AVA: Inconspicuous Attribute Variation-based Adversarial Attack
  bypassing DeepFake Detection
Xiangtao Meng Li Wang Shanqing Guo Lei Ju Qingchuan Zhao
While DeepFake applications are becoming popular in recent years, their
abuses pose a serious privacy threat. Unfortunately, most related detection
algorithms to mitigate the abuse issues are inherently vulnerable to
adversarial attacks because they are built atop DNN-based classification
models, and the literature has demonstrated that they could be bypassed by
introducing pixel-level perturbations. Though corresponding mitigation has been
proposed, we have identified a new attribute-variation-based adversarial attack
(AVA) that perturbs the latent space via a combination of Gaussian prior and
semantic discriminator to bypass such mitigation. It perturbs the semantics in
the attribute space of DeepFake images, which are inconspicuous to human beings
(e.g., mouth open) but can result in substantial differences in DeepFake
detection. We evaluate our proposed AVA attack on nine state-of-the-art
DeepFake detection algorithms and applications. The empirical results
demonstrate that AVA attack defeats the state-of-the-art black box attacks
against DeepFake detectors and achieves more than a 95% success rate on two
commercial DeepFake detectors. Moreover, our human study indicates that
AVA-generated DeepFake images are often imperceptible to humans, which presents
huge security and privacy concerns.