Limits on right to demand a jury?
<p>Section 21 of the Washington State Constitution states:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><strong>The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate,</strong> but the legislature may provide for a jury of any number less than twelve in courts not of record, and for a verdict by nine or more jurors in civil cases in any court of record, and for waiving of the jury in civil cases where the consent of the parties interested is given thereto.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>RCW 4.48.010 goes on to state in part:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The court shall order all or any of the issues in a civil action, whether of fact or law, or both, referred to a referee upon the written consent of the parties which is filed with the clerk. <strong>Any party shall have the right</strong> in an action at law, upon an issue of fact, <strong>to demand a trial by jury.</strong> No referee appointed under this chapter may preside over a jury trial. The written consent of the parties constitutes a waiver of the right of trial by jury by any party having the right.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>However, RCW 3.50.135 imposes a restriction where it states in part:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><strong>In all civil cases, the plaintiff or defendant may demand a jury,</strong> which shall consist of six citizens of the state who shall be impaneled and sworn as in cases before district courts, or the trial may be by a judge of the municipal court: PROVIDED, That <strong>no jury trial may be held</strong> on a proceeding involving a traffic infraction.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Similarly, RCW 35.20.090 states:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><strong>In all civil cases and criminal cases</strong> where jurisdiction is concurrent with district courts as provided in RCW 35.20.250, within the jurisdiction of the municipal court, <strong>the plaintiff or defendant may demand a jury,</strong> which shall consist of six citizens of the state who shall be impaneled and sworn as in cases before district courts, or the trial may be by a judge of the municipal court: PROVIDED, That <strong>no jury trial may be held</strong> on a proceeding involving a traffic infraction.</p>
</blockquote>
<p><strong>Question:</strong> Does the wording of 3.50.135 and 35.20.090 impose a limit on the individual's right to demand a trial by jury, or is it instead a restriction on the ability of traffic courts to conduct a jury trial?  The wording would seem to indicate the latter because <em>individuals do not hold trials or proceedings</em>, but courts do.</p>
<p>And if my interpretation is correct, what would be an appropriate response or course of action on the part of the traffic court if the defendant in a traffic case insisted on their right to a trial by jury?</p>

<p><strong>The right to trial by jury under the Washington State Constitution does not attach to mere regulatory infractions</strong>: <em>City of Pasco v. Mace</em>, <a href="https://casetext.com/case/pasco-v-mace" rel="nofollow noreferrer">98 Wn. 2d 87 (Wash. 1982)</a> (still being cited as of <a href="https://casetext.com/case/state-v-mansfield-40" rel="nofollow noreferrer">2019</a>).</p>
<p>While not at issue in that case, the Court listed &quot;traffic offenses&quot; and the corresponding &quot;uniform and expeditious system for the disposition of these 'infractions'&quot; as an example where a jury is not required by the state Constitution.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>At the same time, the Legislature has shown itself cognizant of the distinction between offenses which are criminal in nature and those to which such a stigma is not attached. This awareness is reflected in RCW 46.63, decriminalizing certain <strong>traffic offenses and providing a uniform and expeditious system for the disposition of these &quot;infractions&quot;</strong>. As long as the offender commits only an infraction, no prison sentence can be imposed. RCW 46.63.060(2)(b). If it is thought that our conclusions here today will unduly burden the courts of limited jurisdiction, that situation can undoubtedly be ameliorated by legislative &quot;decriminalization&quot; of those offenses which are in fact regulatory, rather than criminal in nature, and limiting the penalty accordingly. As <strong>for those offenses which carry a criminal stigma and particularly those for which a possible term of imprisonment is prescribed, the constitution requires that a jury trial be afforded</strong> unless waived.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>It precludes a trial by jury in an alternative municipal court for a traffic infraction. The right to a jury trial is preserved in district court.  <a href="https://app.leg.wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx?cite=3.50&amp;full=true" rel="noreferrer">RCW 3.50.020</a> says that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The municipal court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over
traffic infractions arising under city ordinances and exclusive
original criminal jurisdiction of all violations of city ordinances
duly adopted by the city and shall have original jurisdiction of all
other actions brought to enforce or recover license penalties or
forfeitures declared or given by such ordinances or by state statutes</p>
</blockquote>
<p>which precludes taking the matter to district court in order to get a jury trial. The same municipal courts hear civil and criminal cases where the right to trial is preserved, thus this is a limit on the right of a person to demand a jury, and not a limit on the ability of the courts to hold jury trials.</p>

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