Nor does it apply to the contributory role of the ECB with regard to financial stability under Article 127(5) of the Treaty, as the ECB is not the policymaker in this field. I will conclude my remarks at this point, and I am happy to turn the floor over to the workshop presenters and participants to further elaborate on these themes. [1]This correlation does not imply that independence is causal  for low inflation. In particular, societies with a high degree of inflation-aversion may find it more natural to grant their central bank a high degree of institutional independence. On this, Posen, A., “Why central bank independence does not cause low inflation: there is no institutional fix for politics”, in O’Brien, R. (1994) (ed), Finance and the International Economy: in memory of Robert Marjolin, Oxford University Press. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that the short historical sample reflects the fact that the notion of independent monetary policy is of limited interest in periods of fixed exchange rates regimes (as was the case during the gold standard or under the Bretton Woods regime). [2]Beyer, A., Gaspar, V., Gerberding, C., and Issing, O. (2013), “Opting Out of the Great Inflation: German Monetary Policy after the Break Down of Bretton Woods”, in Bordo, M. D., and Orphanides, A. (eds), The Great Inflation: The Rebirth of Modern Central Banking, University of Chicago Press. [3]Balls, E., Howat, J., and Stansbury, A.
Institutions deemed as having higher risk are subject to more frequent onsite inspections. Let me cite some outcomes from our inspections. Institutions that have failed to meet our requirements have been warned or reprimanded in writing. A few have been required to appoint external consultants to conduct a thorough review of their AML/CFT frameworks; others have been asked to increase the resources devoted to this function. In a couple of cases, where the frameworks and procedures were adequate but ineffective management oversight resulted in inadequate implementation, we have asked the senior management to be replaced. In all cases, MAS informs the institution’s parent supervisor of our findings and concerns. Our supervisory approach aims to be preventive in nature. This means that sanctions can be taken against financial institutions for weak AML/CFT controls, even if no predicate offence has occurred. Having reviewed our regulations and our supervisory and enforcement actions, the FATF assessors concluded, “Singapore’s AML/CFT sanctions regime is effective, proportionate, and dissuasive”. In a nutshell, while a lot has been done, our institutions can always do better. MAS is reviewing whether we need to increase our supervisory intensity and is considering if we should make public, sanctions against persistently or egregiously errant institutions. Strengthened cross-border co-operation The third prong of our efforts is international co-operation.