CH.  XVII.]  CANCELLATION   OF   DEEDS.  5

§  693.  Before  proceeding*  to  the  consideration  of  these  dis-
tinct and  important  subjects,  it  may  be  proper  to  suggest  that
the  application  to  a  Court  of  Equity  for  either  of  these  pur-
poses is  not,  strictly  speakingj  a  matter  of  absolute  right,  upon
which  the  Court  is  bound  to  pass  a  final  decree.  But  it  is  a
matter  of  sound  discretion,  to  be  exercised  by  the  Court,  either
in  granting  or  in  refusing  the  rielief  prayed,  according  to  its  own
notion  of  what  is  reasonable  and  proper  under  all  the  circum-
stances of  the  particular  case.^  Thus,  for  instance,  a  Court  of
Equity  will  sometimes  refuse  to  decree  a  specific  performance
of  an  agreement,  which  it  will  yet  decline  to  order  to  be  deliv-
ered up,  cancelled,  or  rescinded.*  On  the  other  hand,  a  spe-
cific performance  will  be  decreed  upon  the  application  of
one  party,  when  it  would  be  denied  upon  the  application  of  the
other.  And  an  agreement  will  be  rescinded  or  cancelled  upon
the  application  of  one  party,  when  the  Court  would  decline  any
interference  at  the  instance  of  the  other.*  So  that  we  are  here
to  understand,  that  the  interference  of  a  Court  of  Equity  is  a
matter  of  mere  discretion ;  not,  indeed,  of  arbitrary  and  ca-
pricious discretion,  but  of  sound  and  reasonable  discretion,
secundum  arhitrium  boni  Judicis}  And  in  all  cases  of  this  sort,
where  the  interposition  of  a  Court  of  Equity  is  sought,  the
Court  will,  in  granting  relief,  impose  such  terms  upon  the
party,  as  it  deems  the  real  justice  of  the  case  to  require;  and,
if  the  plaintiff  refuses  to  comply  with  such  terms,  his  bill  will
be  dismissed.®  The  maxim  here  is  emphatically  applied,-^-
He  who  seeks  equity  must  do  equity.
