What rights do inmates have during natural disasters?
<p>The water level behind Oroville Dam, CA, recently went way up due to heavy rain, and the rarely used "emergency spillway" was used for the first time in the dam's 50+ year life.  It sustained significant damage and authorities tweeted out, “Auxiliary spillway at Oroville Dam predicted to fail within the next hour. Oroville residents evacuate northward.”  Officials' fear of a catastrophic flood prompted the evacuation of hundreds of thousands of people.  <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/02/13/officials-were-warned-the-oroville-dam-emergency-spillway-wasnt-safe-they-didnt-listen/?utm_term=.bca3d0f135c3" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>Washington Post</em> coverage</a> concluded with a note that "Inmates at the Butte County Jail also had been moved to Alameda County, about 170 miles away."  As of this writing, no such flood occurred, but for the sake of this question suppose one had, before the inmates were evacuated.  Suppose that the guards saw (or were taken out by) some imminent danger and are out of the picture, though the inmates don't necessarily know why - they just notice water coming in and rising inside, relatively quickly.  They don't know how high it will go; maybe nobody does.  What rights do they have?</p>

<p>If they try to escape, is that a crime (e.g. attempted/actual Escape) they'll be prosecuted for later?  If they succeeded, but were traumatized by it being an extremely dangerous situation and no longer trust the state to take care of them and provide the protection from those kinds of dangers that they thought was part of their duty, are they still practically required to go back into that situation, with the State getting a free pass?  If they get out, for how long can they remain free (and if the jail is severely damaged, to where would they be required to go?) </p>

<p>At 20:14 in <a href="http://www.radiolab.org/story/91616-people-who-lie/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">this Radiolab segment</a>, an inmate who was first released due to prison overcrowding is described as having been "lost" during Hurricane Katrina, and the attorney general's office has no idea where that person is, end of story (?).   There may be other, more direct answers based on actual situations of what happened after Katrina, or in some fires, etc.; it seems likely this sort of thing has actually happened when jailers faced a disaster without having or using sufficient advance notice.</p>

<p>The question is focused on California, but answers/examples from other jurisdictions might be interesting too.</p>

<p>It is a felony to escape from a jail; see <a href="http://codes.findlaw.com/ca/penal-code/pen-sect-4532.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">California Penal Code section 4532</a>.  (Escapes from a prison are covered in <a href="http://codes.findlaw.com/ca/penal-code/pen-sect-4530.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">section 4530</a>).</p>

<p>However, California law recognizes a <a href="https://www.justia.com/criminal/docs/calcrim/3400/3403.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">necessity defense</a> when a crime is committed in order to avoid "significant bodily harm".  (See the link for other important elements of the defense.)  This defense would probably only be viable if after escaping, the inmate turned himself in as promptly as he reasonably could, once clear of the immediate danger of harm.  He could go to any police station or law enforcement office; or he could call any police agency, explain the situation, and wait for them to come and arrest him.  He would then presumably be taken to a different jail.</p>

<p>If the inmate thinks the jail is unsafe, he can sue the state in either state or federal court (the latter as a civil rights case).  It's unlikely that a court would order his release on this basis; more likely, they would order the state to improve conditions in some specific way, and they might award monetary damages to the inmate if he is injured.  </p>

<p>He also would probably not be able to stay out of jail during the suit.  If the state arrests him, they'll put him in jail unless a court orders his release (or he's granted bail, or his case is otherwise resolved).  If he hides to avoid arrest, then he's a fugitive.  I seem to recall there's a general principle that fugitives don't have access to the courts.</p>

<p>The question of whether it would be a crime to escape in that situation boils down to the "necessity" or "choice of evils" justification which applies only in extreme circumstances but might apply here.  </p>

<p>As others have noted, that defense would apply only so long as it is actually necessary to escape to stay alive, after which someone would have to surrender to the first available authority. But, even if someone was technically guilty of "escape" the circumstances would no doubt influence how prosecutorial discretion was exercised and would likely result in a shorter sentence for escape to the extent that there was a conviction for that offense and the judge had discretion to impose a mild sentence or a sentence concurrent with out sentences that the inmate is serving at the time.</p>

<p>If a result of the disaster the state had more inmates than it had a capacity to house in other facilities or by relocating inmates to facilities in other states under a contract arrangement and the state could not secure a legal waiver of the limits on how many inmates it could house at a particular authority, it might have to release inmates (systemwide) of its choice until it had enough room to house the remaining inmates. Usually, in a situation like that, the state tries to release inmates who are fairly close to their release date and have good disciplinary records while incarcerated.</p>

<p>Also, the prison operators have a legal duty to protect inmates that arises under the 8th Amendment as incorporated against the states thorough the 14th Amendment and usually enforced in a lawsuit for money damages or injunctive relief or both brought under Section 1983. </p>

<p>A <a href="http://www.ncmd.uscourts.gov/sites/ncmd/files/opinions/14cv730moo_0.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">case discussing the duty in the context of medical care</a> (which applies equally in the case of a natural disaster) says this:</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>The Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on municipal actors to “provide
  humane conditions of confinement.” Makdessi v. Fields, 789 F.3d 126,
  132 (4th Cir. 2015). In order to state a § 1983 claim under the Eighth
  Amendment for inadequate medical care when in confinement, a plaintiff
  must allege that municipal actors were deliberately indifferent to his
  serious medical needs. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
  “[T]here is a subjective and an objective component to showing a
  violation of the right. The plaintiff must demonstrate that the
  officers acted with ‘deliberate indifference’ (subjective) to the
  inmate’s ‘serious medical needs’ (objective).” Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d
  225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104).</p>
  
  <p>According to the Supreme Court, the deliberate indifference standard
  lies “somewhere between the poles of negligence at one end and purpose
  or knowledge at the other” and equates to recklessness. Farmer v.
  Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835–36 (1994). Allegations that a municipal
  actor knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of harm are
  sufficient to state a claim for relief. See id. (“It is, indeed, fair
  to say that acting or failing to act with deliberate indifference to a
  substantial risk of serious harm to a prisoner is the equivalent of
  recklessly disregarding that risk.”); Parrish ex rel. Lee v.
  Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 302 (4th Cir. 2004).</p>
</blockquote>

<p>A more generous standard of liability for the prison operators (if I recall correctly, "negligence" rather than "deliberate indifference") applies in cases where the inmate is detained prior to conviction while awaiting trial, or for a purpose other than a criminal conviction (e.g. due to a mental health hold, protective custody, awaiting deportation where criminal immigration violations are not alleged, or curfew violations).</p>

<p>The standards for holding the governmental entity itself liable is different than the standard for holding the individuals operating the prison liable (and additional 11th Amendment issues of substance and forum come into play that require suit to be brought in state rather than federal court on such a claim when the governmental entity owning the facility is a state government) (per the same case linked above):</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>In order to state a § 1983 claim under the Eighth Amendment for
  inadequate medical care, a plaintiff must allege that a municipal
  actor was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. See
  Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. A municipality, however, may not be found
  liable under § 1983 “based on a theory of respondeat superior or
  simply for employing a tortfeasor.” Hill v. Robeson Cnty., N.C., 733
  F. Supp. 2d 676, 683 (E.D.N.C. 2010); see also Riddick v. Sch. Bd. of
  Portsmouth, 238 F.3d 518, 522 (4th Cir. 2000). Rather, to state a §
  1983 cause of action against a municipality, a plaintiff must plead
  “(1) the existence of an official policy or custom; (2) that the
  policy or custom is fairly attributable to the municipality; and (3)
  that the policy or custom proximately caused the deprivation of a
  constitutional right.” Pettiford v. City of Greensboro, 556 F. Supp.
  2d 512, 530 (M.D.N.C. 2008) (citing Jordan by Jordan v. Jackson, 15
  F.3d 333, 338 (4th Cir. 1994)); see also Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d
  215, 218 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that a plaintiff must allege that a
  constitutional violation was caused by a municipality’s “official
  policy or custom”).</p>
</blockquote>

<p>The prison operators could also be subject to federal criminal charges for violating the civil rights of the inmates for abandoning them in a natural disaster, and quite possibly also various states charges related to official misconduct.</p>

united-states california prison emergencies