For the foregoing reasons we cannot regard our conscious-
ness of other persons either as assured to us inferentially,
or conveyed to us merely perceptually. We maintain that
our consciousness of others is 'instinctive' or 'intuitive'; by
which terms we mean to imply that the knowledge of ' alter '
and that of ' ego ' are essential parts of one and the same
mental system. We cannot here enter upon a fuU discussion
of the vexed question of the meaning of instinct, but there
seems strong reason for holding, with Dr. McDougaU, that
a ' perceptual disposition ' is organised into the instinctive

1 Prof, stout also recognises the importance of this factor of social
co-operation. ' A child may get an apple peeled by pushing it towards his
father or mother, but not by pushing it towards the knife.' Groundwork
of Psych, p. 171 sq.
INTER-SUBJECTIVE INTERCOURSE 139

experience ^ even on the purely animal level, and that this
innate perceptual disposition gives the knowledge of the
existence of others, — specifically of the mother. Thus out
of all the sounds on a summer day the chick ' responds in a
specific manner with specific conative tendency and a
system of innately co-ordinated movements ... to a parti-
cular call uttered by its mother.' And indeed all animals
appear to cognise the presence of the mother with an im-
mediacy that is characteristic of sense-perception. And this
perceptual disposition functions as a unit with the rest of the
instinctive experience.^ It is unnecessary to discuss precisely
what relation the 'perceptual disposition' holds to the whole
instinctive experience, whether, with Dr. McDougall, it
initiates and excites the experience, or whether, with Mr.
