One issue that has led to questions and been discussed considerably is that some leading politicians have actively involved themselves in the debate and on repeated occasions expressed very specific requirements for immediate interest rate cuts and in one case even a change in our meeting schedule. The question is whether this is appropriate or even wise. This is not a new issue, and it is one I have faced on numerous occasions since I began work at the Riksbank. My point of view has always been that we have a statutory task to perform. We shall perform this independently and to the best of our abilities. The law is crystal clear; we are not allowed to accept political instructions or even advice. Moreover, even before the new legislation was in place we had chosen to design a clear framework for our work. Our target of maintaining price stability has been specified as an inflation rate of 2 per cent. We have also “tied” our actions in other ways, such as publishing forecasts and systematically following particular working methods. This enables those outside of the bank to assess our actions and motives and thereby to be sure that we are not taking  BIS Review 9/2004  9  account of inappropriate considerations. Given this, over the years I have had a fairly relaxed attitude to politicians' interference in the general debate. However, this issue has further implications than such.
Since 2015, cybersecurity issues attract an increasing level of attention, and regulators have produced a large number of regulatory texts, both at national and international levels. This was called for to trigger the appropriate response and efforts from the industry. It helped the sector to reinforce its safeguards. Nevertheless, we must ask ourselves whether the multiplication of new regulations can have a counterproductive effect. From the panelists’ interventions, two issues need to be addressed: • First, we should avoid the possible proliferation of texts by standardsetters for banking, payments, securities services, insurance and/or financial markets. The FSB has already provided such evidence in a stock-taking exercise performed in 2017. Regulators are paying attention to cyber risks, and while they share the same objectives, regulatory texts tend to differ across regulators and as a result add to firms’ burden in terms of compliance with these various regulations, with  Page 3 sur 6 little marginal gain. Clarity would be enhanced by reducing the multiple variations in the formulation of requirements across institutions. In turn, regulators’ efforts would be streamlined and their experts employed more effectively. How can we better coordinate regulation? Obviously, a “principle-based” regulation on cybersecurity is preferable, rather than increasingly prescriptive standards, too rigidly “rules-based”. Supervision completes regulation. Principle-based regulation would give supervisors some room for manoeuvre to modulate their expectations to the risk profile of the institutions. • But then, we should also pay attention to the risk of regulatory arbitrage. Regulatory differences can create opportunities.