Towards Optimal Randomized Strategies in Adversarial Example Game
Jiahao Xie Chao Zhang Weijie Liu Wensong Bai Hui Qian
The vulnerability of deep neural network models to adversarial example
attacks is a practical challenge in many artificial intelligence applications.
A recent line of work shows that the use of randomization in adversarial
training is the key to find optimal strategies against adversarial example
attacks. However, in a fully randomized setting where both the defender and the
attacker can use randomized strategies, there are no efficient algorithm for
finding such an optimal strategy. To fill the gap, we propose the first
algorithm of its kind, called FRAT, which models the problem with a new
infinite-dimensional continuous-time flow on probability distribution spaces.
FRAT maintains a lightweight mixture of models for the defender, with
flexibility to efficiently update mixing weights and model parameters at each
iteration. Furthermore, FRAT utilizes lightweight sampling subroutines to
construct a random strategy for the attacker. We prove that the continuous-time
limit of FRAT converges to a mixed Nash equilibria in a zero-sum game formed by
a defender and an attacker. Experimental results also demonstrate the
efficiency of FRAT on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets.