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[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nopportunity to respond to his allegation that counsel had rendered ineffective assistance. Petitioner now seeks review of the BIA’s order in this court. We review “the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for an abuse of discretion.” Abdi v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 430 F.3d 1148, 1149 (11th Cir.2005). Our review “is limited to determining whether there has been an exercise of administrative discretion and whether the matter of exercise has been arbitrary or capricious.” Id. (quotation omitted). Petitioner’s brief to this court contains no argument concerning the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen. Therefore, he has abandoned the issue. Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1228 n. 2 (11th Cir.2005) (citing Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1573 n. 6 (11th Cir.1989) (holding that the appellant abandoned an issue to which he only made passing references", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nopportunity to respond to his allegation that counsel had rendered ineffective assistance. Petitioner now seeks review of the BIA’s order in this court. We review “the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for an abuse of discretion.” Abdi v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 430 F.3d 1148, 1149 (11th Cir.2005). Our review “is limited to determining whether there has been an exercise of administrative discretion and whether the matter of exercise has been arbitrary or capricious.” Id. (quotation omitted). Petitioner’s brief to this court contains no argument concerning the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen. Therefore, he has abandoned the issue. Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1228 n. 2 (11th Cir.2005) (citing Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1573 n. 6 (11th Cir.1989) (holding that issues not raised in the initial brief on appeal are deemed abandoned", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nopportunity to respond to his allegation that counsel had rendered ineffective assistance. Petitioner now seeks review of the BIA’s order in this court. We review “the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for an abuse of discretion.” Abdi v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 430 F.3d 1148, 1149 (11th Cir.2005). Our review “is limited to determining whether there has been an exercise of administrative discretion and whether the matter of exercise has been arbitrary or capricious.” Id. (quotation omitted). Petitioner’s brief to this court contains no argument concerning the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen. Therefore, he has abandoned the issue. Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1228 n. 2 (11th Cir.2005) (citing Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1573 n. 6 (11th Cir.1989) (holding that issues are deemed abandoned when the brief only makes a passing references to an issue", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nopportunity to respond to his allegation that counsel had rendered ineffective assistance. Petitioner now seeks review of the BIA’s order in this court. We review “the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for an abuse of discretion.” Abdi v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 430 F.3d 1148, 1149 (11th Cir.2005). Our review “is limited to determining whether there has been an exercise of administrative discretion and whether the matter of exercise has been arbitrary or capricious.” Id. (quotation omitted). Petitioner’s brief to this court contains no argument concerning the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen. Therefore, he has abandoned the issue. Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1228 n. 2 (11th Cir.2005) (citing Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1573 n. 6 (11th Cir.1989) (holding that issues not raised in an initial brief on appeal are deemed abandoned", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nopportunity to respond to his allegation that counsel had rendered ineffective assistance. Petitioner now seeks review of the BIA’s order in this court. We review “the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for an abuse of discretion.” Abdi v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 430 F.3d 1148, 1149 (11th Cir.2005). Our review “is limited to determining whether there has been an exercise of administrative discretion and whether the matter of exercise has been arbitrary or capricious.” Id. (quotation omitted). Petitioner’s brief to this court contains no argument concerning the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen. Therefore, he has abandoned the issue. Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1228 n. 2 (11th Cir.2005) (citing Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1573 n. 6 (11th Cir.1989) (holding that issues not raised in an appellants initial brief are deemed abandoned" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nof months from filing to trial for civil cases.” AL & PO Corp. v. Am. Healthcare Capital, Inc., No. 14 C 1905, 2015 WL 738694, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 19, 2015) (quotation marks omitted). The defendant notes that the time to disposition, in shorter'in this district than in Minnesota, while the time to trial is quick er in Minnesota- than in Illinois. Where the two statistical measures point in different directions, some courts have held that they cancel one another out. See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. RPM Int’l, Inc., 223 F.Supp.3d 110, 117-18 (D.D.C. 2016) (“Because these statistics essentially cancel one another out, this factor is neutral.”). Other courts, however, have held that the time to disposition is the more important metric. See, e.g., AL & PO Corp., 2015 WL 738694, at *5 (holding that the relevant time is the time of the employment decision", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nof months from filing to trial for civil cases.” AL & PO Corp. v. Am. Healthcare Capital, Inc., No. 14 C 1905, 2015 WL 738694, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 19, 2015) (quotation marks omitted). The defendant notes that the time to disposition, in shorter'in this district than in Minnesota, while the time to trial is quick er in Minnesota- than in Illinois. Where the two statistical measures point in different directions, some courts have held that they cancel one another out. See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. RPM Int’l, Inc., 223 F.Supp.3d 110, 117-18 (D.D.C. 2016) (“Because these statistics essentially cancel one another out, this factor is neutral.”). Other courts, however, have held that the time to disposition is the more important metric. See, e.g., AL & PO Corp., 2015 WL 738694, at *5 (holding that the time to disposition is more important than time to trial", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nof months from filing to trial for civil cases.” AL & PO Corp. v. Am. Healthcare Capital, Inc., No. 14 C 1905, 2015 WL 738694, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 19, 2015) (quotation marks omitted). The defendant notes that the time to disposition, in shorter'in this district than in Minnesota, while the time to trial is quick er in Minnesota- than in Illinois. Where the two statistical measures point in different directions, some courts have held that they cancel one another out. See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. RPM Int’l, Inc., 223 F.Supp.3d 110, 117-18 (D.D.C. 2016) (“Because these statistics essentially cancel one another out, this factor is neutral.”). Other courts, however, have held that the time to disposition is the more important metric. See, e.g., AL & PO Corp., 2015 WL 738694, at *5 (holding that where the law is unsettled at the time of trial but settled by the time of appeal the plainness of the error should be judged by the law at the time of appeal", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nof months from filing to trial for civil cases.” AL & PO Corp. v. Am. Healthcare Capital, Inc., No. 14 C 1905, 2015 WL 738694, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 19, 2015) (quotation marks omitted). The defendant notes that the time to disposition, in shorter'in this district than in Minnesota, while the time to trial is quick er in Minnesota- than in Illinois. Where the two statistical measures point in different directions, some courts have held that they cancel one another out. See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. RPM Int’l, Inc., 223 F.Supp.3d 110, 117-18 (D.D.C. 2016) (“Because these statistics essentially cancel one another out, this factor is neutral.”). Other courts, however, have held that the time to disposition is the more important metric. See, e.g., AL & PO Corp., 2015 WL 738694, at *5 (holding that appellate courts analyze plain error by reference to the law as of the time the appeal is decided rather than the extant law at the time of the disputed trial court ruling", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nof months from filing to trial for civil cases.” AL & PO Corp. v. Am. Healthcare Capital, Inc., No. 14 C 1905, 2015 WL 738694, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 19, 2015) (quotation marks omitted). The defendant notes that the time to disposition, in shorter'in this district than in Minnesota, while the time to trial is quick er in Minnesota- than in Illinois. Where the two statistical measures point in different directions, some courts have held that they cancel one another out. See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. RPM Int’l, Inc., 223 F.Supp.3d 110, 117-18 (D.D.C. 2016) (“Because these statistics essentially cancel one another out, this factor is neutral.”). Other courts, however, have held that the time to disposition is the more important metric. See, e.g., AL & PO Corp., 2015 WL 738694, at *5 (holding that more than notice to a defendant is required" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfor breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by Amtrak because it has failed to plead a valid contract. While Virginia law recognizes a contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing, Va. Vermiculite, Ltd. v. W.R. Grace & Company-Connecticut, 156 F.3d 535, 542 (4th Cir.1998), a breach of that duty only creates a claim for breach of contract. Joyce v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 845 F.Supp. 353, 355 (E.D.Va.1993) (stating that there is no independent cause of action for breach of implied covenant). Where, as here, there is no allegation of a valid contract betwee ence with prospective business advantage fails because Plaintiff has not alleged the existence of a valid business expectancy. Krantz v. Air Line Pilots Assoc., 245 Va. 202, 205-06, 427 S.E.2d 326 (1993) (holding that with respect to tortious interference recognized standards of business ethics and business customs and practices are pertinent", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfor breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by Amtrak because it has failed to plead a valid contract. While Virginia law recognizes a contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing, Va. Vermiculite, Ltd. v. W.R. Grace & Company-Connecticut, 156 F.3d 535, 542 (4th Cir.1998), a breach of that duty only creates a claim for breach of contract. Joyce v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 845 F.Supp. 353, 355 (E.D.Va.1993) (stating that there is no independent cause of action for breach of implied covenant). Where, as here, there is no allegation of a valid contract betwee ence with prospective business advantage fails because Plaintiff has not alleged the existence of a valid business expectancy. Krantz v. Air Line Pilots Assoc., 245 Va. 202, 205-06, 427 S.E.2d 326 (1993) (recognizing the tort of interference with prospective contractual relations as a subspecies of the broader tort of interference with prospective economic advantage", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfor breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by Amtrak because it has failed to plead a valid contract. While Virginia law recognizes a contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing, Va. Vermiculite, Ltd. v. W.R. Grace & Company-Connecticut, 156 F.3d 535, 542 (4th Cir.1998), a breach of that duty only creates a claim for breach of contract. Joyce v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 845 F.Supp. 353, 355 (E.D.Va.1993) (stating that there is no independent cause of action for breach of implied covenant). Where, as here, there is no allegation of a valid contract betwee ence with prospective business advantage fails because Plaintiff has not alleged the existence of a valid business expectancy. Krantz v. Air Line Pilots Assoc., 245 Va. 202, 205-06, 427 S.E.2d 326 (1993) (holding that the first element in a prima facie case of tortious interference with prospective business advantage is the existence of business expectancy", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfor breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by Amtrak because it has failed to plead a valid contract. While Virginia law recognizes a contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing, Va. Vermiculite, Ltd. v. W.R. Grace & Company-Connecticut, 156 F.3d 535, 542 (4th Cir.1998), a breach of that duty only creates a claim for breach of contract. Joyce v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 845 F.Supp. 353, 355 (E.D.Va.1993) (stating that there is no independent cause of action for breach of implied covenant). Where, as here, there is no allegation of a valid contract betwee ence with prospective business advantage fails because Plaintiff has not alleged the existence of a valid business expectancy. Krantz v. Air Line Pilots Assoc., 245 Va. 202, 205-06, 427 S.E.2d 326 (1993) (holding that the first element in a prima facie case of tortious interference with contract is the existence of a valid contractual relationship", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfor breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by Amtrak because it has failed to plead a valid contract. While Virginia law recognizes a contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing, Va. Vermiculite, Ltd. v. W.R. Grace & Company-Connecticut, 156 F.3d 535, 542 (4th Cir.1998), a breach of that duty only creates a claim for breach of contract. Joyce v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 845 F.Supp. 353, 355 (E.D.Va.1993) (stating that there is no independent cause of action for breach of implied covenant). Where, as here, there is no allegation of a valid contract betwee ence with prospective business advantage fails because Plaintiff has not alleged the existence of a valid business expectancy. Krantz v. Air Line Pilots Assoc., 245 Va. 202, 205-06, 427 S.E.2d 326 (1993) (recognizing action for tortious interference with prospective advantage" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ncreating anger or resentment and a cross burning done with the [constitutionally proscribable] purpose of threatening or intimidating a victim”), 374 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (agreeing that the First Amendment prohibits the conviction of a person for cross burning without the intent to intimidate, but concluding that the number of such convictions likely to occur under the Virginia statute was too small to render the statute facially overbroad). 20 Pet. for Review, State v. Schaler, No. 81864-9, at 13 (Wash. Aug. 19, 2008) (conceding that “[t]he true threat test is determined under an objective standard that focuses on the speaker” (citing Kilburn, 151 Wn.2d at 44)). 21 Majority at 900. 22 United States v. Heineman, 767 F.3d 970, 976-82 (10th Cir. 2014) (holding after long discussion of the various opinions in black that that case established that a defendant can be constitutionally convicted of making a true threat only if the defendant intended the recipient of the threat to feel threatened", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ncreating anger or resentment and a cross burning done with the [constitutionally proscribable] purpose of threatening or intimidating a victim”), 374 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (agreeing that the First Amendment prohibits the conviction of a person for cross burning without the intent to intimidate, but concluding that the number of such convictions likely to occur under the Virginia statute was too small to render the statute facially overbroad). 20 Pet. for Review, State v. Schaler, No. 81864-9, at 13 (Wash. Aug. 19, 2008) (conceding that “[t]he true threat test is determined under an objective standard that focuses on the speaker” (citing Kilburn, 151 Wn.2d at 44)). 21 Majority at 900. 22 United States v. Heineman, 767 F.3d 970, 976-82 (10th Cir. 2014) (holding that the district courts finding that an allegedly coercive threat did not specifically motivate the defendants confession where 1 there was no evidence that the threat was repeated at the police station 2 defendant offered no admissible evidence that the threat was the crucial factor motivating his confession and 3 he confessed immediately after the officer threatened to administer a gun residue test as opposed to confessing immediately after the allegedly coercive threat was made thus the gunresidue test was just as plausible a motivating factor for the confession as was the threat", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ncreating anger or resentment and a cross burning done with the [constitutionally proscribable] purpose of threatening or intimidating a victim”), 374 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (agreeing that the First Amendment prohibits the conviction of a person for cross burning without the intent to intimidate, but concluding that the number of such convictions likely to occur under the Virginia statute was too small to render the statute facially overbroad). 20 Pet. for Review, State v. Schaler, No. 81864-9, at 13 (Wash. Aug. 19, 2008) (conceding that “[t]he true threat test is determined under an objective standard that focuses on the speaker” (citing Kilburn, 151 Wn.2d at 44)). 21 Majority at 900. 22 United States v. Heineman, 767 F.3d 970, 976-82 (10th Cir. 2014) (holding that an enhancement for an express threat of death may not be applied to the sentence for robbery when the threat is related to the use of the firearm and the defendant has a 924c sentence for the same firearm", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ncreating anger or resentment and a cross burning done with the [constitutionally proscribable] purpose of threatening or intimidating a victim”), 374 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (agreeing that the First Amendment prohibits the conviction of a person for cross burning without the intent to intimidate, but concluding that the number of such convictions likely to occur under the Virginia statute was too small to render the statute facially overbroad). 20 Pet. for Review, State v. Schaler, No. 81864-9, at 13 (Wash. Aug. 19, 2008) (conceding that “[t]he true threat test is determined under an objective standard that focuses on the speaker” (citing Kilburn, 151 Wn.2d at 44)). 21 Majority at 900. 22 United States v. Heineman, 767 F.3d 970, 976-82 (10th Cir. 2014) (holding that the statement i have a gun is a threat of death", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ncreating anger or resentment and a cross burning done with the [constitutionally proscribable] purpose of threatening or intimidating a victim”), 374 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (agreeing that the First Amendment prohibits the conviction of a person for cross burning without the intent to intimidate, but concluding that the number of such convictions likely to occur under the Virginia statute was too small to render the statute facially overbroad). 20 Pet. for Review, State v. Schaler, No. 81864-9, at 13 (Wash. Aug. 19, 2008) (conceding that “[t]he true threat test is determined under an objective standard that focuses on the speaker” (citing Kilburn, 151 Wn.2d at 44)). 21 Majority at 900. 22 United States v. Heineman, 767 F.3d 970, 976-82 (10th Cir. 2014) (holding that threat occurring 36 days before possession of firearm not present threat" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993). The Brecht rule applies even when the “federal habeas court is the first to review for harmless error.” Gilliam v. Mitchell, 179 F.3d 990, 995 (6th Cir.1999). Under Brecht, a Doyle error only warrants reversal if the mistake “had substantial or injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637,113 S.Ct. 1710. A “reasonable possibility” that the error influenced the outcome is not enough to warrant relief. Id. Rather, the defendant must show a “reasonable probability” that the error af fected the verdict. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). The present case is not distinguishable on its facts from Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637-38, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (holding that an error must have a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict to entitle a petitioner to habeas relief", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993). The Brecht rule applies even when the “federal habeas court is the first to review for harmless error.” Gilliam v. Mitchell, 179 F.3d 990, 995 (6th Cir.1999). Under Brecht, a Doyle error only warrants reversal if the mistake “had substantial or injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637,113 S.Ct. 1710. A “reasonable possibility” that the error influenced the outcome is not enough to warrant relief. Id. Rather, the defendant must show a “reasonable probability” that the error af fected the verdict. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). The present case is not distinguishable on its facts from Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637-38, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (holding that states improper use of defendants postmiranda silence was error but did not warrant habeas relief unless error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jurys verdict", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993). The Brecht rule applies even when the “federal habeas court is the first to review for harmless error.” Gilliam v. Mitchell, 179 F.3d 990, 995 (6th Cir.1999). Under Brecht, a Doyle error only warrants reversal if the mistake “had substantial or injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637,113 S.Ct. 1710. A “reasonable possibility” that the error influenced the outcome is not enough to warrant relief. Id. Rather, the defendant must show a “reasonable probability” that the error af fected the verdict. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). The present case is not distinguishable on its facts from Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637-38, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (holding that nonconstitutional error is harmless if it did not have substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jurys verdict", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993). The Brecht rule applies even when the “federal habeas court is the first to review for harmless error.” Gilliam v. Mitchell, 179 F.3d 990, 995 (6th Cir.1999). Under Brecht, a Doyle error only warrants reversal if the mistake “had substantial or injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637,113 S.Ct. 1710. A “reasonable possibility” that the error influenced the outcome is not enough to warrant relief. Id. Rather, the defendant must show a “reasonable probability” that the error af fected the verdict. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). The present case is not distinguishable on its facts from Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637-38, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (holding that a substantial right is affected when the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jurys verdict", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993). The Brecht rule applies even when the “federal habeas court is the first to review for harmless error.” Gilliam v. Mitchell, 179 F.3d 990, 995 (6th Cir.1999). Under Brecht, a Doyle error only warrants reversal if the mistake “had substantial or injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637,113 S.Ct. 1710. A “reasonable possibility” that the error influenced the outcome is not enough to warrant relief. Id. Rather, the defendant must show a “reasonable probability” that the error af fected the verdict. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). The present case is not distinguishable on its facts from Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637-38, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (holding that the states improper use of the defendants postmiranda silence to impeach the defendants claim that shooting was accidental did not have substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining jurys verdict and thus was harmless error" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nmay well be, as I have argued elsewhere, that there is something intrinsically immoral about condemning a man as a criminal while telling oneself, \"I believe that there is a chance of one in twenty that this defendant is innocent, but a 1/20 risk of sacrificing him erroneously is one I am willing to run in the interest of the public’s — and my own— safety.” 84 Harv.L.Rev. at 1372. 17 . As the majority points out, Judge Kennedy sat for twenty days, heard testimony from eight expert witnesses, admitted over 110 exhibits, and received over 1,300 pages of briefs. I want to go on record with a commendation for all counsel. 18 . Presumably the testimony of the complainant in this case will not need corroboration. 19 . See State v. Vandebogart, — N.H. —, - —, 616 A.2d 483, 493-94 (N.H.1992) (holding that after review the minutes were unambiguous and the trial judge erred in admitting parol evidence", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nmay well be, as I have argued elsewhere, that there is something intrinsically immoral about condemning a man as a criminal while telling oneself, \"I believe that there is a chance of one in twenty that this defendant is innocent, but a 1/20 risk of sacrificing him erroneously is one I am willing to run in the interest of the public’s — and my own— safety.” 84 Harv.L.Rev. at 1372. 17 . As the majority points out, Judge Kennedy sat for twenty days, heard testimony from eight expert witnesses, admitted over 110 exhibits, and received over 1,300 pages of briefs. I want to go on record with a commendation for all counsel. 18 . Presumably the testimony of the complainant in this case will not need corroboration. 19 . See State v. Vandebogart, — N.H. —, - —, 616 A.2d 483, 493-94 (N.H.1992) (holding that product rule method of dna statistical evidence is now generally accepted in the relevant scientific community", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nmay well be, as I have argued elsewhere, that there is something intrinsically immoral about condemning a man as a criminal while telling oneself, \"I believe that there is a chance of one in twenty that this defendant is innocent, but a 1/20 risk of sacrificing him erroneously is one I am willing to run in the interest of the public’s — and my own— safety.” 84 Harv.L.Rev. at 1372. 17 . As the majority points out, Judge Kennedy sat for twenty days, heard testimony from eight expert witnesses, admitted over 110 exhibits, and received over 1,300 pages of briefs. I want to go on record with a commendation for all counsel. 18 . Presumably the testimony of the complainant in this case will not need corroboration. 19 . See State v. Vandebogart, — N.H. —, - —, 616 A.2d 483, 493-94 (N.H.1992) (holding that trial court erred in admitting population frequency estimates used by fbi since such statistical techniques are not generally accepted among population geneticists because of the debate regarding population substructure", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nmay well be, as I have argued elsewhere, that there is something intrinsically immoral about condemning a man as a criminal while telling oneself, \"I believe that there is a chance of one in twenty that this defendant is innocent, but a 1/20 risk of sacrificing him erroneously is one I am willing to run in the interest of the public’s — and my own— safety.” 84 Harv.L.Rev. at 1372. 17 . As the majority points out, Judge Kennedy sat for twenty days, heard testimony from eight expert witnesses, admitted over 110 exhibits, and received over 1,300 pages of briefs. I want to go on record with a commendation for all counsel. 18 . Presumably the testimony of the complainant in this case will not need corroboration. 19 . See State v. Vandebogart, — N.H. —, - —, 616 A.2d 483, 493-94 (N.H.1992) (holding that determining corporate value may be done by including proof of value by any techniques or methods which are generally considered acceptable in the financial community and otherwise admissible in court", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nmay well be, as I have argued elsewhere, that there is something intrinsically immoral about condemning a man as a criminal while telling oneself, \"I believe that there is a chance of one in twenty that this defendant is innocent, but a 1/20 risk of sacrificing him erroneously is one I am willing to run in the interest of the public’s — and my own— safety.” 84 Harv.L.Rev. at 1372. 17 . As the majority points out, Judge Kennedy sat for twenty days, heard testimony from eight expert witnesses, admitted over 110 exhibits, and received over 1,300 pages of briefs. I want to go on record with a commendation for all counsel. 18 . Presumably the testimony of the complainant in this case will not need corroboration. 19 . See State v. Vandebogart, — N.H. —, - —, 616 A.2d 483, 493-94 (N.H.1992) (holding that no serious dispute exists as to whether the techniques involved in rflp analysis are generally accepted" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndemonstrate a violation of an individual’s bodily integrity sufficient to support a constitutional violation. Moran v. Clarke, 296 F.3d 638, 647 (8th Cir.2002) (en banc) (discussing the severity of conduct necessary to establish a violation). For instance, in Reeve v. Oliver, our court refused to find a substantive due process violation when a state actor touched and rubbed a woman’s back while staring at her chest. 41 F.3d 381, 382-83 (8th Cir.1994). Similarly, in Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 726 (6th Cir.1996), the Sixth Circuit held that a teacher’s act of rubbing a student’s stomach while he made suggestive remarks to her did not violate the student’s right to bodily integrity. See also Petrone v. Cleveland State Univ., 993 F.Supp. 1119, 1126 (N.D.Ohio 1998) (holding that sexual harassment need not take the form of sexual advances or other explicitly sexual conduct in order to be actionable under title vii", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndemonstrate a violation of an individual’s bodily integrity sufficient to support a constitutional violation. Moran v. Clarke, 296 F.3d 638, 647 (8th Cir.2002) (en banc) (discussing the severity of conduct necessary to establish a violation). For instance, in Reeve v. Oliver, our court refused to find a substantive due process violation when a state actor touched and rubbed a woman’s back while staring at her chest. 41 F.3d 381, 382-83 (8th Cir.1994). Similarly, in Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 726 (6th Cir.1996), the Sixth Circuit held that a teacher’s act of rubbing a student’s stomach while he made suggestive remarks to her did not violate the student’s right to bodily integrity. See also Petrone v. Cleveland State Univ., 993 F.Supp. 1119, 1126 (N.D.Ohio 1998) (holding that a seventeenyearold student lacked the capacity to consent to engage in sexual conduct with a teacher and consequently her allegations of a seeminglyconsensual sexual relationship with the teacher were sufficient to state a 1983 claim based on a violation of substantive due process", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndemonstrate a violation of an individual’s bodily integrity sufficient to support a constitutional violation. Moran v. Clarke, 296 F.3d 638, 647 (8th Cir.2002) (en banc) (discussing the severity of conduct necessary to establish a violation). For instance, in Reeve v. Oliver, our court refused to find a substantive due process violation when a state actor touched and rubbed a woman’s back while staring at her chest. 41 F.3d 381, 382-83 (8th Cir.1994). Similarly, in Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 726 (6th Cir.1996), the Sixth Circuit held that a teacher’s act of rubbing a student’s stomach while he made suggestive remarks to her did not violate the student’s right to bodily integrity. See also Petrone v. Cleveland State Univ., 993 F.Supp. 1119, 1126 (N.D.Ohio 1998) (holding that allegations of a supervisors sexual advances including one where the supervisor slid his hand along a womans leg toward her pelvic area did not state a substantive due process claim", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndemonstrate a violation of an individual’s bodily integrity sufficient to support a constitutional violation. Moran v. Clarke, 296 F.3d 638, 647 (8th Cir.2002) (en banc) (discussing the severity of conduct necessary to establish a violation). For instance, in Reeve v. Oliver, our court refused to find a substantive due process violation when a state actor touched and rubbed a woman’s back while staring at her chest. 41 F.3d 381, 382-83 (8th Cir.1994). Similarly, in Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 726 (6th Cir.1996), the Sixth Circuit held that a teacher’s act of rubbing a student’s stomach while he made suggestive remarks to her did not violate the student’s right to bodily integrity. See also Petrone v. Cleveland State Univ., 993 F.Supp. 1119, 1126 (N.D.Ohio 1998) (recognizing 1983 substantive due process claim", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndemonstrate a violation of an individual’s bodily integrity sufficient to support a constitutional violation. Moran v. Clarke, 296 F.3d 638, 647 (8th Cir.2002) (en banc) (discussing the severity of conduct necessary to establish a violation). For instance, in Reeve v. Oliver, our court refused to find a substantive due process violation when a state actor touched and rubbed a woman’s back while staring at her chest. 41 F.3d 381, 382-83 (8th Cir.1994). Similarly, in Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 726 (6th Cir.1996), the Sixth Circuit held that a teacher’s act of rubbing a student’s stomach while he made suggestive remarks to her did not violate the student’s right to bodily integrity. See also Petrone v. Cleveland State Univ., 993 F.Supp. 1119, 1126 (N.D.Ohio 1998) (holding that similar allegations were insufficient to state a due process claim" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ndefendant nor CMR has presented any evidence that calls into question BBSSI’s diligence in asserting its rights. According to BBSSI, ten weeks, standing alone, is not an unreasonable amount of time to file a bid protest at the Court of Federal Claims, see Oral Argument at 3:37:15-25, and the court agrees. There exists no firm line of demarcation separating a reasonable delay from an unreasonable delay, see A.C. Aukerman Co., 960 F.2d at 1032, and courts are cognizant of the realities presented by litigation. To that end, negotiations between the parties, as well as the composition of briefs and assembly of supporting documentation, have been recognized as legitimate excuses for a delay in filing suit. See, e.g., Global Computer Enters., Inc. v. United States, 88 Fed.Cl. 350, 423 (2009) (recognizing that voluminous filings cannot be drafted and assembled overnight", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ndefendant nor CMR has presented any evidence that calls into question BBSSI’s diligence in asserting its rights. According to BBSSI, ten weeks, standing alone, is not an unreasonable amount of time to file a bid protest at the Court of Federal Claims, see Oral Argument at 3:37:15-25, and the court agrees. There exists no firm line of demarcation separating a reasonable delay from an unreasonable delay, see A.C. Aukerman Co., 960 F.2d at 1032, and courts are cognizant of the realities presented by litigation. To that end, negotiations between the parties, as well as the composition of briefs and assembly of supporting documentation, have been recognized as legitimate excuses for a delay in filing suit. See, e.g., Global Computer Enters., Inc. v. United States, 88 Fed.Cl. 350, 423 (2009) (holding that courts may take judicial notice of sec filings that are matters of public record", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ndefendant nor CMR has presented any evidence that calls into question BBSSI’s diligence in asserting its rights. According to BBSSI, ten weeks, standing alone, is not an unreasonable amount of time to file a bid protest at the Court of Federal Claims, see Oral Argument at 3:37:15-25, and the court agrees. There exists no firm line of demarcation separating a reasonable delay from an unreasonable delay, see A.C. Aukerman Co., 960 F.2d at 1032, and courts are cognizant of the realities presented by litigation. To that end, negotiations between the parties, as well as the composition of briefs and assembly of supporting documentation, have been recognized as legitimate excuses for a delay in filing suit. See, e.g., Global Computer Enters., Inc. v. United States, 88 Fed.Cl. 350, 423 (2009) (recognizing that a court may take judicial notice of a document filed in another court to establish the fact of such litigation and related filings", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ndefendant nor CMR has presented any evidence that calls into question BBSSI’s diligence in asserting its rights. According to BBSSI, ten weeks, standing alone, is not an unreasonable amount of time to file a bid protest at the Court of Federal Claims, see Oral Argument at 3:37:15-25, and the court agrees. There exists no firm line of demarcation separating a reasonable delay from an unreasonable delay, see A.C. Aukerman Co., 960 F.2d at 1032, and courts are cognizant of the realities presented by litigation. To that end, negotiations between the parties, as well as the composition of briefs and assembly of supporting documentation, have been recognized as legitimate excuses for a delay in filing suit. See, e.g., Global Computer Enters., Inc. v. United States, 88 Fed.Cl. 350, 423 (2009) (holding that a written report drafted by a person who is not properly qualified as an expert may not be considered as summary judgment evidence", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ndefendant nor CMR has presented any evidence that calls into question BBSSI’s diligence in asserting its rights. According to BBSSI, ten weeks, standing alone, is not an unreasonable amount of time to file a bid protest at the Court of Federal Claims, see Oral Argument at 3:37:15-25, and the court agrees. There exists no firm line of demarcation separating a reasonable delay from an unreasonable delay, see A.C. Aukerman Co., 960 F.2d at 1032, and courts are cognizant of the realities presented by litigation. To that end, negotiations between the parties, as well as the composition of briefs and assembly of supporting documentation, have been recognized as legitimate excuses for a delay in filing suit. See, e.g., Global Computer Enters., Inc. v. United States, 88 Fed.Cl. 350, 423 (2009) (recognizing that a court may take judicial notice of court filings and other matters of public record" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe Department, and went on to hold that the Department’s seizure of the vessel violated state law but that it was immune from damages. In no place in the opinion did the court discuss the award of attorneys’ fees or intimate that such fees had ever been awarded. It was simply silent on the issue. Because no separate judgment has been “entered” under Rule 58, the time for filing a notice of appeal has not yet begun to run. See Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(7) (providing that a judgment or order is “entered ... when it is entered in compliance with Rules 58”). Given that the district court treated the order allowing attorneys’ fees as an appealable order and that the parties do not object to treating it as such, we find no reason to remand for formal compliance with Rule 58. Domegan, 972 F.2d 401 (holding that there was appellate jurisdiction under principle that a premature notice of appeal from a nonfinal order may ripen into a valid notice of appeal if a final judgment has been entered by the time the appeal is heard and the appellee suffers no prejudice", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe Department, and went on to hold that the Department’s seizure of the vessel violated state law but that it was immune from damages. In no place in the opinion did the court discuss the award of attorneys’ fees or intimate that such fees had ever been awarded. It was simply silent on the issue. Because no separate judgment has been “entered” under Rule 58, the time for filing a notice of appeal has not yet begun to run. See Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(7) (providing that a judgment or order is “entered ... when it is entered in compliance with Rules 58”). Given that the district court treated the order allowing attorneys’ fees as an appealable order and that the parties do not object to treating it as such, we find no reason to remand for formal compliance with Rule 58. Domegan, 972 F.2d 401 (holding that court had jurisdiction where no separate judgment had been entered even though notice of appeal was not timely filed as measured from the final decision", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe Department, and went on to hold that the Department’s seizure of the vessel violated state law but that it was immune from damages. In no place in the opinion did the court discuss the award of attorneys’ fees or intimate that such fees had ever been awarded. It was simply silent on the issue. Because no separate judgment has been “entered” under Rule 58, the time for filing a notice of appeal has not yet begun to run. See Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(7) (providing that a judgment or order is “entered ... when it is entered in compliance with Rules 58”). Given that the district court treated the order allowing attorneys’ fees as an appealable order and that the parties do not object to treating it as such, we find no reason to remand for formal compliance with Rule 58. Domegan, 972 F.2d 401 (holding that a notice of appeal is timely when filed before final judgment is entered by the district court", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe Department, and went on to hold that the Department’s seizure of the vessel violated state law but that it was immune from damages. In no place in the opinion did the court discuss the award of attorneys’ fees or intimate that such fees had ever been awarded. It was simply silent on the issue. Because no separate judgment has been “entered” under Rule 58, the time for filing a notice of appeal has not yet begun to run. See Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(7) (providing that a judgment or order is “entered ... when it is entered in compliance with Rules 58”). Given that the district court treated the order allowing attorneys’ fees as an appealable order and that the parties do not object to treating it as such, we find no reason to remand for formal compliance with Rule 58. Domegan, 972 F.2d 401 (holding that lack of a separate judgment does not preclude the taking of an appeal from a district courts final decision because the parties may waive the separate judgment requirement where one has accidentally not been entered", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe Department, and went on to hold that the Department’s seizure of the vessel violated state law but that it was immune from damages. In no place in the opinion did the court discuss the award of attorneys’ fees or intimate that such fees had ever been awarded. It was simply silent on the issue. Because no separate judgment has been “entered” under Rule 58, the time for filing a notice of appeal has not yet begun to run. See Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(7) (providing that a judgment or order is “entered ... when it is entered in compliance with Rules 58”). Given that the district court treated the order allowing attorneys’ fees as an appealable order and that the parties do not object to treating it as such, we find no reason to remand for formal compliance with Rule 58. Domegan, 972 F.2d 401 (holding that notice of appeal was not effectively taken where appeal was filed simultaneously with timely motion for reconsideration because when timely motion for reconsideration is filed a notice of appeal filed prior to disposition of the motion to reconsider has no effect" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nsame counsel during his trial proceedings and on his direct appeals. Moreover, he had the benefit of two attorneys’ thoughts concerning the post-conviction petitions. We note parenthetically that the attorney who initially drafted one of the petitions, and reviewed the record in Stewart II, did not choose to raise any claim regarding Mr. Pumilia’s alleged incompetency. More significantly, defendant did not even raise this issue in his briefs filed with this court appealing the denial of his post-conviction petitions. Our Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7) provides that points not asserted in an appellant’s brief are waived and shall not be raised for the first time, as defendant did here, during oral argument. 107 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7); see also People v. Lewis (1984), 105 Ill. 2d 226, 249-50 (holding argument is waived when raised for first time in reply brief", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nsame counsel during his trial proceedings and on his direct appeals. Moreover, he had the benefit of two attorneys’ thoughts concerning the post-conviction petitions. We note parenthetically that the attorney who initially drafted one of the petitions, and reviewed the record in Stewart II, did not choose to raise any claim regarding Mr. Pumilia’s alleged incompetency. More significantly, defendant did not even raise this issue in his briefs filed with this court appealing the denial of his post-conviction petitions. Our Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7) provides that points not asserted in an appellant’s brief are waived and shall not be raised for the first time, as defendant did here, during oral argument. 107 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7); see also People v. Lewis (1984), 105 Ill. 2d 226, 249-50 (holding that defendant waived review of an issue which he raised for the first time during oral argument", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nsame counsel during his trial proceedings and on his direct appeals. Moreover, he had the benefit of two attorneys’ thoughts concerning the post-conviction petitions. We note parenthetically that the attorney who initially drafted one of the petitions, and reviewed the record in Stewart II, did not choose to raise any claim regarding Mr. Pumilia’s alleged incompetency. More significantly, defendant did not even raise this issue in his briefs filed with this court appealing the denial of his post-conviction petitions. Our Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7) provides that points not asserted in an appellant’s brief are waived and shall not be raised for the first time, as defendant did here, during oral argument. 107 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7); see also People v. Lewis (1984), 105 Ill. 2d 226, 249-50 (holding that an argument raised for the first time in a reply brief is waived", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nsame counsel during his trial proceedings and on his direct appeals. Moreover, he had the benefit of two attorneys’ thoughts concerning the post-conviction petitions. We note parenthetically that the attorney who initially drafted one of the petitions, and reviewed the record in Stewart II, did not choose to raise any claim regarding Mr. Pumilia’s alleged incompetency. More significantly, defendant did not even raise this issue in his briefs filed with this court appealing the denial of his post-conviction petitions. Our Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7) provides that points not asserted in an appellant’s brief are waived and shall not be raised for the first time, as defendant did here, during oral argument. 107 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7); see also People v. Lewis (1984), 105 Ill. 2d 226, 249-50 (holding that an argument raised for the first time in a rule 59e motion is waived on appeal", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nsame counsel during his trial proceedings and on his direct appeals. Moreover, he had the benefit of two attorneys’ thoughts concerning the post-conviction petitions. We note parenthetically that the attorney who initially drafted one of the petitions, and reviewed the record in Stewart II, did not choose to raise any claim regarding Mr. Pumilia’s alleged incompetency. More significantly, defendant did not even raise this issue in his briefs filed with this court appealing the denial of his post-conviction petitions. Our Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7) provides that points not asserted in an appellant’s brief are waived and shall not be raised for the first time, as defendant did here, during oral argument. 107 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7); see also People v. Lewis (1984), 105 Ill. 2d 226, 249-50 (holding that argument raised at oral argument that was not included in brief is waived" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nfor the prosecution to point out inconsistencies in Edwards’ defense strategy. (c) Edwards argues the State improperly commented on his objection to the admission of the cocaine into evidence. At the outset, we reject the State’s contention that Edwards failed to preserve this objection because the transcript shows defense counsel objected. See Hall v. State, 180 Ga. App. 881 (350 SE2d 801) (1986). However, even assuming the State’s comment was improper, we cannot say it is highly probable that the improper remark contributed to the verdict. Id. at 885. Thus, even if we were to determine the State’s argument was improper and inflammatory, such argument did not likely affect the verdict and Edwards’ conviction must be affirmed. Miles v. State, 183 Ga. App. 346 (358 SE2d 904) (1987) (recognizing that if a guidelines error did not affect the district courts selection of the sentence imposed the sentence should be affirmed", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nfor the prosecution to point out inconsistencies in Edwards’ defense strategy. (c) Edwards argues the State improperly commented on his objection to the admission of the cocaine into evidence. At the outset, we reject the State’s contention that Edwards failed to preserve this objection because the transcript shows defense counsel objected. See Hall v. State, 180 Ga. App. 881 (350 SE2d 801) (1986). However, even assuming the State’s comment was improper, we cannot say it is highly probable that the improper remark contributed to the verdict. Id. at 885. Thus, even if we were to determine the State’s argument was improper and inflammatory, such argument did not likely affect the verdict and Edwards’ conviction must be affirmed. Miles v. State, 183 Ga. App. 346 (358 SE2d 904) (1987) (holding the prosecutors argument if it was there they can bring it to you was not an improper jury argument", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nfor the prosecution to point out inconsistencies in Edwards’ defense strategy. (c) Edwards argues the State improperly commented on his objection to the admission of the cocaine into evidence. At the outset, we reject the State’s contention that Edwards failed to preserve this objection because the transcript shows defense counsel objected. See Hall v. State, 180 Ga. App. 881 (350 SE2d 801) (1986). However, even assuming the State’s comment was improper, we cannot say it is highly probable that the improper remark contributed to the verdict. Id. at 885. Thus, even if we were to determine the State’s argument was improper and inflammatory, such argument did not likely affect the verdict and Edwards’ conviction must be affirmed. Miles v. State, 183 Ga. App. 346 (358 SE2d 904) (1987) (holding on habeas review that counsels failure to object to improper argument at trial did not prejudice petitioner where other evidence supported a guilty verdict and the jury was told closing argument was not evidence", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nfor the prosecution to point out inconsistencies in Edwards’ defense strategy. (c) Edwards argues the State improperly commented on his objection to the admission of the cocaine into evidence. At the outset, we reject the State’s contention that Edwards failed to preserve this objection because the transcript shows defense counsel objected. See Hall v. State, 180 Ga. App. 881 (350 SE2d 801) (1986). However, even assuming the State’s comment was improper, we cannot say it is highly probable that the improper remark contributed to the verdict. Id. at 885. Thus, even if we were to determine the State’s argument was improper and inflammatory, such argument did not likely affect the verdict and Edwards’ conviction must be affirmed. Miles v. State, 183 Ga. App. 346 (358 SE2d 904) (1987) (holding that although states argument was improper and inflammatory conviction was affirmed because it probably did not affect the verdict", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nfor the prosecution to point out inconsistencies in Edwards’ defense strategy. (c) Edwards argues the State improperly commented on his objection to the admission of the cocaine into evidence. At the outset, we reject the State’s contention that Edwards failed to preserve this objection because the transcript shows defense counsel objected. See Hall v. State, 180 Ga. App. 881 (350 SE2d 801) (1986). However, even assuming the State’s comment was improper, we cannot say it is highly probable that the improper remark contributed to the verdict. Id. at 885. Thus, even if we were to determine the State’s argument was improper and inflammatory, such argument did not likely affect the verdict and Edwards’ conviction must be affirmed. Miles v. State, 183 Ga. App. 346 (358 SE2d 904) (1987) (holding prosecutors statement that defendants testimony was outandout lies not improper because not excessive or inflammatory" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nseek unnecessary. See ch.2002-240, § 2, at 1782, Laws of Fla. (deleting authorization for arbitration). WOLF, C.J., Concurring. I cannot agree with the reasoning of the majority. Section 627.062(6)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), requires that “[t]he department and insurer must treat the decision of the arbitrators as the final approval of a rate filing.” The majority determines that the statute may not be enforced as written because it conflicts with the Florida Windstorm Underwriters Association Plan of Operation. That plan was adopted by rule by the Department of Insurance. Fundamental administrative law dictates that an administrative rule may not conflict with the unambiguous dictates of a statute. See Cleveland v. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families, 868 So.2d 1227 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (holding that 9 usc 1 conflicts with the inclusive language of the convention and thus may not restrict its scope", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nseek unnecessary. See ch.2002-240, § 2, at 1782, Laws of Fla. (deleting authorization for arbitration). WOLF, C.J., Concurring. I cannot agree with the reasoning of the majority. Section 627.062(6)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), requires that “[t]he department and insurer must treat the decision of the arbitrators as the final approval of a rate filing.” The majority determines that the statute may not be enforced as written because it conflicts with the Florida Windstorm Underwriters Association Plan of Operation. That plan was adopted by rule by the Department of Insurance. Fundamental administrative law dictates that an administrative rule may not conflict with the unambiguous dictates of a statute. See Cleveland v. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families, 868 So.2d 1227 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (holding that confirmation of a chapter 11 plan creates a binding contract which may be enforced in state courts", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nseek unnecessary. See ch.2002-240, § 2, at 1782, Laws of Fla. (deleting authorization for arbitration). WOLF, C.J., Concurring. I cannot agree with the reasoning of the majority. Section 627.062(6)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), requires that “[t]he department and insurer must treat the decision of the arbitrators as the final approval of a rate filing.” The majority determines that the statute may not be enforced as written because it conflicts with the Florida Windstorm Underwriters Association Plan of Operation. That plan was adopted by rule by the Department of Insurance. Fundamental administrative law dictates that an administrative rule may not conflict with the unambiguous dictates of a statute. See Cleveland v. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families, 868 So.2d 1227 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (holding that a rule that conflicts with a subsequent adopted statutory amendment may not be enforced", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nseek unnecessary. See ch.2002-240, § 2, at 1782, Laws of Fla. (deleting authorization for arbitration). WOLF, C.J., Concurring. I cannot agree with the reasoning of the majority. Section 627.062(6)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), requires that “[t]he department and insurer must treat the decision of the arbitrators as the final approval of a rate filing.” The majority determines that the statute may not be enforced as written because it conflicts with the Florida Windstorm Underwriters Association Plan of Operation. That plan was adopted by rule by the Department of Insurance. Fundamental administrative law dictates that an administrative rule may not conflict with the unambiguous dictates of a statute. See Cleveland v. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families, 868 So.2d 1227 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (holding that property settlement agreements may be specifically enforced", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nseek unnecessary. See ch.2002-240, § 2, at 1782, Laws of Fla. (deleting authorization for arbitration). WOLF, C.J., Concurring. I cannot agree with the reasoning of the majority. Section 627.062(6)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), requires that “[t]he department and insurer must treat the decision of the arbitrators as the final approval of a rate filing.” The majority determines that the statute may not be enforced as written because it conflicts with the Florida Windstorm Underwriters Association Plan of Operation. That plan was adopted by rule by the Department of Insurance. Fundamental administrative law dictates that an administrative rule may not conflict with the unambiguous dictates of a statute. See Cleveland v. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families, 868 So.2d 1227 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (holding that this boilerplate language conflicts with the regulations and rulings" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nsee id. at 74-75, 21 L.Ed. 394. The former include only rights the Federal Constitution grants or the national government enables, but not those preexisting rights the Bill of Rights merely protects from federal invasion. Id. at 76-80, 21 L.Ed. 394. The Second Amendment protects a right that predates the Constitution; therefore, the Constitution did not grant it. See, e.g., Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2797 (“[I]t has always been widely understood that the Second Amendment, like the First and Fourth Amendments, codified a pre-existing right.”). It necessarily follows that the Privileges or Immunities Clause did not protect the right to keep and bear arms because it was not a right of citizens of the United States. See Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553; cf. Presser, 116 U.S. at 266-67, 6 S.Ct. 580 (recognizing a right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political social economic educational religious and cultural ends", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nsee id. at 74-75, 21 L.Ed. 394. The former include only rights the Federal Constitution grants or the national government enables, but not those preexisting rights the Bill of Rights merely protects from federal invasion. Id. at 76-80, 21 L.Ed. 394. The Second Amendment protects a right that predates the Constitution; therefore, the Constitution did not grant it. See, e.g., Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2797 (“[I]t has always been widely understood that the Second Amendment, like the First and Fourth Amendments, codified a pre-existing right.”). It necessarily follows that the Privileges or Immunities Clause did not protect the right to keep and bear arms because it was not a right of citizens of the United States. See Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553; cf. Presser, 116 U.S. at 266-67, 6 S.Ct. 580 (holding that the right to associate with others as a military company is not a privilege of citizens of the united states", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nsee id. at 74-75, 21 L.Ed. 394. The former include only rights the Federal Constitution grants or the national government enables, but not those preexisting rights the Bill of Rights merely protects from federal invasion. Id. at 76-80, 21 L.Ed. 394. The Second Amendment protects a right that predates the Constitution; therefore, the Constitution did not grant it. See, e.g., Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2797 (“[I]t has always been widely understood that the Second Amendment, like the First and Fourth Amendments, codified a pre-existing right.”). It necessarily follows that the Privileges or Immunities Clause did not protect the right to keep and bear arms because it was not a right of citizens of the United States. See Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553; cf. Presser, 116 U.S. at 266-67, 6 S.Ct. 580 (recognizing even federal constitutional right of association does not apply to the right of one individual to associate with another", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nsee id. at 74-75, 21 L.Ed. 394. The former include only rights the Federal Constitution grants or the national government enables, but not those preexisting rights the Bill of Rights merely protects from federal invasion. Id. at 76-80, 21 L.Ed. 394. The Second Amendment protects a right that predates the Constitution; therefore, the Constitution did not grant it. See, e.g., Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2797 (“[I]t has always been widely understood that the Second Amendment, like the First and Fourth Amendments, codified a pre-existing right.”). It necessarily follows that the Privileges or Immunities Clause did not protect the right to keep and bear arms because it was not a right of citizens of the United States. See Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553; cf. Presser, 116 U.S. at 266-67, 6 S.Ct. 580 (holding that the plaintiff must demonstrate that defendants contacts with the united states as a whole support the exercise of jurisdiction consistent with the constitution and laws of the united states", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nsee id. at 74-75, 21 L.Ed. 394. The former include only rights the Federal Constitution grants or the national government enables, but not those preexisting rights the Bill of Rights merely protects from federal invasion. Id. at 76-80, 21 L.Ed. 394. The Second Amendment protects a right that predates the Constitution; therefore, the Constitution did not grant it. See, e.g., Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2797 (“[I]t has always been widely understood that the Second Amendment, like the First and Fourth Amendments, codified a pre-existing right.”). It necessarily follows that the Privileges or Immunities Clause did not protect the right to keep and bear arms because it was not a right of citizens of the United States. See Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553; cf. Presser, 116 U.S. at 266-67, 6 S.Ct. 580 (holding that the fourteenth amendment which makes persons bom in the united states and subject to its jurisdiction citizens of the united states and requires that representatives be apportioned among the states based on population excluding indians not taxed did not make an indian a citizen of the united states" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe right to a jury trial. See, e.g., Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 495, 94 S.Ct. 2697, 41 L.Ed.2d 897 (1974) (classifying contempt to determine whether the contemnor enjoyed the right to a jury trial). In such cases, the Supreme Court has noted that “the severity of the penalty actually imposed is the best indication of the seriousness of a particular offense.” Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 149, 89 S.Ct. 1503, 23 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969). The Court notes that the actual sentence imposed and the final guideline range are not the same; however, in this unusual context, the final guideline range is a closer benchmark to the sentence imposed than the offense guideline without the applicable adjustments. Cf. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2462, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (holding that a court of appeals may afford a presumption of reasonableness to a withinguidelines sentence", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe right to a jury trial. See, e.g., Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 495, 94 S.Ct. 2697, 41 L.Ed.2d 897 (1974) (classifying contempt to determine whether the contemnor enjoyed the right to a jury trial). In such cases, the Supreme Court has noted that “the severity of the penalty actually imposed is the best indication of the seriousness of a particular offense.” Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 149, 89 S.Ct. 1503, 23 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969). The Court notes that the actual sentence imposed and the final guideline range are not the same; however, in this unusual context, the final guideline range is a closer benchmark to the sentence imposed than the offense guideline without the applicable adjustments. Cf. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2462, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (holding a court of appeals may apply a presumption of reasonableness to a district court sentence that reflects a proper application of the sentencing guidelines", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe right to a jury trial. See, e.g., Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 495, 94 S.Ct. 2697, 41 L.Ed.2d 897 (1974) (classifying contempt to determine whether the contemnor enjoyed the right to a jury trial). In such cases, the Supreme Court has noted that “the severity of the penalty actually imposed is the best indication of the seriousness of a particular offense.” Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 149, 89 S.Ct. 1503, 23 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969). The Court notes that the actual sentence imposed and the final guideline range are not the same; however, in this unusual context, the final guideline range is a closer benchmark to the sentence imposed than the offense guideline without the applicable adjustments. Cf. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2462, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (holding that district court may not presume reasonableness of guidelines sentencing range in particular case", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe right to a jury trial. See, e.g., Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 495, 94 S.Ct. 2697, 41 L.Ed.2d 897 (1974) (classifying contempt to determine whether the contemnor enjoyed the right to a jury trial). In such cases, the Supreme Court has noted that “the severity of the penalty actually imposed is the best indication of the seriousness of a particular offense.” Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 149, 89 S.Ct. 1503, 23 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969). The Court notes that the actual sentence imposed and the final guideline range are not the same; however, in this unusual context, the final guideline range is a closer benchmark to the sentence imposed than the offense guideline without the applicable adjustments. Cf. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2462, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (holding that we may apply a presumption of reasonableness to a sentence within the guidelines range", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe right to a jury trial. See, e.g., Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 495, 94 S.Ct. 2697, 41 L.Ed.2d 897 (1974) (classifying contempt to determine whether the contemnor enjoyed the right to a jury trial). In such cases, the Supreme Court has noted that “the severity of the penalty actually imposed is the best indication of the seriousness of a particular offense.” Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 149, 89 S.Ct. 1503, 23 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969). The Court notes that the actual sentence imposed and the final guideline range are not the same; however, in this unusual context, the final guideline range is a closer benchmark to the sentence imposed than the offense guideline without the applicable adjustments. Cf. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2462, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (holding that a court of appeals may presume reasonable a district courts proper application of the sentencing guidelines" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nRossi’s affidavit would be admissible at trial and whether Mr. Rossi would be competent to testify about it. For all the Court knows from Mr. Rossi’s affidavit, the information contained in it is based upon rank speculation and fourth-hand hearsay. While Mr. Rossi’s counsel contended at oral argument that in opposing summary judgment, Mr. Rossi had no burden to show that the information contained in his affidavit would be admissible at trial, Mr. Rossi’s counsel is plainly wrong. See Patterson, 375 F.3d at 219 (“Rule 56(e)’s requirement ... means that an affidavit’s hearsay assertion that would not be admis sible at trial if testified to by the affiant is insufficient to create a genuine issue for trial.”); Sarno v. Douglas Elliman-Gibbons & Ives, Inc., 183 F.Bd 155, 160 (2d Cir.1999) (holding that hearsay statement did not constitute competent evidence and thus could not be considered in opposition to motion for summary judgment", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nRossi’s affidavit would be admissible at trial and whether Mr. Rossi would be competent to testify about it. For all the Court knows from Mr. Rossi’s affidavit, the information contained in it is based upon rank speculation and fourth-hand hearsay. While Mr. Rossi’s counsel contended at oral argument that in opposing summary judgment, Mr. Rossi had no burden to show that the information contained in his affidavit would be admissible at trial, Mr. Rossi’s counsel is plainly wrong. See Patterson, 375 F.3d at 219 (“Rule 56(e)’s requirement ... means that an affidavit’s hearsay assertion that would not be admis sible at trial if testified to by the affiant is insufficient to create a genuine issue for trial.”); Sarno v. Douglas Elliman-Gibbons & Ives, Inc., 183 F.Bd 155, 160 (2d Cir.1999) (holding that a signed but unsworn letter which is not otherwise authenticated is hearsay and should not be considered as evidence in opposition to a motion for summary judgment", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nRossi’s affidavit would be admissible at trial and whether Mr. Rossi would be competent to testify about it. For all the Court knows from Mr. Rossi’s affidavit, the information contained in it is based upon rank speculation and fourth-hand hearsay. While Mr. Rossi’s counsel contended at oral argument that in opposing summary judgment, Mr. Rossi had no burden to show that the information contained in his affidavit would be admissible at trial, Mr. Rossi’s counsel is plainly wrong. See Patterson, 375 F.3d at 219 (“Rule 56(e)’s requirement ... means that an affidavit’s hearsay assertion that would not be admis sible at trial if testified to by the affiant is insufficient to create a genuine issue for trial.”); Sarno v. Douglas Elliman-Gibbons & Ives, Inc., 183 F.Bd 155, 160 (2d Cir.1999) (recognizing motion to strike as proper vehicle for evaluating objectionable hearsay evidence in opposition papers to summary judgment motion", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nRossi’s affidavit would be admissible at trial and whether Mr. Rossi would be competent to testify about it. For all the Court knows from Mr. Rossi’s affidavit, the information contained in it is based upon rank speculation and fourth-hand hearsay. While Mr. Rossi’s counsel contended at oral argument that in opposing summary judgment, Mr. Rossi had no burden to show that the information contained in his affidavit would be admissible at trial, Mr. Rossi’s counsel is plainly wrong. See Patterson, 375 F.3d at 219 (“Rule 56(e)’s requirement ... means that an affidavit’s hearsay assertion that would not be admis sible at trial if testified to by the affiant is insufficient to create a genuine issue for trial.”); Sarno v. Douglas Elliman-Gibbons & Ives, Inc., 183 F.Bd 155, 160 (2d Cir.1999) (holding that arguments not raised in opposition to a motion for summary judgment are waived", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nRossi’s affidavit would be admissible at trial and whether Mr. Rossi would be competent to testify about it. For all the Court knows from Mr. Rossi’s affidavit, the information contained in it is based upon rank speculation and fourth-hand hearsay. While Mr. Rossi’s counsel contended at oral argument that in opposing summary judgment, Mr. Rossi had no burden to show that the information contained in his affidavit would be admissible at trial, Mr. Rossi’s counsel is plainly wrong. See Patterson, 375 F.3d at 219 (“Rule 56(e)’s requirement ... means that an affidavit’s hearsay assertion that would not be admis sible at trial if testified to by the affiant is insufficient to create a genuine issue for trial.”); Sarno v. Douglas Elliman-Gibbons & Ives, Inc., 183 F.Bd 155, 160 (2d Cir.1999) (holding that hearsay in affidavit which would be inadmissible in evidence at trial could not be considered on motion for summary judgment" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nreceived from the account. b. If the applicant is not able to provide the amount of taxes that are due, the value shall be determined by deducting 20% from the gross value of the account. Colorado Department of Health Care Policy and Financing, § 8.110.51(C); Aple. Supp. App. at 33. 3 . Although the MCCA provides for a hearing by parties challenging an eligibility determination, the Sellers did not ask for a hearing. This fact, however, is not fatal to their § 1983 claim. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002) (\"plaintiffs pursuing civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 need not exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in court”); see also Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 521-22, 110 S.Ct. 2510, 110 L.Ed.2d 455 (1990)(holding that 1396aa8 is enforceable by medicaid recipients under 1983", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nreceived from the account. b. If the applicant is not able to provide the amount of taxes that are due, the value shall be determined by deducting 20% from the gross value of the account. Colorado Department of Health Care Policy and Financing, § 8.110.51(C); Aple. Supp. App. at 33. 3 . Although the MCCA provides for a hearing by parties challenging an eligibility determination, the Sellers did not ask for a hearing. This fact, however, is not fatal to their § 1983 claim. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002) (\"plaintiffs pursuing civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 need not exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in court”); see also Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 521-22, 110 S.Ct. 2510, 110 L.Ed.2d 455 (1990)(holding the medicaid act permits enforcement under 1983 notwithstanding inclusion of alternative state administrative procedures", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nreceived from the account. b. If the applicant is not able to provide the amount of taxes that are due, the value shall be determined by deducting 20% from the gross value of the account. Colorado Department of Health Care Policy and Financing, § 8.110.51(C); Aple. Supp. App. at 33. 3 . Although the MCCA provides for a hearing by parties challenging an eligibility determination, the Sellers did not ask for a hearing. This fact, however, is not fatal to their § 1983 claim. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002) (\"plaintiffs pursuing civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 need not exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in court”); see also Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 521-22, 110 S.Ct. 2510, 110 L.Ed.2d 455 (1990)(holding no exhaustion requirement in 1983 suit alleging violations of the medicaid act", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nreceived from the account. b. If the applicant is not able to provide the amount of taxes that are due, the value shall be determined by deducting 20% from the gross value of the account. Colorado Department of Health Care Policy and Financing, § 8.110.51(C); Aple. Supp. App. at 33. 3 . Although the MCCA provides for a hearing by parties challenging an eligibility determination, the Sellers did not ask for a hearing. This fact, however, is not fatal to their § 1983 claim. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002) (\"plaintiffs pursuing civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 need not exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in court”); see also Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 521-22, 110 S.Ct. 2510, 110 L.Ed.2d 455 (1990)(holding that there is an exhaustion requirement in 1983 suits asserting violations of the medicaid act", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nreceived from the account. b. If the applicant is not able to provide the amount of taxes that are due, the value shall be determined by deducting 20% from the gross value of the account. Colorado Department of Health Care Policy and Financing, § 8.110.51(C); Aple. Supp. App. at 33. 3 . Although the MCCA provides for a hearing by parties challenging an eligibility determination, the Sellers did not ask for a hearing. This fact, however, is not fatal to their § 1983 claim. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002) (\"plaintiffs pursuing civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 need not exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in court”); see also Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 521-22, 110 S.Ct. 2510, 110 L.Ed.2d 455 (1990)(holding that patient could sue state agency under 1983 for breaching its obligation under the balance billing provision of the medicaid statute" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe federal officer removal statute. When the Second Circuit held that removal was improper under section 1442, it necessarily held that this Court lacked jurisdiction because there is no independent statute that gives original subject matter jurisdiction to federal courts over cases involving federal officers. \"Federal jurisdiction rests on a ‘federal interest in the matter,’ the very basic interest in the enforcement of federal law through federal officials.” Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 406, 89 S.Ct. 1813, 23 L.Ed.2d 396 (1969) (quoting Poss v. Lieberman, 299 F.2d 358, 359 (2d Cir.1962)). 24 . PL Mem. at 5. 25 . 28 U.S.C. § 1452 (emphasis added). 26 . 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) & (b). 27 . See, e.g., United States ex rel. Fullington v. Parkway Hosp., Inc., 351 B.R. 280 (E.D.N.Y2006) (recognizing the indicia of authority from a governmental unit to the authorized person to pursue some endeavor as common in the enumerated items", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe federal officer removal statute. When the Second Circuit held that removal was improper under section 1442, it necessarily held that this Court lacked jurisdiction because there is no independent statute that gives original subject matter jurisdiction to federal courts over cases involving federal officers. \"Federal jurisdiction rests on a ‘federal interest in the matter,’ the very basic interest in the enforcement of federal law through federal officials.” Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 406, 89 S.Ct. 1813, 23 L.Ed.2d 396 (1969) (quoting Poss v. Lieberman, 299 F.2d 358, 359 (2d Cir.1962)). 24 . PL Mem. at 5. 25 . 28 U.S.C. § 1452 (emphasis added). 26 . 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) & (b). 27 . See, e.g., United States ex rel. Fullington v. Parkway Hosp., Inc., 351 B.R. 280 (E.D.N.Y2006) (holding that while qui tam actions by private parties could be on behalf of or for a governmental unit they are not actions by a governmental unit as required by the bankruptcy code", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe federal officer removal statute. When the Second Circuit held that removal was improper under section 1442, it necessarily held that this Court lacked jurisdiction because there is no independent statute that gives original subject matter jurisdiction to federal courts over cases involving federal officers. \"Federal jurisdiction rests on a ‘federal interest in the matter,’ the very basic interest in the enforcement of federal law through federal officials.” Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 406, 89 S.Ct. 1813, 23 L.Ed.2d 396 (1969) (quoting Poss v. Lieberman, 299 F.2d 358, 359 (2d Cir.1962)). 24 . PL Mem. at 5. 25 . 28 U.S.C. § 1452 (emphasis added). 26 . 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) & (b). 27 . See, e.g., United States ex rel. Fullington v. Parkway Hosp., Inc., 351 B.R. 280 (E.D.N.Y2006) (holding that recovery against an individual employee is barred and may be sought against the governmental unit only when suit is filed against both the governmental unit and its employee id 101106e", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe federal officer removal statute. When the Second Circuit held that removal was improper under section 1442, it necessarily held that this Court lacked jurisdiction because there is no independent statute that gives original subject matter jurisdiction to federal courts over cases involving federal officers. \"Federal jurisdiction rests on a ‘federal interest in the matter,’ the very basic interest in the enforcement of federal law through federal officials.” Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 406, 89 S.Ct. 1813, 23 L.Ed.2d 396 (1969) (quoting Poss v. Lieberman, 299 F.2d 358, 359 (2d Cir.1962)). 24 . PL Mem. at 5. 25 . 28 U.S.C. § 1452 (emphasis added). 26 . 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) & (b). 27 . See, e.g., United States ex rel. Fullington v. Parkway Hosp., Inc., 351 B.R. 280 (E.D.N.Y2006) (holding section 1010215 does not waive governmental immunity merely because a governmental action falls within the listed governmental functions thus further inquiry under the act is necessary", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe federal officer removal statute. When the Second Circuit held that removal was improper under section 1442, it necessarily held that this Court lacked jurisdiction because there is no independent statute that gives original subject matter jurisdiction to federal courts over cases involving federal officers. \"Federal jurisdiction rests on a ‘federal interest in the matter,’ the very basic interest in the enforcement of federal law through federal officials.” Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 406, 89 S.Ct. 1813, 23 L.Ed.2d 396 (1969) (quoting Poss v. Lieberman, 299 F.2d 358, 359 (2d Cir.1962)). 24 . PL Mem. at 5. 25 . 28 U.S.C. § 1452 (emphasis added). 26 . 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) & (b). 27 . See, e.g., United States ex rel. Fullington v. Parkway Hosp., Inc., 351 B.R. 280 (E.D.N.Y2006) (recognizing utswmc as a governmental unit under the act" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nnot persuaded that the [employer’s] failure to post such a notice justifies invocation of the tolling doctrine.”), McClinton v. Alabama By-Products Corp., 743 F.2d 1483, 1486 n. 5 (“Although the failure of the employer to display the poster may toll the 180-day notification period, it will not normally toll the two-year statute of limitations for bringing the action in court, which continues to run from the date of the alleged wrongful act.”) (citing Kazanzas v. Walt Disney World Co., 704 F.2d 1527, 1530-31 (11th Cir.1983)), and Ramirez v. CSJ & Co., No. 06 Civ. 13677(LAK), 2007 WL 1040363, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. April 3, 2007) (refusing to pronounce that the failure to post a notice, in and of itself, warrants equitable tolling), with Bonham v. Dresser Indus., 569 F.2d 187, 193 (3d Cir.1977) (holding that duress toll to statute of limitations under state law had no application to federal rico statute of limitations", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nnot persuaded that the [employer’s] failure to post such a notice justifies invocation of the tolling doctrine.”), McClinton v. Alabama By-Products Corp., 743 F.2d 1483, 1486 n. 5 (“Although the failure of the employer to display the poster may toll the 180-day notification period, it will not normally toll the two-year statute of limitations for bringing the action in court, which continues to run from the date of the alleged wrongful act.”) (citing Kazanzas v. Walt Disney World Co., 704 F.2d 1527, 1530-31 (11th Cir.1983)), and Ramirez v. CSJ & Co., No. 06 Civ. 13677(LAK), 2007 WL 1040363, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. April 3, 2007) (refusing to pronounce that the failure to post a notice, in and of itself, warrants equitable tolling), with Bonham v. Dresser Indus., 569 F.2d 187, 193 (3d Cir.1977) (holding that failure to post the required notice will toll the running of the 180day statute of limitations ", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nnot persuaded that the [employer’s] failure to post such a notice justifies invocation of the tolling doctrine.”), McClinton v. Alabama By-Products Corp., 743 F.2d 1483, 1486 n. 5 (“Although the failure of the employer to display the poster may toll the 180-day notification period, it will not normally toll the two-year statute of limitations for bringing the action in court, which continues to run from the date of the alleged wrongful act.”) (citing Kazanzas v. Walt Disney World Co., 704 F.2d 1527, 1530-31 (11th Cir.1983)), and Ramirez v. CSJ & Co., No. 06 Civ. 13677(LAK), 2007 WL 1040363, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. April 3, 2007) (refusing to pronounce that the failure to post a notice, in and of itself, warrants equitable tolling), with Bonham v. Dresser Indus., 569 F.2d 187, 193 (3d Cir.1977) (holding that the running of the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nnot persuaded that the [employer’s] failure to post such a notice justifies invocation of the tolling doctrine.”), McClinton v. Alabama By-Products Corp., 743 F.2d 1483, 1486 n. 5 (“Although the failure of the employer to display the poster may toll the 180-day notification period, it will not normally toll the two-year statute of limitations for bringing the action in court, which continues to run from the date of the alleged wrongful act.”) (citing Kazanzas v. Walt Disney World Co., 704 F.2d 1527, 1530-31 (11th Cir.1983)), and Ramirez v. CSJ & Co., No. 06 Civ. 13677(LAK), 2007 WL 1040363, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. April 3, 2007) (refusing to pronounce that the failure to post a notice, in and of itself, warrants equitable tolling), with Bonham v. Dresser Indus., 569 F.2d 187, 193 (3d Cir.1977) (holding that ignorance or misunderstanding of the law would not toll the running of the statute of limitations", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nnot persuaded that the [employer’s] failure to post such a notice justifies invocation of the tolling doctrine.”), McClinton v. Alabama By-Products Corp., 743 F.2d 1483, 1486 n. 5 (“Although the failure of the employer to display the poster may toll the 180-day notification period, it will not normally toll the two-year statute of limitations for bringing the action in court, which continues to run from the date of the alleged wrongful act.”) (citing Kazanzas v. Walt Disney World Co., 704 F.2d 1527, 1530-31 (11th Cir.1983)), and Ramirez v. CSJ & Co., No. 06 Civ. 13677(LAK), 2007 WL 1040363, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. April 3, 2007) (refusing to pronounce that the failure to post a notice, in and of itself, warrants equitable tolling), with Bonham v. Dresser Indus., 569 F.2d 187, 193 (3d Cir.1977) (holding that the concealment of ones identity does not toll the running of the statute of limitations" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nVII because the action of the Sheriff’s Office interfered with his employment opportunities with third party employers. Because defendants moved for summary judgment only on the question of the employment relationship between plaintiff and defendants, it is not necessary for us to decide the viability of this theory. We note, however, that the Fifth Circuit apparently has not resolved the question of whether an “employer” as defined by Title VII, can be liable under Title VII for interference with a plaintiff's employment opportunities with a third party. See Diggs v. Harris Hospital-Methodist, Inc., 847 F.2d 270, 272 & n. 2 (5th Cir.1988); Daniels v. Allied Elec. Contractors Inc., 847 F.Supp. 514 (E.D.Tex.1994). See also Sibley Memorial Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C.Cir.1973) (holding that a title vii plaintiff could not hold coworkers liable in their individual capacities under title vii", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nVII because the action of the Sheriff’s Office interfered with his employment opportunities with third party employers. Because defendants moved for summary judgment only on the question of the employment relationship between plaintiff and defendants, it is not necessary for us to decide the viability of this theory. We note, however, that the Fifth Circuit apparently has not resolved the question of whether an “employer” as defined by Title VII, can be liable under Title VII for interference with a plaintiff's employment opportunities with a third party. See Diggs v. Harris Hospital-Methodist, Inc., 847 F.2d 270, 272 & n. 2 (5th Cir.1988); Daniels v. Allied Elec. Contractors Inc., 847 F.Supp. 514 (E.D.Tex.1994). See also Sibley Memorial Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C.Cir.1973) (holding that such a theory is viable under title vii", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nVII because the action of the Sheriff’s Office interfered with his employment opportunities with third party employers. Because defendants moved for summary judgment only on the question of the employment relationship between plaintiff and defendants, it is not necessary for us to decide the viability of this theory. We note, however, that the Fifth Circuit apparently has not resolved the question of whether an “employer” as defined by Title VII, can be liable under Title VII for interference with a plaintiff's employment opportunities with a third party. See Diggs v. Harris Hospital-Methodist, Inc., 847 F.2d 270, 272 & n. 2 (5th Cir.1988); Daniels v. Allied Elec. Contractors Inc., 847 F.Supp. 514 (E.D.Tex.1994). See also Sibley Memorial Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C.Cir.1973) (holding the title vii mixedmotive theory does not apply to adea claims", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nVII because the action of the Sheriff’s Office interfered with his employment opportunities with third party employers. Because defendants moved for summary judgment only on the question of the employment relationship between plaintiff and defendants, it is not necessary for us to decide the viability of this theory. We note, however, that the Fifth Circuit apparently has not resolved the question of whether an “employer” as defined by Title VII, can be liable under Title VII for interference with a plaintiff's employment opportunities with a third party. See Diggs v. Harris Hospital-Methodist, Inc., 847 F.2d 270, 272 & n. 2 (5th Cir.1988); Daniels v. Allied Elec. Contractors Inc., 847 F.Supp. 514 (E.D.Tex.1994). See also Sibley Memorial Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C.Cir.1973) (holding that relief granted under title vii is against the employer not individual employees whose actions constituted a violation of title vii emphasis in original", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nVII because the action of the Sheriff’s Office interfered with his employment opportunities with third party employers. Because defendants moved for summary judgment only on the question of the employment relationship between plaintiff and defendants, it is not necessary for us to decide the viability of this theory. We note, however, that the Fifth Circuit apparently has not resolved the question of whether an “employer” as defined by Title VII, can be liable under Title VII for interference with a plaintiff's employment opportunities with a third party. See Diggs v. Harris Hospital-Methodist, Inc., 847 F.2d 270, 272 & n. 2 (5th Cir.1988); Daniels v. Allied Elec. Contractors Inc., 847 F.Supp. 514 (E.D.Tex.1994). See also Sibley Memorial Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C.Cir.1973) (holding that there is no individual liability under title vii" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nopportunity to submit its views on fuel switching to EPA during the rulemaking proceedings. And it did. See Julander Comments Aug. 4, 2011. It could also have sought permission to appear as amicus in this court, which it did not. Absent any reason to conclude that it is an “unusually suitable champion[]” of Congress’ goals in the CAA, we hold, consistent with this court’s precedent, that Julander’s interest in increasing the regulatory burden on others falls outside the zone of interests protected by the CAA and 98 S.Ct. 2279, 57 L.Ed.2d 117 (1978) (“The plain intent of Congress in enacting [the Endangered Species Act] was to halt and reverse the trend towards species extinction, whatever the cost.”); Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 257-58, 96 S.Ct. 2518, 49 L.Ed.2d 474 (1976) (holding that economic loss rule precludes recovery of economic damages only in the absence of personal injury or property damage claims", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nopportunity to submit its views on fuel switching to EPA during the rulemaking proceedings. And it did. See Julander Comments Aug. 4, 2011. It could also have sought permission to appear as amicus in this court, which it did not. Absent any reason to conclude that it is an “unusually suitable champion[]” of Congress’ goals in the CAA, we hold, consistent with this court’s precedent, that Julander’s interest in increasing the regulatory burden on others falls outside the zone of interests protected by the CAA and 98 S.Ct. 2279, 57 L.Ed.2d 117 (1978) (“The plain intent of Congress in enacting [the Endangered Species Act] was to halt and reverse the trend towards species extinction, whatever the cost.”); Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 257-58, 96 S.Ct. 2518, 49 L.Ed.2d 474 (1976) (holding that epa may not consider claims of economic infeasibility in evaluating a state requirement that primary ambient air quality standards be met by a certain deadline", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nopportunity to submit its views on fuel switching to EPA during the rulemaking proceedings. And it did. See Julander Comments Aug. 4, 2011. It could also have sought permission to appear as amicus in this court, which it did not. Absent any reason to conclude that it is an “unusually suitable champion[]” of Congress’ goals in the CAA, we hold, consistent with this court’s precedent, that Julander’s interest in increasing the regulatory burden on others falls outside the zone of interests protected by the CAA and 98 S.Ct. 2279, 57 L.Ed.2d 117 (1978) (“The plain intent of Congress in enacting [the Endangered Species Act] was to halt and reverse the trend towards species extinction, whatever the cost.”); Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 257-58, 96 S.Ct. 2518, 49 L.Ed.2d 474 (1976) (holding that subject to certain exceptions the economic loss rule bars recovery in tort for economic damages arising out of matters governed by contract", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nopportunity to submit its views on fuel switching to EPA during the rulemaking proceedings. And it did. See Julander Comments Aug. 4, 2011. It could also have sought permission to appear as amicus in this court, which it did not. Absent any reason to conclude that it is an “unusually suitable champion[]” of Congress’ goals in the CAA, we hold, consistent with this court’s precedent, that Julander’s interest in increasing the regulatory burden on others falls outside the zone of interests protected by the CAA and 98 S.Ct. 2279, 57 L.Ed.2d 117 (1978) (“The plain intent of Congress in enacting [the Endangered Species Act] was to halt and reverse the trend towards species extinction, whatever the cost.”); Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 257-58, 96 S.Ct. 2518, 49 L.Ed.2d 474 (1976) (holding that certain claims could not be a class issue in part because the complaint did not mention the claims", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nopportunity to submit its views on fuel switching to EPA during the rulemaking proceedings. And it did. See Julander Comments Aug. 4, 2011. It could also have sought permission to appear as amicus in this court, which it did not. Absent any reason to conclude that it is an “unusually suitable champion[]” of Congress’ goals in the CAA, we hold, consistent with this court’s precedent, that Julander’s interest in increasing the regulatory burden on others falls outside the zone of interests protected by the CAA and 98 S.Ct. 2279, 57 L.Ed.2d 117 (1978) (“The plain intent of Congress in enacting [the Endangered Species Act] was to halt and reverse the trend towards species extinction, whatever the cost.”); Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 257-58, 96 S.Ct. 2518, 49 L.Ed.2d 474 (1976) (holding that the trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury to consider certain additional factors in evaluating the validity of eyewitness identification testimony" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nClass may lack standing to bring this claim. See infra § VI(C). 12 . Because the court is dismissing the Transferee Class’s claim on other grounds, it need not decide a question that the Fifth Circuit has not yet resolved: whether \"the scope of § 510 is limited to acts that affect the employer-employee relationship; in other words, [whether] plan amendments by themselves cannot be actionable under § 510.” Hines v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 43 F.3d 207, 210 n. 5 (5th Cir.1995). The court also need not reach whether § 510 claims are limited to interference with the attainment of a right, as opposed to interference with an existing, vested right. See generally Inter-Modal Rail Emps. Ass’n v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 U.S. 510, 516-17, 117 S.Ct. 1513, 137 L.Ed.2d 763 (1997) (recognizing issue but reserving decision because not properly presented", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nClass may lack standing to bring this claim. See infra § VI(C). 12 . Because the court is dismissing the Transferee Class’s claim on other grounds, it need not decide a question that the Fifth Circuit has not yet resolved: whether \"the scope of § 510 is limited to acts that affect the employer-employee relationship; in other words, [whether] plan amendments by themselves cannot be actionable under § 510.” Hines v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 43 F.3d 207, 210 n. 5 (5th Cir.1995). The court also need not reach whether § 510 claims are limited to interference with the attainment of a right, as opposed to interference with an existing, vested right. See generally Inter-Modal Rail Emps. Ass’n v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 U.S. 510, 516-17, 117 S.Ct. 1513, 137 L.Ed.2d 763 (1997) (holding that we cannot properly receive and consider evidence that was not presented to and considered by the trial court", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nClass may lack standing to bring this claim. See infra § VI(C). 12 . Because the court is dismissing the Transferee Class’s claim on other grounds, it need not decide a question that the Fifth Circuit has not yet resolved: whether \"the scope of § 510 is limited to acts that affect the employer-employee relationship; in other words, [whether] plan amendments by themselves cannot be actionable under § 510.” Hines v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 43 F.3d 207, 210 n. 5 (5th Cir.1995). The court also need not reach whether § 510 claims are limited to interference with the attainment of a right, as opposed to interference with an existing, vested right. See generally Inter-Modal Rail Emps. Ass’n v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 U.S. 510, 516-17, 117 S.Ct. 1513, 137 L.Ed.2d 763 (1997) (holding that issues not properly presented to the bankruptcy court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nClass may lack standing to bring this claim. See infra § VI(C). 12 . Because the court is dismissing the Transferee Class’s claim on other grounds, it need not decide a question that the Fifth Circuit has not yet resolved: whether \"the scope of § 510 is limited to acts that affect the employer-employee relationship; in other words, [whether] plan amendments by themselves cannot be actionable under § 510.” Hines v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 43 F.3d 207, 210 n. 5 (5th Cir.1995). The court also need not reach whether § 510 claims are limited to interference with the attainment of a right, as opposed to interference with an existing, vested right. See generally Inter-Modal Rail Emps. Ass’n v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 U.S. 510, 516-17, 117 S.Ct. 1513, 137 L.Ed.2d 763 (1997) (holding that an issue not presented to the trial court will not be considered on appeal", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nClass may lack standing to bring this claim. See infra § VI(C). 12 . Because the court is dismissing the Transferee Class’s claim on other grounds, it need not decide a question that the Fifth Circuit has not yet resolved: whether \"the scope of § 510 is limited to acts that affect the employer-employee relationship; in other words, [whether] plan amendments by themselves cannot be actionable under § 510.” Hines v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 43 F.3d 207, 210 n. 5 (5th Cir.1995). The court also need not reach whether § 510 claims are limited to interference with the attainment of a right, as opposed to interference with an existing, vested right. See generally Inter-Modal Rail Emps. Ass’n v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 U.S. 510, 516-17, 117 S.Ct. 1513, 137 L.Ed.2d 763 (1997) (recognizing the validity of the doctrine but holding no equitable tolling on the facts presented" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nincorporating Stevo’s marks — conduct at the heart of initial interest confusion on the internet. See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1065 (9th Cir.1999) (discussing how use of metadata can create initial interest confusion); Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d 1417 (9th Cir.2004) (discussing how the purchase of trademarked keywords can create initial interest confusion). In short, Plaintiffs have alleged nothing to show that SBR created the type of confusion needed to defeat application of the first native fair use — “did not intend [it] to constitute an affirmative defense.” 6 McCarthy, supra, § 31:156.50; see also Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1150 (9th Cir.2002) (holding that nominative fair use is an affirmative defense to a prima facie case of likelihood of confusion similar to the fair use defense", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nincorporating Stevo’s marks — conduct at the heart of initial interest confusion on the internet. See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1065 (9th Cir.1999) (discussing how use of metadata can create initial interest confusion); Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d 1417 (9th Cir.2004) (discussing how the purchase of trademarked keywords can create initial interest confusion). In short, Plaintiffs have alleged nothing to show that SBR created the type of confusion needed to defeat application of the first native fair use — “did not intend [it] to constitute an affirmative defense.” 6 McCarthy, supra, § 31:156.50; see also Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1150 (9th Cir.2002) (recognizing nominative fair use as an affirmative defense to trademark infringement", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nincorporating Stevo’s marks — conduct at the heart of initial interest confusion on the internet. See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1065 (9th Cir.1999) (discussing how use of metadata can create initial interest confusion); Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d 1417 (9th Cir.2004) (discussing how the purchase of trademarked keywords can create initial interest confusion). In short, Plaintiffs have alleged nothing to show that SBR created the type of confusion needed to defeat application of the first native fair use — “did not intend [it] to constitute an affirmative defense.” 6 McCarthy, supra, § 31:156.50; see also Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1150 (9th Cir.2002) (holding that an assertion of nominative use gives rise to a modified likelihood of confusion analysis", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nincorporating Stevo’s marks — conduct at the heart of initial interest confusion on the internet. See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1065 (9th Cir.1999) (discussing how use of metadata can create initial interest confusion); Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d 1417 (9th Cir.2004) (discussing how the purchase of trademarked keywords can create initial interest confusion). In short, Plaintiffs have alleged nothing to show that SBR created the type of confusion needed to defeat application of the first native fair use — “did not intend [it] to constitute an affirmative defense.” 6 McCarthy, supra, § 31:156.50; see also Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1150 (9th Cir.2002) (holding that the nominative fair use factors replace the traditional sleekcraft factors for likelihood of confusion where nominative fair use is at issue", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nincorporating Stevo’s marks — conduct at the heart of initial interest confusion on the internet. See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1065 (9th Cir.1999) (discussing how use of metadata can create initial interest confusion); Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d 1417 (9th Cir.2004) (discussing how the purchase of trademarked keywords can create initial interest confusion). In short, Plaintiffs have alleged nothing to show that SBR created the type of confusion needed to defeat application of the first native fair use — “did not intend [it] to constitute an affirmative defense.” 6 McCarthy, supra, § 31:156.50; see also Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1150 (9th Cir.2002) (recognizing the underlying principles of nominative fair use" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nMinnesota Power contends that it was improper, as a matter of law, for the Commission to consider the factors that it did because those factors are not cost based. The dissent's contention is therefore not at issue in this case. 8 . The dissent nevertheless contends that the Commission's adoption of an interim rate at 60 percent of Minnesota Power's final rate request should be set aside as arbitrary and capricious. The Commission explained that its decision to set the rate at 60 percent, \"an amount slightly in excess of any final revenue requirement found in previous Company rate cases in the last 22 years,” was based on its \"balanc[ing] the potential burdens faced by the Company and its ratepayers in light of [the] exigent diyohi Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 713 N.W.2d 817, 836 (Minn.2006) (holding that evidence contrary to an administrators decision does not make the decision arbitrary and capricious so long as a reasonable basis appears for the decision", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nMinnesota Power contends that it was improper, as a matter of law, for the Commission to consider the factors that it did because those factors are not cost based. The dissent's contention is therefore not at issue in this case. 8 . The dissent nevertheless contends that the Commission's adoption of an interim rate at 60 percent of Minnesota Power's final rate request should be set aside as arbitrary and capricious. The Commission explained that its decision to set the rate at 60 percent, \"an amount slightly in excess of any final revenue requirement found in previous Company rate cases in the last 22 years,” was based on its \"balanc[ing] the potential burdens faced by the Company and its ratepayers in light of [the] exigent diyohi Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 713 N.W.2d 817, 836 (Minn.2006) (holding that when applying an arbitrary and capricious standard of review the courts role is to determine whether the plan administrators decision was completely unreasonable", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nMinnesota Power contends that it was improper, as a matter of law, for the Commission to consider the factors that it did because those factors are not cost based. The dissent's contention is therefore not at issue in this case. 8 . The dissent nevertheless contends that the Commission's adoption of an interim rate at 60 percent of Minnesota Power's final rate request should be set aside as arbitrary and capricious. The Commission explained that its decision to set the rate at 60 percent, \"an amount slightly in excess of any final revenue requirement found in previous Company rate cases in the last 22 years,” was based on its \"balanc[ing] the potential burdens faced by the Company and its ratepayers in light of [the] exigent diyohi Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 713 N.W.2d 817, 836 (Minn.2006) (holding that judicial review of an administrative agencys decision is limited solely to whether given the relevant standard and facts the agencys decision was arbitrary illegal capricious or unreasonable", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nMinnesota Power contends that it was improper, as a matter of law, for the Commission to consider the factors that it did because those factors are not cost based. The dissent's contention is therefore not at issue in this case. 8 . The dissent nevertheless contends that the Commission's adoption of an interim rate at 60 percent of Minnesota Power's final rate request should be set aside as arbitrary and capricious. The Commission explained that its decision to set the rate at 60 percent, \"an amount slightly in excess of any final revenue requirement found in previous Company rate cases in the last 22 years,” was based on its \"balanc[ing] the potential burdens faced by the Company and its ratepayers in light of [the] exigent diyohi Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 713 N.W.2d 817, 836 (Minn.2006) (holding that the citys decision was arbitrary and capricious when it was contrary to the evidence and based solely on speculation arising from prior unrelated acts", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nMinnesota Power contends that it was improper, as a matter of law, for the Commission to consider the factors that it did because those factors are not cost based. The dissent's contention is therefore not at issue in this case. 8 . The dissent nevertheless contends that the Commission's adoption of an interim rate at 60 percent of Minnesota Power's final rate request should be set aside as arbitrary and capricious. The Commission explained that its decision to set the rate at 60 percent, \"an amount slightly in excess of any final revenue requirement found in previous Company rate cases in the last 22 years,” was based on its \"balanc[ing] the potential burdens faced by the Company and its ratepayers in light of [the] exigent diyohi Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 713 N.W.2d 817, 836 (Minn.2006) (holding that when the agencys decision was based on an erroneous and completely unsupported assumption the decision was arbitrary and capricious" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nbut that is otherwise related to a case under title 11” and to \"submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court,” subject to de novo review. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c); In re Wood, 825 F.2d at 95. 41 . In re Querner, 7 F.3d at 1201. 42 . In re Wood, 825 F.2d at 93. 43 . 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). 44 . Id. § 541(a)(6). 45 . Id. § 541(a)(7). 46 . In re Klein-Swanson, 488 B.R. 628, 633 (8th Cir. BAP 2013). 47 . In re Swift, 129 F.3d 792, 795 & n. 12 (5th Cir.1997); In re Klein-Swanson, 488 B.R. at 633. 48 . See In re IFS Fin. Corp., 669 F.3d 255, 262 (5th Cir.2012) (noting that, under Texas law, \"control over funds in an account is the predominant factor in determining an account’s ownership”); see also In re Kemp, 52 F.3d 546, 551-53 (5th Cir.1995) (per curiam) (holding that funds held in escrow are property of the estate only to the extent of the debtors independent right to that property", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nbut that is otherwise related to a case under title 11” and to \"submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court,” subject to de novo review. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c); In re Wood, 825 F.2d at 95. 41 . In re Querner, 7 F.3d at 1201. 42 . In re Wood, 825 F.2d at 93. 43 . 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). 44 . Id. § 541(a)(6). 45 . Id. § 541(a)(7). 46 . In re Klein-Swanson, 488 B.R. 628, 633 (8th Cir. BAP 2013). 47 . In re Swift, 129 F.3d 792, 795 & n. 12 (5th Cir.1997); In re Klein-Swanson, 488 B.R. at 633. 48 . See In re IFS Fin. Corp., 669 F.3d 255, 262 (5th Cir.2012) (noting that, under Texas law, \"control over funds in an account is the predominant factor in determining an account’s ownership”); see also In re Kemp, 52 F.3d 546, 551-53 (5th Cir.1995) (per curiam) (holding that a debtors interest in a tenancy by the entirety is property of the bankruptcy estate under section 541 because of debtors undivided present interests in the use possession income and right of survivorship of the property", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nbut that is otherwise related to a case under title 11” and to \"submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court,” subject to de novo review. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c); In re Wood, 825 F.2d at 95. 41 . In re Querner, 7 F.3d at 1201. 42 . In re Wood, 825 F.2d at 93. 43 . 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). 44 . Id. § 541(a)(6). 45 . Id. § 541(a)(7). 46 . In re Klein-Swanson, 488 B.R. 628, 633 (8th Cir. BAP 2013). 47 . In re Swift, 129 F.3d 792, 795 & n. 12 (5th Cir.1997); In re Klein-Swanson, 488 B.R. at 633. 48 . See In re IFS Fin. Corp., 669 F.3d 255, 262 (5th Cir.2012) (noting that, under Texas law, \"control over funds in an account is the predominant factor in determining an account’s ownership”); see also In re Kemp, 52 F.3d 546, 551-53 (5th Cir.1995) (per curiam) (holding that erisa benefits are not property of the estate", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nbut that is otherwise related to a case under title 11” and to \"submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court,” subject to de novo review. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c); In re Wood, 825 F.2d at 95. 41 . In re Querner, 7 F.3d at 1201. 42 . In re Wood, 825 F.2d at 93. 43 . 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). 44 . Id. § 541(a)(6). 45 . Id. § 541(a)(7). 46 . In re Klein-Swanson, 488 B.R. 628, 633 (8th Cir. BAP 2013). 47 . In re Swift, 129 F.3d 792, 795 & n. 12 (5th Cir.1997); In re Klein-Swanson, 488 B.R. at 633. 48 . See In re IFS Fin. Corp., 669 F.3d 255, 262 (5th Cir.2012) (noting that, under Texas law, \"control over funds in an account is the predominant factor in determining an account’s ownership”); see also In re Kemp, 52 F.3d 546, 551-53 (5th Cir.1995) (per curiam) (holding that property seized by a creditor prior to debtors bankruptcy was property of the estate even though creditor the irs held a secured interest a tax lien in the property", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nbut that is otherwise related to a case under title 11” and to \"submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court,” subject to de novo review. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c); In re Wood, 825 F.2d at 95. 41 . In re Querner, 7 F.3d at 1201. 42 . In re Wood, 825 F.2d at 93. 43 . 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). 44 . Id. § 541(a)(6). 45 . Id. § 541(a)(7). 46 . In re Klein-Swanson, 488 B.R. 628, 633 (8th Cir. BAP 2013). 47 . In re Swift, 129 F.3d 792, 795 & n. 12 (5th Cir.1997); In re Klein-Swanson, 488 B.R. at 633. 48 . See In re IFS Fin. Corp., 669 F.3d 255, 262 (5th Cir.2012) (noting that, under Texas law, \"control over funds in an account is the predominant factor in determining an account’s ownership”); see also In re Kemp, 52 F.3d 546, 551-53 (5th Cir.1995) (per curiam) (recognizing that exempt property ceases to be property of the estate" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwas relevant to establishing Joshua’s motive, intent, or identity, on appeal the Government only contends the evidence is relevant to establishing Joshua’s motive. Evidence is relevant to motive if it helps establish why the defendant committed the offense. United States v. Benton, 637 F.2d 1052, 1056 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981). The majority holds Joshua’s prior possession helps establish why he committed the charged offense without explaining how. The cases the majority cites in support of the relevancy of Joshua’s prior possession, United States v. Bitterman, 320 F.3d 723 (7th Cir.2003) and United States v. Weems, 322 F.3d 18 (1st Cir.2003), are readily distin ways: (1) the extrinsic act can cause the mental state, see e.g., United States v. Stumes, 549 F.2d 831, 833 (8th Cir.1977) (holding evidence of prior conviction of manslaughter admissible to show vengeful motive for sending threatening letters to witnesses", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwas relevant to establishing Joshua’s motive, intent, or identity, on appeal the Government only contends the evidence is relevant to establishing Joshua’s motive. Evidence is relevant to motive if it helps establish why the defendant committed the offense. United States v. Benton, 637 F.2d 1052, 1056 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981). The majority holds Joshua’s prior possession helps establish why he committed the charged offense without explaining how. The cases the majority cites in support of the relevancy of Joshua’s prior possession, United States v. Bitterman, 320 F.3d 723 (7th Cir.2003) and United States v. Weems, 322 F.3d 18 (1st Cir.2003), are readily distin ways: (1) the extrinsic act can cause the mental state, see e.g., United States v. Stumes, 549 F.2d 831, 833 (8th Cir.1977) (holding evidence of prior drug use admissible to show motive and the nature of the defendants relationship with coconspirators", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwas relevant to establishing Joshua’s motive, intent, or identity, on appeal the Government only contends the evidence is relevant to establishing Joshua’s motive. Evidence is relevant to motive if it helps establish why the defendant committed the offense. United States v. Benton, 637 F.2d 1052, 1056 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981). The majority holds Joshua’s prior possession helps establish why he committed the charged offense without explaining how. The cases the majority cites in support of the relevancy of Joshua’s prior possession, United States v. Bitterman, 320 F.3d 723 (7th Cir.2003) and United States v. Weems, 322 F.3d 18 (1st Cir.2003), are readily distin ways: (1) the extrinsic act can cause the mental state, see e.g., United States v. Stumes, 549 F.2d 831, 833 (8th Cir.1977) (holding other crimes evidence admissible to show motive where motive was put in issue by defense at trial", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwas relevant to establishing Joshua’s motive, intent, or identity, on appeal the Government only contends the evidence is relevant to establishing Joshua’s motive. Evidence is relevant to motive if it helps establish why the defendant committed the offense. United States v. Benton, 637 F.2d 1052, 1056 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981). The majority holds Joshua’s prior possession helps establish why he committed the charged offense without explaining how. The cases the majority cites in support of the relevancy of Joshua’s prior possession, United States v. Bitterman, 320 F.3d 723 (7th Cir.2003) and United States v. Weems, 322 F.3d 18 (1st Cir.2003), are readily distin ways: (1) the extrinsic act can cause the mental state, see e.g., United States v. Stumes, 549 F.2d 831, 833 (8th Cir.1977) (holding that evidence of defendants threatening behavior toward a witness was admissible", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwas relevant to establishing Joshua’s motive, intent, or identity, on appeal the Government only contends the evidence is relevant to establishing Joshua’s motive. Evidence is relevant to motive if it helps establish why the defendant committed the offense. United States v. Benton, 637 F.2d 1052, 1056 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981). The majority holds Joshua’s prior possession helps establish why he committed the charged offense without explaining how. The cases the majority cites in support of the relevancy of Joshua’s prior possession, United States v. Bitterman, 320 F.3d 723 (7th Cir.2003) and United States v. Weems, 322 F.3d 18 (1st Cir.2003), are readily distin ways: (1) the extrinsic act can cause the mental state, see e.g., United States v. Stumes, 549 F.2d 831, 833 (8th Cir.1977) (holding that evidence of other crimes though generally inadmissible to show character is admissible to show for instance proof of motive or plan" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\n72 S.Ct. 93, 95, 96 L.Ed. 59 (1951) (\"Over and again this Court has emphasized that the mandate of the [Fourth] Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes. Only where incident to a valid arrest, or in 'exceptional circumstances,’ may an exemption lie, and then the burden is on those seeking the exemption to show the need for it.\" (citations omitted)). 3 . See Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236, 88 S.Ct. 992, 993, 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1968) (\"It has long been settled that objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence.”); see also Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983). 4 . See Terry, 392 U.S. at 12, 88 S.Ct. a 878 (11th Cir.1983) (holding that it was not error for the court to give a substantive new instruction to the jury after deliberations began where the instruction was given in court with the defendant and his counsel present", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\n72 S.Ct. 93, 95, 96 L.Ed. 59 (1951) (\"Over and again this Court has emphasized that the mandate of the [Fourth] Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes. Only where incident to a valid arrest, or in 'exceptional circumstances,’ may an exemption lie, and then the burden is on those seeking the exemption to show the need for it.\" (citations omitted)). 3 . See Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236, 88 S.Ct. 992, 993, 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1968) (\"It has long been settled that objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence.”); see also Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983). 4 . See Terry, 392 U.S. at 12, 88 S.Ct. a 878 (11th Cir.1983) (holding that it was error for the trial judge to answer a jurys question without giving defendants counsel an opportunity to be heard before the trial judge responded", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\n72 S.Ct. 93, 95, 96 L.Ed. 59 (1951) (\"Over and again this Court has emphasized that the mandate of the [Fourth] Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes. Only where incident to a valid arrest, or in 'exceptional circumstances,’ may an exemption lie, and then the burden is on those seeking the exemption to show the need for it.\" (citations omitted)). 3 . See Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236, 88 S.Ct. 992, 993, 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1968) (\"It has long been settled that objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence.”); see also Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983). 4 . See Terry, 392 U.S. at 12, 88 S.Ct. a 878 (11th Cir.1983) (holding that identical error did not prejudice defendant because by giving the instruction the judge merely gave the jury the opportunity to overturn his own ruling", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\n72 S.Ct. 93, 95, 96 L.Ed. 59 (1951) (\"Over and again this Court has emphasized that the mandate of the [Fourth] Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes. Only where incident to a valid arrest, or in 'exceptional circumstances,’ may an exemption lie, and then the burden is on those seeking the exemption to show the need for it.\" (citations omitted)). 3 . See Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236, 88 S.Ct. 992, 993, 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1968) (\"It has long been settled that objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence.”); see also Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983). 4 . See Terry, 392 U.S. at 12, 88 S.Ct. a 878 (11th Cir.1983) (holding that district court did not err in giving an instruction identical to that proposed by jenkins", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\n72 S.Ct. 93, 95, 96 L.Ed. 59 (1951) (\"Over and again this Court has emphasized that the mandate of the [Fourth] Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes. Only where incident to a valid arrest, or in 'exceptional circumstances,’ may an exemption lie, and then the burden is on those seeking the exemption to show the need for it.\" (citations omitted)). 3 . See Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236, 88 S.Ct. 992, 993, 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1968) (\"It has long been settled that objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence.”); see also Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983). 4 . See Terry, 392 U.S. at 12, 88 S.Ct. a 878 (11th Cir.1983) (holding that the trial court committed fundamental error by giving the standard jury instruction for attempted manslaughter by act" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nGillie. On February 19, 1987, Mr. Gillie executed a note in the amount of $5,498.40, including interest at 12.51% per annum, payable to the Bank in 60 monthly installments of $91.64 each. The amount financed included credit life and credit health and accident premiums in the amount of $338.27. The note recited that it was secured by the June 19, 1985 security agreement and Table, Chairs and Entertainment Center. It also recited “Renew: 3245 1”, but there is no number 3245 1 on either of the previous notes. Again, Mr. Gillie signed no Security Agreement or Financing Statement. The note of April 21, 1986 was stamped “Paid by Renewal.” The parties stipulated that all three notes related to the same transaction and that the Bank advanced no new funds and added no new collateral when 85) (holding that a creditors refinancing by renewal does not destroy a pmsi to the extent that the balance remaining on the original loan is transferred to the renewal note", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nGillie. On February 19, 1987, Mr. Gillie executed a note in the amount of $5,498.40, including interest at 12.51% per annum, payable to the Bank in 60 monthly installments of $91.64 each. The amount financed included credit life and credit health and accident premiums in the amount of $338.27. The note recited that it was secured by the June 19, 1985 security agreement and Table, Chairs and Entertainment Center. It also recited “Renew: 3245 1”, but there is no number 3245 1 on either of the previous notes. Again, Mr. Gillie signed no Security Agreement or Financing Statement. The note of April 21, 1986 was stamped “Paid by Renewal.” The parties stipulated that all three notes related to the same transaction and that the Bank advanced no new funds and added no new collateral when 85) (holding that under north dakota law consolidation of a note secured by a pmsi in farm machinery with other goods resulted in a novation destroying the creditors pmsi", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nGillie. On February 19, 1987, Mr. Gillie executed a note in the amount of $5,498.40, including interest at 12.51% per annum, payable to the Bank in 60 monthly installments of $91.64 each. The amount financed included credit life and credit health and accident premiums in the amount of $338.27. The note recited that it was secured by the June 19, 1985 security agreement and Table, Chairs and Entertainment Center. It also recited “Renew: 3245 1”, but there is no number 3245 1 on either of the previous notes. Again, Mr. Gillie signed no Security Agreement or Financing Statement. The note of April 21, 1986 was stamped “Paid by Renewal.” The parties stipulated that all three notes related to the same transaction and that the Bank advanced no new funds and added no new collateral when 85) (holding that under michigan law when debtors paid off the initial loan with the proceeds of refinancing the creditors pmsi in stereo expired", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nGillie. On February 19, 1987, Mr. Gillie executed a note in the amount of $5,498.40, including interest at 12.51% per annum, payable to the Bank in 60 monthly installments of $91.64 each. The amount financed included credit life and credit health and accident premiums in the amount of $338.27. The note recited that it was secured by the June 19, 1985 security agreement and Table, Chairs and Entertainment Center. It also recited “Renew: 3245 1”, but there is no number 3245 1 on either of the previous notes. Again, Mr. Gillie signed no Security Agreement or Financing Statement. The note of April 21, 1986 was stamped “Paid by Renewal.” The parties stipulated that all three notes related to the same transaction and that the Bank advanced no new funds and added no new collateral when 85) (holding that under georgia law a creditors refinancing of a promissory note destroyed the purchase money nature of the creditors security interest in a wall unit which served as collateral", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nGillie. On February 19, 1987, Mr. Gillie executed a note in the amount of $5,498.40, including interest at 12.51% per annum, payable to the Bank in 60 monthly installments of $91.64 each. The amount financed included credit life and credit health and accident premiums in the amount of $338.27. The note recited that it was secured by the June 19, 1985 security agreement and Table, Chairs and Entertainment Center. It also recited “Renew: 3245 1”, but there is no number 3245 1 on either of the previous notes. Again, Mr. Gillie signed no Security Agreement or Financing Statement. The note of April 21, 1986 was stamped “Paid by Renewal.” The parties stipulated that all three notes related to the same transaction and that the Bank advanced no new funds and added no new collateral when 85) (holding that under colorado law refinancing of a purchase money loan whereby an old note and security agreement were canceled and replaced by a new note and security agreement did not automatically extinguish the creditors pmsi in the debtors furniture the parties did not intend the new note to extinguish the original debt and security interest in that identical collateral remained almost no new money was advanced and the document specifically stated an intent to continue the pmsi" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n“I guess so.” In light of the “high degree of deference” that we must give to the factual determinations of the IJ, the inconsistencies in Kostic’s testimony and written sub missions leave us with little choice but to uphold the adverse credibility determination. See Sterkaj v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 273, 278 (6th Cir.2006) (upholding an IJ’s adverse credibility determination where an asylum applicant submitted an inconsistent document without explanation). Because Kostic cannot overcome the IJ’s finding regarding his lack of credibility, he cannot prove that he is eligible for asylum. This also means that he cannot meet the more stringent standards required to qualify for withholding of removal. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431-32, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987) (holding that to establish asylum eligibility based on future persecution an applicant must show that he or she subjectively fears persecution and that this fear is objectively reasonable", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n“I guess so.” In light of the “high degree of deference” that we must give to the factual determinations of the IJ, the inconsistencies in Kostic’s testimony and written sub missions leave us with little choice but to uphold the adverse credibility determination. See Sterkaj v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 273, 278 (6th Cir.2006) (upholding an IJ’s adverse credibility determination where an asylum applicant submitted an inconsistent document without explanation). Because Kostic cannot overcome the IJ’s finding regarding his lack of credibility, he cannot prove that he is eligible for asylum. This also means that he cannot meet the more stringent standards required to qualify for withholding of removal. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431-32, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987) (holding that absent past persecution an alien can demonstrate eligibility for asylum based on a wellfounded fear of future persecution by demonstrating that he or she subjectively fears persecution and that this fear is objectively reasonable", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n“I guess so.” In light of the “high degree of deference” that we must give to the factual determinations of the IJ, the inconsistencies in Kostic’s testimony and written sub missions leave us with little choice but to uphold the adverse credibility determination. See Sterkaj v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 273, 278 (6th Cir.2006) (upholding an IJ’s adverse credibility determination where an asylum applicant submitted an inconsistent document without explanation). Because Kostic cannot overcome the IJ’s finding regarding his lack of credibility, he cannot prove that he is eligible for asylum. This also means that he cannot meet the more stringent standards required to qualify for withholding of removal. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431-32, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987) (holding that the clear probability standard for withholding of removal is higher than the standard for asylum which requires only a reasonable possibility of persecution", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n“I guess so.” In light of the “high degree of deference” that we must give to the factual determinations of the IJ, the inconsistencies in Kostic’s testimony and written sub missions leave us with little choice but to uphold the adverse credibility determination. See Sterkaj v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 273, 278 (6th Cir.2006) (upholding an IJ’s adverse credibility determination where an asylum applicant submitted an inconsistent document without explanation). Because Kostic cannot overcome the IJ’s finding regarding his lack of credibility, he cannot prove that he is eligible for asylum. This also means that he cannot meet the more stringent standards required to qualify for withholding of removal. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431-32, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987) (holding that the asylum standard for past persecution or wellfounded fear of future persecution is lower than the clear probability standard to show eligibility for withholding of removal", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n“I guess so.” In light of the “high degree of deference” that we must give to the factual determinations of the IJ, the inconsistencies in Kostic’s testimony and written sub missions leave us with little choice but to uphold the adverse credibility determination. See Sterkaj v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 273, 278 (6th Cir.2006) (upholding an IJ’s adverse credibility determination where an asylum applicant submitted an inconsistent document without explanation). Because Kostic cannot overcome the IJ’s finding regarding his lack of credibility, he cannot prove that he is eligible for asylum. This also means that he cannot meet the more stringent standards required to qualify for withholding of removal. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431-32, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987) (holding that the standard for withholding of removal is more demanding than the standard for asylum" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nnot contest Alaimalo’s actual innocence. B. Prior Opportunities to Raise Actual Innocence Claim We turn to the question of whether Alaimalo’s actual innocence claim was unavailable to him during his direct appeal and his first § 2255 motion. In making this determination, we consider “(1) wheth er the legal basis for petitioner’s claim did not arise until after he had exhausted his direct appeal and first § 2255 motion; and (2) whether the law changed in any way relevant to petitioner’s claim after that first § 2255 motion.” Harrison, 519 F.3d at 960 (internal quotation marks omitted). An intervening court decision must “effect a material change in the applicable law” to establish unavailability. Harrison, 519 F.3d at 960. See also In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 607, 610 (7th Cir.1998) (holding that the supreme courts interpretation of 18 usc 924c1 in bailey v united states 516 us 137 116 sct 501 133 led2d 472 1995 has retroactive application to cases on collateral review", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nnot contest Alaimalo’s actual innocence. B. Prior Opportunities to Raise Actual Innocence Claim We turn to the question of whether Alaimalo’s actual innocence claim was unavailable to him during his direct appeal and his first § 2255 motion. In making this determination, we consider “(1) wheth er the legal basis for petitioner’s claim did not arise until after he had exhausted his direct appeal and first § 2255 motion; and (2) whether the law changed in any way relevant to petitioner’s claim after that first § 2255 motion.” Harrison, 519 F.3d at 960 (internal quotation marks omitted). An intervening court decision must “effect a material change in the applicable law” to establish unavailability. Harrison, 519 F.3d at 960. See also In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 607, 610 (7th Cir.1998) (holding that to enhance a sentence because of the defendants use of a firearm the jury must find the defendant guilty of a crime involving a firearm or otherwise specifically find that a firearm was used", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nnot contest Alaimalo’s actual innocence. B. Prior Opportunities to Raise Actual Innocence Claim We turn to the question of whether Alaimalo’s actual innocence claim was unavailable to him during his direct appeal and his first § 2255 motion. In making this determination, we consider “(1) wheth er the legal basis for petitioner’s claim did not arise until after he had exhausted his direct appeal and first § 2255 motion; and (2) whether the law changed in any way relevant to petitioner’s claim after that first § 2255 motion.” Harrison, 519 F.3d at 960 (internal quotation marks omitted). An intervening court decision must “effect a material change in the applicable law” to establish unavailability. Harrison, 519 F.3d at 960. See also In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 607, 610 (7th Cir.1998) (holding that to apply the firearm enhancement the firearm need only reflect the context of the defendants possession and the defendants ability to use the firearm to promote the controlled substance offense", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nnot contest Alaimalo’s actual innocence. B. Prior Opportunities to Raise Actual Innocence Claim We turn to the question of whether Alaimalo’s actual innocence claim was unavailable to him during his direct appeal and his first § 2255 motion. In making this determination, we consider “(1) wheth er the legal basis for petitioner’s claim did not arise until after he had exhausted his direct appeal and first § 2255 motion; and (2) whether the law changed in any way relevant to petitioner’s claim after that first § 2255 motion.” Harrison, 519 F.3d at 960 (internal quotation marks omitted). An intervening court decision must “effect a material change in the applicable law” to establish unavailability. Harrison, 519 F.3d at 960. See also In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 607, 610 (7th Cir.1998) (holding that the rule announced in bailey v united states 516 us 137 116 sct 501 133 led2d 472 1995 applies retroactively on collateral review", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nnot contest Alaimalo’s actual innocence. B. Prior Opportunities to Raise Actual Innocence Claim We turn to the question of whether Alaimalo’s actual innocence claim was unavailable to him during his direct appeal and his first § 2255 motion. In making this determination, we consider “(1) wheth er the legal basis for petitioner’s claim did not arise until after he had exhausted his direct appeal and first § 2255 motion; and (2) whether the law changed in any way relevant to petitioner’s claim after that first § 2255 motion.” Harrison, 519 F.3d at 960 (internal quotation marks omitted). An intervening court decision must “effect a material change in the applicable law” to establish unavailability. Harrison, 519 F.3d at 960. See also In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 607, 610 (7th Cir.1998) (holding that the supreme courts decision in bailey v united states 516 us 137 116 sct 501 133 led2d 472 1995 effected a material change in the law because the circuit previously held that accessibility of a firearm was enough to support an inference that a firearm was used in a drug crime whereas bailey required active employment of the firearm" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nDISMISSING FIRST AMENDED PETITION WITHOUT PREJUDICE SAMUEL P. KING, District Judge. I. INTRODUCTION On January 7, 1999, Petitioner Michael Kent Poland (“Petitioner” or “Poland”) filed a First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, amending a habeas petition filed on- October 20, 1998. Poland seeks, among other things, an evidentiary hearing on a claim that he is currently incompetent to be executed under Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986) (holding that leaning towards the death penalty is not the same as an automatic vote for the death penalty", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nDISMISSING FIRST AMENDED PETITION WITHOUT PREJUDICE SAMUEL P. KING, District Judge. I. INTRODUCTION On January 7, 1999, Petitioner Michael Kent Poland (“Petitioner” or “Poland”) filed a First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, amending a habeas petition filed on- October 20, 1998. Poland seeks, among other things, an evidentiary hearing on a claim that he is currently incompetent to be executed under Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986) (holding that the eighth amendment prohibits the state from inflicting the penalty of death upon a prisoner who is insane", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nDISMISSING FIRST AMENDED PETITION WITHOUT PREJUDICE SAMUEL P. KING, District Judge. I. INTRODUCTION On January 7, 1999, Petitioner Michael Kent Poland (“Petitioner” or “Poland”) filed a First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, amending a habeas petition filed on- October 20, 1998. Poland seeks, among other things, an evidentiary hearing on a claim that he is currently incompetent to be executed under Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986) (holding that the eighth amendment prohibits the punishment of death for a defendant convicting of raping a child", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nDISMISSING FIRST AMENDED PETITION WITHOUT PREJUDICE SAMUEL P. KING, District Judge. I. INTRODUCTION On January 7, 1999, Petitioner Michael Kent Poland (“Petitioner” or “Poland”) filed a First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, amending a habeas petition filed on- October 20, 1998. Poland seeks, among other things, an evidentiary hearing on a claim that he is currently incompetent to be executed under Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986) (holding that the eighth amendment prohibits execution of persons whose mental illness prevents them from comprehending the reasons for the penalty and its implications", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nDISMISSING FIRST AMENDED PETITION WITHOUT PREJUDICE SAMUEL P. KING, District Judge. I. INTRODUCTION On January 7, 1999, Petitioner Michael Kent Poland (“Petitioner” or “Poland”) filed a First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, amending a habeas petition filed on- October 20, 1998. Poland seeks, among other things, an evidentiary hearing on a claim that he is currently incompetent to be executed under Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986) (recognizing that the eighth amendment protects individuals from a lingering death" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n(2) and (3) of 9006(b) set forth certain exceptions. Paragraph 2 enumerates the bankruptcy rules for which enlargement is not permitted and paragraph 3, which includes Rule 4007(c), enumerates the bankruptcy rules for which enlargement of time is limited to the “extent and under the conditions stated in those rules.” Fed. R.Bankr.P. 9006(b)(3). Although Rule 4007(c) permits a court to extend the time to file a complaint under § 523(c), the motion to extend must be filed before the time has expired. Accordingly, the Court does not have the discretion to allow an untimely complaint under any of the sections set forth in § 523(c) on the basis of excusable neglect. See In re Tucker, 263 B.R. 632, 636-637 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2001). See also Byrd v. Alton, 837 F.2d 457, 459 (11th Cir.1988) (holding that a motion to continue a hearing on a postjudgment motion was ineffective to extend the period for the trial court to rule on the motion absent the express consent of the parties", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n(2) and (3) of 9006(b) set forth certain exceptions. Paragraph 2 enumerates the bankruptcy rules for which enlargement is not permitted and paragraph 3, which includes Rule 4007(c), enumerates the bankruptcy rules for which enlargement of time is limited to the “extent and under the conditions stated in those rules.” Fed. R.Bankr.P. 9006(b)(3). Although Rule 4007(c) permits a court to extend the time to file a complaint under § 523(c), the motion to extend must be filed before the time has expired. Accordingly, the Court does not have the discretion to allow an untimely complaint under any of the sections set forth in § 523(c) on the basis of excusable neglect. See In re Tucker, 263 B.R. 632, 636-637 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2001). See also Byrd v. Alton, 837 F.2d 457, 459 (11th Cir.1988) (holding creditors actual notice of chapter 7 case in ample time to prepare and timely file the necessary request for determination of dischargeability bars them from challenging the dischargeability of their claim 15 months after bar date", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n(2) and (3) of 9006(b) set forth certain exceptions. Paragraph 2 enumerates the bankruptcy rules for which enlargement is not permitted and paragraph 3, which includes Rule 4007(c), enumerates the bankruptcy rules for which enlargement of time is limited to the “extent and under the conditions stated in those rules.” Fed. R.Bankr.P. 9006(b)(3). Although Rule 4007(c) permits a court to extend the time to file a complaint under § 523(c), the motion to extend must be filed before the time has expired. Accordingly, the Court does not have the discretion to allow an untimely complaint under any of the sections set forth in § 523(c) on the basis of excusable neglect. See In re Tucker, 263 B.R. 632, 636-637 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2001). See also Byrd v. Alton, 837 F.2d 457, 459 (11th Cir.1988) (holding that the district court cannot extend the time for filing a rule 59e motion by margin order", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n(2) and (3) of 9006(b) set forth certain exceptions. Paragraph 2 enumerates the bankruptcy rules for which enlargement is not permitted and paragraph 3, which includes Rule 4007(c), enumerates the bankruptcy rules for which enlargement of time is limited to the “extent and under the conditions stated in those rules.” Fed. R.Bankr.P. 9006(b)(3). Although Rule 4007(c) permits a court to extend the time to file a complaint under § 523(c), the motion to extend must be filed before the time has expired. Accordingly, the Court does not have the discretion to allow an untimely complaint under any of the sections set forth in § 523(c) on the basis of excusable neglect. See In re Tucker, 263 B.R. 632, 636-637 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2001). See also Byrd v. Alton, 837 F.2d 457, 459 (11th Cir.1988) (holding that motion to extend time period for filing dischargeability complaint must be made before the running of that period and that court lacks discretion to grant late filed motion to extend time to file dischargeability complaint", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n(2) and (3) of 9006(b) set forth certain exceptions. Paragraph 2 enumerates the bankruptcy rules for which enlargement is not permitted and paragraph 3, which includes Rule 4007(c), enumerates the bankruptcy rules for which enlargement of time is limited to the “extent and under the conditions stated in those rules.” Fed. R.Bankr.P. 9006(b)(3). Although Rule 4007(c) permits a court to extend the time to file a complaint under § 523(c), the motion to extend must be filed before the time has expired. Accordingly, the Court does not have the discretion to allow an untimely complaint under any of the sections set forth in § 523(c) on the basis of excusable neglect. See In re Tucker, 263 B.R. 632, 636-637 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2001). See also Byrd v. Alton, 837 F.2d 457, 459 (11th Cir.1988) (holding that a second motion to reconsider served within ten days of the denial of the first motion does not extend the time period for filing a notice of appeal from the underlying judgment" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe violation as well as restore and compensate the employee. Id. Again, because these remedies adequately promoted the relevant public policy, the Cudney court was unwilling to recognize a common law tort remedy. See 172 Wn.2d at 536, 538. ¶15 In Cudney, our Supreme Court additionally held law enforcement action available under Washington statutes criminalizing drunk driving adequately protected the public from drunk driving. Id. at 536-38. There, the employee reported to his private employer that his supervisor drove a company vehicle while intoxicated. Id. at 527-28. But the employee did not inform l court issued another opinion applying Korslund and Cudney, and our Supreme Court denied review of that case despite Piel. See Weiss v. Lonnquist, 173 Wn. App. 344, 353-60, 293 P.3d 1264 (holding that a breach of the rules of professional conduct would not justify setting aside a divorce judgment and citing terry cove north for the proposition that the sole remedy for a violation of the rules of professional conduct was the imposition of disciplinary measures", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe violation as well as restore and compensate the employee. Id. Again, because these remedies adequately promoted the relevant public policy, the Cudney court was unwilling to recognize a common law tort remedy. See 172 Wn.2d at 536, 538. ¶15 In Cudney, our Supreme Court additionally held law enforcement action available under Washington statutes criminalizing drunk driving adequately protected the public from drunk driving. Id. at 536-38. There, the employee reported to his private employer that his supervisor drove a company vehicle while intoxicated. Id. at 527-28. But the employee did not inform l court issued another opinion applying Korslund and Cudney, and our Supreme Court denied review of that case despite Piel. See Weiss v. Lonnquist, 173 Wn. App. 344, 353-60, 293 P.3d 1264 (holding that the rules of professional conduct are selfimposed internal regulations and do not play a role in determining the admissi bility of evidence and citing terry cove north for the proposition that the sole remedy for a violation of the rules of professional conduct was the imposition of disciplinary measures", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe violation as well as restore and compensate the employee. Id. Again, because these remedies adequately promoted the relevant public policy, the Cudney court was unwilling to recognize a common law tort remedy. See 172 Wn.2d at 536, 538. ¶15 In Cudney, our Supreme Court additionally held law enforcement action available under Washington statutes criminalizing drunk driving adequately protected the public from drunk driving. Id. at 536-38. There, the employee reported to his private employer that his supervisor drove a company vehicle while intoxicated. Id. at 527-28. But the employee did not inform l court issued another opinion applying Korslund and Cudney, and our Supreme Court denied review of that case despite Piel. See Weiss v. Lonnquist, 173 Wn. App. 344, 353-60, 293 P.3d 1264 (holding that a violation of the rules of professional conduct may not be used as evidence and citing terry cove north for the proposition that the sole remedy for a violation of the rules of professional conduct was the imposition of disciplinary measures", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe violation as well as restore and compensate the employee. Id. Again, because these remedies adequately promoted the relevant public policy, the Cudney court was unwilling to recognize a common law tort remedy. See 172 Wn.2d at 536, 538. ¶15 In Cudney, our Supreme Court additionally held law enforcement action available under Washington statutes criminalizing drunk driving adequately protected the public from drunk driving. Id. at 536-38. There, the employee reported to his private employer that his supervisor drove a company vehicle while intoxicated. Id. at 527-28. But the employee did not inform l court issued another opinion applying Korslund and Cudney, and our Supreme Court denied review of that case despite Piel. See Weiss v. Lonnquist, 173 Wn. App. 344, 353-60, 293 P.3d 1264 (holding that where the conviction was final the disciplinary commission was not authorized to assume the roles of both an accusatory tribunal and the ultimate determiner of guilt and that the separation of responsibility between the disciplinary board and the disciplinary commission provides constitutional due process", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe violation as well as restore and compensate the employee. Id. Again, because these remedies adequately promoted the relevant public policy, the Cudney court was unwilling to recognize a common law tort remedy. See 172 Wn.2d at 536, 538. ¶15 In Cudney, our Supreme Court additionally held law enforcement action available under Washington statutes criminalizing drunk driving adequately protected the public from drunk driving. Id. at 536-38. There, the employee reported to his private employer that his supervisor drove a company vehicle while intoxicated. Id. at 527-28. But the employee did not inform l court issued another opinion applying Korslund and Cudney, and our Supreme Court denied review of that case despite Piel. See Weiss v. Lonnquist, 173 Wn. App. 344, 353-60, 293 P.3d 1264 (holding the misconduct reporting and disciplinary process prescribed by the washington rules of professional conduct rpc 33 and 83 adequately promoted attorney candor toward the tribunal" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nalleged forced sterilization. In re J-S- 24 I. & N. Dec. 520, 523 (A.G. 2008). Instead, in order to establish eligibility for relief on family planning grounds, a partner must demonstrate past persecution based on his own “other resistance” to a coercive population control program or a well founded fear that he will be subject to persecution for such “resistance.” Id. Even assuming that Chen-Xu established that he engaged in other resistance, he failed to challenge on appeal to the BIA the IJ’s finding that he did not demonstrate past persecution. Thus, we decline to review as unexhausted Chen Xu’s argument in his brief to this Court that his two day detention and 12,000 RMB fíne amounted to persecution. See Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 121-22, 124 (2d Cir.2007) (holding that issue exhaustion is mandatory even if not a statutory jurisdictional requirement", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nalleged forced sterilization. In re J-S- 24 I. & N. Dec. 520, 523 (A.G. 2008). Instead, in order to establish eligibility for relief on family planning grounds, a partner must demonstrate past persecution based on his own “other resistance” to a coercive population control program or a well founded fear that he will be subject to persecution for such “resistance.” Id. Even assuming that Chen-Xu established that he engaged in other resistance, he failed to challenge on appeal to the BIA the IJ’s finding that he did not demonstrate past persecution. Thus, we decline to review as unexhausted Chen Xu’s argument in his brief to this Court that his two day detention and 12,000 RMB fíne amounted to persecution. See Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 121-22, 124 (2d Cir.2007) (holding that exhaustion of issues is jurisdictional", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nalleged forced sterilization. In re J-S- 24 I. & N. Dec. 520, 523 (A.G. 2008). Instead, in order to establish eligibility for relief on family planning grounds, a partner must demonstrate past persecution based on his own “other resistance” to a coercive population control program or a well founded fear that he will be subject to persecution for such “resistance.” Id. Even assuming that Chen-Xu established that he engaged in other resistance, he failed to challenge on appeal to the BIA the IJ’s finding that he did not demonstrate past persecution. Thus, we decline to review as unexhausted Chen Xu’s argument in his brief to this Court that his two day detention and 12,000 RMB fíne amounted to persecution. See Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 121-22, 124 (2d Cir.2007) (holding that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nalleged forced sterilization. In re J-S- 24 I. & N. Dec. 520, 523 (A.G. 2008). Instead, in order to establish eligibility for relief on family planning grounds, a partner must demonstrate past persecution based on his own “other resistance” to a coercive population control program or a well founded fear that he will be subject to persecution for such “resistance.” Id. Even assuming that Chen-Xu established that he engaged in other resistance, he failed to challenge on appeal to the BIA the IJ’s finding that he did not demonstrate past persecution. Thus, we decline to review as unexhausted Chen Xu’s argument in his brief to this Court that his two day detention and 12,000 RMB fíne amounted to persecution. See Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 121-22, 124 (2d Cir.2007) (holding that this time requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nalleged forced sterilization. In re J-S- 24 I. & N. Dec. 520, 523 (A.G. 2008). Instead, in order to establish eligibility for relief on family planning grounds, a partner must demonstrate past persecution based on his own “other resistance” to a coercive population control program or a well founded fear that he will be subject to persecution for such “resistance.” Id. Even assuming that Chen-Xu established that he engaged in other resistance, he failed to challenge on appeal to the BIA the IJ’s finding that he did not demonstrate past persecution. Thus, we decline to review as unexhausted Chen Xu’s argument in his brief to this Court that his two day detention and 12,000 RMB fíne amounted to persecution. See Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 121-22, 124 (2d Cir.2007) (recognizing that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nsee also Johnson v. City of Fort Wayne, 91 F.3d 922, 943 (7th Cir.1996) (noting that a property interest may arise from an express or implied contract, as well as a state statute or regulation). The plaintiffs assert that defendants deprived them of a property interest in an expected degree from an accredited state institution. Illinois courts have not identified clearly a property right in post-secondary education. However, Illinois courts have found that the payment of tuition to an educational institution ordinarily gives rise to an implied contract that the school will award a degree upon the student’s satisfaction of the degree requirements established by the school. See Johnson v. Lincoln Christian Coll., 150 Ill.App.3d 733, 103 Ill.Dec. 842, 501 N.E.2d 1380, 1384 (1986) (recognizing that breach of contract cause of action accrues at time of the breach", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nsee also Johnson v. City of Fort Wayne, 91 F.3d 922, 943 (7th Cir.1996) (noting that a property interest may arise from an express or implied contract, as well as a state statute or regulation). The plaintiffs assert that defendants deprived them of a property interest in an expected degree from an accredited state institution. Illinois courts have not identified clearly a property right in post-secondary education. However, Illinois courts have found that the payment of tuition to an educational institution ordinarily gives rise to an implied contract that the school will award a degree upon the student’s satisfaction of the degree requirements established by the school. See Johnson v. Lincoln Christian Coll., 150 Ill.App.3d 733, 103 Ill.Dec. 842, 501 N.E.2d 1380, 1384 (1986) (holding that violation of accountants duties mandated by statute did not create a cause of action based on breach of implied contract for employee", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nsee also Johnson v. City of Fort Wayne, 91 F.3d 922, 943 (7th Cir.1996) (noting that a property interest may arise from an express or implied contract, as well as a state statute or regulation). The plaintiffs assert that defendants deprived them of a property interest in an expected degree from an accredited state institution. Illinois courts have not identified clearly a property right in post-secondary education. However, Illinois courts have found that the payment of tuition to an educational institution ordinarily gives rise to an implied contract that the school will award a degree upon the student’s satisfaction of the degree requirements established by the school. See Johnson v. Lincoln Christian Coll., 150 Ill.App.3d 733, 103 Ill.Dec. 842, 501 N.E.2d 1380, 1384 (1986) (holding that a cause of action for breach of contract accrues at the time of the breach", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nsee also Johnson v. City of Fort Wayne, 91 F.3d 922, 943 (7th Cir.1996) (noting that a property interest may arise from an express or implied contract, as well as a state statute or regulation). The plaintiffs assert that defendants deprived them of a property interest in an expected degree from an accredited state institution. Illinois courts have not identified clearly a property right in post-secondary education. However, Illinois courts have found that the payment of tuition to an educational institution ordinarily gives rise to an implied contract that the school will award a degree upon the student’s satisfaction of the degree requirements established by the school. See Johnson v. Lincoln Christian Coll., 150 Ill.App.3d 733, 103 Ill.Dec. 842, 501 N.E.2d 1380, 1384 (1986) (holding that a student who allegedly completed all the requirements for a diploma but had not been given a diploma stated a cause of action for breach of an implied contract", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nsee also Johnson v. City of Fort Wayne, 91 F.3d 922, 943 (7th Cir.1996) (noting that a property interest may arise from an express or implied contract, as well as a state statute or regulation). The plaintiffs assert that defendants deprived them of a property interest in an expected degree from an accredited state institution. Illinois courts have not identified clearly a property right in post-secondary education. However, Illinois courts have found that the payment of tuition to an educational institution ordinarily gives rise to an implied contract that the school will award a degree upon the student’s satisfaction of the degree requirements established by the school. See Johnson v. Lincoln Christian Coll., 150 Ill.App.3d 733, 103 Ill.Dec. 842, 501 N.E.2d 1380, 1384 (1986) (holding that the failure to act in good faith does not amount to an independent tort the breach of the implied duty under the ucc gives rise only to a cause of action for breach of contract" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nnotice to or the presence of either attorney and without any formal record. Her later questioning of the two officers on the stand may have brought some of the substance of this in-chambers interview into formal evidence, but, as with her call to the pharmacy manager, it is impossible for this Court to know what further information may have been shared behind the closed doors of chambers. Thus, it is impossible to adequately review whether or not the private conversation inappropriately affected the judge’s decision. This fact highlights one of the reasons ex parte contacts with a judge are impermissible when they address a matter pending before the judge: They leave no record for the reviewing court on appeal. See Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Shannon, 356 N.W.2d 175, 179 (Wis. 1984) (holding that after review the minutes were unambiguous and the trial judge erred in admitting parol evidence", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nnotice to or the presence of either attorney and without any formal record. Her later questioning of the two officers on the stand may have brought some of the substance of this in-chambers interview into formal evidence, but, as with her call to the pharmacy manager, it is impossible for this Court to know what further information may have been shared behind the closed doors of chambers. Thus, it is impossible to adequately review whether or not the private conversation inappropriately affected the judge’s decision. This fact highlights one of the reasons ex parte contacts with a judge are impermissible when they address a matter pending before the judge: They leave no record for the reviewing court on appeal. See Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Shannon, 356 N.W.2d 175, 179 (Wis. 1984) (holding that trial judge sitting as finder of fact erred by making unnoticed and unrecorded visit to accident scene because in part such actions are outside the record and therefore beyond this courts reach in its review", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nnotice to or the presence of either attorney and without any formal record. Her later questioning of the two officers on the stand may have brought some of the substance of this in-chambers interview into formal evidence, but, as with her call to the pharmacy manager, it is impossible for this Court to know what further information may have been shared behind the closed doors of chambers. Thus, it is impossible to adequately review whether or not the private conversation inappropriately affected the judge’s decision. This fact highlights one of the reasons ex parte contacts with a judge are impermissible when they address a matter pending before the judge: They leave no record for the reviewing court on appeal. See Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Shannon, 356 N.W.2d 175, 179 (Wis. 1984) (holding that a challenge to the proper weight of the evidence is a question of fact outside this courts jurisdiction", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nnotice to or the presence of either attorney and without any formal record. Her later questioning of the two officers on the stand may have brought some of the substance of this in-chambers interview into formal evidence, but, as with her call to the pharmacy manager, it is impossible for this Court to know what further information may have been shared behind the closed doors of chambers. Thus, it is impossible to adequately review whether or not the private conversation inappropriately affected the judge’s decision. This fact highlights one of the reasons ex parte contacts with a judge are impermissible when they address a matter pending before the judge: They leave no record for the reviewing court on appeal. See Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Shannon, 356 N.W.2d 175, 179 (Wis. 1984) (holding that the issue of proximate causation involves application of law to fact which should be left to the fact finder subject to limited review", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nnotice to or the presence of either attorney and without any formal record. Her later questioning of the two officers on the stand may have brought some of the substance of this in-chambers interview into formal evidence, but, as with her call to the pharmacy manager, it is impossible for this Court to know what further information may have been shared behind the closed doors of chambers. Thus, it is impossible to adequately review whether or not the private conversation inappropriately affected the judge’s decision. This fact highlights one of the reasons ex parte contacts with a judge are impermissible when they address a matter pending before the judge: They leave no record for the reviewing court on appeal. See Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Shannon, 356 N.W.2d 175, 179 (Wis. 1984) (holding that this court will not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative fact finder who heard the testimony and was in a position to evaluate the credibility of witnesses because evidence is weighed by the administrative agency and not by the courts" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nBill of review plaintiffs must ordinarily plead and prove (1) a meritorious defense to the underlying cause of action, (2) which the plaintiffs were prevented from making by the fraud, accident, or wrongful act of the opposing party or official mistake, (3) unmixed with any fault or negligence on their own part. Caldwell, 154 S.W.3d at 96 (citing Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 406-08). Bill of review plaintiffs claiming non-service, however, are relieved of two elements ordinarily required to be proved in a bill of review proceeding. Caldwell, 154 S.W.3d at 96. First, if a plaintiff was not served, constitutional due process relieves the plaintiff from the need to show a meritorious defense. Id. (citing Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 86-87, 108 S.Ct. 896, 99 L.Ed.2d 75 (1988) (holding thata bill of review was unavailable where the petitioner had actual notice of a default judgment between twentyone and ninety days of the judgment but failed to utilize rule 306a", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nBill of review plaintiffs must ordinarily plead and prove (1) a meritorious defense to the underlying cause of action, (2) which the plaintiffs were prevented from making by the fraud, accident, or wrongful act of the opposing party or official mistake, (3) unmixed with any fault or negligence on their own part. Caldwell, 154 S.W.3d at 96 (citing Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 406-08). Bill of review plaintiffs claiming non-service, however, are relieved of two elements ordinarily required to be proved in a bill of review proceeding. Caldwell, 154 S.W.3d at 96. First, if a plaintiff was not served, constitutional due process relieves the plaintiff from the need to show a meritorious defense. Id. (citing Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 86-87, 108 S.Ct. 896, 99 L.Ed.2d 75 (1988) (holding that bill of review brought in wrong court constitutes collateral attack", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nBill of review plaintiffs must ordinarily plead and prove (1) a meritorious defense to the underlying cause of action, (2) which the plaintiffs were prevented from making by the fraud, accident, or wrongful act of the opposing party or official mistake, (3) unmixed with any fault or negligence on their own part. Caldwell, 154 S.W.3d at 96 (citing Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 406-08). Bill of review plaintiffs claiming non-service, however, are relieved of two elements ordinarily required to be proved in a bill of review proceeding. Caldwell, 154 S.W.3d at 96. First, if a plaintiff was not served, constitutional due process relieves the plaintiff from the need to show a meritorious defense. Id. (citing Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 86-87, 108 S.Ct. 896, 99 L.Ed.2d 75 (1988) (holding that standard for obtaining equitable bill of review did not apply to statutory bill of review in guardianship proceeding citing jones v parker 67 tex 76 3 sw 222 224 1886", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nBill of review plaintiffs must ordinarily plead and prove (1) a meritorious defense to the underlying cause of action, (2) which the plaintiffs were prevented from making by the fraud, accident, or wrongful act of the opposing party or official mistake, (3) unmixed with any fault or negligence on their own part. Caldwell, 154 S.W.3d at 96 (citing Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 406-08). Bill of review plaintiffs claiming non-service, however, are relieved of two elements ordinarily required to be proved in a bill of review proceeding. Caldwell, 154 S.W.3d at 96. First, if a plaintiff was not served, constitutional due process relieves the plaintiff from the need to show a meritorious defense. Id. (citing Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 86-87, 108 S.Ct. 896, 99 L.Ed.2d 75 (1988) (holding a judgment in the absence of notice violates due process rights", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nBill of review plaintiffs must ordinarily plead and prove (1) a meritorious defense to the underlying cause of action, (2) which the plaintiffs were prevented from making by the fraud, accident, or wrongful act of the opposing party or official mistake, (3) unmixed with any fault or negligence on their own part. Caldwell, 154 S.W.3d at 96 (citing Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 406-08). Bill of review plaintiffs claiming non-service, however, are relieved of two elements ordinarily required to be proved in a bill of review proceeding. Caldwell, 154 S.W.3d at 96. First, if a plaintiff was not served, constitutional due process relieves the plaintiff from the need to show a meritorious defense. Id. (citing Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 86-87, 108 S.Ct. 896, 99 L.Ed.2d 75 (1988) (holding that the meritorious defense requirement in a bill of review proceeding violates due process where the bill of review plaintiff has no notice of the proceeding in which the default judgment was rendered" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ndeclaration thereof has been filed by making and filing with the officer holding the process an affidavit that, in his belief, either the claim is invalid entirely or it is invalid in part or is excessive, specifying wherein such invalidity or excess consists, and if excessive, also specifying the property alleged to be in excess, to be, in all cases, the last named in the claim.” (Emphasis added.) In this case, Bartholomew attempted to contest Gutzmore’s claim of exemption by filing an unsworn objection. This does not meet the requirements of § 6-10-25, which provides that any contest to a claim of exemption must be made by affidavit. Accordingly, Bartholomew did not properly contest Gutzmore’s claim of exemption. See Griffin v. Bank Street Fin., 587 So.2d 349, 350 (Ala.Civ.App.1991) (holding that a search warrant is invalid if not based on an affidavit", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ndeclaration thereof has been filed by making and filing with the officer holding the process an affidavit that, in his belief, either the claim is invalid entirely or it is invalid in part or is excessive, specifying wherein such invalidity or excess consists, and if excessive, also specifying the property alleged to be in excess, to be, in all cases, the last named in the claim.” (Emphasis added.) In this case, Bartholomew attempted to contest Gutzmore’s claim of exemption by filing an unsworn objection. This does not meet the requirements of § 6-10-25, which provides that any contest to a claim of exemption must be made by affidavit. Accordingly, Bartholomew did not properly contest Gutzmore’s claim of exemption. See Griffin v. Bank Street Fin., 587 So.2d 349, 350 (Ala.Civ.App.1991) (holding that the argument that an additional limitation be read into claims 1 3 and 4 was only correct with respect to claim 1 and thus only claim 1 was invalid", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ndeclaration thereof has been filed by making and filing with the officer holding the process an affidavit that, in his belief, either the claim is invalid entirely or it is invalid in part or is excessive, specifying wherein such invalidity or excess consists, and if excessive, also specifying the property alleged to be in excess, to be, in all cases, the last named in the claim.” (Emphasis added.) In this case, Bartholomew attempted to contest Gutzmore’s claim of exemption by filing an unsworn objection. This does not meet the requirements of § 6-10-25, which provides that any contest to a claim of exemption must be made by affidavit. Accordingly, Bartholomew did not properly contest Gutzmore’s claim of exemption. See Griffin v. Bank Street Fin., 587 So.2d 349, 350 (Ala.Civ.App.1991) (holding that general creditors do not have standing to contest forfeitures", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ndeclaration thereof has been filed by making and filing with the officer holding the process an affidavit that, in his belief, either the claim is invalid entirely or it is invalid in part or is excessive, specifying wherein such invalidity or excess consists, and if excessive, also specifying the property alleged to be in excess, to be, in all cases, the last named in the claim.” (Emphasis added.) In this case, Bartholomew attempted to contest Gutzmore’s claim of exemption by filing an unsworn objection. This does not meet the requirements of § 6-10-25, which provides that any contest to a claim of exemption must be made by affidavit. Accordingly, Bartholomew did not properly contest Gutzmore’s claim of exemption. See Griffin v. Bank Street Fin., 587 So.2d 349, 350 (Ala.Civ.App.1991) (holding the defendants claim that he was denied the right to testify was appropriate for direct review when the record was adequately developed to permit full consideration of the defendants claim the pertinent facts were undisputed a pcr hearing was not necessary to resolve a factual dispute and would not aid in the application of the law and the defendants claim was presented not as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim but rather as an error committed by the trial court in excluding the defendants testimony which was not an appropriate basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ndeclaration thereof has been filed by making and filing with the officer holding the process an affidavit that, in his belief, either the claim is invalid entirely or it is invalid in part or is excessive, specifying wherein such invalidity or excess consists, and if excessive, also specifying the property alleged to be in excess, to be, in all cases, the last named in the claim.” (Emphasis added.) In this case, Bartholomew attempted to contest Gutzmore’s claim of exemption by filing an unsworn objection. This does not meet the requirements of § 6-10-25, which provides that any contest to a claim of exemption must be made by affidavit. Accordingly, Bartholomew did not properly contest Gutzmore’s claim of exemption. See Griffin v. Bank Street Fin., 587 So.2d 349, 350 (Ala.Civ.App.1991) (holding that a contest to a claim of exemption was ineffective when that contest was not by affidavit and did not properly state that the claim of exemption was invalid or excessive" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nhis statement to the authorities. The litany of crimes discussed in cross-examination indicated that Hicks was not a trustworthy individual, and the evidence that he received a benefit for his testimony only would have been consistent with that well-supported notion. Further, as Hicks had already been convicted of perjury once (before the same judge) and had admitted to his use of a variety of false identities, the jury was already under the impression that Hicks was prone to lie at any point. On that basis, even if Gentry had an opportunity to impeach Hicks as to his false testimony regarding the denial of any benefit for testifying, that opportunity would have been cumulative of other impeachment evidence and thus immaterial. See Heishman v. Ayers, 621 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that undisclosed napue evidence is cumulative and thus immaterial where the witness is already sufficiently impeached", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nhis statement to the authorities. The litany of crimes discussed in cross-examination indicated that Hicks was not a trustworthy individual, and the evidence that he received a benefit for his testimony only would have been consistent with that well-supported notion. Further, as Hicks had already been convicted of perjury once (before the same judge) and had admitted to his use of a variety of false identities, the jury was already under the impression that Hicks was prone to lie at any point. On that basis, even if Gentry had an opportunity to impeach Hicks as to his false testimony regarding the denial of any benefit for testifying, that opportunity would have been cumulative of other impeachment evidence and thus immaterial. See Heishman v. Ayers, 621 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that witness could not be impeached with prior statement because his silence did not constitute testimony ", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nhis statement to the authorities. The litany of crimes discussed in cross-examination indicated that Hicks was not a trustworthy individual, and the evidence that he received a benefit for his testimony only would have been consistent with that well-supported notion. Further, as Hicks had already been convicted of perjury once (before the same judge) and had admitted to his use of a variety of false identities, the jury was already under the impression that Hicks was prone to lie at any point. On that basis, even if Gentry had an opportunity to impeach Hicks as to his false testimony regarding the denial of any benefit for testifying, that opportunity would have been cumulative of other impeachment evidence and thus immaterial. See Heishman v. Ayers, 621 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that new evidence must be evidence that is not merely cumulative", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nhis statement to the authorities. The litany of crimes discussed in cross-examination indicated that Hicks was not a trustworthy individual, and the evidence that he received a benefit for his testimony only would have been consistent with that well-supported notion. Further, as Hicks had already been convicted of perjury once (before the same judge) and had admitted to his use of a variety of false identities, the jury was already under the impression that Hicks was prone to lie at any point. On that basis, even if Gentry had an opportunity to impeach Hicks as to his false testimony regarding the denial of any benefit for testifying, that opportunity would have been cumulative of other impeachment evidence and thus immaterial. See Heishman v. Ayers, 621 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir.2010) (holding impeachment evidence was not merely cumulative where the withheld evidence was of a different character than evidence already known to the defense", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nhis statement to the authorities. The litany of crimes discussed in cross-examination indicated that Hicks was not a trustworthy individual, and the evidence that he received a benefit for his testimony only would have been consistent with that well-supported notion. Further, as Hicks had already been convicted of perjury once (before the same judge) and had admitted to his use of a variety of false identities, the jury was already under the impression that Hicks was prone to lie at any point. On that basis, even if Gentry had an opportunity to impeach Hicks as to his false testimony regarding the denial of any benefit for testifying, that opportunity would have been cumulative of other impeachment evidence and thus immaterial. See Heishman v. Ayers, 621 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that new evidence is evidence not previously of record and not merely cumulative of other evidence" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nor coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct,” 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(A). It is undisputed that Ibrahim was convicted of federal crimes of terrorism, and the evidence presented at trial showed that Ibra-him was involved in or intended to promote these crimes, which were intended to influence by means of intimidation and to retaliate against the government of the United States of America. To assess an enhancement for obstruction of justice based on false testimony, “a sentencing court must find that the defendant 1) willfully 2) and materially 3) committed perjury, which is (a) the intentional (b) giving of false testimony (c) as to a material matter.” United States v. Salim, 549 F.3d 67, 72 (2d Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). The distri 72, 80 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that sentencing under the mandatory guidelines regime creates a presumption of prejudice that the government must rebut with clear and specific evidence that the district court would not have sentenced the defendant to a lower sentence if it had treated the guidelines as advisory", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nor coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct,” 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(A). It is undisputed that Ibrahim was convicted of federal crimes of terrorism, and the evidence presented at trial showed that Ibra-him was involved in or intended to promote these crimes, which were intended to influence by means of intimidation and to retaliate against the government of the United States of America. To assess an enhancement for obstruction of justice based on false testimony, “a sentencing court must find that the defendant 1) willfully 2) and materially 3) committed perjury, which is (a) the intentional (b) giving of false testimony (c) as to a material matter.” United States v. Salim, 549 F.3d 67, 72 (2d Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). The distri 72, 80 (2d Cir.2006) (holding guidelines to be only advisory", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nor coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct,” 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(A). It is undisputed that Ibrahim was convicted of federal crimes of terrorism, and the evidence presented at trial showed that Ibra-him was involved in or intended to promote these crimes, which were intended to influence by means of intimidation and to retaliate against the government of the United States of America. To assess an enhancement for obstruction of justice based on false testimony, “a sentencing court must find that the defendant 1) willfully 2) and materially 3) committed perjury, which is (a) the intentional (b) giving of false testimony (c) as to a material matter.” United States v. Salim, 549 F.3d 67, 72 (2d Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). The distri 72, 80 (2d Cir.2006) (recognizing that under the booker remedial regime the guidelines are no longer mandatory but are only advisory", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nor coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct,” 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(A). It is undisputed that Ibrahim was convicted of federal crimes of terrorism, and the evidence presented at trial showed that Ibra-him was involved in or intended to promote these crimes, which were intended to influence by means of intimidation and to retaliate against the government of the United States of America. To assess an enhancement for obstruction of justice based on false testimony, “a sentencing court must find that the defendant 1) willfully 2) and materially 3) committed perjury, which is (a) the intentional (b) giving of false testimony (c) as to a material matter.” United States v. Salim, 549 F.3d 67, 72 (2d Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). The distri 72, 80 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that even in the absence of a sixth amendment violation the imposition of a sentence under the former mandatory guidelines regime rather than under the advisory regime outlined in booker is plain error", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nor coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct,” 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(A). It is undisputed that Ibrahim was convicted of federal crimes of terrorism, and the evidence presented at trial showed that Ibra-him was involved in or intended to promote these crimes, which were intended to influence by means of intimidation and to retaliate against the government of the United States of America. To assess an enhancement for obstruction of justice based on false testimony, “a sentencing court must find that the defendant 1) willfully 2) and materially 3) committed perjury, which is (a) the intentional (b) giving of false testimony (c) as to a material matter.” United States v. Salim, 549 F.3d 67, 72 (2d Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). The distri 72, 80 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that judicial factfinding at sentencing is permissible indeed required under an advisory guidelines regime" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nable [to] control.” Later, the petitioners note that the BIA’s rejection of their “particular social group” definition “was challenged ... in [the] Motion to Reconsider ... which stressed [that] ... young women in general are a particular group that has characteristics which are indisputable and not subject to change.” Finally, the petitioners assert that the BIA’s description of Kuci’s definition as “simply too broad” is “obviously erroneous, especially when you consider the fact that women in Albania are being kidnapped and threatened to be sold as prostitutes to this day, no matter their age.” But the petitioners have failed to elaborate on these statements, none of which explains how the BIA erred in its legal analysis. See Lunderstadt v. Colafella, 885 F.2d 66, 78 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that vague conclusory statements are insufficient", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nable [to] control.” Later, the petitioners note that the BIA’s rejection of their “particular social group” definition “was challenged ... in [the] Motion to Reconsider ... which stressed [that] ... young women in general are a particular group that has characteristics which are indisputable and not subject to change.” Finally, the petitioners assert that the BIA’s description of Kuci’s definition as “simply too broad” is “obviously erroneous, especially when you consider the fact that women in Albania are being kidnapped and threatened to be sold as prostitutes to this day, no matter their age.” But the petitioners have failed to elaborate on these statements, none of which explains how the BIA erred in its legal analysis. See Lunderstadt v. Colafella, 885 F.2d 66, 78 (3d Cir.1989) (holding a onesentence conclusory objection to an issue in the magistrates recommendation insufficient to preserve that issue for appeal", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nable [to] control.” Later, the petitioners note that the BIA’s rejection of their “particular social group” definition “was challenged ... in [the] Motion to Reconsider ... which stressed [that] ... young women in general are a particular group that has characteristics which are indisputable and not subject to change.” Finally, the petitioners assert that the BIA’s description of Kuci’s definition as “simply too broad” is “obviously erroneous, especially when you consider the fact that women in Albania are being kidnapped and threatened to be sold as prostitutes to this day, no matter their age.” But the petitioners have failed to elaborate on these statements, none of which explains how the BIA erred in its legal analysis. See Lunderstadt v. Colafella, 885 F.2d 66, 78 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that scattered statements in the appellants briefs are not enough to preserve an issue for appeal", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nable [to] control.” Later, the petitioners note that the BIA’s rejection of their “particular social group” definition “was challenged ... in [the] Motion to Reconsider ... which stressed [that] ... young women in general are a particular group that has characteristics which are indisputable and not subject to change.” Finally, the petitioners assert that the BIA’s description of Kuci’s definition as “simply too broad” is “obviously erroneous, especially when you consider the fact that women in Albania are being kidnapped and threatened to be sold as prostitutes to this day, no matter their age.” But the petitioners have failed to elaborate on these statements, none of which explains how the BIA erred in its legal analysis. See Lunderstadt v. Colafella, 885 F.2d 66, 78 (3d Cir.1989) (holding defendant failed to preserve burden of proof issue for appeal", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nable [to] control.” Later, the petitioners note that the BIA’s rejection of their “particular social group” definition “was challenged ... in [the] Motion to Reconsider ... which stressed [that] ... young women in general are a particular group that has characteristics which are indisputable and not subject to change.” Finally, the petitioners assert that the BIA’s description of Kuci’s definition as “simply too broad” is “obviously erroneous, especially when you consider the fact that women in Albania are being kidnapped and threatened to be sold as prostitutes to this day, no matter their age.” But the petitioners have failed to elaborate on these statements, none of which explains how the BIA erred in its legal analysis. See Lunderstadt v. Colafella, 885 F.2d 66, 78 (3d Cir.1989) (recognizing that conclusory statements do not preserve an issue for appeal" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nchallenge, we consider and weigh all the evidence, both supporting and contradicting the finding. Mar. Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 406-07 (Tex.1998). We set aside the fact finding only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex.1986). Initially, we note that the jury was asked to determine Grace’s damages for the breach of contract the court had found. The question was worded as follows: What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, w pp.Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (measuring sufficiency of damages evidence against commonly understood meaning of undefined term used in charge); see also Equistar Chems., L.P. v. Dresser-Rand Co., 240 S.W.3d 864, 868 (Tex.2007) (holding on habeas review that counsels failure to object to improper argument at trial did not prejudice petitioner where other evidence supported a guilty verdict and the jury was told closing argument was not evidence", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nchallenge, we consider and weigh all the evidence, both supporting and contradicting the finding. Mar. Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 406-07 (Tex.1998). We set aside the fact finding only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex.1986). Initially, we note that the jury was asked to determine Grace’s damages for the breach of contract the court had found. The question was worded as follows: What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, w pp.Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (measuring sufficiency of damages evidence against commonly understood meaning of undefined term used in charge); see also Equistar Chems., L.P. v. Dresser-Rand Co., 240 S.W.3d 864, 868 (Tex.2007) (holding argument not waived for failure to object where party previously raised argument and district court considered and rejected it", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nchallenge, we consider and weigh all the evidence, both supporting and contradicting the finding. Mar. Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 406-07 (Tex.1998). We set aside the fact finding only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex.1986). Initially, we note that the jury was asked to determine Grace’s damages for the breach of contract the court had found. The question was worded as follows: What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, w pp.Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (measuring sufficiency of damages evidence against commonly understood meaning of undefined term used in charge); see also Equistar Chems., L.P. v. Dresser-Rand Co., 240 S.W.3d 864, 868 (Tex.2007) (holding complaint that sentence violated equal protection was waived because of failure to object at trial", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nchallenge, we consider and weigh all the evidence, both supporting and contradicting the finding. Mar. Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 406-07 (Tex.1998). We set aside the fact finding only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex.1986). Initially, we note that the jury was asked to determine Grace’s damages for the breach of contract the court had found. The question was worded as follows: What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, w pp.Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (measuring sufficiency of damages evidence against commonly understood meaning of undefined term used in charge); see also Equistar Chems., L.P. v. Dresser-Rand Co., 240 S.W.3d 864, 868 (Tex.2007) (holding that a defendant waived a sentencing issue by failing to object in district court", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nchallenge, we consider and weigh all the evidence, both supporting and contradicting the finding. Mar. Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 406-07 (Tex.1998). We set aside the fact finding only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex.1986). Initially, we note that the jury was asked to determine Grace’s damages for the breach of contract the court had found. The question was worded as follows: What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, w pp.Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (measuring sufficiency of damages evidence against commonly understood meaning of undefined term used in charge); see also Equistar Chems., L.P. v. Dresser-Rand Co., 240 S.W.3d 864, 868 (Tex.2007) (holding argument that charge submitted improper measure of damages was waived by failure to object in trial court" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n“I don’t recall the incident like that, but I do recall him putting it in the report like that,” Id. at p. 36, lines 14-18. 3 The “sufficient notice” element of the standard requires the court to examine the situation from the objective perspective of “a reasonable person who has been subjected to the conduct which forms the basis for the plaintiffs complaint.” Doe v. Creighton, 439 Mass. at 284 (quoting Riley v. Presnell, 409 Mass. 239, 245 (1991)). 4 In his opposition to summary judgment, Martin submitted an affidavit stating that he did not read the evaluation report until 2005. This affidavit squarely contradicts his deposition testimony as referenced in Footnote 2, and is therefore not taken into consideration. See O'Brien v. Analog Devices, Inc., 34 Mass.App.Ct. 905, 906 (1993) (holding that subsequent affidavit contradicting prior sworn testimony does not create genuine issue of fact", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n“I don’t recall the incident like that, but I do recall him putting it in the report like that,” Id. at p. 36, lines 14-18. 3 The “sufficient notice” element of the standard requires the court to examine the situation from the objective perspective of “a reasonable person who has been subjected to the conduct which forms the basis for the plaintiffs complaint.” Doe v. Creighton, 439 Mass. at 284 (quoting Riley v. Presnell, 409 Mass. 239, 245 (1991)). 4 In his opposition to summary judgment, Martin submitted an affidavit stating that he did not read the evaluation report until 2005. This affidavit squarely contradicts his deposition testimony as referenced in Footnote 2, and is therefore not taken into consideration. See O'Brien v. Analog Devices, Inc., 34 Mass.App.Ct. 905, 906 (1993) (holding that inconsistencies in the summary judgment evidence of a single witness create a fact issue", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n“I don’t recall the incident like that, but I do recall him putting it in the report like that,” Id. at p. 36, lines 14-18. 3 The “sufficient notice” element of the standard requires the court to examine the situation from the objective perspective of “a reasonable person who has been subjected to the conduct which forms the basis for the plaintiffs complaint.” Doe v. Creighton, 439 Mass. at 284 (quoting Riley v. Presnell, 409 Mass. 239, 245 (1991)). 4 In his opposition to summary judgment, Martin submitted an affidavit stating that he did not read the evaluation report until 2005. This affidavit squarely contradicts his deposition testimony as referenced in Footnote 2, and is therefore not taken into consideration. See O'Brien v. Analog Devices, Inc., 34 Mass.App.Ct. 905, 906 (1993) (holding that it is well settled that a plaintiff may not create a factual issue for the purpose of defeating a motion for summary judgment by filing an affidavit contradicting a statement the plaintiff made in a prior deposition", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n“I don’t recall the incident like that, but I do recall him putting it in the report like that,” Id. at p. 36, lines 14-18. 3 The “sufficient notice” element of the standard requires the court to examine the situation from the objective perspective of “a reasonable person who has been subjected to the conduct which forms the basis for the plaintiffs complaint.” Doe v. Creighton, 439 Mass. at 284 (quoting Riley v. Presnell, 409 Mass. 239, 245 (1991)). 4 In his opposition to summary judgment, Martin submitted an affidavit stating that he did not read the evaluation report until 2005. This affidavit squarely contradicts his deposition testimony as referenced in Footnote 2, and is therefore not taken into consideration. See O'Brien v. Analog Devices, Inc., 34 Mass.App.Ct. 905, 906 (1993) (holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n“I don’t recall the incident like that, but I do recall him putting it in the report like that,” Id. at p. 36, lines 14-18. 3 The “sufficient notice” element of the standard requires the court to examine the situation from the objective perspective of “a reasonable person who has been subjected to the conduct which forms the basis for the plaintiffs complaint.” Doe v. Creighton, 439 Mass. at 284 (quoting Riley v. Presnell, 409 Mass. 239, 245 (1991)). 4 In his opposition to summary judgment, Martin submitted an affidavit stating that he did not read the evaluation report until 2005. This affidavit squarely contradicts his deposition testimony as referenced in Footnote 2, and is therefore not taken into consideration. See O'Brien v. Analog Devices, Inc., 34 Mass.App.Ct. 905, 906 (1993) (holding that a plaintiff cannot create an issue of material fact to defeat summary judgment through an affidavit that contradicts prior testimony" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nre Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed.Cir.1999). “The absence of ... a suggestion to combine is dispositive in an obviousness determination.” Gambro Lundia AB v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 110 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed.Cir.1997). 3. Remaining Issues of Fact The parties dispute the extent to which the prior art could have suggested its combination to create the ’014 patent. (PL Reply Memo, on Validity at 9; Def. Memo, on Validity at 8). That determination, whether there is a suggestion or motivation to modify a prior art reference, is a question of fact to be decided prior to the ultimate conclusion of obviousness. SIBIA Neurosciences, Inc. v. Cadus Pharmaceutical Corp., 225 F.3d 1349, 1356 (Fed.Cir. 2000); Tec Air, Inc. v. Denso Manufacturing Michigan, Inc., 192 F.3d 1353, 1359 (Fed.Cir.l999)(holding that factual underpinnings of obviousness include whether reference provides motivation to combine its teachings with those of another reference", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nre Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed.Cir.1999). “The absence of ... a suggestion to combine is dispositive in an obviousness determination.” Gambro Lundia AB v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 110 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed.Cir.1997). 3. Remaining Issues of Fact The parties dispute the extent to which the prior art could have suggested its combination to create the ’014 patent. (PL Reply Memo, on Validity at 9; Def. Memo, on Validity at 8). That determination, whether there is a suggestion or motivation to modify a prior art reference, is a question of fact to be decided prior to the ultimate conclusion of obviousness. SIBIA Neurosciences, Inc. v. Cadus Pharmaceutical Corp., 225 F.3d 1349, 1356 (Fed.Cir. 2000); Tec Air, Inc. v. Denso Manufacturing Michigan, Inc., 192 F.3d 1353, 1359 (Fed.Cir.l999)(holding that obviousness is determined entirely with reference to a hypothetical person having ordinary skill in the art and the actual inventors skill is irrelevant to the obviousness inquiry", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nre Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed.Cir.1999). “The absence of ... a suggestion to combine is dispositive in an obviousness determination.” Gambro Lundia AB v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 110 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed.Cir.1997). 3. Remaining Issues of Fact The parties dispute the extent to which the prior art could have suggested its combination to create the ’014 patent. (PL Reply Memo, on Validity at 9; Def. Memo, on Validity at 8). That determination, whether there is a suggestion or motivation to modify a prior art reference, is a question of fact to be decided prior to the ultimate conclusion of obviousness. SIBIA Neurosciences, Inc. v. Cadus Pharmaceutical Corp., 225 F.3d 1349, 1356 (Fed.Cir. 2000); Tec Air, Inc. v. Denso Manufacturing Michigan, Inc., 192 F.3d 1353, 1359 (Fed.Cir.l999)(holding of obviousness affirmed on the basis of the teachings of the prior art references in combination not on the basis of the contemporaneous invention", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nre Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed.Cir.1999). “The absence of ... a suggestion to combine is dispositive in an obviousness determination.” Gambro Lundia AB v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 110 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed.Cir.1997). 3. Remaining Issues of Fact The parties dispute the extent to which the prior art could have suggested its combination to create the ’014 patent. (PL Reply Memo, on Validity at 9; Def. Memo, on Validity at 8). That determination, whether there is a suggestion or motivation to modify a prior art reference, is a question of fact to be decided prior to the ultimate conclusion of obviousness. SIBIA Neurosciences, Inc. v. Cadus Pharmaceutical Corp., 225 F.3d 1349, 1356 (Fed.Cir. 2000); Tec Air, Inc. v. Denso Manufacturing Michigan, Inc., 192 F.3d 1353, 1359 (Fed.Cir.l999)(holding that obviousness analysis may include recourse to logic judgment and common sense available to a person of ordinary skill that do not necessarily require explication in any reference or expert opinion", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nre Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed.Cir.1999). “The absence of ... a suggestion to combine is dispositive in an obviousness determination.” Gambro Lundia AB v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 110 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed.Cir.1997). 3. Remaining Issues of Fact The parties dispute the extent to which the prior art could have suggested its combination to create the ’014 patent. (PL Reply Memo, on Validity at 9; Def. Memo, on Validity at 8). That determination, whether there is a suggestion or motivation to modify a prior art reference, is a question of fact to be decided prior to the ultimate conclusion of obviousness. SIBIA Neurosciences, Inc. v. Cadus Pharmaceutical Corp., 225 F.3d 1349, 1356 (Fed.Cir. 2000); Tec Air, Inc. v. Denso Manufacturing Michigan, Inc., 192 F.3d 1353, 1359 (Fed.Cir.l999)(holding that reference to ordinance is not improper reference to an external document because injunction sufficiently describes the act sought to be enjoined and reference to the ordinance as stated in the injunction is merely to give further notice as to the enjoined conduct but the reference was unnecessary to give the appellants sufficient notice of that conduct" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\njobs are not the same; therefore, they are not equal. Much of the precedent regarding unequal jobs involves comparing two jobs with a common core of duties, but with the higher-paid job having additional duties. See, e.g., Horn v. Univ. of Minn., 362 F.3d 1042, 1045-46 (8th Cir.2004) (finding that the jobs of two hockey coaches were not equal because the female hockey coach served as a public representative to the hockey team, in addition to the administrative duties she had in common with the male hockey coach), McLaughlin v. Esselte Pendaflex Corp., 50 F.3d 507, 513-14 (8th Cir.1995) (finding two jobs not equal because male employee performed other tasks in addition to the tasks female employee had previously performed), Krenik v. County of Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 961 (8th Cir.1995) (holding two maintenance employees jobs not equal where male maintenance engineer had supervisory duties in addition to the job functions that female assistant performed", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\njobs are not the same; therefore, they are not equal. Much of the precedent regarding unequal jobs involves comparing two jobs with a common core of duties, but with the higher-paid job having additional duties. See, e.g., Horn v. Univ. of Minn., 362 F.3d 1042, 1045-46 (8th Cir.2004) (finding that the jobs of two hockey coaches were not equal because the female hockey coach served as a public representative to the hockey team, in addition to the administrative duties she had in common with the male hockey coach), McLaughlin v. Esselte Pendaflex Corp., 50 F.3d 507, 513-14 (8th Cir.1995) (finding two jobs not equal because male employee performed other tasks in addition to the tasks female employee had previously performed), Krenik v. County of Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 961 (8th Cir.1995) (holding that a change in job duties was not an adverse employment action where the new job duties did not constitute qualitatively inferior work requiring any less skill or knowledge", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\njobs are not the same; therefore, they are not equal. Much of the precedent regarding unequal jobs involves comparing two jobs with a common core of duties, but with the higher-paid job having additional duties. See, e.g., Horn v. Univ. of Minn., 362 F.3d 1042, 1045-46 (8th Cir.2004) (finding that the jobs of two hockey coaches were not equal because the female hockey coach served as a public representative to the hockey team, in addition to the administrative duties she had in common with the male hockey coach), McLaughlin v. Esselte Pendaflex Corp., 50 F.3d 507, 513-14 (8th Cir.1995) (finding two jobs not equal because male employee performed other tasks in addition to the tasks female employee had previously performed), Krenik v. County of Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 961 (8th Cir.1995) (holding that under the first amendment speech can be pursuant to a public employees official job duties even though it is not required by or included in the employees job description or in response to a request by the employer", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\njobs are not the same; therefore, they are not equal. Much of the precedent regarding unequal jobs involves comparing two jobs with a common core of duties, but with the higher-paid job having additional duties. See, e.g., Horn v. Univ. of Minn., 362 F.3d 1042, 1045-46 (8th Cir.2004) (finding that the jobs of two hockey coaches were not equal because the female hockey coach served as a public representative to the hockey team, in addition to the administrative duties she had in common with the male hockey coach), McLaughlin v. Esselte Pendaflex Corp., 50 F.3d 507, 513-14 (8th Cir.1995) (finding two jobs not equal because male employee performed other tasks in addition to the tasks female employee had previously performed), Krenik v. County of Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 961 (8th Cir.1995) (holding that an employers policy requiring female employees to make larger pension fund contributions than male employees was discriminatory on its face in violation of title vii", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\njobs are not the same; therefore, they are not equal. Much of the precedent regarding unequal jobs involves comparing two jobs with a common core of duties, but with the higher-paid job having additional duties. See, e.g., Horn v. Univ. of Minn., 362 F.3d 1042, 1045-46 (8th Cir.2004) (finding that the jobs of two hockey coaches were not equal because the female hockey coach served as a public representative to the hockey team, in addition to the administrative duties she had in common with the male hockey coach), McLaughlin v. Esselte Pendaflex Corp., 50 F.3d 507, 513-14 (8th Cir.1995) (finding two jobs not equal because male employee performed other tasks in addition to the tasks female employee had previously performed), Krenik v. County of Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 961 (8th Cir.1995) (holding that garcetti barred claims involving speech not necessarily required by the plaintiffs job duties but nevertheless related to his job duties" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\none. We do not anticipate an escalation of such claims. The Legislature has provided a remedy to members of the public injured by “failure on the part of a public entity to provide an emergency warning signal or device when a condition exists constituting a ‘trap’ to a person using a street or highway with due care.” N.J.S.A. 59:4-4 comment. But the Legislature has closely limited that remedy by requiring compliance with N.J.S.A 59:4-2, which, among other things, requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition and that the public entity’s conduct was “palpably unreasonable.” Those requirements are difficult to meet. See, e.g., DeBonis v. Orange Quarry Co., 233 N.J.Super. 156, 170-71, 558 A.2d 474 (App.Div.1989) (holding that warrantless search as probation condition was a valid limitation to the defendants fourth amendment rights when defendant asserted the condition was not reasonably related to rehabilitation", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\none. We do not anticipate an escalation of such claims. The Legislature has provided a remedy to members of the public injured by “failure on the part of a public entity to provide an emergency warning signal or device when a condition exists constituting a ‘trap’ to a person using a street or highway with due care.” N.J.S.A. 59:4-4 comment. But the Legislature has closely limited that remedy by requiring compliance with N.J.S.A 59:4-2, which, among other things, requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition and that the public entity’s conduct was “palpably unreasonable.” Those requirements are difficult to meet. See, e.g., DeBonis v. Orange Quarry Co., 233 N.J.Super. 156, 170-71, 558 A.2d 474 (App.Div.1989) (holding that contractor owed general negligence duty to thirdparty by dangerous condition contractor created on road", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\none. We do not anticipate an escalation of such claims. The Legislature has provided a remedy to members of the public injured by “failure on the part of a public entity to provide an emergency warning signal or device when a condition exists constituting a ‘trap’ to a person using a street or highway with due care.” N.J.S.A. 59:4-4 comment. But the Legislature has closely limited that remedy by requiring compliance with N.J.S.A 59:4-2, which, among other things, requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition and that the public entity’s conduct was “palpably unreasonable.” Those requirements are difficult to meet. See, e.g., DeBonis v. Orange Quarry Co., 233 N.J.Super. 156, 170-71, 558 A.2d 474 (App.Div.1989) (recognizing that duty to warn of dangerous conditions could be based on constructive knowledge of that condition as well as actual knowledge", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\none. We do not anticipate an escalation of such claims. The Legislature has provided a remedy to members of the public injured by “failure on the part of a public entity to provide an emergency warning signal or device when a condition exists constituting a ‘trap’ to a person using a street or highway with due care.” N.J.S.A. 59:4-4 comment. But the Legislature has closely limited that remedy by requiring compliance with N.J.S.A 59:4-2, which, among other things, requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition and that the public entity’s conduct was “palpably unreasonable.” Those requirements are difficult to meet. See, e.g., DeBonis v. Orange Quarry Co., 233 N.J.Super. 156, 170-71, 558 A.2d 474 (App.Div.1989) (recognizing that before a special condition of probation may be imposed there must be an oral pronouncement of the condition at sentencing", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\none. We do not anticipate an escalation of such claims. The Legislature has provided a remedy to members of the public injured by “failure on the part of a public entity to provide an emergency warning signal or device when a condition exists constituting a ‘trap’ to a person using a street or highway with due care.” N.J.S.A. 59:4-4 comment. But the Legislature has closely limited that remedy by requiring compliance with N.J.S.A 59:4-2, which, among other things, requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition and that the public entity’s conduct was “palpably unreasonable.” Those requirements are difficult to meet. See, e.g., DeBonis v. Orange Quarry Co., 233 N.J.Super. 156, 170-71, 558 A.2d 474 (App.Div.1989) (holding that countys general knowledge that stones from quarry would occasionally create dangerous condition on road surface was insufficient to impute to county constructive knowledge of condition of road at time of motorcyclists accident because condition was dynamic rather than static and was not predictably recurrent" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndistinguishable from this case because there the Court sought to prevent a declaratory judgment action from being used to prejudice a plaintiff in the underlying tort action who was not a party to the declaratory judgment action. Id. at 407-08, 347 A.2d 842. Nevertheless, we find Brohawn persuasive to the extent that it articulates one of many considerations that weigh on the question as to whether a declaratory judgment action is proper. We further find persuasive decisions arising from the courts of other jurisdictions that have refused to endorse the usurping of the jurisdiction of a court with concurrent jurisdiction through the failure to permit the matter to be resolved in its original forum. See, e.g., First Midwest Corp. v. Corp. Fin. Assoc., 663 N.W.2d 888, 892-93 (Iowa 2003) (holding not an abuse of discretion to deny funds", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndistinguishable from this case because there the Court sought to prevent a declaratory judgment action from being used to prejudice a plaintiff in the underlying tort action who was not a party to the declaratory judgment action. Id. at 407-08, 347 A.2d 842. Nevertheless, we find Brohawn persuasive to the extent that it articulates one of many considerations that weigh on the question as to whether a declaratory judgment action is proper. We further find persuasive decisions arising from the courts of other jurisdictions that have refused to endorse the usurping of the jurisdiction of a court with concurrent jurisdiction through the failure to permit the matter to be resolved in its original forum. See, e.g., First Midwest Corp. v. Corp. Fin. Assoc., 663 N.W.2d 888, 892-93 (Iowa 2003) (holding that it was an abuse of discretion to deny stay while matter was pending in neighboring state", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndistinguishable from this case because there the Court sought to prevent a declaratory judgment action from being used to prejudice a plaintiff in the underlying tort action who was not a party to the declaratory judgment action. Id. at 407-08, 347 A.2d 842. Nevertheless, we find Brohawn persuasive to the extent that it articulates one of many considerations that weigh on the question as to whether a declaratory judgment action is proper. We further find persuasive decisions arising from the courts of other jurisdictions that have refused to endorse the usurping of the jurisdiction of a court with concurrent jurisdiction through the failure to permit the matter to be resolved in its original forum. See, e.g., First Midwest Corp. v. Corp. Fin. Assoc., 663 N.W.2d 888, 892-93 (Iowa 2003) (holding it was not an abuse of discretion to deny funds", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndistinguishable from this case because there the Court sought to prevent a declaratory judgment action from being used to prejudice a plaintiff in the underlying tort action who was not a party to the declaratory judgment action. Id. at 407-08, 347 A.2d 842. Nevertheless, we find Brohawn persuasive to the extent that it articulates one of many considerations that weigh on the question as to whether a declaratory judgment action is proper. We further find persuasive decisions arising from the courts of other jurisdictions that have refused to endorse the usurping of the jurisdiction of a court with concurrent jurisdiction through the failure to permit the matter to be resolved in its original forum. See, e.g., First Midwest Corp. v. Corp. Fin. Assoc., 663 N.W.2d 888, 892-93 (Iowa 2003) (holding that it was an abuse of discretion for a district court not to stay an exhausted petition pending exhaustion of a newly discovered claim", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndistinguishable from this case because there the Court sought to prevent a declaratory judgment action from being used to prejudice a plaintiff in the underlying tort action who was not a party to the declaratory judgment action. Id. at 407-08, 347 A.2d 842. Nevertheless, we find Brohawn persuasive to the extent that it articulates one of many considerations that weigh on the question as to whether a declaratory judgment action is proper. We further find persuasive decisions arising from the courts of other jurisdictions that have refused to endorse the usurping of the jurisdiction of a court with concurrent jurisdiction through the failure to permit the matter to be resolved in its original forum. See, e.g., First Midwest Corp. v. Corp. Fin. Assoc., 663 N.W.2d 888, 892-93 (Iowa 2003) (holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to deny an award of attorneys fees to the wife" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof her appeal, and thereby “failed to exercise due diligence in pursuing her rights”). Here we agree with the BIA that even if Acquaah’s motions were found to be timely, he would still not be entitled to relief because, as explained below, he has not shown that he missed his hearing due to exceptional circumstances. Acquaah does not dispute that he had proper notice of the hearing date and does not allege that he was ill or in custody at the time of his hearing. Rather, he asserts that had Kloek promptly filed a motion to reopen — which Klock all 92) (affirming the denial of motion to reopen where an alien appeared ten minutes late at a hearing because he and his attorney had “crossed signals” about where to meet); but see Barseghian v. INS, 14 Fed.Appx. 806, 807 (9th Cir.2001) (holding that the date of sale for an installment contract was the date of contract formation not the date of the last payment due", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof her appeal, and thereby “failed to exercise due diligence in pursuing her rights”). Here we agree with the BIA that even if Acquaah’s motions were found to be timely, he would still not be entitled to relief because, as explained below, he has not shown that he missed his hearing due to exceptional circumstances. Acquaah does not dispute that he had proper notice of the hearing date and does not allege that he was ill or in custody at the time of his hearing. Rather, he asserts that had Kloek promptly filed a motion to reopen — which Klock all 92) (affirming the denial of motion to reopen where an alien appeared ten minutes late at a hearing because he and his attorney had “crossed signals” about where to meet); but see Barseghian v. INS, 14 Fed.Appx. 806, 807 (9th Cir.2001) (holding that where surety was given until date of forfeiture hearing to produce defendant and defendant was killed by police before that date bond would not be forfeited", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof her appeal, and thereby “failed to exercise due diligence in pursuing her rights”). Here we agree with the BIA that even if Acquaah’s motions were found to be timely, he would still not be entitled to relief because, as explained below, he has not shown that he missed his hearing due to exceptional circumstances. Acquaah does not dispute that he had proper notice of the hearing date and does not allege that he was ill or in custody at the time of his hearing. Rather, he asserts that had Kloek promptly filed a motion to reopen — which Klock all 92) (affirming the denial of motion to reopen where an alien appeared ten minutes late at a hearing because he and his attorney had “crossed signals” about where to meet); but see Barseghian v. INS, 14 Fed.Appx. 806, 807 (9th Cir.2001) (holding that the date of the federal indictment not the date of the state arrest was the triggering date for the speedytrial act", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof her appeal, and thereby “failed to exercise due diligence in pursuing her rights”). Here we agree with the BIA that even if Acquaah’s motions were found to be timely, he would still not be entitled to relief because, as explained below, he has not shown that he missed his hearing due to exceptional circumstances. Acquaah does not dispute that he had proper notice of the hearing date and does not allege that he was ill or in custody at the time of his hearing. Rather, he asserts that had Kloek promptly filed a motion to reopen — which Klock all 92) (affirming the denial of motion to reopen where an alien appeared ten minutes late at a hearing because he and his attorney had “crossed signals” about where to meet); but see Barseghian v. INS, 14 Fed.Appx. 806, 807 (9th Cir.2001) (holding that trial courts resetting of hearing date for motion for summary judgment made timely summaryjudgment evidence that had been untimely based on hearing date in effect when the evidence was filed and served", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof her appeal, and thereby “failed to exercise due diligence in pursuing her rights”). Here we agree with the BIA that even if Acquaah’s motions were found to be timely, he would still not be entitled to relief because, as explained below, he has not shown that he missed his hearing due to exceptional circumstances. Acquaah does not dispute that he had proper notice of the hearing date and does not allege that he was ill or in custody at the time of his hearing. Rather, he asserts that had Kloek promptly filed a motion to reopen — which Klock all 92) (affirming the denial of motion to reopen where an alien appeared ten minutes late at a hearing because he and his attorney had “crossed signals” about where to meet); but see Barseghian v. INS, 14 Fed.Appx. 806, 807 (9th Cir.2001) (holding in a twopage unpublished opinion without supporting caselaw that exceptional circumstances existed where an alien misunderstood a court interpreter to say that his hearing date was a week later than the date of the actual hearing" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhas standing to require compliance with that provision.”). Cf. Zenith Radio Corp., 437 U.S. at 457-58, 98 S.Ct. 2441 (noting the reliance interests of foreign producers on both the continuity of U.S. laws, and the adherence to international legal principles); Made in the USA Found., 242 F.3d at 1318. Because prudential standing is satisfied when the injury asserted by a plaintiff “ ‘arguably [falls] within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute ... in question,’ ” Akins, 524 U.S. at 20, 118 S.Ct. 1777 (quoting NCUA, 522 U.S. at 488, 118 S.Ct. 927), there are no prudential standing restraints to bar Plaintiffs’ claims here, accord United Food & Commer. Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 555-58, 116 S.Ct. 1529, 134 L.Ed.2d 758 (1996) (holding that article iii constitutional standing must be addressed before considering lanham act prudential standing", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhas standing to require compliance with that provision.”). Cf. Zenith Radio Corp., 437 U.S. at 457-58, 98 S.Ct. 2441 (noting the reliance interests of foreign producers on both the continuity of U.S. laws, and the adherence to international legal principles); Made in the USA Found., 242 F.3d at 1318. Because prudential standing is satisfied when the injury asserted by a plaintiff “ ‘arguably [falls] within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute ... in question,’ ” Akins, 524 U.S. at 20, 118 S.Ct. 1777 (quoting NCUA, 522 U.S. at 488, 118 S.Ct. 927), there are no prudential standing restraints to bar Plaintiffs’ claims here, accord United Food & Commer. Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 555-58, 116 S.Ct. 1529, 134 L.Ed.2d 758 (1996) (holding that congress may dispense with prudential standing requirements", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhas standing to require compliance with that provision.”). Cf. Zenith Radio Corp., 437 U.S. at 457-58, 98 S.Ct. 2441 (noting the reliance interests of foreign producers on both the continuity of U.S. laws, and the adherence to international legal principles); Made in the USA Found., 242 F.3d at 1318. Because prudential standing is satisfied when the injury asserted by a plaintiff “ ‘arguably [falls] within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute ... in question,’ ” Akins, 524 U.S. at 20, 118 S.Ct. 1777 (quoting NCUA, 522 U.S. at 488, 118 S.Ct. 927), there are no prudential standing restraints to bar Plaintiffs’ claims here, accord United Food & Commer. Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 555-58, 116 S.Ct. 1529, 134 L.Ed.2d 758 (1996) (holding that constitutional requirements under article iii and prudential requirement that plaintiffs be the proper proponents of the particular legal rights on which they base their suits are distinct aspects of standing inquiry", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhas standing to require compliance with that provision.”). Cf. Zenith Radio Corp., 437 U.S. at 457-58, 98 S.Ct. 2441 (noting the reliance interests of foreign producers on both the continuity of U.S. laws, and the adherence to international legal principles); Made in the USA Found., 242 F.3d at 1318. Because prudential standing is satisfied when the injury asserted by a plaintiff “ ‘arguably [falls] within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute ... in question,’ ” Akins, 524 U.S. at 20, 118 S.Ct. 1777 (quoting NCUA, 522 U.S. at 488, 118 S.Ct. 927), there are no prudential standing restraints to bar Plaintiffs’ claims here, accord United Food & Commer. Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 555-58, 116 S.Ct. 1529, 134 L.Ed.2d 758 (1996) (recognizing prudential concerns underlying antitrust standing restrictions", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhas standing to require compliance with that provision.”). Cf. Zenith Radio Corp., 437 U.S. at 457-58, 98 S.Ct. 2441 (noting the reliance interests of foreign producers on both the continuity of U.S. laws, and the adherence to international legal principles); Made in the USA Found., 242 F.3d at 1318. Because prudential standing is satisfied when the injury asserted by a plaintiff “ ‘arguably [falls] within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute ... in question,’ ” Akins, 524 U.S. at 20, 118 S.Ct. 1777 (quoting NCUA, 522 U.S. at 488, 118 S.Ct. 927), there are no prudential standing restraints to bar Plaintiffs’ claims here, accord United Food & Commer. Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 555-58, 116 S.Ct. 1529, 134 L.Ed.2d 758 (1996) (holding that plaintiffs may not circumvent the requirements for prudential standing by relying on forms of relief that benefit the public at large" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nLikewise, whereas the qualifications to serve as a probate or juvenile judge of the city and county of Denver are set forth in Colorado Constitution article VI, sections 14 and 15, respectively, the term of office is set forth for both judges by reference to Colorado Constitution article VI, section 10(2). I agree that our decision in In re Title, Ballot Title and Submission Clause, and Summary for 1997-1998 # 64, 960 P.2d 1192, 1197 n. 11 (Colo.1998), includes a footnote that suggests that a single initiative which sought to alter the manner in which judges are nominated, appointed and retained, judicial terms of office, and term limits would not violate the single-subject mandate of section 1(5.5), so long as the subject of the initiative was qualific .2d 1205, 1211 (Colo. 1994) (holding that the colorado constitution reserves no authority in the state legislature to change add to or diminish the qualifications for constitutionally created offices", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nLikewise, whereas the qualifications to serve as a probate or juvenile judge of the city and county of Denver are set forth in Colorado Constitution article VI, sections 14 and 15, respectively, the term of office is set forth for both judges by reference to Colorado Constitution article VI, section 10(2). I agree that our decision in In re Title, Ballot Title and Submission Clause, and Summary for 1997-1998 # 64, 960 P.2d 1192, 1197 n. 11 (Colo.1998), includes a footnote that suggests that a single initiative which sought to alter the manner in which judges are nominated, appointed and retained, judicial terms of office, and term limits would not violate the single-subject mandate of section 1(5.5), so long as the subject of the initiative was qualific .2d 1205, 1211 (Colo. 1994) (holding that in order for there to be state debt in the constitutional sense one legislature in effect must obligate a future legislature to appropriate funds to discharge the debt created by the first legislature", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nLikewise, whereas the qualifications to serve as a probate or juvenile judge of the city and county of Denver are set forth in Colorado Constitution article VI, sections 14 and 15, respectively, the term of office is set forth for both judges by reference to Colorado Constitution article VI, section 10(2). I agree that our decision in In re Title, Ballot Title and Submission Clause, and Summary for 1997-1998 # 64, 960 P.2d 1192, 1197 n. 11 (Colo.1998), includes a footnote that suggests that a single initiative which sought to alter the manner in which judges are nominated, appointed and retained, judicial terms of office, and term limits would not violate the single-subject mandate of section 1(5.5), so long as the subject of the initiative was qualific .2d 1205, 1211 (Colo. 1994) (holding that the requirement that the county seek recommendations for appointments to a civil office from a private corporation was not constitutionally repugnant because where the office was created by the legislature the legislature retains the control over that offices method of appointment", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nLikewise, whereas the qualifications to serve as a probate or juvenile judge of the city and county of Denver are set forth in Colorado Constitution article VI, sections 14 and 15, respectively, the term of office is set forth for both judges by reference to Colorado Constitution article VI, section 10(2). I agree that our decision in In re Title, Ballot Title and Submission Clause, and Summary for 1997-1998 # 64, 960 P.2d 1192, 1197 n. 11 (Colo.1998), includes a footnote that suggests that a single initiative which sought to alter the manner in which judges are nominated, appointed and retained, judicial terms of office, and term limits would not violate the single-subject mandate of section 1(5.5), so long as the subject of the initiative was qualific .2d 1205, 1211 (Colo. 1994) (holding that state legislature may at pleasure create or abolish public offices", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nLikewise, whereas the qualifications to serve as a probate or juvenile judge of the city and county of Denver are set forth in Colorado Constitution article VI, sections 14 and 15, respectively, the term of office is set forth for both judges by reference to Colorado Constitution article VI, section 10(2). I agree that our decision in In re Title, Ballot Title and Submission Clause, and Summary for 1997-1998 # 64, 960 P.2d 1192, 1197 n. 11 (Colo.1998), includes a footnote that suggests that a single initiative which sought to alter the manner in which judges are nominated, appointed and retained, judicial terms of office, and term limits would not violate the single-subject mandate of section 1(5.5), so long as the subject of the initiative was qualific .2d 1205, 1211 (Colo. 1994) (recognizing that provisions of the colorado constitution should be construed in the context of the constitution as a whole" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\ncompeting motion for summary judgment. We overrule Faucette and Schadler’s first issue. Damages for Breach of Option Contract In their second issue, Faucette and Schadler contend that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to prove damages for breach of contract. They argue that Grace was awarded what she would have received from the sale of the remaining shares of Sarco without any evidence of the value of the shares she should have surrendered in the transaction. According to Faucette and Schadler, proper proof of damages required not only evidence of the amount Grace would have received had the sale of the shares been performed, but also evidence of the value of the shares she would have surrendered in the transaction. See Miga v. Jensen, 96 S.W.3d 207, 215 (Tex.2002) (holding merely that to the extent a breaching party claims that the appropriate measure of damages is the difference between the contract price and the market price it holds the burden of proving that there is in fact an available market for the goods in issue", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\ncompeting motion for summary judgment. We overrule Faucette and Schadler’s first issue. Damages for Breach of Option Contract In their second issue, Faucette and Schadler contend that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to prove damages for breach of contract. They argue that Grace was awarded what she would have received from the sale of the remaining shares of Sarco without any evidence of the value of the shares she should have surrendered in the transaction. According to Faucette and Schadler, proper proof of damages required not only evidence of the amount Grace would have received had the sale of the shares been performed, but also evidence of the value of the shares she would have surrendered in the transaction. See Miga v. Jensen, 96 S.W.3d 207, 215 (Tex.2002) (recognizing that breach of contract cause of action accrues at time of the breach", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\ncompeting motion for summary judgment. We overrule Faucette and Schadler’s first issue. Damages for Breach of Option Contract In their second issue, Faucette and Schadler contend that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to prove damages for breach of contract. They argue that Grace was awarded what she would have received from the sale of the remaining shares of Sarco without any evidence of the value of the shares she should have surrendered in the transaction. According to Faucette and Schadler, proper proof of damages required not only evidence of the amount Grace would have received had the sale of the shares been performed, but also evidence of the value of the shares she would have surrendered in the transaction. See Miga v. Jensen, 96 S.W.3d 207, 215 (Tex.2002) (holding that a cause of action for breach of contract accrues at the time of the breach", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\ncompeting motion for summary judgment. We overrule Faucette and Schadler’s first issue. Damages for Breach of Option Contract In their second issue, Faucette and Schadler contend that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to prove damages for breach of contract. They argue that Grace was awarded what she would have received from the sale of the remaining shares of Sarco without any evidence of the value of the shares she should have surrendered in the transaction. According to Faucette and Schadler, proper proof of damages required not only evidence of the amount Grace would have received had the sale of the shares been performed, but also evidence of the value of the shares she would have surrendered in the transaction. See Miga v. Jensen, 96 S.W.3d 207, 215 (Tex.2002) (holding that the measure of damages for the breach of a contract of sale where no fraud is shown is the difference between the contract price and the market price of the goods on the date of the breach", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\ncompeting motion for summary judgment. We overrule Faucette and Schadler’s first issue. Damages for Breach of Option Contract In their second issue, Faucette and Schadler contend that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to prove damages for breach of contract. They argue that Grace was awarded what she would have received from the sale of the remaining shares of Sarco without any evidence of the value of the shares she should have surrendered in the transaction. According to Faucette and Schadler, proper proof of damages required not only evidence of the amount Grace would have received had the sale of the shares been performed, but also evidence of the value of the shares she would have surrendered in the transaction. See Miga v. Jensen, 96 S.W.3d 207, 215 (Tex.2002) (holding damage award resulting from a breach of an agreement to purchase securities is the difference between the contract price and the fair market value of the asset at the time of the breach" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nof Jotun’s defense costs have not been recovered, Jotun may be reimbursed for the reasonable costs of defense paid by Jotun and not paid by Zurich. See Coleman, 418 F.3d at 525; Smith v. Reliance Ins. Co. of Ill., 807 So.2d 1010, 1022 (La.Ct.App.2002) (“[The insurer] must underwrite reasonable costs incurred by the insured.”). G. Jotun’s Ability To Recover Attorney’s Fees Incurred in the Instant Lawsuit With respect to Jotun’s claims that it be reimbursed for attorney’s fees and costs in this action, Liberty argues that Jotun cannot recover these fees pursuant to Louisiana law. Jotun claims that Louisiana Revised Statutes §§ 22:658 and 22:1220 provide an award of attorney’s fees as a result of its having to enforce Liberty’s duty to defend. “ g, PA., 691 So.2d 715, 727 (La.Ct.App.1997) (holding that insurers failure to deny existence of insurance coverage under policy at issue was to admit that coverage existed", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nof Jotun’s defense costs have not been recovered, Jotun may be reimbursed for the reasonable costs of defense paid by Jotun and not paid by Zurich. See Coleman, 418 F.3d at 525; Smith v. Reliance Ins. Co. of Ill., 807 So.2d 1010, 1022 (La.Ct.App.2002) (“[The insurer] must underwrite reasonable costs incurred by the insured.”). G. Jotun’s Ability To Recover Attorney’s Fees Incurred in the Instant Lawsuit With respect to Jotun’s claims that it be reimbursed for attorney’s fees and costs in this action, Liberty argues that Jotun cannot recover these fees pursuant to Louisiana law. Jotun claims that Louisiana Revised Statutes §§ 22:658 and 22:1220 provide an award of attorney’s fees as a result of its having to enforce Liberty’s duty to defend. “ g, PA., 691 So.2d 715, 727 (La.Ct.App.1997) (holding that insured may recover attorneys fees from insurer where insurer acts in bad faith", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nof Jotun’s defense costs have not been recovered, Jotun may be reimbursed for the reasonable costs of defense paid by Jotun and not paid by Zurich. See Coleman, 418 F.3d at 525; Smith v. Reliance Ins. Co. of Ill., 807 So.2d 1010, 1022 (La.Ct.App.2002) (“[The insurer] must underwrite reasonable costs incurred by the insured.”). G. Jotun’s Ability To Recover Attorney’s Fees Incurred in the Instant Lawsuit With respect to Jotun’s claims that it be reimbursed for attorney’s fees and costs in this action, Liberty argues that Jotun cannot recover these fees pursuant to Louisiana law. Jotun claims that Louisiana Revised Statutes §§ 22:658 and 22:1220 provide an award of attorney’s fees as a result of its having to enforce Liberty’s duty to defend. “ g, PA., 691 So.2d 715, 727 (La.Ct.App.1997) (holding that if an insurer denies coverage based on an assertion that the underlying claim is excluded from coverage there is a presumption that the insurer did not suffer prejudice because prompt notice would have merely resulted in an earlier denial of coverage", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nof Jotun’s defense costs have not been recovered, Jotun may be reimbursed for the reasonable costs of defense paid by Jotun and not paid by Zurich. See Coleman, 418 F.3d at 525; Smith v. Reliance Ins. Co. of Ill., 807 So.2d 1010, 1022 (La.Ct.App.2002) (“[The insurer] must underwrite reasonable costs incurred by the insured.”). G. Jotun’s Ability To Recover Attorney’s Fees Incurred in the Instant Lawsuit With respect to Jotun’s claims that it be reimbursed for attorney’s fees and costs in this action, Liberty argues that Jotun cannot recover these fees pursuant to Louisiana law. Jotun claims that Louisiana Revised Statutes §§ 22:658 and 22:1220 provide an award of attorney’s fees as a result of its having to enforce Liberty’s duty to defend. “ g, PA., 691 So.2d 715, 727 (La.Ct.App.1997) (holding that when the insured brings an action for a declaration of coverage and prevails absent a bad faith denial of coverage by the insurer attorneys fees incurred by the insured in the prosecution of that action are not incurred at the request of the insurer", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nof Jotun’s defense costs have not been recovered, Jotun may be reimbursed for the reasonable costs of defense paid by Jotun and not paid by Zurich. See Coleman, 418 F.3d at 525; Smith v. Reliance Ins. Co. of Ill., 807 So.2d 1010, 1022 (La.Ct.App.2002) (“[The insurer] must underwrite reasonable costs incurred by the insured.”). G. Jotun’s Ability To Recover Attorney’s Fees Incurred in the Instant Lawsuit With respect to Jotun’s claims that it be reimbursed for attorney’s fees and costs in this action, Liberty argues that Jotun cannot recover these fees pursuant to Louisiana law. Jotun claims that Louisiana Revised Statutes §§ 22:658 and 22:1220 provide an award of attorney’s fees as a result of its having to enforce Liberty’s duty to defend. “ g, PA., 691 So.2d 715, 727 (La.Ct.App.1997) (holding that an insured could not recover attorneys fees pursuant to 22658 for litigating the coverage issue because the insurer did not act arbitrarily or capriciously and the insurers coverage defense was not frivolous" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthe capacity to prejudice the penalty-phase proceedings of a capital murder case. Erazo, supra, 126 N.J. at 132, 594 A.2d 232; State v. Moore, 113 N.J. 239, 276-77, 550 A.2d 117 (1988). ‘With the stakes so high, the possibility of prejudice on the penalty phase persists as a cause for continuing concern.” Erazo, supra, 126 N.J. at 132, 594 A.2d 232. The use of two juries “commends itself when guilt-phase evidence is so prejudicial that the same jury could not fairly sit on both phases of the trial.” Id. at 133, 594 A.2d 232 (citing Monturi, supra, 195 N.J.Super. 317, 478 A.2d 1266). One instance in which the Court has required separate juries is when the State relies on aggravating factor c(4)(a), conviction of another murder. See Biegenwald IV, supra, 126 N.J. at 43-44, 594 A.2d 172 (recognizing the diminished importance of the state policy factor", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthe capacity to prejudice the penalty-phase proceedings of a capital murder case. Erazo, supra, 126 N.J. at 132, 594 A.2d 232; State v. Moore, 113 N.J. 239, 276-77, 550 A.2d 117 (1988). ‘With the stakes so high, the possibility of prejudice on the penalty phase persists as a cause for continuing concern.” Erazo, supra, 126 N.J. at 132, 594 A.2d 232. The use of two juries “commends itself when guilt-phase evidence is so prejudicial that the same jury could not fairly sit on both phases of the trial.” Id. at 133, 594 A.2d 232 (citing Monturi, supra, 195 N.J.Super. 317, 478 A.2d 1266). One instance in which the Court has required separate juries is when the State relies on aggravating factor c(4)(a), conviction of another murder. See Biegenwald IV, supra, 126 N.J. at 43-44, 594 A.2d 172 (recognizing that our finding that defendant is entitled to voir dire potential jurors on the possible blinding impact of the e4a factor most likely will require a twojury system for all capital cases in which the state seeks to prove that factor", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthe capacity to prejudice the penalty-phase proceedings of a capital murder case. Erazo, supra, 126 N.J. at 132, 594 A.2d 232; State v. Moore, 113 N.J. 239, 276-77, 550 A.2d 117 (1988). ‘With the stakes so high, the possibility of prejudice on the penalty phase persists as a cause for continuing concern.” Erazo, supra, 126 N.J. at 132, 594 A.2d 232. The use of two juries “commends itself when guilt-phase evidence is so prejudicial that the same jury could not fairly sit on both phases of the trial.” Id. at 133, 594 A.2d 232 (citing Monturi, supra, 195 N.J.Super. 317, 478 A.2d 1266). One instance in which the Court has required separate juries is when the State relies on aggravating factor c(4)(a), conviction of another murder. See Biegenwald IV, supra, 126 N.J. at 43-44, 594 A.2d 172 (holding that the most critical factor is the degree of success obtained", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthe capacity to prejudice the penalty-phase proceedings of a capital murder case. Erazo, supra, 126 N.J. at 132, 594 A.2d 232; State v. Moore, 113 N.J. 239, 276-77, 550 A.2d 117 (1988). ‘With the stakes so high, the possibility of prejudice on the penalty phase persists as a cause for continuing concern.” Erazo, supra, 126 N.J. at 132, 594 A.2d 232. The use of two juries “commends itself when guilt-phase evidence is so prejudicial that the same jury could not fairly sit on both phases of the trial.” Id. at 133, 594 A.2d 232 (citing Monturi, supra, 195 N.J.Super. 317, 478 A.2d 1266). One instance in which the Court has required separate juries is when the State relies on aggravating factor c(4)(a), conviction of another murder. See Biegenwald IV, supra, 126 N.J. at 43-44, 594 A.2d 172 (recognizing that court need not address each hahn factor if defendant does not raise issue relating to that factor", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthe capacity to prejudice the penalty-phase proceedings of a capital murder case. Erazo, supra, 126 N.J. at 132, 594 A.2d 232; State v. Moore, 113 N.J. 239, 276-77, 550 A.2d 117 (1988). ‘With the stakes so high, the possibility of prejudice on the penalty phase persists as a cause for continuing concern.” Erazo, supra, 126 N.J. at 132, 594 A.2d 232. The use of two juries “commends itself when guilt-phase evidence is so prejudicial that the same jury could not fairly sit on both phases of the trial.” Id. at 133, 594 A.2d 232 (citing Monturi, supra, 195 N.J.Super. 317, 478 A.2d 1266). One instance in which the Court has required separate juries is when the State relies on aggravating factor c(4)(a), conviction of another murder. See Biegenwald IV, supra, 126 N.J. at 43-44, 594 A.2d 172 (recognizing that the third factor permanence is the most important" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nbetween Long Creek, Little River, Limehouse, and Lake Wylie, the Court can attest that the factual premise of Rickborn’s argument is an understatement. Nevertheless, that prevalence of pickups is not persuasive. The command to construe an exclusion against the insurer applies only when the exclusion’s meaning is ambiguous. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Nivens, No. 0:12-cv-151-MBS, 2014 WL 4793987, at *5 (D.S.C. Sept. 25, 2014) (stating the rule applies “ ‘if doubt exists as to the extent or fact of coverage’ ” (quoting Buddin v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 250 S.C. 332, 157 S.E.2d 633, 635 (1967)) (emphasis added)). As this Court has explained, exclusion A.7 is not ambiguous on the issue of whether a pickup is a private passenger auto. Cf. Home Indem. Co., 280 F.Supp. at 448 (recognizing that certainly under many circumstances a pickup truck is used by its owner as a private passenger automobile but nonetheless holding that policy read as a whole unambiguously excluded pickups from that term", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nbetween Long Creek, Little River, Limehouse, and Lake Wylie, the Court can attest that the factual premise of Rickborn’s argument is an understatement. Nevertheless, that prevalence of pickups is not persuasive. The command to construe an exclusion against the insurer applies only when the exclusion’s meaning is ambiguous. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Nivens, No. 0:12-cv-151-MBS, 2014 WL 4793987, at *5 (D.S.C. Sept. 25, 2014) (stating the rule applies “ ‘if doubt exists as to the extent or fact of coverage’ ” (quoting Buddin v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 250 S.C. 332, 157 S.E.2d 633, 635 (1967)) (emphasis added)). As this Court has explained, exclusion A.7 is not ambiguous on the issue of whether a pickup is a private passenger auto. Cf. Home Indem. Co., 280 F.Supp. at 448 (holding that a contract will be read as a whole and the intent of each part will be gathered from a consideration of the whole", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nbetween Long Creek, Little River, Limehouse, and Lake Wylie, the Court can attest that the factual premise of Rickborn’s argument is an understatement. Nevertheless, that prevalence of pickups is not persuasive. The command to construe an exclusion against the insurer applies only when the exclusion’s meaning is ambiguous. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Nivens, No. 0:12-cv-151-MBS, 2014 WL 4793987, at *5 (D.S.C. Sept. 25, 2014) (stating the rule applies “ ‘if doubt exists as to the extent or fact of coverage’ ” (quoting Buddin v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 250 S.C. 332, 157 S.E.2d 633, 635 (1967)) (emphasis added)). As this Court has explained, exclusion A.7 is not ambiguous on the issue of whether a pickup is a private passenger auto. Cf. Home Indem. Co., 280 F.Supp. at 448 (recognizing that a statute should be read as comprehensive whole", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nbetween Long Creek, Little River, Limehouse, and Lake Wylie, the Court can attest that the factual premise of Rickborn’s argument is an understatement. Nevertheless, that prevalence of pickups is not persuasive. The command to construe an exclusion against the insurer applies only when the exclusion’s meaning is ambiguous. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Nivens, No. 0:12-cv-151-MBS, 2014 WL 4793987, at *5 (D.S.C. Sept. 25, 2014) (stating the rule applies “ ‘if doubt exists as to the extent or fact of coverage’ ” (quoting Buddin v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 250 S.C. 332, 157 S.E.2d 633, 635 (1967)) (emphasis added)). As this Court has explained, exclusion A.7 is not ambiguous on the issue of whether a pickup is a private passenger auto. Cf. Home Indem. Co., 280 F.Supp. at 448 (holding pickup truck was not a private passenger automobile under policy although that term standing alone might be ambiguous there was no room for misunderstanding whether it included pickups because separate defined policy term included pickups", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nbetween Long Creek, Little River, Limehouse, and Lake Wylie, the Court can attest that the factual premise of Rickborn’s argument is an understatement. Nevertheless, that prevalence of pickups is not persuasive. The command to construe an exclusion against the insurer applies only when the exclusion’s meaning is ambiguous. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Nivens, No. 0:12-cv-151-MBS, 2014 WL 4793987, at *5 (D.S.C. Sept. 25, 2014) (stating the rule applies “ ‘if doubt exists as to the extent or fact of coverage’ ” (quoting Buddin v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 250 S.C. 332, 157 S.E.2d 633, 635 (1967)) (emphasis added)). As this Court has explained, exclusion A.7 is not ambiguous on the issue of whether a pickup is a private passenger auto. Cf. Home Indem. Co., 280 F.Supp. at 448 (holding that because public use of a beach was permissive the public was a licensee and as such could be excluded from the whole area at any time by the title owner" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nor to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. Tex.R. Evid. 702. In these cases, the jury was required to determine the appropriate sentence for each of appellant’s offenses. In making that determination, the jury was entitled to consider “any matter the court deem[ed] relevant to sentencing.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07, § 3(a) (Vernon Supp.2000) (noting that, during punishment, State and defendant may introduce any evidence court deems relevant to sentencing). One such matter is the accused’s “personal responsibility” and “moral culpability” for the crime charged. See Stavinoha v. State, 808 S.W.2d 76, 79 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (per curiam) (holding evidence admissible in punishment phase of trial because evidence had bearing on appellants personal responsibility and moral guilt", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nor to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. Tex.R. Evid. 702. In these cases, the jury was required to determine the appropriate sentence for each of appellant’s offenses. In making that determination, the jury was entitled to consider “any matter the court deem[ed] relevant to sentencing.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07, § 3(a) (Vernon Supp.2000) (noting that, during punishment, State and defendant may introduce any evidence court deems relevant to sentencing). One such matter is the accused’s “personal responsibility” and “moral culpability” for the crime charged. See Stavinoha v. State, 808 S.W.2d 76, 79 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (per curiam) (holding that capital punishment must be tailored to the defendants personal responsibility and moral guilt", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nor to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. Tex.R. Evid. 702. In these cases, the jury was required to determine the appropriate sentence for each of appellant’s offenses. In making that determination, the jury was entitled to consider “any matter the court deem[ed] relevant to sentencing.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07, § 3(a) (Vernon Supp.2000) (noting that, during punishment, State and defendant may introduce any evidence court deems relevant to sentencing). One such matter is the accused’s “personal responsibility” and “moral culpability” for the crime charged. See Stavinoha v. State, 808 S.W.2d 76, 79 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (per curiam) (holding defendant waived right to contest lawfulness of search on appeal after he had admitted guilt at punishment phase of trial", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nor to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. Tex.R. Evid. 702. In these cases, the jury was required to determine the appropriate sentence for each of appellant’s offenses. In making that determination, the jury was entitled to consider “any matter the court deem[ed] relevant to sentencing.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07, § 3(a) (Vernon Supp.2000) (noting that, during punishment, State and defendant may introduce any evidence court deems relevant to sentencing). One such matter is the accused’s “personal responsibility” and “moral culpability” for the crime charged. See Stavinoha v. State, 808 S.W.2d 76, 79 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (per curiam) (holding that a codefendants sentence is not relevant to an appellants guilt innocence or punishment", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nor to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. Tex.R. Evid. 702. In these cases, the jury was required to determine the appropriate sentence for each of appellant’s offenses. In making that determination, the jury was entitled to consider “any matter the court deem[ed] relevant to sentencing.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07, § 3(a) (Vernon Supp.2000) (noting that, during punishment, State and defendant may introduce any evidence court deems relevant to sentencing). One such matter is the accused’s “personal responsibility” and “moral culpability” for the crime charged. See Stavinoha v. State, 808 S.W.2d 76, 79 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (per curiam) (holding defendant waived right to challenge incourt identification when he admitted guilt at punishment phase of trial" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nof ORS 183.310(9), a rule is: “any agency directive, standard, regulation or statement of general applicability that implements, interprets or prescribes law or policy, or describes the procedure or practice requirements of any agency. The term * * * does not include: “(a) * * * internal management directives * * * which do not substantially affect the interests of the public: «:{: * * ‡ * “(B) Within an agency, between its officers or between employees [.]” The parties agree that the health policy constitutes a “directive, standard, regulation or statement.” Further, the health policy has general applicability, as it applies to all inmates who receive or may need to receive medical care while incarcerated. See Smith v. Board of Parole, 250 Or App 345, 350-51, 284 P3d 1150 (2012) (recognizing that cjlearly buie requires more than ignorance or a constant assumption that more than one person is present in a residence", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nof ORS 183.310(9), a rule is: “any agency directive, standard, regulation or statement of general applicability that implements, interprets or prescribes law or policy, or describes the procedure or practice requirements of any agency. The term * * * does not include: “(a) * * * internal management directives * * * which do not substantially affect the interests of the public: «:{: * * ‡ * “(B) Within an agency, between its officers or between employees [.]” The parties agree that the health policy constitutes a “directive, standard, regulation or statement.” Further, the health policy has general applicability, as it applies to all inmates who receive or may need to receive medical care while incarcerated. See Smith v. Board of Parole, 250 Or App 345, 350-51, 284 P3d 1150 (2012) (holding that a noticeofrights form that plainly affects more than one person and encompasses more than an immediate set of facts and is applicable to all inmates in a particular category is a rule", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nof ORS 183.310(9), a rule is: “any agency directive, standard, regulation or statement of general applicability that implements, interprets or prescribes law or policy, or describes the procedure or practice requirements of any agency. The term * * * does not include: “(a) * * * internal management directives * * * which do not substantially affect the interests of the public: «:{: * * ‡ * “(B) Within an agency, between its officers or between employees [.]” The parties agree that the health policy constitutes a “directive, standard, regulation or statement.” Further, the health policy has general applicability, as it applies to all inmates who receive or may need to receive medical care while incarcerated. See Smith v. Board of Parole, 250 Or App 345, 350-51, 284 P3d 1150 (2012) (holding a defendant may not be convicted of more than one count of dissemination of matter harmful to minors based on one occurrence even if there was more than one victim", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nof ORS 183.310(9), a rule is: “any agency directive, standard, regulation or statement of general applicability that implements, interprets or prescribes law or policy, or describes the procedure or practice requirements of any agency. The term * * * does not include: “(a) * * * internal management directives * * * which do not substantially affect the interests of the public: «:{: * * ‡ * “(B) Within an agency, between its officers or between employees [.]” The parties agree that the health policy constitutes a “directive, standard, regulation or statement.” Further, the health policy has general applicability, as it applies to all inmates who receive or may need to receive medical care while incarcerated. See Smith v. Board of Parole, 250 Or App 345, 350-51, 284 P3d 1150 (2012) (holding that more than notice to a defendant is required", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nof ORS 183.310(9), a rule is: “any agency directive, standard, regulation or statement of general applicability that implements, interprets or prescribes law or policy, or describes the procedure or practice requirements of any agency. The term * * * does not include: “(a) * * * internal management directives * * * which do not substantially affect the interests of the public: «:{: * * ‡ * “(B) Within an agency, between its officers or between employees [.]” The parties agree that the health policy constitutes a “directive, standard, regulation or statement.” Further, the health policy has general applicability, as it applies to all inmates who receive or may need to receive medical care while incarcerated. See Smith v. Board of Parole, 250 Or App 345, 350-51, 284 P3d 1150 (2012) (holding that it was plain error for trial court to allow more than one conviction of grossly negligent operation of a vehicle where more than one person was injured" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n1 . The amendments made by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Division C of Pub.L.No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (\"IIRIRA”), are not applicable to the instant case. As such, references herein are made to the Immigration and Nationality Act as it existed prior to the enactment of the IIRIRA. The IIRIRA repealed the section under consideration in this case, but provided transitional rules that apply to cases, such as the instant case, where the deportation proceedings commenced prior to April 1,, 1996. The transitional rules provided that the INA applies as codified prior to the passage of the IIRIRA. See IIRIRA §§ 306(c)(1), 309(a). 2 . In early 1996, Scorteanu had married Doi-na Zieminska and retained attorney Mosabi Hamed to file an 1 1999) (holding that 242bc3as time bar is not jurisdictional and thus subject to equitable tolling", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n1 . The amendments made by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Division C of Pub.L.No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (\"IIRIRA”), are not applicable to the instant case. As such, references herein are made to the Immigration and Nationality Act as it existed prior to the enactment of the IIRIRA. The IIRIRA repealed the section under consideration in this case, but provided transitional rules that apply to cases, such as the instant case, where the deportation proceedings commenced prior to April 1,, 1996. The transitional rules provided that the INA applies as codified prior to the passage of the IIRIRA. See IIRIRA §§ 306(c)(1), 309(a). 2 . In early 1996, Scorteanu had married Doi-na Zieminska and retained attorney Mosabi Hamed to file an 1 1999) (holding that the 120day filing period is subject to equitable tolling and addressing circumstances warranting equitable tolling", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n1 . The amendments made by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Division C of Pub.L.No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (\"IIRIRA”), are not applicable to the instant case. As such, references herein are made to the Immigration and Nationality Act as it existed prior to the enactment of the IIRIRA. The IIRIRA repealed the section under consideration in this case, but provided transitional rules that apply to cases, such as the instant case, where the deportation proceedings commenced prior to April 1,, 1996. The transitional rules provided that the INA applies as codified prior to the passage of the IIRIRA. See IIRIRA §§ 306(c)(1), 309(a). 2 . In early 1996, Scorteanu had married Doi-na Zieminska and retained attorney Mosabi Hamed to file an 1 1999) (holding title vii subject to equitable tolling", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n1 . The amendments made by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Division C of Pub.L.No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (\"IIRIRA”), are not applicable to the instant case. As such, references herein are made to the Immigration and Nationality Act as it existed prior to the enactment of the IIRIRA. The IIRIRA repealed the section under consideration in this case, but provided transitional rules that apply to cases, such as the instant case, where the deportation proceedings commenced prior to April 1,, 1996. The transitional rules provided that the INA applies as codified prior to the passage of the IIRIRA. See IIRIRA §§ 306(c)(1), 309(a). 2 . In early 1996, Scorteanu had married Doi-na Zieminska and retained attorney Mosabi Hamed to file an 1 1999) (holding that oneyear limitations period set forth in 2255 is not a jurisdictional bar and is thus subject to equitable tolling", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n1 . The amendments made by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Division C of Pub.L.No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (\"IIRIRA”), are not applicable to the instant case. As such, references herein are made to the Immigration and Nationality Act as it existed prior to the enactment of the IIRIRA. The IIRIRA repealed the section under consideration in this case, but provided transitional rules that apply to cases, such as the instant case, where the deportation proceedings commenced prior to April 1,, 1996. The transitional rules provided that the INA applies as codified prior to the passage of the IIRIRA. See IIRIRA §§ 306(c)(1), 309(a). 2 . In early 1996, Scorteanu had married Doi-na Zieminska and retained attorney Mosabi Hamed to file an 1 1999) (holding that the ninetyday filing requirement is not a jurisdictional prerequisite and is subject to equitable tolling" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nabuse occurrence.” In reaching this conclusion, the undersigned is mindful that Florida has adopted the “cause” theory to assess whether one or more “occurrences” have taken place as the term “occurrence” might appear or be defined in many comprehensive general liability policies. The theory has been utilized by the courts where, unlike in this case, the “occurrence” policy either failed to define “occurrence” or defined “occurrence” as being in the nature of an accident “including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same harmful conditions.” See New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. RLI Ins. Co., 807 So.2d 171, 172 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (reasoning that “[t]he act which causes the damage constitutes the occurrence”); See also Koikos v. Travelers Ins. Co., 849 So.2d 263 (Fla.2003) (holding each act of shooting from a vehicle constituted a separate and distinct crime explaining where completed offense has occurred a separate charge may be brought for a repetition of the same conduct", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nabuse occurrence.” In reaching this conclusion, the undersigned is mindful that Florida has adopted the “cause” theory to assess whether one or more “occurrences” have taken place as the term “occurrence” might appear or be defined in many comprehensive general liability policies. The theory has been utilized by the courts where, unlike in this case, the “occurrence” policy either failed to define “occurrence” or defined “occurrence” as being in the nature of an accident “including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same harmful conditions.” See New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. RLI Ins. Co., 807 So.2d 171, 172 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (reasoning that “[t]he act which causes the damage constitutes the occurrence”); See also Koikos v. Travelers Ins. Co., 849 So.2d 263 (Fla.2003) (holding the payment of benefits at the occurrence of a single event an indicium of lack of an administrative scheme", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nabuse occurrence.” In reaching this conclusion, the undersigned is mindful that Florida has adopted the “cause” theory to assess whether one or more “occurrences” have taken place as the term “occurrence” might appear or be defined in many comprehensive general liability policies. The theory has been utilized by the courts where, unlike in this case, the “occurrence” policy either failed to define “occurrence” or defined “occurrence” as being in the nature of an accident “including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same harmful conditions.” See New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. RLI Ins. Co., 807 So.2d 171, 172 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (reasoning that “[t]he act which causes the damage constitutes the occurrence”); See also Koikos v. Travelers Ins. Co., 849 So.2d 263 (Fla.2003) (holding a judgment that reserved the issue of child support indefinitely and not pending the occurrence of a specific event to be final", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nabuse occurrence.” In reaching this conclusion, the undersigned is mindful that Florida has adopted the “cause” theory to assess whether one or more “occurrences” have taken place as the term “occurrence” might appear or be defined in many comprehensive general liability policies. The theory has been utilized by the courts where, unlike in this case, the “occurrence” policy either failed to define “occurrence” or defined “occurrence” as being in the nature of an accident “including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same harmful conditions.” See New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. RLI Ins. Co., 807 So.2d 171, 172 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (reasoning that “[t]he act which causes the damage constitutes the occurrence”); See also Koikos v. Travelers Ins. Co., 849 So.2d 263 (Fla.2003) (holding that each separate pull of a trigger during the same shooting spree is an event sufficiently in time and space to constitute an independent occurrence", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nabuse occurrence.” In reaching this conclusion, the undersigned is mindful that Florida has adopted the “cause” theory to assess whether one or more “occurrences” have taken place as the term “occurrence” might appear or be defined in many comprehensive general liability policies. The theory has been utilized by the courts where, unlike in this case, the “occurrence” policy either failed to define “occurrence” or defined “occurrence” as being in the nature of an accident “including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same harmful conditions.” See New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. RLI Ins. Co., 807 So.2d 171, 172 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (reasoning that “[t]he act which causes the damage constitutes the occurrence”); See also Koikos v. Travelers Ins. Co., 849 So.2d 263 (Fla.2003) (holding that the liability creating event constitutes an occurrence" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nwas incurred within the 910-day preceding the date of the filing of the petition, and the collateral for that debt consists of a motor vehicle (as defined in section 30102 of title 49 [49 U.S.C. § 30102]) acquired for the personal use of the debtor, or if collateral for that debt consists of any other thing of value, if the debt was incurred during the 1-year period preceding that filing. 7 . A claim which meets the requirements of the \"hanging paragraph\" is known as a “910-claim.” See Dean, 537 F.3d at 1318 n. 2. 8 . 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) provides that \"[t]he court shall confirm a plan only if all of the following requirements are met: .... ” 9 . See, e.g., Sparks v. HSBC Auto Fin., No. 1:06cv670, 2007 WL 2080289, **5-6, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51943, at *14-*15 (S.D.Ohio July 18, 2007) (holding debtors are entitled to establish and recover their compensatory damages under 11 usc 105a for violations of the discharge injunction", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nwas incurred within the 910-day preceding the date of the filing of the petition, and the collateral for that debt consists of a motor vehicle (as defined in section 30102 of title 49 [49 U.S.C. § 30102]) acquired for the personal use of the debtor, or if collateral for that debt consists of any other thing of value, if the debt was incurred during the 1-year period preceding that filing. 7 . A claim which meets the requirements of the \"hanging paragraph\" is known as a “910-claim.” See Dean, 537 F.3d at 1318 n. 2. 8 . 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) provides that \"[t]he court shall confirm a plan only if all of the following requirements are met: .... ” 9 . See, e.g., Sparks v. HSBC Auto Fin., No. 1:06cv670, 2007 WL 2080289, **5-6, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51943, at *14-*15 (S.D.Ohio July 18, 2007) (holding debtors negative equity in a tradein vehicle included in amount financed created a purchase money obligation within the meaning of 11 usc 1325a 2006 we summarily affirm the portion of the district courts order at issue in no 081850", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nwas incurred within the 910-day preceding the date of the filing of the petition, and the collateral for that debt consists of a motor vehicle (as defined in section 30102 of title 49 [49 U.S.C. § 30102]) acquired for the personal use of the debtor, or if collateral for that debt consists of any other thing of value, if the debt was incurred during the 1-year period preceding that filing. 7 . A claim which meets the requirements of the \"hanging paragraph\" is known as a “910-claim.” See Dean, 537 F.3d at 1318 n. 2. 8 . 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) provides that \"[t]he court shall confirm a plan only if all of the following requirements are met: .... ” 9 . See, e.g., Sparks v. HSBC Auto Fin., No. 1:06cv670, 2007 WL 2080289, **5-6, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51943, at *14-*15 (S.D.Ohio July 18, 2007) (holding that 1325a is mandatory and that the general powers of the court codified in 11 usc 105a do not permit a court to confirm a plan that does not satisfy 1325a", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nwas incurred within the 910-day preceding the date of the filing of the petition, and the collateral for that debt consists of a motor vehicle (as defined in section 30102 of title 49 [49 U.S.C. § 30102]) acquired for the personal use of the debtor, or if collateral for that debt consists of any other thing of value, if the debt was incurred during the 1-year period preceding that filing. 7 . A claim which meets the requirements of the \"hanging paragraph\" is known as a “910-claim.” See Dean, 537 F.3d at 1318 n. 2. 8 . 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) provides that \"[t]he court shall confirm a plan only if all of the following requirements are met: .... ” 9 . See, e.g., Sparks v. HSBC Auto Fin., No. 1:06cv670, 2007 WL 2080289, **5-6, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51943, at *14-*15 (S.D.Ohio July 18, 2007) (holding a bankruptcy court is empowered to reopen a bankruptcy case on its own motion under 11 usc 105a", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nwas incurred within the 910-day preceding the date of the filing of the petition, and the collateral for that debt consists of a motor vehicle (as defined in section 30102 of title 49 [49 U.S.C. § 30102]) acquired for the personal use of the debtor, or if collateral for that debt consists of any other thing of value, if the debt was incurred during the 1-year period preceding that filing. 7 . A claim which meets the requirements of the \"hanging paragraph\" is known as a “910-claim.” See Dean, 537 F.3d at 1318 n. 2. 8 . 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) provides that \"[t]he court shall confirm a plan only if all of the following requirements are met: .... ” 9 . See, e.g., Sparks v. HSBC Auto Fin., No. 1:06cv670, 2007 WL 2080289, **5-6, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51943, at *14-*15 (S.D.Ohio July 18, 2007) (holding that bankruptcy court has discretionary power pursuant to 11 usc 105a to order preconfirmation plan payments in a chapter 12 proceeding" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfiduciaries by this subchap-ter shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary.... 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a). Under § 1109(a), the fiduciary is liable for at least two types of damages: losses to the plan and profits made by the fiduciary. In order to recover damages for losses to the benefit plans, the Plaintiffs must show causation between the breach of fiduciary duty and the loss. See In re Unisys Savings Plan Litigation, 74 F.3d 420, 445 (3d Cir.1996) (interpreting-similar language in 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) to require causal connection and quoting Brandt v. Grounds, 687 F.2d 895, 898 (7th Cir.1982) (holding that 1109a requires causal connection between breach and loss", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfiduciaries by this subchap-ter shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary.... 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a). Under § 1109(a), the fiduciary is liable for at least two types of damages: losses to the plan and profits made by the fiduciary. In order to recover damages for losses to the benefit plans, the Plaintiffs must show causation between the breach of fiduciary duty and the loss. See In re Unisys Savings Plan Litigation, 74 F.3d 420, 445 (3d Cir.1996) (interpreting-similar language in 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) to require causal connection and quoting Brandt v. Grounds, 687 F.2d 895, 898 (7th Cir.1982) (holding that eight months between charges and dismissal created inference of causal connection", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfiduciaries by this subchap-ter shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary.... 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a). Under § 1109(a), the fiduciary is liable for at least two types of damages: losses to the plan and profits made by the fiduciary. In order to recover damages for losses to the benefit plans, the Plaintiffs must show causation between the breach of fiduciary duty and the loss. See In re Unisys Savings Plan Litigation, 74 F.3d 420, 445 (3d Cir.1996) (interpreting-similar language in 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) to require causal connection and quoting Brandt v. Grounds, 687 F.2d 895, 898 (7th Cir.1982) (holding that the language of the statute clearly requires proof of a causal connection between the drivers intoxication and the death of another person", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfiduciaries by this subchap-ter shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary.... 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a). Under § 1109(a), the fiduciary is liable for at least two types of damages: losses to the plan and profits made by the fiduciary. In order to recover damages for losses to the benefit plans, the Plaintiffs must show causation between the breach of fiduciary duty and the loss. See In re Unisys Savings Plan Litigation, 74 F.3d 420, 445 (3d Cir.1996) (interpreting-similar language in 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) to require causal connection and quoting Brandt v. Grounds, 687 F.2d 895, 898 (7th Cir.1982) (holding that to show a causal connection the plaintiff must demonstrate a relationship between the misconduct and the plaintiffs injury", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfiduciaries by this subchap-ter shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary.... 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a). Under § 1109(a), the fiduciary is liable for at least two types of damages: losses to the plan and profits made by the fiduciary. In order to recover damages for losses to the benefit plans, the Plaintiffs must show causation between the breach of fiduciary duty and the loss. See In re Unisys Savings Plan Litigation, 74 F.3d 420, 445 (3d Cir.1996) (interpreting-similar language in 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) to require causal connection and quoting Brandt v. Grounds, 687 F.2d 895, 898 (7th Cir.1982) (holding that there must be a causal connection between the advertising activity and the injury alleged in the underlying complaint" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat the court instruct the prosecutor not to make a general-deterrence argument. Moreover, the argument is misleading because general deterrence has nothing to do with the proper weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The Tennessee Supreme Court agreed that the prosecutor’s argument in the present case was improper for this reason, stating that “[unquestionably, any argument based on general deterrence to others has no application to either aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Argument of this nature is inappropriate at a sentencing hearing.” State v. Irick, 762 S.W.2d 121, 131 (Tenn.1988). In my view, the majority oversteps its role by second-guessing the Tennessee Supreme Court’s explicit conclusion on this question of state law. See Cristini v. McKee, 52 .2000) (holding that it is improper to ask a witness to comment on the credibility of another witness", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat the court instruct the prosecutor not to make a general-deterrence argument. Moreover, the argument is misleading because general deterrence has nothing to do with the proper weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The Tennessee Supreme Court agreed that the prosecutor’s argument in the present case was improper for this reason, stating that “[unquestionably, any argument based on general deterrence to others has no application to either aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Argument of this nature is inappropriate at a sentencing hearing.” State v. Irick, 762 S.W.2d 121, 131 (Tenn.1988). In my view, the majority oversteps its role by second-guessing the Tennessee Supreme Court’s explicit conclusion on this question of state law. See Cristini v. McKee, 52 .2000) (holding that mentally retarded capital murderers are constitutionally ineligible for death penalty", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat the court instruct the prosecutor not to make a general-deterrence argument. Moreover, the argument is misleading because general deterrence has nothing to do with the proper weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The Tennessee Supreme Court agreed that the prosecutor’s argument in the present case was improper for this reason, stating that “[unquestionably, any argument based on general deterrence to others has no application to either aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Argument of this nature is inappropriate at a sentencing hearing.” State v. Irick, 762 S.W.2d 121, 131 (Tenn.1988). In my view, the majority oversteps its role by second-guessing the Tennessee Supreme Court’s explicit conclusion on this question of state law. See Cristini v. McKee, 52 .2000) (holding that the prosecutors request that the jury send a message to the community was improper in the guilt phase of the trial but was not so flagrantly improper as to constitute plain error", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat the court instruct the prosecutor not to make a general-deterrence argument. Moreover, the argument is misleading because general deterrence has nothing to do with the proper weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The Tennessee Supreme Court agreed that the prosecutor’s argument in the present case was improper for this reason, stating that “[unquestionably, any argument based on general deterrence to others has no application to either aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Argument of this nature is inappropriate at a sentencing hearing.” State v. Irick, 762 S.W.2d 121, 131 (Tenn.1988). In my view, the majority oversteps its role by second-guessing the Tennessee Supreme Court’s explicit conclusion on this question of state law. See Cristini v. McKee, 52 .2000) (holding that the prosecutors comment regarding the defendants failure to call a potential witness did not shift the burden of proof because it did not implicate the defendants fifth amendment right not to testify", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat the court instruct the prosecutor not to make a general-deterrence argument. Moreover, the argument is misleading because general deterrence has nothing to do with the proper weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The Tennessee Supreme Court agreed that the prosecutor’s argument in the present case was improper for this reason, stating that “[unquestionably, any argument based on general deterrence to others has no application to either aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Argument of this nature is inappropriate at a sentencing hearing.” State v. Irick, 762 S.W.2d 121, 131 (Tenn.1988). In my view, the majority oversteps its role by second-guessing the Tennessee Supreme Court’s explicit conclusion on this question of state law. See Cristini v. McKee, 52 .2000) (holding that a prosecutors comment that jurors should impose the death penalty in order to fulfill their societal duty was not improper because the prosecutor did not ask the jury to send a message to other potential murderers or robbers" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n“rights” and a state court’s discretion than any prior Texas cases. Prior case law has indicated the types of acts or omissions that demonstrate significant impairment of the child, such as physical abuse, severe neglect, abandonment, drug or alcohol abuse, or immoral behavior on the part of the parent. See Brook v. Brook, 881 S.W.2d 297, 298 (Tex.1994); In re Hidalgo, 938 S.W.2d at 494, 497 (affirming appointment of mother and step-grandmother as joint managing conservators when mother effectively abandoned child after birth; child was raised first by father and stepmother, then, after father’s death by stepmother, and then by step-grandmother; and mother first sought custody when child was eleven years old); Thomas v. Thomas, 852 S.W.2d 31, 32-36 (Tex.App.-Waco 1993, no writ) (holding that grandmother who had intermittent custody of her grandchild had no protected liberty interest in the continued custody of the child", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n“rights” and a state court’s discretion than any prior Texas cases. Prior case law has indicated the types of acts or omissions that demonstrate significant impairment of the child, such as physical abuse, severe neglect, abandonment, drug or alcohol abuse, or immoral behavior on the part of the parent. See Brook v. Brook, 881 S.W.2d 297, 298 (Tex.1994); In re Hidalgo, 938 S.W.2d at 494, 497 (affirming appointment of mother and step-grandmother as joint managing conservators when mother effectively abandoned child after birth; child was raised first by father and stepmother, then, after father’s death by stepmother, and then by step-grandmother; and mother first sought custody when child was eleven years old); Thomas v. Thomas, 852 S.W.2d 31, 32-36 (Tex.App.-Waco 1993, no writ) (holding trial court did not err in appointing maternal grandmother as managing conservator when evidence showed grandmother had been childs primary caretaker for years father had history of criminal conduct drug and alcohol use dishonesty unemployment and instability and had abandoned and failed to support child and mother who had immoral and unstable lifestyle and had exposed child to violence asked court to award managing conservatorship to grandmother", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n“rights” and a state court’s discretion than any prior Texas cases. Prior case law has indicated the types of acts or omissions that demonstrate significant impairment of the child, such as physical abuse, severe neglect, abandonment, drug or alcohol abuse, or immoral behavior on the part of the parent. See Brook v. Brook, 881 S.W.2d 297, 298 (Tex.1994); In re Hidalgo, 938 S.W.2d at 494, 497 (affirming appointment of mother and step-grandmother as joint managing conservators when mother effectively abandoned child after birth; child was raised first by father and stepmother, then, after father’s death by stepmother, and then by step-grandmother; and mother first sought custody when child was eleven years old); Thomas v. Thomas, 852 S.W.2d 31, 32-36 (Tex.App.-Waco 1993, no writ) (holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in trial of mother for felony injury to child when after grandmother testified that she had been concerned about leaving a child with mother or suspicious of her when another of mothers young children had diedevidence which had been the subject of a motion in limine the trial court strongly instructed the jurors three times that day and polled them individually the next day about whether they could follow the instruction to disregard", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n“rights” and a state court’s discretion than any prior Texas cases. Prior case law has indicated the types of acts or omissions that demonstrate significant impairment of the child, such as physical abuse, severe neglect, abandonment, drug or alcohol abuse, or immoral behavior on the part of the parent. See Brook v. Brook, 881 S.W.2d 297, 298 (Tex.1994); In re Hidalgo, 938 S.W.2d at 494, 497 (affirming appointment of mother and step-grandmother as joint managing conservators when mother effectively abandoned child after birth; child was raised first by father and stepmother, then, after father’s death by stepmother, and then by step-grandmother; and mother first sought custody when child was eleven years old); Thomas v. Thomas, 852 S.W.2d 31, 32-36 (Tex.App.-Waco 1993, no writ) (holding that court could permit grandparent or other person having substantial past contact with child to intervene in pending sapcr even though original suit requesting possessory conservatorship could not be filed by grandparent or other person and further holding that stepgrandmother had standing to intervene to seek managing conservatorship of child under section 102004b and section 1020039 where natural mother abandoned child after birth parents were divorced natural father remarried father had custody of child after father died child lived first with stepmother then with stepgrandmother and mother first sought custody when child was eleven years old", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n“rights” and a state court’s discretion than any prior Texas cases. Prior case law has indicated the types of acts or omissions that demonstrate significant impairment of the child, such as physical abuse, severe neglect, abandonment, drug or alcohol abuse, or immoral behavior on the part of the parent. See Brook v. Brook, 881 S.W.2d 297, 298 (Tex.1994); In re Hidalgo, 938 S.W.2d at 494, 497 (affirming appointment of mother and step-grandmother as joint managing conservators when mother effectively abandoned child after birth; child was raised first by father and stepmother, then, after father’s death by stepmother, and then by step-grandmother; and mother first sought custody when child was eleven years old); Thomas v. Thomas, 852 S.W.2d 31, 32-36 (Tex.App.-Waco 1993, no writ) (holding that maternal grandmother had standing to intervene in pending sapcr to seek managing conservatorship of child pursuant to former section 102004b and section 102004a where she had substantial past contact with child there was evidence of abuse and neglect of child by mother and mother had been arrested and had subsequently engaged in bizarre and dangerous behavior towards child had attacked grandmother with frying pan and hedge clippers and had been involuntarily committed to psychiatric center all of which established serious and immediate concern for welfare of child" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n2. The Hatch Letter Select portions of two paragraphs of the August 9, 1984 letter from Robert A. McConnell to Senator Orin G. Hatch have been redacted pursuant to Exemption 5, because defendant claims that they contain information protected by the deliberative process and attorney work-product privileges. Second Ferrel Decl. ¶ 5 and Exhibit 1 thereto. Plaintiff claims that this letter is not covered by Exemption 5 because it was prepared after the Moon case had concluded. However, the fact that the final decision to prosecute was made and the litigation was concluded prior to the date of the Hatch letter does not remove this information from Exemption 5 and the attorney work-product privilege. Federal Trade Comm’n v. Grolier, 462 U.S. 19, 103 S.Ct. 2209, 76 L.Ed.2d 387 (1983) (holding that the government must provide the party seeking disclosure with a detailed index describing the documents the government claims are exempt from disclosure under foia", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n2. The Hatch Letter Select portions of two paragraphs of the August 9, 1984 letter from Robert A. McConnell to Senator Orin G. Hatch have been redacted pursuant to Exemption 5, because defendant claims that they contain information protected by the deliberative process and attorney work-product privileges. Second Ferrel Decl. ¶ 5 and Exhibit 1 thereto. Plaintiff claims that this letter is not covered by Exemption 5 because it was prepared after the Moon case had concluded. However, the fact that the final decision to prosecute was made and the litigation was concluded prior to the date of the Hatch letter does not remove this information from Exemption 5 and the attorney work-product privilege. Federal Trade Comm’n v. Grolier, 462 U.S. 19, 103 S.Ct. 2209, 76 L.Ed.2d 387 (1983) (holding attorney workproduct was exempt from disclosure under foia exemption 5 even after the case was dismissed and litigation terminated by the ftc", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n2. The Hatch Letter Select portions of two paragraphs of the August 9, 1984 letter from Robert A. McConnell to Senator Orin G. Hatch have been redacted pursuant to Exemption 5, because defendant claims that they contain information protected by the deliberative process and attorney work-product privileges. Second Ferrel Decl. ¶ 5 and Exhibit 1 thereto. Plaintiff claims that this letter is not covered by Exemption 5 because it was prepared after the Moon case had concluded. However, the fact that the final decision to prosecute was made and the litigation was concluded prior to the date of the Hatch letter does not remove this information from Exemption 5 and the attorney work-product privilege. Federal Trade Comm’n v. Grolier, 462 U.S. 19, 103 S.Ct. 2209, 76 L.Ed.2d 387 (1983) (holding that memoranda prepared by various levels of staff lawyers within the department of justice tax division and by an assistant united states attorney were exempt from disclosure under foia exemption 5", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n2. The Hatch Letter Select portions of two paragraphs of the August 9, 1984 letter from Robert A. McConnell to Senator Orin G. Hatch have been redacted pursuant to Exemption 5, because defendant claims that they contain information protected by the deliberative process and attorney work-product privileges. Second Ferrel Decl. ¶ 5 and Exhibit 1 thereto. Plaintiff claims that this letter is not covered by Exemption 5 because it was prepared after the Moon case had concluded. However, the fact that the final decision to prosecute was made and the litigation was concluded prior to the date of the Hatch letter does not remove this information from Exemption 5 and the attorney work-product privilege. Federal Trade Comm’n v. Grolier, 462 U.S. 19, 103 S.Ct. 2209, 76 L.Ed.2d 387 (1983) (holding that unauthorized disclosure of documents does not constitute a waiver of the applicable foia exemption", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n2. The Hatch Letter Select portions of two paragraphs of the August 9, 1984 letter from Robert A. McConnell to Senator Orin G. Hatch have been redacted pursuant to Exemption 5, because defendant claims that they contain information protected by the deliberative process and attorney work-product privileges. Second Ferrel Decl. ¶ 5 and Exhibit 1 thereto. Plaintiff claims that this letter is not covered by Exemption 5 because it was prepared after the Moon case had concluded. However, the fact that the final decision to prosecute was made and the litigation was concluded prior to the date of the Hatch letter does not remove this information from Exemption 5 and the attorney work-product privilege. Federal Trade Comm’n v. Grolier, 462 U.S. 19, 103 S.Ct. 2209, 76 L.Ed.2d 387 (1983) (holding that the work product doctrine applied to a document prepared in anticipation of litigation and was therefore protected from disclosure under foia exemption 5" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat a tennis court was a use of land, not a structure. Id. at 191. This interpretation focused on the specific zoning provisions regulating buildings and structures, as opposed to uses. We were unwilling to extend the term “structure” to a use of land. Williams, supra at 190-191. These opinions demonstrate that we have been sensitive to the purposes for which the term “structure” has been used in the particular statute or regulation in issue. To the extent that our cases interpreting the term “structure” in other statutes and by-laws are relevant, as the newspapers contend, there are numerous other cases that take a broad interpretation and reach the opposite conclusion from Galligon and Williams. See, e.g., Scott v. Board of Appeal of Wellesley, 356 Mass. 159, 161-162 & n.2 (1969) (holding that argument offered in defense of decision below had been waived when not raised below", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat a tennis court was a use of land, not a structure. Id. at 191. This interpretation focused on the specific zoning provisions regulating buildings and structures, as opposed to uses. We were unwilling to extend the term “structure” to a use of land. Williams, supra at 190-191. These opinions demonstrate that we have been sensitive to the purposes for which the term “structure” has been used in the particular statute or regulation in issue. To the extent that our cases interpreting the term “structure” in other statutes and by-laws are relevant, as the newspapers contend, there are numerous other cases that take a broad interpretation and reach the opposite conclusion from Galligon and Williams. See, e.g., Scott v. Board of Appeal of Wellesley, 356 Mass. 159, 161-162 & n.2 (1969) (holding black box labeled sel was sufficient structure because it was a well known electronic structure and performs a common electronic function", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat a tennis court was a use of land, not a structure. Id. at 191. This interpretation focused on the specific zoning provisions regulating buildings and structures, as opposed to uses. We were unwilling to extend the term “structure” to a use of land. Williams, supra at 190-191. These opinions demonstrate that we have been sensitive to the purposes for which the term “structure” has been used in the particular statute or regulation in issue. To the extent that our cases interpreting the term “structure” in other statutes and by-laws are relevant, as the newspapers contend, there are numerous other cases that take a broad interpretation and reach the opposite conclusion from Galligon and Williams. See, e.g., Scott v. Board of Appeal of Wellesley, 356 Mass. 159, 161-162 & n.2 (1969) (holding that a defendants sentence was reasonable in part because it was well below the statutory maximum", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat a tennis court was a use of land, not a structure. Id. at 191. This interpretation focused on the specific zoning provisions regulating buildings and structures, as opposed to uses. We were unwilling to extend the term “structure” to a use of land. Williams, supra at 190-191. These opinions demonstrate that we have been sensitive to the purposes for which the term “structure” has been used in the particular statute or regulation in issue. To the extent that our cases interpreting the term “structure” in other statutes and by-laws are relevant, as the newspapers contend, there are numerous other cases that take a broad interpretation and reach the opposite conclusion from Galligon and Williams. See, e.g., Scott v. Board of Appeal of Wellesley, 356 Mass. 159, 161-162 & n.2 (1969) (holding that swimming pool was structure for zoning bylaw purposes although it was mostly below ground level", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat a tennis court was a use of land, not a structure. Id. at 191. This interpretation focused on the specific zoning provisions regulating buildings and structures, as opposed to uses. We were unwilling to extend the term “structure” to a use of land. Williams, supra at 190-191. These opinions demonstrate that we have been sensitive to the purposes for which the term “structure” has been used in the particular statute or regulation in issue. To the extent that our cases interpreting the term “structure” in other statutes and by-laws are relevant, as the newspapers contend, there are numerous other cases that take a broad interpretation and reach the opposite conclusion from Galligon and Williams. See, e.g., Scott v. Board of Appeal of Wellesley, 356 Mass. 159, 161-162 & n.2 (1969) (holding that the sentence was reasonable in part because it was well below the statutory maximum" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nv. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 755, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (declining to find a due process right to appointed counsel on appeal from state collateral review even when under state law, ineffectiveness claims relating to trial or direct appeal could only be brought in a state collateral review proceeding). To the extent Petitioner premises her asserted entitlement to collateral review on the constitutional nature of her ineffectiveness claims, we have already held that, in the context of the jurisdictional timeliness restrictions on the right to bring a PCRA petition, see 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b), the constitutional nature of a collateral claim does not overcome the legislature’s restrictions on collateral review. See Commonwealth v. Murray, 562 Pa. 1, 753 A.2d 201 (2000) (holding that where the appellant had the opportunity to bring his petition within the parameters of the jurisdictional requirements of the pcra yet did not do so he cannot complain of a lack of due process", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nv. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 755, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (declining to find a due process right to appointed counsel on appeal from state collateral review even when under state law, ineffectiveness claims relating to trial or direct appeal could only be brought in a state collateral review proceeding). To the extent Petitioner premises her asserted entitlement to collateral review on the constitutional nature of her ineffectiveness claims, we have already held that, in the context of the jurisdictional timeliness restrictions on the right to bring a PCRA petition, see 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b), the constitutional nature of a collateral claim does not overcome the legislature’s restrictions on collateral review. See Commonwealth v. Murray, 562 Pa. 1, 753 A.2d 201 (2000) (holding no court has jurisdiction to hear an untimely pcra petition", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nv. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 755, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (declining to find a due process right to appointed counsel on appeal from state collateral review even when under state law, ineffectiveness claims relating to trial or direct appeal could only be brought in a state collateral review proceeding). To the extent Petitioner premises her asserted entitlement to collateral review on the constitutional nature of her ineffectiveness claims, we have already held that, in the context of the jurisdictional timeliness restrictions on the right to bring a PCRA petition, see 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b), the constitutional nature of a collateral claim does not overcome the legislature’s restrictions on collateral review. See Commonwealth v. Murray, 562 Pa. 1, 753 A.2d 201 (2000) (holding that because an untimely pcra petition was premised on claims that were cognizable under the pcra the statutory writ of habeas corpus was unavailable", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nv. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 755, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (declining to find a due process right to appointed counsel on appeal from state collateral review even when under state law, ineffectiveness claims relating to trial or direct appeal could only be brought in a state collateral review proceeding). To the extent Petitioner premises her asserted entitlement to collateral review on the constitutional nature of her ineffectiveness claims, we have already held that, in the context of the jurisdictional timeliness restrictions on the right to bring a PCRA petition, see 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b), the constitutional nature of a collateral claim does not overcome the legislature’s restrictions on collateral review. See Commonwealth v. Murray, 562 Pa. 1, 753 A.2d 201 (2000) (holding that the constitutional nature of the violations alleged in a pcra petition has no effect on the application of the pcra jurisdictional time bar", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nv. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 755, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (declining to find a due process right to appointed counsel on appeal from state collateral review even when under state law, ineffectiveness claims relating to trial or direct appeal could only be brought in a state collateral review proceeding). To the extent Petitioner premises her asserted entitlement to collateral review on the constitutional nature of her ineffectiveness claims, we have already held that, in the context of the jurisdictional timeliness restrictions on the right to bring a PCRA petition, see 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b), the constitutional nature of a collateral claim does not overcome the legislature’s restrictions on collateral review. See Commonwealth v. Murray, 562 Pa. 1, 753 A.2d 201 (2000) (holding that a pcra petitioner may not raise new claims by merely supplementing a pending pcra petition without court authorization because to do so would wrongly subvert the time limitation and serial petition restrictions of the pcra" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nconduct. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). In imposing a particular sentence, the court must also consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the kinds of sentences available, the applicable guidelines range, the pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the need to provide restitution to victims. Id. § 3553(a)(1), (3)-(7). We ordinarily expect a sentence within the Guidelines sentence range to be reasonable. United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir.2008). A sentence imposed well below the statutory maximum penalty, as is the case here, is another indicator of a reasonable sentence. See United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir.2008) (holding that the sentence was reasonable in part because it was well below the statutory maximum", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nconduct. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). In imposing a particular sentence, the court must also consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the kinds of sentences available, the applicable guidelines range, the pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the need to provide restitution to victims. Id. § 3553(a)(1), (3)-(7). We ordinarily expect a sentence within the Guidelines sentence range to be reasonable. United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir.2008). A sentence imposed well below the statutory maximum penalty, as is the case here, is another indicator of a reasonable sentence. See United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir.2008) (holding sentences need only be below the statutory maximum", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nconduct. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). In imposing a particular sentence, the court must also consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the kinds of sentences available, the applicable guidelines range, the pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the need to provide restitution to victims. Id. § 3553(a)(1), (3)-(7). We ordinarily expect a sentence within the Guidelines sentence range to be reasonable. United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir.2008). A sentence imposed well below the statutory maximum penalty, as is the case here, is another indicator of a reasonable sentence. See United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir.2008) (recognizing a claim that the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nconduct. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). In imposing a particular sentence, the court must also consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the kinds of sentences available, the applicable guidelines range, the pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the need to provide restitution to victims. Id. § 3553(a)(1), (3)-(7). We ordinarily expect a sentence within the Guidelines sentence range to be reasonable. United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir.2008). A sentence imposed well below the statutory maximum penalty, as is the case here, is another indicator of a reasonable sentence. See United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir.2008) (holding a sentence 110 the length of the 20year statutory maximum sentence was reasonable", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nconduct. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). In imposing a particular sentence, the court must also consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the kinds of sentences available, the applicable guidelines range, the pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the need to provide restitution to victims. Id. § 3553(a)(1), (3)-(7). We ordinarily expect a sentence within the Guidelines sentence range to be reasonable. United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir.2008). A sentence imposed well below the statutory maximum penalty, as is the case here, is another indicator of a reasonable sentence. See United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir.2008) (holding statutory maximum for prior conviction is the potential maximum sentence defined by the applicable state criminal statute not the maximum sentence which could have been imposed against the particular defendant according to the states sentencing guidelines" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nBenavidez test because dismissing his time-barred claims will not simply postpone the inevitable filing of a new suit. Bustos does not claim the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in failing to extend the statute of limitations, nor does he seek the “equitable” remedy the majority provides. Rather, Bustos only claims that he satisfies the Benavidez test. As noted above, he does not. Bustos elected to intervene on limited grounds. Bustos did not seek an extension of the statute of limitations to assert his own claims, nor did he seek to be substituted for OneCap before its dismissal. It is not the province of this Court, at this stage, to introduce a remedy that in hindsight appears better for the appellant as a matter of equity. See, e.g., In Re Bernal, 207 F.3d 595 (9th Cir.2000) (holding that the fourth amendment remedy sought is suppression", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nBenavidez test because dismissing his time-barred claims will not simply postpone the inevitable filing of a new suit. Bustos does not claim the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in failing to extend the statute of limitations, nor does he seek the “equitable” remedy the majority provides. Rather, Bustos only claims that he satisfies the Benavidez test. As noted above, he does not. Bustos elected to intervene on limited grounds. Bustos did not seek an extension of the statute of limitations to assert his own claims, nor did he seek to be substituted for OneCap before its dismissal. It is not the province of this Court, at this stage, to introduce a remedy that in hindsight appears better for the appellant as a matter of equity. See, e.g., In Re Bernal, 207 F.3d 595 (9th Cir.2000) (holding that the remedy in a prison conditions case must remedy actual injuries that have been identified by the court and suffered by the plaintiffs", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nBenavidez test because dismissing his time-barred claims will not simply postpone the inevitable filing of a new suit. Bustos does not claim the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in failing to extend the statute of limitations, nor does he seek the “equitable” remedy the majority provides. Rather, Bustos only claims that he satisfies the Benavidez test. As noted above, he does not. Bustos elected to intervene on limited grounds. Bustos did not seek an extension of the statute of limitations to assert his own claims, nor did he seek to be substituted for OneCap before its dismissal. It is not the province of this Court, at this stage, to introduce a remedy that in hindsight appears better for the appellant as a matter of equity. See, e.g., In Re Bernal, 207 F.3d 595 (9th Cir.2000) (holding that where noteholder improperly sought intervention after default where the proper remedy was substitution pursuant to fed r bankrp 7025 court had no remedy for the noteholder", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nBenavidez test because dismissing his time-barred claims will not simply postpone the inevitable filing of a new suit. Bustos does not claim the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in failing to extend the statute of limitations, nor does he seek the “equitable” remedy the majority provides. Rather, Bustos only claims that he satisfies the Benavidez test. As noted above, he does not. Bustos elected to intervene on limited grounds. Bustos did not seek an extension of the statute of limitations to assert his own claims, nor did he seek to be substituted for OneCap before its dismissal. It is not the province of this Court, at this stage, to introduce a remedy that in hindsight appears better for the appellant as a matter of equity. See, e.g., In Re Bernal, 207 F.3d 595 (9th Cir.2000) (holding that retroactive award of benefits proper remedy where district court made finding that claimant was disabled", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nBenavidez test because dismissing his time-barred claims will not simply postpone the inevitable filing of a new suit. Bustos does not claim the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in failing to extend the statute of limitations, nor does he seek the “equitable” remedy the majority provides. Rather, Bustos only claims that he satisfies the Benavidez test. As noted above, he does not. Bustos elected to intervene on limited grounds. Bustos did not seek an extension of the statute of limitations to assert his own claims, nor did he seek to be substituted for OneCap before its dismissal. It is not the province of this Court, at this stage, to introduce a remedy that in hindsight appears better for the appellant as a matter of equity. See, e.g., In Re Bernal, 207 F.3d 595 (9th Cir.2000) (holding that rendition is remedy for no evidence" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nor there are other specific requirements applicable to a particular device under the act, thereby making any existing divergent State or local requirements applicable to the device different from, or in addition to, the specific Food and Drug Administration requirements. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d). This regulation makes clear, the Mitchells contend, that common law causes of action survive preemption unless the FDA has established “specific counterpart regulations” or “other specific requirements” for the medical device in question. They submit that, because no such “regulations” or “requirements” exist with respect to Zyderm, none of their common law causes of action are preempted. In response, Collagen does not challenge the validity of the FDA regulation. Cf. Lohr, 56 F.3d at 1343-45 (holding regulations entitled to chevron deference", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nor there are other specific requirements applicable to a particular device under the act, thereby making any existing divergent State or local requirements applicable to the device different from, or in addition to, the specific Food and Drug Administration requirements. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d). This regulation makes clear, the Mitchells contend, that common law causes of action survive preemption unless the FDA has established “specific counterpart regulations” or “other specific requirements” for the medical device in question. They submit that, because no such “regulations” or “requirements” exist with respect to Zyderm, none of their common law causes of action are preempted. In response, Collagen does not challenge the validity of the FDA regulation. Cf. Lohr, 56 F.3d at 1343-45 (holding that an agencys interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to deference", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nor there are other specific requirements applicable to a particular device under the act, thereby making any existing divergent State or local requirements applicable to the device different from, or in addition to, the specific Food and Drug Administration requirements. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d). This regulation makes clear, the Mitchells contend, that common law causes of action survive preemption unless the FDA has established “specific counterpart regulations” or “other specific requirements” for the medical device in question. They submit that, because no such “regulations” or “requirements” exist with respect to Zyderm, none of their common law causes of action are preempted. In response, Collagen does not challenge the validity of the FDA regulation. Cf. Lohr, 56 F.3d at 1343-45 (holding that this portion of 21 cfr 8081d is entitled to deference", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nor there are other specific requirements applicable to a particular device under the act, thereby making any existing divergent State or local requirements applicable to the device different from, or in addition to, the specific Food and Drug Administration requirements. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d). This regulation makes clear, the Mitchells contend, that common law causes of action survive preemption unless the FDA has established “specific counterpart regulations” or “other specific requirements” for the medical device in question. They submit that, because no such “regulations” or “requirements” exist with respect to Zyderm, none of their common law causes of action are preempted. In response, Collagen does not challenge the validity of the FDA regulation. Cf. Lohr, 56 F.3d at 1343-45 (holding that agency interpretation which is reasonable is entitled to deference", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nor there are other specific requirements applicable to a particular device under the act, thereby making any existing divergent State or local requirements applicable to the device different from, or in addition to, the specific Food and Drug Administration requirements. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d). This regulation makes clear, the Mitchells contend, that common law causes of action survive preemption unless the FDA has established “specific counterpart regulations” or “other specific requirements” for the medical device in question. They submit that, because no such “regulations” or “requirements” exist with respect to Zyderm, none of their common law causes of action are preempted. In response, Collagen does not challenge the validity of the FDA regulation. Cf. Lohr, 56 F.3d at 1343-45 (holding that sec interpretation of federal securities law is entitled to deference if it is reasonable" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nto the district court at sentencing that he did not have the Montgomerys' books and records either. 8 . The $137,990 figure factored in solely Montgomery’s Contracting’s cost of goods sold. The $68,995 figure factored in both the cost of goods sold and the Montgomerys’ purportedly deductible charitable contributions. At sentencing, Mr. Montgomery's counsel conceded that accounting for the contributions was \"problematic” and therefore focused the district court's attention on the $137,990 figure. Because the Montgomerys failed to brief whether the district court should have accounted for any deductible charitable contributions that the Montgomeiys could have claimed, they have waived this issue. See Rodriguez v. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co., 436 F.3d 468, 474 n. 21 (5th Cir.2006) (holding that party waived argument by failing to brief it on appeal", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nto the district court at sentencing that he did not have the Montgomerys' books and records either. 8 . The $137,990 figure factored in solely Montgomery’s Contracting’s cost of goods sold. The $68,995 figure factored in both the cost of goods sold and the Montgomerys’ purportedly deductible charitable contributions. At sentencing, Mr. Montgomery's counsel conceded that accounting for the contributions was \"problematic” and therefore focused the district court's attention on the $137,990 figure. Because the Montgomerys failed to brief whether the district court should have accounted for any deductible charitable contributions that the Montgomeiys could have claimed, they have waived this issue. See Rodriguez v. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co., 436 F.3d 468, 474 n. 21 (5th Cir.2006) (holding that the defendant waived an argument by failing to raise it in his appellants brief", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nto the district court at sentencing that he did not have the Montgomerys' books and records either. 8 . The $137,990 figure factored in solely Montgomery’s Contracting’s cost of goods sold. The $68,995 figure factored in both the cost of goods sold and the Montgomerys’ purportedly deductible charitable contributions. At sentencing, Mr. Montgomery's counsel conceded that accounting for the contributions was \"problematic” and therefore focused the district court's attention on the $137,990 figure. Because the Montgomerys failed to brief whether the district court should have accounted for any deductible charitable contributions that the Montgomeiys could have claimed, they have waived this issue. See Rodriguez v. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co., 436 F.3d 468, 474 n. 21 (5th Cir.2006) (holding that the defendant waived argument on appeal by failing to develop a cogent argument", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nto the district court at sentencing that he did not have the Montgomerys' books and records either. 8 . The $137,990 figure factored in solely Montgomery’s Contracting’s cost of goods sold. The $68,995 figure factored in both the cost of goods sold and the Montgomerys’ purportedly deductible charitable contributions. At sentencing, Mr. Montgomery's counsel conceded that accounting for the contributions was \"problematic” and therefore focused the district court's attention on the $137,990 figure. Because the Montgomerys failed to brief whether the district court should have accounted for any deductible charitable contributions that the Montgomeiys could have claimed, they have waived this issue. See Rodriguez v. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co., 436 F.3d 468, 474 n. 21 (5th Cir.2006) (holding party failing to adequately brief complaint waived issue on appeal", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nto the district court at sentencing that he did not have the Montgomerys' books and records either. 8 . The $137,990 figure factored in solely Montgomery’s Contracting’s cost of goods sold. The $68,995 figure factored in both the cost of goods sold and the Montgomerys’ purportedly deductible charitable contributions. At sentencing, Mr. Montgomery's counsel conceded that accounting for the contributions was \"problematic” and therefore focused the district court's attention on the $137,990 figure. Because the Montgomerys failed to brief whether the district court should have accounted for any deductible charitable contributions that the Montgomeiys could have claimed, they have waived this issue. See Rodriguez v. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co., 436 F.3d 468, 474 n. 21 (5th Cir.2006) (holding that appellant waived argument by failing to raise argument before workers compensation board and failing to list or brief issue in administrative appeal to superior court" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\naward, do not justify overturning that award. Instead, only “utterly irrational” legal conclusions will be cognizable; “[i]n these circumstances the appropriate standard of review is whether the construction of the contract presents such an egregious mistake that it amounts to an arbitrary remaking of the contract between the parties.” 277 Cal.Rptr. at 714. Other jurisdictions have applied stricter standards for upsetting an award than that adopted by the plurality. E.g., Department of Parks & Tourism v. Resort Managers, Inc., 294 Ark. 255, 743 S.W.2d 389, 391-92 (1988) (reviewing Uniform Arbitration Act and holding mistakes of law insufficient to overturn an award absent fraud or corruption); Jackson Trak Group, Inc. v. Mid States Port Auth., 242 Kan. 683, 751 P.2d 122, 127 (1988) (holding that an award of arbitration cannot be set aside for mere errors of judgment either as to the law or the facts if the award is within the scope of the submission and the arbitrators are not guilty of the acts of misconduct set forth in the statute the award operates as a final and conclusive judgment and however disappointing it may be the parties must abide by it", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\naward, do not justify overturning that award. Instead, only “utterly irrational” legal conclusions will be cognizable; “[i]n these circumstances the appropriate standard of review is whether the construction of the contract presents such an egregious mistake that it amounts to an arbitrary remaking of the contract between the parties.” 277 Cal.Rptr. at 714. Other jurisdictions have applied stricter standards for upsetting an award than that adopted by the plurality. E.g., Department of Parks & Tourism v. Resort Managers, Inc., 294 Ark. 255, 743 S.W.2d 389, 391-92 (1988) (reviewing Uniform Arbitration Act and holding mistakes of law insufficient to overturn an award absent fraud or corruption); Jackson Trak Group, Inc. v. Mid States Port Auth., 242 Kan. 683, 751 P.2d 122, 127 (1988) (holding that manifest disregard of the law is one of the very unusual circumstances in which a federal court can set aside an arbitration award", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\naward, do not justify overturning that award. Instead, only “utterly irrational” legal conclusions will be cognizable; “[i]n these circumstances the appropriate standard of review is whether the construction of the contract presents such an egregious mistake that it amounts to an arbitrary remaking of the contract between the parties.” 277 Cal.Rptr. at 714. Other jurisdictions have applied stricter standards for upsetting an award than that adopted by the plurality. E.g., Department of Parks & Tourism v. Resort Managers, Inc., 294 Ark. 255, 743 S.W.2d 389, 391-92 (1988) (reviewing Uniform Arbitration Act and holding mistakes of law insufficient to overturn an award absent fraud or corruption); Jackson Trak Group, Inc. v. Mid States Port Auth., 242 Kan. 683, 751 P.2d 122, 127 (1988) (holding that errors of law without accompanying fraud or misconduct not enough to set aside arbitration award", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\naward, do not justify overturning that award. Instead, only “utterly irrational” legal conclusions will be cognizable; “[i]n these circumstances the appropriate standard of review is whether the construction of the contract presents such an egregious mistake that it amounts to an arbitrary remaking of the contract between the parties.” 277 Cal.Rptr. at 714. Other jurisdictions have applied stricter standards for upsetting an award than that adopted by the plurality. E.g., Department of Parks & Tourism v. Resort Managers, Inc., 294 Ark. 255, 743 S.W.2d 389, 391-92 (1988) (reviewing Uniform Arbitration Act and holding mistakes of law insufficient to overturn an award absent fraud or corruption); Jackson Trak Group, Inc. v. Mid States Port Auth., 242 Kan. 683, 751 P.2d 122, 127 (1988) (holding that the trial court was without authority to set aside entry of default on motion to set aside default judgment", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\naward, do not justify overturning that award. Instead, only “utterly irrational” legal conclusions will be cognizable; “[i]n these circumstances the appropriate standard of review is whether the construction of the contract presents such an egregious mistake that it amounts to an arbitrary remaking of the contract between the parties.” 277 Cal.Rptr. at 714. Other jurisdictions have applied stricter standards for upsetting an award than that adopted by the plurality. E.g., Department of Parks & Tourism v. Resort Managers, Inc., 294 Ark. 255, 743 S.W.2d 389, 391-92 (1988) (reviewing Uniform Arbitration Act and holding mistakes of law insufficient to overturn an award absent fraud or corruption); Jackson Trak Group, Inc. v. Mid States Port Auth., 242 Kan. 683, 751 P.2d 122, 127 (1988) (recognizing that a trial court can set aside verdict" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndetermining whether the state court magistrate, who did not know about the information the Cl provided to Dunn on October 16, 1997, properly found that probable cause existed for the warrant to issue. This 'Court has long held that only the information presented under oath and affirmation to the judicial officer who issued the warrant may factor into the calculus of whether probable cause existed for the warrant to issue. See e.g., Tabasko v. Barton, 472 F.2d 871, 874-75 (6th Cir. 1972) (refusing to consider proof to support probable cause where statement at issue was not in affidavit and state court record failed to show that affiant made the statement under oath in state court before the issuing magistrate); see also United States v. Harris, 255 F.3d 288, 292-93 & n. 1 (6th Cir.2001) (holding informants testimony corroborated by evidence consisting of defendants presence at scene coupled with cash found in his pocket carrying serial numbers matching those provided to informant for controlled buy and videotape of transaction included conversation of defendant regarding prior drug sale", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndetermining whether the state court magistrate, who did not know about the information the Cl provided to Dunn on October 16, 1997, properly found that probable cause existed for the warrant to issue. This 'Court has long held that only the information presented under oath and affirmation to the judicial officer who issued the warrant may factor into the calculus of whether probable cause existed for the warrant to issue. See e.g., Tabasko v. Barton, 472 F.2d 871, 874-75 (6th Cir. 1972) (refusing to consider proof to support probable cause where statement at issue was not in affidavit and state court record failed to show that affiant made the statement under oath in state court before the issuing magistrate); see also United States v. Harris, 255 F.3d 288, 292-93 & n. 1 (6th Cir.2001) (holding that there was probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant where the officers corroboration of events that occurred during the controlled buy as set forth in the affidavit provide sufficient probable cause", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndetermining whether the state court magistrate, who did not know about the information the Cl provided to Dunn on October 16, 1997, properly found that probable cause existed for the warrant to issue. This 'Court has long held that only the information presented under oath and affirmation to the judicial officer who issued the warrant may factor into the calculus of whether probable cause existed for the warrant to issue. See e.g., Tabasko v. Barton, 472 F.2d 871, 874-75 (6th Cir. 1972) (refusing to consider proof to support probable cause where statement at issue was not in affidavit and state court record failed to show that affiant made the statement under oath in state court before the issuing magistrate); see also United States v. Harris, 255 F.3d 288, 292-93 & n. 1 (6th Cir.2001) (holding that affidavit officer submitted to state court judge coupled with officers sworn testimony before that judge regarding informants controlled drug purchases at defendants residence sufficed to establish probable cause", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndetermining whether the state court magistrate, who did not know about the information the Cl provided to Dunn on October 16, 1997, properly found that probable cause existed for the warrant to issue. This 'Court has long held that only the information presented under oath and affirmation to the judicial officer who issued the warrant may factor into the calculus of whether probable cause existed for the warrant to issue. See e.g., Tabasko v. Barton, 472 F.2d 871, 874-75 (6th Cir. 1972) (refusing to consider proof to support probable cause where statement at issue was not in affidavit and state court record failed to show that affiant made the statement under oath in state court before the issuing magistrate); see also United States v. Harris, 255 F.3d 288, 292-93 & n. 1 (6th Cir.2001) (holding that a controlled buy at a particular home provided probable cause for the search of that residence", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndetermining whether the state court magistrate, who did not know about the information the Cl provided to Dunn on October 16, 1997, properly found that probable cause existed for the warrant to issue. This 'Court has long held that only the information presented under oath and affirmation to the judicial officer who issued the warrant may factor into the calculus of whether probable cause existed for the warrant to issue. See e.g., Tabasko v. Barton, 472 F.2d 871, 874-75 (6th Cir. 1972) (refusing to consider proof to support probable cause where statement at issue was not in affidavit and state court record failed to show that affiant made the statement under oath in state court before the issuing magistrate); see also United States v. Harris, 255 F.3d 288, 292-93 & n. 1 (6th Cir.2001) (holding that a known informants statement can support probable cause even though the affidavit fails to provide any additional basis for the known informants credibility" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nTischendorf v. Tischendorf 321 N.W.2d 405, 410 (Minn.1982). Although appellant did not raise his equal protection argument in the district court, we believe the conditions described in Tis-chendorf have been met here, and elect to review the issue. “The granting of jail credit is not discretionary with the trial court.” State v. Cameron, 603 N.W.2 Guidelines III.C.3 (credit for confinement as a condition of stayed sentence “is limit ed to time spent in jails, workhouses, and regional correctional facilities”); Minn. Sent. Guidelines cmt. Ill .C.04 (“Credit should not be extended for time spent in residential treatment facilities or on electric home monitoring as a condition of a stay of imposition or stay of execution.”); see also State v. Bonafide, 457 N.W.2d 211, 215 (Minn.App.1990) (holding that a defendant who does not receive concurrent sentences on multiple charges is not entitled to have his jail time credit pyramided by being given credit on each sentence for the full time he spends in jail awaiting disposition he is only entitled to jail credit on the first of the consecutive sentences quoting daniels v state 491 so2d 543 545 fla1986", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nTischendorf v. Tischendorf 321 N.W.2d 405, 410 (Minn.1982). Although appellant did not raise his equal protection argument in the district court, we believe the conditions described in Tis-chendorf have been met here, and elect to review the issue. “The granting of jail credit is not discretionary with the trial court.” State v. Cameron, 603 N.W.2 Guidelines III.C.3 (credit for confinement as a condition of stayed sentence “is limit ed to time spent in jails, workhouses, and regional correctional facilities”); Minn. Sent. Guidelines cmt. Ill .C.04 (“Credit should not be extended for time spent in residential treatment facilities or on electric home monitoring as a condition of a stay of imposition or stay of execution.”); see also State v. Bonafide, 457 N.W.2d 211, 215 (Minn.App.1990) (holding that the statutory entitlement to presentence jail credit starts with the initial arrest for a criminal offense", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nTischendorf v. Tischendorf 321 N.W.2d 405, 410 (Minn.1982). Although appellant did not raise his equal protection argument in the district court, we believe the conditions described in Tis-chendorf have been met here, and elect to review the issue. “The granting of jail credit is not discretionary with the trial court.” State v. Cameron, 603 N.W.2 Guidelines III.C.3 (credit for confinement as a condition of stayed sentence “is limit ed to time spent in jails, workhouses, and regional correctional facilities”); Minn. Sent. Guidelines cmt. Ill .C.04 (“Credit should not be extended for time spent in residential treatment facilities or on electric home monitoring as a condition of a stay of imposition or stay of execution.”); see also State v. Bonafide, 457 N.W.2d 211, 215 (Minn.App.1990) (holding that a defendant must be granted credit for time served in any institution serving as the functional equivalent of a county jail", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nTischendorf v. Tischendorf 321 N.W.2d 405, 410 (Minn.1982). Although appellant did not raise his equal protection argument in the district court, we believe the conditions described in Tis-chendorf have been met here, and elect to review the issue. “The granting of jail credit is not discretionary with the trial court.” State v. Cameron, 603 N.W.2 Guidelines III.C.3 (credit for confinement as a condition of stayed sentence “is limit ed to time spent in jails, workhouses, and regional correctional facilities”); Minn. Sent. Guidelines cmt. Ill .C.04 (“Credit should not be extended for time spent in residential treatment facilities or on electric home monitoring as a condition of a stay of imposition or stay of execution.”); see also State v. Bonafide, 457 N.W.2d 211, 215 (Minn.App.1990) (holding defendant who received treatment in a state hospital was not entitled to jail credit for that time", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nTischendorf v. Tischendorf 321 N.W.2d 405, 410 (Minn.1982). Although appellant did not raise his equal protection argument in the district court, we believe the conditions described in Tis-chendorf have been met here, and elect to review the issue. “The granting of jail credit is not discretionary with the trial court.” State v. Cameron, 603 N.W.2 Guidelines III.C.3 (credit for confinement as a condition of stayed sentence “is limit ed to time spent in jails, workhouses, and regional correctional facilities”); Minn. Sent. Guidelines cmt. Ill .C.04 (“Credit should not be extended for time spent in residential treatment facilities or on electric home monitoring as a condition of a stay of imposition or stay of execution.”); see also State v. Bonafide, 457 N.W.2d 211, 215 (Minn.App.1990) (holding that jail credit may be granted for presentence custodial period spent under a civil commitment order at state security hospital and observing that denying credit for time relating to probationary conditions is not inconsistent with that holding" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nof retaliation into a broader hostile work environment claim. The reason is simple: hostile work environments are by definition different because their very nature involves repeated conduct. 811 F.Supp.2d at 177-78 (internal citations, quotation marks, and alteration marks committed). 9 . In fact, this allegation does not even support her theory of the case. Following the Jeffers/Perry email episode, the Agency in fact responded to complaints about insulting emails in the workplace and took corrective measures — it sent around an office-wide memorandum about inappropriate emails and hired the Littler Mendelson firm to investigate the matter. However, plaintiff complains nonetheless because she disagrees with the way in which it remediated the problem. 10 . See Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1201 (holding that two acts were not sufficiently similar when one consisted of verbal threats and other resulted in physical violence", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nof retaliation into a broader hostile work environment claim. The reason is simple: hostile work environments are by definition different because their very nature involves repeated conduct. 811 F.Supp.2d at 177-78 (internal citations, quotation marks, and alteration marks committed). 9 . In fact, this allegation does not even support her theory of the case. Following the Jeffers/Perry email episode, the Agency in fact responded to complaints about insulting emails in the workplace and took corrective measures — it sent around an office-wide memorandum about inappropriate emails and hired the Littler Mendelson firm to investigate the matter. However, plaintiff complains nonetheless because she disagrees with the way in which it remediated the problem. 10 . See Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1201 (holding that when two penetrations were separated by a short period of time two independent assaults occurred", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nof retaliation into a broader hostile work environment claim. The reason is simple: hostile work environments are by definition different because their very nature involves repeated conduct. 811 F.Supp.2d at 177-78 (internal citations, quotation marks, and alteration marks committed). 9 . In fact, this allegation does not even support her theory of the case. Following the Jeffers/Perry email episode, the Agency in fact responded to complaints about insulting emails in the workplace and took corrective measures — it sent around an office-wide memorandum about inappropriate emails and hired the Littler Mendelson firm to investigate the matter. However, plaintiff complains nonetheless because she disagrees with the way in which it remediated the problem. 10 . See Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1201 (holding delay of two years and four months lengthy enough to warrant review of other factors", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nof retaliation into a broader hostile work environment claim. The reason is simple: hostile work environments are by definition different because their very nature involves repeated conduct. 811 F.Supp.2d at 177-78 (internal citations, quotation marks, and alteration marks committed). 9 . In fact, this allegation does not even support her theory of the case. Following the Jeffers/Perry email episode, the Agency in fact responded to complaints about insulting emails in the workplace and took corrective measures — it sent around an office-wide memorandum about inappropriate emails and hired the Littler Mendelson firm to investigate the matter. However, plaintiff complains nonetheless because she disagrees with the way in which it remediated the problem. 10 . See Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1201 (holding that a dozen racial incidents over a two and one half year period were too few to constitute a custom with the force of law", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nof retaliation into a broader hostile work environment claim. The reason is simple: hostile work environments are by definition different because their very nature involves repeated conduct. 811 F.Supp.2d at 177-78 (internal citations, quotation marks, and alteration marks committed). 9 . In fact, this allegation does not even support her theory of the case. Following the Jeffers/Perry email episode, the Agency in fact responded to complaints about insulting emails in the workplace and took corrective measures — it sent around an office-wide memorandum about inappropriate emails and hired the Littler Mendelson firm to investigate the matter. However, plaintiff complains nonetheless because she disagrees with the way in which it remediated the problem. 10 . See Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1201 (holding that employees four verbal altercations with supervisor two impositions of leave restrictions two proposals of suspension and other clashes over twoyear period were too sporadic" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndistinct aspects of a combined criminal prosecution and civil forfeiture). Thus, trials are generally bifurcated based upon a recognition that judicial resources will be preserved if specific issues are separately tried. See Bolton v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 119 N.M. 355, 361, 890 P.2d 808, 814 (Ct.App.1994). If, as suggested by Defendant Esparza, a court were required to simultaneously resolve the criminal charges and the forfeiture matter, the clear policies underlying the use of bifurcated proceedings would be undermined. In addition, such a requirement would impermissibly interfere with the inherent ability of district judges to manage their dockets and to expedite the flow of cases through the courts. See State v. Ahasteen, 1998-NMCA-158, ¶ 28, 126 N.M. 238, 968 P.2d 328 (recognizing district courts power to admit evidence for a limited purpose", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndistinct aspects of a combined criminal prosecution and civil forfeiture). Thus, trials are generally bifurcated based upon a recognition that judicial resources will be preserved if specific issues are separately tried. See Bolton v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 119 N.M. 355, 361, 890 P.2d 808, 814 (Ct.App.1994). If, as suggested by Defendant Esparza, a court were required to simultaneously resolve the criminal charges and the forfeiture matter, the clear policies underlying the use of bifurcated proceedings would be undermined. In addition, such a requirement would impermissibly interfere with the inherent ability of district judges to manage their dockets and to expedite the flow of cases through the courts. See State v. Ahasteen, 1998-NMCA-158, ¶ 28, 126 N.M. 238, 968 P.2d 328 (recognizing inherent power of courts of appeals", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndistinct aspects of a combined criminal prosecution and civil forfeiture). Thus, trials are generally bifurcated based upon a recognition that judicial resources will be preserved if specific issues are separately tried. See Bolton v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 119 N.M. 355, 361, 890 P.2d 808, 814 (Ct.App.1994). If, as suggested by Defendant Esparza, a court were required to simultaneously resolve the criminal charges and the forfeiture matter, the clear policies underlying the use of bifurcated proceedings would be undermined. In addition, such a requirement would impermissibly interfere with the inherent ability of district judges to manage their dockets and to expedite the flow of cases through the courts. See State v. Ahasteen, 1998-NMCA-158, ¶ 28, 126 N.M. 238, 968 P.2d 328 (recognizing power of district courts to control movement of cases from filing to final disposition", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndistinct aspects of a combined criminal prosecution and civil forfeiture). Thus, trials are generally bifurcated based upon a recognition that judicial resources will be preserved if specific issues are separately tried. See Bolton v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 119 N.M. 355, 361, 890 P.2d 808, 814 (Ct.App.1994). If, as suggested by Defendant Esparza, a court were required to simultaneously resolve the criminal charges and the forfeiture matter, the clear policies underlying the use of bifurcated proceedings would be undermined. In addition, such a requirement would impermissibly interfere with the inherent ability of district judges to manage their dockets and to expedite the flow of cases through the courts. See State v. Ahasteen, 1998-NMCA-158, ¶ 28, 126 N.M. 238, 968 P.2d 328 (holding a defendant is liable as a control person if the defendant had the power to control the general affairs of the entity primarily liable at the time the entity violated the securities laws but declining to decide whether power to control means simply abstract power to control or actual exercise of the power to control internal quotations omitted", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndistinct aspects of a combined criminal prosecution and civil forfeiture). Thus, trials are generally bifurcated based upon a recognition that judicial resources will be preserved if specific issues are separately tried. See Bolton v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 119 N.M. 355, 361, 890 P.2d 808, 814 (Ct.App.1994). If, as suggested by Defendant Esparza, a court were required to simultaneously resolve the criminal charges and the forfeiture matter, the clear policies underlying the use of bifurcated proceedings would be undermined. In addition, such a requirement would impermissibly interfere with the inherent ability of district judges to manage their dockets and to expedite the flow of cases through the courts. See State v. Ahasteen, 1998-NMCA-158, ¶ 28, 126 N.M. 238, 968 P.2d 328 (recognizing the power of federal courts to decide cases is restricted by the cases and controversies clause of article iii" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ninvolved. Critical to the application of DR-105(c) is that the clients give informed consent to the multiple representation. The issue, therefore, is whether Mr. Sabatino and the Debtor had “differing interests” while they were both represented by BG & S and, if so, whether BG & S could have competently represented both Mr. Sabatino and the Debtor, and whether they provided BG & S with their informed consent to the dual representation. It is clear that Mr. Sabatino and the Debtor had differing interests from the beginning of the representation. It is well settled that “[a] passenger will almost always be advised to assert claims against all other drivers, including the passenger’s driver.” Shaikh et al. v. Waiter, 185 Misc.2d 52, 54, 710 N.Y.S.2d 873, 875 (2000) (citation omitted) (recognizing the conflict", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ninvolved. Critical to the application of DR-105(c) is that the clients give informed consent to the multiple representation. The issue, therefore, is whether Mr. Sabatino and the Debtor had “differing interests” while they were both represented by BG & S and, if so, whether BG & S could have competently represented both Mr. Sabatino and the Debtor, and whether they provided BG & S with their informed consent to the dual representation. It is clear that Mr. Sabatino and the Debtor had differing interests from the beginning of the representation. It is well settled that “[a] passenger will almost always be advised to assert claims against all other drivers, including the passenger’s driver.” Shaikh et al. v. Waiter, 185 Misc.2d 52, 54, 710 N.Y.S.2d 873, 875 (2000) (citation omitted) (holding that right to appeal claim of inef fective assistance of counsel alleging that counsel had disqualifying conflict of interest waived because record did not show that jordan would have pleaded not guilty but for alleged conflict of interest", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ninvolved. Critical to the application of DR-105(c) is that the clients give informed consent to the multiple representation. The issue, therefore, is whether Mr. Sabatino and the Debtor had “differing interests” while they were both represented by BG & S and, if so, whether BG & S could have competently represented both Mr. Sabatino and the Debtor, and whether they provided BG & S with their informed consent to the dual representation. It is clear that Mr. Sabatino and the Debtor had differing interests from the beginning of the representation. It is well settled that “[a] passenger will almost always be advised to assert claims against all other drivers, including the passenger’s driver.” Shaikh et al. v. Waiter, 185 Misc.2d 52, 54, 710 N.Y.S.2d 873, 875 (2000) (citation omitted) (recognizing conflict", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ninvolved. Critical to the application of DR-105(c) is that the clients give informed consent to the multiple representation. The issue, therefore, is whether Mr. Sabatino and the Debtor had “differing interests” while they were both represented by BG & S and, if so, whether BG & S could have competently represented both Mr. Sabatino and the Debtor, and whether they provided BG & S with their informed consent to the dual representation. It is clear that Mr. Sabatino and the Debtor had differing interests from the beginning of the representation. It is well settled that “[a] passenger will almost always be advised to assert claims against all other drivers, including the passenger’s driver.” Shaikh et al. v. Waiter, 185 Misc.2d 52, 54, 710 N.Y.S.2d 873, 875 (2000) (citation omitted) (holding that a lawyer representing both passenger and driver incurs a substantial risk of a disqualifying conflict of interest", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ninvolved. Critical to the application of DR-105(c) is that the clients give informed consent to the multiple representation. The issue, therefore, is whether Mr. Sabatino and the Debtor had “differing interests” while they were both represented by BG & S and, if so, whether BG & S could have competently represented both Mr. Sabatino and the Debtor, and whether they provided BG & S with their informed consent to the dual representation. It is clear that Mr. Sabatino and the Debtor had differing interests from the beginning of the representation. It is well settled that “[a] passenger will almost always be advised to assert claims against all other drivers, including the passenger’s driver.” Shaikh et al. v. Waiter, 185 Misc.2d 52, 54, 710 N.Y.S.2d 873, 875 (2000) (citation omitted) (holding that defense counsel suffered from an actual conflict of interest in representing two codefendants because had the attorney not been facing a conflict of interest he might have been able to negotiate a plea agreement on one defendants behalf in return for becoming a prosecution witness against the eodefendant" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nInstead, the BIA found him ineligible for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT on the merits. Because the BIA did not order Fajardo-Alvarez removed based upon his offense and made a determination on the merits, we have jurisdiction to review the decision. See Unuakhaulu v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 931, 936-37 (9th Cir.2005). However, we lack jurisdiction to consider this petition on the merits. Fajardo-Alvarez failed to exhaust the critical issue of credibility in his appeal to the BIA, notwithstanding the IJ’s clear and unambiguous findings regarding adverse credibility. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir.2004). We therefore have no basis to consider Fajardo-Alvarez’s claims for asylum, withholding of removal, or CAT. See Zara v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 927, 931 (9th Cir.2004) (holding where withholding of removal and cat claims were based on the same discredited testimony the bia properly concluded the adverse credibility finding was fatal to all claims", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nInstead, the BIA found him ineligible for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT on the merits. Because the BIA did not order Fajardo-Alvarez removed based upon his offense and made a determination on the merits, we have jurisdiction to review the decision. See Unuakhaulu v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 931, 936-37 (9th Cir.2005). However, we lack jurisdiction to consider this petition on the merits. Fajardo-Alvarez failed to exhaust the critical issue of credibility in his appeal to the BIA, notwithstanding the IJ’s clear and unambiguous findings regarding adverse credibility. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir.2004). We therefore have no basis to consider Fajardo-Alvarez’s claims for asylum, withholding of removal, or CAT. See Zara v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 927, 931 (9th Cir.2004) (holding that when the asylum withholding of removal and cat claims are based on the same factual predicate a credibility ruling necessarily forecloses relief in each", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nInstead, the BIA found him ineligible for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT on the merits. Because the BIA did not order Fajardo-Alvarez removed based upon his offense and made a determination on the merits, we have jurisdiction to review the decision. See Unuakhaulu v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 931, 936-37 (9th Cir.2005). However, we lack jurisdiction to consider this petition on the merits. Fajardo-Alvarez failed to exhaust the critical issue of credibility in his appeal to the BIA, notwithstanding the IJ’s clear and unambiguous findings regarding adverse credibility. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir.2004). We therefore have no basis to consider Fajardo-Alvarez’s claims for asylum, withholding of removal, or CAT. See Zara v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 927, 931 (9th Cir.2004) (holding that the agency may not deny a cat claim solely on the basis of an adverse credibility finding made in the asylum context where the cat claim did not turn upon credibility", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nInstead, the BIA found him ineligible for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT on the merits. Because the BIA did not order Fajardo-Alvarez removed based upon his offense and made a determination on the merits, we have jurisdiction to review the decision. See Unuakhaulu v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 931, 936-37 (9th Cir.2005). However, we lack jurisdiction to consider this petition on the merits. Fajardo-Alvarez failed to exhaust the critical issue of credibility in his appeal to the BIA, notwithstanding the IJ’s clear and unambiguous findings regarding adverse credibility. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir.2004). We therefore have no basis to consider Fajardo-Alvarez’s claims for asylum, withholding of removal, or CAT. See Zara v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 927, 931 (9th Cir.2004) (holding that petitioners failure to exhaust the adverse credibility finding precluded this court from having jurisdiction to consider her claims of asylum withholding of removal and cat", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nInstead, the BIA found him ineligible for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT on the merits. Because the BIA did not order Fajardo-Alvarez removed based upon his offense and made a determination on the merits, we have jurisdiction to review the decision. See Unuakhaulu v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 931, 936-37 (9th Cir.2005). However, we lack jurisdiction to consider this petition on the merits. Fajardo-Alvarez failed to exhaust the critical issue of credibility in his appeal to the BIA, notwithstanding the IJ’s clear and unambiguous findings regarding adverse credibility. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir.2004). We therefore have no basis to consider Fajardo-Alvarez’s claims for asylum, withholding of removal, or CAT. See Zara v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 927, 931 (9th Cir.2004) (holding that the agency may not deny a cat claim solely on the basis of adverse credibility finding made in the asylum context where the cat claim did not turn upon credibility" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nit encompasses a duty to refrain from implementation at all, unless and until an overall impasse has been reached on bargaining for the agreement as a whole.” Bottom Line Enters., 302 NLRB 373, 374 (1991). The Board recognizes two limited exceptions to requiring an employer to bargain to impasse: “[w]hen a union, in response to an employer’s diligent and earnest efforts to engage in bargaining, insists on continually avoiding or delaying bargaining, and when economic exigencies compel prompt action.” Id. The mandatory subjects of bargaining include “wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). Employees’ workloads, such as the number of rooms a housekeeper must clean at issue here, is a mandatory subject of bargaining. See HTH, 2011 WL 2414720, at *6 (holding that the district courts erroneous rulings violated respondents sixth amendment right to paid counsel of his choosing", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nit encompasses a duty to refrain from implementation at all, unless and until an overall impasse has been reached on bargaining for the agreement as a whole.” Bottom Line Enters., 302 NLRB 373, 374 (1991). The Board recognizes two limited exceptions to requiring an employer to bargain to impasse: “[w]hen a union, in response to an employer’s diligent and earnest efforts to engage in bargaining, insists on continually avoiding or delaying bargaining, and when economic exigencies compel prompt action.” Id. The mandatory subjects of bargaining include “wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). Employees’ workloads, such as the number of rooms a housekeeper must clean at issue here, is a mandatory subject of bargaining. See HTH, 2011 WL 2414720, at *6 (holding that the number of rooms that housekeepers must clean is a mandatory subject of bargaining", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nit encompasses a duty to refrain from implementation at all, unless and until an overall impasse has been reached on bargaining for the agreement as a whole.” Bottom Line Enters., 302 NLRB 373, 374 (1991). The Board recognizes two limited exceptions to requiring an employer to bargain to impasse: “[w]hen a union, in response to an employer’s diligent and earnest efforts to engage in bargaining, insists on continually avoiding or delaying bargaining, and when economic exigencies compel prompt action.” Id. The mandatory subjects of bargaining include “wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). Employees’ workloads, such as the number of rooms a housekeeper must clean at issue here, is a mandatory subject of bargaining. See HTH, 2011 WL 2414720, at *6 (holding that respondents violated 8a1 and 5 of the act uni laterally changing the housekeepers workloads by adding two additional rooms to clean per day", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nit encompasses a duty to refrain from implementation at all, unless and until an overall impasse has been reached on bargaining for the agreement as a whole.” Bottom Line Enters., 302 NLRB 373, 374 (1991). The Board recognizes two limited exceptions to requiring an employer to bargain to impasse: “[w]hen a union, in response to an employer’s diligent and earnest efforts to engage in bargaining, insists on continually avoiding or delaying bargaining, and when economic exigencies compel prompt action.” Id. The mandatory subjects of bargaining include “wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). Employees’ workloads, such as the number of rooms a housekeeper must clean at issue here, is a mandatory subject of bargaining. See HTH, 2011 WL 2414720, at *6 (holding that the limitation act does not apply to claims brought under the clean water act", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nit encompasses a duty to refrain from implementation at all, unless and until an overall impasse has been reached on bargaining for the agreement as a whole.” Bottom Line Enters., 302 NLRB 373, 374 (1991). The Board recognizes two limited exceptions to requiring an employer to bargain to impasse: “[w]hen a union, in response to an employer’s diligent and earnest efforts to engage in bargaining, insists on continually avoiding or delaying bargaining, and when economic exigencies compel prompt action.” Id. The mandatory subjects of bargaining include “wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). Employees’ workloads, such as the number of rooms a housekeeper must clean at issue here, is a mandatory subject of bargaining. See HTH, 2011 WL 2414720, at *6 (holding that the government did not have to prove that the defendant knew that his acts violated the clean water act but merely that he was aware of the conduct that resulted in the permits violation" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe time of the physical injury that caused it; or b. Loss of use of tangible property that is not physically injured. All such loss of use shall be deemed to occur at- the time of the “occurrence” that caused it. {¶ 10} CGL policies are not intended to protect business owners against every risk of operating a business. In particular, [these] policies * * * are not intended to insure “business risks” [see generally Franco, Insurance Coverage for Faulty Workmanship Claims under Commercial General Liability Policies, 30 Tort & Ins.L.J. 785 (1994)] — risks that are the “ ‘normal, frequent, or predictable consequences of doing business, and which business management can and should control or manage.’ ” [Columbia Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schauf 967 nc., 348 S.C. 559, 565-566, 561 S.E.2d 355 (2002) (holding that an agent breaches its duty to use reasonable care and diligence in procuring insurance when it fails to provide an insurance policy that covers the contents of the insureds business as the insured had requested", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe time of the physical injury that caused it; or b. Loss of use of tangible property that is not physically injured. All such loss of use shall be deemed to occur at- the time of the “occurrence” that caused it. {¶ 10} CGL policies are not intended to protect business owners against every risk of operating a business. In particular, [these] policies * * * are not intended to insure “business risks” [see generally Franco, Insurance Coverage for Faulty Workmanship Claims under Commercial General Liability Policies, 30 Tort & Ins.L.J. 785 (1994)] — risks that are the “ ‘normal, frequent, or predictable consequences of doing business, and which business management can and should control or manage.’ ” [Columbia Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schauf 967 nc., 348 S.C. 559, 565-566, 561 S.E.2d 355 (2002) (holding that a cgl policy such as the one at issue here does not insure against claims for defective or negligent workmanship or construction because defective workmanship does not constitute an accident and therefore claims for defective or negligent workmanship do not constitute an occurrence under the policy", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe time of the physical injury that caused it; or b. Loss of use of tangible property that is not physically injured. All such loss of use shall be deemed to occur at- the time of the “occurrence” that caused it. {¶ 10} CGL policies are not intended to protect business owners against every risk of operating a business. In particular, [these] policies * * * are not intended to insure “business risks” [see generally Franco, Insurance Coverage for Faulty Workmanship Claims under Commercial General Liability Policies, 30 Tort & Ins.L.J. 785 (1994)] — risks that are the “ ‘normal, frequent, or predictable consequences of doing business, and which business management can and should control or manage.’ ” [Columbia Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schauf 967 nc., 348 S.C. 559, 565-566, 561 S.E.2d 355 (2002) (holding that under a cgl policy an insurer had no duty to defend its insured in an action resulting from faulty workmanship and that a cgl policy is not intended to insure business risks ie risks that are the normal frequent or predictable consequences of doing business and which business management can and should control or manage rowland h long the law of liability insurance 10011 specifically the policies do not insure an insureds work itself but rather they generally insure consequential risks that stem from that work id", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe time of the physical injury that caused it; or b. Loss of use of tangible property that is not physically injured. All such loss of use shall be deemed to occur at- the time of the “occurrence” that caused it. {¶ 10} CGL policies are not intended to protect business owners against every risk of operating a business. In particular, [these] policies * * * are not intended to insure “business risks” [see generally Franco, Insurance Coverage for Faulty Workmanship Claims under Commercial General Liability Policies, 30 Tort & Ins.L.J. 785 (1994)] — risks that are the “ ‘normal, frequent, or predictable consequences of doing business, and which business management can and should control or manage.’ ” [Columbia Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schauf 967 nc., 348 S.C. 559, 565-566, 561 S.E.2d 355 (2002) (holding an attorney does not have a duty to insure or guarantee that the most favorable outcome possible and because no amount of work can guarantee a favorable result attorneys would never know when the work they do is sufficiently more than adequate to be enough to protect not only their clients from error but themselves from liability", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe time of the physical injury that caused it; or b. Loss of use of tangible property that is not physically injured. All such loss of use shall be deemed to occur at- the time of the “occurrence” that caused it. {¶ 10} CGL policies are not intended to protect business owners against every risk of operating a business. In particular, [these] policies * * * are not intended to insure “business risks” [see generally Franco, Insurance Coverage for Faulty Workmanship Claims under Commercial General Liability Policies, 30 Tort & Ins.L.J. 785 (1994)] — risks that are the “ ‘normal, frequent, or predictable consequences of doing business, and which business management can and should control or manage.’ ” [Columbia Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schauf 967 nc., 348 S.C. 559, 565-566, 561 S.E.2d 355 (2002) (holding that a claim of faulty workmanship that results in damage to property other than the work product is an accident and that a cgl policy is not intended to insure business risks that are the normal frequent or predictable consequences of doing business and which businesses can control and manage a cgl policy does not insure the insureds work itself rather it insures consequential damages that stem from that work as a result a cgl policy may provide coverage for claims arising out of tort breaches of contract and statutory liabilities as long as the requisite accidental occurrence and property damage are present" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfrom other circuits to support his argument that the beaches are a public forum. Tellingly, these cases involve parks and beaches readily available to the general public where property use was not limited to recreation by deed restriction or otherwise. See, e.g., Naturist Soc’y, Inc. v. Fillyaw, 958 F.2d 1515, 1522-23 (11th Cir.1992); Paulsen v. Lehman, 839 F.Supp. 147, 158-61 (E.D.N.Y.1993). In contrast, IVGID has historically limited access to the beaches to certain persons for recreational uses only because it is required to do so by the restrictive covenant. The beaches here are similar to properties where the government has restricted access or only allowed the public to use portions for limited, non-expressive purposes. See, e.g., Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, 455 F.3d at 920 (holding that the courthouse lobby was a nonpublic forum", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfrom other circuits to support his argument that the beaches are a public forum. Tellingly, these cases involve parks and beaches readily available to the general public where property use was not limited to recreation by deed restriction or otherwise. See, e.g., Naturist Soc’y, Inc. v. Fillyaw, 958 F.2d 1515, 1522-23 (11th Cir.1992); Paulsen v. Lehman, 839 F.Supp. 147, 158-61 (E.D.N.Y.1993). In contrast, IVGID has historically limited access to the beaches to certain persons for recreational uses only because it is required to do so by the restrictive covenant. The beaches here are similar to properties where the government has restricted access or only allowed the public to use portions for limited, non-expressive purposes. See, e.g., Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, 455 F.3d at 920 (holding that a courthouse was a nonpublic forum but an unenclosed courthouse plaza was a designated public forum", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfrom other circuits to support his argument that the beaches are a public forum. Tellingly, these cases involve parks and beaches readily available to the general public where property use was not limited to recreation by deed restriction or otherwise. See, e.g., Naturist Soc’y, Inc. v. Fillyaw, 958 F.2d 1515, 1522-23 (11th Cir.1992); Paulsen v. Lehman, 839 F.Supp. 147, 158-61 (E.D.N.Y.1993). In contrast, IVGID has historically limited access to the beaches to certain persons for recreational uses only because it is required to do so by the restrictive covenant. The beaches here are similar to properties where the government has restricted access or only allowed the public to use portions for limited, non-expressive purposes. See, e.g., Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, 455 F.3d at 920 (holding that the fact that a speech regulation is now being enforced is not enough to convert the property into a nonpublic forum", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfrom other circuits to support his argument that the beaches are a public forum. Tellingly, these cases involve parks and beaches readily available to the general public where property use was not limited to recreation by deed restriction or otherwise. See, e.g., Naturist Soc’y, Inc. v. Fillyaw, 958 F.2d 1515, 1522-23 (11th Cir.1992); Paulsen v. Lehman, 839 F.Supp. 147, 158-61 (E.D.N.Y.1993). In contrast, IVGID has historically limited access to the beaches to certain persons for recreational uses only because it is required to do so by the restrictive covenant. The beaches here are similar to properties where the government has restricted access or only allowed the public to use portions for limited, non-expressive purposes. See, e.g., Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, 455 F.3d at 920 (holding that the airspace surrounding honolulus beaches was a nonpublic forum partly because of the traditional limitations on use of and access to airspace", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfrom other circuits to support his argument that the beaches are a public forum. Tellingly, these cases involve parks and beaches readily available to the general public where property use was not limited to recreation by deed restriction or otherwise. See, e.g., Naturist Soc’y, Inc. v. Fillyaw, 958 F.2d 1515, 1522-23 (11th Cir.1992); Paulsen v. Lehman, 839 F.Supp. 147, 158-61 (E.D.N.Y.1993). In contrast, IVGID has historically limited access to the beaches to certain persons for recreational uses only because it is required to do so by the restrictive covenant. The beaches here are similar to properties where the government has restricted access or only allowed the public to use portions for limited, non-expressive purposes. See, e.g., Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, 455 F.3d at 920 (holding first amendment guarantees access to criminal trials and limitations on access are subject to strict scrutiny" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\neither be on the persons of the assailants or about the premises where they lived.”). Second, Chambers argues that the police exceeded their authority under the Municipal Police Jurisdiction Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8953, thereby invalidating the search warrant, because the shooting occurred in Harrisburg, was investigated by Harrisburg police, and Harrisburg police obtained the search warrant, but the warrant was approved by a Swatara magistrate and executed in Swatara Township. Even if Chambers’s interpretation of the Municipal Police Jurisdiction Act were correct, however, he does not explain how a violation of state law would be relevant to the federal constitutional analysis required here. Cf Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176-78, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008) (holding that warrantless arrest based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\neither be on the persons of the assailants or about the premises where they lived.”). Second, Chambers argues that the police exceeded their authority under the Municipal Police Jurisdiction Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8953, thereby invalidating the search warrant, because the shooting occurred in Harrisburg, was investigated by Harrisburg police, and Harrisburg police obtained the search warrant, but the warrant was approved by a Swatara magistrate and executed in Swatara Township. Even if Chambers’s interpretation of the Municipal Police Jurisdiction Act were correct, however, he does not explain how a violation of state law would be relevant to the federal constitutional analysis required here. Cf Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176-78, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008) (holding that a warrantless arrest on probable cause does not violate the fourth amendment even if state law required the police to have prior authorization", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\neither be on the persons of the assailants or about the premises where they lived.”). Second, Chambers argues that the police exceeded their authority under the Municipal Police Jurisdiction Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8953, thereby invalidating the search warrant, because the shooting occurred in Harrisburg, was investigated by Harrisburg police, and Harrisburg police obtained the search warrant, but the warrant was approved by a Swatara magistrate and executed in Swatara Township. Even if Chambers’s interpretation of the Municipal Police Jurisdiction Act were correct, however, he does not explain how a violation of state law would be relevant to the federal constitutional analysis required here. Cf Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176-78, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008) (holding that a search incident to a lawful arrest does not violate the fourth amendment", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\neither be on the persons of the assailants or about the premises where they lived.”). Second, Chambers argues that the police exceeded their authority under the Municipal Police Jurisdiction Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8953, thereby invalidating the search warrant, because the shooting occurred in Harrisburg, was investigated by Harrisburg police, and Harrisburg police obtained the search warrant, but the warrant was approved by a Swatara magistrate and executed in Swatara Township. Even if Chambers’s interpretation of the Municipal Police Jurisdiction Act were correct, however, he does not explain how a violation of state law would be relevant to the federal constitutional analysis required here. Cf Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176-78, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008) (holding that arrest in backyard violated fourth amendment", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\neither be on the persons of the assailants or about the premises where they lived.”). Second, Chambers argues that the police exceeded their authority under the Municipal Police Jurisdiction Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8953, thereby invalidating the search warrant, because the shooting occurred in Harrisburg, was investigated by Harrisburg police, and Harrisburg police obtained the search warrant, but the warrant was approved by a Swatara magistrate and executed in Swatara Township. Even if Chambers’s interpretation of the Municipal Police Jurisdiction Act were correct, however, he does not explain how a violation of state law would be relevant to the federal constitutional analysis required here. Cf Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176-78, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008) (holding that state law is immaterial for fourth amendment search analysis and refusing to suppress evidence obtained illegally under state law after warrantless arrest because the arrest rules that the officers violated were those of state law alone and as we have just concluded it is not the province of the fourth amendment to enforce state law that amendment does not require the exclusion of evidence obtained from a constitutionally permissible arrest" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\na substantial question of federal law.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). As the District Court correctly held, the ease before us does not depend on resolution of a substantial question of federal law. Petitioner argues that because his petition for vacatur alleged that arbiters had disregarded federal law by holding that a settlement agreement bound the parties, there is federal-question jurisdiction. But whether a settlement agreement is binding is generally a question of state contract law. Of course, federal common law does sometimes govern settlements, as when state law over settlements might otherwise conflict with federal policy or frustrate objectives of federal legislation. See, e.g., Maynard v. Durham & S. Ry. Co., 365 U.S. 160, 161, 81 S.Ct. 561, 5 L.Ed.2d 486 (1961) (holding that under illinois law interpreting the meaning of a contract is a question of law determined by the court", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\na substantial question of federal law.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). As the District Court correctly held, the ease before us does not depend on resolution of a substantial question of federal law. Petitioner argues that because his petition for vacatur alleged that arbiters had disregarded federal law by holding that a settlement agreement bound the parties, there is federal-question jurisdiction. But whether a settlement agreement is binding is generally a question of state contract law. Of course, federal common law does sometimes govern settlements, as when state law over settlements might otherwise conflict with federal policy or frustrate objectives of federal legislation. See, e.g., Maynard v. Durham & S. Ry. Co., 365 U.S. 160, 161, 81 S.Ct. 561, 5 L.Ed.2d 486 (1961) (holding that state court with jurisdiction over 301 claim should have applied federal labor law rather than state contract law", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\na substantial question of federal law.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). As the District Court correctly held, the ease before us does not depend on resolution of a substantial question of federal law. Petitioner argues that because his petition for vacatur alleged that arbiters had disregarded federal law by holding that a settlement agreement bound the parties, there is federal-question jurisdiction. But whether a settlement agreement is binding is generally a question of state contract law. Of course, federal common law does sometimes govern settlements, as when state law over settlements might otherwise conflict with federal policy or frustrate objectives of federal legislation. See, e.g., Maynard v. Durham & S. Ry. Co., 365 U.S. 160, 161, 81 S.Ct. 561, 5 L.Ed.2d 486 (1961) (holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\na substantial question of federal law.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). As the District Court correctly held, the ease before us does not depend on resolution of a substantial question of federal law. Petitioner argues that because his petition for vacatur alleged that arbiters had disregarded federal law by holding that a settlement agreement bound the parties, there is federal-question jurisdiction. But whether a settlement agreement is binding is generally a question of state contract law. Of course, federal common law does sometimes govern settlements, as when state law over settlements might otherwise conflict with federal policy or frustrate objectives of federal legislation. See, e.g., Maynard v. Durham & S. Ry. Co., 365 U.S. 160, 161, 81 S.Ct. 561, 5 L.Ed.2d 486 (1961) (holding that the validity of releases under the federal employers liability act was a question to be determined by federal rather than state law", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\na substantial question of federal law.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). As the District Court correctly held, the ease before us does not depend on resolution of a substantial question of federal law. Petitioner argues that because his petition for vacatur alleged that arbiters had disregarded federal law by holding that a settlement agreement bound the parties, there is federal-question jurisdiction. But whether a settlement agreement is binding is generally a question of state contract law. Of course, federal common law does sometimes govern settlements, as when state law over settlements might otherwise conflict with federal policy or frustrate objectives of federal legislation. See, e.g., Maynard v. Durham & S. Ry. Co., 365 U.S. 160, 161, 81 S.Ct. 561, 5 L.Ed.2d 486 (1961) (holding that just because a claim implicates a federal issue or involves construction of federal law does not necessarily give rise to a federal question and confer removal jurisdiction on a federal court" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthe employee was invited to an employer-sponsored dinner meeting. After attending the meeting, while on her way home, the employee was severely injured in an automobile accident. After accepting the Commission’s finding that the employee had been required to attend the dinner, the court held the em ployee’s journey was covered under the special mission exception: Here, claimant was attending an off-premises dinner meeting, after normal working hours, under at least the implied direction of her employer, and travel to and from the meeting was a necessity. These special circumstances justify the Commission’s determination that claimant’s injuries while returning from the meeting were compensable. Id. at 916. See also Brown v. City of Wheeling, 212 W.Va. 121, 569 S.E.2d 197, 203 (2002) (holding the employee was clearly within the zone of her employment even though not at her work station because she was on the universitys premises the campus", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthe employee was invited to an employer-sponsored dinner meeting. After attending the meeting, while on her way home, the employee was severely injured in an automobile accident. After accepting the Commission’s finding that the employee had been required to attend the dinner, the court held the em ployee’s journey was covered under the special mission exception: Here, claimant was attending an off-premises dinner meeting, after normal working hours, under at least the implied direction of her employer, and travel to and from the meeting was a necessity. These special circumstances justify the Commission’s determination that claimant’s injuries while returning from the meeting were compensable. Id. at 916. See also Brown v. City of Wheeling, 212 W.Va. 121, 569 S.E.2d 197, 203 (2002) (holding that it was appellants burden to prove that her husbands death occurred in the scope of employment and that she was eligible for widows benefits", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthe employee was invited to an employer-sponsored dinner meeting. After attending the meeting, while on her way home, the employee was severely injured in an automobile accident. After accepting the Commission’s finding that the employee had been required to attend the dinner, the court held the em ployee’s journey was covered under the special mission exception: Here, claimant was attending an off-premises dinner meeting, after normal working hours, under at least the implied direction of her employer, and travel to and from the meeting was a necessity. These special circumstances justify the Commission’s determination that claimant’s injuries while returning from the meeting were compensable. Id. at 916. See also Brown v. City of Wheeling, 212 W.Va. 121, 569 S.E.2d 197, 203 (2002) (holding that threatening employee to mind her own business investigating her videotaping her without her permission and forcing her to take polygraph could not be considered adverse employment actions because they had no effect on conditions of employment", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthe employee was invited to an employer-sponsored dinner meeting. After attending the meeting, while on her way home, the employee was severely injured in an automobile accident. After accepting the Commission’s finding that the employee had been required to attend the dinner, the court held the em ployee’s journey was covered under the special mission exception: Here, claimant was attending an off-premises dinner meeting, after normal working hours, under at least the implied direction of her employer, and travel to and from the meeting was a necessity. These special circumstances justify the Commission’s determination that claimant’s injuries while returning from the meeting were compensable. Id. at 916. See also Brown v. City of Wheeling, 212 W.Va. 121, 569 S.E.2d 197, 203 (2002) (holding that the employers party was a social event thus the employee was not acting within the scope of her employment when drinking at a party or when she was driving home afterwards", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthe employee was invited to an employer-sponsored dinner meeting. After attending the meeting, while on her way home, the employee was severely injured in an automobile accident. After accepting the Commission’s finding that the employee had been required to attend the dinner, the court held the em ployee’s journey was covered under the special mission exception: Here, claimant was attending an off-premises dinner meeting, after normal working hours, under at least the implied direction of her employer, and travel to and from the meeting was a necessity. These special circumstances justify the Commission’s determination that claimant’s injuries while returning from the meeting were compensable. Id. at 916. See also Brown v. City of Wheeling, 212 W.Va. 121, 569 S.E.2d 197, 203 (2002) (holding that the employee was acting within the course of her employment when she died while returning from the workrelated session because her death occurred on a public highway which was brought within the scope of her employment by her employers requirement that she attend training at the state police academy" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ntrial judge was correct in his analysis. 5 . We note the inconsistency of the phrases “prima facie case” and “preponderance of the evidence” appearing in the same burden of proof. However, this is the United States Supreme Court's language. Interestingly, it is only used by the federal courts in discussing summary judgment; i.e., presumptions that arise from establishing a prima facie case of retaliation. Even the federal courts that have attempted to instruct a jury on the McDonnell Douglas analysis do not instruct on prima facie case. 6 . In Sanghvi v. City of Claremont, 328 F.3d 532 (9th Cir.2003), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that it was error to instruct the jury on the technical elements of the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting ana .3d 207, 221-222 (3rd Cir.2000) (holding that although a jury instruction that included the phrase prima facie case and referred to defendants burden of production created a distinct risk of confusing the jury in certain instances it would be appropriate to instruct the jury on the elements of a prima facie case", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ntrial judge was correct in his analysis. 5 . We note the inconsistency of the phrases “prima facie case” and “preponderance of the evidence” appearing in the same burden of proof. However, this is the United States Supreme Court's language. Interestingly, it is only used by the federal courts in discussing summary judgment; i.e., presumptions that arise from establishing a prima facie case of retaliation. Even the federal courts that have attempted to instruct a jury on the McDonnell Douglas analysis do not instruct on prima facie case. 6 . In Sanghvi v. City of Claremont, 328 F.3d 532 (9th Cir.2003), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that it was error to instruct the jury on the technical elements of the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting ana .3d 207, 221-222 (3rd Cir.2000) (holding that although it is proper to instruct the jury that it may consider whether the factual predicates necessary to establish the prima facie case have been shown it is error to instruct the jury on the mcdonnell douglas burden shifting scheme", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ntrial judge was correct in his analysis. 5 . We note the inconsistency of the phrases “prima facie case” and “preponderance of the evidence” appearing in the same burden of proof. However, this is the United States Supreme Court's language. Interestingly, it is only used by the federal courts in discussing summary judgment; i.e., presumptions that arise from establishing a prima facie case of retaliation. Even the federal courts that have attempted to instruct a jury on the McDonnell Douglas analysis do not instruct on prima facie case. 6 . In Sanghvi v. City of Claremont, 328 F.3d 532 (9th Cir.2003), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that it was error to instruct the jury on the technical elements of the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting ana .3d 207, 221-222 (3rd Cir.2000) (holding that the district courts failure to instruct the jury as to the proper standard of proof constituted plain error", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ntrial judge was correct in his analysis. 5 . We note the inconsistency of the phrases “prima facie case” and “preponderance of the evidence” appearing in the same burden of proof. However, this is the United States Supreme Court's language. Interestingly, it is only used by the federal courts in discussing summary judgment; i.e., presumptions that arise from establishing a prima facie case of retaliation. Even the federal courts that have attempted to instruct a jury on the McDonnell Douglas analysis do not instruct on prima facie case. 6 . In Sanghvi v. City of Claremont, 328 F.3d 532 (9th Cir.2003), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that it was error to instruct the jury on the technical elements of the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting ana .3d 207, 221-222 (3rd Cir.2000) (holding that it was improper for the trial court to instruct the jury that it could not consider the states failure to videotape the defendant", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ntrial judge was correct in his analysis. 5 . We note the inconsistency of the phrases “prima facie case” and “preponderance of the evidence” appearing in the same burden of proof. However, this is the United States Supreme Court's language. Interestingly, it is only used by the federal courts in discussing summary judgment; i.e., presumptions that arise from establishing a prima facie case of retaliation. Even the federal courts that have attempted to instruct a jury on the McDonnell Douglas analysis do not instruct on prima facie case. 6 . In Sanghvi v. City of Claremont, 328 F.3d 532 (9th Cir.2003), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that it was error to instruct the jury on the technical elements of the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting ana .3d 207, 221-222 (3rd Cir.2000) (holding that the failure to properly instruct the jury on the burden of proof required a new trial" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n593 S.W.2d 280, 286 (Tenn.1980). 6 . The Supreme Court recently held that a break in the custodial interrogation of fourteen days is sufficient to end the Edwards presumption that any statements made by the individual after invoking his right to counsel must be suppressed. Maryland v. Shatzer, - U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1223,-L.Ed.2d -(2010). 7 . In State v. Smith, 834 S.W.2d 915, 918 (Tenn.1992), in which the voluntariness of a confession was at issue, this Court observed that article I, section 9 of our state constitution may apply more broadly than its Fifth Amendment counterpart “based upon considerations other than, and in addition to, the difference in terminology.” 8 . See, e.g., State v. Ragland, No. W2008-02065-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 4825182, at *8 (Tenn.Crim.App. Dec. 15, 2009) (holding that even where a client was more sophisticated in business matters than the lawyer himself the lawyer should have assumed the client was relying on the lawyer for the legal aspects of the loan from the client to the lawyer to the same extent that the client would rely on the lawyer for advice were the client making the loan to a third person", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n593 S.W.2d 280, 286 (Tenn.1980). 6 . The Supreme Court recently held that a break in the custodial interrogation of fourteen days is sufficient to end the Edwards presumption that any statements made by the individual after invoking his right to counsel must be suppressed. Maryland v. Shatzer, - U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1223,-L.Ed.2d -(2010). 7 . In State v. Smith, 834 S.W.2d 915, 918 (Tenn.1992), in which the voluntariness of a confession was at issue, this Court observed that article I, section 9 of our state constitution may apply more broadly than its Fifth Amendment counterpart “based upon considerations other than, and in addition to, the difference in terminology.” 8 . See, e.g., State v. Ragland, No. W2008-02065-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 4825182, at *8 (Tenn.Crim.App. Dec. 15, 2009) (holding that a suspect made an acceptable request for counsel by stating i dont think i want to talk to you anymore without a lawyer", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n593 S.W.2d 280, 286 (Tenn.1980). 6 . The Supreme Court recently held that a break in the custodial interrogation of fourteen days is sufficient to end the Edwards presumption that any statements made by the individual after invoking his right to counsel must be suppressed. Maryland v. Shatzer, - U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1223,-L.Ed.2d -(2010). 7 . In State v. Smith, 834 S.W.2d 915, 918 (Tenn.1992), in which the voluntariness of a confession was at issue, this Court observed that article I, section 9 of our state constitution may apply more broadly than its Fifth Amendment counterpart “based upon considerations other than, and in addition to, the difference in terminology.” 8 . See, e.g., State v. Ragland, No. W2008-02065-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 4825182, at *8 (Tenn.Crim.App. Dec. 15, 2009) (holding that statement i think i should call my lawyer was an unequivocal request for counsel", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n593 S.W.2d 280, 286 (Tenn.1980). 6 . The Supreme Court recently held that a break in the custodial interrogation of fourteen days is sufficient to end the Edwards presumption that any statements made by the individual after invoking his right to counsel must be suppressed. Maryland v. Shatzer, - U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1223,-L.Ed.2d -(2010). 7 . In State v. Smith, 834 S.W.2d 915, 918 (Tenn.1992), in which the voluntariness of a confession was at issue, this Court observed that article I, section 9 of our state constitution may apply more broadly than its Fifth Amendment counterpart “based upon considerations other than, and in addition to, the difference in terminology.” 8 . See, e.g., State v. Ragland, No. W2008-02065-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 4825182, at *8 (Tenn.Crim.App. Dec. 15, 2009) (holding that request for counsel was not unequivocal when suspect wrote i need a lawyer on the blackboard among several of other statements while alone in the interview room then responded to officers clarifying questions that he did not want a lawyer", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n593 S.W.2d 280, 286 (Tenn.1980). 6 . The Supreme Court recently held that a break in the custodial interrogation of fourteen days is sufficient to end the Edwards presumption that any statements made by the individual after invoking his right to counsel must be suppressed. Maryland v. Shatzer, - U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1223,-L.Ed.2d -(2010). 7 . In State v. Smith, 834 S.W.2d 915, 918 (Tenn.1992), in which the voluntariness of a confession was at issue, this Court observed that article I, section 9 of our state constitution may apply more broadly than its Fifth Amendment counterpart “based upon considerations other than, and in addition to, the difference in terminology.” 8 . See, e.g., State v. Ragland, No. W2008-02065-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 4825182, at *8 (Tenn.Crim.App. Dec. 15, 2009) (holding that the state courts conclusion that a suspect did not unambiguously request counsel was not unreasonable when during a postmiranda interview the suspect stated i think i would like to talk to a lawyer after which the police stopped questioning him left the room and did not resume questioning until the suspect explicitly said he did not want a lawyer and wanted to continue talking" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nUniversity of Alabama v. Calhoun, 514 So.2d 895, 898 (Ala.1987). This case is different from Law, supra, in that there was no proffered testimony to the effect that the Heads intended the correction fluid or the word “VOID” to effect a revocation of the entire will. Because the word “VOID” was written in the margin with two arrows pointing to the obliterated legacy, as opposed to being written over the signatures of the testators or over the entire face of the document, we hold that the revocatory intent of the Heads was directed only to the obliterated legacy, not to the entire will. See Woodruff v. Hundley, 127 Ala. 640, 29 So. 98 (1900) (stating that a will must be materially mutilated so that intent to revoke the entire will can be inferred); cf. Board of Trustees, 514 So.2d at 898 (holding that the obliteration of a signature page effects revocation of the entire will", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nUniversity of Alabama v. Calhoun, 514 So.2d 895, 898 (Ala.1987). This case is different from Law, supra, in that there was no proffered testimony to the effect that the Heads intended the correction fluid or the word “VOID” to effect a revocation of the entire will. Because the word “VOID” was written in the margin with two arrows pointing to the obliterated legacy, as opposed to being written over the signatures of the testators or over the entire face of the document, we hold that the revocatory intent of the Heads was directed only to the obliterated legacy, not to the entire will. See Woodruff v. Hundley, 127 Ala. 640, 29 So. 98 (1900) (stating that a will must be materially mutilated so that intent to revoke the entire will can be inferred); cf. Board of Trustees, 514 So.2d at 898 (holding that revocation of the harriss parole like revocation of a defendants probation did not subject him to double jeopardy under the united states constitution because of similarities between the two", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nUniversity of Alabama v. Calhoun, 514 So.2d 895, 898 (Ala.1987). This case is different from Law, supra, in that there was no proffered testimony to the effect that the Heads intended the correction fluid or the word “VOID” to effect a revocation of the entire will. Because the word “VOID” was written in the margin with two arrows pointing to the obliterated legacy, as opposed to being written over the signatures of the testators or over the entire face of the document, we hold that the revocatory intent of the Heads was directed only to the obliterated legacy, not to the entire will. See Woodruff v. Hundley, 127 Ala. 640, 29 So. 98 (1900) (stating that a will must be materially mutilated so that intent to revoke the entire will can be inferred); cf. Board of Trustees, 514 So.2d at 898 (holding that standard for revocation of probation is preponderance of the evidence", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nUniversity of Alabama v. Calhoun, 514 So.2d 895, 898 (Ala.1987). This case is different from Law, supra, in that there was no proffered testimony to the effect that the Heads intended the correction fluid or the word “VOID” to effect a revocation of the entire will. Because the word “VOID” was written in the margin with two arrows pointing to the obliterated legacy, as opposed to being written over the signatures of the testators or over the entire face of the document, we hold that the revocatory intent of the Heads was directed only to the obliterated legacy, not to the entire will. See Woodruff v. Hundley, 127 Ala. 640, 29 So. 98 (1900) (stating that a will must be materially mutilated so that intent to revoke the entire will can be inferred); cf. Board of Trustees, 514 So.2d at 898 (holding that the standard of proof in revocation proceedings is a preponderance of the evidence", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nUniversity of Alabama v. Calhoun, 514 So.2d 895, 898 (Ala.1987). This case is different from Law, supra, in that there was no proffered testimony to the effect that the Heads intended the correction fluid or the word “VOID” to effect a revocation of the entire will. Because the word “VOID” was written in the margin with two arrows pointing to the obliterated legacy, as opposed to being written over the signatures of the testators or over the entire face of the document, we hold that the revocatory intent of the Heads was directed only to the obliterated legacy, not to the entire will. See Woodruff v. Hundley, 127 Ala. 640, 29 So. 98 (1900) (stating that a will must be materially mutilated so that intent to revoke the entire will can be inferred); cf. Board of Trustees, 514 So.2d at 898 (holding that there is no significant conceptual difference between the revocation of probation or parole and the revocation of supervised release" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nTo be clear, petitioner “must make two showings of prejudice.” Owens, 483 F.3d at 64 n.13; see also Bucci, 662 F.3d at 29. First, he must show that “counsel’s failure to object to the trial closure prejudiced him for the purposes of determining whether there was ineffective assistance of counsel.” Owens, 483 F.3d at 64. n.13. That is the inquiry relevant here, when petitioner seeks to use his counsel’s ineffective assistance to demonstrate “cause” for his procedural default. The séeond showing of prejudice is the “prejudice to excuse his procedural default.” Id. If petitioner were convicted in federal court and bringing his motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, then he would not need to establish actual prejudice for purposes of ineffective assistance of counsel, See id. at 64, 66 (holding that a defendant who is seeking to excuse a procedurally defaulted claim of structural error need not establish actual prejudice", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nTo be clear, petitioner “must make two showings of prejudice.” Owens, 483 F.3d at 64 n.13; see also Bucci, 662 F.3d at 29. First, he must show that “counsel’s failure to object to the trial closure prejudiced him for the purposes of determining whether there was ineffective assistance of counsel.” Owens, 483 F.3d at 64. n.13. That is the inquiry relevant here, when petitioner seeks to use his counsel’s ineffective assistance to demonstrate “cause” for his procedural default. The séeond showing of prejudice is the “prejudice to excuse his procedural default.” Id. If petitioner were convicted in federal court and bringing his motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, then he would not need to establish actual prejudice for purposes of ineffective assistance of counsel, See id. at 64, 66 (holding that the convention claim was procedurally defaulted", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nTo be clear, petitioner “must make two showings of prejudice.” Owens, 483 F.3d at 64 n.13; see also Bucci, 662 F.3d at 29. First, he must show that “counsel’s failure to object to the trial closure prejudiced him for the purposes of determining whether there was ineffective assistance of counsel.” Owens, 483 F.3d at 64. n.13. That is the inquiry relevant here, when petitioner seeks to use his counsel’s ineffective assistance to demonstrate “cause” for his procedural default. The séeond showing of prejudice is the “prejudice to excuse his procedural default.” Id. If petitioner were convicted in federal court and bringing his motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, then he would not need to establish actual prejudice for purposes of ineffective assistance of counsel, See id. at 64, 66 (holding the defendant waived his courtroom closure challenge because he both failed to object to the limited closure and agreed to the closure through his attorney", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nTo be clear, petitioner “must make two showings of prejudice.” Owens, 483 F.3d at 64 n.13; see also Bucci, 662 F.3d at 29. First, he must show that “counsel’s failure to object to the trial closure prejudiced him for the purposes of determining whether there was ineffective assistance of counsel.” Owens, 483 F.3d at 64. n.13. That is the inquiry relevant here, when petitioner seeks to use his counsel’s ineffective assistance to demonstrate “cause” for his procedural default. The séeond showing of prejudice is the “prejudice to excuse his procedural default.” Id. If petitioner were convicted in federal court and bringing his motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, then he would not need to establish actual prejudice for purposes of ineffective assistance of counsel, See id. at 64, 66 (holding that a defendant who is seeking to excuse a procedurally defaulted claim of structural error need not establish actual prejudice and so the court need not require petitioner to prove that his counsels failure to object to the trial closure was actually prejudicial", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nTo be clear, petitioner “must make two showings of prejudice.” Owens, 483 F.3d at 64 n.13; see also Bucci, 662 F.3d at 29. First, he must show that “counsel’s failure to object to the trial closure prejudiced him for the purposes of determining whether there was ineffective assistance of counsel.” Owens, 483 F.3d at 64. n.13. That is the inquiry relevant here, when petitioner seeks to use his counsel’s ineffective assistance to demonstrate “cause” for his procedural default. The séeond showing of prejudice is the “prejudice to excuse his procedural default.” Id. If petitioner were convicted in federal court and bringing his motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, then he would not need to establish actual prejudice for purposes of ineffective assistance of counsel, See id. at 64, 66 (holding that the government need not prove actual notice to the prisoner" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nPrecision, Inc, 469 Mich 362, 374; 666 NW2d 251 (2003). An affirmative expression of assent constitutes a waiver. Id. at 378. In contrast, a failure to timely assert a right constitutes a forfeiture. Id. at 379. “A stipulation is an agreement, admission or concession made by the parties in a legal action with regard to a matter related to the case.” People v Metamora Water Serv, Inc, 276 Mich App 376, 385; 741 NW2d 61 (2007). To waive a right, the language of a stipulation must show an intent to plainly relinquish that right. Whitley v Chrysler Corp, 373 Mich 469, 474; 130 NW2d 26 (1964). However, the use of specific key words is not required to waive a right. See Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1564, AFL-CIO v Southeastern Mich Transp Auth, 437 Mich 441, 463 n 16; 473 NW2d 249 (1991) (recognizing that courts will enforce waiver of appeal rights when waiver is knowing and voluntary", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nPrecision, Inc, 469 Mich 362, 374; 666 NW2d 251 (2003). An affirmative expression of assent constitutes a waiver. Id. at 378. In contrast, a failure to timely assert a right constitutes a forfeiture. Id. at 379. “A stipulation is an agreement, admission or concession made by the parties in a legal action with regard to a matter related to the case.” People v Metamora Water Serv, Inc, 276 Mich App 376, 385; 741 NW2d 61 (2007). To waive a right, the language of a stipulation must show an intent to plainly relinquish that right. Whitley v Chrysler Corp, 373 Mich 469, 474; 130 NW2d 26 (1964). However, the use of specific key words is not required to waive a right. See Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1564, AFL-CIO v Southeastern Mich Transp Auth, 437 Mich 441, 463 n 16; 473 NW2d 249 (1991) (holding unionnegotiated waiver of employees right to judicial forum for statutory claims must be clear and unmistakable", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nPrecision, Inc, 469 Mich 362, 374; 666 NW2d 251 (2003). An affirmative expression of assent constitutes a waiver. Id. at 378. In contrast, a failure to timely assert a right constitutes a forfeiture. Id. at 379. “A stipulation is an agreement, admission or concession made by the parties in a legal action with regard to a matter related to the case.” People v Metamora Water Serv, Inc, 276 Mich App 376, 385; 741 NW2d 61 (2007). To waive a right, the language of a stipulation must show an intent to plainly relinquish that right. Whitley v Chrysler Corp, 373 Mich 469, 474; 130 NW2d 26 (1964). However, the use of specific key words is not required to waive a right. See Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1564, AFL-CIO v Southeastern Mich Transp Auth, 437 Mich 441, 463 n 16; 473 NW2d 249 (1991) (holding that clear and unmistakable standard applied to unionnegotiated waiver of employees statutory right to a judicial forum for claims of employment discrimination", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nPrecision, Inc, 469 Mich 362, 374; 666 NW2d 251 (2003). An affirmative expression of assent constitutes a waiver. Id. at 378. In contrast, a failure to timely assert a right constitutes a forfeiture. Id. at 379. “A stipulation is an agreement, admission or concession made by the parties in a legal action with regard to a matter related to the case.” People v Metamora Water Serv, Inc, 276 Mich App 376, 385; 741 NW2d 61 (2007). To waive a right, the language of a stipulation must show an intent to plainly relinquish that right. Whitley v Chrysler Corp, 373 Mich 469, 474; 130 NW2d 26 (1964). However, the use of specific key words is not required to waive a right. See Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1564, AFL-CIO v Southeastern Mich Transp Auth, 437 Mich 441, 463 n 16; 473 NW2d 249 (1991) (holding that the word waiver is not required to waive a right even when a statute requires clear and unmistakable evidence of waiver", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nPrecision, Inc, 469 Mich 362, 374; 666 NW2d 251 (2003). An affirmative expression of assent constitutes a waiver. Id. at 378. In contrast, a failure to timely assert a right constitutes a forfeiture. Id. at 379. “A stipulation is an agreement, admission or concession made by the parties in a legal action with regard to a matter related to the case.” People v Metamora Water Serv, Inc, 276 Mich App 376, 385; 741 NW2d 61 (2007). To waive a right, the language of a stipulation must show an intent to plainly relinquish that right. Whitley v Chrysler Corp, 373 Mich 469, 474; 130 NW2d 26 (1964). However, the use of specific key words is not required to waive a right. See Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1564, AFL-CIO v Southeastern Mich Transp Auth, 437 Mich 441, 463 n 16; 473 NW2d 249 (1991) (holding that even if the standard for waiver is clear the standard was not met" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nIns. Co., 512 So.2d 1125, 1128-29 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). Regarding the difference between the grounds for rescission based on misrepresentations that are material as a matter of law, and misrepresentations that lead an insurer to issue a policy that it otherwise would not have issued if it had known the true facts, we have explained: 'While several of the decisions finding that a misrepresentation was material as a matter of law also address the issue of whether the insurer would have actually issued the policy under the same terms and same premium had it known the true facts, the consideration of that issue [is] not required in making a determination that a misrepresentation was material to the risk or the hazard assumed by the insurer. . ¡ Id. at 1128; see also Salgado, 22 So.3d at 604 (holding that when the insurer takes the position that the policy does not cover the complaint the insurer must 1 defend the suit under a reservation of rights or 2 seek a declaratory judgment that there is no coverage if the insurer fails to take either of these actions it will be estopped from later raising policy defenses to coverage", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nIns. Co., 512 So.2d 1125, 1128-29 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). Regarding the difference between the grounds for rescission based on misrepresentations that are material as a matter of law, and misrepresentations that lead an insurer to issue a policy that it otherwise would not have issued if it had known the true facts, we have explained: 'While several of the decisions finding that a misrepresentation was material as a matter of law also address the issue of whether the insurer would have actually issued the policy under the same terms and same premium had it known the true facts, the consideration of that issue [is] not required in making a determination that a misrepresentation was material to the risk or the hazard assumed by the insurer. . ¡ Id. at 1128; see also Salgado, 22 So.3d at 604 (holding that the law is well settled that if the misrepresentation of the insured were material to the acceptance of the risk by the insurer or if the insurer in good faith would not have issued the policy under the same terms and premium then rescission of the policy by the insurer is proper emphasis added quoting ny life ins co v nespereira 366 so2d 859 861 fla 3d dca 1979", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nIns. Co., 512 So.2d 1125, 1128-29 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). Regarding the difference between the grounds for rescission based on misrepresentations that are material as a matter of law, and misrepresentations that lead an insurer to issue a policy that it otherwise would not have issued if it had known the true facts, we have explained: 'While several of the decisions finding that a misrepresentation was material as a matter of law also address the issue of whether the insurer would have actually issued the policy under the same terms and same premium had it known the true facts, the consideration of that issue [is] not required in making a determination that a misrepresentation was material to the risk or the hazard assumed by the insurer. . ¡ Id. at 1128; see also Salgado, 22 So.3d at 604 (holding that when an insurer files suit to cancel a policy the entire liability of the insurer both on the policy and under the statute is put in issue", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nIns. Co., 512 So.2d 1125, 1128-29 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). Regarding the difference between the grounds for rescission based on misrepresentations that are material as a matter of law, and misrepresentations that lead an insurer to issue a policy that it otherwise would not have issued if it had known the true facts, we have explained: 'While several of the decisions finding that a misrepresentation was material as a matter of law also address the issue of whether the insurer would have actually issued the policy under the same terms and same premium had it known the true facts, the consideration of that issue [is] not required in making a determination that a misrepresentation was material to the risk or the hazard assumed by the insurer. . ¡ Id. at 1128; see also Salgado, 22 So.3d at 604 (holding despite a reservation of rights that when the insurer provides a defense to its insured the insured has no right to interfere with the insurers control of the defense and a stipulated judgment between the insured and the injured claimant without the consent of the insurer is ineffective to impose liability upon the insurer", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nIns. Co., 512 So.2d 1125, 1128-29 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). Regarding the difference between the grounds for rescission based on misrepresentations that are material as a matter of law, and misrepresentations that lead an insurer to issue a policy that it otherwise would not have issued if it had known the true facts, we have explained: 'While several of the decisions finding that a misrepresentation was material as a matter of law also address the issue of whether the insurer would have actually issued the policy under the same terms and same premium had it known the true facts, the consideration of that issue [is] not required in making a determination that a misrepresentation was material to the risk or the hazard assumed by the insurer. . ¡ Id. at 1128; see also Salgado, 22 So.3d at 604 (holding that if the insured is only partially compensated by the insurer both the insurer and the insured are real partiesininterest" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\norders, were signed on April 28, 1998, August 18, 1998, and December 15, 1998. 75 . The first order (signed in December 1997) did not order the mother to pay any child support, but ordered the father to pay $100. The remaining three orders directed each parent to pay $100. 76 . The parents had undergone individual psychological testing in 1997, before the children were removed, pursuant to the initial Child Safety Evaluation and Plan that CPS had implemented in April 1997. The psychiatric evaluations ordered after removal were to be new, additional evaluations that were distinct from the previous psychological testing. 77 . In re A.R.R., 61 S.W.3d 691, 695 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied) (Sixth Amendment); In re B.B., 971 S.W.2d 160, 172 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1998, pet. denied) (recognizing that the statutory right to counsel in parental termination cases requires that the appointed counsel provide effective assistance", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\norders, were signed on April 28, 1998, August 18, 1998, and December 15, 1998. 75 . The first order (signed in December 1997) did not order the mother to pay any child support, but ordered the father to pay $100. The remaining three orders directed each parent to pay $100. 76 . The parents had undergone individual psychological testing in 1997, before the children were removed, pursuant to the initial Child Safety Evaluation and Plan that CPS had implemented in April 1997. The psychiatric evaluations ordered after removal were to be new, additional evaluations that were distinct from the previous psychological testing. 77 . In re A.R.R., 61 S.W.3d 691, 695 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied) (Sixth Amendment); In re B.B., 971 S.W.2d 160, 172 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1998, pet. denied) (holding that in parental termination proceedings the parent is entitled to effective assistance of counsel", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\norders, were signed on April 28, 1998, August 18, 1998, and December 15, 1998. 75 . The first order (signed in December 1997) did not order the mother to pay any child support, but ordered the father to pay $100. The remaining three orders directed each parent to pay $100. 76 . The parents had undergone individual psychological testing in 1997, before the children were removed, pursuant to the initial Child Safety Evaluation and Plan that CPS had implemented in April 1997. The psychiatric evaluations ordered after removal were to be new, additional evaluations that were distinct from the previous psychological testing. 77 . In re A.R.R., 61 S.W.3d 691, 695 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied) (Sixth Amendment); In re B.B., 971 S.W.2d 160, 172 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1998, pet. denied) (holding that the sixth amendment right to counsel embodies the right to effective assistance of counsel", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\norders, were signed on April 28, 1998, August 18, 1998, and December 15, 1998. 75 . The first order (signed in December 1997) did not order the mother to pay any child support, but ordered the father to pay $100. The remaining three orders directed each parent to pay $100. 76 . The parents had undergone individual psychological testing in 1997, before the children were removed, pursuant to the initial Child Safety Evaluation and Plan that CPS had implemented in April 1997. The psychiatric evaluations ordered after removal were to be new, additional evaluations that were distinct from the previous psychological testing. 77 . In re A.R.R., 61 S.W.3d 691, 695 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied) (Sixth Amendment); In re B.B., 971 S.W.2d 160, 172 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1998, pet. denied) (holding that the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel does not extend to parental termination proceedings without identifying any specific constitutional provision", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\norders, were signed on April 28, 1998, August 18, 1998, and December 15, 1998. 75 . The first order (signed in December 1997) did not order the mother to pay any child support, but ordered the father to pay $100. The remaining three orders directed each parent to pay $100. 76 . The parents had undergone individual psychological testing in 1997, before the children were removed, pursuant to the initial Child Safety Evaluation and Plan that CPS had implemented in April 1997. The psychiatric evaluations ordered after removal were to be new, additional evaluations that were distinct from the previous psychological testing. 77 . In re A.R.R., 61 S.W.3d 691, 695 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied) (Sixth Amendment); In re B.B., 971 S.W.2d 160, 172 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1998, pet. denied) (holding that the sixth amendment right does not extend to parental termination cases although the parent contended the right to effective counsel stemmed from tex famcode 107013" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfor Writ of Certiorari at ii, Maxwell-Jolly, 2010 WL 599171 (Feb. 16, 2010) (No. 09-958). The Court is not persuaded, as the Commissioner’s argument appears to run contrary to a body of cases involving freestanding claims brought under the Supremacy Clause. For instance, the Supreme Court has reached the merits of a preemption claim concerning a statute enacted pursuant to Congress’s spending clause authority. See PhRMA v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 123 S.Ct. 1855, 155 L.Ed.2d 889 (2003) (plurality opinion) (involving Medicaid Act). Although PhRMA was a plurality decision, “seven Justices assumed both that the federal courts have jurisdiction and that a claim was stated for spending clause preemption.” Planned Parenthood of Houston, & Se. Tex. v. Sanchez, 403 F.3d 324, 331-32 (5th Cir.2005) (holding that no federal court other than the supreme court may entertain a proceeding to reverse or modify a judgment of a state court", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfor Writ of Certiorari at ii, Maxwell-Jolly, 2010 WL 599171 (Feb. 16, 2010) (No. 09-958). The Court is not persuaded, as the Commissioner’s argument appears to run contrary to a body of cases involving freestanding claims brought under the Supremacy Clause. For instance, the Supreme Court has reached the merits of a preemption claim concerning a statute enacted pursuant to Congress’s spending clause authority. See PhRMA v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 123 S.Ct. 1855, 155 L.Ed.2d 889 (2003) (plurality opinion) (involving Medicaid Act). Although PhRMA was a plurality decision, “seven Justices assumed both that the federal courts have jurisdiction and that a claim was stated for spending clause preemption.” Planned Parenthood of Houston, & Se. Tex. v. Sanchez, 403 F.3d 324, 331-32 (5th Cir.2005) (recognizing that the statute vesting this court with the supreme judicial power of the territory implicitly repealed 1 vic 4", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfor Writ of Certiorari at ii, Maxwell-Jolly, 2010 WL 599171 (Feb. 16, 2010) (No. 09-958). The Court is not persuaded, as the Commissioner’s argument appears to run contrary to a body of cases involving freestanding claims brought under the Supremacy Clause. For instance, the Supreme Court has reached the merits of a preemption claim concerning a statute enacted pursuant to Congress’s spending clause authority. See PhRMA v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 123 S.Ct. 1855, 155 L.Ed.2d 889 (2003) (plurality opinion) (involving Medicaid Act). Although PhRMA was a plurality decision, “seven Justices assumed both that the federal courts have jurisdiction and that a claim was stated for spending clause preemption.” Planned Parenthood of Houston, & Se. Tex. v. Sanchez, 403 F.3d 324, 331-32 (5th Cir.2005) (holding that the petitioners federal habeas action accrued when a witness executed an affidavit recanting the testimony he gave during a prisoners murder prosecution not on the date that the state supreme court rejected the prisoners claim", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfor Writ of Certiorari at ii, Maxwell-Jolly, 2010 WL 599171 (Feb. 16, 2010) (No. 09-958). The Court is not persuaded, as the Commissioner’s argument appears to run contrary to a body of cases involving freestanding claims brought under the Supremacy Clause. For instance, the Supreme Court has reached the merits of a preemption claim concerning a statute enacted pursuant to Congress’s spending clause authority. See PhRMA v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 123 S.Ct. 1855, 155 L.Ed.2d 889 (2003) (plurality opinion) (involving Medicaid Act). Although PhRMA was a plurality decision, “seven Justices assumed both that the federal courts have jurisdiction and that a claim was stated for spending clause preemption.” Planned Parenthood of Houston, & Se. Tex. v. Sanchez, 403 F.3d 324, 331-32 (5th Cir.2005) (recognizing that supreme court implicitly rejected the contention that asserting the preemptive force of federal spending clause legislation is itself no claim", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfor Writ of Certiorari at ii, Maxwell-Jolly, 2010 WL 599171 (Feb. 16, 2010) (No. 09-958). The Court is not persuaded, as the Commissioner’s argument appears to run contrary to a body of cases involving freestanding claims brought under the Supremacy Clause. For instance, the Supreme Court has reached the merits of a preemption claim concerning a statute enacted pursuant to Congress’s spending clause authority. See PhRMA v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 123 S.Ct. 1855, 155 L.Ed.2d 889 (2003) (plurality opinion) (involving Medicaid Act). Although PhRMA was a plurality decision, “seven Justices assumed both that the federal courts have jurisdiction and that a claim was stated for spending clause preemption.” Planned Parenthood of Houston, & Se. Tex. v. Sanchez, 403 F.3d 324, 331-32 (5th Cir.2005) (recognizing as foreclosed the contention that recent supreme court decisions limit almendareztorres holding to cases where a defendant has admitted the prior convictions during a guilty plea" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nviolated Doyle in his closing argument. First, he impeached Fields’ trial testimony that he did not remember the stabbing by calling attention to his response, “I ain’t saying nothing,” to the question of whether he had stabbed Fodness raised by Officer Mattson during his first post -Miranda warnings interview. See supra note 2. Second, the prosecutor also referenced Fields’ response, “I won’t talk to you about that without an attorney,” to questions by Detective Norlin regarding what happened when Fodness and Fields were in the bushes across the street from the Pomp Room. See supra note 2. Under Greenfield, both of the statements that the prosecutor used to impeach Fields’ trial testimony were invocations of Fields’ Miranda rights. Cf. Greenfield, 474 U.S. at 295, 106 S.Ct. at 640 (holding that although defendants voluntarily given initial statement was inadmissible because of miranda violation subsequent statement made after careful miranda warnings were given and waiver was obtained was admissible", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nviolated Doyle in his closing argument. First, he impeached Fields’ trial testimony that he did not remember the stabbing by calling attention to his response, “I ain’t saying nothing,” to the question of whether he had stabbed Fodness raised by Officer Mattson during his first post -Miranda warnings interview. See supra note 2. Second, the prosecutor also referenced Fields’ response, “I won’t talk to you about that without an attorney,” to questions by Detective Norlin regarding what happened when Fodness and Fields were in the bushes across the street from the Pomp Room. See supra note 2. Under Greenfield, both of the statements that the prosecutor used to impeach Fields’ trial testimony were invocations of Fields’ Miranda rights. Cf. Greenfield, 474 U.S. at 295, 106 S.Ct. at 640 (holding that juveniles request for parent is invocation of fifth amendment rights", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nviolated Doyle in his closing argument. First, he impeached Fields’ trial testimony that he did not remember the stabbing by calling attention to his response, “I ain’t saying nothing,” to the question of whether he had stabbed Fodness raised by Officer Mattson during his first post -Miranda warnings interview. See supra note 2. Second, the prosecutor also referenced Fields’ response, “I won’t talk to you about that without an attorney,” to questions by Detective Norlin regarding what happened when Fodness and Fields were in the bushes across the street from the Pomp Room. See supra note 2. Under Greenfield, both of the statements that the prosecutor used to impeach Fields’ trial testimony were invocations of Fields’ Miranda rights. Cf. Greenfield, 474 U.S. at 295, 106 S.Ct. at 640 (holding that defendants invocation of miranda rights is inadmissible to prove defendants sanity", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nviolated Doyle in his closing argument. First, he impeached Fields’ trial testimony that he did not remember the stabbing by calling attention to his response, “I ain’t saying nothing,” to the question of whether he had stabbed Fodness raised by Officer Mattson during his first post -Miranda warnings interview. See supra note 2. Second, the prosecutor also referenced Fields’ response, “I won’t talk to you about that without an attorney,” to questions by Detective Norlin regarding what happened when Fodness and Fields were in the bushes across the street from the Pomp Room. See supra note 2. Under Greenfield, both of the statements that the prosecutor used to impeach Fields’ trial testimony were invocations of Fields’ Miranda rights. Cf. Greenfield, 474 U.S. at 295, 106 S.Ct. at 640 (holding that defendants request to call his mother to get an attorney was an invocation of miranda rights requiring that further questioning must end", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nviolated Doyle in his closing argument. First, he impeached Fields’ trial testimony that he did not remember the stabbing by calling attention to his response, “I ain’t saying nothing,” to the question of whether he had stabbed Fodness raised by Officer Mattson during his first post -Miranda warnings interview. See supra note 2. Second, the prosecutor also referenced Fields’ response, “I won’t talk to you about that without an attorney,” to questions by Detective Norlin regarding what happened when Fodness and Fields were in the bushes across the street from the Pomp Room. See supra note 2. Under Greenfield, both of the statements that the prosecutor used to impeach Fields’ trial testimony were invocations of Fields’ Miranda rights. Cf. Greenfield, 474 U.S. at 295, 106 S.Ct. at 640 (holding that evidence of a defendants invocation of the right to remain silent ordinarily is not admissible at the defendants criminal trial" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nv. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 63 Fla. 122, 58 So. 182, 184 (1912). 46 . Fla. Stat. § 726.105(l)(a). 47 . Fla. Stat. § 726.105(l)(b). 48 . Fla. Stat. § 726.106(1). 49 . In re Phoenix Diversified Investment Corp., 2011 WL 2182881, *4 (Bankr.S.D. Fla. June 2, 2011). That determination is made on the specific facts of the case and the circumstances relevant to the transaction. In re 21st Century Satellite Communications, Inc., 278 B.R. 577, 582 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2002). 50 . Berkman Case, Doc. No. 115-1, SAM Case, Doc. No. 61-1. 51 . Berkman Case, Doc. No. 50. 52 .See Goldberg v. Chong, 2007 WL 2028792, *6 (S.D. Fla. July 11, 2007) (noting that a transferor may not manufacture an illusory debt merely to satisfy the statute). Cf. In re Southmark Corp., 138 B.R. 820, 830 (Bankr. N.D.Tex.1992) (holding that a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment precluded default judgment", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nv. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 63 Fla. 122, 58 So. 182, 184 (1912). 46 . Fla. Stat. § 726.105(l)(a). 47 . Fla. Stat. § 726.105(l)(b). 48 . Fla. Stat. § 726.106(1). 49 . In re Phoenix Diversified Investment Corp., 2011 WL 2182881, *4 (Bankr.S.D. Fla. June 2, 2011). That determination is made on the specific facts of the case and the circumstances relevant to the transaction. In re 21st Century Satellite Communications, Inc., 278 B.R. 577, 582 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2002). 50 . Berkman Case, Doc. No. 115-1, SAM Case, Doc. No. 61-1. 51 . Berkman Case, Doc. No. 50. 52 .See Goldberg v. Chong, 2007 WL 2028792, *6 (S.D. Fla. July 11, 2007) (noting that a transferor may not manufacture an illusory debt merely to satisfy the statute). Cf. In re Southmark Corp., 138 B.R. 820, 830 (Bankr. N.D.Tex.1992) (holding that judgment debtor received reasonably equivalent value when judgment creditor received payment under a supersedeas bond and subsequently released its judgment", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nv. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 63 Fla. 122, 58 So. 182, 184 (1912). 46 . Fla. Stat. § 726.105(l)(a). 47 . Fla. Stat. § 726.105(l)(b). 48 . Fla. Stat. § 726.106(1). 49 . In re Phoenix Diversified Investment Corp., 2011 WL 2182881, *4 (Bankr.S.D. Fla. June 2, 2011). That determination is made on the specific facts of the case and the circumstances relevant to the transaction. In re 21st Century Satellite Communications, Inc., 278 B.R. 577, 582 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2002). 50 . Berkman Case, Doc. No. 115-1, SAM Case, Doc. No. 61-1. 51 . Berkman Case, Doc. No. 50. 52 .See Goldberg v. Chong, 2007 WL 2028792, *6 (S.D. Fla. July 11, 2007) (noting that a transferor may not manufacture an illusory debt merely to satisfy the statute). Cf. In re Southmark Corp., 138 B.R. 820, 830 (Bankr. N.D.Tex.1992) (recognizing holding in miner that a judgment creditor can file a new action to seek to pierce the corporate veil of a judgment debtor and hold individual shareholders and directors liable", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nv. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 63 Fla. 122, 58 So. 182, 184 (1912). 46 . Fla. Stat. § 726.105(l)(a). 47 . Fla. Stat. § 726.105(l)(b). 48 . Fla. Stat. § 726.106(1). 49 . In re Phoenix Diversified Investment Corp., 2011 WL 2182881, *4 (Bankr.S.D. Fla. June 2, 2011). That determination is made on the specific facts of the case and the circumstances relevant to the transaction. In re 21st Century Satellite Communications, Inc., 278 B.R. 577, 582 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2002). 50 . Berkman Case, Doc. No. 115-1, SAM Case, Doc. No. 61-1. 51 . Berkman Case, Doc. No. 50. 52 .See Goldberg v. Chong, 2007 WL 2028792, *6 (S.D. Fla. July 11, 2007) (noting that a transferor may not manufacture an illusory debt merely to satisfy the statute). Cf. In re Southmark Corp., 138 B.R. 820, 830 (Bankr. N.D.Tex.1992) (holding llcs were entitled to notice of proceedings supplemental instituted by a judgment creditor to attempt to obtain judgment debtors interests in the companies to pay judgment debt", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nv. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 63 Fla. 122, 58 So. 182, 184 (1912). 46 . Fla. Stat. § 726.105(l)(a). 47 . Fla. Stat. § 726.105(l)(b). 48 . Fla. Stat. § 726.106(1). 49 . In re Phoenix Diversified Investment Corp., 2011 WL 2182881, *4 (Bankr.S.D. Fla. June 2, 2011). That determination is made on the specific facts of the case and the circumstances relevant to the transaction. In re 21st Century Satellite Communications, Inc., 278 B.R. 577, 582 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2002). 50 . Berkman Case, Doc. No. 115-1, SAM Case, Doc. No. 61-1. 51 . Berkman Case, Doc. No. 50. 52 .See Goldberg v. Chong, 2007 WL 2028792, *6 (S.D. Fla. July 11, 2007) (noting that a transferor may not manufacture an illusory debt merely to satisfy the statute). Cf. In re Southmark Corp., 138 B.R. 820, 830 (Bankr. N.D.Tex.1992) (holding the judgment premature citing one case holding the judgment void and another holding the judgment irregular" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwrongful discharge is administrative). Under Van Baale, it is plausible to assert that to the extent a taxpayer has a dispute with the IDOR or the director with respect to taxes paid to the department, Iowa Code section 423.47 (2013) provides an exclusive remedy to resolve the issues. No one can seriously contest that the regulatory framework is a dense, comprehensive scheme. See Iowa Code §§ 422.67-.75; Iowa Admin. Code ch. 701 (2013); cf. Walthart v. Bd. of Dirs., 667 N.W.2d 873, 878 (Iowa 2003); Van Baale, 550 N.W.2d at 156 (“Where the legislature has provided a comprehensive scheme for dealing with a specified kind of dispute, the statutory remedy provided is generally exclusive.” (quoting 1A C.J.S. Actions § 14 n. 55 (1985))); In re Entergy Corp., 142 S.W.3d 316, 322 (Tex.2004) (holding a pervasive regulatory scheme shows that the legislature intended the administrative remedy to be exclusive", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwrongful discharge is administrative). Under Van Baale, it is plausible to assert that to the extent a taxpayer has a dispute with the IDOR or the director with respect to taxes paid to the department, Iowa Code section 423.47 (2013) provides an exclusive remedy to resolve the issues. No one can seriously contest that the regulatory framework is a dense, comprehensive scheme. See Iowa Code §§ 422.67-.75; Iowa Admin. Code ch. 701 (2013); cf. Walthart v. Bd. of Dirs., 667 N.W.2d 873, 878 (Iowa 2003); Van Baale, 550 N.W.2d at 156 (“Where the legislature has provided a comprehensive scheme for dealing with a specified kind of dispute, the statutory remedy provided is generally exclusive.” (quoting 1A C.J.S. Actions § 14 n. 55 (1985))); In re Entergy Corp., 142 S.W.3d 316, 322 (Tex.2004) (holding the flsa does not provide the exclusive remedy for violations of its mandates", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwrongful discharge is administrative). Under Van Baale, it is plausible to assert that to the extent a taxpayer has a dispute with the IDOR or the director with respect to taxes paid to the department, Iowa Code section 423.47 (2013) provides an exclusive remedy to resolve the issues. No one can seriously contest that the regulatory framework is a dense, comprehensive scheme. See Iowa Code §§ 422.67-.75; Iowa Admin. Code ch. 701 (2013); cf. Walthart v. Bd. of Dirs., 667 N.W.2d 873, 878 (Iowa 2003); Van Baale, 550 N.W.2d at 156 (“Where the legislature has provided a comprehensive scheme for dealing with a specified kind of dispute, the statutory remedy provided is generally exclusive.” (quoting 1A C.J.S. Actions § 14 n. 55 (1985))); In re Entergy Corp., 142 S.W.3d 316, 322 (Tex.2004) (holding that in order for there to be state debt in the constitutional sense one legislature in effect must obligate a future legislature to appropriate funds to discharge the debt created by the first legislature", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwrongful discharge is administrative). Under Van Baale, it is plausible to assert that to the extent a taxpayer has a dispute with the IDOR or the director with respect to taxes paid to the department, Iowa Code section 423.47 (2013) provides an exclusive remedy to resolve the issues. No one can seriously contest that the regulatory framework is a dense, comprehensive scheme. See Iowa Code §§ 422.67-.75; Iowa Admin. Code ch. 701 (2013); cf. Walthart v. Bd. of Dirs., 667 N.W.2d 873, 878 (Iowa 2003); Van Baale, 550 N.W.2d at 156 (“Where the legislature has provided a comprehensive scheme for dealing with a specified kind of dispute, the statutory remedy provided is generally exclusive.” (quoting 1A C.J.S. Actions § 14 n. 55 (1985))); In re Entergy Corp., 142 S.W.3d 316, 322 (Tex.2004) (recognizing that the regulatory scheme created by the ina is so pervasive as to be consistent with the exclusive federal power over immigration", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwrongful discharge is administrative). Under Van Baale, it is plausible to assert that to the extent a taxpayer has a dispute with the IDOR or the director with respect to taxes paid to the department, Iowa Code section 423.47 (2013) provides an exclusive remedy to resolve the issues. No one can seriously contest that the regulatory framework is a dense, comprehensive scheme. See Iowa Code §§ 422.67-.75; Iowa Admin. Code ch. 701 (2013); cf. Walthart v. Bd. of Dirs., 667 N.W.2d 873, 878 (Iowa 2003); Van Baale, 550 N.W.2d at 156 (“Where the legislature has provided a comprehensive scheme for dealing with a specified kind of dispute, the statutory remedy provided is generally exclusive.” (quoting 1A C.J.S. Actions § 14 n. 55 (1985))); In re Entergy Corp., 142 S.W.3d 316, 322 (Tex.2004) (holding that the legislature granted exclusive authority over ratemaking to the public service commission" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\na “catchall exception” that allows hearsay to be admitted in cases in which the declarant testifies if certain conditions are satisfied, the key one being that there are circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to those surrounding statements fitting within the 23 specific exceptions created by Rule 803. Rule 803(24) is identical to Rule 804(b)(5), which is the corresponding “catchall exception” to be used when the declarant is unavailable. See State v. Posten, 302 N.W.2d 638, 641 (Minn.1981). We have considered either Rule 803(24) or 804(b)(5) in a number of cases, including: State v. Langley, 354 N.W.2d 389 (Minn.1984) (admission of hearsay accounts of prior assaults upon homicide victim by defendant under Rule 804(b)(5)); State v. Hansen, 312 N.W.2d 96 (Minn.1981) (holding inconsistent out of court statements otherwise admissible not admissible against government in criminal prosecution", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\na “catchall exception” that allows hearsay to be admitted in cases in which the declarant testifies if certain conditions are satisfied, the key one being that there are circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to those surrounding statements fitting within the 23 specific exceptions created by Rule 803. Rule 803(24) is identical to Rule 804(b)(5), which is the corresponding “catchall exception” to be used when the declarant is unavailable. See State v. Posten, 302 N.W.2d 638, 641 (Minn.1981). We have considered either Rule 803(24) or 804(b)(5) in a number of cases, including: State v. Langley, 354 N.W.2d 389 (Minn.1984) (admission of hearsay accounts of prior assaults upon homicide victim by defendant under Rule 804(b)(5)); State v. Hansen, 312 N.W.2d 96 (Minn.1981) (holding in a criminal case that a statement by an unavailable declarant was not admissible as a declaration against his penal interest and was not admissible under rule 804b5 either", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\na “catchall exception” that allows hearsay to be admitted in cases in which the declarant testifies if certain conditions are satisfied, the key one being that there are circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to those surrounding statements fitting within the 23 specific exceptions created by Rule 803. Rule 803(24) is identical to Rule 804(b)(5), which is the corresponding “catchall exception” to be used when the declarant is unavailable. See State v. Posten, 302 N.W.2d 638, 641 (Minn.1981). We have considered either Rule 803(24) or 804(b)(5) in a number of cases, including: State v. Langley, 354 N.W.2d 389 (Minn.1984) (admission of hearsay accounts of prior assaults upon homicide victim by defendant under Rule 804(b)(5)); State v. Hansen, 312 N.W.2d 96 (Minn.1981) (holding that testimonial evidence is admissible only if the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to crossexamine the declarant", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\na “catchall exception” that allows hearsay to be admitted in cases in which the declarant testifies if certain conditions are satisfied, the key one being that there are circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to those surrounding statements fitting within the 23 specific exceptions created by Rule 803. Rule 803(24) is identical to Rule 804(b)(5), which is the corresponding “catchall exception” to be used when the declarant is unavailable. See State v. Posten, 302 N.W.2d 638, 641 (Minn.1981). We have considered either Rule 803(24) or 804(b)(5) in a number of cases, including: State v. Langley, 354 N.W.2d 389 (Minn.1984) (admission of hearsay accounts of prior assaults upon homicide victim by defendant under Rule 804(b)(5)); State v. Hansen, 312 N.W.2d 96 (Minn.1981) (holding that only selfinculpatory aspects of hearsay statement but not other parts of statement are admissible under exception for statements against penal interest", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\na “catchall exception” that allows hearsay to be admitted in cases in which the declarant testifies if certain conditions are satisfied, the key one being that there are circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to those surrounding statements fitting within the 23 specific exceptions created by Rule 803. Rule 803(24) is identical to Rule 804(b)(5), which is the corresponding “catchall exception” to be used when the declarant is unavailable. See State v. Posten, 302 N.W.2d 638, 641 (Minn.1981). We have considered either Rule 803(24) or 804(b)(5) in a number of cases, including: State v. Langley, 354 N.W.2d 389 (Minn.1984) (admission of hearsay accounts of prior assaults upon homicide victim by defendant under Rule 804(b)(5)); State v. Hansen, 312 N.W.2d 96 (Minn.1981) (holding that statement that declarant saw defendant outside was admissible under rule 8081 because the statement explained an event or condition" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n508 (1993). See also United States v. Story, 503 F.3d 436, 438 (6th Cir.2007); United States v. Oliver, 397 F.3d 369, 379 (6th Cir.2005) (“a sentencing error affects substantial rights where it causes the defendant to receive a more severe sentence” (internal quotation and citation omitted)). In the instant case, Defendant claims that she was unaware of the maximum sentence before the plea hearing, and nothing in the record indicates that the defendant independently knew or was advised of the correct maximum sentence prior to the plea colloquy. Furthermore, the district court’s error may have caused Defendant to go to prison for longer than she thought possible for the crime she committed. Thus, the court’s error affects Defendant’s substantial rights. See, e.g., Syal, 963 F.2d at 906 (holding that further supervised release may be ordered as a sentence for violation of supervised release", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n508 (1993). See also United States v. Story, 503 F.3d 436, 438 (6th Cir.2007); United States v. Oliver, 397 F.3d 369, 379 (6th Cir.2005) (“a sentencing error affects substantial rights where it causes the defendant to receive a more severe sentence” (internal quotation and citation omitted)). In the instant case, Defendant claims that she was unaware of the maximum sentence before the plea hearing, and nothing in the record indicates that the defendant independently knew or was advised of the correct maximum sentence prior to the plea colloquy. Furthermore, the district court’s error may have caused Defendant to go to prison for longer than she thought possible for the crime she committed. Thus, the court’s error affects Defendant’s substantial rights. See, e.g., Syal, 963 F.2d at 906 (holding that the failure to notify the defendant of the term of supervised release and its possible effect on his sentence was not harmless error where njothing in the record suggests that the defendant understood that his sentence would include supervised release andthere was no written plea agreement by which he might have been warned", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n508 (1993). See also United States v. Story, 503 F.3d 436, 438 (6th Cir.2007); United States v. Oliver, 397 F.3d 369, 379 (6th Cir.2005) (“a sentencing error affects substantial rights where it causes the defendant to receive a more severe sentence” (internal quotation and citation omitted)). In the instant case, Defendant claims that she was unaware of the maximum sentence before the plea hearing, and nothing in the record indicates that the defendant independently knew or was advised of the correct maximum sentence prior to the plea colloquy. Furthermore, the district court’s error may have caused Defendant to go to prison for longer than she thought possible for the crime she committed. Thus, the court’s error affects Defendant’s substantial rights. See, e.g., Syal, 963 F.2d at 906 (holding that invitederror doctrine precludes defendant from challenging sentence of supervised release where defendant requested sentence of supervised release", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n508 (1993). See also United States v. Story, 503 F.3d 436, 438 (6th Cir.2007); United States v. Oliver, 397 F.3d 369, 379 (6th Cir.2005) (“a sentencing error affects substantial rights where it causes the defendant to receive a more severe sentence” (internal quotation and citation omitted)). In the instant case, Defendant claims that she was unaware of the maximum sentence before the plea hearing, and nothing in the record indicates that the defendant independently knew or was advised of the correct maximum sentence prior to the plea colloquy. Furthermore, the district court’s error may have caused Defendant to go to prison for longer than she thought possible for the crime she committed. Thus, the court’s error affects Defendant’s substantial rights. See, e.g., Syal, 963 F.2d at 906 (holding that term of supervised release was not automatically terminated when defendant was deported from united states and thus defendants subsequent commission of another offense illegal reentry after deportation prior to expiration of term of supervised release violated condition of supervised release that defendant commit no new offenses", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n508 (1993). See also United States v. Story, 503 F.3d 436, 438 (6th Cir.2007); United States v. Oliver, 397 F.3d 369, 379 (6th Cir.2005) (“a sentencing error affects substantial rights where it causes the defendant to receive a more severe sentence” (internal quotation and citation omitted)). In the instant case, Defendant claims that she was unaware of the maximum sentence before the plea hearing, and nothing in the record indicates that the defendant independently knew or was advised of the correct maximum sentence prior to the plea colloquy. Furthermore, the district court’s error may have caused Defendant to go to prison for longer than she thought possible for the crime she committed. Thus, the court’s error affects Defendant’s substantial rights. See, e.g., Syal, 963 F.2d at 906 (holding that courts failure to tell defendant in rule 11 plea hearing that he faced a mandatory period of supervised release was harmless error because the defendant was on notice of the supervised release requirement set out in the plea agreement and the defendant did not claim he was unaware of the requirement only that court technically had failed to comply with requirements of rule" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nset forth above, the court disagrees. The defendant cites EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 650 F.2d 14, 19 (2d Cir.1981) in support of its decision. That decision, however, supports this court's conclusion. In Sears, Roebuck & Co., the circuit court rejected the EEOC’s decision to litigate those claims that it did not attempt to conciliate. Id., 650 F.2d at 19. Here, by contrast, the defendant asks this court to dismiss all of the plaintiff's claims because the plaintiff was unwilling to conciliate as to a specific issue. PL's Opp'n at 24 & n. 16. 5 . Judicial inquiries of this sort run afoul of Legi-Tech, 75 F.3d at 709 (indicating the inappropriateness of judicial intrusion into internal agency actions) and Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 379 F.2d 453, 468 (D.C.Cir.1968) (holding that it would offend due process to permit criminal prosecution of an individual for invoking a privilege against selfincrimination in hearings before a state legislative commission after having been assured of his right to do so by the chairman members and counsel of the commission", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nset forth above, the court disagrees. The defendant cites EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 650 F.2d 14, 19 (2d Cir.1981) in support of its decision. That decision, however, supports this court's conclusion. In Sears, Roebuck & Co., the circuit court rejected the EEOC’s decision to litigate those claims that it did not attempt to conciliate. Id., 650 F.2d at 19. Here, by contrast, the defendant asks this court to dismiss all of the plaintiff's claims because the plaintiff was unwilling to conciliate as to a specific issue. PL's Opp'n at 24 & n. 16. 5 . Judicial inquiries of this sort run afoul of Legi-Tech, 75 F.3d at 709 (indicating the inappropriateness of judicial intrusion into internal agency actions) and Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 379 F.2d 453, 468 (D.C.Cir.1968) (holding an organization had standing because some of its individual members did", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nset forth above, the court disagrees. The defendant cites EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 650 F.2d 14, 19 (2d Cir.1981) in support of its decision. That decision, however, supports this court's conclusion. In Sears, Roebuck & Co., the circuit court rejected the EEOC’s decision to litigate those claims that it did not attempt to conciliate. Id., 650 F.2d at 19. Here, by contrast, the defendant asks this court to dismiss all of the plaintiff's claims because the plaintiff was unwilling to conciliate as to a specific issue. PL's Opp'n at 24 & n. 16. 5 . Judicial inquiries of this sort run afoul of Legi-Tech, 75 F.3d at 709 (indicating the inappropriateness of judicial intrusion into internal agency actions) and Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 379 F.2d 453, 468 (D.C.Cir.1968) (recognizing the commission as an institutional agency not a mere composition of its individual members", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nset forth above, the court disagrees. The defendant cites EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 650 F.2d 14, 19 (2d Cir.1981) in support of its decision. That decision, however, supports this court's conclusion. In Sears, Roebuck & Co., the circuit court rejected the EEOC’s decision to litigate those claims that it did not attempt to conciliate. Id., 650 F.2d at 19. Here, by contrast, the defendant asks this court to dismiss all of the plaintiff's claims because the plaintiff was unwilling to conciliate as to a specific issue. PL's Opp'n at 24 & n. 16. 5 . Judicial inquiries of this sort run afoul of Legi-Tech, 75 F.3d at 709 (indicating the inappropriateness of judicial intrusion into internal agency actions) and Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 379 F.2d 453, 468 (D.C.Cir.1968) (recognizing standing for an environmental group based on the adverse effect of an international commerce commission decision on its members", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nset forth above, the court disagrees. The defendant cites EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 650 F.2d 14, 19 (2d Cir.1981) in support of its decision. That decision, however, supports this court's conclusion. In Sears, Roebuck & Co., the circuit court rejected the EEOC’s decision to litigate those claims that it did not attempt to conciliate. Id., 650 F.2d at 19. Here, by contrast, the defendant asks this court to dismiss all of the plaintiff's claims because the plaintiff was unwilling to conciliate as to a specific issue. PL's Opp'n at 24 & n. 16. 5 . Judicial inquiries of this sort run afoul of Legi-Tech, 75 F.3d at 709 (indicating the inappropriateness of judicial intrusion into internal agency actions) and Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 379 F.2d 453, 468 (D.C.Cir.1968) (recognizing an exception allowing parties to raise for the first time on review challenges that concern the very composition or constitution of an agency" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nworth did not exceed $2,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B). The Government argues that Haselwander’s fee claim should be rejected because there is no “evidence” that Haselwander is worth less than $2 million. We disagree. The record in this case is adequate to show that Haselwan-der’s net worth is less than $2 million. In addition to counsel’s uncontested statement to this effect on behalf of his client, the record also includes a letter from Ha-selwander to Senator Lugar, in which he says, “My wife and I are just mid-level State of Indiana employees, and we cannot afford to pay for the current very high costs of college educations.” Joint Appendix 80. Nothing more is necessary. See, e.g., Hirschey v. FERC, 760 F.2d 305, 309 n. 19 (D.C.Cir.1985) (holding that record documents may show that a plaintiff meets the financial qualifications specified in 28 usc 2412d2b", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nworth did not exceed $2,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B). The Government argues that Haselwander’s fee claim should be rejected because there is no “evidence” that Haselwander is worth less than $2 million. We disagree. The record in this case is adequate to show that Haselwan-der’s net worth is less than $2 million. In addition to counsel’s uncontested statement to this effect on behalf of his client, the record also includes a letter from Ha-selwander to Senator Lugar, in which he says, “My wife and I are just mid-level State of Indiana employees, and we cannot afford to pay for the current very high costs of college educations.” Joint Appendix 80. Nothing more is necessary. See, e.g., Hirschey v. FERC, 760 F.2d 305, 309 n. 19 (D.C.Cir.1985) (holding that where jurisdiction was based on 28 usc 2201 venue was determined as per 28 usc 1391", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nworth did not exceed $2,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B). The Government argues that Haselwander’s fee claim should be rejected because there is no “evidence” that Haselwander is worth less than $2 million. We disagree. The record in this case is adequate to show that Haselwan-der’s net worth is less than $2 million. In addition to counsel’s uncontested statement to this effect on behalf of his client, the record also includes a letter from Ha-selwander to Senator Lugar, in which he says, “My wife and I are just mid-level State of Indiana employees, and we cannot afford to pay for the current very high costs of college educations.” Joint Appendix 80. Nothing more is necessary. See, e.g., Hirschey v. FERC, 760 F.2d 305, 309 n. 19 (D.C.Cir.1985) (holding that under 28 usc 1292b the appellate courts may review only matters in the order not all issues in the case", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nworth did not exceed $2,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B). The Government argues that Haselwander’s fee claim should be rejected because there is no “evidence” that Haselwander is worth less than $2 million. We disagree. The record in this case is adequate to show that Haselwan-der’s net worth is less than $2 million. In addition to counsel’s uncontested statement to this effect on behalf of his client, the record also includes a letter from Ha-selwander to Senator Lugar, in which he says, “My wife and I are just mid-level State of Indiana employees, and we cannot afford to pay for the current very high costs of college educations.” Joint Appendix 80. Nothing more is necessary. See, e.g., Hirschey v. FERC, 760 F.2d 305, 309 n. 19 (D.C.Cir.1985) (holding that venue for litigation was proper based on 28 usc 1441 regardless of whether defendant was doing business in the district within the meaning of 28 usc 1391", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nworth did not exceed $2,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B). The Government argues that Haselwander’s fee claim should be rejected because there is no “evidence” that Haselwander is worth less than $2 million. We disagree. The record in this case is adequate to show that Haselwan-der’s net worth is less than $2 million. In addition to counsel’s uncontested statement to this effect on behalf of his client, the record also includes a letter from Ha-selwander to Senator Lugar, in which he says, “My wife and I are just mid-level State of Indiana employees, and we cannot afford to pay for the current very high costs of college educations.” Joint Appendix 80. Nothing more is necessary. See, e.g., Hirschey v. FERC, 760 F.2d 305, 309 n. 19 (D.C.Cir.1985) (holding that plaintiff could not establish prima facie case of discrimination where plaintiff failed to meet minimum qualifications for job" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nemployer might apply a salary retention policy in a discriminatory fashion or use such a policy as a vehicle to perpetuate historically unequal wages caused by past discrimination, these potential abuses do not provide valid bases to adopt a per se rule that declares all salary retention practices inherently discriminatory. Rather, these risks simply highlight the need to carefully examine the record in cases where prior salary or salary retention policies are asserted as defenses to claims of unequal pay. In particular, it is important to ensure that employers do not rely on the prohibited “market force theory” to justify lower wages for female employees simply because the market might bear such wages. See Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 205, 94 S.Ct. 2223, 41 L.Ed.2d 1 (holding that to establish a prima facie equal pay act claim the plaintiff must show that the jobs being compared are substantially equal", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nemployer might apply a salary retention policy in a discriminatory fashion or use such a policy as a vehicle to perpetuate historically unequal wages caused by past discrimination, these potential abuses do not provide valid bases to adopt a per se rule that declares all salary retention practices inherently discriminatory. Rather, these risks simply highlight the need to carefully examine the record in cases where prior salary or salary retention policies are asserted as defenses to claims of unequal pay. In particular, it is important to ensure that employers do not rely on the prohibited “market force theory” to justify lower wages for female employees simply because the market might bear such wages. See Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 205, 94 S.Ct. 2223, 41 L.Ed.2d 1 (holding that although women may have been willing to work for lower wages than men and market forces therefore dictated that an employer could pay women less than men reliance on such a market force theory nevertheless became illegal once congress enacted into law the principle of equal pay for equal work", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nemployer might apply a salary retention policy in a discriminatory fashion or use such a policy as a vehicle to perpetuate historically unequal wages caused by past discrimination, these potential abuses do not provide valid bases to adopt a per se rule that declares all salary retention practices inherently discriminatory. Rather, these risks simply highlight the need to carefully examine the record in cases where prior salary or salary retention policies are asserted as defenses to claims of unequal pay. In particular, it is important to ensure that employers do not rely on the prohibited “market force theory” to justify lower wages for female employees simply because the market might bear such wages. See Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 205, 94 S.Ct. 2223, 41 L.Ed.2d 1 (holding that the mere allegation that a female professor was paid less than a male colleague for equal work stated a claim under the equal pay act", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nemployer might apply a salary retention policy in a discriminatory fashion or use such a policy as a vehicle to perpetuate historically unequal wages caused by past discrimination, these potential abuses do not provide valid bases to adopt a per se rule that declares all salary retention practices inherently discriminatory. Rather, these risks simply highlight the need to carefully examine the record in cases where prior salary or salary retention policies are asserted as defenses to claims of unequal pay. In particular, it is important to ensure that employers do not rely on the prohibited “market force theory” to justify lower wages for female employees simply because the market might bear such wages. See Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 205, 94 S.Ct. 2223, 41 L.Ed.2d 1 (holding that reliance may be established by proof that securities not traded on the open market could not have been issued at all but for a fraudulent scheme of the defendants the plaintiff still had to prove that he relied on the integrity of the offerings of the securities market", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nemployer might apply a salary retention policy in a discriminatory fashion or use such a policy as a vehicle to perpetuate historically unequal wages caused by past discrimination, these potential abuses do not provide valid bases to adopt a per se rule that declares all salary retention practices inherently discriminatory. Rather, these risks simply highlight the need to carefully examine the record in cases where prior salary or salary retention policies are asserted as defenses to claims of unequal pay. In particular, it is important to ensure that employers do not rely on the prohibited “market force theory” to justify lower wages for female employees simply because the market might bear such wages. See Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 205, 94 S.Ct. 2223, 41 L.Ed.2d 1 (holding that disposable retirement pay from military pension was equal to gross retirement pay less federal income taxes" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n1316, 1324 (Fed.Cir.2001). If the specification does not contain an “adequate disclosure” of the structure, the patent violates § 112, ¶ 6 and the claim should be found indefinite. In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189, 1195 (Fed.Cir.1994). The function expressed in the '780 Patent is “means for reducing the absorption of laser energy at a wavelength of about 1.4-2.2 micrometers.” CardioFocus submits that the phrase should be construed to cover the following corresponding structure: specially treated fiber that has been purified to reduce the concentration of hydroxyl ions including fused silica optical fiber part no. 822W manufactured by Spectran Corporation and equivalents thereof. That structure is adequately described in the specification, CardioFocus explains, as Holm (Fed.Cir.2001) (holding that a claim was not indefinite for using the term selector because it was a standard component and its structure was well known in the art", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n1316, 1324 (Fed.Cir.2001). If the specification does not contain an “adequate disclosure” of the structure, the patent violates § 112, ¶ 6 and the claim should be found indefinite. In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189, 1195 (Fed.Cir.1994). The function expressed in the '780 Patent is “means for reducing the absorption of laser energy at a wavelength of about 1.4-2.2 micrometers.” CardioFocus submits that the phrase should be construed to cover the following corresponding structure: specially treated fiber that has been purified to reduce the concentration of hydroxyl ions including fused silica optical fiber part no. 822W manufactured by Spectran Corporation and equivalents thereof. That structure is adequately described in the specification, CardioFocus explains, as Holm (Fed.Cir.2001) (holding that the specifications reference to a selector sufficed as one skilled in the art would have understood the term", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n1316, 1324 (Fed.Cir.2001). If the specification does not contain an “adequate disclosure” of the structure, the patent violates § 112, ¶ 6 and the claim should be found indefinite. In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189, 1195 (Fed.Cir.1994). The function expressed in the '780 Patent is “means for reducing the absorption of laser energy at a wavelength of about 1.4-2.2 micrometers.” CardioFocus submits that the phrase should be construed to cover the following corresponding structure: specially treated fiber that has been purified to reduce the concentration of hydroxyl ions including fused silica optical fiber part no. 822W manufactured by Spectran Corporation and equivalents thereof. That structure is adequately described in the specification, CardioFocus explains, as Holm (Fed.Cir.2001) (holding that what is important is not simply that the element at issue is defined in terms of what it does but that the term as the name for a structure has a reasonably well understood meaning in the art", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n1316, 1324 (Fed.Cir.2001). If the specification does not contain an “adequate disclosure” of the structure, the patent violates § 112, ¶ 6 and the claim should be found indefinite. In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189, 1195 (Fed.Cir.1994). The function expressed in the '780 Patent is “means for reducing the absorption of laser energy at a wavelength of about 1.4-2.2 micrometers.” CardioFocus submits that the phrase should be construed to cover the following corresponding structure: specially treated fiber that has been purified to reduce the concentration of hydroxyl ions including fused silica optical fiber part no. 822W manufactured by Spectran Corporation and equivalents thereof. That structure is adequately described in the specification, CardioFocus explains, as Holm (Fed.Cir.2001) (holding that use of term black box did not render the claim indefinite because that term was known in the field to represent video standard detector circuitry", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n1316, 1324 (Fed.Cir.2001). If the specification does not contain an “adequate disclosure” of the structure, the patent violates § 112, ¶ 6 and the claim should be found indefinite. In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189, 1195 (Fed.Cir.1994). The function expressed in the '780 Patent is “means for reducing the absorption of laser energy at a wavelength of about 1.4-2.2 micrometers.” CardioFocus submits that the phrase should be construed to cover the following corresponding structure: specially treated fiber that has been purified to reduce the concentration of hydroxyl ions including fused silica optical fiber part no. 822W manufactured by Spectran Corporation and equivalents thereof. That structure is adequately described in the specification, CardioFocus explains, as Holm (Fed.Cir.2001) (holding black box labeled sel was sufficient structure because it was a well known electronic structure and performs a common electronic function" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nU.S. Const. amend. II. In Heller, the Court determined that “the Second Amendment conferred an individu al right to keep and bear arms.” 128 S.Ct. at 2799. The holding in Heller is very limited, however, and the Court did not address whether (1) the Second Amendment applies to the states; (2) the individual right to keep and bear arms is a fundamental right; or (3) strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny is the proper standard of review. In assessing the validity of appellant’s claim, we must first address the reach of the Second Amendment. “It is settled law ... that the Second Amendment applies only to limitations the federal government seeks to impose on this right.” Maloney v. Cuomo, 554 F.3d 56, 58 (2nd Cir.2009). See also, Bach v. Pataki, 408 F.3d 75, 84 (2d Cir.2005) (holding that the second amendment fully applies to state and local regulation through the fourteenth amendment", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nU.S. Const. amend. II. In Heller, the Court determined that “the Second Amendment conferred an individu al right to keep and bear arms.” 128 S.Ct. at 2799. The holding in Heller is very limited, however, and the Court did not address whether (1) the Second Amendment applies to the states; (2) the individual right to keep and bear arms is a fundamental right; or (3) strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny is the proper standard of review. In assessing the validity of appellant’s claim, we must first address the reach of the Second Amendment. “It is settled law ... that the Second Amendment applies only to limitations the federal government seeks to impose on this right.” Maloney v. Cuomo, 554 F.3d 56, 58 (2nd Cir.2009). See also, Bach v. Pataki, 408 F.3d 75, 84 (2d Cir.2005) (holding that the limitation of 1367b applies only to plaintiffs efforts to join nondiverse parties", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nU.S. Const. amend. II. In Heller, the Court determined that “the Second Amendment conferred an individu al right to keep and bear arms.” 128 S.Ct. at 2799. The holding in Heller is very limited, however, and the Court did not address whether (1) the Second Amendment applies to the states; (2) the individual right to keep and bear arms is a fundamental right; or (3) strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny is the proper standard of review. In assessing the validity of appellant’s claim, we must first address the reach of the Second Amendment. “It is settled law ... that the Second Amendment applies only to limitations the federal government seeks to impose on this right.” Maloney v. Cuomo, 554 F.3d 56, 58 (2nd Cir.2009). See also, Bach v. Pataki, 408 F.3d 75, 84 (2d Cir.2005) (holding that duration of limitation is a factor in determining whether limitation is significant", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nU.S. Const. amend. II. In Heller, the Court determined that “the Second Amendment conferred an individu al right to keep and bear arms.” 128 S.Ct. at 2799. The holding in Heller is very limited, however, and the Court did not address whether (1) the Second Amendment applies to the states; (2) the individual right to keep and bear arms is a fundamental right; or (3) strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny is the proper standard of review. In assessing the validity of appellant’s claim, we must first address the reach of the Second Amendment. “It is settled law ... that the Second Amendment applies only to limitations the federal government seeks to impose on this right.” Maloney v. Cuomo, 554 F.3d 56, 58 (2nd Cir.2009). See also, Bach v. Pataki, 408 F.3d 75, 84 (2d Cir.2005) (holding that the fourteenth amendment only applies to state action", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nU.S. Const. amend. II. In Heller, the Court determined that “the Second Amendment conferred an individu al right to keep and bear arms.” 128 S.Ct. at 2799. The holding in Heller is very limited, however, and the Court did not address whether (1) the Second Amendment applies to the states; (2) the individual right to keep and bear arms is a fundamental right; or (3) strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny is the proper standard of review. In assessing the validity of appellant’s claim, we must first address the reach of the Second Amendment. “It is settled law ... that the Second Amendment applies only to limitations the federal government seeks to impose on this right.” Maloney v. Cuomo, 554 F.3d 56, 58 (2nd Cir.2009). See also, Bach v. Pataki, 408 F.3d 75, 84 (2d Cir.2005) (holding that the second amendment imposes a limitation on only federal not state legislative efforts" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nMason, 2004 WL 3242339 at **5-7 (concluding that a plaintiffs failure to submit evidence from a medical professional demonstrating that she was unable to work made it impossible for the plaintiff to factually establish that she suffered from a serious health condition and, therefore, a prima facie case of FMLA interference); Niese v. Gen. Elec. Appliances, 2001 WL 290382 at *7 (S.D.Ind.2001) (“A release to work without restrictions is not consistent with a request for FMLA leave due to the employee’s serious health condition that makes her unable to perform her job.”). As a result, because Matthys can not factually establish that she suffered from a serious health condition, Matthys can also not legally establish a prima facie claim of FMLA interference. See Darst, 512 F.3d at 910-12 (holding that there was no sustainable fmla interference claim wherein a plaintiff could not establish that her daughter suffered from a serious health condition as defined by the regulations", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nMason, 2004 WL 3242339 at **5-7 (concluding that a plaintiffs failure to submit evidence from a medical professional demonstrating that she was unable to work made it impossible for the plaintiff to factually establish that she suffered from a serious health condition and, therefore, a prima facie case of FMLA interference); Niese v. Gen. Elec. Appliances, 2001 WL 290382 at *7 (S.D.Ind.2001) (“A release to work without restrictions is not consistent with a request for FMLA leave due to the employee’s serious health condition that makes her unable to perform her job.”). As a result, because Matthys can not factually establish that she suffered from a serious health condition, Matthys can also not legally establish a prima facie claim of FMLA interference. See Darst, 512 F.3d at 910-12 (holding the district court did not err in denying the defendants rule 60b3 motion where the defendant had an opportunity to cure any prejudice because the plaintiffs failure to disclose evidence did not interfere with the defendants ability to proceed", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nMason, 2004 WL 3242339 at **5-7 (concluding that a plaintiffs failure to submit evidence from a medical professional demonstrating that she was unable to work made it impossible for the plaintiff to factually establish that she suffered from a serious health condition and, therefore, a prima facie case of FMLA interference); Niese v. Gen. Elec. Appliances, 2001 WL 290382 at *7 (S.D.Ind.2001) (“A release to work without restrictions is not consistent with a request for FMLA leave due to the employee’s serious health condition that makes her unable to perform her job.”). As a result, because Matthys can not factually establish that she suffered from a serious health condition, Matthys can also not legally establish a prima facie claim of FMLA interference. See Darst, 512 F.3d at 910-12 (holding that a plaintiffs failure to submit evidence of continuing treatment by a health care provider as defined by the regulations was fatal to a plaintiffs fmla interference claim regardless of the defendants alleged failure to allow the plaintiff an opportunity to cure medical certification deficiencies", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nMason, 2004 WL 3242339 at **5-7 (concluding that a plaintiffs failure to submit evidence from a medical professional demonstrating that she was unable to work made it impossible for the plaintiff to factually establish that she suffered from a serious health condition and, therefore, a prima facie case of FMLA interference); Niese v. Gen. Elec. Appliances, 2001 WL 290382 at *7 (S.D.Ind.2001) (“A release to work without restrictions is not consistent with a request for FMLA leave due to the employee’s serious health condition that makes her unable to perform her job.”). As a result, because Matthys can not factually establish that she suffered from a serious health condition, Matthys can also not legally establish a prima facie claim of FMLA interference. See Darst, 512 F.3d at 910-12 (recognizing that a lack of funds may justify a failure to receive medical care however a plaintiffs case is buttressed by evidence he related an inability to afford prescriptions to his provider and was denied the prescription", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nMason, 2004 WL 3242339 at **5-7 (concluding that a plaintiffs failure to submit evidence from a medical professional demonstrating that she was unable to work made it impossible for the plaintiff to factually establish that she suffered from a serious health condition and, therefore, a prima facie case of FMLA interference); Niese v. Gen. Elec. Appliances, 2001 WL 290382 at *7 (S.D.Ind.2001) (“A release to work without restrictions is not consistent with a request for FMLA leave due to the employee’s serious health condition that makes her unable to perform her job.”). As a result, because Matthys can not factually establish that she suffered from a serious health condition, Matthys can also not legally establish a prima facie claim of FMLA interference. See Darst, 512 F.3d at 910-12 (holding that a plaintiffs failure to obtain evidence of continuing treatment an element of a serious health condition was fatal to a plaintiffs fmla interference claim regardless of the plaintiffs allegations that the defendant failed to allow the plaintiff an opportunity to cure medical certification deficiencies in so ruling the 7th circuit denied the plaintiffs estoppel arguments and instead placed an affirmative duty on the plaintiff to present sufficient evidence to establish a serious health condition as defined by the regulations in order to overcome a summary judgment motion on an fmla interference claim" ]