The  effect  of  the  first  section  of  the  XlVth  Amendment  upon  an
entirely  different  class  of  state  statutes  was  discussed,  and  to  some
extent  determined  in  a  very  recent  adjudication.  A  statute  regulat-
ing the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors,  providing  for  the  licensing  of
lawful  vendors,  and  prohibiting  the  sale  by  persons  not  licensed,  —  in
short,  one  of  the  ordinary  forms  of  legislation  in  reference  to  this
particular  subject  matter,  —  was  attacked  on  the  ground  that  it  was
obnoxious  to  the  provisions  of  the  amendment.  This  statute  had
been  in  existence  for  several  years  prior  to  the  adoption  of  the
amendment,  and  the  argument  was  that  the  addition  thus  made  to
the  organic  law  swept  it  out  of  existence.  Without  inquiring  to
any  extent  into  the  full  meaning  of  the  first  section,  the  Supreme
Court  of  the  United  States  simply  declared  that  the  right  to  sell  in-
toxicating liquors  is  not  one  of  the  privileges  and  immunities  belong-
ing to  citizenship  of  the  United  States  which  the  States  are  forbid-
den to  abridge.  This  particular  trade  is  a  matter  which  has  been
always  under  the  control  of  the  States  by  virtue  of  their  powers  of
police  regulation,  and  such  universally  admitted  police  power  has
not  been  in  any  manner  affected.  The  court  added,  however,'  that
if  such  a  law,  purporting  to  be  an  exercise  of  police  regulation,  should
absolutely  forbid  the  sale  of  liquors,  or  of  any  other  lawful  property,
which  an  owner  had  on  hand  at  the  time  of  its  passage,  it  would
violate  that  clause  of  the  first  section  which  prohibits  a  state  from
depriving  any  person  of  life,  liberty,  or  property  without  due  pro-
cess of  law.-'  This  statement  was  of  course  a  dictum,  but  its  correct-
ness is  sustained  by  numerous  judgments  of  other  courts.
