Physical Invisible Backdoor Based on Camera Imaging
Yusheng Guo Nan Zhong Zhenxing Qian Xinpeng Zhang
Backdoor attack aims to compromise a model, which returns an adversary-wanted
output when a specific trigger pattern appears yet behaves normally for clean
inputs. Current backdoor attacks require changing pixels of clean images, which
results in poor stealthiness of attacks and increases the difficulty of the
physical implementation. This paper proposes a novel physical invisible
backdoor based on camera imaging without changing nature image pixels.
Specifically, a compromised model returns a target label for images taken by a
particular camera, while it returns correct results for other images. To
implement and evaluate the proposed backdoor, we take shots of different
objects from multi-angles using multiple smartphones to build a new dataset of
21,500 images. Conventional backdoor attacks work ineffectively with some
classical models, such as ResNet18, over the above-mentioned dataset.
Therefore, we propose a three-step training strategy to mount the backdoor
attack. First, we design and train a camera identification model with the phone
IDs to extract the camera fingerprint feature. Subsequently, we elaborate a
special network architecture, which is easily compromised by our backdoor
attack, by leveraging the attributes of the CFA interpolation algorithm and
combining it with the feature extraction block in the camera identification
model. Finally, we transfer the backdoor from the elaborated special network
architecture to the classical architecture model via teacher-student
distillation learning. Since the trigger of our method is related to the
specific phone, our attack works effectively in the physical world. Experiment
results demonstrate the feasibility of our proposed approach and robustness
against various backdoor defenses.