find  wherein  personal  identity  consists,"   says  Mr.   Locke,
"  we  must  consider  what  person  stands  for,  which,  I  think,  is
a  thinking  intelligent  Being,  that  has  reason  and  reflection,
and  can  consider  itself  as  itself,  the  same  thinking  thing  in
different  times  and  places,  which  it  does  only  by  that  con-
sciousness, which  is  inseparable  from  thinking,  and  seems  to
be  essential  to  it."    Here  we  find  the  very  opinion  of  Bishop
Butler  distinctly  stated,  a  person  is  a  thinking  intelligent
-being,  that  has  reason  and  reflection,  and  can  consider  itself
as  itself,  the  same  thinking  thing  in  diflerent  times  and  places,
by  means  of  consciousness.     It  is  unaccountable  that  Mr.
Locke  should  after  this,  have  maintained  that  our  personal
identity  consists  in  consciousness,  when  he  here  considers
JEonsciousness,  and  very  justly,  as  tbat  act  of  the  mind  by
which  we  become  acquainted  with  our  own  persons,  or  that


Of  Personal  Identity.  283

thinking  principle  within,  aiid  with  its  sameness  at  one  mo-
ment and  another,  or  at  different  periods  of  life.  He  might
as  well,  in  any  other  case,  have  confounded  our  perception  of
an  object  with  the  object  of  perception.  Consciousness  with'
the  aid  of  memory,  becomes  the  mirror  in  which  those  be-
ings called  ourselvi.  s  are  successively  disclosed  to  us,  and  in-
variably accompanies  thought  and  other  operations  of  the
mind;  but  can  no  more  be  regarded  as  including  the  person,
than  a  part  can  include  the  whole.  "  Self,"  repeats  Mr.
