Is there such a thing as &quot;indirect&quot; defamation?
<p>A says to B, "You are a lousy drug dealer." They are overheard by a bystander, C, with consequent damage to B, who really isn't a drug dealer.</p>

<p>My understanding is that "defamation" does not exist for conversations between two parties, but does occur when one or more third parties become involved. So the issue here is, at what point does C become a third party. I'll use two cases for illustration:</p>

<p>1) A, B, and C are together in the same room. A addressed B but not C.</p>

<p>2) A and B are inside a building, C walks by at the "right" moment and overhears A's remarks through an open window. He also sees A and B.</p>

<p>Do either or both of these cases constitute defamation of B by A to C?</p>

<p>The answer is likely "yes" in both scenarios, because defamation can be either intentional or negligent.  This is what the Restatement says:</p>

<blockquote>
  <p><strong>(1)  Publication of defamatory matter is its communication intentionally or by a negligent act to one other than the person
  defamed. . . .</strong></p>
  
  <p><strong>COMMENTS &amp; ILLUSTRATIONS</strong> </p>
  
  <p><strong>Comment:</strong></p>
  
  <p><em>a.  Manner of making publication.</em>  A publication of the defamatory matter is essential to liability. (See § 558). Any act by which the
  defamatory matter is intentionally or negligently communicated to a
  third person is a publication. . . .</p>
  
  <p>. . .</p>
  
  <p><em>k.  Intentional or negligent publication.</em>  There is an intent to publish defamatory matter when the actor does an act for the purpose
  of communicating it to a third person or with knowledge that it is
  substantially certain to be so communicated. (See § 8A).</p>
  
  <p>It is not necessary, however, that the communication to a third person
  be intentional. If a reasonable person would recognize that an act
  creates an unreasonable risk that the defamatory matter will be
  communicated to a third person, the conduct becomes a negligent
  communication. A negligent communication amounts to a publication just
  as effectively as an intentional communication.</p>
  
  <p><strong>Illustrations:</strong></p>
  
  <ol start="4">
  <li>A and B engage in an altercation on the street where there are a number of pedestrians. During the course of the quarrel, A in a loud
  voice accuses B of larceny, the accusation being overheard by a number
  of passers-by. A has published a slander.</li>
  </ol>
</blockquote>

<p>Restatement (Second) of Torts § 577 (1979).</p>

<p>Scenario 1) amounts to defamation because A was aware that his statement would be heard by C.
Scenario 2) depends on the circumstances. A reasonable likelihood (and A's awareness) that people frequently walk by that window might constitute circumstantial evidence that A's statement was made negligently.</p>

defamation slander