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Mar 17

Unsupervised Manifold Linearizing and Clustering

We consider the problem of simultaneously clustering and learning a linear representation of data lying close to a union of low-dimensional manifolds, a fundamental task in machine learning and computer vision. When the manifolds are assumed to be linear subspaces, this reduces to the classical problem of subspace clustering, which has been studied extensively over the past two decades. Unfortunately, many real-world datasets such as natural images can not be well approximated by linear subspaces. On the other hand, numerous works have attempted to learn an appropriate transformation of the data, such that data is mapped from a union of general non-linear manifolds to a union of linear subspaces (with points from the same manifold being mapped to the same subspace). However, many existing works have limitations such as assuming knowledge of the membership of samples to clusters, requiring high sampling density, or being shown theoretically to learn trivial representations. In this paper, we propose to optimize the Maximal Coding Rate Reduction metric with respect to both the data representation and a novel doubly stochastic cluster membership, inspired by state-of-the-art subspace clustering results. We give a parameterization of such a representation and membership, allowing efficient mini-batching and one-shot initialization. Experiments on CIFAR-10, -20, -100, and TinyImageNet-200 datasets show that the proposed method is much more accurate and scalable than state-of-the-art deep clustering methods, and further learns a latent linear representation of the data.

Sharper Bounds for ell_p Sensitivity Sampling

In large scale machine learning, random sampling is a popular way to approximate datasets by a small representative subset of examples. In particular, sensitivity sampling is an intensely studied technique which provides provable guarantees on the quality of approximation, while reducing the number of examples to the product of the VC dimension d and the total sensitivity mathfrak S in remarkably general settings. However, guarantees going beyond this general bound of mathfrak S d are known in perhaps only one setting, for ell_2 subspace embeddings, despite intense study of sensitivity sampling in prior work. In this work, we show the first bounds for sensitivity sampling for ell_p subspace embeddings for pneq 2 that improve over the general mathfrak S d bound, achieving a bound of roughly mathfrak S^{2/p} for 1leq p<2 and mathfrak S^{2-2/p} for 2<p<infty. For 1leq p<2, we show that this bound is tight, in the sense that there exist matrices for which mathfrak S^{2/p} samples is necessary. Furthermore, our techniques yield further new results in the study of sampling algorithms, showing that the root leverage score sampling algorithm achieves a bound of roughly d for 1leq p<2, and that a combination of leverage score and sensitivity sampling achieves an improved bound of roughly d^{2/p}mathfrak S^{2-4/p} for 2<p<infty. Our sensitivity sampling results yield the best known sample complexity for a wide class of structured matrices that have small ell_p sensitivity.

Using Mechanistic Interpretability to Craft Adversarial Attacks against Large Language Models

Traditional white-box methods for creating adversarial perturbations against LLMs typically rely only on gradient computation from the targeted model, ignoring the internal mechanisms responsible for attack success or failure. Conversely, interpretability studies that analyze these internal mechanisms lack practical applications beyond runtime interventions. We bridge this gap by introducing a novel white-box approach that leverages mechanistic interpretability techniques to craft practical adversarial inputs. Specifically, we first identify acceptance subspaces - sets of feature vectors that do not trigger the model's refusal mechanisms - then use gradient-based optimization to reroute embeddings from refusal subspaces to acceptance subspaces, effectively achieving jailbreaks. This targeted approach significantly reduces computation cost, achieving attack success rates of 80-95\% on state-of-the-art models including Gemma2, Llama3.2, and Qwen2.5 within minutes or even seconds, compared to existing techniques that often fail or require hours of computation. We believe this approach opens a new direction for both attack research and defense development. Furthermore, it showcases a practical application of mechanistic interpretability where other methods are less efficient, which highlights its utility. The code and generated datasets are available at https://github.com/Sckathach/subspace-rerouting.

Get the Best of Both Worlds: Improving Accuracy and Transferability by Grassmann Class Representation

We generalize the class vectors found in neural networks to linear subspaces (i.e.~points in the Grassmann manifold) and show that the Grassmann Class Representation (GCR) enables the simultaneous improvement in accuracy and feature transferability. In GCR, each class is a subspace and the logit is defined as the norm of the projection of a feature onto the class subspace. We integrate Riemannian SGD into deep learning frameworks such that class subspaces in a Grassmannian are jointly optimized with the rest model parameters. Compared to the vector form, the representative capability of subspaces is more powerful. We show that on ImageNet-1K, the top-1 error of ResNet50-D, ResNeXt50, Swin-T and Deit3-S are reduced by 5.6%, 4.5%, 3.0% and 3.5%, respectively. Subspaces also provide freedom for features to vary and we observed that the intra-class feature variability grows when the subspace dimension increases. Consequently, we found the quality of GCR features is better for downstream tasks. For ResNet50-D, the average linear transfer accuracy across 6 datasets improves from 77.98% to 79.70% compared to the strong baseline of vanilla softmax. For Swin-T, it improves from 81.5% to 83.4% and for Deit3, it improves from 73.8% to 81.4%. With these encouraging results, we believe that more applications could benefit from the Grassmann class representation. Code is released at https://github.com/innerlee/GCR.

FLoRA: Low-Rank Core Space for N-dimension

Adapting pre-trained foundation models for various downstream tasks has been prevalent in artificial intelligence. Due to the vast number of tasks and high costs, adjusting all parameters becomes unfeasible. To mitigate this, several fine-tuning techniques have been developed to update the pre-trained model weights in a more resource-efficient manner, such as through low-rank adjustments. Yet, almost all of these methods focus on linear weights, neglecting the intricacies of parameter spaces in higher dimensions like 4D. Alternatively, some methods can be adapted for high-dimensional parameter space by compressing changes in the original space into two dimensions and then employing low-rank matrix decomposition. However, these approaches destructs the structural integrity of the involved high-dimensional spaces. To tackle the diversity of dimensional spaces across different foundation models and provide a more precise representation of the changes within these spaces, this paper introduces a generalized parameter-efficient fine-tuning framework, FLoRA, designed for various dimensional parameter space. Specifically, utilizing Tucker decomposition, FLoRA asserts that changes in each dimensional parameter space are based on a low-rank core space which maintains the consistent topological structure with the original space. It then models the changes through this core space alongside corresponding weights to reconstruct alterations in the original space. FLoRA effectively preserves the structural integrity of the change of original N-dimensional parameter space, meanwhile decomposes it via low-rank tensor decomposition. Extensive experiments on computer vision, natural language processing and multi-modal tasks validate FLoRA's effectiveness. Codes are available at https://github.com/SJTU-DeepVisionLab/FLoRA.

On the Proactive Generation of Unsafe Images From Text-To-Image Models Using Benign Prompts

Text-to-image models like Stable Diffusion have had a profound impact on daily life by enabling the generation of photorealistic images from textual prompts, fostering creativity, and enhancing visual experiences across various applications. However, these models also pose risks. Previous studies have successfully demonstrated that manipulated prompts can elicit text-to-image models to generate unsafe images, e.g., hateful meme variants. Yet, these studies only unleash the harmful power of text-to-image models in a passive manner. In this work, we focus on the proactive generation of unsafe images using targeted benign prompts via poisoning attacks. We propose two poisoning attacks: a basic attack and a utility-preserving attack. We qualitatively and quantitatively evaluate the proposed attacks using four representative hateful memes and multiple query prompts. Experimental results indicate that text-to-image models are vulnerable to the basic attack even with five poisoning samples. However, the poisoning effect can inadvertently spread to non-targeted prompts, leading to undesirable side effects. Root cause analysis identifies conceptual similarity as an important contributing factor to the side effects. To address this, we introduce the utility-preserving attack as a viable mitigation strategy to maintain the attack stealthiness, while ensuring decent attack performance. Our findings underscore the potential risks of adopting text-to-image models in real-world scenarios, calling for future research and safety measures in this space.

Visual Adversarial Examples Jailbreak Large Language Models

Recently, there has been a surge of interest in introducing vision into Large Language Models (LLMs). The proliferation of large Visual Language Models (VLMs), such as Flamingo, BLIP-2, and GPT-4, signifies an exciting convergence of advancements in both visual and language foundation models. Yet, the risks associated with this integrative approach are largely unexamined. In this paper, we shed light on the security and safety implications of this trend. First, we underscore that the continuous and high-dimensional nature of the additional visual input space intrinsically makes it a fertile ground for adversarial attacks. This unavoidably expands the attack surfaces of LLMs. Second, we highlight that the broad functionality of LLMs also presents visual attackers with a wider array of achievable adversarial objectives, extending the implications of security failures beyond mere misclassification. To elucidate these risks, we study adversarial examples in the visual input space of a VLM. Specifically, against MiniGPT-4, which incorporates safety mechanisms that can refuse harmful instructions, we present visual adversarial examples that can circumvent the safety mechanisms and provoke harmful behaviors of the model. Remarkably, we discover that adversarial examples, even if optimized on a narrow, manually curated derogatory corpus against specific social groups, can universally jailbreak the model's safety mechanisms. A single such adversarial example can generally undermine MiniGPT-4's safety, enabling it to heed a wide range of harmful instructions and produce harmful content far beyond simply imitating the derogatory corpus used in optimization. Unveiling these risks, we accentuate the urgent need for comprehensive risk assessments, robust defense strategies, and the implementation of responsible practices for the secure and safe utilization of VLMs.