The fact is, to put it as briefly as possible, that the bung-
ling and the lack of success in this theatre of the war were
due to its too close proximity to Washington. In many ways
this condition was made manifest. In the beginning the
politically prominent demanded military recognition, and
thence arose a class of appointments to the army of men who
soon became known as "political Generals." Most of these
sank into comparative oblivion as the war progressed and pro-
fessional military capacity became more necessary to redeem
their blunders and their constantly threatening failures, but
they managed, in the meantime, to work irreparable harm.
Public opinion, always a powerful factor in the determina-
tion of national affairs, made itself felt most through Washing-
ton, and often the clamors of a public that was impatiently
enthusiastic, but totally ignorant of military matters, caused
the wrecking of plans that might have been successful.
The Government was timid and unduly apprehensive of an
attack upon the capital, continually causing to be held back
for its protection forces that should have been actively engaged
in the field. Many times expeditions and campaigns that
started with every promise of success were brought to a sud-
den and unintelligible stop, and a retrograde movement
ordered from Washington because of a panic fright there.
Finally, although admittedly ignorant of the art and science
of warfare, the civil authorities committed the characteristic
mistake of insisting upon keeping commanders in the field
always under their thumbs, and of issuing orders for the con-
duct of campaigns directly from their offices. The President,
had he been left to himself, would probably have willingly
given the conduct of military matters entirely to his Generals,
but the influence of the Secretary of War was in the ascendant.
