In one place Green speaks as though the essence of the
perfection of mankind were ' a good will on the part of all
persons,' which, he adds, we can promote only indirectly,
since ' all that one man can do to make another better is to
remove obstacles, and supply conditions favourable to the
formation of a good character.' But the possession of a
' good will ' by all persons no more realises a good that is
strictly ' common ' than does the reahsation of each man's
capabilities. In both cases you have a number of men
doing similar things, and possibly exercising some influence
over one another, but without any essential identity of
interest. By merely multipl5dng the persons possessed of
the idea you do not, says Sidgwick, get beyond a will
' possessed by some abstract idea of goodness.' And he
carries the criticism further by remarking that ' the
question " What is good ? " is not adequately answered
by sa3dng that it is the will to promote the will to be
good in mankind. . . . Am I to regard nothing as truly
good, as an ultimate object of rational aim for me,
except this very choice of nothing but this state of will in



TEACHING OF GREEN AND D'ARCY i61

others ? . . . Suppose us all willing the <good, what should
we all wiU ? '

Now the latter part of tliis criticism of Green by Sidg-
wick may be discounted by pointing out that Green has
a second doctrine of the nature of good, and one which
embodies much more adequately the principle of community.
