Robust Adversarial Reinforcement Learning via Bounded Rationality
  Curricula
Aryaman Reddi Maximilian Tölle Jan Peters Georgia Chalvatzaki Carlo D'Eramo
Robustness against adversarial attacks and distribution shifts is a
long-standing goal of Reinforcement Learning (RL). To this end, Robust
Adversarial Reinforcement Learning (RARL) trains a protagonist against
destabilizing forces exercised by an adversary in a competitive zero-sum Markov
game, whose optimal solution, i.e., rational strategy, corresponds to a Nash
equilibrium. However, finding Nash equilibria requires facing complex saddle
point optimization problems, which can be prohibitive to solve, especially for
high-dimensional control. In this paper, we propose a novel approach for
adversarial RL based on entropy regularization to ease the complexity of the
saddle point optimization problem. We show that the solution of this
entropy-regularized problem corresponds to a Quantal Response Equilibrium
(QRE), a generalization of Nash equilibria that accounts for bounded
rationality, i.e., agents sometimes play random actions instead of optimal
ones. Crucially, the connection between the entropy-regularized objective and
QRE enables free modulation of the rationality of the agents by simply tuning
the temperature coefficient. We leverage this insight to propose our novel
algorithm, Quantal Adversarial RL (QARL), which gradually increases the
rationality of the adversary in a curriculum fashion until it is fully
rational, easing the complexity of the optimization problem while retaining
robustness. We provide extensive evidence of QARL outperforming RARL and recent
baselines across several MuJoCo locomotion and navigation problems in overall
performance and robustness.