era. 4/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  While both national and cross-border consolidation options are potentially viable, the key consideration for financial stability is that the combined entity should be able to successfully execute the merger, resulting in a bank that can sustain profitability in the long run. 1 See European Banking Authority (2018), Risk Assessment Questionnaire – Summary of Results, December. 70% of banks view their cost of equity in this range, with a further 15% of banks estimating that it lies in the range of 10–12%. 2 See, for example, Babihuga, R. and Spaltro, M. (2014), “Bank Funding Costs for International Banks,” IMF  Working Papers 14/71, International Monetary Fund; Keeley, M. (1990), “Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking,” American Economic Review, 80(5): 1183–1200. 3 See Andrews, D. and Petroulakis, F. (2019), “Breaking the shackles: Zombie firms, weak banks and depressed  restructuring in Europe,” Working Paper Series, No. 2240, ECB, Frankfurt am Main. 4 See Gopinath, G., Kalemli-Ozcan, S., Karabarbounis, L. and Villegas-Sanchez, C. (2017), “Capital Allocationand  Productivity in South Europe”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 132(4): 1915–1967. 5 See Adalet McGowan, M., Andrews D. and Millot, V. (2018), “The walking dead? Zombie firms and productivity  performance in OECD countries,” Economic Policy, 33(96): 685–736.