Ich wies immer darauf hin, dass England als
Handelsstaat bei jedem Kriege zwischen europaischen
Grossmachten ausserordentlich leiden, ihn daher mit
alien Mitteln verhindern wiirde, andererseits aber eine
Schwachung oder Vernichtung Frankreichs im In-
teresse des europaischen Gleichgewichts und um eine
deutsche Ubermacht zu verhindern niemals dulden

17 B.-C: "Jahres."

[96]



319

and the necessary funds, was never placed at my
disposal; and it was not until the last days of July,
1914, that I learned by chance from the naval attache
of the secret Anglo-French agreements concerning
the cooperation of the two fleets in case of a war.
Moreover, other important correspondence, longknown
to the Foreign Office, such as the Grey-Cambon cor-
respondence, was withheld from me. 26

The Casus Belli

Soon after my arrival I became convinced that
under no circumstances had we to apprehend an
English attack or any English support of an attack
by a third power, but that under any circumstances
England would protect the French. I advanced this
opinion in repeated reports, with detailed statement
of my reasons and with great emphasis, but without
obtaining any credence, although Lord Haldane's re-
fusal of the proposed neutrality clause 27 and England's
attitude during the Morocco crisis gave us very clear
hints. Besides all this, there were those secret agree-
ments which I have already mentioned and which
were known to the Foreign Office.
