THE DOCTRINE OF METHOD 137

its parts." Finite things must be understood through their
immediate causes ; " for the knowledge of an effect is in truth
nothing else than acquiring a more perfect knowledge of the
cause." Hence it appears, adds Spinoza in a note, that we can
understand no part of nature without at the same time increasing
our knowledge of the first cause or God ; in modern language,
every true explanation of a particular fact gives us a particular
piece of the single and universal order of nature, and thereby adds
to our knowledge of that order. " Therefore," the text con-
tinues, "so long as our business is inquiry concerning actual
things, we may never form any conclusion from abstract notions ,
and we shall use exceeding care not to confound that which is
only in the understanding with that which is in the thing itself."

To appreciate the significance of this we must bear in mind
that Spinoza was a thorough-going nominalist. And further
on he says that our chief aim should be to acquire knowledge of
particulars. Such an outspoken abjuration of all figments and
preconceived notions might almost be expected to introduce
without more ceremony an exhortation to practical observation.
But Spinoza proceeds otherwise : he tells us that the best way
is to work from the true definition of the thing investigated, and
that the next problem is to fix the conditions of such a definition.
