sion  mto  the  docks.     "  If  the  charter  party  had  left  it  free  to  the

merchant  to  select  a  dock,  it  may  be  well  that  he  was  bound  to

select  one  into  which  admittance  could  be  procured.     Ogden  v.
Graham  (c)  is  an  authority  in  favour  of  that  position.     But  when,

as  in  this  case,  the  dock  is  named  from  the  beginning  by  both

parties,  I  think  the  refusal  of  the  dock  authorities  to  let  the  ship

inside  the  dock  gates  is  the  fault  of  neither  party  "  {d).
{z)  6  A.  C.  38;  12  Ch.  D.  568.
{a)  12  Ch.  D.  at  p.  599.
(b)  6  A.  C.  38.
(c)  1  B.  &  S.  773  ;  31  L.  J.,  Q.  B.  26.
{d)  6  A.  C.  at  p.  44.     Cf.  Lilly  v.
Stevenson,  22  Sess.  (4th)  278 ;  Little  v.
Stevenson,  (1896)  A.  C.  108;  supra,
s.  254a.  Where  a  ship  was  to  "  proceed
to  London  or  Tyne  dock  to  such  readi/
quay  berth  as  ordered  by  charterer,"  and


DEMUEEAGE.  757

626.  It  may,  ho-wever,  happen  that  the  ship  is  prevented  from    Sect.  626.
getting  to  a  loading  herth,  owing  to  obstacles  which  have  been  Where  delay
caused  by  the  charterer  himself;  for  example,  by  the  state  of  his  charterfr-f  °^
business  with  other  ships  in  the  port  or  dock.     In  such  cases  the  ^"siness.
delay  is  attributable  to  the  charterer ;  and  the  lay  days  begin  to
run  when  the  shipowner  has  done  all  that  is  needful  to  bring  his
ship  to  the  loading  place,  except  that  which  has  been  prevented  by
the  charterer's  default,  or  by  obstacles  which  he  has  introduced.
