Shared Adversarial Unlearning: Backdoor Mitigation by Unlearning Shared
  Adversarial Examples
Shaokui Wei Mingda Zhang Hongyuan Zha Baoyuan Wu
Backdoor attacks are serious security threats to machine learning models
where an adversary can inject poisoned samples into the training set, causing a
backdoored model which predicts poisoned samples with particular triggers to
particular target classes, while behaving normally on benign samples. In this
paper, we explore the task of purifying a backdoored model using a small clean
dataset. By establishing the connection between backdoor risk and adversarial
risk, we derive a novel upper bound for backdoor risk, which mainly captures
the risk on the shared adversarial examples (SAEs) between the backdoored model
and the purified model. This upper bound further suggests a novel bi-level
optimization problem for mitigating backdoor using adversarial training
techniques. To solve it, we propose Shared Adversarial Unlearning (SAU).
Specifically, SAU first generates SAEs, and then, unlearns the generated SAEs
such that they are either correctly classified by the purified model and/or
differently classified by the two models, such that the backdoor effect in the
backdoored model will be mitigated in the purified model. Experiments on
various benchmark datasets and network architectures show that our proposed
method achieves state-of-the-art performance for backdoor defense.