Indeed,  ^s  concerns  some  of  the  'ancient  forfeitures,  they  evi-
dently rest  on  no  satisfactory  reason  ;  and  .the  others  are  unnec-
essary, since  punishment  can  best  be  inflicted  by  direct  sentence
of  the  court.  And  though  strictly  no  injustice  is  chargeable  to  a
government  that  takes  away  rights  because  of  their  violation,
even  when  indirectly  ill  consequences  fall  on  the  innocent,  yet,
as  justice  can  be  as  effectually  administered  in  some  other  way,
humanity  demands  that  it  be  so  done.  Therefore  the  Constitu-
tion of  the  United  States  provides,  that  "  no  attainder  of  treasoh
shall  work  corruption  of  blood,  or  forfeiture,  except  during  the
life  of  the  person  attainted."  ^  And,  by  an  act  of  Congress,  all
forfeitures  and  corruptions  of  blood,  whether  for  treason  or  fel-
ony, are,  as  to  convictions  under  the  United  States  laws,  abol-
ished.^ In  some  of  the  older  States,  there  are  early  traces  of
judicial  recognitions  of  the  common-law  forfeitures,  or  early  stat-
utes creating  like  forfeitures  ;  *  and,  in  New  York,  there  are  judi-
cial decisions  acknowledging  the  incapacity  of  felons  attaint,
especially  when  imprisoned  for  life,  to  come  as  plaintiffs  into  the
courts.^     More  recently  the  constitutions  of  some  of  the  States


1  Story  Const.  §  1300.  v.  Drake,  Coxe,  315 ;  Ash  v.  Ashton,  3

2  Const.  U.  S.  art.  3,  §  3.  Watts  &  S.  510 ;  Wells  v.  Martin,  2  Bay,
8  1  U.  S.  Stats,  at  Large,  117,  act  of  20;  Boyd  w.  Banta,  Coxe,  266;  Common-
April  30,  1790,  c.  9,  §  24 ;  B.  S.  of  U.  S.  wealth  v.  Pennock,  3  S.  &  E.  199.
