I  propose  to  consider  the  argument  for  each  kind  of
restriction  ia  turn.  First,  however,  I  must  briefly  recall
what  was  before  said  on  the  general  question  of  restricting
at  all.  I  noticed  that  Bequest  occupies  a  somewhat
different  position  from  other  rights  included  in  our  common
conception  of  the  Eight  of  Property,  when  the  question  of
allowing  it  is  regarded  from  the  individualistic  point  of
view :  the  consideration  of  it  seems  to  lead  us  to  an
"  antinomy ; "  a  pair  of  irresistible  arguments  on  either  side
of  the  question.  It  seems  on  the  one  hand  that  other  men
can  have  no  right  to  a  dead  man's  property,  so  far  as  its
value  is  due  to  his  own  labour,  or  the  labour  of  men  whose
free  choice  has  transferred  it  to  biTn — since  it  would  not
have  been  there  at  all  but  for  him  or  them :  and,  on  the
other  hand,  it  seems  that  the  dead  can  have  no  right  to
control  men's  use  of  a  material  world  to  which  they  no
longer  hold  any  cognisable  relation.  As  I  have  before  said,
neither  side  of  the  argument  admits  of  a  satisfactory  answer,
so  long  as  mutual  non-interference  is  taken  as  an  ultimate
end ;  but,  from  a  utilitarian  point  of  view,  the   argument

^  These  limitations  are,  no  doubt,  derived  from  the  Roman  Law  :  but  they
may  be  assumed  to  have  been  in  harmony  with  mediaeval  sentiment.
