Post Miller, have there been any obscenity convictions or prohibitions for purely textual material?
<p>If I understand correctly, a U.S. state could in principle criminalize or otherwise prevent publication of a text-only book meeting the <a href="https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Miller_test" rel="nofollow noreferrer">three-pronged test for obscenity</a> handed down in <em>Miller v. California</em>. Before that case, there were several important obscenity trials involving literary works, including <em>Ulysses</em> and <em>The Naked Lunch</em>. Since then, it has seemed as if the <em>Miller</em> test has been treated as having a tacit corollary that text-only works are never obscene. But is that impression wrong? Have any <em>successful</em> enforcement actions been brought against text-only content? (Recently, an attempt was made to restrict sales of two books in Virginia, but <a href="https://www.virginiamercury.com/2022/08/30/judge-throws-out-obscenity-case-attempting-to-restrict-sales-of-books-in-virginia-beach/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">that was dismissed</a>.)</p>

<p>An almost-successful case is the recent case <a href="https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-S17041-21o%20-%20104819877139092537.pdf?cb=1" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Pennsylvania v. Alexander</a>, where the defendant was convicted of sending obscene text messages. However, the conviction was overturned on appeal to the PA Superior Court. The trial court, as summarized in the appeal</p>
<blockquote>
<p>reasoned that text messages may constitute obscene “material” because
the statutory definition does not “expressly exclude” them, and the
General Assembly must have intended for them to fall within the ambit
of the obscenity statute.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>and</p>
<blockquote>
<p>because the messages appealed to the prurient interest, described
patently offensive sexual conduct, and lacked any social value,
Alexander’s messages were “obscene” as defined in Section 5903(b)</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Defendant argues (and the appeals court agrees) that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the statute does not make it a crime to send sexually explicit text
messages to a consenting adult</p>
</blockquote>
<p>because the law</p>
<blockquote>
<p>only criminalizes the dissemination of obscene “material”: No person,
knowing the obscene character of the <strong>materials</strong> or performances
involved, shall: . . . . design, copy, draw, photograph, print, utter,
publish or in any manner manufacture or prepare any obscene <strong>materials</strong></p>
</blockquote>
<p>(emphasis in appellate ruling)</p>
<p>and 18 Pa.C.S. § 5903(a)(3)(i) states that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Obscene “material” is defined for the purposes of that subsection as:
Any literature, including any book, magazine, pamphlet, newspaper,
storypaper, bumper sticker, comic book or writing; any figure, visual
representation, or image, including any drawing, photograph, picture,
videotape or motion picture.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The conviction was overturned because the texts were not &quot;material&quot;: as the appellate court reasoned,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>even assuming that Alexander’s texts were obscene under the Miller
test, private and consensual text messages between two adults are not
“material” within the meaning of subsection 5903(b). For the purposes
of the statute, “obscene material” unambiguously refers to content
made for public dissemination.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This &quot;necessarily excludes private speech
exchanged via text messages by two consenting adults&quot;. The ruling does not consider whether a message disseminated to three or four adults would constitute &quot;public dissemination&quot;.</p>

first-amendment