These advocates say that this would make it easier for the central bank to implement an efficient monetary policy with a negative interest rate. 10 This reasoning is based on the central bank being prevented from setting a negative interest rate to the extent considered necessary to stimulate economic activity. Personally, I am not convinced that this problem would arise in Sweden and I would once again like to say that the Riksbank has a statutory requirement to issue banknotes and coins. I see e-krona primarily as a complement to cash. 10 The idea is as follows. If the central bank introduces a negative interest rate, economic agents will choose to  hold cash, which does not have an interest rate, instead of deposits with the banks. This means that the central bank's policy loses impact at the level where the agents begin to prefer cash. This is often referred to in academic research as the “zero lower bound” problem. 8 [10]  The issuing of e-krona together with a positive interest rate on e-krona could affect financial stability in the banking sector. Today, the banking sector functions as a system of communicating vessels. If a consumer or a company withdraws money from a bank, this money comes into another bank, either as a deposit or as payment for a product or service.
That in turn could result in unnecessary economic and financial instability. If, on the other hand, IMF assistance were too readily forthcoming, both the member countries, and their creditors, might be encouraged to take excessive risks in the belief that the IMF would in the end bail them out. This is a particular form of the familiar problem of moral hazard. It, too, could result in unnecessary economic and financial instability. What does seem clear is that, given the scale of private international capital flows today, the IMF’s resources are certain to be limited in relation to the problems that could emerge. At some point therefore - depending on just where the balance is struck - the onus for resolving the situation has to fall back on the borrowing country and on its creditors, who cannot avoid taking ultimate responsibility for their own lending decisions. So there is a link between the review of the IMF’s facilities and what has come to be called - in the jargon - PSI, or private sector involvement in crisis resolution. And that link remains to be clarified. Just how these issues are resolved will have an important bearing upon global economic and financial stability, and in turn, upon the safety of our national banking systems. Somewhat similar considerations apply in the narrower national context.