Physical Adversarial Examples for Multi-Camera Systems
Ana Răduţoiu Jan-Philipp Schulze Philip Sperl Konstantin Böttinger
Neural networks build the foundation of several intelligent systems, which,
however, are known to be easily fooled by adversarial examples. Recent advances
made these attacks possible even in air-gapped scenarios, where the autonomous
system observes its surroundings by, e.g., a camera. We extend these ideas in
our research and evaluate the robustness of multi-camera setups against such
physical adversarial examples. This scenario becomes ever more important with
the rise in popularity of autonomous vehicles, which fuse the information of
several cameras for their driving decision. While we find that multi-camera
setups provide some robustness towards past attack methods, we see that this
advantage reduces when optimizing on multiple perspectives at once. We propose
a novel attack method that we call Transcender-MC, where we incorporate online
3D renderings and perspective projections in the training process. Moreover, we
motivate that certain data augmentation techniques can facilitate the
generation of successful adversarial examples even further. Transcender-MC is
11% more effective in successfully attacking multi-camera setups than
state-of-the-art methods. Our findings offer valuable insights regarding the
resilience of object detection in a setup with multiple cameras and motivate
the need of developing adequate defense mechanisms against them.