Unsegment Anything by Simulating Deformation
Jiahao Lu Xingyi Yang Xinchao Wang
Foundation segmentation models, while powerful, pose a significant risk: they
enable users to effortlessly extract any objects from any digital content with
a single click, potentially leading to copyright infringement or malicious
misuse. To mitigate this risk, we introduce a new task "Anything Unsegmentable"
to grant any image "the right to be unsegmented". The ambitious pursuit of the
task is to achieve highly transferable adversarial attacks against all
prompt-based segmentation models, regardless of model parameterizations and
prompts. We highlight the non-transferable and heterogeneous nature of
prompt-specific adversarial noises. Our approach focuses on disrupting image
encoder features to achieve prompt-agnostic attacks. Intriguingly, targeted
feature attacks exhibit better transferability compared to untargeted ones,
suggesting the optimal update direction aligns with the image manifold. Based
on the observations, we design a novel attack named Unsegment Anything by
Simulating Deformation (UAD). Our attack optimizes a differentiable deformation
function to create a target deformed image, which alters structural information
while preserving achievable feature distance by adversarial example. Extensive
experiments verify the effectiveness of our approach, compromising a variety of
promptable segmentation models with different architectures and prompt
interfaces. We release the code at
https://github.com/jiahaolu97/anything-unsegmentable.