new

Get trending papers in your email inbox!

Subscribe

byAK and the research community

Mar 17

Think Thrice Before You Act: Progressive Thought Refinement in Large Language Models

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated that progressive refinement, rather than providing a single answer, results in more accurate and thoughtful outputs. However, existing methods often rely heavily on supervision signals to evaluate previous responses, making it difficult to assess output quality in more open-ended scenarios effectively. Additionally, these methods are typically designed for specific tasks, which limits their generalization to new domains. To address these limitations, we propose Progressive Thought Refinement (PTR), a framework that enables LLMs to refine their responses progressively. PTR operates in two phases: (1) Thought data construction stage: We propose a weak and strong model collaborative selection strategy to build a high-quality progressive refinement dataset to ensure logical consistency from thought to answers, and the answers are gradually refined in each round. (2) Thought-Mask Fine-Tuning Phase: We design a training structure to mask the "thought" and adjust loss weights to encourage LLMs to refine prior thought, teaching them to implicitly understand "how to improve" rather than "what is correct." Experimental results show that PTR significantly enhances LLM performance across ten diverse tasks (avg. from 49.6% to 53.5%) without task-specific fine-tuning. Notably, in more open-ended tasks, LLMs also demonstrate substantial improvements in the quality of responses beyond mere accuracy, suggesting that PTR truly teaches LLMs to self-improve over time.

Debate Helps Weak-to-Strong Generalization

Common methods for aligning already-capable models with desired behavior rely on the ability of humans to provide supervision. However, future superhuman models will surpass the capability of humans. Therefore, humans will only be able to weakly supervise superhuman models. This expected deficiency of human evaluation would weaken the safety of future AI systems. Scalable oversight and weak-to-strong generalization are two complementary approaches to tackle this issue. In this paper, we attempt to combine the strengths of these two approaches to further improve alignment. Specifically, we investigate ways of improving human supervision with a strong pretrained model and then supervise the strong model with enhanced weak human supervision. To make iterative empirical progress, we consider an analogy: can we use a strong model to improve weak model supervision and then use it to supervise the strong model? We empirically test it by finetuning a small weak model on ground truth labels with the additional help from a large strong model, and then finetuning the strong model on labels generated by the weak model. We find that debate can assist a weak model in extracting trustworthy information from an untrustworthy strong model, which provides leverage as context on samples when training a weak model. We also show that an ensemble of weak models helps exploit long arguments generated by strong model debaters and obtain a more robust supervision estimate. Extensive experiments on the OpenAI weak-to-strong NLP benchmarks show that the combination approach leads to better alignment, which indicates that debate has the potential to help weak-to-strong generalization.

Super(ficial)-alignment: Strong Models May Deceive Weak Models in Weak-to-Strong Generalization

Superalignment, where humans are weak supervisors of superhuman models, has become an important and widely discussed issue in the current era of rapid development of Large Language Models (LLMs). The recent work preliminarily studies this problem by using weak models to supervise strong models. It discovers that weakly supervised strong students can consistently outperform weak teachers towards the alignment target, leading to a weak-to-strong generalization phenomenon. However, we are concerned that behind such a promising phenomenon, whether there exists an issue of weak-to-strong deception, where strong models may deceive weak models by exhibiting well-aligned in areas known to weak models but producing misaligned behaviors in cases weak models do not know. We then take an initial step towards exploring this security issue in a specific but realistic multi-objective alignment case, where there may be some alignment targets conflicting with each other (e.g., helpfulness v.s. harmlessness). Such a conflict is likely to cause strong models to deceive weak models in one alignment dimension to gain high reward in other alignment dimension. Our experiments on both the reward modeling task and the preference optimization scenario indicate: (1) the weak-to-strong deception exists; (2) the deception phenomenon may intensify as the capability gap between weak and strong models increases. We also discuss potential solutions and find bootstrapping with an intermediate model can mitigate the deception to some extent. Our work highlights the urgent need to pay more attention to the true reliability of superalignment.

The Consciousness Prior

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.