On around half of the occasions we have made more accurate forecasts than 80 per cent of the other forecasters. The inflation forecasts measured as the annual rate of change in the CPI have in almost 75 per cent of cases been more accurate than half of the forecasters in Consensus panel (Figure 12). In a comparison of quarterly GDP and CPIX forecasts, it is shown that the Riksbank has on the whole made slightly more accurate forecasts than the NIER. At the same time, it should be said that the differences in forecasting performance are not statistically significant. If we compare the results with an earlier forecast evaluation made by the Riksbank, there are some similarities. In this evaluation we found, for instance, that the NIER has made better forecasts of productivity than we have, at the same time as we have made better forecasts of CPIX inflation.9  8  During the evaluation period for productivity, which extends from 2002 to 2006, we have under-estimated both GDP and employment in our forecasts. Please note that the bias estimate for GDP changes character depending on whether the sample refers to 2000-2006 or 2002-2006. 9  This result from an earlier forecast evaluation applies only to forecasts for the next year. The result is statistically reliable. BIS Review 138/2007  5  There are of course a number of difficulties in making correct comparisons of this nature, which is also indicated in the study.
The CBC is governed by the principle of transparency in exercising its public function, enshrined in Article 8 of the Constitution, the bylaws of its own Constitutional Organic Act and the relevant legislation that has expressly included the CBC, such as Law No 20285 on Access to Public Information (2009), Law No 20730, which regulates the lobbying and management of private interests (2014), and Law No 20880 on public service probity (2016). Still, the Board has added several transparency standards that go beyond the aforementioned norms. For example, last March we made available to the public a total of 96 minutes of past monetary policy meetings held during the period 2000-2007, a practice that will continue into the future years. We have also included as passive subjects of transparency all division directors, area managers and heads of departments that may have relevant decision-making powers, and we have supplemented the obligations of the Lobby Law with the publication on the CBC’s website the weekly agenda of the Governor and all Board members. In addition, we have established an external Audit and Compliance Committee and an internal reporting channel to denounce situations of harassment or abuse. From the perspective of using the powers inherent to an autonomous institution to strengthen transparency in more specific areas that are not covered by general legislation, the CBC is preparing some additional initiatives to implement over the next twelve months. One, we want to raise the levels of information and guidance we give to the community regarding monetary policy decisions.