Meade  was  afraid — that  is  the  term — to  risk  an  ad-
vance in  view  of  the  circumstances — ^the  strong  line
still  held  by  his  opponent,  occupied  by  a  hundred  gims,
and  by  thousands  of  men  who  had  not  taken  part  in
the  charge;  the  field  in  front  covered  with  dead  and
wounded  by  the  thousand;  the  possibiKties  of  a  re-
verse; the  exhausted  condition  of  the  Army  of  the
Potomac;  and  the  traditional  specter  of  Lee's  trans-
cendent generalship,  from  the  spell  of  which  thus  far
no  one  in  the  Union  forces  had  as  yet  been  able  to
escape.  It  may  be  taken  for  granted  that  a  counter-
stroke  in  front,  an  attempt  at  once  to  follow  up  the
remnant  of  the  assaxilting  divisions,  might  not  have
been  wise;  but  surely  an  advance  from  the  Round
Top  region  made  by  a  strong  body  of  cavalry  and
urged  by  the  Fifth  and  Sixth  corps  could  have  turned

329


GETTYSBURG

the  right  flank  of  Lee,  occupied  the  Fairfield  road,
and  created  confusion  and  panic  in  his  rear,  had  it
been  undertaken  promptly.  However,  the  work  al-
ready done  was  so  great  that  Meade  dreaded  to  en-
danger it  by  an  assault  which  might  become  a  reverse,
and  a  heavy  rain  that  night  and  on  the  next  day  made
an  engagement  just  then  out  of  the  question.
