Is Apple abusing its position with iOS by requiring MacOS to build apps?
<p>In Europe, we have a concept of abuse of a dominant position.
<a href="http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consumers/abuse_en.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consumers/abuse_en.html</a></p>

<p>When you develop an App for the very popular iOS devices, you're required to use a less popular MacOS device to do so. Is this an abuse of a dominant position in the mobile/cellular market to sell their (poor quality in my opinion!) MacOS devices?</p>

<p>I don’t think you can require Apple to develop all their tools for Windows as well. You can’t require them to make MacOS available for non-apple computers, and since there is massive precedent of malware generated by hacked versions of Xcode, I think they are completely within their rights to insist on original software being used for development. </p>

<p>&quot;Abuse of a dominant position&quot; is a concept from <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Competition_law" rel="nofollow noreferrer">competition law</a>. In Apple's home jurisdiction, the United States, this field is called <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_antitrust_law" rel="nofollow noreferrer">antitrust</a> and the concept of abuse of a dominant position is called (unlawful) <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monopolization" rel="nofollow noreferrer">monopolization</a>.</p>
<p>Antitrust cases are legally complex, and there is usually significant room for debate about whether a particular company is breaking the law or pursuing its legitimate interests. There are a number of claims pending against Apple alleging unlawful monopolization of various iOS-related markets. Identifying the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relevant_market" rel="nofollow noreferrer">relevant market</a> is another fundamental concept in competition law which can be hotly contested in litigation.</p>
<p>As of January 2023, the most authoritative legal opinion on the antitrust implications of Apple's control of iOS is the <a href="https://cand.uscourts.gov/wp-content/uploads/cases-of-interest/epic-games-v-apple/Epic-v.-Apple-20-cv-05640-YGR-Dkt-812-Order.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">September 10, 2021</a> decision of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California in <em><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epic_Games_v._Apple" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Epic Games v. Apple</a></em>. That decision has been <a href="https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/cases-of-interest/epic-games-v-apple-inc/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">appealed</a> to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which heard oral argument on <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WS8Oe09GaqU" rel="nofollow noreferrer">November 15, 2022</a>, but has not yet issued its decision.</p>
<p>Epic did not complain about the need to develop iOS apps on macOS. Rather, Epic says that Apple illegally monopolized its control over the &quot;aftermarkets&quot; for iOS app distribution and in-app payment processing. The district court rejected Epic's federal antitrust claim by adopting a definition of the relevant market which was closer to that advanced by Apple:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Ultimately, after evaluating the trial evidence, the Court finds that the relevant market here is <em><strong>digital mobile gaming transactions</strong></em>, not gaming generally and not Apple’s own internal operating systems related to the App Store. The mobile gaming market itself is a $100 billion industry. The size of this market explains Epic Games’ motive in bringing this action …</p>
<p>Having defined the relevant market as digital mobile gaming transactions … the Court cannot ultimately conclude that Apple is a monopolist under either federal or state antitrust laws. While the Court finds that Apple enjoys considerable market share of over 55% and extraordinarily high profit
margins, these factors alone do not show antitrust conduct. Success is not illegal.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The district court's decision was sharply criticised by the <a href="https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2022/10/20/21-16506-Amicus-brief-by-United-States-of-America.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Department of Justice</a>, the <a href="https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2022/10/20/21-16506-Amicus-brief-by-Electronic-Frontier-Foundation.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Electronic Frontier Foundation</a> and <a href="https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2022/10/20/21-16506-Amicus-brief-by-Microsoft-Corporation.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Microsoft</a>, who all filed <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amicus_curiae" rel="nofollow noreferrer">amici briefs</a> broadly in support of Epic's position. One <a href="http://www.fosspatents.com/2022/11/apple-on-losing-track-against-epic.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">commentator</a> who has analysed the oral argument in the Ninth Circuit confidently predicts that &quot;Apple will most likely lose this appeal&quot; and &quot;this case will presumably end up in the Supreme Court.&quot;</p>
<p>I will update this answer when a higher court determines the relevant market, under U.S. antitrust law, for assessing claims that Apple is unlawfully monopolizing its control over iOS.</p>

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