Why is sports gambling not considered interstate commerce?
<p>It <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/03-1454.ZS.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">is</a> <a href="http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2013/08/23/10-36094.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">generally</a> <a href="http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2006/06/30/0210318.pdf?openelement?openelement" rel="nofollow noreferrer">agreed</a> that the United States can prohibit intrastate sales of goods it feels might affect interstate commerce under the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commerce_Clause" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Commerce Clause</a>.  How does <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-476_dbfi.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">intrastate gambling</a> differ? Obviously gambling isn't a tangible good, but I would imagine it could affect the interstate demand for the service.</p>

<p><a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/questions/16340/how-does-personal-drug-possession-affect-interstate-commerce">related</a></p>

<p>From the holdings of May 14, 2018 in <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-476_dbfi.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">NJ. v. NCAA</a>,</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>As  the  Tenth  Amendment  confirms,  all  legislative  power  not
  conferred on Congress by the Constitution is reserved for the States.
  Absent  from  the  list  of  conferred  powers  is  the  power  to 
  issue  direct   orders  to  the  governments  of  the  States.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>The federal law in question forbids legislatures from passing certain laws, but</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>PASPA’s    anti-authorization provision  unequivocally  dictates what 
  a  state  legislature  may  and  may  not  do.    The  distinction 
  between compelling a State to enact legislation and prohibiting a
  State from  enacting  new  laws  is  an  empty  one.    The  basic 
  principle—that   Congress  cannot  issue  direct  orders  to  state 
  legislatures—applies  in either event.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>The anti-authorization provision does not</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>constitute  a  valid preemption  provision.   To  preempt   state 
  law,  it  must  satisfy  two  requirements.   It  must  represent  the
  exercise  of  a  power  conferred  on   Congress  by  the 
  Constitution.    And,  since  the  Constitution  “confers   upon 
  Congress  the  power  to  regulate  individuals,  not  States,”  New 
  York, supra, at 177, it must be best read as one that regulates
  private actors.  There is no way that the PASPA anti-authorization
  provision can be understood as a regulation of  private actors.  It
  does not confer  any  federal  rights  on  private  actors  interested
  in  conducting  sports gambling operations or impose any federal
  restrictions on private actors.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>The Commerce Clause does not enter into the majority opinion, though in Thomas' concurring opinion, he indicates he is not entirely happy with purely in-state applications of the Commerce Clause. But, at present, interstate gambling does <em>not</em> differ.</p>

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