DTA: Distribution Transform-based Attack for Query-Limited Scenario
Renyang Liu Wei Zhou Xin Jin Song Gao Yuanyu Wang Ruxin Wang
In generating adversarial examples, the conventional black-box attack methods
rely on sufficient feedback from the to-be-attacked models by repeatedly
querying until the attack is successful, which usually results in thousands of
trials during an attack. This may be unacceptable in real applications since
Machine Learning as a Service Platform (MLaaS) usually only returns the final
result (i.e., hard-label) to the client and a system equipped with certain
defense mechanisms could easily detect malicious queries. By contrast, a
feasible way is a hard-label attack that simulates an attacked action being
permitted to conduct a limited number of queries. To implement this idea, in
this paper, we bypass the dependency on the to-be-attacked model and benefit
from the characteristics of the distributions of adversarial examples to
reformulate the attack problem in a distribution transform manner and propose a
distribution transform-based attack (DTA). DTA builds a statistical mapping
from the benign example to its adversarial counterparts by tackling the
conditional likelihood under the hard-label black-box settings. In this way, it
is no longer necessary to query the target model frequently. A well-trained DTA
model can directly and efficiently generate a batch of adversarial examples for
a certain input, which can be used to attack un-seen models based on the
assumed transferability. Furthermore, we surprisingly find that the
well-trained DTA model is not sensitive to the semantic spaces of the training
dataset, meaning that the model yields acceptable attack performance on other
datasets. Extensive experiments validate the effectiveness of the proposed idea
and the superiority of DTA over the state-of-the-art.