vii.),  "Were  [the  judicial  power]  joined  with  the  legislative,  the  life,  liberty,
and  property  of  the  subject  would  be  in  the  hands  of  arbitrary  judges,  whose
decisions  would  then  be  regulated  only  by  their  opinions,  and  not  by  any
fundamental  principles  of  law." — So  Paley  (Moral  Philosophy,  Book  VI.  ch.
viii.),  "  It  is  evident,  in  the  first  place,  that  the  decisions  of  such  a  judicature
would  be  so  many  laws ;  and  in  the  second  place,  that,  when  the  parties  and
the  interests  to  be  affected  by  the  laws  were  known,  the  inclinations  of  the
lawmakers  would  inevitably  attach  on  one  side  or  the  other ;  and  that  where
there  were  neither  any  fixed  rules  to  regulate  their  determinations,  nor  any
superior  force  to  control  their  proceedings,  these  inclinations  would  interfere
with  the  integrity  of  public  justice."  But  the  identity  of  organs  does  not
necessarily  imply  a  confusion  of  processes :  and  it  seems  extravagant  to  sup-
pose that  the  judges  would  avowedly  and  habitually  disregard  an  elementary
principle  of  justice,  viz.  that  the  law  by  which  an  act  is  judged  should  be
law  established  and  promulgated  at  the  time  that  the  act  was  done ;  or  to
suppose  that,  as  a  body,  they  would  be  blind  to  the  evil  consequences  of  con-
tinually altering  general  rules  of  law  to  suit  their  inclinations  in  any  par-
ticular case.  Besides,  it  would  obviously  be  easy  to  arrange  that  no  single
tribunal,  but  only  a  collection  of  tribunals  sitting  together,  should  exercise
the  legislative  function.
