What is the SCOTUS&#39;s standard of *dangerousness* in decisions of involuntary psychiatric commitment?
<p>It seems that the standard of immediacy/imminence of the dangerousness was not ever that well defined by the SCOTUS.</p>
<p>This is the best, most comprehensive reference on the matter that I've been able to find, but I'm hoping that someone familiar with the relevant case law can weigh in.</p>
<p><a href="http://psychrights.org/force_of_law.htm" rel="nofollow noreferrer">http://psychrights.org/force_of_law.htm</a></p>
<p>If someone is nonspecifically or potentially dangerous at some vague, distant, indeteminate point in the future, can they be constitutionally committed to a mental institution?</p>

<p>An annotated bibliography of the leading cases in the mental health area from the U.S. Supreme Court are summarized <a href="https://mentalillnesspolicy.org/legal/mental-illness-supreme-court.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">here</a> and this is a pretty fair summary of the U.S. Supreme Court case law in this area.</p>
<p>Essentially, the specific details of the commitment standard within the bounds established by <em>O’Connor v. Donaldson</em>, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) are a question of state law with respect to which some variation is permissible without being dictated precisely by the limitations of the U.S. Constitution. There is also no controlling federal statute that further limits state discretion.</p>
<p>I'll quote entries related to the six controlling U.S. Supreme Court that are pertinent to this question (emphasis mine):</p>
<blockquote>
<p><em>O’Connor v. Donaldson</em>, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). Mentally ill plaintiff was confined without treatment for 15 years. Held: <strong>states cannot
constitutionally confine, “without more,” a person who is not a danger
to others or to himself.</strong> The latter category includes the suicidal
and the “gravely disabled,” who are unable to “avoid the hazards of
freedom” either alone or with the aid of willing family or friends.
422 U.S. at 575 and n.9. As the plaintiff received no treatment, the
Court expressly reserved the question “whether the provision of
treatment, standing alone, can ever constitutionally justify
involuntary confinement or, if it can, how much and what kind of
treatment would suffice. . . . “ Id. at n.10. The Court has never
revisited this issue. <a href="http://laws.findlaw.com/US/422/563.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">http://laws.findlaw.com/US/422/563.html</a></p>
<p><em>Addington v. Texas</em>, 441 U.S. 418 (1979). Plaintiff, who disputed his dangerousness, was indefinitely committed based on a history of mental
illness, threats, and several in-hospital assaults. Held: <strong>jury
instruction requiring “clear and convincing evidence” that plaintiff
required commitment “for his own welfare and protection, or the
protection of others” was constitutionally adequate.</strong></p>
<p><em>Zinermon v. Burch</em>, 494 U.S. 113 (1990). Psychotic individual “voluntarily” committed for treatment. Held: <strong>U.S. Constitution
prohibits “voluntary” commitments where patient is incapable of
informed consent.</strong> Dualing dicta: On the one hand, wrongly
characterizes O’Connor v. Donaldson as holding that <strong>“there is no
basis for confining mentally ill persons involuntarily ‘if they are
dangerous to no one and can safely live in freedom,’”</strong> 494 U.S. at
134. On <strong>the other, accepts without comment a state standard that defines grave disability very loosely, permitting involuntary
commitment for individuals whose “neglect or refusal to care for
themselves threatens their well-being,”</strong> Id . (emphasis added).</p>
<p><em>Kansas v. Hendricks</em>, 521 U.S. 346 (1997). Held: civil commitment of pedophile by jury trial immediately following his release from prison
did not constitute double jeopardy , ex post-facto lawmaking or
violation of substantive due process, where petitioner admittedly
posed current danger to children. It was immaterial that pedophile was
not mentally ill, as <strong>“we have traditionally left to state
legislatures the task of defining terms of a medical nature that have
legal significance” and “have never held that the Constitution
prevents a State from civilly detaining those for whom no treatment is
available, but who nevertheless pose a danger to others.”</strong>
<strong>Holding modified in <em>Kansas v. Crane</em></strong>, 534 U.S. 407 (2002): <strong>“[T]here must be proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior. . .viewed in light of such features of the cases as the
nature of the psychiatric diagnosis, and the severity of the mental
abnormality itself. . . sufficient to distinguish the dangerous sexual
offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder
subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical
recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case. . . . “</strong> 534 U.S.
at 412-413.</p>
<p><em>Sell v U.S</em>, 539 U.S.166 (2003) Psychotic dentist threatened a witness, refused medications needed to make him competent to stand
trial for Medicaid fraud, and stalked a nurse while hospitalized.
Lower courts disagreed whether dentist was dangerous. Supreme Court
assumed he was not dangerous because of procedural posture, but was
plainly unhappy about the assumption. Held: <strong>1) courts should first
consider authorizing medications on alternative grounds, such as
dangerousness, to avoid the question posed; 2)Eighth Circuit erred in
holding that medication may be forced solely to force trial
competence, without considering whether medications would affect
fairness of trial, obviate an already lengthy confinement, or
ameliorate future dangerousness.</strong></p>
</blockquote>

us-constitution us-supreme-court mental-health