Does the presumption of innocence apply when deciding whether to exonerate a convict?
<p>I just read an article in the Austin Chronicle (<a href="http://www.austinchronicle.com/news/2016-03-11/learning-from-our-mistakes/" rel="nofollow">link</a>) about Fran and Dan Keller, who were convicted of a felony in the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oak_Hill_satanic_ritual_abuse_trial" rel="nofollow">Oak Hill satanic ritual abuse trial</a>.</p>

<p>Some quotes from the article: </p>

<blockquote>
  <p>Their 1992 conviction...has effectively been overturned by a May 2015
  Court of Criminal Appeals ruling 'granting relief' to the
  Kellers...but the ruling was not accompanied by actual exoneration.</p>
  
  <p>...</p>
  
  <p>In the absence of an exoneration from the court, there remains one
  person who can act upon the complete absence of evidence...District
  Attorney Rosemary Lehmberg.</p>
  
  <p>...</p>
  
  <p>In previous local exonerations, Lehmberg recalled, DNA evidence
  eventually led away from the person convicted.  In this case, the
  absence of any physical evidence...has had a perverse result: it has
  thus far prevented Lehmberg from any further action.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>While I'm not sure if it's technically correct that there's no evidence of wrongdoing whatsoever, it seems strange to me that in a legal system where the defendant is innocent until proven guilty, an appeals court would not be legally required to exonerate the convict if unable to find any evidence (or the single piece of evidence was retracted, as in this case) with which they could have rendered a guilty verdict in the first place.</p>

<p>Why is it possible for a convict not to get exonerated even if the only evidence against them gets retracted?</p>

<p>The <a href="http://www.search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=06b0e779-7183-4ec7-b403-2faba6082bf2&amp;coa=coscca&amp;DT=OPINION&amp;MediaID=7a8e7ee4-27b1-41d2-bc16-e486fb24196b" rel="nofollow">Court of Criminal Appeals ruling</a> states that the conviction was set aside on grounds of false testimony. It appears based on a <a href="http://www.search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=0be87070-06f7-441c-9c6f-ffbd4b525ff3&amp;coa=coscca&amp;DT=OPINION&amp;MediaID=08d05fea-c068-4331-b880-74c4da39009b" rel="nofollow">concurring opinion</a> that there were other grounds: J. Johnson said that she would grant relief on all the grounds that have been raised. From that we can conclude that there were other grounds that the majority did not agree with: they presumably concluded that there was not sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction, but also not enough enough evidence to support a declaration of actual innocence.</p>

<p>Convictions are overturned for numerous reasons, many of which are called "technicalities" – improper jury instructions, procedural flaws (Mirandacizing a suspect), etc. Sometimes, a conviction is overturned even though there is good reason to believe that the suspect actually did it. The problem is that if every overturning of a conviction required the courts to additionally declare the actual innocence of the accused, then (1) the courts would be required to make patently false statements (when actual guilt is clear, but the path to conviction was improper) which would be bad, and (2) the negative consequences of over-applying such a requirement for exoneration would no doubt lead to a serious decrease in the probability of <em>any</em> conviction being overturned on procedural grounds. Since no "automatic exoneration" principle has been tried out on the legal system, we can't tell exactly why by reading cases, but I think automatic exoneration would have serious problems, which is why exoneration is separate from overturnnig a conviction.</p>

<p>The presumption of innocence doesn't apply once a case has reached this procedural posture.  A defendant is presumed innocent when charged and tried, but once the defendant is convicted, everything flips, and he or she faces extremely adverse legal standards -- especially in a post-conviction proceeding.</p>

<p>It looks like the defendants in this case prevailed on a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Giglio_v._United_States" rel="nofollow"><em>Brady</em>/<em>Giglio</em></a> claim (or perhaps a state-law equivalent).  As one court has observed, the remedy for those types of violations "will usually be a new trial."  <em>United States v. Kohring</em>, 637 F.3d 895, 913 (9th Cir. 2011).  Another court explains that "the applicable remedy analysis for a <em>Brady</em> violation is as follows: (1) a <em>Brady</em> violation requires a remedy of a new trial; (2) such new trial may require striking evidence, a special jury instruction, or other additional curative measures tailored to address persistent prejudice; and (3) if the lingering prejudice of a <em>Brady</em> violation has removed all possibility that the defendant could receive a new trial that is fair, the indictment must be dismissed.  To be sure, dismissal is appropriate only as a last resort, where no other remedy would cure prejudice against a defendant."  <em>United States v. Pasha</em>, 797 F.3d 1122, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2015).</p>

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