For strict liabiity, how does a change in facts produce a different result, even when the relative weights of the policies remain the same?
<p><sub>Source: p 204, <em>Thinking Like a Lawyer: An Introduction to Legal Reasoning</em> (2010, 2 ed) by  Kenneth J. Vandevelde</sub></p>

<blockquote>
  <p>The imposition of strict liability on abnormally dangerous activities illustrates
  the way in which  <strong>a change in facts</strong> alters the relationship between
  ends and means and thus  produces <strong>a different result, even when the relative
  weights of the policies remain the same</strong>.<sup>9</sup></p>
  
  <p>[p 311:] <sup>9</sup>The shift to strict liability in any particular context, of course, could also reflect
  a shift toward rights-based theories of justice and away from utilitarianism.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>I do not understand the quote from p 204: how does <strong>a change in facts</strong> produces <strong>a different result, even when the relative
weights of the policies remain the same</strong>? </p>

<p>I only appear to be able to think of examples where a change in facts produces a different result when the relative weights of the policies also change (I have one example in mind, but will not post it unless requested as it probably is too complex).</p>

<p>This applies to unusual circumstances where the danger imposed exceeds what would be expected by the average person.</p>

<p>For example, if you walk into your friend's garage at their residence while smoking a cigarette, and are injured or killed because your friend is storing gasoline in their garage, your friend wouldn't be liable, because storing gasoline in a residence's garage is common.</p>

<p>However, if you walk into your friend's garage at their residence while smoking a cigarette, and are injured or killed because your friend is storing dynamite in their garage, your friend would be liable, because storing dynamite in a residence's garage is abnormally dangerous, and most people wouldn't expect such a danger to be present.</p>

<p>Similarly, if you and a friend are carrying a glass pane from a vehicle into a building, and someone's texting and walks through the glass pane while you're yelling at them to stop, you're unlikely to be held liable.</p>

<p>However, if you and a friend are lifting a piano to an upper floor of a building, and someone walks under it and the piano falls on them, you may be held liable if you didn't take extraordinary measures to prevent harm, like blocking traffic along the sidewalk during the lifting procedure, and giving loud audio cues to protect the public from the danger.</p>

<p>This also applies to situations where there is no one to blame, but an abnormal danger is foreseeable.  A crane operator on a skyscraper can't be blamed for damage due to crane failure from high winds (an act of god/nature), but they can be held liable because knowing that cranes are vulnerable to high winds demands that they pay special attention to weather reports, and reduce the risk in such circumstances.</p>

<p>Facts can change the result in circumstances where the danger exceeds the reasonable expectations of the public.</p>

legal-concepts tort