APPENDIX

PART I. CHAPTER III

Note a, p. 20. ' We call any creature worthy or virtuous, when
it can have the notion of a public interest, and can attain the
speculation or science of what is morally good or iU. If a crea-
ture be generous, kind, constant, compassionate ; yet if he cannot
reflect on what he himself does, or sees others do, so as to take
notice of what is worthy or honest ; and make that notice
or conception of worth and honesty to be an object of his
affection ; he has not the character of being virtuous, for
thus and no otherwise he is capable of having a sense of Right
and Wrong. Actions themselves and Affections of Pity, Kind-
ness, Gratitude and their contraries, being brought into the mind
by Reflection, become objects. So that by means of this re-
flected sense there arises another kind of Affection towards those
very Affections themselves which have been already felt, and are
now become the subject of a new Uking or disUke.'.
Note b, p. 20. ' If there be any sense of right and wrong which an
absolute wicked creature has not, it must consist in a real anti-
pathy or aversion to Injustice or Wrong, and in a real Affection
or Love towards Equity and Right for its own sake and on
account of its own natural Beauty and Worth.'



PART I. CHAPTER V

Note a, p. 42. Pity, for example, is explained by sympathy.
