Architecture-agnostic Iterative Black-box Certified Defense against
  Adversarial Patches
Di Yang Yihao Huang Qing Guo Felix Juefei-Xu Ming Hu Yang Liu Geguang Pu
The adversarial patch attack aims to fool image classifiers within a bounded,
contiguous region of arbitrary changes, posing a real threat to computer vision
systems (e.g., autonomous driving, content moderation, biometric
authentication, medical imaging) in the physical world. To address this problem
in a trustworthy way, proposals have been made for certified patch defenses
that ensure the robustness of classification models and prevent future patch
attacks from breaching the defense. State-of-the-art certified defenses can be
compatible with any model architecture, as well as achieve high clean and
certified accuracy. Although the methods are adaptive to arbitrary patch
positions, they inevitably need to access the size of the adversarial patch,
which is unreasonable and impractical in real-world attack scenarios. To
improve the feasibility of the architecture-agnostic certified defense in a
black-box setting (i.e., position and size of the patch are both unknown), we
propose a novel two-stage Iterative Black-box Certified Defense method, termed
IBCD.In the first stage, it estimates the patch size in a search-based manner
by evaluating the size relationship between the patch and mask with pixel
masking. In the second stage, the accuracy results are calculated by the
existing white-box certified defense methods with the estimated patch size. The
experiments conducted on two popular model architectures and two datasets
verify the effectiveness and efficiency of IBCD.