Alabama Accomplice Law - Charging a person with murder who hasn&#39;t killed anyone
<p>There has recently been a case of a teenager who was charged with 65 years because, during a robbery he and his accomplices were committing, a police officer shot and killed one of the robbers. The media reports that charging all those engaged in the crime that led to the criminal's death with murder is legal under "Alabama's Accomplice Law."  I could not find the pertinent statutes leading to this conclusion; what is the legal justification for this charge?</p>

<p><a href="http://www.foxnews.com/us/2018/04/07/ala-teen-turns-down-25-year-plea-deal-gets-sentenced-to-65-years-instead-and-laughs.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Article</a> - Media report on the story</p>

<p><a href="http://alisondb.legislature.state.al.us/alison/codeofalabama/1975/13A-2-23.htm" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Alabama Section 13-A-2-23</a> Criminal liability based upon behavior of another - Complicity.</p>

<p>This is an example of the so-called <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Felony_murder_rule#United_States" rel="noreferrer">felony murder rule</a>, in which the crime of murder is defined to include deaths related to a felony committed by the defendant.  You'll note that the article actually uses the phrase "felony murder".</p>

<p>See the Alamaba Criminal Code at <a href="http://codes.findlaw.com/al/title-13a-criminal-code/al-code-sect-13a-6-2.html" rel="noreferrer">13A-6-2</a>:</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>(a) A person commits the crime of murder if he or she does any of the following:
  [...]</p>
  
  <p>(3) He or she commits or attempts to commit arson in the first degree, <strong>burglary in the first or second degree</strong>, escape in the first degree, kidnapping in the first degree, rape in the first degree, robbery in any degree, sodomy in the first degree, aggravated child abuse under Section 26-15-3.1, or any other felony clearly dangerous to human life and, in the course of and in furtherance of the crime that he or she is committing or attempting to commit, or in immediate flight therefrom, he or she, <strong>or another participant if there be any</strong>, causes the death of any person.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>It's interesting that "another participant" was apparently held to include the police officer.</p>

<p>In addition to the felony-murder statute itself, the justification rests on principles of causation and foreseeability.  As Alabama courts have explained:</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>Section 13A-2-5, Ala. Code 1975, addresses causation, in
  pertinent part, as follows:</p>
  
  <blockquote>
    <p>"(a) A person is criminally liable if the result would not have
    occurred but for his conduct, operating either alone or concurrently 
    with another cause, unless the concurrent cause was sufficient
    to produce the result and the conduct of the actor clearly
    insufficient.</p>
    
    <p>"(b) A person is nevertheless criminally liable for causing a result
    if the only difference between what actually occurred and what he
    intended, contemplated or risked is that:</p>
    
    <p>"(1) A different person or property was injured, harmed or affected;</p>
    
    <p>". . . ."</p>
  </blockquote>
  
  <p>This Court addressed causation in the context of felony murder in
  <em><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8863092968652647248&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=6&amp;as_vis=1&amp;oi=scholarr" rel="noreferrer">Witherspoon v. State</a></em>, 33 So. 3d 625 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009). In
  <em>Witherspoon</em>, two masked men, Witherspoon and Baggett, entered a
  convenience store; Baggett was holding a gun. The store clerk grabbed
  his own gun and shot Baggett. In upholding Witherspoon's conviction
  for felony murder, this Court stated:</p>
  
  <blockquote>
    <p>"'[F]oreseeability is the key issue in a causation inquiry. The
    "controlling question[]" is "whether the ultimate result was
    foreseeable to the original actor." <em>Henderson v. Kibbe</em>, 431 U.S. 145,
    151 n.9, 97 S.Ct. 1730, 1735 n.9, 52 L.Ed.2d 203 (1977). If the
    accused "should have perceived" that his own conduct would concur with
    another cause to bring about the injury to the victim, then the other
    cause is concurrent, not supervening. <em>See Shirah v. State</em>, 555 So. 2d
    807, 812-13 (Ala. Cr. App. 1989) (conduct of accused, who
    supplied morphine to victim, was the cause-in-fact of victim's death
    from overdose of Secobarbital and morphine combined). On the other
    hand, a supervening cause "breaks the chain of causation" precisely
    because it is not a reasonably foreseeable result of the accused's
    conduct. <em>Lewis</em> [<em>v. State</em>], 474 So. 2d [766, 771 (Ala. Crim. App.
    1985)].'"</p>
  </blockquote>
  
  <p><em>Witherspoon</em>, 33 So. 3d at 628-29 (quoting <em>Pearson v. State</em>,
  601 So. 2d 1119, 1127 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992)).</p>
  
  <p>Resolving the issue of causation, this Court held that, but for the
  acts of Witherspoon and Baggett entering the store wearing masks,
  demanding money, and carrying a gun, the store clerk would not have
  used his own gun to shoot and kill Baggett. <em>Witherspoon</em>, 33 So. 3d at
  631. Furthermore, the store clerk's reactions to Witherspoon and Baggett's conduct were not abnormal or unforeseeable, given the
  actions of the participants in the robbery. <em>Witherspoon</em>, 33 So. 3d at
  631.</p>
</blockquote>

<p><em><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7617108686340836004&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=6&amp;as_vis=1&amp;oi=scholarr" rel="noreferrer">Mills v. State</a></em>, 144 So. 3d 499, 505 (Ala. Crim. App. 2013) (alteration in original).</p>

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