S  368. There  have  been  able  and  learned  discussions
touching  the  authority  of  the  states  to  impose  regula-
tions upon  masters  of  vessels;  either  from  foreign  ports
or  from  ports  within  the  United  States,  touching  the
landing  of  passengers,  etc. But  the  questions  discussed
were  whether  the  regulations  were  matters  of  internal
police,  belonging  to  the  states,  or  whether  they  amounted
to  a  regulation  of  commerce,  the  power  of  which  was
exclusively  in  congress. By  a  certain  act  of  the  state
of  New  York,  concerning  passengers  of  vessels  coming
to  the  port  of  New  York,  the  master  of  any  ship  arriv-
ing from  a  foreign  port,  or  from  one  of  the  other  states,
within  twenty-four  hours  after  its  arrival,  was  required
to  report  to  the  mayor,  in  writing,  on  oath  or  affirmation,
the  name,  place  of  birth,  last  legal  settlement,  age  and
occupation  of  every  passenger  brought  in  such  ship  to
the  city  of  New  York,  or  permitted  to  land  at  any  place,
or  put  on  board  of  any  other  ship  with  an  intention  of
proceeding  to  the  city,  under  a  penalty  of  seventy-five
dollars  for  every  passenger,  to  be  paid  by  the  master,
owner  or  consignee. And  further,  each  master  was
required  to  give  bond  to  the  mayor,  with  two  sureties,
in  a  sum  not  exceeding  three  hundred  dollars  for  each
passenger  not  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  to  save
harmless  the  mayor,  &c.,  and  the  overseers  of  the  poor,
from  all  expense  and  charges  which  might  be  incurred
in  the  maintenance  and  support  of  such  passenger,
under  a  penalty  of  five  hundred  dollars. It  further  pro-
vided that  the  master  or  owner  should,  on  the  order  of
the  mayor,  be  compelled,  under  a  heavy  penalty,  to
remove  to  the  place  of  his  last  settlement,  any  passen-
ger, being  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  who  should  be
likely  to  become  chargeable  on  the  city.^

g  369. Ifc  seemed  to  be  conceded  in  the  adjudication
of  this  case,  that  if  the  provision  above  referred  to  was,
in  effect,  a  regulation  of  commerce,  the  act  would  be
unconstitutional. 