Agent Smith: A Single Image Can Jailbreak One Million Multimodal LLM
  Agents Exponentially Fast
Xiangming Gu Xiaosen Zheng Tianyu Pang Chao Du Qian Liu Ye Wang Jing Jiang Min Lin
A multimodal large language model (MLLM) agent can receive instructions,
capture images, retrieve histories from memory, and decide which tools to use.
Nonetheless, red-teaming efforts have revealed that adversarial images/prompts
can jailbreak an MLLM and cause unaligned behaviors. In this work, we report an
even more severe safety issue in multi-agent environments, referred to as
infectious jailbreak. It entails the adversary simply jailbreaking a single
agent, and without any further intervention from the adversary, (almost) all
agents will become infected exponentially fast and exhibit harmful behaviors.
To validate the feasibility of infectious jailbreak, we simulate multi-agent
environments containing up to one million LLaVA-1.5 agents, and employ
randomized pair-wise chat as a proof-of-concept instantiation for multi-agent
interaction. Our results show that feeding an (infectious) adversarial image
into the memory of any randomly chosen agent is sufficient to achieve
infectious jailbreak. Finally, we derive a simple principle for determining
whether a defense mechanism can provably restrain the spread of infectious
jailbreak, but how to design a practical defense that meets this principle
remains an open question to investigate. Our project page is available at
https://sail-sg.github.io/Agent-Smith/.