§  784.  Further  of  the  Reason,  &c.  —  Let  it  be  still  borne  in
mind,  that  this  appearance  of  the  law  cannot  be  avoided  by  any
skill  of  scientific  arrangement,  or  by  legislation.  The  reason  is,
as  already  intimated,  that,  because  of  the  diversity  of  human
actions,  no  two  acts,  of  the  past  or  the  present,  viewed  in  refer-
ence to  all  their  surroundings,  and  the  inner  motives  prompting
to  them,  are  precisely  alike.  And  no  single  future  act,  viewed
with  reference  to  all  these  things,  can  be  foreseen.  We  can
merely  foresee,  that,  in  its  own  minuter  qualities,  and  in  its  rela-
tions to  its  surroundings,  each  future  act  will  differ  from  every
preceding  one,  and  thus  the  course  of  events  wiU  continue  for
ever.  The  consequence  is,  that  the  law,  statutory  and  common,
must  forbid  things  in  terms  broad  enough  to  comprehend  an  in-
finite variety  of  shades  and  particular  qualities  of  wrong-doing.
The  inhibition  must  also  be  specific,  descending  somewhat  to  the
minute.  When  it  thus  descends,  it,  of  course,  can  include  only
a  part  of  the  wrong  things  possible  to  be  done.  Then  must  fol-
low another  somewhat  minute  direction,  then  another,  then
another;  until  the  lawgiver  thinks  he  has  gone  far  enough.
Each  new  defining  or  drawing  of  lines  around  a  thing  thus  newly
made  indictable  is  just  as  likely  to  embrace  within  it  some  acts
which  were  indictable  before,  by  reason  of  lying  within  different
lines,  as  to  embrace  what  was  not  before  indictable.  The  new
and  the  old  stand  together,  and  a  particular  element  of  wrong

435


§  785  DIVISIONS  AND  DISTINCTIONS.  [BOOK  VI.
