The banks created special intermediaries off their balance sheets to hold and structure the securitised credits. This made it possible for the banks to increase leverage both on and off the balance sheet. However, explicit and implicit guarantees from the banks to these special companies meant in practice that the risks led directly back to the banks' balance sheets. The result of all these new instruments and artificial intermediaries was a motley and almost impenetrable structure. A wide range of asset types with idiosyncrasies in pricing arose. This also made them more difficult to value. Moreover, the complicated links between the banks and their special investment vehicles made it difficult to see exactly what the banks' exposures were. Eventually, no one knew where the risks were. The increasing amount of credit not only made investors highly indebted in relation to their equity, many banks also did not really have enough capital in relation to the risks they took. When economic activity began to decline in the USA and prices fell on the US housing market, many institutions suffered major losses. Above all, however, a great deal of uncertainty arose. It proved to be simply impossible to know with any certainty who was exposed to "toxic assets", that is assets that risked losing value as a result of major credit losses. The realisation that many institutions could be more in debt than appeared to be the case on their balance sheets fuelled this uncertainty.
A well-functioning Capital Markets Union will have major ramifications as it will attract institutional investors, improving the allocation of resources and strengthening the international role of the euro. Crucially, it will help reshape capital markets in Europe after Brexit. I believe that this project is essential for the Single Market, for the Economic and Monetary Union and a resilient euro, and, ultimately, for the EU’s global competitiveness. I am certain that these and other matters will be raised and discussed during the following panel of this conference. The case for a fiscal stabilisation capacity But, even if developments in European financial markets were complete, private risksharing would still be inefficiently low. This is because private investors do not yet internalise the positive macroeconomic stabilisation externalities of their portfolio choices. In this context, the other area that urgently needs addressing is enhancing the stabilisation capacity of the euro area through fiscal instruments. Moreover, the efficiency case for fiscal risk-sharing ultimately hinges on the relevance of idiosyncratic shocks and the capacity of national fiscal policy to face these shocks. The efficiency argument meets the responsibility argument in the case of fiscal liabilities stemming from inadequate Euro-wide policies, as is now the case of financial supervision and resolution. True, some evidence suggests that national business cycles have now become more synchronised. But it is clear from economic developments over the last decade that the mere sum of national fiscal buffers may not be enough to accommodate severe common shocks.