think  that  in  transactions  of  sale  and  mortgage  of

estates,  if  there  be  no  inquiry  as  to  the  title-deeds

which  constitute  the  sole  evidence  of  the  title  to  Absence  of

.such  property,  the  court  is  justified  in  assuming  that  dleds^res^mp-

ithe  purchaser  or  mortgagee  has  abstained  from  mak-  fraud.
ing  the  inquiry  from  a  suspicion  that  his  title  would

be  affected  if  it  was  made,  and  is,  therefore,  bound

ito  impute  to  him  the  knowledge  which  the  inquiry  if

made  would  have  imparted.     But  I  think,  if  a  hona


1  Hiern  v.  Mill,  13  Ves.  114;  Jones  v.  Williams,  5  W.  K.  540.
2  9  Hare,  458.
300  THE   EXCLUSIVE   JURISDICTION.
fide  inquiry  is  made,  and  a  reasonable  excuse  given,,
there  is  no  ground  for  imputing  the  suspicion,  or
the  notice  which  is  consequent  upon  it ;  but  the  per-
son who  accepts  the  excuse  will  afterwards  have  the
burden  of  showing  that  it  was  a  reasonable  one  for
any  prudent  lender  of  money  to  accept."'


1  Spencer  v.  Clarke,  9  Ch.  Div.  137.
301


CHAPTER  XVIII.
OF  MORTGAGES  AND  PLEDGES  OF  PERSONALTY.
A  mortgage  of  personal  property  differs  from  a  Differences
pledge.     The  mortgage  is  a  conditional  trsLusfev  ovgag'au&apudge

„     ,  .        ,  „      ,        .  °f  personalty,(o.)

•conveyance  or  the  very  property  itself,  the  interim  in  their  own
possession  usually  remaining  with  the  mortgagor ;  and
if  the  condition  is  not  duly  performed,  the  whole
ititle  vests  absolutely  at  law  in  the  mortgagee,  ex-
actly as  it  does  in  the  case  of  a  mortgage  of  lands.
