They are also likely to rely on importing price stability from abroad during the interim period. Larger countries that have invested heavily in developing a credible independent monetary policy but still have more to do in the area of fiscal policy reforms and flexibility of domestic economies, will probably opt for a more cautious approach. They are likely to prefer avoiding double regime switches, opting instead for a smooth and fast transition from the current regime to euro adoption. The Czech Republic belongs to the latter group. The Czech strategy for euro adoption is based on a cautious timescale. In the pre-EMU period, we want to ensure low inflation domestically, not by importing it. In the strategy, we have pointed to the years 2009-10 as the most likely entry date. In comparison to other new EU member states, this timescale had been viewed as relatively cautious. However, it should be said that other countries in the region have recently pushed back their initially more optimistic estimates. The primary reasons for this more cautious timescale are - in all cases fiscal developments. In the pre-EMU period, we will continue targeting inflation. This strategy has gained a substantial degree of credibility in the Czech Republic since its introduction in 1997. Our inflation target for the period beyond January 2006 is set at 3% (for CPI), which should allow us to fulfil the monetary side of Maastricht convergence criteria, and at the same time to reflect the long-term real convergence needs of the Czech economy.
My role today as the opening speaker is a privileged one. Like a university professor during exams, I can ask questions. Unlike a good professor, I am certainly not in possession of all the answers. I am confident, however, that the exceptional group of people assembled here will make a positive contribution to this difficult and complex debate. II. The problem  Arguably, much of the debate surrounding the international monetary system boils down to the following question: how sustainable is an international monetary regime, in which one national currency serves as the international reserve asset? Over the past few decades, this question has been examined under different perspectives. A first perspective was the so-called “Triffin dilemma”, discussed in the context of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate regime. This discussion highlighted that increasing indebtedness of the reserve-issuing country would in time undermine the very confidence that forms the basis for the reserve asset status. A second perspective refers to the alleged “exorbitant privilege” of the reserve-issuing country. It highlights the asymmetry in the adjustment to shocks, as the reserve-issuing country has the privilege of not being under much pressure to adjust to current account deficits, at least over the short and medium term. It is worth noting that part of Keynes’ goal in setting up the IMF was to try to create symmetry between the need to adjust for both deficit and surplus countries. More recently, the question appeared under the perspective of global imbalances.