Daily Papers

The emerging field of Diverse Intelligence seeks to identify, formalize, and understand commonalities in behavioral competencies across a wide range of implementations. Especially interesting are simple systems that provide unexpected examples of memory, decision-making, or problem-solving in substrates that at first glance do not appear to be complex enough to implement such capabilities. We seek to develop tools to help understand the minimal requirements for such capabilities, and to learn to recognize and predict basal forms of intelligence in unconventional substrates. Here, we apply novel analyses to the behavior of classical sorting algorithms, short pieces of code which have been studied for many decades. To study these sorting algorithms as a model of biological morphogenesis and its competencies, we break two formerly-ubiquitous assumptions: top-down control (instead, showing how each element within a array of numbers can exert minimal agency and implement sorting policies from the bottom up), and fully reliable hardware (instead, allowing some of the elements to be "damaged" and fail to execute the algorithm). We quantitatively characterize sorting activity as the traversal of a problem space, showing that arrays of autonomous elements sort themselves more reliably and robustly than traditional implementations in the presence of errors. Moreover, we find the ability to temporarily reduce progress in order to navigate around a defect, and unexpected clustering behavior among the elements in chimeric arrays whose elements follow one of two different algorithms. The discovery of emergent problem-solving capacities in simple, familiar algorithms contributes a new perspective to the field of Diverse Intelligence, showing how basal forms of intelligence can emerge in simple systems without being explicitly encoded in their underlying mechanics.

A hallmark of intelligence is the ability to autonomously learn new flexible, cognitive behaviors - that is, behaviors where the appropriate action depends not just on immediate stimuli (as in simple reflexive stimulus-response associations), but on contextual information that must be adequately acquired, stored and processed. While many meta-learning algorithms can design agents that autonomously learn new tasks, cognitive tasks adds another level of learning and memory to typical ``learning-to-learn'' problems. Here we evolve neural networks, endowed with plastic connections and neuromodulation, over a sizable set of simple cognitive tasks adapted from a computational neuroscience framework. The resulting evolved networks can automatically modify their own connectivity to acquire a novel simple cognitive task, never seen during evolution, from stimuli and rewards alone, through the spontaneous operation of their evolved neural organization and plasticity system. Our results emphasize the importance of carefully considering the multiple learning loops involved in the emergence of intelligent behavior.

The recent wave of generative AI has sparked unprecedented global attention, with both excitement and concern over potentially superhuman levels of artificial intelligence: models now take only seconds to produce outputs that would challenge or exceed the capabilities even of expert humans. At the same time, models still show basic errors in understanding that would not be expected even in non-expert humans. This presents us with an apparent paradox: how do we reconcile seemingly superhuman capabilities with the persistence of errors that few humans would make? In this work, we posit that this tension reflects a divergence in the configuration of intelligence in today's generative models relative to intelligence in humans. Specifically, we propose and test the Generative AI Paradox hypothesis: generative models, having been trained directly to reproduce expert-like outputs, acquire generative capabilities that are not contingent upon -- and can therefore exceed -- their ability to understand those same types of outputs. This contrasts with humans, for whom basic understanding almost always precedes the ability to generate expert-level outputs. We test this hypothesis through controlled experiments analyzing generation vs. understanding in generative models, across both language and image modalities. Our results show that although models can outperform humans in generation, they consistently fall short of human capabilities in measures of understanding, as well as weaker correlation between generation and understanding performance, and more brittleness to adversarial inputs. Our findings support the hypothesis that models' generative capability may not be contingent upon understanding capability, and call for caution in interpreting artificial intelligence by analogy to human intelligence.

To make deliberate progress towards more intelligent and more human-like artificial systems, we need to be following an appropriate feedback signal: we need to be able to define and evaluate intelligence in a way that enables comparisons between two systems, as well as comparisons with humans. Over the past hundred years, there has been an abundance of attempts to define and measure intelligence, across both the fields of psychology and AI. We summarize and critically assess these definitions and evaluation approaches, while making apparent the two historical conceptions of intelligence that have implicitly guided them. We note that in practice, the contemporary AI community still gravitates towards benchmarking intelligence by comparing the skill exhibited by AIs and humans at specific tasks such as board games and video games. We argue that solely measuring skill at any given task falls short of measuring intelligence, because skill is heavily modulated by prior knowledge and experience: unlimited priors or unlimited training data allow experimenters to "buy" arbitrary levels of skills for a system, in a way that masks the system's own generalization power. We then articulate a new formal definition of intelligence based on Algorithmic Information Theory, describing intelligence as skill-acquisition efficiency and highlighting the concepts of scope, generalization difficulty, priors, and experience. Using this definition, we propose a set of guidelines for what a general AI benchmark should look like. Finally, we present a benchmark closely following these guidelines, the Abstraction and Reasoning Corpus (ARC), built upon an explicit set of priors designed to be as close as possible to innate human priors. We argue that ARC can be used to measure a human-like form of general fluid intelligence and that it enables fair general intelligence comparisons between AI systems and humans.

As recent multi-modality large language models (MLLMs) have shown formidable proficiency on various complex tasks, there has been increasing attention on debating whether these models could eventually mirror human intelligence. However, existing benchmarks mainly focus on evaluating solely on task performance, such as the accuracy of identifying the attribute of an object. Combining well-developed cognitive science to understand the intelligence of MLLMs beyond superficial achievements remains largely unexplored. To this end, we introduce the first cognitive-driven multi-lingual and multi-modal benchmark to evaluate the general intelligence ability of MLLMs, dubbed M3GIA. Specifically, we identify five key cognitive factors based on the well-recognized Cattell-Horn-Carrol (CHC) model of intelligence and propose a novel evaluation metric. In addition, since most MLLMs are trained to perform in different languages, a natural question arises: is language a key factor influencing the cognitive ability of MLLMs? As such, we go beyond English to encompass other languages based on their popularity, including Chinese, French, Spanish, Portuguese and Korean, to construct our M3GIA. We make sure all the data relevant to the cultural backgrounds are collected from their native context to avoid English-centric bias. We collected a significant corpus of data from human participants, revealing that the most advanced MLLM reaches the lower boundary of human intelligence in English. Yet, there remains a pronounced disparity in the other five languages assessed. We also reveals an interesting winner takes all phenomenon that are aligned with the discovery in cognitive studies. Our benchmark will be open-sourced, with the aspiration of facilitating the enhancement of cognitive capabilities in MLLMs.

In this perspective paper, we introduce the concept of Specialized Generalist Artificial Intelligence (SGAI or simply SGI) as a crucial milestone toward Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). Compared to directly scaling general abilities, SGI is defined as AI that specializes in at least one task, surpassing human experts, while also retaining general abilities. This fusion path enables SGI to rapidly achieve high-value areas. We categorize SGI into three stages based on the level of mastery over professional skills and generality performance. Additionally, we discuss the necessity of SGI in addressing issues associated with large language models, such as their insufficient generality, specialized capabilities, uncertainty in innovation, and practical applications. Furthermore, we propose a conceptual framework for developing SGI that integrates the strengths of Systems 1 and 2 cognitive processing. This framework comprises three layers and four key components, which focus on enhancing individual abilities and facilitating collaborative evolution. We conclude by summarizing the potential challenges and suggesting future directions. We hope that the proposed SGI will provide insights into further research and applications towards achieving AGI.

Recent studies show evidence for emergent cognitive abilities in Large Pre-trained Language Models (PLMs). The increasing cognitive alignment of these models has made them candidates for cognitive science theories. Prior research into the emergent cognitive abilities of PLMs has largely been path-independent to model training, i.e., has focused on the final model weights and not the intermediate steps. However, building plausible models of human cognition using PLMs would benefit from considering the developmental alignment of their performance during training to the trajectories of children's thinking. Guided by psychometric tests of human intelligence, we choose four sets of tasks to investigate the alignment of ten popular families of PLMs and evaluate their available intermediate and final training steps. These tasks are Numerical ability, Linguistic abilities, Conceptual understanding, and Fluid reasoning. We find a striking regularity: regardless of model size, the developmental trajectories of PLMs consistently exhibit a window of maximal alignment to human cognitive development. Before that window, training appears to endow "blank slate" models with the requisite structure to be poised to rapidly learn from experience. After that window, training appears to serve the engineering goal of reducing loss but not the scientific goal of increasing alignment with human cognition.

Facing the current debate on whether Large Language Models (LLMs) attain near-human intelligence levels (Mitchell & Krakauer, 2023; Bubeck et al., 2023; Kosinski, 2023; Shiffrin & Mitchell, 2023; Ullman, 2023), the current study introduces a benchmark for evaluating social intelligence, one of the most distinctive aspects of human cognition. We developed a comprehensive theoretical framework for social dynamics and introduced two evaluation tasks: Inverse Reasoning (IR) and Inverse Inverse Planning (IIP). Our approach also encompassed a computational model based on recursive Bayesian inference, adept at elucidating diverse human behavioral patterns. Extensive experiments and detailed analyses revealed that humans surpassed the latest GPT models in overall performance, zero-shot learning, one-shot generalization, and adaptability to multi-modalities. Notably, GPT models demonstrated social intelligence only at the most basic order (order = 0), in stark contrast to human social intelligence (order >= 2). Further examination indicated a propensity of LLMs to rely on pattern recognition for shortcuts, casting doubt on their possession of authentic human-level social intelligence. Our codes, dataset, appendix and human data are released at https://github.com/bigai-ai/Evaluate-n-Model-Social-Intelligence.

We explore the emergence of intelligent behavior in artificial systems by investigating how the complexity of rule-based systems influences the capabilities of models trained to predict these rules. Our study focuses on elementary cellular automata (ECA), simple yet powerful one-dimensional systems that generate behaviors ranging from trivial to highly complex. By training distinct Large Language Models (LLMs) on different ECAs, we evaluated the relationship between the complexity of the rules' behavior and the intelligence exhibited by the LLMs, as reflected in their performance on downstream tasks. Our findings reveal that rules with higher complexity lead to models exhibiting greater intelligence, as demonstrated by their performance on reasoning and chess move prediction tasks. Both uniform and periodic systems, and often also highly chaotic systems, resulted in poorer downstream performance, highlighting a sweet spot of complexity conducive to intelligence. We conjecture that intelligence arises from the ability to predict complexity and that creating intelligence may require only exposure to complexity.

The academic intelligence of large language models (LLMs) has made remarkable progress in recent times, but their social intelligence performance remains unclear. Inspired by established human social intelligence frameworks, particularly Daniel Goleman's social intelligence theory, we have developed a standardized social intelligence test based on real-world social scenarios to comprehensively assess the social intelligence of LLMs, termed as the Situational Evaluation of Social Intelligence (SESI). We conducted an extensive evaluation with 13 recent popular and state-of-art LLM agents on SESI. The results indicate the social intelligence of LLMs still has significant room for improvement, with superficially friendliness as a primary reason for errors. Moreover, there exists a relatively low correlation between the social intelligence and academic intelligence exhibited by LLMs, suggesting that social intelligence is distinct from academic intelligence for LLMs. Additionally, while it is observed that LLMs can't ``understand'' what social intelligence is, their social intelligence, similar to that of humans, is influenced by social factors.

Human intelligence thrives on the concept of cognitive synergy, where collaboration and information integration among different cognitive processes yield superior outcomes compared to individual cognitive processes in isolation. Although Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated promising performance as general task-solving agents, they still struggle with tasks that require intensive domain knowledge and complex reasoning. In this work, we propose Solo Performance Prompting (SPP), which transforms a single LLM into a cognitive synergist by engaging in multi-turn self-collaboration with multiple personas. A cognitive synergist refers to an intelligent agent that collaborates with multiple minds, combining their individual strengths and knowledge, to enhance problem-solving and overall performance in complex tasks. By dynamically identifying and simulating different personas based on task inputs, SPP unleashes the potential of cognitive synergy in LLMs. We have discovered that assigning multiple, fine-grained personas in LLMs elicits better problem-solving abilities compared to using a single or fixed number of personas. We evaluate SPP on three challenging tasks: Trivia Creative Writing, Codenames Collaborative, and Logic Grid Puzzle, encompassing both knowledge-intensive and reasoning-intensive types. Unlike previous works, such as Chain-of-Thought, that solely enhance the reasoning abilities in LLMs, SPP effectively elicits internal knowledge acquisition abilities, reduces hallucination, and maintains strong reasoning capabilities. Code, data, and prompts can be found at: https://github.com/MikeWangWZHL/Solo-Performance-Prompting.git.

There is a belief that learning to compress well will lead to intelligence. Recently, language modeling has been shown to be equivalent to compression, which offers a compelling rationale for the success of large language models (LLMs): the development of more advanced language models is essentially enhancing compression which facilitates intelligence. Despite such appealing discussions, little empirical evidence is present for the interplay between compression and intelligence. In this work, we examine their relationship in the context of LLMs, treating LLMs as data compressors. Given the abstract concept of "intelligence", we adopt the average downstream benchmark scores as a surrogate, specifically targeting intelligence related to knowledge and commonsense, coding, and mathematical reasoning. Across 12 benchmarks, our study brings together 30 public LLMs that originate from diverse organizations. Remarkably, we find that LLMs' intelligence -- reflected by average benchmark scores -- almost linearly correlates with their ability to compress external text corpora. These results provide concrete evidence supporting the belief that superior compression indicates greater intelligence. Furthermore, our findings suggest that compression efficiency, as an unsupervised metric derived from raw text corpora, serves as a reliable evaluation measure that is linearly associated with the model capabilities. We open-source our compression datasets as well as our data collection pipelines to facilitate future researchers to assess compression properly.

During the evolution of large models, performance evaluation is necessarily performed to assess their capabilities and ensure safety before practical application. However, current model evaluations mainly rely on specific tasks and datasets, lacking a united framework for assessing the multidimensional intelligence of large models. In this perspective, we advocate for a comprehensive framework of cognitive science-inspired artificial general intelligence (AGI) tests, aimed at fulfilling the testing needs of large models with enhanced capabilities. The cognitive science-inspired AGI tests encompass the full spectrum of intelligence facets, including crystallized intelligence, fluid intelligence, social intelligence, and embodied intelligence. To assess the multidimensional intelligence of large models, the AGI tests consist of a battery of well-designed cognitive tests adopted from human intelligence tests, and then naturally encapsulates into an immersive virtual community. We propose increasing the complexity of AGI testing tasks commensurate with advancements in large models and emphasizing the necessity for the interpretation of test results to avoid false negatives and false positives. We believe that cognitive science-inspired AGI tests will effectively guide the targeted improvement of large models in specific dimensions of intelligence and accelerate the integration of large models into human society.

Intelligence is a crucial trait for species to find solutions within a limited number of trial-and-error attempts. Building on this idea, we introduce Survival Game as a framework to evaluate intelligence based on the number of failed attempts in a trial-and-error process. Fewer failures indicate higher intelligence. When the expectation and variance of failure counts are both finite, it signals the ability to consistently find solutions to new challenges, which we define as the Autonomous Level of intelligence. Using Survival Game, we comprehensively evaluate existing AI systems. Our results show that while AI systems achieve the Autonomous Level in simple tasks, they are still far from it in more complex tasks, such as vision, search, recommendation, and language. While scaling current AI technologies might help, this would come at an astronomical cost. Projections suggest that achieving the Autonomous Level for general tasks would require 10^{26} parameters. To put this into perspective, loading such a massive model requires so many H100 GPUs that their total value is 10^{7} times that of Apple Inc.'s market value. Even with Moore's Law, supporting such a parameter scale would take 70 years. This staggering cost highlights the complexity of human tasks and the inadequacies of current AI technologies. To further investigate this phenomenon, we conduct a theoretical analysis of Survival Game and its experimental results. Our findings suggest that human tasks possess a criticality property. As a result, Autonomous Level requires a deep understanding of the task's underlying mechanisms. Current AI systems, however, do not fully grasp these mechanisms and instead rely on superficial mimicry, making it difficult for them to reach an autonomous level. We believe Survival Game can not only guide the future development of AI but also offer profound insights into human intelligence.

We find arithmetic ability resides within a limited number of attention heads, with each head specializing in distinct operations. To delve into the reason, we introduce the Comparative Neuron Analysis (CNA) method, which identifies an internal logic chain consisting of four distinct stages from input to prediction: feature enhancing with shallow FFN neurons, feature transferring by shallow attention layers, feature predicting by arithmetic heads, and prediction enhancing among deep FFN neurons. Moreover, we identify the human-interpretable FFN neurons within both feature-enhancing and feature-predicting stages. These findings lead us to investigate the mechanism of LoRA, revealing that it enhances prediction probabilities by amplifying the coefficient scores of FFN neurons related to predictions. Finally, we apply our method in model pruning for arithmetic tasks and model editing for reducing gender bias. Code is on https://github.com/zepingyu0512/arithmetic-mechanism.

Recent work claims that large language models display emergent abilities, abilities not present in smaller-scale models that are present in larger-scale models. What makes emergent abilities intriguing is two-fold: their sharpness, transitioning seemingly instantaneously from not present to present, and their unpredictability, appearing at seemingly unforeseeable model scales. Here, we present an alternative explanation for emergent abilities: that for a particular task and model family, when analyzing fixed model outputs, emergent abilities appear due to the researcher's choice of metric rather than due to fundamental changes in model behavior with scale. Specifically, nonlinear or discontinuous metrics produce apparent emergent abilities, whereas linear or continuous metrics produce smooth, continuous predictable changes in model performance. We present our alternative explanation in a simple mathematical model, then test it in three complementary ways: we (1) make, test and confirm three predictions on the effect of metric choice using the InstructGPT/GPT-3 family on tasks with claimed emergent abilities; (2) make, test and confirm two predictions about metric choices in a meta-analysis of emergent abilities on BIG-Bench; and (3) show to choose metrics to produce never-before-seen seemingly emergent abilities in multiple vision tasks across diverse deep networks. Via all three analyses, we provide evidence that alleged emergent abilities evaporate with different metrics or with better statistics, and may not be a fundamental property of scaling AI models.

Human intelligence, the most evident and accessible form of source of reasoning, hosted by biological hardware, has evolved and been refined over thousands of years, positioning itself today to create new artificial forms and preparing to self--design their evolutionary path forward. Beginning with the advent of foundation models, the rate at which human and artificial intelligence interact with each other has surpassed any anticipated quantitative figures. The close engagement led to both bits of intelligence to be impacted in various ways, which naturally resulted in complex confluences that warrant close scrutiny. In the sequel, we shall explore the interplay between human and machine intelligence, focusing on the crucial role humans play in developing ethical, responsible, and robust intelligent systems. We slightly delve into interesting aspects of implementation inspired by the mechanisms underlying neuroscience and human cognition. Additionally, we propose future perspectives, capitalizing on the advantages of symbiotic designs to suggest a human-centered direction for next-generation AI development. We finalize this evolving document with a few thoughts and open questions yet to be addressed by the broader community.

Developmental psychologists have spent decades devising experiments to test the intelligence and knowledge of infants and children, tracing the origin of crucial concepts and capacities. Moreover, experimental techniques in developmental psychology have been carefully designed to discriminate the cognitive capacities that underlie particular behaviors. We propose that using classical experiments from child development is a particularly effective way to probe the computational abilities of AI models, in general, and LLMs in particular. First, the methodological techniques of developmental psychology, such as the use of novel stimuli to control for past experience or control conditions to determine whether children are using simple associations, can be equally helpful for assessing the capacities of LLMs. In parallel, testing LLMs in this way can tell us whether the information that is encoded in text is sufficient to enable particular responses, or whether those responses depend on other kinds of information, such as information from exploration of the physical world. In this work we adapt classical developmental experiments to evaluate the capabilities of LaMDA, a large language model from Google. We propose a novel LLM Response Score (LRS) metric which can be used to evaluate other language models, such as GPT. We find that LaMDA generates appropriate responses that are similar to those of children in experiments involving social understanding, perhaps providing evidence that knowledge of these domains is discovered through language. On the other hand, LaMDA's responses in early object and action understanding, theory of mind, and especially causal reasoning tasks are very different from those of young children, perhaps showing that these domains require more real-world, self-initiated exploration and cannot simply be learned from patterns in language input.

The deep neural nets of modern artificial intelligence (AI) have not achieved defining features of biological intelligence, including abstraction, causal learning, and energy-efficiency. While scaling to larger models has delivered performance improvements for current applications, more brain-like capacities may demand new theories, models, and methods for designing artificial learning systems. Here, we argue that this opportunity to reassess insights from the brain should stimulate cooperation between AI research and theory-driven computational neuroscience (CN). To motivate a brain basis of neural computation, we present a dynamical view of intelligence from which we elaborate concepts of sparsity in network structure, temporal dynamics, and interactive learning. In particular, we suggest that temporal dynamics, as expressed through neural synchrony, nested oscillations, and flexible sequences, provide a rich computational layer for reading and updating hierarchical models distributed in long-term memory networks. Moreover, embracing agent-centered paradigms in AI and CN will accelerate our understanding of the complex dynamics and behaviors that build useful world models. A convergence of AI/CN theories and objectives will reveal dynamical principles of intelligence for brains and engineered learning systems. This article was inspired by our symposium on dynamical neuroscience and machine learning at the 6th Annual US/NIH BRAIN Initiative Investigators Meeting.

A modular design encourages neural models to disentangle and recombine different facets of knowledge to generalise more systematically to new tasks. In this work, we assume that each task is associated with a subset of latent discrete skills from a (potentially small) inventory. In turn, skills correspond to parameter-efficient (sparse / low-rank) model parameterisations. By jointly learning these and a task-skill allocation matrix, the network for each task is instantiated as the average of the parameters of active skills. To favour non-trivial soft partitions of skills across tasks, we experiment with a series of inductive biases, such as an Indian Buffet Process prior and a two-speed learning rate. We evaluate our latent-skill model on two main settings: 1) multitask reinforcement learning for grounded instruction following on 8 levels of the BabyAI platform; and 2) few-shot adaptation of pre-trained text-to-text generative models on CrossFit, a benchmark comprising 160 NLP tasks. We find that the modular design of a network significantly increases sample efficiency in reinforcement learning and few-shot generalisation in supervised learning, compared to baselines with fully shared, task-specific, or conditionally generated parameters where knowledge is entangled across tasks. In addition, we show how discrete skills help interpretability, as they yield an explicit hierarchy of tasks.

This paper presents an in-depth analysis of Large Language Models (LLMs), focusing on LLaMA, a prominent open-source foundational model in natural language processing. Instead of assessing LLaMA through its generative output, we design multiple-choice tasks to probe its intrinsic understanding in high-order tasks such as reasoning and computation. We examine the model horizontally, comparing different sizes, and vertically, assessing different layers. We unveil several key and uncommon findings based on the designed probing tasks: (1) Horizontally, enlarging model sizes almost could not automatically impart additional knowledge or computational prowess. Instead, it can enhance reasoning abilities, especially in math problem solving, and helps reduce hallucinations, but only beyond certain size thresholds; (2) In vertical analysis, the lower layers of LLaMA lack substantial arithmetic and factual knowledge, showcasing logical thinking, multilingual and recognitive abilities, with top layers housing most computational power and real-world knowledge.

We propose a framework for classifying the capabilities and behavior of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) models and their precursors. This framework introduces levels of AGI performance, generality, and autonomy. It is our hope that this framework will be useful in an analogous way to the levels of autonomous driving, by providing a common language to compare models, assess risks, and measure progress along the path to AGI. To develop our framework, we analyze existing definitions of AGI, and distill six principles that a useful ontology for AGI should satisfy. These principles include focusing on capabilities rather than mechanisms; separately evaluating generality and performance; and defining stages along the path toward AGI, rather than focusing on the endpoint. With these principles in mind, we propose 'Levels of AGI' based on depth (performance) and breadth (generality) of capabilities, and reflect on how current systems fit into this ontology. We discuss the challenging requirements for future benchmarks that quantify the behavior and capabilities of AGI models against these levels. Finally, we discuss how these levels of AGI interact with deployment considerations such as autonomy and risk, and emphasize the importance of carefully selecting Human-AI Interaction paradigms for responsible and safe deployment of highly capable AI systems.

The surprising ability of Large Language Models (LLMs) to perform well on complex reasoning with only few-shot chain-of-thought prompts is believed to emerge only in very large-scale models (100+ billion parameters). We show that such abilities can, in fact, be distilled down from GPT-3.5 (ge 175B) to T5 variants (le 11B). We propose model specialization, to specialize the model's ability towards a target task. The hypothesis is that large models (commonly viewed as larger than 100B) have strong modeling power, but are spread on a large spectrum of tasks. Small models (commonly viewed as smaller than 10B) have limited model capacity, but if we concentrate their capacity on a specific target task, the model can achieve a decent improved performance. We use multi-step math reasoning as our testbed because it is a very typical emergent ability. We show two important aspects of model abilities: (1). there exists a very complex balance/ tradeoff between language models' multi-dimensional abilities; (2). by paying the price of decreased generic ability, we can clearly lift up the scaling curve of models smaller than 10B towards a specialized multi-step math reasoning ability. We further give comprehensive discussions about important design choices for better generalization, including the tuning data format, the start model checkpoint, and a new model selection method. We hope our practice and discoveries can serve as an important attempt towards specialized smaller models in the new research paradigm set by LLMs.

The concept of Artificial Intelligence has gained a lot of attention over the last decade. In particular, AI-based tools have been employed in several scenarios and are, by now, pervading our everyday life. Nonetheless, most of these systems lack many capabilities that we would naturally consider to be included in a notion of "intelligence". In this work, we present an architecture that, inspired by the cognitive theory known as Thinking Fast and Slow by D. Kahneman, is tasked with solving planning problems in different settings, specifically: classical and multi-agent epistemic. The system proposed is an instance of a more general AI paradigm, referred to as SOFAI (for Slow and Fast AI). SOFAI exploits multiple solving approaches, with different capabilities that characterize them as either fast or slow, and a metacognitive module to regulate them. This combination of components, which roughly reflects the human reasoning process according to D. Kahneman, allowed us to enhance the reasoning process that, in this case, is concerned with planning in two different settings. The behavior of this system is then compared to state-of-the-art solvers, showing that the newly introduced system presents better results in terms of generality, solving a wider set of problems with an acceptable trade-off between solving times and solution accuracy.

A hallmark of human intelligence is the ability to create complex artifacts through structured multi-step processes. Generating procedural tutorials with AI is a longstanding but challenging goal, facing three key obstacles: (1) scarcity of multi-task procedural datasets, (2) maintaining logical continuity and visual consistency between steps, and (3) generalizing across multiple domains. To address these challenges, we propose a multi-domain dataset covering 21 tasks with over 24,000 procedural sequences. Building upon this foundation, we introduce MakeAnything, a framework based on the diffusion transformer (DIT), which leverages fine-tuning to activate the in-context capabilities of DIT for generating consistent procedural sequences. We introduce asymmetric low-rank adaptation (LoRA) for image generation, which balances generalization capabilities and task-specific performance by freezing encoder parameters while adaptively tuning decoder layers. Additionally, our ReCraft model enables image-to-process generation through spatiotemporal consistency constraints, allowing static images to be decomposed into plausible creation sequences. Extensive experiments demonstrate that MakeAnything surpasses existing methods, setting new performance benchmarks for procedural generation tasks.

Mathematical reasoning serves as a cornerstone for assessing the fundamental cognitive capabilities of human intelligence. In recent times, there has been a notable surge in the development of Large Language Models (LLMs) geared towards the automated resolution of mathematical problems. However, the landscape of mathematical problem types is vast and varied, with LLM-oriented techniques undergoing evaluation across diverse datasets and settings. This diversity makes it challenging to discern the true advancements and obstacles within this burgeoning field. This survey endeavors to address four pivotal dimensions: i) a comprehensive exploration of the various mathematical problems and their corresponding datasets that have been investigated; ii) an examination of the spectrum of LLM-oriented techniques that have been proposed for mathematical problem-solving; iii) an overview of factors and concerns affecting LLMs in solving math; and iv) an elucidation of the persisting challenges within this domain. To the best of our knowledge, this survey stands as one of the first extensive examinations of the landscape of LLMs in the realm of mathematics, providing a holistic perspective on the current state, accomplishments, and future challenges in this rapidly evolving field.

Humans and animals have the ability to continually acquire, fine-tune, and transfer knowledge and skills throughout their lifespan. This ability, referred to as lifelong learning, is mediated by a rich set of neurocognitive mechanisms that together contribute to the development and specialization of our sensorimotor skills as well as to long-term memory consolidation and retrieval. Consequently, lifelong learning capabilities are crucial for autonomous agents interacting in the real world and processing continuous streams of information. However, lifelong learning remains a long-standing challenge for machine learning and neural network models since the continual acquisition of incrementally available information from non-stationary data distributions generally leads to catastrophic forgetting or interference. This limitation represents a major drawback for state-of-the-art deep neural network models that typically learn representations from stationary batches of training data, thus without accounting for situations in which information becomes incrementally available over time. In this review, we critically summarize the main challenges linked to lifelong learning for artificial learning systems and compare existing neural network approaches that alleviate, to different extents, catastrophic forgetting. We discuss well-established and emerging research motivated by lifelong learning factors in biological systems such as structural plasticity, memory replay, curriculum and transfer learning, intrinsic motivation, and multisensory integration.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) demonstrate that their capabilities are comparable, or even superior, to humans in many tasks in natural language processing. Despite this progress, LLMs are still inadequate at social-cognitive reasoning, which humans are naturally good at. Drawing inspiration from psychological research on the links between certain personality traits and Theory-of-Mind (ToM) reasoning, and from prompt engineering research on the hyper-sensitivity of prompts in affecting LLMs capabilities, this study investigates how inducing personalities in LLMs using prompts affects their ToM reasoning capabilities. Our findings show that certain induced personalities can significantly affect the LLMs' reasoning capabilities in three different ToM tasks. In particular, traits from the Dark Triad have a larger variable effect on LLMs like GPT-3.5, Llama 2, and Mistral across the different ToM tasks. We find that LLMs that exhibit a higher variance across personality prompts in ToM also tends to be more controllable in personality tests: personality traits in LLMs like GPT-3.5, Llama 2 and Mistral can be controllably adjusted through our personality prompts. In today's landscape where role-play is a common strategy when using LLMs, our research highlights the need for caution, as models that adopt specific personas with personalities potentially also alter their reasoning abilities in an unexpected manner.

Mathematical reasoning is an increasingly important indicator of large language model (LLM) capabilities, yet we lack understanding of how LLMs process even simple mathematical tasks. To address this, we reverse engineer how three mid-sized LLMs compute addition. We first discover that numbers are represented in these LLMs as a generalized helix, which is strongly causally implicated for the tasks of addition and subtraction, and is also causally relevant for integer division, multiplication, and modular arithmetic. We then propose that LLMs compute addition by manipulating this generalized helix using the "Clock" algorithm: to solve a+b, the helices for a and b are manipulated to produce the a+b answer helix which is then read out to model logits. We model influential MLP outputs, attention head outputs, and even individual neuron preactivations with these helices and verify our understanding with causal interventions. By demonstrating that LLMs represent numbers on a helix and manipulate this helix to perform addition, we present the first representation-level explanation of an LLM's mathematical capability.

This paper explores the integration of two AI subdisciplines employed in the development of artificial agents that exhibit intelligent behavior: Large Language Models (LLMs) and Cognitive Architectures (CAs). We present three integration approaches, each grounded in theoretical models and supported by preliminary empirical evidence. The modular approach, which introduces four models with varying degrees of integration, makes use of chain-of-thought prompting, and draws inspiration from augmented LLMs, the Common Model of Cognition, and the simulation theory of cognition. The agency approach, motivated by the Society of Mind theory and the LIDA cognitive architecture, proposes the formation of agent collections that interact at micro and macro cognitive levels, driven by either LLMs or symbolic components. The neuro-symbolic approach, which takes inspiration from the CLARION cognitive architecture, proposes a model where bottom-up learning extracts symbolic representations from an LLM layer and top-down guidance utilizes symbolic representations to direct prompt engineering in the LLM layer. These approaches aim to harness the strengths of both LLMs and CAs, while mitigating their weaknesses, thereby advancing the development of more robust AI systems. We discuss the tradeoffs and challenges associated with each approach.

Today's large language models (LLMs) routinely generate coherent, grammatical and seemingly meaningful paragraphs of text. This achievement has led to speculation that these networks are -- or will soon become -- "thinking machines", capable of performing tasks that require abstract knowledge and reasoning. Here, we review the capabilities of LLMs by considering their performance on two different aspects of language use: 'formal linguistic competence', which includes knowledge of rules and patterns of a given language, and 'functional linguistic competence', a host of cognitive abilities required for language understanding and use in the real world. Drawing on evidence from cognitive neuroscience, we show that formal competence in humans relies on specialized language processing mechanisms, whereas functional competence recruits multiple extralinguistic capacities that comprise human thought, such as formal reasoning, world knowledge, situation modeling, and social cognition. In line with this distinction, LLMs show impressive (although imperfect) performance on tasks requiring formal linguistic competence, but fail on many tests requiring functional competence. Based on this evidence, we argue that (1) contemporary LLMs should be taken seriously as models of formal linguistic skills; (2) models that master real-life language use would need to incorporate or develop not only a core language module, but also multiple non-language-specific cognitive capacities required for modeling thought. Overall, a distinction between formal and functional linguistic competence helps clarify the discourse surrounding LLMs' potential and provides a path toward building models that understand and use language in human-like ways.

Natural intelligences (NIs) thrive in a dynamic world - they learn quickly, sometimes with only a few samples. In contrast, artificial intelligences (AIs) typically learn with a prohibitive number of training samples and computational power. What design principle difference between NI and AI could contribute to such a discrepancy? Here, we investigate the role of weight polarity: development processes initialize NIs with advantageous polarity configurations; as NIs grow and learn, synapse magnitudes update, yet polarities are largely kept unchanged. We demonstrate with simulation and image classification tasks that if weight polarities are adequately set a priori, then networks learn with less time and data. We also explicitly illustrate situations in which a priori setting the weight polarities is disadvantageous for networks. Our work illustrates the value of weight polarities from the perspective of statistical and computational efficiency during learning.

Understanding the connections between artificial and biological intelligent systems can reveal fundamental principles underlying general intelligence. While many artificial intelligence (AI) models have a neuroscience counterpart, such connections are largely missing in Transformer models and the self-attention mechanism. Here, we examine the relationship between attention heads and human episodic memory. We focus on the induction heads, which contribute to the in-context learning capabilities of Transformer-based large language models (LLMs). We demonstrate that induction heads are behaviorally, functionally, and mechanistically similar to the contextual maintenance and retrieval (CMR) model of human episodic memory. Our analyses of LLMs pre-trained on extensive text data show that CMR-like heads often emerge in the intermediate model layers and that their behavior qualitatively mirrors the memory biases seen in humans. Our findings uncover a parallel between the computational mechanisms of LLMs and human memory, offering valuable insights into both research fields.

While behaviors of pretrained language models (LMs) have been thoroughly examined, what happened during pretraining is rarely studied. We thus investigate the developmental process from a set of randomly initialized parameters to a totipotent language model, which we refer to as the embryology of a pretrained language model. Our results show that ALBERT learns to reconstruct and predict tokens of different parts of speech (POS) in different learning speeds during pretraining. We also find that linguistic knowledge and world knowledge do not generally improve as pretraining proceeds, nor do downstream tasks' performance. These findings suggest that knowledge of a pretrained model varies during pretraining, and having more pretrain steps does not necessarily provide a model with more comprehensive knowledge. We will provide source codes and pretrained models to reproduce our results at https://github.com/d223302/albert-embryology.

Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) has been a long-standing goal of humanity, with the aim of creating machines capable of performing any intellectual task that humans can do. To achieve this, AGI researchers draw inspiration from the human brain and seek to replicate its principles in intelligent machines. Brain-inspired artificial intelligence is a field that has emerged from this endeavor, combining insights from neuroscience, psychology, and computer science to develop more efficient and powerful AI systems. In this article, we provide a comprehensive overview of brain-inspired AI from the perspective of AGI. We begin with the current progress in brain-inspired AI and its extensive connection with AGI. We then cover the important characteristics for both human intelligence and AGI (e.g., scaling, multimodality, and reasoning). We discuss important technologies toward achieving AGI in current AI systems, such as in-context learning and prompt tuning. We also investigate the evolution of AGI systems from both algorithmic and infrastructural perspectives. Finally, we explore the limitations and future of AGI.

With the development in cognitive science and Large Language Models (LLMs), increasing connections have come to light between these two distinct fields. Building upon these connections, we propose a conjecture suggesting the existence of a duality between LLMs and Tulving's theory of memory. We identify a potential correspondence between Tulving's synergistic ecphory model (SEM) of retrieval and the emergent abilities observed in LLMs, serving as supporting evidence for our conjecture. Furthermore, we speculate that consciousness may be considered a form of emergent ability based on this duality. We also discuss how other theories of consciousness intersect with our research.

Trained on vast corpora of human language, language models demonstrate emergent human-like reasoning abilities. Yet they are still far from true intelligence, which opens up intriguing opportunities to explore the parallels of humans and model behaviors. In this work, we study the ability to skip steps in reasoning - a hallmark of human expertise developed through practice. Unlike humans, who may skip steps to enhance efficiency or to reduce cognitive load, models do not inherently possess such motivations to minimize reasoning steps. To address this, we introduce a controlled framework that stimulates step-skipping behavior by iteratively refining models to generate shorter and accurate reasoning paths. Empirical results indicate that models can develop the step skipping ability under our guidance. Moreover, after fine-tuning on expanded datasets that include both complete and skipped reasoning sequences, the models can not only resolve tasks with increased efficiency without sacrificing accuracy, but also exhibit comparable and even enhanced generalization capabilities in out-of-domain scenarios. Our work presents the first exploration into human-like step-skipping ability and provides fresh perspectives on how such cognitive abilities can benefit AI models.

Achieving human-level intelligence requires refining the transition from the fast, intuitive System 1 to the slower, more deliberate System 2 reasoning. While System 1 excels in quick, heuristic decisions, System 2 relies on logical reasoning for more accurate judgments and reduced biases. Foundational Large Language Models (LLMs) excel at fast decision-making but lack the depth for complex reasoning, as they have not yet fully embraced the step-by-step analysis characteristic of true System 2 thinking. Recently, reasoning LLMs like OpenAI's o1/o3 and DeepSeek's R1 have demonstrated expert-level performance in fields such as mathematics and coding, closely mimicking the deliberate reasoning of System 2 and showcasing human-like cognitive abilities. This survey begins with a brief overview of the progress in foundational LLMs and the early development of System 2 technologies, exploring how their combination has paved the way for reasoning LLMs. Next, we discuss how to construct reasoning LLMs, analyzing their features, the core methods enabling advanced reasoning, and the evolution of various reasoning LLMs. Additionally, we provide an overview of reasoning benchmarks, offering an in-depth comparison of the performance of representative reasoning LLMs. Finally, we explore promising directions for advancing reasoning LLMs and maintain a real-time https://github.com/zzli2022/Awesome-Slow-Reason-System{GitHub Repository} to track the latest developments. We hope this survey will serve as a valuable resource to inspire innovation and drive progress in this rapidly evolving field.

Human intelligence excels at combining basic skills to solve complex tasks. This capability is vital for Artificial Intelligence (AI) and should be embedded in comprehensive intelligent models, enabling them to harness expert models for complex task-solving towards Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). Large Language Models (LLMs) show promising learning and reasoning abilities, and can effectively use external models, tools or APIs to tackle complex problems. In this work, we introduce OpenAGI, an open-source AGI research platform designed for multi-step, real-world tasks. Specifically, OpenAGI uses a dual strategy, integrating standard benchmark tasks for benchmarking and evaluation, and open-ended tasks including more expandable models, tools or APIs for creative problem-solving. Tasks are presented as natural language queries to the LLM, which then selects and executes appropriate models. We also propose a Reinforcement Learning from Task Feedback (RLTF) mechanism that uses task results to improve the LLM's ability, which creates a self-improving AI feedback loop. While we acknowledge that AGI is a broad and multifaceted research challenge with no singularly defined solution path, the integration of LLMs with domain-specific expert models, inspired by mirroring the blend of general and specialized intelligence in humans, offers a promising approach towards AGI. We are open-sourcing the OpenAGI project's code, dataset, benchmarks, evaluation methods, and demo to foster community involvement in AGI advancement: https://github.com/agiresearch/OpenAGI.

Neural Network movement controllers promise a variety of advantages over conventional control methods however they are not widely adopted due to their inability to produce reliably precise movements. This research explores a bilateral neural network architecture as a control system for motor tasks. We aimed to achieve hemispheric specialisation similar to what is observed in humans across different tasks; the dominant system (usually the right hand, left hemisphere) excels at tasks involving coordination and efficiency of movement, and the non-dominant system performs better at tasks requiring positional stability. Specialisation was achieved by training the hemispheres with different loss functions tailored toward the expected behaviour of the respective hemispheres. We compared bilateral models with and without specialised hemispheres, with and without inter-hemispheric connectivity (representing the biological Corpus Callosum), and unilateral models with and without specialisation. The models were trained and tested on two tasks common in the human motor control literature: the random reach task, suited to the dominant system, a model with better coordination, and the hold position task, suited to the non-dominant system, a model with more stable movement. Each system out-performed the non-favoured system in its preferred task. For both tasks, a bilateral model outperforms the 'non-preferred' hand, and is as good or better than the 'preferred' hand. The Corpus Callosum tends to improve performance, but not always for the specialised models.

Large language models (LLMs) are currently at the forefront of intertwining AI systems with human communication and everyday life. Therefore, it is of great importance to evaluate their emerging abilities. In this study, we show that LLMs like GPT-3 exhibit behavior that strikingly resembles human-like intuition - and the cognitive errors that come with it. However, LLMs with higher cognitive capabilities, in particular ChatGPT and GPT-4, learned to avoid succumbing to these errors and perform in a hyperrational manner. For our experiments, we probe LLMs with the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) as well as semantic illusions that were originally designed to investigate intuitive decision-making in humans. Our study demonstrates that investigating LLMs with methods from psychology has the potential to reveal otherwise unknown emergent traits.

Despite superior reasoning prowess demonstrated by Large Language Models (LLMs) with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting, a lack of understanding prevails around the internal mechanisms of the models that facilitate CoT generation. This work investigates the neural sub-structures within LLMs that manifest CoT reasoning from a mechanistic point of view. From an analysis of LLaMA-2 7B applied to multistep reasoning over fictional ontologies, we demonstrate that LLMs deploy multiple parallel pathways of answer generation for step-by-step reasoning. These parallel pathways provide sequential answers from the input question context as well as the generated CoT. We observe a striking functional rift in the middle layers of the LLM. Token representations in the initial half remain strongly biased towards the pretraining prior, with the in-context taking over abruptly in the later half. This internal phase shift manifests in different functional components: attention heads that write the answer token predominantly appear in the later half, attention heads that move information along ontological relationships appear exclusively in the initial half, and so on. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt towards mechanistic investigation of CoT reasoning in LLMs.

Do large language models (LLMs) solve reasoning tasks by learning robust generalizable algorithms, or do they memorize training data? To investigate this question, we use arithmetic reasoning as a representative task. Using causal analysis, we identify a subset of the model (a circuit) that explains most of the model's behavior for basic arithmetic logic and examine its functionality. By zooming in on the level of individual circuit neurons, we discover a sparse set of important neurons that implement simple heuristics. Each heuristic identifies a numerical input pattern and outputs corresponding answers. We hypothesize that the combination of these heuristic neurons is the mechanism used to produce correct arithmetic answers. To test this, we categorize each neuron into several heuristic types-such as neurons that activate when an operand falls within a certain range-and find that the unordered combination of these heuristic types is the mechanism that explains most of the model's accuracy on arithmetic prompts. Finally, we demonstrate that this mechanism appears as the main source of arithmetic accuracy early in training. Overall, our experimental results across several LLMs show that LLMs perform arithmetic using neither robust algorithms nor memorization; rather, they rely on a "bag of heuristics".

The emergence of Large Language Models (LLMs) has brought to light promising language generation capabilities, particularly in performing tasks like complex reasoning and creative writing. Consequently, distillation through imitation of teacher responses has emerged as a popular technique to transfer knowledge from LLMs to more accessible, Small Language Models (SLMs). While this works well for simpler tasks, there is a substantial performance gap on tasks requiring intricate language comprehension and creativity, such as humor generation. We hypothesize that this gap may stem from the fact that creative tasks might be hard to learn by imitation alone and explore whether an approach, involving supplementary guidance from the teacher, could yield higher performance. To address this, we study the effect of assigning a dual role to the LLM - as a "teacher" generating data, as well as a "critic" evaluating the student's performance. Our experiments on humor generation reveal that the incorporation of feedback significantly narrows the performance gap between SLMs and their larger counterparts compared to merely relying on imitation. As a result, our research highlights the potential of using feedback as an additional dimension to data when transferring complex language abilities via distillation.

Recent advancements in large language models have showcased their remarkable generalizability across various domains. However, their reasoning abilities still have significant room for improvement, especially when confronted with scenarios requiring multi-step reasoning. Although large language models possess extensive knowledge, their behavior, particularly in terms of reasoning, often fails to effectively utilize this knowledge to establish a coherent thinking paradigm. Generative language models sometimes show hallucinations as their reasoning procedures are unconstrained by logical principles. Aiming to improve the zero-shot chain-of-thought reasoning ability of large language models, we propose Logical Chain-of-Thought (LogiCoT), a neurosymbolic framework that leverages principles from symbolic logic to verify and revise the reasoning processes accordingly. Experimental evaluations conducted on language tasks in diverse domains, including arithmetic, commonsense, symbolic, causal inference, and social problems, demonstrate the efficacy of the enhanced reasoning paradigm by logic.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in scientific tasks, existing evaluation frameworks primarily assess their performance using rich contextual inputs, overlooking their ability to generate novel ideas from minimal information. We introduce LiveIdeaBench, a comprehensive benchmark that evaluates LLMs' scientific creativity and divergent thinking capabilities using single-keyword prompts. Drawing from Guilford's creativity theory, our framework employs a dynamic panel of state-of-the-art LLMs to assess generated ideas across four key dimensions: originality, feasibility, fluency, and flexibility. Through extensive experimentation with 20 leading models across 1,180 keywords spanning 18 scientific domains, we reveal that scientific creative ability shows distinct patterns from general intelligence metrics. Notably, our results demonstrate that models like QwQ-32B-preview achieve comparable creative performance to top-tier models like o1-preview, despite significant gaps in their general intelligence scores. These findings highlight the importance of specialized evaluation frameworks for scientific creativity and suggest that the development of creative capabilities in LLMs may follow different trajectories than traditional problem-solving abilities.

As machine intelligence evolves, the need to test and compare the problem-solving abilities of different AI models grows. However, current benchmarks are often overly simplistic, allowing models to perform uniformly well, making it difficult to distinguish their capabilities. Additionally, benchmarks typically rely on static question-answer pairs, which models might memorize or guess. To address these limitations, we introduce the Dynamic Intelligence Assessment (DIA), a novel methodology for testing AI models using dynamic question templates and improved metrics across multiple disciplines such as mathematics, cryptography, cybersecurity, and computer science. The accompanying DIA-Bench dataset, which includes 150 diverse and challenging task templates with mutable parameters, is presented in various formats such as text, PDFs, compiled binaries, and visual puzzles. Our framework introduces four new metrics to assess a model's reliability and confidence across multiple attempts. These metrics revealed that even simple questions are frequently answered incorrectly when posed in varying forms, highlighting significant gaps in models' reliability. Notably, models like GPT-4o tended to overestimate their mathematical abilities, while ChatGPT-4o demonstrated better decision-making and performance through effective tool usage. We evaluated eight state-of-the-art large language models (LLMs) using DIA-Bench, showing that current models struggle with complex tasks and often display unexpectedly low confidence, even with simpler questions. The DIA framework sets a new standard for assessing not only problem-solving but also a model's adaptive intelligence and ability to assess its own limitations. The dataset is publicly available on our project's website.

A multi-decade exploration into the theoretical foundations of artificial and natural general intelligence, which has been expressed in a series of books and papers and used to guide a series of practical and research-prototype software systems, is reviewed at a moderate level of detail. The review covers underlying philosophies (patternist philosophy of mind, foundational phenomenological and logical ontology), formalizations of the concept of intelligence, and a proposed high level architecture for AGI systems partly driven by these formalizations and philosophies. The implementation of specific cognitive processes such as logical reasoning, program learning, clustering and attention allocation in the context and language of this high level architecture is considered, as is the importance of a common (e.g. typed metagraph based) knowledge representation for enabling "cognitive synergy" between the various processes. The specifics of human-like cognitive architecture are presented as manifestations of these general principles, and key aspects of machine consciousness and machine ethics are also treated in this context. Lessons for practical implementation of advanced AGI in frameworks such as OpenCog Hyperon are briefly considered.

Artificial intelligence (AI) researchers have been developing and refining large language models (LLMs) that exhibit remarkable capabilities across a variety of domains and tasks, challenging our understanding of learning and cognition. The latest model developed by OpenAI, GPT-4, was trained using an unprecedented scale of compute and data. In this paper, we report on our investigation of an early version of GPT-4, when it was still in active development by OpenAI. We contend that (this early version of) GPT-4 is part of a new cohort of LLMs (along with ChatGPT and Google's PaLM for example) that exhibit more general intelligence than previous AI models. We discuss the rising capabilities and implications of these models. We demonstrate that, beyond its mastery of language, GPT-4 can solve novel and difficult tasks that span mathematics, coding, vision, medicine, law, psychology and more, without needing any special prompting. Moreover, in all of these tasks, GPT-4's performance is strikingly close to human-level performance, and often vastly surpasses prior models such as ChatGPT. Given the breadth and depth of GPT-4's capabilities, we believe that it could reasonably be viewed as an early (yet still incomplete) version of an artificial general intelligence (AGI) system. In our exploration of GPT-4, we put special emphasis on discovering its limitations, and we discuss the challenges ahead for advancing towards deeper and more comprehensive versions of AGI, including the possible need for pursuing a new paradigm that moves beyond next-word prediction. We conclude with reflections on societal influences of the recent technological leap and future research directions.

Generative artificial intelligence (AI) systems based on large-scale pretrained foundation models (PFMs) such as vision-language models, large language models (LLMs), diffusion models and vision-language-action (VLA) models have demonstrated the ability to solve complex and truly non-trivial AI problems in a wide variety of domains and contexts. Multimodal large language models (MLLMs), in particular, learn from vast and diverse data sources, allowing rich and nuanced representations of the world and, thereby, providing extensive capabilities, including the ability to reason, engage in meaningful dialog; collaborate with humans and other agents to jointly solve complex problems; and understand social and emotional aspects of humans. Despite this impressive feat, the cognitive abilities of state-of-the-art LLMs trained on large-scale datasets are still superficial and brittle. Consequently, generic LLMs are severely limited in their generalist capabilities. A number of foundational problems -- embodiment, symbol grounding, causality and memory -- are required to be addressed for LLMs to attain human-level general intelligence. These concepts are more aligned with human cognition and provide LLMs with inherent human-like cognitive properties that support the realization of physically-plausible, semantically meaningful, flexible and more generalizable knowledge and intelligence. In this work, we discuss the aforementioned foundational issues and survey state-of-the art approaches for implementing these concepts in LLMs. Specifically, we discuss how the principles of embodiment, symbol grounding, causality and memory can be leveraged toward the attainment of artificial general intelligence (AGI) in an organic manner.

We introduce the Structured Knowledge Accumulation (SKA) framework, which reinterprets entropy as a dynamic, layer-wise measure of knowledge alignment in neural networks. Instead of relying on traditional gradient-based optimization, SKA defines entropy in terms of knowledge vectors and their influence on decision probabilities across multiple layers. This formulation naturally leads to the emergence of activation functions such as the sigmoid as a consequence of entropy minimization. Unlike conventional backpropagation, SKA allows each layer to optimize independently by aligning its knowledge representation with changes in decision probabilities. As a result, total network entropy decreases in a hierarchical manner, allowing knowledge structures to evolve progressively. This approach provides a scalable, biologically plausible alternative to gradient-based learning, bridging information theory and artificial intelligence while offering promising applications in resource-constrained and parallel computing environments.

Since the first instances of online education, where courses were uploaded to accessible and shared online platforms, this form of scaling the dissemination of human knowledge to reach a broader audience has sparked extensive discussion and widespread adoption. Recognizing that personalized learning still holds significant potential for improvement, new AI technologies have been continuously integrated into this learning format, resulting in a variety of educational AI applications such as educational recommendation and intelligent tutoring. The emergence of intelligence in large language models (LLMs) has allowed for these educational enhancements to be built upon a unified foundational model, enabling deeper integration. In this context, we propose MAIC (Massive AI-empowered Course), a new form of online education that leverages LLM-driven multi-agent systems to construct an AI-augmented classroom, balancing scalability with adaptivity. Beyond exploring the conceptual framework and technical innovations, we conduct preliminary experiments at Tsinghua University, one of China's leading universities. Drawing from over 100,000 learning records of more than 500 students, we obtain a series of valuable observations and initial analyses. This project will continue to evolve, ultimately aiming to establish a comprehensive open platform that supports and unifies research, technology, and applications in exploring the possibilities of online education in the era of large model AI. We envision this platform as a collaborative hub, bringing together educators, researchers, and innovators to collectively explore the future of AI-driven online education.

Hallucinations (i.e., generating plausible but inaccurate content) and laziness (i.e. excessive refusals or defaulting to "I don't know") persist as major challenges in LLM reasoning. Current efforts to reduce hallucinations primarily focus on factual errors in knowledge-grounded tasks, often neglecting hallucinations related to faulty reasoning. Meanwhile, some approaches render LLMs overly conservative, limiting their problem-solving capabilities. To mitigate hallucination and laziness in reasoning tasks, we propose Automatic Curriculum Expert Iteration (Auto-CEI) to enhance LLM reasoning and align responses to the model's capabilities--assertively answering within its limits and declining when tasks exceed them. In our method, Expert Iteration explores the reasoning trajectories near the LLM policy, guiding incorrect paths back on track to reduce compounding errors and improve robustness; it also promotes appropriate "I don't know" responses after sufficient reasoning attempts. The curriculum automatically adjusts rewards, incentivizing extended reasoning before acknowledging incapability, thereby pushing the limits of LLM reasoning and aligning its behaviour with these limits. We compare Auto-CEI with various SOTA baselines across logical reasoning, mathematics, and planning tasks, where Auto-CEI achieves superior alignment by effectively balancing assertiveness and conservativeness.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

Spatial perception is a fundamental component of intelligence. While many studies highlight that large multimodal language models (MLMs) struggle to reason about space, they only test for static spatial reasoning, such as categorizing the relative positions of objects. Meanwhile, real-world deployment requires dynamic capabilities like perspective-taking and egocentric action recognition. As a roadmap to improving spatial intelligence, we introduce SAT, Spatial Aptitude Training, which goes beyond static relative object position questions to the more dynamic tasks. SAT contains 218K question-answer pairs for 22K synthetic scenes across a training and testing set. Generated using a photo-realistic physics engine, our dataset can be arbitrarily scaled and easily extended to new actions, scenes, and 3D assets. We find that even MLMs that perform relatively well on static questions struggle to accurately answer dynamic spatial questions. Further, we show that SAT instruction-tuning data improves not only dynamic spatial reasoning on SAT, but also zero-shot performance on existing real-image spatial benchmarks: 23% on CVBench, 8% on the harder BLINK benchmark, and 18% on VSR. When instruction-tuned on SAT, our 13B model matches larger proprietary MLMs like GPT4-V and Gemini-3-1.0 in spatial reasoning. Our data/code is available at http://arijitray1993.github.io/SAT/ .

Recent advancements in natural language processing by large language models (LLMs), such as GPT-4, have been suggested to approach Artificial General Intelligence. And yet, it is still under dispute whether LLMs possess similar reasoning abilities to humans. This study evaluates GPT-4 and various other LLMs in judging the profoundness of mundane, motivational, and pseudo-profound statements. We found a significant statement-to-statement correlation between the LLMs and humans, irrespective of the type of statements and the prompting technique used. However, LLMs systematically overestimate the profoundness of nonsensical statements, with the exception of Tk-instruct, which uniquely underestimates the profoundness of statements. Only few-shot learning prompts, as opposed to chain-of-thought prompting, draw LLMs ratings closer to humans. Furthermore, this work provides insights into the potential biases induced by Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), inducing an increase in the bias to overestimate the profoundness of statements.

Adaptive behavior often requires predicting future events. The theory of reinforcement learning prescribes what kinds of predictive representations are useful and how to compute them. This paper integrates these theoretical ideas with work on cognition and neuroscience. We pay special attention to the successor representation (SR) and its generalizations, which have been widely applied both as engineering tools and models of brain function. This convergence suggests that particular kinds of predictive representations may function as versatile building blocks of intelligence.

What makes a difference in the post-training of LLMs? We investigate the training patterns of different layers in large language models (LLMs), through the lens of gradient, when training with different responses and initial models. We are specifically interested in how fast vs. slow thinking affects the layer-wise gradients, given the recent popularity of training LLMs on reasoning paths such as chain-of-thoughts (CoT) and process rewards. In our study, fast thinking without CoT leads to larger gradients and larger differences of gradients across layers than slow thinking (Detailed CoT), indicating the learning stability brought by the latter. Moreover, pre-trained LLMs are less affected by the instability of fast thinking than instruction-tuned LLMs. Additionally, we study whether the gradient patterns can reflect the correctness of responses when training different LLMs using slow vs. fast thinking paths. The results show that the gradients of slow thinking can distinguish correct and irrelevant reasoning paths. As a comparison, we conduct similar gradient analyses on non-reasoning knowledge learning tasks, on which, however, trivially increasing the response length does not lead to similar behaviors of slow thinking. Our study strengthens fundamental understandings of LLM training and sheds novel insights on its efficiency and stability, which pave the way towards building a generalizable System-2 agent. Our code, data, and gradient statistics can be found in: https://github.com/MingLiiii/Layer_Gradient.