The direction is proper.'

(i) The action is for the value of personal property destroyed
by the negligent act of the defendant. Interest is allowable as
damages.'

(j) The cause of action is for destruction of property through
negligence. On the trial the judge directs the jury to allow interest
as a matter of law. This is error. It should have been left to the
jury, in their discretion, to allow damages in the nature of interest,
for the lapse of time.^

(k) The cause of action is the same. The case is referred to an
auditor, who, having the powers of a jury, allows interest. On
appeal it is held that the jury has the power to consider the delay
caused by the defendant, and that it cannot be better done than
by taking interest on the original damage as a measure.*

(T) A. brings suit against B., on an account annexed for $25.
Prior to this a trustee process had been begun by C. against A.,
making B. the trustee. B., as trustee, having paid S25 on the exe-
cution, cannot be charged with interest in A.'s suit against him.^

(m) The action is replevin for the loss of a savings-bank book ;
the deposit draws interest at three per cent. The rate for purposes
of damages is seven, this being the statutory rate in all cases."

when the delay was caused by the fact that the demand was grossly ex-
cessive. Philadelphia Ball Club v. Philadelphia, 192 Pa. 632; 46 L. R. A. 724.
' Andrews v. Durant, 18 N. Y. 496.
' Parrott v. Knickerbocker Ice Co.,- 46 N. Y. 361.
