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Mar 17

Online Information Acquisition: Hiring Multiple Agents

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

Run-Off Election: Improved Provable Defense against Data Poisoning Attacks

In data poisoning attacks, an adversary tries to change a model's prediction by adding, modifying, or removing samples in the training data. Recently, ensemble-based approaches for obtaining provable defenses against data poisoning have been proposed where predictions are done by taking a majority vote across multiple base models. In this work, we show that merely considering the majority vote in ensemble defenses is wasteful as it does not effectively utilize available information in the logits layers of the base models. Instead, we propose Run-Off Election (ROE), a novel aggregation method based on a two-round election across the base models: In the first round, models vote for their preferred class and then a second, Run-Off election is held between the top two classes in the first round. Based on this approach, we propose DPA+ROE and FA+ROE defense methods based on Deep Partition Aggregation (DPA) and Finite Aggregation (FA) approaches from prior work. We evaluate our methods on MNIST, CIFAR-10, and GTSRB and obtain improvements in certified accuracy by up to 3%-4%. Also, by applying ROE on a boosted version of DPA, we gain improvements around 12%-27% comparing to the current state-of-the-art, establishing a new state-of-the-art in (pointwise) certified robustness against data poisoning. In many cases, our approach outperforms the state-of-the-art, even when using 32 times less computational power.

FRL: Federated Rank Learning

Federated learning (FL) allows mutually untrusted clients to collaboratively train a common machine learning model without sharing their private/proprietary training data among each other. FL is unfortunately susceptible to poisoning by malicious clients who aim to hamper the accuracy of the commonly trained model through sending malicious model updates during FL's training process. We argue that the key factor to the success of poisoning attacks against existing FL systems is the large space of model updates available to the clients, allowing malicious clients to search for the most poisonous model updates, e.g., by solving an optimization problem. To address this, we propose Federated Rank Learning (FRL). FRL reduces the space of client updates from model parameter updates (a continuous space of float numbers) in standard FL to the space of parameter rankings (a discrete space of integer values). To be able to train the global model using parameter ranks (instead of parameter weights), FRL leverage ideas from recent supermasks training mechanisms. Specifically, FRL clients rank the parameters of a randomly initialized neural network (provided by the server) based on their local training data. The FRL server uses a voting mechanism to aggregate the parameter rankings submitted by clients in each training epoch to generate the global ranking of the next training epoch. Intuitively, our voting-based aggregation mechanism prevents poisoning clients from making significant adversarial modifications to the global model, as each client will have a single vote! We demonstrate the robustness of FRL to poisoning through analytical proofs and experimentation. We also show FRL's high communication efficiency. Our experiments demonstrate the superiority of FRL in real-world FL settings.