How does Dobbs v. Jackson Women&#39;s Health compare to previous decisions which reaffirmed Roe v. Wade?
<p>How does <em><a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2021/19-1392" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health</a></em> compare to previous cases which reaffirmed <em>Roe v. Wade</em>—e.g., <em>Webster v. Reproductive Health Services</em> (1989), <em>Planned Parenthood v. Casey</em> (1992)?</p>

<p><em>Dobbs</em> is a test case involving a newly enacted law (unlike <em>Roe</em> which examined a law that had already been on the books), but both involve effectively facial challenges to the validity of the statutes prohibiting abortions - <em>Roe</em> almost completely, and <em>Dobbs</em> as described below.</p>
<p>The court has not yet ruled in <em>Dobbs</em>, and a ruling is expected in June.</p>
<p>The principal distinction is that <em>Dobbs</em> involves a ban on abortions after fifteen weeks with few exceptions, that is squarely contrary to <em>Roe</em> and to the undue burden test of <em>Casey</em>. So, it squarely presents the issue of whether <em>Roe</em> and <em>Casey</em> remain good law. If they are good law, the law challenged in <em>Dobbs</em> must clearly be struck down as unconstitutional. If the justices decide that these cases are no longer good law (as a majority of the justices seemed to indicate in oral arguments), then the justices need to decide what alternative test should replace legal standards established in <em>Roe</em> and <em>Casey</em>.</p>
<p>The more extreme resolution would be to overrule <em>Roe</em> and <em>Casey</em> in their entirety, probably also, in the process disavowing a number of other implied privacy/substantive due process rights in the U.S. Constitution, including the right to marry, the right of married and unmarried adults to have legal access to contraception, and the right to educate one's own children.</p>
<p>The comparatively moderate resolution would be to enact a new test that somehow allows states to ban late term abortions with few exceptions, but would allow the lion's share of existing abortions, which mostly happen early in a pregnancy, perhaps citing evolving standards of medical knowledge (even though that isn't entirely true), and perhaps even salvaging <em>Casey</em> and the underlying privacy/substantive due process justification for constitutional rights.</p>

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