The Green Swan explores three dimensions of this coordination: ‐ firstly, the interactions between monetary and prudential policies with fiscal policies; 14  See for instance the call for action issued by Nobel Prize Laureates and other experts: Agre et al. (2021). Our Planet, Our Future: An Urgent Call for Action. Accessible at: https://www.nationalacademies.org/news/2021/04/nobel‐prize‐laureates‐and‐other‐experts‐issue‐urgent‐call‐for‐ action‐after‐our‐planet‐our‐future‐summit  5  ‐ ‐  secondly, how central banks can facilitate the international monetary and financial coordination needed on climate change; and, lastly, how central banks can contribute to promoting values and behaviours that are particularly important for the low‐carbon transition, such as long‐termism. For example, climate change is now at the agenda of the G7 and the G20 finance Tracks where representatives of finance ministries and central banks work together. New forms of cooperation between the public and the private sector have emerged as well, such as on the very important topic of disclosure: ‐ The TCFD for climate‐related disclosure; tasked by the FSB (finance ministries and CB) but private led; the work of the TCFD is now taken into account by public authorities and standard‐setting bodies at the global level (IFRS) as well as in the EU (EU Commission / EFRAG) ‐ The TNFD, a private‐led initiative that brings together industry, NGOs, international organisations and public authorities, aiming to develop a nature‐related disclosure. As Mark Carney stressed yesterday, disclosure should be a priority and his goal for the Cop 26 is to make the TCFD framework mandatory.
See ‘Lambda’, speech by Mark Carney at the London School of Economics, 16 January 2017. 16 Each observation shows the central projection for spare capacity or excess demand at the end of the second year of the forecast period (the 'Year 2' point) on the horizontal axis against the central projection for four-quarter CPI inflation at Year 2 on the vertical axis from successive Inflation Reports. The left-most observation (labelled "Aug. 2016 no stimulus") is a counterfactual version of the August 2016 Inflation Report forecasts with the effect of the MPC's Bank Rate cut, Term Funding Scheme and Asset Purchases removed. See ’Lambda’, speech by Mark Carney at the London School of Economics, 16h January 2017, for further details and discussion. 17 See Table 4.C in the May 2018 Inflation Report, available at www.bankofengland.co.uk/inflation-report/2018/may-2018. 12  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  12  Chart 7: Trade-off in successive Inflation Report projections at Year 3 3.0  Inflation (%)  August 2016 2.5  November 2016  February 2017 August 2017  May 2017 November 2017 February 2018  2.0 -1.0  August 2016, no stimulus  -0.5  May 2018  Excess demand (%)  0.5  1.0  0.0  Preferred trade-off if λ=0.1  1.5  Preferred trade-off if λ=1 1.0 A Guidance Stocktake As the UK enters the most critical phase of the Brexit negotiations, it is useful to take stock of forward guidance and its potential role during the upcoming period.