Public Trespass
<p>The Town Adminstrator of my town has issued a NO TRESPASS order on me personally.  I'm a Private Citizen with no history criminal past.  The No Trespass order is telling to stay off of Senior Center grounds and the building.  Is this legal?  I feel it's a public building and I have enjoying the Center for several years with no trouble.  Is this against my civil rights?</p>

<p>What do you mean by "a public building"? </p>

<p>Just because a place is owned by the public, doesn't mean anyone can go there any time they wish. Military bases, firehouses, and jails are owned by the public, but many of these have limited access to the public.</p>

<p>It may be open to the general public, but that does not mean restrictions cannot be put into place, either on times, or activities, or individuals. For example, public parks often have time and activity restrictions; schools have the power to restrict individuals from their premises, either specifically or by general category.</p>

<p>As a general point of law, the owner of any property, or their agent, can order anyone without the right to stay (e.g. not a co-owner or tenant), and that person must depart, otherwise that person is tresspassing. Assuming that the Senior Center is owned by the town, it is probable that the Administrator is empowered to act as the town's agent in this matter.</p>

<p>Now, since this "No Trespass order" is specifically directed at you, there is a reason behind it. It may be something you've done. It may be that complaints have been received about your behavior. It may be an actual abuse by someone who doesn't like you. We have no way of knowing. It the order itself doesn't give you a hint as to why, you can ask the town administrator for the reason.</p>

<p>As for being against your rights, there is nothing inherently illegal about this situation(that is, an agent of a property owner exercising the latter's right to prohibit an individual from said property), but some of the details, especially why it was specifically applied to you as an individual might be a civil rights violation. </p>

<p>If this Senior Center is operated by the local government for the general benefit of the public, and it, or parts of it, are open to the general public, then the government or properly delegated administrative officials  may make and enforce regulations limiting access in appropriate cases.</p>
<p>However, such regulations may not be arbitrary or unreasonable, nor may they be administered in an   arbitrary or unreasonable manner. Denial of access by the local government or its appointed officials or employees would constitute &quot;State Action&quot; under color of law and must pass muster under the Due Process clause of the 14th amendment of the US Federal Constitution.</p>
<p>By &quot;denial of access&quot; I mean an individual denial of access to those parts of the facility (if any) open to the general public, or if open only for a limited purpose, denial of access to a person wishing to use them for a designated and approved purpose. In short, an individual denial of the same access being granted to others at the same time, possibly based on alleged past conduct.</p>
<p><a href="https://law.justia.com/constitution/us/amendment-14/05-procedural-due-process-civil.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">This page from Justia on Due Process requirements</a> says:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Although due process tolerates variances in procedure “appropriate to the nature of the case,” (<em>Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &amp; Trust Co.</em>, 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).) it is nonetheless possible to identify its core goals and requirements. First, “[p]rocedural due process rules are meant to protect persons not from the deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or property.”(<em>Carey v. Piphus</em>, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978).) Thus, the required elements of due process are those that “minimize substantively unfair or mistaken deprivations” by enabling persons to contest the basis upon which a state proposes to deprive them of protected interests.(<em>Fuentes v. Shevin</em>, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972)) The core of these requirements is notice and a hearing before an impartial tribunal. Due process <strong>may</strong> also require an opportunity for confrontation and cross-examination, and for discovery; that a decision be made based on the record, and that a party be allowed to be represented by counsel. (additional citations in footnotes omitted)</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Written regulations specifying when denial of access is permitted should exist, and should be provided on request, or failing that, via a Freedom of Information (or state equivalent) request.</p>
<p>If the local government has not explained its decisions beyond saying that &quot;there have been complaints&quot; and no hearing of any kind was ever held, the OP could file an action seeking to require such a hearing to be held, or else access to be restored. A lawyer would probably be needed to take such proceedings, and there is no guarantee that legal fees would be reimbursed, even of the action was successful.</p>
<p>A Section 1983 suit would be possible in theory. This would, if successful,  result in money damages, not an injunction mandating access. No one can predict the chance of success without more specifics than are present in the question, and that is beyond the scope of this forum.</p>
<h3><em>Carey v. Piphus</em></h3>
<p><a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/435/247/" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>Carey v. Piphus</em>, 435 U.S. 247 (1978)</a> started as a pair of suits under  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (derived from § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871) This is the famous &quot;Section 1983&quot; under which people may take action against acts taken &quot;under color of law&quot; which deprive them of civil rights. This particular case started with two particular students in the public schools, each of whom was suspended without a hearing, and each of whom attempted to challenge the suspension as improper. Neither was accorded any opportunity to contest the suspensions in any way. The Court of Appeals decision held, and the US Supreme court affirmed, that the denial of a hearing was improper.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Although respondents' suspensions occurred before <em>Goss v. Lopez</em> was decided, the District Court thought that petitioners should have been placed on notice that the suspensions violated procedural due process by <em>Linwood v. Board of Ed. of City of Peoria</em>, 463 F.2d 763 (CA7), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027 (1972). Petitioners have not challenged this holding.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>...</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Even if respondents' suspensions were justified, and even if they did not suffer any other actual injury, the fact remains that they were deprived of their right to procedural due process.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>&quot;It is enough to invoke the procedural safeguards of the Fourteenth Amendment that a significant property interest is at stake, whatever the ultimate outcome of a hearing. . . .&quot; <em>Fuentes v. Shevin</em>, 407 U.S. at 407 U. S. 87;</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Because the right to procedural due process is &quot;absolute&quot; in the sense that it does not depend upon the merits of a claimant's substantive assertions, and because of the importance to organized society that procedural due process be observed, see Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371, 401 U. S. 37 (1971); Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. at 171-172 (Frankfurter, J., concurring), we believe that the denial of procedural due process should be actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury.</p>
</blockquote>
<p><em>Carey v. Piphus</em> was largely about whether the complainants should be entitled to sizable damages in the absence of any proof of having suffered harm beyond the procedurally invalid suspensions themselves. The Court held they they were entitled to nominal damages. But all the courts that reviewed the case accepted as basic that the failure to accord procedural due process on request was a violation of rights, and was wrongful under sec 1983. This was true even if a hearing would have upheld the suspensions.</p>

civil-law massachusetts