Public perception and trusts for bankers were severely dented. Bankers became a figure of ridicule. We should not let this happen in Malaysia. Both the law and the expectations of the central bank on directors’ role and responsibilities are very clear. Directors are responsible for ensuring the conformance of senior management to the strategies and policies set by the board. They are also ultimately accountable for the financial institution’s compliance with relevant laws and regulations. This includes overseeing the implementation of the financial institution’s governance framework and internal control environment, and periodically reviewing whether these remain appropriate in the light of changes to the size, nature and complexity of the institution’s operations. In addition to ensuring conformance, directors are also expected to drive performance through their oversight involvement in shaping the long-term direction of the institution, anticipating strategic challenges and mentoring senior management. Directors have to achieve this while confronting international and domestic developments that are fundamentally changing the landscape in which Malaysian financial institutions operate. The global economic outlook remains uncertain, with cyclical and structural weaknesses persisting in the advanced economies, more moderate growth in China and continued volatility in the global financial markets. For the last two decades, Malaysia has been becoming more integrated with the regional and global economy. The recent conclusion of the ASEAN Banking Integration Framework and Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, if properly sequence and implemented, provide further opportunities for Malaysian companies to expand abroad. But expansion beyond our shores poses new challenges as financial institutions will navigate unfamiliar territory.
A number of factors have contributed to this outcome, including flight to safety flows, the presence of the Eurosystem on the secondary market, the hunt for yield by investors, and the success of the first European common debt issues. Liquidity indicators also displayed good resilience. For instance, the depth of the secondary market for French government negotiable securities, measured by the average volume of daily transactions (excluding Eurosystem purchases), has remained at a historically high level,albeit at 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  an increased transaction cost, more pronounced for non-core sovereign debt markets, but at levels far below those of previous crises. The ownership structure of European debt securities has also contributed to and reflects this resilience. According to data from the ECB1, non-residents of the euro area were holding a significantand stable 44% of euro area government debt at the end of 2020,willing to invest in EUR, via highly liquid securities. Among residents, long term investors are prominent investors : the central banks were accounting for 21% of total outstanding debt, for the euro area, investment funds, insurance corporations and pension funds were holding about 11%, while other monetary financial institutions or banks for 19%. b) Let me now turn to the repo market and its resiliency during the Covid crisis. Under normal market conditions, the repo market is very liquid since large banks dedicate specific balance sheet capacity for this activity.