Fernando Restoy: Challenges for banking resolution Closing remarks by Mr Fernando Restoy, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Spain and Chairman of the FROB (The Fondo de reestructuración ordenada bancaria – Fund for Orderly Bank Restructuring), at its conference, Madrid, 4 June 2014. * 1  *  *  Introduction  Good evening. I welcome this opportunity to share with you some thoughts on banking resolution. I cannot think of a more qualified audience to discuss this matter than that invited by the FROB for this conference, with representatives of competent authorities in the field, among others. I will organise my remarks as follows. First, I will briefly describe how I see the general global framework for banking resolution established after the crisis. Next, I will review the special features of the European case. And finally, I will concentrate on the lessons to be drawn from the Spanish experience, with a special reference to issues relating to the institutional design of banking resolution. 2  The global framework for banking resolution after the crisis  We all know that banking resolution has not achieved the status of a well-defined policy area until very recently. Actions taken by authorities in relation to failing or likely-to-fail institutions have followed a discretionary case-by-case approach, particularly with respect to the availability of public funds to protect banks’ creditors.
Otmar Issing: A framework for stability in Europe Speech by Professor Otmar Issing, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the University of London, European Economics and Financial Centre, London, 19 November 2004. * 1. *  *  Introduction  The formation of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has created a framework for economic policy-making in Europe which is unique in history. While the single monetary policy is oriented towards a union-wide objective, namely the maintenance of price stability, the other policy areas involving fiscal and wage policies - largely remain the competence of national governments and other national actors, such as the social partners. The combination of a centralised monetary policy and decentralised other policies has led to the evolution of a new set of rules and objectives for national and supranational policy-makers. The Maastricht Treaty and the secondary legislation, including the Stability and Growth Pact, established the basic set of rules and objectives to lay out a framework for stability in Europe. 2. Responsibilities under the “Maastricht assignment”  With regard to monetary and fiscal policies, the assignment of responsibilities is defined by the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact, respectively. The Treaty has assigned the maintenance of price stability as the primary objective to the single monetary policy conducted by the ECB for the euro area as a whole. Without prejudice to its primary objective, the ECB shall support the general economic policies in the European Community.