How can an agent represent more than one principal without receiving secret commissions?
<p>Let's suppose an agent wishes to sell products on behalf of an indefinite number of principals and the principals are all direct competitors manufacturing the same kind of widgets.</p>
<p>How might the agent provide sufficient disclosure to receive informed consent from each principal to avoid the legal issue of secret commissions? Would it be sufficient to include some type of consent clause upfront in the agency agreement?</p>

<p>An agent can't represent multiple direct competitors selling identical goods, without breaching the agent's fiduciary duty of loyalty to the principals involved. The conflict is so severe that it can't be waived.</p>
<p>Someone might be what is called in my part of the world a &quot;transaction broker&quot;, a &quot;broker&quot;, a &quot;wholesaler&quot;, or a &quot;consignment seller&quot;, who is not an agent for any party, and is instead an independent firm that purchases good from various manufacturers and resells those goods to third parties for this firm's own benefit, or who facilitates sales between two other parties for this firm's own benefit (rather than as an agent for either party to the sale). In financial markets, individuals known as &quot;market makers&quot; also act in something approximating this role.</p>
<p>But, the term &quot;agency&quot; inherently denotes a fiduciary relationship that puts the principal first, allows the agent to act on behalf of the principal, has knowledge received by the agent attributed to the principal, etc. This just can't be done. The role described in the question is not the role of an agent.</p>

england-and-wales agency