Securing NextG Systems against Poisoning Attacks on Federated Learning:
  A Game-Theoretic Solution
Yalin E. Sagduyu Tugba Erpek Yi Shi
This paper studies the poisoning attack and defense interactions in a
federated learning (FL) system, specifically in the context of wireless signal
classification using deep learning for next-generation (NextG) communications.
FL collectively trains a global model without the need for clients to exchange
their data samples. By leveraging geographically dispersed clients, the trained
global model can be used for incumbent user identification, facilitating
spectrum sharing. However, in this distributed learning system, the presence of
malicious clients introduces the risk of poisoning the training data to
manipulate the global model through falsified local model exchanges. To address
this challenge, a proactive defense mechanism is employed in this paper to make
informed decisions regarding the admission or rejection of clients
participating in FL systems. Consequently, the attack-defense interactions are
modeled as a game, centered around the underlying admission and poisoning
decisions. First, performance bounds are established, encompassing the best and
worst strategies for attackers and defenders. Subsequently, the attack and
defense utilities are characterized within the Nash equilibrium, where no
player can unilaterally improve its performance given the fixed strategies of
others. The results offer insights into novel operational modes that safeguard
FL systems against poisoning attacks by quantifying the performance of both
attacks and defenses in the context of NextG communications.