First, it appears that for the time being there is no consistent trend towards “deglobalisation”, but rather a change in the nature of globalisation, leading to a rise in the regionalisation of trade and supply chains, a diversification of sourcing and a certain slowdown in global value chain fragmentation. 22 While the marked slowdown in firms’ decisions to relocate part of their production processes abroad (“offshoring”) or to repatriate previously offshored activities (“reshoring”) is compatible with a deglobalisation phase, other factors qualify this view. The flattening of trade in goods does indeed hint at a trend slowdown, but the continued growth of international trade in services seems to signal a continuation of globalisation trends in these sectors, driven by technological progress, including data trading and the expansion of artificial intelligence. Second, the impact of these new trends – as opposed to purely globalisation or deglobalisation trends – are far from obvious . As an illustration, while offshoring is usually related to job displacement, several recent studies highlight that it is also related to the upgrading of jobs, towards more competitive and innovative varieties, and to changes in employment composition in favour of high-skilled workers. 23 Third, the globalisation process lasted for several decades. The current location decisions and choice of providers are the result of long-run economic forces, which might work differently in a deglobalisation phase, especially if this is more abrupt and takes place in a short period of time, which could lead to non-linear effects on growth, inflation or monetary policy transmission.
An increase in unemployment that is due to a higher rate of increase in labour costs than implied by productivity growth cannot be offset by low interest rates or higher public spending and tax cuts, but requires changes in the functioning of the labour market. The planned use of petroleum revenues implies that the sheltered sector will lay claim to a larger share of the labour force. This will probably cause a decline in manufacturing employment. The ensuing deterioration in competitiveness may lead to restructuring. In the long run, monetary policy cannot influence overall employment or its distribution across industries. Norway’s terms of trade flucture widely. This is largely attributable to variations in the oil price. However, a substantial portion of petroleum revenues is invested in foreign equities and bonds through the Government Petroleum Fund. Changes in the oil price influence the size of the Fund, but have little effect on the domestic use of petroleum revenues. The Petroleum Fund acts as a buffer against fluctuations in the oil price, which stabilises the krone exchange rate. The Norwegian economy may nevertheless be exposed to disturbances of a type that cannot be absorbed by the Petroleum Fund. We have to be prepared for fluctuations in the value of our currency that are more in line with the fluctuations observed in other countries. The exchange rate will vary. This means that economic agents cannot assume that the krone will be stable against the euro, the US dollar or a weighted average of foreign currencies.