personal  chattels,  than  is  at  present  exercised  in  the  English
Courts.^

§  7^-5.  Some  of  the  cases  already  stated  are  not  purely  cases
respecting  the  sale,  transfer,  or  enjoyment  of  personal  chattels ;
but  may  properly  be  deemed  to  involve  personal  acts  and  pro-
ceedings. But  it  is  difficult  to  separate  the  one  class  entirely
from  the  other ;  and  they  naturally  flow  into  each  other.  In
regard,  however,  to  contracts  for  personal  acts  and  pl-oceedings,
there  is  some  diversity  of  judgment  in  the  authorities,  as  to
the  cases  and  circumstances  in  which  a  specific  performance
ought  to  be  decreed  in  Equity.  Thus,  for  example,  it  has  been
a  matter  of  some  conflict  of  opinion,  how  far  Courts  of  Equity
ought  to  entertain  a  suit  for  the  specific  performance  of  a  cov-  ^
enant  to  build  or  rebuild  a  house  of  a  specified  form  and  size
on  particular  land.  In  the  earlier  cases,  the  jurisdiction  was
maintained;  ^  and  Lord  Hardwicke  recOgnized.it  in  its  full  ex-
tent, at  the  same  time  that  he  denied  that  a  covenant  to  repair
a  house  ought  to  be  specifically  performed.^  The  ground  of
his  opinion  in  the  particular  case  (which  was  between  landlord
and  tenant)  was,  that  the  not  building  takes  away  the  security
of  the  landlord;  but  that,  upon  the  covenant  to  repair,  he
might  have  a  remedy  at  law.*

§  7^6.  On  the  other  hand,  in  later  cases  this  doctrine  has
been  expressly  denied ;  and  it  has  been  said,  that  no  such  cov-
enant ought  to  be  enforced  specifically  in  Equity ;  for,  if  one
will  not  build,  another  may.  There  can  be  a  full  compensation
at  law  in  damages;  and  Courts  of  Equity  ought  not  to  under-

1  Barr  v.  Lapsley,  1  Wheat.  K.  151 ;  Mechanics  Bank  of  Alexandria  v.  Seton,
1  Peters,  K.  305.
