generally  to  the  enjoyment  of  a  particular  trade  *s»™^^^^J®°^Qgj,
designation,  the  right  to  protection  does  not  seem  to  p°ope®^y"{^„°"


1  Drew,  on  Inj.,  208,  209.     [Folsom  v.  Marsh,  2  Story,  100.]

2  Pope  V.  Curl,  2  Atk.  342;  Gee  v.  Pritchard,  2  Swanst.  402.
3  Granard  v.  Dunkin,  1  Ball  &  Beat.  207 ;  Thompson  v.  Stan-
hope, Amb.  737.
4  Perceval  v.   Phipps,  2  "V.  &  B.  19 ;  Joyce  on  Injunctions,
351,  352.
s  2  Bden.  329;  Coplngeron  Copyright,  24-33,

6  Prince  Albert  v.  Strange,  1  Mac.  &  G.  25;  1  H.  &  Tw.  1.
502  THE    CONCURRENT   JDEI^DICTION.
wm'not  *ermu     depend  upon  a  property  in  them,  but  on  the  princi-

fi-aua.  pjg  ^tjat  the  court  will  not  allow  fraud  to  he  practised

upon  a  private  individuals  or  upon  the  public.     "This

right  cannot  properly  be  described  as  a  copyright ;

it  is,  in  fact,  aright  which  can  be  said  to  exist  only,

and   can  be  tested   only,  by  its   violation:   it  is  the

right   which   any  person   designating   his   wares  or

commodities  by  a  particular  trade-mark,   as   it   is

called,  has   to   prevent   others   from  selling  wares

which  are   not  his,  marked  with  that  trade-mark  in

order  to  mislead  the  public,  and  so  incidentally  to

injure  the  person  who  is  owner  of  the  trade-mark."^

The  principle  will  be  seen  by  a  comparison  of  the

^ur^^ess V.  ^ur^ess following   cascs.     In   Burgess  Y .  Burgess,^  viheve  &

be  restrained       father  had  f Or  many  years  exclusively  sold  an  article

Irom  using  his  ,,.,n-r.  !t->  j?»i-)>

own  name  as       under  the  title  of '  'Burgess  s  Jtissence  or  Anchovies,

vendor  of  an  °  p  it

article.  the  court   would  not  restrain  his  son  from  selling  a

similar  article  under  that  name , no  fraud  being  proved.
