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+IN CASE 8/55
+FEDERATION CHARBONNIERE DE BELGIQUE, REPRESENTED BY LOUIS DEHASSE, LEON CANIVET, PIERRE DELVILLE AND HENRI GOUDAILLIER, ASSISTED BY PAUL TSCHOFFEN, ADVOCATE AT THE COUR D'APPEL, LIEGE, AND HENRI SIMONT, ADVOCATE AT THE COUR DE CASSATION OF BELGIUM, PROFESSOR AT THE UNIVERSITE LIBRE DE BRUSSELS, WITH AN ADDRESS FOR SERVICE IN LUXEMBOURG AT 6, RUE HENRI HEINE, APPLICANT,
+HIGH AUTHORITY OF THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY, REPRESENTED BY ITS LEGAL ADVISER, WALTER MUCH, ACTING AS AGENT, ASSISTED BY G. VAN HECKE, ADVOCATE AT THE COUR D'APPEL, BRUSSELS, PROFESSOR AT THE UNIVERSITY OF LOUVAIN, WITH AN ADDRESS FOR SERVICE IN LUXEMBOURG AT ITS OFFICES, 2, PLACE DE METZ, DEFENDANT,
+APPLICATION FOR THE ANNULMENT OF DECISION NO 22/55 OF THE HIGH AUTHORITY OF 28 MAY 1955 AND OF CERTAIN DECISIONS OF THE HIGH AUTHORITY RESULTING FROM ITS LETTER OF 28 MAY 1955 TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF BELGIUM CONCERNING THE ADJUSTMENT OF THE EQUALIZATION SYSTEM (JOURNAL OFFICIEL OF 31 MAY 1955, PP. 753-758), A - AS REGARDS DECISION NO 22/55 OF 28 MAY 1955 I. POWER OF THE HIGH AUTHORITY TO FIX THE PRICE LIST AND TO DO SO AT A REDUCED LEVEL
+IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION, THE EQUALIZATION MACHINERY PROVIDED FOR IN PART THREE OF THE CONVENTION SHALL BE SET UP BEFORE THE COMMON MARKET IS ESTABLISHED.
+THUS, FROM THE BEGINNING, THE CONVENTION EXPOSES THE BELGIAN COAL MARKET TO THE EFFECTS OF THE COMMON MARKET ONLY THROUGH THE APPLICATION OF SPECIAL MEASURES, AND IN PARTICULAR THE INTRODUCTION OF THE EQUALIZATION SCHEME.
+THE MEASURES IN QUESTION ARE EXPLAINED BY THE EXISTENCE OF A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BELGIUM AND THE OTHER STATES OF THE COMMUNITY RESULTING FROM DISADVANTAGEOUS CONDITIONS OF PRODUCTION.
+DURING THE ORAL PROCEDURE THE DEFENDANT EXPLAINED THE CAUSES OF THAT DISADVANTAGE.
+THAT EXPLANATION HAS NOT BEEN CONTRADICTED AND IT APPEARS TO THE COURT TO BE CORRECT.
+IN FACT, IN BELGIUM:
+2. MINING TECHNIQUES ARE NOT SO ADVANCED, SINCE FOR SEVERAL YEARS IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO MAKE THE NECESSARY INVESTMENTS; AND
+3. THE LEVEL OF WAGES IS HIGHER THAN IN THE OTHER PRODUCING COUNTRIES.
+IN ORDER TO BRING THE PRICES OF BELGIAN COAL INTO LINE WITH THE RULING COMMON MARKET PRICES THAT ARTICLE PROVIDES FOR ALL CONSUMERS OF THAT COAL TO BENEFIT FROM A REDUCTION IN PRICES AND INDICATES THE CONDITIONS WHICH UNDERTAKINGS MUST SATISFY IN ORDER TO BENEFIT FROM EQUALIZATION, THE DATE FROM WHICH PRICES MUST BE BROUGHT INTO LINE AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH THEY MUST BE REDUCED.
+IF, AS THE APPLICANT HAS SUGGESTED, THE PRICES WERE BROUGHT INTO LINE BY A RISE IN THE RULING COMMON MARKET PRICES RATHER THAN BY A REDUCTION IN BELGIAN PRICES THE EQUALIZATION PAYMENTS WOULD BE TRANSFORMED INTO A SUBSIDY FOR WHICH THERE IS NO REASON OR PURPOSE.
+UNDER THE TERMS OF ARTICLE 26 OF THE CONVENTION THE EXISTENCE OF A SITUATION IN WHICH EQUALIZATION IS JUSTIFIED IMPLIES THE NEED TO LOWER THE LEVEL OF BELGIAN PRICES TO A MORE OR LESS FIXED LIMIT RESULTING FROM A GENERAL ASSESSMENT BASED ON ESTIMATED PRODUCTION COSTS IN BELGIUM AT THE END OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD.
+THE APPLICANT HAS MAINTAINED THAT THE TREATY ESTABLISHES A MARKET SYSTEM IN WHICH PRICES ARE FIXED BY THE UNDERTAKINGS AND THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY CONTRARY PROVISION, IT IS THEREFORE THE UNDERTAKINGS THEMSELVES WHICH FIX PRICES IN THIS INSTANCE WHICH, WHERE THEY RECEIVE EQUALIZATION PAYMENTS, THEY MUST DO AT THE LEVEL OF ESTIMATED PRODUCTION COSTS. THUS THE APPLICANT DOES NOT RULE OUT ALL INTERVENTION BY THE HIGH AUTHORITY IN THE FIXING OF PRICES BUT LIMITS IT TO THE CASES EXPRESSLY PROVIDED FOR IN THE TREATY AND IN PARTICULAR IN ARTICLE 61 THEREOF. THE REDUCTION OF BELGIAN PRICES REQUIRED BY THE CONVENTION IS AN OPERATION OF CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE WHOSE PURPOSE IS TO PREPARE, UNDER CONDITIONS OF PARTICULAR DIFFICULTY, FOR THE INTEGRATION OF BELGIAN COAL INTO THE COMMON MARKET AND WHICH IS INSPIRED BY THE GENERAL INTEREST OF THE COMMUNITY IN THE GRADUAL STANDARDIZATION OF THE COMMON MARKET IN COAL.
+ACCORDING TO THAT ARGUMENT, DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD ALL THOSE AIMS ARE SUBJECT TO OR FALL ESSENTIALLY WITHIN THE AREA OF DISCRETION OF THE BELGIAN COLLIERIES THEMSELVES.
+SUCH A RESULT CANNOT BE ACCEPTED.
+DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD PRICES OF BELGIAN COAL MUST BE FIXED AND MUST REMAIN AT APPROXIMATELY THE LEVEL OF ESTIMATED PRODUCTION COSTS. THAT LIMIT, WHICH IS FIXED BY MEANS OF A GENERAL ASSESSMENT BASED, INTER ALIA, ON ESTIMATED IMPROVEMENTS IN THE OUTPUT OF THE MINES AND THE EFFECTS OF PLANS FOR THE CLOSURE OF MARGINAL MINES, IS NOT SUBJECT TO MARKET INFLUENCES. IF THE PRICES OF BELGIAN COAL WERE SUBJECT TO THE EFFECT OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND IN THE MARKET, THEIR REDUCTION COULD NOT BE GUARANTEED.
+FINALLY, ARTICLE 61 OF THE TREATY IS NOT APPLICABLE HERE. THAT PROVISION PROVIDES FOR INTERVENTION ONLY IN CASES OF NECESSITY TO DEAL WITH TEMPORARY DIFFICULTIES CAUSED BY EXCESSIVE RISES BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE NORMAL OPERATION OF THE MARKET ECONOMY. TO MAKE USE OF THAT ARTICLE TO MAINTAIN PRICES PERMANENTLY AT AN ARTIFICIAL LEVEL RESULTING FROM THE ASSESSMENT OF ESTIMATED PRODUCTION COSTS AT THE END OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD WOULD BE TO USE IT OTHERWISE THAN FOR ITS TRUE OBJECTIVE.
+FURTHERMORE, THE AWKWARD NATURE OF THE PROCEDURE UNDER ARTICLE 61 DOES NOT FIT IN EASILY WITH THE FIXING OF PRICES WHICH ARE SUBJECT TO REVISION AS A RESULT OF MODIFICATIONS IN THE ASSESSMENTS OF ESTIMATED PRODUCTION COSTS WHICH ARE MADE AS THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD COMES TO AN END AND AS THE PLANS ARE ALREADY BEING PARTLY IMPLEMENTED. MOREOVER, A FACT WHICH SHOWS CLEARLY THAT ARTICLE 61 WAS NOT INTENDED TO APPLY TO A CASE OF THIS NATURE IS THAT IT REQUIRES PRELIMINARY CONSULTATION WITH THE CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE AND THE COUNCIL" AS TO THE ADVISABILITY OF SO DOING AND THE PRICE LEVEL TO BE SO DETERMINED" , THAT IS, AS TO CONSIDERATIONS OF ECONOMIC EXPEDIENCY.
+THIS CASE CONCERNS QUITE ANOTHER MATTER, THAT IS, THE ASSESSMENT OF FUTURE PRODUCTION COSTS IN THE LIGHT OF EXPECTED IMPROVEMENTS IN OUTPUT AS A RESULT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PLANS FOR RE-EQUIPMENT AND MODERNIZATION, WHICH IS A PURELY TECHNICAL MATTER. AS REGARDS THE AMOUNT OF THE REDUCTION, THAT IS NOT OPEN TO DISCUSSION SINCE IT HAS ALREADY BEEN DETERMINED BY THE CONVENTION.
+AS THAT METHOD IS SUFFICIENTLY EFFECTIVE, THE FIXING OF PRICES BY THE HIGH AUTHORITY ON ITS OWN AUTHORITY NEED NOT BE ACCEPTED AS BEING INDISPENSABLE.
+FOR THAT REASON THE HIGH AUTHORITY CAN BE EMPOWERED ONLY TO REDUCE EQUALIZATION PAYMENTS TO THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE UNDERTAKINGS HAVE NOT REDUCED THEIR PRICES WITHIN THE STATED LIMITS.
+IN THAT CASE, UNDERTAKINGS ALWAYS HAVE A CLEAR INTEREST IN RISKING SUCH A REDUCTION IN EQUALIZATION AND IN PREFERRING PROFITS FROM PRICES WHICH ARE TOO HIGH IN RELATIVE TERMS TO HIGHER EQUALIZATION PAYMENTS CORRESPONDING TO ANY REDUCTION IN PRICES WHICH THEY MIGHT HAVE MADE, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR EQUALIZATION ARE ON A SLIDING SCALE.
+IT RESULTS FROM THE FOREGOING THAT INDIRECT ACTION ON THE PART OF THE HIGH AUTHORITY SUCH AS A REDUCTION IN EQUALIZATION PAYMENTS IS INSUFFICIENT TO ATTAIN THE OBJECTIVE OF ARTICLE 26 (2) (a) OF THE CONVENTION. IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT MUST BE ACCEPTED THAT ONLY DIRECT ACTION BY THE HIGH AUTHORITY CAN GUARANTEE THE IMMEDIATE REDUCTION IN PRICES WHICH MUST NECESSARILY ACCOMPANY EQUALIZATION. DURING THE ORAL PROCEDURE THE APPLICANT MAINTAINED THAT THE ABSENCE FROM THE TREATY OF ANY PROVISION EXPRESSLY ENABLING FIXED PRICES TO BE IMPOSED PRECLUDES RECOGNITION OF SUCH A POWER BY MEANS OF AN INTERPRETATION WHICH IT REGARDS AS BEING WIDE AND UNACCEPTABLE IN LAW.
+THE COURT DOES NOT SHARE THAT OPINION IN SO FAR AS, AS IT HAS JUST OBSERVED, THE POWER INVOLVED IN THIS INSTANCE IS ONE WITHOUT WHICH EQUALIZATION CANNOT OPERATE AS PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE 26 OF THE CONVENTION, THAT IS, ON THE BASIS OF AN IMMEDIATE AND GUARANTEED REDUCTION IN PRICES.
+FURTHERMORE, UNDER THE TERMS OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE TREATY IT SHALL BE THE DUTY OF THE HIGH AUTHORITY TO ENSURE THAT THE OBJECTIVES SET OUT IN THAT TREATY ARE ATTAINED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS THEREOF.
+IT MUST BE CONCLUDED FROM THAT PROVISION, WHICH IS THE GUIDING PRINCIPLE FOR THE POWERS OF THE HIGH AUTHORITY DEFINED IN CHAPTER I OF THE TREATY, THAT IT ENJOYS A CERTAIN INDEPENDENCE IN DETERMINING THE IMPLEMENTING MEASURES NECESSARY FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF THE OBJECTIVES REFERRED TO IN THE TREATY OR IN THE CONVENTION WHICH FORMS AN INTEGRAL PART THEREOF.
+AS, IN THIS INSTANCE, IT IS NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE THE AIM OF ARTICLE 26 OF THE CONVENTION, THE HIGH AUTHORITY HAS THE POWER, IF NOT THE DUTY, TO ADOPT - WITHIN THE LIMITS LAID DOWN BY THAT PROVISION - MEASURES TO REDUCE THE PRICES OF BELGIAN COAL.
+THE RESULT IS THAT THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF ITS TASK IN THIS INSTANCE ASSUMES A POWER TO FIX PRICES ON THE PART OF THE HIGH AUTHORITY.
+THE APPLICANT HAS FURTHER DENIED THAT THE HIGH AUTHORITY HAS THE POWER TO FIX PRICES BY MAINTAINING THAT THE SENTENCE IN ARTICLE 26 (2) (a) WHICH STATES THAT "THE PRICE LIST SO FIXED SHALL NOT BE CHANGED WITHOUT THE AGREEMENT OF THE HIGH AUTHORITY" MUST BE INTERPRETED AS PROHIBITING THE HIGH AUTHORITY FROM DRAWING UP A TABLE SHOWING THE LEVEL TO WHICH THE PRICES OF BELGIAN COAL MUST BE REDUCED IN PURSUANCE OF ARTICLE 26 OF THE CONVENTION. HOWEVER, NO SUCH PROHIBITION APPEARS IN THE AFOREMENTIONED PROVISION; IT IS DEDUCED THEREFROM BY THE APPLICANT INDIRECTLY AND A CONTRARIO.
+THE REDUCTION IN PRICES AS A CONSEQUENCE OF EQUALIZATION IS REQUIRED BY ARTICLE 26 OF THE CONVENTION, WHICH ALSO LAYS DOWN THE EXTENT OF THAT REDUCTION. THERE CAN THEREFORE BE NO QUESTION OF ANY MISUSE OF POWERS SINCE THE ONLY MEASURE WHICH THE HIGH AUTHORITY COULD TAKE IN ORDER TO PURSUE THE OBJECTIVE OF ARTICLE 26 WAS PRECISELY THAT WHICH CONSISTED IN REDUCING THE PRICES OF BELGIAN COAL. IN THE ABSENCE OF PROOF THAT THE LEVEL OF PRICES FIXED BY THE HIGH AUTHORITY WHEN IT ADOPTED DECISION NO 22/55 WAS DIFFERENT FROM THAT WHICH RESULTS FROM A PROPER FIXING OF PRICES WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 26 (2) (a) OF THE CONVENTION, THE AFOREMENTIONED DECISION CANNOT BE VITIATED BY MISUSE OF POWERS.
+IT EMERGES FROM THE REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE FOR EXAMINING EQUALIZATION FOR THE BELGIAN COLLIERIES, AS WELL AS FROM THE HIGH AUTHORITY's DETAILED CALCULATIONS CONCERNING THE ASSESSMENT OF THE LEVEL OF ESTIMATED PRODUCTION COSTS THAT ONE OF THE AIMS OF THE HIGH AUTHORITY WAS TO REDUCE THE PRICES OF BELGIAN COAL WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE SCHEME ENVISAGED IN ARTICLE 26 OF THE CONVENTION AND, IN PARTICULAR, WITHIN THE LIMITS IMPOSED BY THAT PROVISION.
+EVEN IF ONE UNJUSTIFIED REASON WERE INCLUDED AMONG THOSE WHICH JUSTIFY THE ACTION OF THE HIGH AUTHORITY, THE DECISION WOULD NOT FOR THAT REASON INVOLVE A MISUSE OF POWERS, IN SO FAR AS IT DOES NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE BASIC AIM OF ARTICLE 26 OF THE CONVENTION.
+FOR THE REASONS SET OUT ABOVE THE FIRST AND SECOND COMPLAINTS IN THE APPLICATION MUST BE DISMISSED.
+II. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SELLING PRICES AND ESTIMATED PRODUCTION COSTS
+BEFORE EXAMINING THE QUESTION WHETHER THE HIGH AUTHORITY FIXED PRICES AT THE LEVEL PROVIDED FOR IT IS NECESSARY TO CONSIDER WHETHER IT IS TRUE THAT - AS THE APPLICANT ALLEGES - THE HIGH AUTHORITY SUBSTITUTED RUHR PRICES FOR THOSE RULING IN THE COMMON MARKET WITHOUT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE ARTIFICIALLY LOW LEVEL OF RUHR PRICES AND THE HIGHER LEVEL OF PRICES IN CERTAIN OTHER COALFIELDS. THE DEFENDANT MAINTAINS THAT IT WISHED TO REDUCE THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BELGIAN PRICES AND RUHR PRICES WITHIN THE LIMITS FIXED, SINCE THE FACT THAT IT HAS AVAILABLE THE LARGEST EXPORTABLE SAMPLES OF THE TYPES OF COAL COVERED BY THE EQUALIZATION SCHEME MEANS THAT THE RUHR EXERCISES A "PRICE LEADERSHIP" IN THE COMMON MARKET. AS REGARDS THAT DIFFERENCE OF OPINION, THE COURT FINDS THAT BY REDUCING THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BELGIAN PRICES AND RUHR PRICES AND BASING ITS ACTION ON THE RULING RUHR PRICES, THAT IS, WITHOUT TAKING ACCOUNT OF THEIR POSSIBLY ARTIFICIAL NATURE, THE HIGH AUTHORITY ALLOWED A CERTAIN MARGIN TO REMAIN BETWEEN THOSE TWO PRICES LEVELS.
+ONLY IN THOSE FEW CASES HAS IT BEEN ALLEGED THAT THE HIGH AUTHORITY EXCEEDED THE LEVEL OF COMMON MARKET PRICES. HOWEVER, THE APPLICANT HAS NOT REFERRED TO ANY FACT OR CIRCUMSTANCE WHICH WOULD DEMONSTRATE THAT IN THE AFOREMENTIONED CASES THE LEVEL OF PRICES IN THE COALFIELDS IN QUESTION DETERMINED THE LEVEL IN THE COMMON MARKET. IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES IT CANNOT BE ACCEPTED THAT, IN THE PRESENT CASE, THE PRICES FIXED BY THE HIGH AUTHORITY WERE LOWER THAN THOSE IN THE COMMON MARKET.
+EQUALIZATION IS THUS LINKED TO THE TREND IN ESTIMATED PRODUCTION COSTS IN ORDER TO ENSURE A CORRESPONDING TREND IN PRICES.
+IT IS POSSIBLE THAT AT THE END OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD A GREATER REDUCTION IN PRODUCTION COSTS WILL BE NECESSARY IN ORDER TO BRING ABOUT THE FINAL INTEGRATION OF BELGIAN COAL INTO THE COMMON MARKET; THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THAT NEW OBJECTIVE WILL DEPEND ON THE MEANS AVAILABLE AT THAT TIME, BUT THAT QUESTION DOES NOT CONCERN ARTICLE 26 (2) (a) OF THE CONVENTION AND THE SYSTEM LAID DOWN THEREIN.
+IF, AS THE APPLICANT ALLEGES, THE HIGH AUTHORITY FIXED THE PRICES SOLELY IN ORDER TO BRING THEM INTO LINE WITH THOSE IN THE COMMON MARKET AND HAD NEGLECTED THE LEVEL OF ESTIMATED PRODUCTION COSTS AT THE END OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, ITS DECISION WOULD INVOLVE A MISUSE OF POWERS AND WOULD HAVE TO BE ANNULLED.
+HOWEVER, THAT IS NOT THE CASE HERE.
+THE DIFFERENT VIEWS HELD BY THE PARTIES DURING THE HEARINGS AS TO THE ASSESSMENT OF THE COSTS OF PRODUCTION FOR BELGIAN COAL AT THE END OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD RELATE SOLELY TO FACTORS OF A STATISTICAL NATURE, THE EVALUATION OF WHICH FOR ACCOUNTING PURPOSES ALONE CANNOT PREJUDICE THE LAWFUL NATURE OF THE CONTESTED MEASURE, PROVIDED THAT THAT ASSESSMENT DOES NOT SHOW THAT IN ADOPTING THAT MEASURE THE HIGH AUTHORITY PURSUED AN AIM OTHER THAN THAT DEFINED BY ARTICLE 26 (2) (a) OF THE CONVENTION.
+EVEN IF THE DEFENDANT HAS COMMITTED CERTAIN ERRORS IN SELECTING THE BASIS FOR ITS CALCULATIONS, AS IS THE CASE WITH REGARD TO SELECTION OF THE REFERENCE YEAR AND PERHAPS ALSO WITH REGARD TO AMORTIZATION AND THE GROUPING OF CATEGORIES OF COAL, IT IS NOT TO BE HELD THAT ITS ERRORS CONSTITUTE IPSO FACTO PROOF OF MISUSE OF POWERS UNLESS IT HAS ALSO BEEN ESTABLISHED OBJECTIVELY THAT THE HIGH AUTHORITY PURSUED IN THIS CASE, THROUGH A SERIOUS LACK OF CARE OR ATTENTION AMOUNTING TO A DISREGARD FOR THE LAWFUL AIM, PURPOSES OTHER THAN THOSE FOR WHICH THE POWERS PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE 26 (2) (a) WERE CONFERRED. IN FACT, AS REGARDS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE LEVEL OF ESTIMATED PRODUCTION COSTS IN 1958, IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT - AS REGARDS THE CHOICE, CAETERIS PARIBUS, OF 1952 AS THE REFERENCE YEAR RATHER THAN 1955, WHEN THE DECISIONS IN QUESTION WERE ADOPTED - FACTORS WHICH WERE UNFORESEEABLE IN 1952 AND EARLIER WERE OR COULD BECOME FORESEEABLE IN 1955. IT MUST ALSO BE OBSERVED THAT THE DEFENDANT NEVERTHELESS MITIGATED OR AT LEAST ATTEMPTED TO MITIGATE THESE ERRORS BY INCREASING EITHER THE SELLING PRICE OF COAL OR THE AMOUNT OF THE EQUALIZATION PAYMENTS IN THE LIGHT OF THE INCREASE IN WAGES AND OF CERTAIN LESS IMPORTANT FACTORS.
+THE SAME APPLIES TO THE FACT THAT THE DEFENDANT TOOK ACCOUNT OF ESTIMATES MADE IN 1955 CONCERNING THE REORGANIZATION OF THE MARGINAL MINES (SEE THE REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE FOR MINES) AND OF CERTAIN SUBSIDIES AND CERTAIN EXPENSES FOR THE RENEWAL OF PLANT BY WAY OF AMORTIZATION WITHOUT, HOWEVER, ACCEPTING THE RATES OF AMORTIZATION ENTERED IN THE UNDERTAKINGs' aCCOUNTS.
+WHETHER THOSE FACTS ARE CONSIDERED TOGETHER OR INDIVIDUALLY THEY ARE CHARACTERISTIC OF THE JUSTIFIED DESIRE AND WILL OF THE DEFENDANT TO MAKE AN EVER MORE ACCURATE ASSESSMENT OF THE ESTIMATED PRODUCTION COSTS AT THE END OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD.
+BEFORE THE JUDGMENT OF 16 JULY 1956 WAS GIVEN AND DESPITE CERTAIN RESERVATIONS ON EACH SIDE THE PARTIES PUT FORWARD BY COMMON AGREEMENT A FIGURE REPRESENTING THE AVERAGE WHICH RESULTS FROM GROUPING ALL CATEGORIES TOGETHER; IN THE LIGHT OF THOSE RESERVATIONS THEY HAVE NOW PUT FORWARD AND PLEADED FIGURES BASED ON NEW GROUPINGS WHICH ARE SO DIFFERENT THAT IT IS DIFFICULT, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE, TO COMPARE THEM.
+HOWEVER, WITHOUT GOING INTO THE RESPECTIVE INTRINSIC MERITS OF THE DIFFERENT METHODS OF GROUPING, IT MUST BE FOUND THAT A DETAILED EXAMINATION OF THEM DOES NOT SHOW THAT THE METHOD CHOSEN BY THE DEFENDANT LED IT TO DISREGARD THE LIMIT FORMED BY THE APPROXIMATE FIGURE FOR THE ESTIMATED PRODUCTION COSTS FOR 1958 AND TO ARRIVE AT A RESULT WHICH CONFLICTS WITH THE ALIGNMENT OF COAL PRICES IN BELGIUM UPON THOSE IN THE COMMON MARKET.
+FOR THE REASONS SET OUT ABOVE THE SUBMISSION OF MISUSE OF POWERS IS NOT WELL FOUNDED AS REGARDS THE LEVEL OF SELLING PRICES AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THAT LEVEL AND THE LEVEL OF ESTIMATED PRODUCTION COSTS AT THE END OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD.
+III. INTERVENTION BY THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT
+THE APPLICANT HAS NOT GIVEN PROOF THAT WHEN IT ADOPTED DECISION NO 22/55 THE HIGH AUTHORITY SACRIFICED THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF BELGIAN PRODUCERS TO THE BENEFIT OF THE POLICY OF THEIR GOVERNMENT.
+IT IS, FURTHERMORE, QUITE NORMAL THAT DISCUSSIONS AND CONSULTATIONS SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN SUCH A MATTER. THE UNDISPUTED FACT THAT THE HIGH AUTHORITY FIXED SELLING PRICES AT A LEVEL HIGHER THAN THAT PROPOSED BY THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT INDICATES RATHER THAT THE HIGH AUTHORITY RETAINED ITS UNFETTERED POWER OF DECISION. THE PRESENT COMPLAINT IS THEREFORE UNFOUNDED.
+IV. FIXING OF SELLING PRICES IN CERTAIN CASES WITHOUT PROVISION FOR EQUALIZATION THE DEFENDANT ALLEGES THE EXCLUSION FROM THE BENEFIT OF EQUALIZATION OF UNCLASSIFIED BITUMINOUS COALS FROM THE CAMPINE IN NO WAY IMPLIES THAT THOSE TYPES ARE ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY INTEGRATED INTO THE COMMON MARKET TO BE PLACED OUTSIDE THE SYSTEM OF EQUALIZATION. IT CONSIDERS THAT ACCOUNT MUST BE TAKEN OF THE FACT THAT IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO MAKE A FURTHER REDUCTION IN BELGIAN PRICES AND, WHERE APPROPRIATE, TO RECOMMENCE PAYMENT OF EQUALIZATION TO THE COLLIERIES IN THE CAMPINE AS WELL.
+IN FACT, THE LETTER OF 28 MAY 1955 LEAVES UNCHANGED THE TYPE OF COAL IN QUESTION WITHIN THE EQUALIZATION SYSTEM IN SPITE OF THE MODIFICATIONS WHICH IT MAKES TO THE RULES WHICH DETERMINE THE AMOUNT OF THE EQUALIZATION PAYMENTS TO CERTAIN UNDERTAKINGS.
+THE QUESTION WHETHER THAT SYSTEM ENABLES EQUALIZATION TO BE REDUCED OR EVEN WITHDRAWN ON THE BASIS OF THE CONDITIONS OF PRODUCTION OF CERTAIN INDIVIDUAL UNDERTAKINGS FORMS THE SUBJECT OF THE COMPLAINT RELATING TO THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SELECTIVITY IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 26. THE QUESTION WHETHER SUCH SELECTIVITY IS LAWFUL WILL BE EXAMINED BELOW IN RELATION TO ALL THE PROVISIONS OF THE LETTER OF 28 MAY 1955 FROM THE HIGH AUTHORITY TO THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER, WITHOUT REGARD TO THE DECISION TO BE TAKEN ON THAT PRINCIPLE IT MAY BE STATED NOW THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO CONCEIVE EITHER OF THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL PRICE LISTS APPLYING TO CONSUMERS OF BELGIAN COAL OR OF THE COEXISTENCE OF BOTH LIBERALIZED AND FIXED PRICES FOR COALS OF THE SAME TYPE.
+IT FOLLOWS THAT IN THE FOREGOING CASE THE REDUCTION OR EVEN WITHDRAWAL OF EQUALIZATION IN RESPECT OF CERTAIN TYPES AND IN CERTAIN INDIVIDUAL CASES DOES NOT RESULT IN THOSE TYPES BEING PLACED OUTSIDE THE PRICE LIST, SINCE THERE CAN BE ONLY ONE PRICE LIST RESULTING FROM THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 26 (2) FOR ALL CONSUMERS OF BELGIAN COAL. THE CONTESTED DECISION IS THEREFORE TO BE EXPLAINED BY THE NORMAL APPLICATION OF THE SYSTEM REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 26 AND THE NORMAL EXERCISE OF A POWER WHICH IS NECESSARY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THAT SYSTEM.
+THE SUBMISSION OF MISUSE OF POWERS IS THEREFORE UNFOUNDED.
+B - AS REGARDS THE LETTER OF 28 MAY 1955 I. REDUCTION OR WITHDRAWAL OF EQUALIZATION AS REGARDS CERTAIN UNDERTAKINGS THE APPLICANT MAINTAINS, FIRST, THAT THE INTRODUCTION INTO THE EQUALIZATION SCHEME OF A SELECTIVE CRITERION, THAT IS, THE ADJUSTMENT OF THE EQUALIZATION PAYMENTS TO THE INDIVIDUAL SITUATION OF THE UNDERTAKINGS, CONSTITUTES DISCRIMINATION WHICH IS PROHIBITED BY THE TREATY.
+THAT ARGUMENT MUST BE REJECTED.
+AS A RESULT OF THE DECISION CONTAINED IN THE LETTER OF 28 MAY 1955 THE DISADVANTAGES RESULTING FROM LESS FAVOURABLE GEOLOGICAL CONDITIONS, WHICH ARE INDEED ONE OF THE PREMISES OF THE SPECIAL PROVISIONS APPLYING TO THE BELGIAN COAL INDUSTRY, NO LONGER EXISTS. IT FOLLOWS THEREFROM THAT THE PAYMENT OF DIFFERING RATES OF EQUALIZATION ON THE BASIS OF PHYSICAL CONDITIONS OF PRODUCTION IS EVIDENCE OF A DESIRE TO ACKNOWLEDGE DIFFERENCES WHICH ACTUALLY EXIST, SO AS TO ENSURE THAT COMPARABLE CASES RECEIVE COMPARABLE BENEFIT AND, THEREFORE, TO AVOID DISCRIMINATION. THE APPLICANT's ARGUMENT WOULD BE CONVINCING ONLY IF THE HIGH AUTHORITY HAD NOT APPLIED AN OBJECTIVE AND UNIFORM CRITERION IN ORDER TO CHECK WHETHER THE INDIVIDUAL SITUATION OF THE UNDERTAKINGS SATISFIED THE CONDITIONS FIXED FOR THE AWARD OF EQUALIZATION.
+IN SUPPORT OF ITS ARGUMENT THE DEFENDANT AGAIN REFERS TO THE EXISTENCE OF A GUARANTEE TO MAINTAIN PREVIOUS LEVELS OF RECEIPTS. DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE CONVENTION DOES NOT REFER TO THE EXISTENCE, WHERE APPROPRIATE, OF A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EQUALIZATION AND RECEIPTS, THE LATTER BEING MENTIONED ONLY IN ARTICLE 25 IN RELATION TO THE BASIS OF ASSESSMENT OF THE LEVY, SUCH AN INTERPRETATION WOULD BE ADMISSIBLE ONLY IF EQUALIZATION HAD NECESSARILY AND IN ALL CIRCUMSTANCES TO COVER THE ENTIRE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE REDUCED SELLING PRICES AND RECEIPTS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. THAT IS NOT THE CASE, SINCE EQUALIZATION IS ONLY A NECESSARY PROTECTIVE MEASURE TO AVOID HURRIED AND DANGEROUS SHIFTS IN PRODUCTION LEVELS.
+IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 24 OF THE CONVENTION THE SPECIAL SYSTEM ESTABLISHED FOR THAT PURPOSE MUST TAKE ACCOUNT OF SITUATIONS EXISTING WHEN THE COMMON MARKET IS ESTABLISHED. HOWEVER, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO INTERPRET THAT PROVISION WIDELY, AS GUARANTEEING THE MAINTENANCE OF THE ORIGINAL LEVEL OF RECEIPTS.
+THE INTRODUCTION OF A SPECIAL SYSTEM, SUCH AS THE EQUALIZATION SCHEME, IS TO BE EXPLAINED BY THE EXISTENCE IN BELGIUM OF CERTAIN CONDITIONS OF PRODUCTION WHICH ARE INHERENTLY DIFFERENT FROM THOSE IN OTHER COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN THE COMMON MARKET.
+EQUALIZATION MUST, THEREFORE, NOT EXCEED THE LIMITS OF WHAT IS STRICTLY NECESSARY IN ORDER TO NEUTRALIZE TO A CERTAIN EXTENT THE EFFECTS OF THE DISADVANTAGE RESULTING FROM THOSE DIFFERENCES, WHICH DOES NOT IMPLY A GUARANTEE THAT THE ORIGINAL LEVEL OF RECEIPTS WILL BE MAINTAINED.
+THE QUESTION OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE TOTAL OF SELLING PRICES AND EQUALIZATION PAYMENTS - WHICH DETERMINES THE RECEIPTS OF THE UNDERTAKINGS - MUST VARY DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD IS A QUESTION WHICH THE HIGH AUTHORITY MUST EXAMINE IN THE LIGHT OF THE PROGRESS OF THE PROGRAMMES FOR THE RE-EQUIPMENT AND REORGANIZATION OF THE BELGIAN MINES.
+FURTHERMORE, IF THE PURPOSE OF EQUALIZATION WAS TO GUARANTEE THE MAINTENANCE OF ORIGINAL LEVELS OF RECEIPTS, IT WOULD BE IN CONTRADICTION WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF THE DECREASE OF THE EQUALIZATION LEVY LAID DOWN IN ARTICLE 25 OF THE CONVENTION.
+IN ADDITION, ARTICLE 1 OF THE CONVENTION REFERS TO PRODUCTION BEING PROGRESSIVELY ADAPTED TO THE NEW CONDITIONS RESULTING FROM THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMON MARKET AND NOT TO THE NEW CONDITIONS BEING ADAPTED TO THE MAINTENANCE OF SITUATIONS EXISTING AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD.
+MOREOVER, IF, AS THE APPLICANT MAINTAINS, EQUALIZATION WAS INTENDED TO ENSURE THAT THE COLLIERIES HAVE THE FINANCIAL RESOURCES AVAILABLE WHICH ARE REGARDED AS INDISPENSABLE TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THEIR RE-EQUIPMENT PROGRAMMES, THE AIM OF THE EQUALIZATION SCHEME WOULD GREATLY EXCEED THE REASONS FOR ITS ESTABLISHMENT AND WOULD TRANSFORM IT INTO A MEASURE INTENDED TO CONTRIBUTE ACTIVELY AND DIRECTLY TO THE REORGANIZATION OF THE BELGIAN MINES, WHICH WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THE RATHER PASSIVE NATURE OF A PROTECTIVE MEASURE. FINALLY, THE APPLICANT MAINTAINS THAT EQUALIZATION PAYMENTS MUST BE THE SAME FOR ALL COLLIERIES SINCE THE TREATY AND THE CONVENTION PROVIDE, IN PARTICULAR IN THE FOURTH PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 5 AND ARTICLE 62 OF THE TREATY AND IN ARTICLES 24 (b) AND 26 (4) OF THE CONVENTION, FOR SPECIAL MEASURES INTENDED TO IRON OUT THE DIFFERENCES EXISTING BETWEEN THE COLLIERIES CONSIDERED INDIVIDUALLY. THAT ARGUMENT IS NOT VALID, SINCE ALTHOUGH THE AFOREMENTIONED PROVISIONS PROVIDE FOR MEASURES OTHER THAN EQUALIZATION IN ORDER TO BRING TO AN END DIFFERENCES EXISTING BETWEEN THE COLLIERIES, THAT DOES NOT IN ANY WAY PREVENT EQUALIZATION ALSO TAKING INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES INTO ACCOUNT IN THE CASE OF BELGIUM, IN SO FAR AS THE EQUALIZATION SCHEME ESTABLISHED FOR THAT COUNTRY PERMITS.
+II. THREAT TO WITHDRAW EQUALIZATION
+FURTHERMORE, IF IT WERE TO APPEAR THAT CERTAIN UNDERTAKINGS WERE NOT CARRYING OUT THE WORK OF REORGANIZATION AND RE-EQUIPMENT, SUCH THAT THEY INCURRED LIABILITY, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE WAS NO LONGER ANY BASIS OR JUSTIFICATION FOR EQUALIZATION.
+THOSE UNDERTAKINGS WOULD THUS HAVE DEPRIVED THEMSELVES BY THEIR OWN FAULT OF THE RIGHT TO BENEFIT FROM EQUALIZATION.
+THE HIGH AUTHORITY MUST TAKE SUCH A POSSIBILITY INTO ACCOUNT.
+IT DID SO CONDITIONALLY AT POINT 2 (d) OF ITS LETTER OF 28 MAY 1955, WHEN IT AUTHORIZED THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT TO WITHDRAW EQUALIZATION WHERE APPROPRIATE, SUBJECT TO THE PRIOR AGREEMENT OF THE HIGH AUTHORITY.
+THE COURT HEREBY: 1. DISMISSES THE APPLICATION FOR THE ANNULMENT OF DECISION NO 22/55 OF THE HIGH AUTHORITY OF 28 MAY 1955 AND OF CERTAIN DECISIONS OF THE HIGH AUTHORITY RESULTING FROM ITS LETTER OF 28 MAY 1955 TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF BELGIUM CONCERNING THE ADJUSTMENT OF THE EQUALIZATION SYSTEM;
+2. ORDERS THE APPLICANT TO BEAR THE COSTS OF THE ACTION.

data/principle-mvep-justice-court/mvep-097-hr.aligned.txt

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+U predmetu C-8/55,
+Fédération Charbonnière de Belgique, s izabranom adresom za dostavu u Luxembourgu, 6, Rue Henri Heine, koju zastupaju Louis Dehasse i Léon Canivet, uz asistenciju Paula Tschoffena, odvjetnika na Cour d’ Appel u Liegeu (Žalbeni sud, Belgija) i Henrija Simonta, odvjetnika na Cour de Cassation de Belgique (Kasacijski sud, Belgija), profesora na Université Libre u Bruxellesu, tužitelj, protiv
+Visoke vlasti Europske zajednice za ugljen i čelik, s izabranom adresom za dostavu u njezinim uredima na adresi 2, Place de Metz, Luxembourg, koju zastupa njezin pravni savjetnik, Walter Much, u svojstvu agenta, uz asistenciju G. van Heckea, odvjetnika na Cour d’ Appel u Bruxellesu (Žalbeni sud, Belgija), profesora na Sveučilištu u Louvainu, tuženice,
+povodom tužbe za poništenje podnesene protiv odluke Visoke vlasti br. 22/55 od 28. svibnja 1955. i protiv određenih odluka Visoke vlasti kako proizlaze iz dopisa koji je 28. svibnja 1955. ona uputila vladi Kraljevine Belgije o uređenju sustava izjednačavanja (Službeni list Zajednice od 31. svibnja 1955., stranice 753. - 758.)
+SUD,
+u sastavu: M. Pilotti, predsjednik, J. Rueff i O. Riese, predsjednici vijeća, P. J. S. Serrarens, L. Delvaux, Ch. L. Hammes i A. van Kleffens, suci,
+nezavisni odvjetnik: M. Lagrange,
+tajnik: A. van Houtte,
+donosi sljedeću
+Presudu
+A - Dopuštenost tužbe
+Tužbom se traži poništenje:
+1. Odluke Visoke vlasti br. 22/55 od 28. svibnja 1955. i priloženog cjenika, objavljenih u Službenom listu Zajednice od 31. svibnja 1955., utoliko što utvrđuju niže cijene za određene vrste ugljena.
+2. odlukâ iz dopisa koji je Visoka vlast 28. svibnja 1955. uputila belgijskoj vladi i iz tablice stopa subvencija za izjednačavanje priložene tom dopisu:
+(a) utoliko što povlačenjem ili smanjenjem izjednačavanja u slučaju određenih ugljenokopa nastaje diskriminacija među proizvođačima istih vrsta ugljena.
+(b) utoliko što će sukladno tom dopisu uplate određenim poduzetnicima za izjednačavanje biti ili će moći biti povučene zbog toga što oni ne ulažu u obnovu kapaciteta koliko je moguće ili nužno ili odbijaju ustupiti ili razmijeniti ležišta ugljenokopa iako se ustupanje ili razmjena smatraju neophodnim za bolji razvoj rudarskih područja.
+Što se tiče odluke br. 22/55 tužitelj tvrdi da je to pojedinačna odluka.
+Tuženica međutim smatra da je riječ o općoj odluci.
+Po mišljenju tužitelja pojedinačna narav odluke proizlazi iz činjenice da su zbog neraskidive veze između izjednačavanja i utvrđivanja cijena učinci cjenika za tri ugljenokopa u Campini i za druge belgijske rudnike različiti utoliko što subvencija za izjednačavanje odobrena trima rudnicima nije ista kao ona koje primaju drugi rudnici.
+Bez poricanja činjenice da će se učinci cjenika razlikovati u mjeri u kojoj se razlikuje sâma subvencija za izjednačavanje, Sud odbija argument tužitelja prema kojem te razlike učinaka cjenika određuju narav odluke br. 22/55.
+Naime, ta je odluka donesena u okviru posebnog sustava koji stavak 26. Konvencije predviđa za Belgiju tijekom prijelaznog razdoblja, a primjenjuje se u skladu s konkretnim modalitetima, koliko god da su detaljni i različiti, na sve poduzetnike i sve transakcije koji su obuhvaćeni tim sustavom.
+U okviru tog sustava odluka se odnosi na poduzetnike samo zbog toga što su oni proizvođači ugljena bez navođenja ikakvih drugih pojedinosti.
+Ako bi se u Belgiji otkrilo novo ležište, poduzetnik koji obavlja eksploataciju na tom ležištu morao bi prodavati po cijenama utvrđenim u odluci.
+Štoviše, teritorijalno ograničenje ne podrazumijeva nikakvo individualno određenje i opravdava se činjenicom da je belgijskoj industriji izjednačavanje potrebno.
+Činjenica da Odluka br. 22/55 sadržava detaljan i konkretan propis koji se primjenjuje na različite situacije nije u suprotnosti s općom naravi te odluke.
+Naime, u članku 50. stavku 2. Ugovora navodi se da se uvjeti osnovice i naplate davanja utvrđuju odlukom Visokog tijela što pokazuje da konkretne detaljne i različite posljedice opće odluke ne dovode u pitanje njezinu opću narav.
+Ni činjenica da udruženje koje je ovdje tužitelj okuplja sve poduzetnike na koje se odluka odnosi – i samo njih – ne dovodi do drukčijeg rezultata.
+Da je drukčije, opća narav trebala bi se osporiti čak i što se tiče odluke koja se primjenjuje na sve poduzetnike u Zajednici ako bi oni bili uključeni u samo jedno te isto udruženje.
+Pojedinačna i opća narav odluke treba se utvrditi na osnovi objektivnih kriterija tako da ne bude moguće uspostaviti razliku ovisno o tome je li tužitelj udruženje ili poduzetnik.
+Što se tiče odlukâ iz dopisa od 28. svibnja 1955. stranke smatraju da je prva odluka, koja se odnosi na smanjenje i povlačenje subvencija za izjednačavanje, pojedinačne naravi, a da je druga, koja se odnosi na prijetnju povlačenja subvencije za izjednačavanje, opće naravi.
+U tom pogledu Sud prihvaća stajalište stranaka.
+U usmenom dijelu postupka tuženica je postavila pitanje je li potonju izjavu dopušteno smatrati odlukom protiv koje se može podnijeti tužba za poništenje u skladu s člankom 33. Ugovora.
+Međutim, u svojem dopisu od 28. svibnja 1955. Visoka vlast priznala je da potpora za izjednačavanje obvezno mora biti popraćena nizom mjera koje belgijska vlada treba donijeti. Osim toga, ona smatra da bi belgijska vlada trebala primijeniti četiri mjere, navedene u točkama (a), (b), (c) i (d).
+Ono što je navedeno u točki (d) stoga čini dio svih mjera koje bi belgijska vlada prema potrebi morala donijeti.
+Visoka vlast je tako nedvosmisleno odredila stav koji će odsad zauzeti ako se ostvare uvjeti iz točke 2 (d) dopisa.
+Drugim riječima, donijela je pravilo koje se može primijeniti prema potrebi.
+Stoga ova odluka jest odluka u smislu članka 14. Ugovora.
+Budući da je utvrđena pojedinačna ili opća narav svake od odluka, tužitelj ima pravo zatražiti poništenje smanjenja i povlačenja subvencije za izjednačavanje – pojedinačna odluka iz dopisa od 28. svibnja 1955. – ističući sve tužbene razloge iz članka 33. Ugovora; ima pravo podnijeti tužbu za poništenje dviju drugih odluka koje su opće odluke, ako smatra da one u odnosu na njega predstavljaju zlouporabu ovlasti.
+Da bi tužba za poništenje opće odluke bila dopuštena dostatno je da tužitelj formalno navede da se radi o zlouporabi ovlasti u odnosu na njega, uvjerljivo navodeći razloge zbog kojih, po njegovom mišljenju, dolazi do zlouporabe ovlasti.
+Tužba ispunjava prethodno navedene uvjete i stoga je dopuštena.
+Međutim, stranke imaju različita mišljenja o točnom dosegu članka 33. u pogledu prihvatljivosti određenih razloga koje je tužitelj istaknuo protiv općih odluka.
+Tuženica tvrdi da neki poduzetnik može istaknuti tužbeni razlog zlouporabe ovlasti u odnosu na njega samo ako je Visoka vlast pod prividom regulatorne i opće mjere prikrila pojedinačnu odluku „koja se odnosi” na tog poduzetnika.
+Taj se argument mora odbiti.
+Naime, prikrivena pojedinačna odluka ostaje pojedinačna odluka jer narav odluke ne ovisi o njezinom obliku već o njezinom dosegu.
+Osim toga, takvo tumačenje članka 33., a osobito, riječi „u odnosu na njih”] ne može se prihvatiti zato što izraz”u odnosu na njih” ima samo smisao riječi koje ga izražavaju, odnosno da je riječ o poduzetniku koji je predmet ili barem žrtva zlouporabe ovlasti koju navodi.
+Sud smatra da se u članku 33. jasno navodi da udruženja i poduzetnici mogu osporavati ne samo pojedinačne odluke nego i opće odluke u pravom smislu te riječi.
+Podredno, tuženica smatra da su tužbeni razlozi, koje tužitelj ima pravo istaknuti, ograničeni samo na tužbeni razlog zlouporabe ovlasti, a da se svi drugi tužbeni razlozi moraju odbaciti.
+Tužitelj međutim smatra ne samo da ima pravo istaknuti sve razloge za poništenje uz uvjet da uvjerljivo navede zlouporabu ovlasti, već da može dokazati i druge povrede kako bi potkrijepio zlouporabu ovlasti.
+Po njegovom mišljenju Ugovor uspostavlja pravni sustav u kojemu privatni poduzetnici, kako bi tužba bila dopuštena, raspolažu samo tužbenim razlogom zlouporabe ovlasti u odnosu na njih.
+Zbog toga je nelogično tom razlogu priznati samo izuzetnu i podrednu narav.
+Taj se argument mora odbiti.
+Ako Ugovor predviđa da privatni poduzetnici imaju pravo zatražiti poništenje opće odluke zbog zlouporabe ovlasti u odnosu na njih, to je zbog toga što nemaju pravo na tužbu zbog drugih razloga.
+Da je argument tužitelja ispravan, poduzetnici bi imali pravo na tužbu istog opsega kakvo imaju države i Vijeće i bilo bi neobjašnjivo zašto je u članku 33., umjesto jednakog postupanja prema tužbama poduzetnika i tužbama država i Vijeća, uvedena vrlo jasna razlika između pojedinačnih odluka i općih odluka, ograničavajući pritom, kada je riječ o poduzetnicima, poništenje općih odluka na razlog zlouporabe ovlasti u odnosu na njih.
+Izraz „uz iste uvjete” ne treba se tumačiti tako da poduzetnici, nakon što su utvrdili zlouporabu ovlasti u odnosu na njih, imaju pravo dodatno istaknuti druge tužbene razloge za poništenje jer kada je u odnosu na njih utvrđena zlouporaba ovlasti, dotična se odluka poništava i ne treba se još jednom proglasiti poništenje zbog drugih razloga.
+Ova razmatranja očito su suprotna nelogičnom stajalištu tužitelja da se tumačenje Ugovora mora podrediti želji da se privatnim poduzetnicima dâ pravo na praktično isti pravni lijek kakav imaju države i Vijeće.
+Takva se želja može shvatiti, ali Ugovor ne sadržava nikakvu naznaku iz koje se može zaključiti da je privatnim poduzetnicima dodijeljeno pravo kontrole „ustavnosti” općih odluka, tj. njihove usklađenosti s Ugovorom, iako je riječ o kvazizakonodavnim aktima koje donosi javno tijelo i koje imaju pravni učinak „erga omnes”.
+Točno je da članak 33. dopušta pravo na tužbu za poništenje opće odluke zbog zlouporabe ovlasti u odnosu na poduzetnika, međutim riječ je o iznimci koja se objašnjava činjenicom da u ovom slučaju još uvijek prevladava element pojedinačnosti.
+Protiv općih odluka tužitelj stoga može isticati samo tužbeni razlog zlouporabe ovlasti u odnosu na njega.
+Što se tiče pojedinačne odluke, budući da se stranke slažu u pogledu te kvalifikacije, tužitelj može istaknuti sve razloge iz članka 33. prvog stavka.
+B - Meritum
+Prije razmatranja pitanja koja se odnose na Odluku br. 22/55, osobito ona kojima se pita ima li Visoka vlast ovlast utvrđivanja prodajnih cijena, te pritužaba u odnosu na dopis od 28. svibnja 1955., najprije valja analizirati način utvrđivanja razine procijenjenih proizvodnih troškova.
+Što s tiče procjene te razine, tužitelj kao prvo smatra da Visoka vlast nema pravo izmijeniti početnu procjenu procijenjenih proizvodnih troškova jer je riječ o utvrđivanju „razine standstill” koja se utvrđuje na početku prijelaznog razdoblja i mora ostati nepromijenjena, osim ispravaka o kojima se odlučilo zajedničkim dogovorom.
+Ovaj argument tužitelja mora se odbiti jer stavak 26. Konvencije navodi da stopu neizbježnog snižavanja belgijskih cijena određuje razina proizvodnih troškova procijenjenih na kraju prijelaznog razdoblja.
+Iz toga slijedi da se u slučaju promjene procijenjene razine proizvodnih troškova mora obaviti nova procjena koja to uzima u obzir.
+Kao drugo, pravna stajališta stranaka suprotna su u pogledu načina na koji se procjenjuje razina procijenjenih proizvodnih troškova.
+Sud smatra da prije donošenja odluke treba utvrditi, na osnovi predviđanja koja su omogućile činjenice i okolnosti poznate u trenutku procjene, koja je bila razumna razina „okvirnih proizvodnih troškova na kraju prijelaznog razdoblja” za svaku vrstu i kategoriju ugljena.
+Odgovori koje su dale stranke na pitanja koja je postavio sudac izvjestitelj nisu dostatni u tu svrhu.
+Budući da su stranke u svojem zajedničkom odgovoru izjavile da se takvi dodatni detalji Sudu ne mogu dostaviti u zadanom roku, u tu im svrhu valja odrediti novi rok.
+Uzimajući u obzir postupovne akte, saslušavši stranke na raspravi, saslušavši mišljenje nezavisnog odvjetnika, uzimajući u obzir članak 2., članak 3. točku (c), članke 4., 8., 14., 33., 34., 36., 50., 60. i 61. Ugovora i stavke 1., 8., 24., 25. i 26. Konvencije, uzimajući u obzir Protokol o Statutu Suda, uzimajući u obzir Poslovnik Suda i Poslovnik Suda o troškovima,
+SUD,
+odbijajući sve druge šire ili protivne zahtjeve, proglašava i presuđuje:
+1. Tužba je dopuštena.
+2. Usmeni dio postupka ponovno se otvara.
+Raspravljat će se isključivo o razini, po vrstama i kategorijama, procijenjenih proizvodnih cijena belgijskog ugljena na kraju prijelaznog razdoblja i o njihovom značaju u odnosu na cijene koje su utvrđene u odluci br. 22/55.
+3. Daje se rok do 1. rujna 1956. do kada stranke tajništvu Suda trebaju dostaviti dodatne informacije navedene u ovoj presudi i zakazuje se rasprava za 20. rujna 1956. u 10.30.
+4. O troškovima će se odlučiti naknadno.

data/principle-mvep-justice-court/mvep-098-en.aligned.txt

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+IN CASE 6/60
+JEAN-E. HUMBLET, AN OFFICIAL OF THE ECSC, WITH AN ADDRESS FOR SERVICE IN LUXEMBOURG AT 7 RUE DU FORT-RHEINSHEIM,
+APPLICANT,
+ASSISTED BY PAUL ORIANNE, ADVOCATE AT THE COUR D'APPEL, BRUSSELS,
+V
+BELGIAN STATE, WITH AN ADDRESS FOR SERVICE IN LUXEMBOURG AT THE BELGIAN EMBASSY, 9 BOULEVARD DU PRINCE-HENRI,
+DEFENDANT,
+REPRESENTED BY THE MINISTER FOR FINANCE, WITH GEORGES LALOUX, DEPUTY ADVISER AT THE DEPARTMENT OF DIRECT TAXATION (CONSEILLER ADJOINT A L'ADMINISTRATION CENTRALE DES CONTRIBUTIONS DIRECTES) OF THE MINISTRY FOR FINANCE, ACTING AS AGENT, ASSISTED BY JULES FALLY, ADVOCATE AT THE COUR DE CASSATION OF BELGIUM,
+APPLICATION FOR THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 11 (b) OF THE PROTOCOL ON THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE ECSC,
+I - THE BASIS AND EXTENT OF THE COURT's JURISDICTION
+1. BY VIRTUE OF ARTICLE 16 OF THE PROTOCOL ON THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY, IN CONJONCTION WITH ARTICLE 43 OF THE ECSC TREATY, THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO RULE ON ANY DISPUTE RELATING TO THE INTERPRETATION OR APPLICATION OF THAT PROTOCOL.
+IN THE PRESENT CASE THE DEFENDANT NEVERTHELESS CONTENDS THAT THE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION AND THAT THE CASE DOES NOT RELATE TO THE INTERPRETATION OF THE PROTOCOL BUT TO THE CORRECT APPLICATION OF BELGIAN LAW TO THE INCOME OF THE APPLICANT's WIFE WHO IS NOT HERSELF AN OFFICIAL OF THE COMMUNITY.
+THIS ARGUMENT CANNOT BE ACCEPTED BY THE COURT.
+IN REALITY THE DISPUTE RELATES TO THE QUESTION WHETHER ARTICLE 11 (b) OF THE PROTOCOL ALLOWS MEMBER STATES TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE REMUNERATION OF AN OFFICIAL OF THE COMMUNITY IN ORDER TO DETERMINE THE RATE OF TAX APPLICABLE TO HIS WIFE's INCOME.
+IN ITS DEFENCE, THE DEFENDANT ITSELF STATED THAT THIS WAS THE SUBJECT OF THE DISPUTE.
+THE COURT IS THEREFORE CONCERNED WITH RESOLVING A DISPUTE RELATING TO THE INTERPRETATION OR APPLICATION OF THE PROTOCOL, IN PARTICULAR ARTICLE 11 (b).
+CONSEQUENTLY THE CONTENTION THAT THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION MUST BE REJECTED.
+2. ON THE OTHER HAND THE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO ANNUL LEGISLATIVE OR ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES OF ONE OF THE MEMBER STATES.
+THE ECSC TREATY IS BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF A STRICT SEPARATION OF THE POWERS OF THE COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS AND THOSE OF THE AUTHORITIES OF THE MEMBER STATES.
+COMMUNITY LAW DOES NOT GRANT TO THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMUNITY THE RIGHT TO ANNUL LEGISLATIVE OR ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES ADOPTED BY A MEMBER STATE.
+THUS, IF THE HIGH AUTHORITY BELIEVES THAT A STATE HAS FAILED TO FULFIL AN OBLIGATION UNDER THE TREATY BY ADOPTING OR MAINTAINING IN FORCE PROVISIONS CONTRARY TO THE TREATY, IT MAY NOT ITSELF ANNUL OR REPEAL THOSE PROVISIONS BUT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 88 OF THE TREATY, IT MAY MERELY RECORD SUCH A FAILURE AND SUBSEQUENTLY INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS AS SET OUT IN THE TREATY TO PREVAIL UPON THE STATE IN QUESTION ITSELF TO RESCIND THE MEASURES WHICH IT HAD ADOPTED.
+THE SAME APPLIES TO THE COURT OF JUSTICE. UNDER THE TERMS OF ARTICLE 31 OF THE TREATY IT HAS RESPONSABILITY FOR ENSURING THAT COMMUNITY LAW IS OBSERVED AND BY ARTICLE 16 OF THE PROTOCOL HAS JURISDICTION TO RULE ON ANY DISPUTE RELATING TO THE INTERPRETATION OR APPLICATION OF THE PROTOCOL BUT IT MAY NOT, ON ITS OWN AUTHORITY, ANNUL OR REPEAL THE NATIONAL LAWS OF A MEMBER STATE OR ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES ADOPTED BY THE AUTHORITIES OF THAT STATE.
+THIS STATEMENT OF THE LIMITS OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT MAY FURTHER BE SUPPORTED BY AN ARGUMENT STEMMING FROM THE TREATIES OF ROME, IN PARTICULAR FROM ARTICLE 171 OF THE EEC TREATY AND ARTICLE 143 OF THE EAEC TREATY WHICH MERELY ATTACH DECLARATORY EFFECT TO THE DECISIONS OF THE COURT IN CASES OF FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE TREATIES, ALBEIT OBLIGING THE MEMBER STATES TO TAKE THE NECESSARY MEASURES TO COMPLY WITH THE JUDGMENT.
+THE COURT FINDS THAT THERE IS NO FOUNDATION TO THE ARGUMENT OF THE APPLICANT THAT THE PROTECTION OF THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CONFERRED BY THE PROTOCOL WOULD BE INEFFECTIVE AND THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE REDUCED TO A MERE OPINION IF IT WERE UNABLE TO ANNUL ILLEGAL MEASURES ADOPTED BY NATIONAL AUTHORITIES AND ORDER THE MEMBER STATES TO MAKE REPARATION FOR THE RESULTANT DAMAGE.
+THE APPLICANT BASES HIS REASONING ON THE TEXT OF ARTICLE 16 OF THE PROTOCOL ON THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 43 OF THE ECSC TREATY ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE ABOVE-MENTIONED ARTICLE 16 REFERS NOT ONLY TO INTERPRETATION BUT ALSO TO THE "APPLICATION" OF THAT PROTOCOL.
+NEVERTHELESS IT WOULD BE ERRONEOUS TO ACCEPT THAT THIS PROVISION ENABLES THE COURT TO INTERFERE DIRECTLY IN THE LEGISLATION OR ADMINISTRATION OF MEMBER STATES.
+IN FACT IF THE COURT RULES IN A JUDGMENT THAT A LEGISLATIVE OR ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURE ADOPTED BY THE AUTHORITIES OF A MEMBER STATE IS CONTRARY TO COMMUNITY LAW, THAT MEMBER STATE IS OBLIGED, BY VIRTUE OF ARTICLE 86 OF THE ECSC TREATY, TO RESCIND THE MEASURE IN QUESTION AND TO MAKE REPARATION FOR ANY UNLAWFUL CONSEQUENCES WHICH MAY HAVE ENSUED.
+THIS OBLIGATION IS EVIDENT FROM THE TREATY AND FROM THE PROTOCOL WHICH HAVE THE FORCE OF LAW IN THE MEMBER STATES FOLLOWING THEIR RATIFICATION AND WHICH TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER NATIONAL LAW.
+CONSEQUENTLY IF IN THE PRESENT DISPUTE THE COURT WERE TO RULE THAT THE TAX ASSESSMENT IN QUESTION WAS UNLAWFUL, IT WOULD NECESSARILY FOLLOW THAT THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD BE OBLIGED TO ADOPT THE REQUISITE MEASURES TO CANCEL IT AND TO REIMBURSE TO THE APPLICANT ANY AMOUNTS WHICH WERE WRONGFULLY COLLECTED.
+FOR ALL THE ABOVE REASONS THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE APPLICANT, IN SO FAR AS THEY SEEK THE ANNULMENT OF THE TAX ASSESSMENT AT ISSUE AND AN ORDER FOR THE DEFENDANT TO REPAY THE AMOUNTS PAID ARE INADMISSIBLE AS THE COURT HAS NO POWER TO ACT IN THIS WAY.
+THE SAME APPLIES IN RESPECT OF THE APPLICATION FOR A DECLARATION THAT THE TAX ASSESSMENT IN QUESTION BE DECLARED VOID AND OF NO EFFECT.
+THE SAME APPLIES AGAIN TO THE APPLICATION FOR AN ORDER THAT THE DEFENDANT PAY COMPENSATORY INTEREST IN RESPECT OF TAX UNLAWFULLY LEVIED.
+IT IS FOR THE NATIONAL LEGISLATURE TO DETERMINE WHETHER AN UNLAWFUL IMPOSITION GIVES RISE TO A CLAIM FOR COMPENSATORY INTEREST.
+ON THE SAME PRINCIPLES THE APPLICATION FOR REPAYMENT OF THE PENALTY IMPOSED ON THE APPLICANT FOR SUPPLYING AN INCOMPLETE DECLARATION OF HIS INCOME MUST BE REJECTED.
+II - THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE APPLICATION
+AS REGARDS THE ADMISSIBILITY IT MUST FIRST BE CONSIDERED (a) WHETHER AN INDIVIDUAL MAY BY HIMSELF LODGE WITH THE COURT OF JUSTICE AN APPLICATION BASED ON ARTICLE 16 OF THE PROTOCOL AND (b) WHETHER HE MAY DO THIS BEFORE EXHAUSTING THE LEGAL AND PROCEDURAL MEANS PROVIDED EITHER BY COMMUNITY LAW OR BY NATIONAL LEGISLATION.
+ALTHOUGH THIS QUESTION WAS NOT RAISED BY THE PARTIES IN THE COURSE OF THE WRITTEN PROCEDURE, NEVERTHELESS THE COURT MUST EXAMINE THIS OF ITS OWN MOTION AS IT CONCERNS THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE APPLICATION.
+1. EXAMINATION OF THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS GIVES RISE TO THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS:
+(a) BY GIVING A RIGHT OF RECOURSE BASED ON ARTICLE 16 OF THE PROTOCOL, THE AUTHORS OF THE PROTOCOL CLEARLY SOUGHT TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES THEREIN PRESCRIBED, IN THE INTERESTS NOT ONLY OF THE COMMUNITY AND ITS INSTITUTIONS BUT ALSO OF THE INDIVIDUALS TO WHOM THESE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES WERE GRANTED AND, ON THE OTHER HAND, IN THE INTERESTS OF THE MEMBER STATES AND OF THEIR ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES WHICH NEED TO BE PROTECTED AGAINST TOO WIDE AN INTERPRETATION OF THOSE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES.
+IT IS THUS QUITE ACCEPTABLE FOR AN OFFICIAL OF THE COMMUNITY TO APPEAR BEFORE THE COURT OF JUSTICE AS AN APPLICANT AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF HIS OWN COUNTRY IN THE SAME WAY AS UNDERTAKINGS HAVE ALREADY CONTESTED BEFORE THE COURT OF JUSTICE ARGUMENTS SUBMITTED BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THEIR COUNTRIES, INTERVENING IN SUPPORT OF THE HIGH AUTHORITY.
+ALTHOUGH THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES WERE GRANTED "SOLELY IN THE INTERESTS OF THE COMMUNITY" IT MUST NOT BE FORGOTTEN THAT THEY WERE EXPRESSLY ACCORDED "TO THE OFFICIALS OF INSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMUNITY".
+THE FACT THAT THE PRIVILEGES, IMMUNITIES AND FACILITIES WERE PROVIDED IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST OF THE COMMUNITY CERTAINLY JUSTIFIES THE POWER GIVEN TO THE HIGH AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE THE CATEGORIES OF OFFICIALS TO WHICH THEY ARE APPLICABLE (ARTICLE 12) OR WHERE APPROPRIATE TO WAIVE THE IMMUNITY (SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 13) BUT DOES NOT MEAN THAT THESE PRIVILEGES ARE GRANTED TO THE COMMUNITY AND NOT DIRECTLY TO ITS OFFICIALS. THIS INTERPRETATION IS, FURTHERMORE, CLEARLY SUPPORTED BY THE WORDING OF THE ABOVEMENTIONED PROVISIONS.
+THEREFORE THE PROTOCOL CONFERS AN INDIVIDUAL RIGHT ON THE PERSONS CONCERNED, COMPLIANCE WITH WHICH IS ENSURED BY THE RIGHT OF RECOURSE PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE 16 OF THE PROTOCOL.
+(b) ARTICLE 16 OF THE PROTOCOL, WHEREBY "ANY DISPUTE CONCERNING THE INTERPRETATION OR APPLICATION OF THE... PROTOCOL SHALL BE SUBMITTED TO THE COURT" CONTAINS NO REFERENCE TO ANY PROCEDURE WHICH MUST BE INITIATED AND EXHAUSTED BEFORE THE INTRODUCTION OF AN APPLICATION BEFORE THE COURT.
+ACCORDING TO THE WORDING OF THAT ARTICLE ANY PERSON WHO REGARDS HIMSELF AS PREJUDICED BY THE INTERPRETATION OR APPLICATION OF THE PROTOCOL MAY SUBMIT THE DISPUTE TO THE COURT OF JUSTICE WITHOUT ANY OTHER PRIOR FORMALITIES.
+ACCORDINGLY OFFICIALS OF THE COMMUNITY ARE ENTITLED TO BRING BEFORE THE COURT OF JUSTICE AN APPLICATION UNDER ARTICLE 16 OF THE PROTOCOL AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF THEIR COUNTRY WITHOUT BEING OBLIGED BEFOREHAND TO HAVE RECOURSE TO THE PROCEDURE PROVIDED BY OTHER PROVISIONS OF COMMUNITY LAW OR NATIONAL LAW.
+2. NEVERTHELESS THE PROBLEM MUST ALSO BE EXAMINED IN THE LIGHT OF THE SCHEME OF THE TREATY AND THE RULES OF LAW GENERALLY ACCEPTED IN THE MEMBER STATES:
+(a) THE QUESTION MUST FIRST OF ALL BE RESOLVED WHETHER ACTION BY AN OFFICIAL OF THE COMMUNITY WHO REGARDS HIMSELF AS BEING PREJUDICED BY AN INFRINGEMENT OF THE PROTOCOL BY A MEMBER STATE IS NOT EXCLUSIVELY A MATTER FOR THE COMMUNITY OR THE INSTITUTION TO WHICH THE OFFICIAL BELONGS.
+EXAMINATION OF THIS QUESTION IS ALL THE MORE NECESSARY AS NO PROVISION OF THE ECSC TREATY PERMITS INDIVIDUALS TO BRING AN APPLICATION DIRECTLY TO THE COURT IN RELIANCE ON INFRINGEMENT OF THE TREATY BY A MEMBER STATE BUT, ON THE CONTRARY, IN PRINCIPLE IT IS FOR THE HIGH AUTHORITY TO ACT AGAINST SUCH AN INFRINGEMENT BY APPLYING THE PROCEDURE PROVIDED FOR THIS PURPOSE IN ARTICLE 88 OF THE TREATY.
+NEVERTHELESS THE AUTHORS OF THE TREATY CERTAINLY DO NOT OVERLOOK THE FACT THAT "DISPUTES" CAPABLE OF ARISING CONCERNING "THE INTERPRETATION OR APPLICATION" OF THE PROTOCOL WOULD ARISE IN THE FIRST PLACE FROM CONTROVERSIES BETWEEN THE PARTIES ON WHOM THE PROTOCOL CONFERS PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES AND THE AUTHORITIES WHICH HAVE AN INTEREST IN THE RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION OF THOSE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES.
+IN THIS RESPECT THE PARTIES TO THE PRESENT SUIT APPEAR TO BE TYPICALLY PARTIES TO A "DISPUTE" WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 16.
+IN ADDITION, AS HAS ALREADY BEEN STATED ABOVE, THE PRIVILEGES SET OUT IN THE PROTOCOL CONFER INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS ON THE PERSONS TO WHOM IT APPLIES AS IS EVIDENCED BY THE GERMAN AND DUTCH EQUIVALENTS OF THE TERM "PRIVILEGE"(VORRECHTE AND VOORRECHTEN).
+IT MAY GENERALLY BE PRESUMED THAT A SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT HAS AS ITS COROLLARY THAT IT PROVIDES THE PERSON IN WHOSE INTEREST IT OPERATES WITH THE MEANS OF ENFORCING IT HIMSELF BY PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COURTS RATHER THAN BY THE INTERVENTION OF A THIRD PARTY.
+IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES IT IS PROPER TO APPLY THE PRINCIPLE WHEREBY, IN CASE OF DOUBT, A PROVISION ESTABLISHING GUARANTEES FOR THE PROTECTION OF RIGHTS CANNOT BE INTERPRETED IN A RESTRICTIVE MANNER TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL CONCERNED.
+FINALLY IT MUST NOT BE OVERLOOKED THAT ARTICLE 16 DOES NOT CONTAIN THE LIMITATIONS LAID DOWN IN ARTICLE 33 OF THE TREATY.
+(b) FURTHERMORE IT MUST BE CONSIDERED WHETHER THE APPLICATION IS INADMISSIBLE FOR THE FURTHER REASON THAT THE APPLICANT SHOULD PREVIOUSLY HAVE EXHAUSTED THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURES AVAILABLE TO HIM UNDER THE NATIONAL LAW TO WHICH HE IS SUBJECT.
+AS REGARDS THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IT IS EVIDENT THAT, IN THE PRESENT CASE, AT THIS STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS ALL POSSIBILITIES ARE EXHAUSTED AS THE DIRECTOR OF TAXES FOR THE PROVINCE OF LIEGE, BY A DECISION OF 15 JUNE 1960 REJECTED THE OBJECTION SUBMITTED BY THE APPLICANT AGAINST THE ASSESSMENT IN QUESTION.
+AS REGARDS THE JUDICIAL PROCEDURE IT IS EVIDENT FROM THE STATEMENTS OF THE PARTIES THAT THE APPLICANT LODGED AN APPEAL WITH THE COUR D'APPEL, LIEGE.
+THUS AT THIS STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS THE JUDICIAL PROCEDURE HAS BEEN SET IN MOTION IN BELGIUM BUT THE POSSIBILITIES HAVE NOT BEEN EXHAUSTED.
+NEVERTHELESS THE TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES IN NO WAY SET THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE COMMUNITIES ABOVE THE NATIONAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN THE SENSE THAT DECISIONS TAKEN BY NATIONAL COURTS MAY BE CONTESTED BEFORE THE COURT OF JUSTICE.
+AS AGAINST THIS, THE COURT OF JUSTICE HAS EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION WITH THE REGARD TO THE INTERPRETATION OF THE PROTOCOL.
+AS HAS ALREADY BEEN STATED ABOVE THE TREATIES ARE BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF THE STRICT SEPARATION BETWEEN THE POWERS OF THE COURT ON THE ONE HAND AND OF THE NATIONAL COURTS ON THE OTHER.
+IT FOLLOWS THAT THERE IS NO OVERLAPPING OF THE JURISDICTION ASSIGNED TO THE DIFFERENT COURTS.
+THEREFORE, IN SO FAR AS THE COURT OF JUSTICE HAS JURISDICTION, THERE CAN BE NO QUESTION OF A PRIOR "EXHAUSTING" IN THE NATIONAL COURTS OF A PROCEDURE WHICH CONSISTS OF THE SUBMISSION OF ONE AND THE SAME QUESTION FOR DECISION, FIRST BY THE NATIONAL COURTS AND SUBSEQUENTLY BY THE COURT OF JUSTICE.
+CONSEQUENTLY THE COURT OF JUSTICE HAS JURISDICTION TO RESOLVE THE QUESTION OF LAW SUBMITTED TO IT WITHIN THE LIMITS SET OUT ABOVE AND THE FACT THAT THE APPLICANT HAS NOT EXHAUSTED HIS RIGHTS OF RECOURSE TO THE COURTS OF HIS OWN COUNTRY IS NO OBSTACLE TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE APPLICATION.
+IT FOLLOWS FROM THE ABOVEMENTIONED CONSIDERATIONS THAT THE APPLICANT's RIGHT OF ACTION CANNOT BE DISPUTED.
+THE APPLICATION IS THEREFORE ADMISSIBLE IN SO FAR AS THE CONCLUSIONS FALL WITHIN THE COMPETENCE OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE.
+III - THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CASE
+THE BELGIAN TAX AUTHORITIES BASED THE DISPUTED ASSESSMENT ON THE PROVISIONS OF THE DECREE OF THE REGENT OF 15 JANUARY 1948 CONSOLIDATING LAWS AND DECREES RELATING TO TAXATION OF INCOME (MONITEUR BELGE OF 21 JANUARY 1948), HEREINAFTER REFERRED TO AS THE "CONSOLIDATED LAWS".
+IN PARTICULAR THEY APPLIED ARTICLES 46 AND 43 OF THOSE LAWS. ARTICLE 46 PROVIDES THAT THE RATE OF PERSONAL SURTAX, AN ADDITIONAL TAX LEVIED ON THE TOTAL INCOME, SHALL BE IMPOSED ON SUCCESSIVE BANDS OF INCOME.
+THIS PROVISION IS BASED ON THE SO-CALLED PROGRESSIVE SYSTEM IN THAT THE PERCENTAGE OF THE TAX INCREASES AS THE TOTAL INCOME OF THE TAXPAYER REACHES A HIGHER BAND.
+FOR ITS PART, THE ABOVEMENTIONED ARTICLE 43 PROVIDES THAT "THE INCOME OF THE SPOUSES SHALL BE AGGREGATED" THUS COMBINING THE SPOUSEs' iNCOME INTO A SIMPLE UNIT FOR THE PURPOSES OF TAX LAW.
+IN APPLYING THESE PROVISIONS TO THE PRESENT SITUATION, THE BELGIAN AUTHORITIES TOOK INTO ACCOUNT THE EMOLUMENTS PAID TO THE APPLICANT BY THE ECSC BY ADDING THEM TO THE TAXABLE INCOME OF HIS SPOUSE, THUS PRODUCING AN AMOUNT WHICH, BY REASON OF THE BANDS SET OUT IN ARTICLE 46, MADE THIS INCOME LIABLE AT A SUBSTANTIALLY HIGHER RATE THAN THAT WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN APPLICABLE IF IT HAD BEEN ASSESSED WITHOUT REGARD TO THE EMOLUMENTS OF THE APPLICANT.
+THE APPLICANT BELIEVES THAT THIS METHOD OF ASSESSMENT IS CONTRARY TO ARTICLE 11 (b) OF THE PROTOCOL.
+THEREFORE THE DISPUTE RELATES TO THE QUESTION WHETHER ARTICLE 11 (b) OF THE PROTOCOL ALLOWS THE BELGIAN TAX AUTHORITIES TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE SALARY AND EMOLUMENTS PAID TO AN OFFICIAL OF THE COMMUNITY BY THE COMMUNITY IN ORDER TO DETERMINE THE RATES APPLICABLE TO THE INCOME OF HIS SPOUSE WHO IS SUBJECT TO THE BELGIAN SURTAX ON INCOME.
+THUS THE APPLICANT's CONCLUSIONS RAISE BEFORE THE COURT THE GENERAL PROBLEM WHETHER, BY PROHIBITING ANY TAXATION OF THE ABOVEMENTIONED INCOME, ARTICLE 11 (b) OF THE PROTOCOL ALSO PREVENTS, IN PARTICULAR, ITS BEING INTO ACCOUNT IN FIXING THE RATE OF THE SURTAX ON INCOME AS PROVIDED BY BELGIAN LAW.
+IT IS NECESSARY THEREFORE TO EXAMINE THE GENERAL PROBLEM IN ORDER TO DEDUCE THE PRINCIPLE WHICH CAN BE APPLIED TO ENABLE THE PARTICULAR CASE RAISED HERE TO BE SETTLED.
+1. FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE LAW APPLICABLE, THE GENERAL PROBLEM MUST BE RESOLVED ACCORDING TO THE LAW OF THE COMMUNITY, IN PARTICULAR BY INTERPRETING ARTICLE 11 OF THE PROTOCOL, AND NOT ACCORDING TO BELGIAN LAW.
+CONSEQUENTLY, NEITHER THE BELGIAN LEGISLATION AND CASE LAW NOR THE PRACTICE FOLLOWED IN ANALAGOUS CASES BY THE BELGIAN AUTHORITIES CAN BE RELEVANT TO THIS CASE SINCE THEY RESOLVE THE PROBLEM IN THE LIGHT OF NATIONAL LAW.
+2. THE DEFENDANT ARGUES THAT ARTICLE 11 (b) OF THE PROTOCOL DOES NOT PROVIDE TOTAL EXEMPTION OF THE REMUNERATION PAID TO OFFICIALS BY THE COMMUNITY BUT MERELY DECLARES THAT OFFICIALS ARE PERSONALLY EXEMPT FROM ALL TAXATION.
+THE DEFENDANT DEDUCES FROM THIS THAT IT IS NOT A CASE OF "IMMUNE FROM INCOME TAX" (REVENUS IMMUNISES) BUT MERELY OF "INDIVIDUALS EXEMPT FROM TAXATION" (CONTRIBUABLES EXONERES D'IMPOTS) AND CONCLUDES THAT THIS REMUNERATION WHICH IS IN PRINCIPLE ASSESSABLE" MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN ORDER TO DETERMINE CORRECTLY THE TAXABLE CAPACITY OF THE PERSON CONCERNED".
+THIS LINE OF REASONING IS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE COURT.
+ON THE ONE HAND IT HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED THAT THE WORDS "EXEMPT" ("EXONERES") AND "IMMUNE" ("IMMUNISES") ARE EMPLOYED IN INTERNATIONAL FISCAL TERMINOLOGY TO DESIGNATE DIFFERENT CONCEPTS.
+FURTHERMORE, IT APPEARS FROM THE HEADING TO CHAPTER V OF THE PROTOCOL "MEMBERS OF THE HIGH AUTHORITY AND OFFICIALS OF THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMUNITY" THAT THE PROTOCOL WAS CONCERNED WITH REGULATING AS A WHOLE THE LEGAL POSITION OF THESE PERSONS WHICH EXPLAINS WHY THE AUTHORS OF THE PROTOCOL CHOSE THE CONSISTENT METHOD OF ATTACHING THE VARIOUS POINTS LISTED IN ARTICLE 11 SUBPARAGRAPHS (a) TO (d) TO THE PERSON OF THE MEMBER OR OFFICIAL RATHER THAN TO THE OBJECT OF THE DIFFERENT PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES.
+LITERAL INTERPRETATION OF THE TEXT SUPPORTS THE VIEW ADVOCATED BY THE APPLICANT.
+IN FACT THE WORDS "SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM ANY TAX ON SALARIES" INDICATE CLEARLY AND UNAMBIGUOUSLY EXEMPTION FROM ANY FISCAL CHARGE BASED DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY ON THE EXEMPTED REMUNERATION.
+AGAINST THIS IT MAY NOT BE CONTENDED THAT THE TERM "ON SALARIES" JUSTIFIES THE CONVERSE ARGUMENT THAT ARTICLE 11 DOES NOT PREVENT THE TAXATION OF OTHER INCOME AT A HIGHER RATE BY REASON OF THE REMUNERATION IN QUESTION.
+SUCH TAXATION WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THE EXEMPTION PROVIDED BY ARTICLE 11 SINCE THE COMMUNITY SALARY, WHICH IS EXEMPT FROM ALL TAXATION, WOULD EVEN IN THIS CASE CONSTITUTE THE LEGAL BASIS OF THE TAXATION IN QUESTION.
+FURTHERMORE THE ECSC PROTOCOL (AND ALSO THE EEC AND EAEC PROTOCOLS) CONTAINS NO PROVISION STATING THAT THE EXEMPTION OF COMMUNITY SALARIES DOES NOT PREVENT THIS INCOME FROM BEING INCLUDED IN THE TOTAL TAXABLE INCOME FOR THE PURPOSE OF A TAX OF SIMILAR SCOPE TO THAT OF THE BELGIAN SURTAX WHILST MOST OF THE MORE RECENT INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS RELATING TO DOUBLE TAXATION EXPRESSLY CONTAIN THIS RESERVATION.
+AMONG THE AGREEMENTS CONTAINING THIS RESERVATION THERE ARE SOME CONCLUDED BY ONE OR OTHER OF THE MEMBER STATES SHORTLY BEFORE (SEE FOR EXAMPLE ARTICLE XIX (1) OF THE CONVENTION OF 29 APRIL 1948 BETWEEN THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION OF 25 SEPTEMBER 1948 BETWEEN BELGIUM AND THE NETHERLANDS) OR SHORTLY AFTER THE SIGNATURE OF THE ECSC TREATY (SEE FOR EXAMPLE ARTICLE XVI (d) OF THE CONVENTION OF 27 MARCH 1953 BETWEEN BELGIUM AND THE UNITED KINGDOM; ARTICLE 18 OF THE CONVENTION OF 1 APRIL 1953 BETWEEN BELGIUM AND SWEDEN ETC.) AND IN ANY EVENT BEFORE THE SIGNATURE OF THE EEC AND EAEC TREATIES.
+IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES IF THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES INDEED HAD THE INTENTION OF ALLOWING THE NATIONAL AUTHORITIES TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT COMMUNITY EMOLUMENTS FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING THE RATE OF THE SURTAX OR OTHER TAXES OF SIMILAR SCOPE, IT IS INEXPLICABLE WHY THEY FAILED TO INCLUDE AN EXPRESS RESERVATION SIMILAR TO THAT CONTAINED IN THE CONVENTIONS REFERRED TO ABOVE AS THE PROBLEM COULD NOT HAVE BEEN UNKNOWN TO THE DELEGATIONS WHICH UNDERTOOK THE DRAFTING OF THE PROVISIONS SUBMITTED FOR EXAMINATION BY THE COURT.
+NEVERTHELESS IT IS NOT SUFFICIENT FOR THE COURT TO ADOPT THE LITERAL INTERPRETATION AND THE COURT CONSIDERS IT NECESSARY TO EXAMINE THE QUESTION WHETHER THIS INTERPRETATION IS CONFIRMED BY OTHER CRITERIA CONCERNING IN PARTICULAR THE COMMON INTENTION OF THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES AND THE RATIO LEGIS.
+3. IN THIS RESPECT THE FACT IS THAT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO DISCOVER ANY COMMON VIEW TAKEN BY THE MEMBER STATES WHICH MIGHT SERVE AS A CRITERION FOR THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 11 (b) OF THE PROTOCOL.
+THE OPINIONS OF THE GOVERNMENTS PUT FORWARD DURING THE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES ON THE ECSC TREATY DO NOT TOUCH ON THIS QUESTION.
+THE SAME IS TRUE OF THE PARLIAMENTARY VOTES ON THE EEC AND EAEC TREATIES WHICH CONTAIN A PROVISION IN SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME TERMS. MOST OF THE STATEMENTS BY THE GOVERNMENTS DID NOT DEAL WITH THE QUESTION, THE EXCEPTION BEING THAT OF THE LUXEMBOURG GOVERNMENT, CONCERNING THE EAEC TREATY; THIS ASSERTS THAT THE PROVISION ADOPTED "WILL NOT PREVENT THE NATIONAL TAX AUTHORITIES FROM TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE EXEMPTED INCOME FOR THE PURPOSE OF CALCULATING THE RATE OF TAX APPLICABLE TO THE NON-EXEMPT INCOME, THAT IS TO SAY INCOME ARISING FROM SOURCES OTHER THAN THE EMOLUMENTS PAID BY THE COMMUNITIES".
+QUITE APART FROM THE FACT THAT IT REFERS TO THE PROTOCOLS ANNEXED TO THE TREATIES OF ROME AND NOT TO THE ECSC PROTOCOL, THIS PASSAGE DOES NOT IN ITSELF PROVE THAT THE AUTHORS OF THE TREATIES WERE ALL IN AGREEMENT ON THIS INTERPRETATION.
+ON THE CONTRARY IT RAISES AFRESH THE QUESTION WHETHER THE COMMON INTENT OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES APPLIED EQUALLY TO THE SECONDARY EFFECTS OF THE EXEMPTION GRANTED WHICH HAVE BEEN AT ISSUE IN THE PRESENT CASE.
+A COMPARISON OF THE VARIOUS NATIONAL LAWS REINFORCES THESE DOUBTS.
+INDEED, WHILST IT IS TRUE THAT THE FINANCE LAW OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC IS BASED ON THE SAME PRINCIPLES AS THE CASE-LAW AND PRACTICE IN BELGIUM, IT IS CLEAR FROM THE LEGISLATION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY THAT IT INTERPRETED THE PROTOCOL IN THE SENSE ADVOCATED BY THE APPLICANT.
+THE GERMAN LAW ON THE TAXATION OF INCOME (EINKOMMENSTEUERGESETZ), IN THE VERSIONS OF 23 SEPTEMBER 1958 (BUNDESGESETZBLATT I, P. 672) AND OF 11 OCTOBER 1960 (BUNDESGESETZBLATT I, P. 789) INCORPORATED ARTICLE 11 (b) OF THE PROTOCOL INTO GERMAN LAW BY INCLUDING IT AT NO 34 OF PARAGRAPH 3 UNDER EXEMPT INCOMES.
+THEREFORE THE GERMAN LEGISLATURE DOES NOT SHARE THE VIEW OF THE BELGIAN ADMINISTRATION THAT THE PROTOCOL DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR EXEMPTION OF THE INCOME BUT MERELY FOR EXEMPTION OF THE OFFICIALS.
+4. THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE PROTOCOL PROVIDES THAT "PRIVILEGES, IMMUNITIES AND FACILITIES SHALL BE ACCORDED... TO OFFICIALS OF THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMUNITY SOLELY IN THE INTERESTS OF THE COMMUNITY".
+IT IS THEREFORE NECESSARY TO EXAMINE WHAT INTEREST THE COMMUNITY HAS IN HAVING ITS OFFICIALS EXEMPTED FROM ANY TAXATION ON THE SALARY PAID BY THE COMMUNITY.
+(a) IT MAY BE STATED THAT ONLY THE EXEMPTION OF REMUNERATION PAID BY THE COMMUNITY FROM ALL NATIONAL TAX ENABLES THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMUNITY TO EXERCISE EFFECTIVELY THEIR RIGHT TO FIX THE EFFECTIVE AMOUNT OF THE REMUNERATION OF THEIR OFFICIALS, A RIGHT WHICH IS ACCORDED TO THEM BY THE TREATY (ARTICLE 78 OF THE ECSC TREATY, ARTICLES 15 AND 16 OF THE PROTOCOL ON THE STATUTE OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE ECSC).
+IF THE MEMBER STATES RETAINED THE RIGHT TO ASSESS THE SALARIES OF OFFICIALS OF THE ECSC TO TAX, EACH ACCORDING TO ITS OWN FISCAL SYSTEM, THE COMMUNITY WOULD IN EFFECT NO LONGER BE ABLE TO DETERMINE THE NET INCOME OF ITS OFFICIALS.
+NEVERTHELESS IT IS THE FIXING OF THE NET INCOME WHICH ENABLES THE INSTITUTIONS TO EVALUATE THE SERVICES OF THEIR OFFICIALS AND WHICH ENABLES THE OFFICIALS TO ASSESS THE POST OFFERED TO THEM.
+THE APPLICATION OF NATIONAL TAX LAWS TO THE SALARIES PAID BY THE COMMUNITY WOULD THUS DETRIMENTALLY AFFECT THE COMMUNITY's EXCLUSIVE POWER TO FIX THE AMOUNT OF THOSE SALARIES.
+THIS REASONING IS CONFIRMED BY THE TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EEC AND THE EAEC WHICH, WHILE PROVIDING FOR A TAX ON SALARIES PAID BY THE COMMUNITIES FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE COMMUNITIES, NEVERTHELESS RESERVE THE POWER TO DETERMINE THIS TAX AS WELL AS TO DETERMINE SALARIES TO AN INSTITUTION OF THE COMMUNITY, THAT IS TO SAY, ITS COUNCIL (FIRST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 12 OF THE PROTOCOLS ON THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE EEC AND EAEC; ARTICLE 212 OF THE EEC TREATY, ARTICLE 186 OF THE EAEC TREATY).
+TAKEN AS A WHOLE, THE THREE TREATIES IN THIS RESPECT SHARE COMMON GROUND IN THAT THEY WITHDRAW THE REMUNERATION PAID TO OFFICIALS OF THE COMMUNITY FROM THE MEMBER STATEs' sOVEREIGNTY IN TAX MATTERS.
+IN THIS WAY THE TREATIES SOUGHT TO REINFORCE THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENTS OF THE COMMUNITY VIS-A-VIS THE NATIONAL POWERS.
+(b) A FURTHER DECISIVE REASON MAY BE ADDED TO THE LINE OF ARGUMENT SET OUT ABOVE, NAMELY THE FACT THAT THE TOTAL EXEMPTION FROM NATIONAL TAXES IS INDISPENSABLE IN ORDER TO GUARANTEE THE EQUALITY OF REMUNERATION FOR OFFICIALS OF DIFFERENT NATIONALITIES.
+IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY UNJUST IF TWO OFFICIALS, FOR WHOM THE COMMUNITY INSTITUTION HAD PROVIDED THE SAME GROSS SALARY, WERE TO RECEIVE DIFFERENT NET SALARIES.
+THE DIFFERENCE IN NET REMUNERATION COULD MAKE THE RECRUITMENT OF OFFICIALS FROM CERTAIN MEMBER STATES MORE DIFFICULT, THUS CREATING DISCRIMINATION IN RESPECT OF THE REAL OPPORTUNITIES OF ACCESS TO COMMUNITY SERVICE FOR NATIONALS OF EACH MEMBER STATE.
+(c) AS OFFICIALS ARE CONCERNED NOT WITH THE GROSS BUT THE NET REMUNERATION, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY, IF THE TAX EXEMPTION OF COMMUNITY REMUNERATION WERE NOT ENSURED, TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF FISCAL CHARGES IN FIXING THE EMOLUMENTS OF OFFICIALS.
+THAT CHARGE WOULD THUS FINALLY FALL ON THE BUDGET OF THE COMMUNITY.
+FURTHER, THE ASSESSMENT TO TAX OF THE REMUNERATION IN QUESTION BY THE MEMBER STATES MIGHT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY BETWEEN MEMBER STATES.
+IT COULD PRODUCE THE RESULT THAT IN CERTAIN MEMBER STATES THE UNDERTAKINGS WHICH MAKE RELATIVELY HIGH CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE COMMUNITY WOULD BE INDIRECTLY FINANCING CERTAIN OTHER STATES WHOSE FISCAL LEGISLATION MAY IMPOSE PARTICULARLY HEAVY TAXATION.
+THUS THE EXEMPTION OF THE SALARIES PAID BY THE COMMUNITY MEETS A LEGITIMATE INTEREST, THE SAFEGUARD OF WHICH IS GUARANTEED BY ARTICLE 11 (b) OF THE PROTOCOL.
+5. THE PROPOSITION ADVOCATED BY THE DEFENDANT HINDERS THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE AIMS DESCRIBED ABOVE.
+INDEED IT IS CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLE RECOGNIZED BY THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES WHICH PROVIDES FOR A CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN INCOME SUBJECT TO THE CONTROL OF THE NATIONAL TAX AUTHORITIES OF THE MEMBER STATES ON THE ONE HAND AND THE SALARIES OF OFFICIALS OF THE COMMUNITY ON THE OTHER; BY THE TERMS OF THE TREATIES OF ROME, THE LATTER ARE SUBJECT TO COMMUNITY LAW ALONE AS REGARDS ANY LIABILITY TO TAX WHILE THE OTHER INCOME OF OFFICIALS REMAINS SUBJECT TO TAXATION BY THE MEMBER STATES.
+THIS DIVISION OF RECIPROCAL FISCAL JURISDICTION MUST EXCLUDE ANY TAXATION, DIRECT OR INDIRECT, OF INCOME WHICH IS NOT WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE MEMBER STATES.
+(a) THE SYSTEM ADOPTED BY THE BELGIAN TAX AUTHORITIES WITH REGARD TO THE APPLICATION OF THE SURTAX TO OFFICIALS OF THE ECSC CONSTITUTES INDIRECT TAXATION OF COMMUNITY SALARIES.
+THE DEFENDANT ARGUES THAT THE SYSTEM IS NOT CONTRARY TO THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 11 (b) OF THE PROTOCOL SINCE THE REMUNERATION PAID BY THE COMMUNITY IS NOT SUBJECTED TO ANY TAX.
+THE TAX IS MERELY IMPOSED ON OTHER INCOME BY APPLYING THE RATE WHICH WOULD BE APPLICABLE TO THE INCOME BAND RESULTING FROM THE FICTITIOUS ADDITION OF THE COMMUNITY SALARY TO THE OTHER INCOME.
+THIS ARGUMENT FAILS TO RECOGNIZE CERTAIN EFFECTS OF THE TAXATION SYSTEM PROVIDED FOR BY THE BELGIAN LAW ON THE SURTAX (OR BY THE SIMILAR SYSTEMS IN FORCE IN OTHER MEMBER STATES) WHEREBY THE TAXABLE INCOME IS DIVIDED INTO BANDS WHICH ARE TAXED AT PROGRESSIVELY HIGHER RATES.
+APPLICATION OF THIS SYSTEM OF TAXATION GIVES RISE TO NO DIFFICULTIES WHERE ALL OF THE TAXPAYER's INCOME IS LIABLE TO TAX.
+IN FACT THE APPLICATION OF DIFFERENT RATES TO DIFFERENT BANDS DOES NOT PREVENT THE IMPOSITION OF A SINGLE TOTAL SUM OF TAX COVERING THE WHOLE OF THE INCOME WITH THE RESULT THAT THE HIGHEST RATE APPLIED TO THE HIGHEST BAND IN REALITY ALSO COVERS THE WHOLE OF THE INCOME.
+NORMALLY THEREFORE IT IS OF NO IMPORTANCE WHETHER A PARTICULAR ITEM OF INCOME IS INCLUDED IN THE LOWER OR HIGHER BANDS AS THE AMOUNT OF THE TOTAL TAX ON THE WHOLE INCOME IS ALWAYS THE SAME.
+ON THE OTHER HAND THE SYSTEM USED BY THE BELGIAN TAX AUTHORITIES IN RESPECT OF OFFICIALS OF THE ECSC ENTAILS, FOR REASONS WHICH CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED, THE INCLUSION OF INCOME OTHER THAN COMMUNITY SALARIES IN THE HIGHER BANDS AND THE APPLICATION OF A HIGHER RATE THAN WOULD HAVE BEEN APPLIED TO IT IF THE COMMUNITY SALARY HAD NOT BEEN TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.
+FOR THIS REASON INCOME OTHER THAN THE COMMUNITY SALARY IS ASSESSED TO TAX AT A RATE WHICH IS NOT THAT APPROPRIATE TO ITS ACTUAL AMOUNT.
+CONSEQUENTLY THE COMMUNITY SALARY IS INDIRECTLY ASSESSED TO TAX AS ONLY THE TAKING INTO ACCOUNT OF THIS SALARY PERMITS THE APPLICATION TO THE OTHER INCOME OF A RATE HIGHER THAN THAT WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN APPLICABLE TO IT.
+(b) MOREOVER, TAKING ACCOUNT OF LOGICAL ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS, THE TOTAL INCOME OF A TAXPAYER CONSTITUTES AN ORGANIC WHOLE.
+THE NATIONAL LAWS THEMSELVES ARE BASED ON THESE CONSIDERATIONS.
+IN VIEW OF THIS, THE IMPOSITION OF TAXES "ON" A CATEGORY OF INCOME WHILE TAKING ACCOUNT OF OTHER INCOME TO CALCULATE THE RATE OF TAX HAS THE EFFECT, AT LEAST IN SUBSTANCE, OF TAXING THE LATTER INCOME DIRECTLY.
+IN FACT THERE EXISTS A COMMON FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENT IN TAXING INCOME DIRECTLY AND TAXING IT INDIRECTLY BY AGGREGATING IT SINCE IN BOTH CASES THERE IS A CAUSAL LINK BETWEEN THAT INCOME AND THE TOTAL AMOUNT FOR WHICH THE PERSON CONCERNED IS LIABLE.
+(c) CONSEQUENTLY, A MEMBER STATE INFRINGES THE PROTOCOL IF IT TAKES ACCOUNT OF THE SALARIES PAID BY THE COMMUNITY TO ITS OFFICIALS IN ORDER TO DETERMINE THE RATE OF TAX DUE ON OTHER INCOME WHICH IS NOT EXEMPTED WHERE THE NATIONAL TAX LAW PROVIDES FOR A SYSTEM OF TAXATION ON A RISING SCALE.
+IT IS CONTRARY TO COMMUNITY LAW THAT AN OFFICIAL SHOULD BE TAXED MORE HEAVILY IN RESPECT OF HIS PRIVATE INCOME BECAUSE HE RECEIVES A SALARY FROM THE COMMUNITY AS TAXATION ON THIS BASIS INEVITABLY HAS THE EFFECT OF REDUCING THAT SALARY THUS BREACHING THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY OF REMUNERATION.
+IT CANNOT BE ARGUED AGAINST THIS THAT SUCH AN ASSESSMENT DOES NOT INFRINGE THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY IN RELATION TO FISCAL CHARGES BECAUSE IT ONLY AFFECTS OFFICIALS WHO POSSESS SOURCES OF INCOME OTHER THAN THE EMOLUMENTS PAID BY THE COMMUNITY.
+THIS LINE OF ARGUMENT TAKES NO ACCOUNT OF THE FACT THAT THE ESSENTIAL COMPARISON WHICH IS REQUIRED HERE MUST BE BETWEEN COMMUNITY OFFICIALS OF DIFFERENT NATIONALITIES RECEIVING THE SAME GROSS REMUNERATION AND HAVING ALSO IN THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES EQUAL AMOUNTS OF OTHER TAXABLE INCOME.
+IF THE MEMBER STATES WERE ABLE TO INCLUDE THE REMUNERATION OF COMMUNITY OFFICIALS IN THE TOTAL TAXABLE INCOME FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING THE RATE APPLICABLE TO OTHER INCOME, THE ABOVEMENTIONED DIFFERENTIATION WOULD BE THE RESULT NOT ONLY OF VARIATIONS BETWEEN THE TAX SCALES UNDER THE DIFFERENT NATIONAL LAWS, THAT IS OF FACTORS OUTSIDE THE COMMUNITY, BUT ALSO OF THE APPLICATION OF DIFFERENT NATIONAL LAWS TO INCOMES WHICH ARE COVERED BY COMMUNITY LAW AND WHICH COMMUNITY LAW INTENDED TO BE TREATED ALIKE.
+(d) FROM ANOTHER ASPECT THE SYSTEM APPLIED BY THE DEFENDANT AFFECTS THE FREEDOM OF THE COMMUNITY TO FIX THE REMUNERATION OF ITS OFFICIALS.
+UNDER THIS SYSTEM AN OFFICIAL OF THE COMMUNITY WOULD NOT MERELY BE OBLIGED TO DECLARE HIS REMUNERATION TO THE TAX AUTHORITIES BUT ALSO TO SET OUT THE USUAL DEDUCTIONS (EXPENSES ARISING FROM EMPLOYMENT AND OTHER EXPENSES) RELATING TO THIS SALARY IN ORDER TO AVOID EXCESSIVE TAX ON HIS PERSONAL INCOME.
+IF THE NATIONAL TAX AUTHORITIES HAD TO EXAMINE THE ADMISSIBILITY AND THE AMOUNT OF THESE DEDUCTIONS THEY WOULD HAVE TO LOOK INTO THE VARIOUS COMPONENTS OF THE COMMUNITY SALARY.
+APART FROM THE UNFORTUNATE CONSEQUENCES WHICH COULD FOLLOW FROM DIFFERENCES IN STANDARDS OF JUDGMENT BETWEEN THE NATIONAL TAX AUTHORITIES, THIS WOULD ALSO AFFECT THE RIGHT OF THE COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS TO FIX IN COMPLETE INDEPENDENCE THE REMUNERATION OF THEIR OFFICIALS AND THUS TO DETERMINE AND JUSTIFY THE VARIOUS COMPONENTS OF THE TOTAL SALARY PAID TO EACH OFFICIAL.
+THE VIEW ADVOCATED BY THE DEFENDANT HAS THE RESULT OF MISCONTRUING, IF ONLY IN PART, THE MEANING WHICH SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO ARTICLE 11 (b) OF THE PROTOCOL.
+IT WOULD RESULT NOT ONLY IN REMOVING THE REMUNERATION IN QUESTION FROM THE SPHERE OF THE SINGLE, UNIFORM LAW OF THE COMMUNITY BUT IT WOULD ALSO SUBJECT IT TO A NUMBER OF DIFFERENT, AND INDEED DISPARATE, LEGAL SYSTEMS.
+IT IS THEREFORE AN INFRINGEMENT OF THE TREATY TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE REMUNERATION REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 11 (b) OF THE PROTOCOL IN ORDER TO CALCULATE THE RATE APPLICABLE TO OTHER INCOME OF THE PERSON CONCERNED.
+6. IT MUST ALSO BE BORNE IN MIND THAT THE PRESENT CASE CONCERNS NOT THE TAXATION OF THE ASSETS OF AN OFFICIAL OF THE COMMUNITY BUT THOSE OF HIS WIFE WHO IS NOT AN OFFICIAL AND THAT FOR THIS REASON THE DEFENDANT ARGUES THAT THE PROTOCOL IS NOT APPLICABLE TO HER PERSONAL INCOME.
+NEVERTHELESS THE BELGIAN TAX LAW REGARDS THE ASSETS OF THE TWO SPOUSES, EVEN IF THEY ARE SEPARATE IN THE EYES OF CIVIL LAW, AS A SINGLE UNIT FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF TAX LAW.
+THE EFFECTS OF THE TAX IN QUESTION ON THE COMMON INCOME CANNOT BE AND INDEED ARE NOT DENIED.
+AS THE INDIRECT TAXATION OF THE REMUNERATION OF AN OFFICIAL OF THE COMMUNITY FOR THE PURPOSE OF AN ASSESSMENT ON BOTH THE SPOUSES BY TAKING IT INTO ACCOUNT IN ORDER TO DETERMINE THE RATE OF TAX IS PROHIBITED, THE SAME PROHIBITION MUST ALSO APPLY IN THE CASE OF A SINGLE ASSESSMENT ON THE OFFICIAL ALONE.
+THIS IS CERTAINLY TRUE IN CASES WHERE THE HUSBAND IS ALSO PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE TAX IMPOSED ON THE ASSETS OF HIS WIFE.
+THE SYSTEM OF COMBINED ASSESSMENT OF THE SPOUSES AS PROVIDED FOR BY ARTICLE 43 OF THE BELGIAN CONSOLIDATED LAWS HAS THIS EFFECT.
+CONSEQUENTLY THE DEFENDANT CANNOT RELY ON THE FACT THAT THE PERSON ACCORDED THE PRIVILEGE WHO IS REFERRED TO IN THE PROTOCOL AND THE SPOUSE WHOSE INCOME HAS BEEN CHARGED TO TAX ARE NOT ONE AND THE SAME.
+ON THE CONTRARY RATHER, THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE REMUNERATION REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 11 (b) OF THE PROTOCOL CANNOT BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING THE RATE APPLICABLE TO OTHER INCOME APPLIES EQUALLY WHERE THE LATTER INCOME WAS RECEIVED BY THE SPOUSE OF THE OFFICIAL WHO IS EXEMPTED.
+FOR ALL THE ABOVE REASONS THE FIRST TWO CONCLUSIONS OF THE APPLICANT WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE APPLICATION FOR A DECLARATION THAT THE ASSESSMENT MADE ON HIM WAS VOID AND OF NO EFFECT ARE WELL-FOUNDED.
+CONSEQUENTLY THE COMPETENT BELGIAN AUTHORITIES ARE OBLIGED, IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 86 OF THE ECSC TREATY, TO NULLIFY THE EFFECTS OF THE MEASURES WHEREBY THE ASSESSMENT WAS MADE AND CONFIRMED.
+THE APPLICANT WAS SUCCESSFUL IN HIS CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING THE INTERPRETATION OF THE PROTOCOL AND THUS IN THE MAIN ISSUE IN THE CASE.
+UNDER ARTICLE 69 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE COURT THE DEFENDANT SHALL BE ORDERED TO PAY THE COSTS.
+THE COURT
+HEREBY:
+1. DISMISSES THE APPLICATION OF THE APPLICANT SEEKING THE ANNULMENT OF THE TAX ASSESSMENT IN QUESTION, A DECLARATION THAT IT IS VOID AND OF NO EFFECT AND AN ORDER THAT THE DEFENDANT SHOULD REPAY THE AMOUNTS PAID, INCLUDING THE PENALTY IMPOSED FOR THE INCOMPLETE DECLARATION OF INCOME AND PAYMENT OF COMPENSATORY INTEREST.
+2. RULES THAT THE OTHER CONCLUSIONS IN THE APPLICATION ARE ADMISSIBLE AND ARE WELL-FOUNDED IN THAT:
+(a) THE PROTOCOL ON THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY PROHIBITS THE MEMBER STATES FROM IMPOSING ON AN OFFICIAL OF THE COMMUNITY ANY TAXATION WHATSOEVER WHICH IS BASED IN WHOLE OR IN PART ON THE PAYMENT OF THE SALARY TO THAT OFFICIAL BY THE COMMUNITY.
+(b) THE PROTOCOL ALSO PROHIBITS THE TAKING INTO ACCOUNT OF THIS SALARY IN ORDER TO DETERMINE THE RATE OF TAX APPLICABLE TO OTHER INCOME OF AN OFFICIAL.
+(c) THE SAME APPLIES TO THE CASE OF AN ASSESSMENT ON THE JOINT INCOME OF AN OFFICIAL OF THE COMMUNITY AND OF HIS SPOUSE IN RESPECT OF TAX PAYABLE ON THE INCOME OF THE LATTER.
+(d) CONSEQUENTLY, THE TAX DEMANDED IN THE NOTICE AND EXTRACT FROM THE INCOME TAX REGISTER SENT TO THE APPLICANT ON 18 OR 19 DECEMBER 1959 (ARTICLES 913, 321) BY THE COLLECTOR OF TAXES AT ENGIS IN THE SUM OF FB 9 035 IS CONTRARY TO THE PROTOCOL IN SO FAR AS IT IS BASED ON THE EXISTENCE OF SALARY AND EMOLUMENTS PAID TO THE APPLIANT BY THE ECSC.
+3. ORDERS THE DEFENDANT TO PAY THE COSTS.

data/principle-mvep-justice-court/mvep-098-hr.aligned.txt

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+U predmetu 6-60,
+Jean-E. Humblet, dužnosnik EZUČ-a, s izabranom adresom za dostavu u Luxembourgu, 7, rue du Fort-Reinsheim,
+tužitelj,
+uz asistenciju Paula Oriannea, odvjetnika Cour d ' appel de Bruxelles (Žalbeni sud u Bruxellesu),
+protiv
+Belgijske države, s izabranom adresom za dostavu u Luxembourgu u sjedištu veleposlanstva Belgije, 9, boulevard du Prince-Henri,
+tuženika,
+koju zastupa ministar financija, uz Georgesa Lalouxa, zamjenika savjetnika u Središnjoj upravi za izravne poreze Ministarstva financija (conseiller adjoint à l ' administration centrale des contributions directes), u svojstvu agenta, uz asistenciju Julesa Fallyja, odvjetnika pri Cour de cassation de Belgique (Kasacijski sud, Belgija),
+povodom tužbe u vezi s tumačenjem članka 11. točke (b) Protokola o povlasticama i imunitetima EZUČ-a, SUD,
+donosi sljedeću Presudu I – Osnova i opseg nadležnosti Suda
+1. U skladu s člankom 16. Protokola o povlasticama i imunitetima Europske zajednice za ugljen i čelik, u vezi s člankom 43. Ugovora o EZUČ-u, Sud je nadležan za odlučivanje o svim sporovima koji se odnose na tumačenje ili primjenu tog Protokola.
+Neovisno o tome, u ovom slučaju tuženik osporava nadležnost Suda jer se spor ne odnosi na tumačenje Protokola, već na pravilnu primjenu belgijskog zakona na dohodak supruge tužitelja, koja sama nije dužnosnica Zajednice.
+Sud ne može prihvatiti taj argument.
+U stvarnosti se spor odnosi na pitanje je li na temelju članka 11. točke (b) Protokola državama članicama dopušteno da u obzir uzmu primitke od rada dužnosnika Zajednice pri utvrđivanju stope poreza koja se primjenjuje na dohodak njegove supruge.
+Tuženik je u svojem odgovoru na tužbu naveo da je to predmet spora.
+Stoga je riječ o rješavanju spora koji se odnosi na tumačenje ili primjenu Protokola, a osobito njegova članka 11. točke (b).
+Prigovor nenadležnosti stoga valja odbaciti.
+2 S druge strane, Sud nema nadležnost za poništenje zakonodavnih ili upravnih akata jedne od država članica.
+Ugovor o EZUČ-u temelji se na načelu stroge podjele nadležnosti institucija Zajednice i tijelâ država članica.
+Pravom Zajednice institucijama Zajednice ne dodjeljuje se pravo da poništavaju zakonodavne ili upravne akte države članice.
+Stoga, ako smatra da je donošenjem ili zadržavanjem na snazi odredaba koje se protive Ugovoru određena država povrijedila obvezu iz Ugovora, Visoka vlast ne može sama poništiti ili staviti izvan snage te odredbe, već u skladu s člankom 88. Ugovora može samo zabilježiti takvu povredu i naknadno pokrenuti postupak predviđen Ugovorom kako bi uvjerila predmetnu državu da sama ukine mjere koje je donijela.
+Isto vrijedi za Sud, koji je u skladu s člankom 31. Ugovora odgovoran za osiguravanje poštovanja prava Zajednice i u skladu s člankom 16. Protokola nadležan za odlučivanje o svim sporovima koji se odnose na tumačenje ili primjenu Protokola, ali ne smije, na temelju samostalne ovlasti, poništiti ili staviti izvan snage nacionalne zakone države članice ili upravne akte njezinih tijela.
+To utvrđenje ograničenja nadležnosti Suda može se dodatno poduprijeti argumentom koji proizlazi iz Rimskih ugovora, a osobito članka 171. Ugovora o EEZ-u i članka 143. Ugovora o EZAE-u, kojima se samo pridodaje deklaratorni učinak odlukama Suda u slučajevima nepoštovanja Ugovora, ali se države članice obvezuju na poduzimanje mjera potrebnih za izvršenje presude.
+Sud neosnovanim smatra argument tužitelja da bi zaštita povlastica i imuniteta dodijeljenih Protokolom bila neučinkovita i presuda Suda svedena na puko mišljenje ako se ne bi mogli poništiti nezakoniti akti nacionalnih uprava i ako se predmetnoj državi ne bi moglo naložiti da nadoknadi nastalu štetu.
+Tužitelj svoje obrazloženje temelji na tekstu članka 16. Protokola o povlasticama i imunitetima u vezi s člankom 43. Ugovora o EZUČ-u jer se u prethodno navedenom članku 16. upućuje ne samo na tumačenje, već i na „primjenu” tog Protokola.
+Ipak, bilo bi pogrešno prihvatiti da se tom odredbom Sud ovlašćuje za izravno uplitanje u zakonodavstvo ili upravljanje država članica.
+Ako Sud u svojoj presudi utvrdi da je zakonodavni ili upravni akt tijelâ države članice protivan pravu Zajednice, ta je država članica u skladu s člankom 86. Ugovora o EZUČ-u dužna ukinuti predmetni akt i nadoknaditi sve nezakonite posljedice koje eventualno proiziđu iz njega.
+Ta obveza proizlazi iz Ugovora i Protokola, koji nakon ratifikacije imaju snagu zakona u državama članicama te prednost u odnosu na nacionalno pravo.
+Stoga, ako bi u ovom slučaju Sud utvrdio da je sporno oporezivanje nezakonito, iz navedenoga bi nužno proizišlo da je belgijska vlada obvezna donijeti mjere potrebne za njegovo ukidanje i tužitelju nadoknaditi sve iznose koji su mu nezakonito naplaćeni.
+Zbog svih prethodno navedenih razloga, zahtjevi tužitelja, u mjeri u kojoj se njima traži poništenje spornog oporezivanja i izdavanje naloga tuženiku da vrati plaćene iznose, nedopušteni su jer Sud nije nadležan za donošenje takve odluke.
+Isto vrijedi i u vezi sa zahtjevom za proglašenje spornog oporezivanja ništavim i bez učinka.
+To utvrđenje vrijedi i za zahtjev za izdavanje naloga tuženiku da plati kompenzacijske kamate zbog nezakonito naplaćenog poreza.
+Na nacionalnom je zakonodavstvu da utvrdi dovodi li nezakonita naplata do zahtjeva za plaćanje kompenzacijskih kamata.
+Na temelju istih pravila valja odbaciti zahtjev za povrat novčane kazne izrečene tužitelju zbog dostave nepotpune prijave poreza na dohodak.
+II – Dopuštenost tužbe
+Kad je riječ o dopuštenosti, prvo valja ispitati (a) može li pojedinac sam na temelju članka 16. Protokola podnijeti tužbu Sudu i (b) može li to učiniti prije negoli iscrpi pravna i postupovna sredstva predviđena pravom Zajednice ili nacionalnim zakonodavstvom.
+Iako to pitanje stranke nisu postavile tijekom pisanog dijela postupka, Sud ga mora ispitati po službenoj dužnosti jer se odnosi na dopuštenost tužbe.
+1 Ispitivanje relevantnih odredaba dovodi do razmatranja koja su navedena kako slijedi:
+(a) Osiguravanjem prava na tužbu na temelju članka 16. Protokola, autori Protokola očito su nastojali osigurati poštovanje povlastica i imuniteta koji su u njemu propisani u interesu ne samo Zajednice i njezinih institucija, već i pojedinaca kojima su te povlastice i imuniteti dodijeljeni te, s druge strane, u interesu država članica i njihovih upravnih tijela koje treba zaštititi od preširokog tumačenja tih povlastica i imuniteta.
+Stoga je sasvim prihvatljivo da se dužnosnik Zajednice pojavi pred Sudom kao tužitelj protiv vlade svoje matične zemlje na isti način kao što su poduzeća pred Sudom, intervenirajući u potporu Visoke vlasti, već osporavala argumente svojih zemalja.
+Iako su povlastice i imuniteti dodijeljeni „isključivo u interesu Zajednice” , ne treba zaboraviti da su priznati izričito „dužnosnicima institucija Zajednice”.
+Činjenicom da su povlastice, imuniteti i olakšice predviđeni u javnom interesu Zajednice bez sumnje se opravdava ovlast dodijeljena Visokom tijelu za utvrđivanje kategorija dužnosnika na koje se oni primjenjuju (članak 12.) ili, prema potrebi, ukidanje imuniteta (članak 13. drugi stavak), ali to ne znači da su te povlastice dodijeljene Zajednici, a ne izravno njezinim dužnosnicima. Osim toga, to tumačenje jasno proizlazi iz teksta prethodno navedenih odredaba.
+Stoga se Protokolom dotičnim osobama dodjeljuje subjektivno pravo, čije je poštovanje osigurano pravom na tužbu predviđenim u članku 16. Protokola.
+(b) Članak 16. Protokola, u skladu s kojim se „svi sporovi o tumačenju ili primjeni... Protokola dostavljaju Sudu” , ne sadržava nikakvo upućivanje na bilo koji postupak koji treba pokrenuti i iscrpiti prije podnošenja tužbe pred Sudom Zajednice.
+U skladu s tekstom tog članka svaka osoba koja smatra da joj je tumačenjem ili primjenom Protokola nanesena šteta može dostaviti spor Sudu bez drugih prethodnih formalnosti.
+U skladu s time dužnosnici Zajednice ovlašteni su na temelju članka 16. Protokola pred Sudom podnijeti tužbu protiv vlade svoje zemlje, pri čemu nisu obvezni prije toga primijeniti postupak predviđen drugim odredbama prava Zajednice ili nacionalnog prava.
+2 Međutim, problem valja ispitati i u svjetlu sustava Ugovora i pravnih pravila koja su opće prihvaćena u državama članicama.
+(a) Na početku valja riješiti pitanje nije li tužba dužnosnika Zajednice koji smatra da mu je povredom Protokola koju je počinila država članica nanesena šteta isključivo stvar Zajednice ili institucije kojoj dužnosnik pripada.
+Ispitivanje tog pitanja nužno je tim više jer se nijednom odredbom Ugovora o EZUČ-u pojedincima ne dopušta da tužbu podnesu izravno Sudu pozivajući se na povredu Ugovora koju je počinila država članica, već je, naprotiv, u načelu na Visokoj vlasti da djeluje protiv takve povrede primjenjujući postupak koji je u tu svrhu predviđen u članku 88. Ugovora.
+Međutim, autori Ugovora zasigurno nisu previdjeli činjenicu da bi „sporovi” koji mogu nastati u vezi s „tumačenjem ili primjenom” Protokola u prvom redu proizišli iz sukoba između stranaka kojima se Protokolom dodjeljuju povlastice i imuniteti i tijela kojima je u interesu usko tumačenje tih povlastica i imuniteta.
+Stranke ovog spora u tom se pogledu pojavljuju kao uobičajene stranke „spora” u smislu članka 16.
+Osim toga, kao što je već prethodno navedeno, povlasticama predviđenima u Protokolu dodjeljuju se subjektivna prava osobama na koje se on primjenjuje, kao što je vidljivo iz njemačke i nizozemske istovrijednice pojma „privilège” (Vorrechte, voorrechten).
+Općenito se može pretpostaviti da je nužna posljedica materijalnog prava da ono svojem korisniku pruža sredstva da to pravo sam ostvari tužbom pred sudom, a ne posredovanjem treće strane.
+U tim okolnostima valja primijeniti načelo prema kojemu se u slučaju sumnje odredba kojom se uspostavljaju pravne zaštitne mjere ne može usko tumačiti na štetu predmetnog pojedinca.
+Naposljetku, ne smije se previdjeti da članak 16. ne sadržava ograničenja predviđena u članku 33. Ugovora.
+(b) Nadalje valja ispitati je li tužba nedopuštena jer je tužitelj prethodno trebao iscrpiti upravna i pravosudna sredstva koji su mu dostupna u skladu odredbama nacionalnog zakonodavstva kojemu podliježe.
+Kad je riječ o upravnom sredstvu, valja utvrditi da su u ovom slučaju i u ovom stadiju postupka iscrpljene sve mogućnosti jer je ravnatelj za izravne poreze pokrajine Liège odlukom od 15. lipnja 1960. odbio prigovor koji je tužitelj podnio protiv spornog oporezivanja.
+Kad je riječ o pravosudnom sredstvu, iz izjava stranaka proizlazi da je tužitelj podnio žalbu pri Cour d ' appel de Liège (Žalbeni sud u Liègeu, Belgija).
+Stoga je u ovom stadiju postupka pravosudno sredstvo pokrenuto u Belgiji, ali mogućnosti još nisu iscrpljene.
+Međutim, Ugovorima o osnivanju Europskih zajednica ni na koji se način Sudu Zajednica ne daje prednost u odnosu na nacionalne sudove u smislu da se odluke tih sudova mogu pobijati pred Sudom.
+Suprotno tomu, kad je riječ o tumačenju Protokola, Sud ima isključivu nadležnost.
+Kao što je već prije navedeno, Ugovori se temelje na načelu stroge podjele između ovlasti Suda, s jedne strane, i nacionalnih sudova, s druge strane.
+Iz navedenoga proizlazi da je isključeno svako preklapanje nadležnosti dodijeljenih različitim sudovima.
+Stoga, u mjeri u kojoj je Sud nadležan, ne može biti riječ o prethodnom „iscrpljivanju” nacionalnog pravnog sredstva koje se sastoji od podnošenja jednog te istog pitanja za odluku prvo nacionalnim sudovima i zatim Sudu.
+Sud je stoga nadležan za rješavanje pravnog pitanja koje mu je dostavljeno unutar prethodno utvrđenih granica te činjenica da tužitelj nije iscrpio svoja pravosudna sredstva pred sudovima u svojoj zemlji nije prepreka dopuštenosti tužbe.
+Iz prethodno navedenoga proizlazi da se ne može osporiti pravo tužitelja na tužbu.
+Stoga je tužba dopuštena u mjeri u kojoj su zahtjevi u nadležnosti Suda.
+III – Meritum predmeta
+Belgijska porezna uprava temeljila je sporno oporezivanje na odredbama Uredbe regenta od 15. siječnja 1948. o usklađivanju zakona i uredaba o oporezivanju dohotka (Moniteur belge od 21. siječnja 1948.), u daljnjem tekstu „usklađeni zakoni”.
+Konkretno, primijenila je članke 46. i 43. tih zakona. Člankom 46. propisano je da se na uzastopne platne razrede naplaćuje stopa osobnog prireza, odnosno dodatnog poreza koji se naplaćuje na ukupni dohodak.
+Ta se odredba temelji na takozvanom progresivnom sustavu u smislu da se postotak poreza povećava s ulaskom ukupnog dohotka poreznog obveznika u viši platni razred.
+Prethodno navedenim člankom 43. propisano je da se „dohodak bračnog druga zbraja” , što znači da se u smislu poreznog prava dohodak bračnih drugova tretira kao jedinica imovine.
+Primjenjujući te odredbe na ovaj slučaj, belgijska uprava uzela je u obzir prihode koje je tužitelju platio EZUČ na način da ih je dodala oporezivom dohotku njegove supruge te je tako dobila iznos koji je, zbog platnih razreda utvrđenih u članku 46., doveo do primjene znatno više stope na taj dohodak od one koja bi se primijenila da u obzir nisu bili uzeti prihodi tužitelja.
+Tužitelj smatra da je taj postupak protivan članku 11. točki (b) Protokola.
+Stoga se spor odnosi na pitanje je li belgijskoj poreznoj upravi na temelju članka 11. točke (b) Protokola dopušteno da u obzir uzme plaću i prihode koje Zajednica isplaćuje svojem dužnosniku pri utvrđivanju stopa koje se primjenjuju na dohodak njegove supruge koja podliježe belgijskom prirezu na dohodak.
+Stoga zahtjevi tužitelja pred Sudom otvaraju opći problem zabranjuje li se člankom 11. točkom (b) Protokola, kojim se zabranjuje svako oporezivanje prethodno navedenog dohotka, i da se on osobito uzme u obzir pri utvrđivanju stope prireza na dohodak kako je predviđeno belgijskim zakonodavstvom.
+Zato valja ispitati opći problem u svrhu izvođenja načela koje se može primijeniti kako bi se omogućilo rješavanje konkretnog slučaja koji je ovdje istaknut.
+1 Kad je riječ o primjenjivom pravu, opći problem treba riješiti u skladu s pravom Zajednice, osobito tumačenjem članka 11. Protokola, a ne u skladu s belgijskim pravom.
+Stoga za ovaj slučaj nisu relevantni belgijsko zakonodavstvo i sudska praksa kao ni praksa koju u sličnim slučajevima primjenjuje belgijska uprava jer oni problem rješavaju na temelju nacionalnog prava.
+2 Tuženik tvrdi da člankom 11. točkom (b) Protokola nije predviđeno potpuno izuzeće primitaka od rada koje Zajednica isplaćuje dužnosnicima, već je samo navedeno da su dužnosnici osobno izuzeti od plaćanja svih poreza.
+Tuženik iz toga zaključuje da to nije slučaj „dohotka koji je oslobođen od poreza” (revenus immunisés), već samo „poreznih obveznika koji su izuzeti od oporezivanja” (contribuables exonérés d ' impôts) i da se ti primitci od rada, koji su u načelu oporezivi, „moraju uzeti u obzir kako bi se pravilno utvrdila porezna sposobnost predmetne osobe”.
+Sud ne može prihvatiti to obrazloženje.
+S jedne strane, nije utvrđeno da se izrazi „izuzeti” (exonérés) i „osloboditi” (immunisés) upotrebljavaju u međunarodnoj fiskalnoj terminologiji za označivanje različitih koncepata.
+Osim toga, iz naslova poglavlja V. Protokola „Članovi Visoke vlasti i dužnosnici institucija Zajednice” proizlazi da se Protokol odnosio na uređenje cjelokupnog pravnog položaja tih osoba, čime se objašnjava zašto su autori Protokola odabrali dosljednu metodu povezivanja različitih točaka navedenih u članku 11. točkama od (a) do (d) s osobom korisnikâ umjesto s predmetom različitih povlastica i imuniteta.
+Doslovnim tumačenjem teksta podupire se stajalište koje zagovara tužitelj.
+Izraz „izuzimaju se od svih poreza na plaće” jasno i nedvojbeno ukazuje na izuzeće od svih fiskalnih davanja koja se izravno ili neizravno temelje na izuzetim primitcima od rada.
+Tomu se ne može prigovoriti da se izrazom „na plaće” (sur les traitements) opravdava suprotan argument da se člankom 11. ne zabranjuje oporezivanje drugog dohotka po višoj stopi zbog plaće o kojoj se radi.
+Takvo oporezivanje bilo bi u suprotnosti s izuzećem koje je predviđeno člankom 11. jer bi čak i u ovom slučaju plaća Zajednice, koja je izuzeta od svih poreza, bila pravna osnova predmetnog oporezivanja.
+Nadalje, Protokol EZUČ-a (kao i protokoli EEZ-a i EZAE-a) ne sadržava nijednu odredbu u kojoj je navedeno da se izuzećem plaća koje isplaćuje Zajednica ne sprječava uključivanje tog dohotka u ukupni oporezivi dohodak u svrhu poreza sličnog opsega kao belgijski prirez, dok većina novijih međunarodnih sporazuma koji se odnose na dvostruko oporezivanje izričito sadržava tu zadršku.
+Među sporazumima koji sadržavaju tu zadršku neke je jedna ili druga država članica sklopila neposredno prije (vidjeti, na primjer, članak XIX. stavak 1. Konvencije od 29. travnja 1948. između Nizozemske i Sjedinjenih Američkih Država te članak 6. Konvencije od 25. rujna 1948. između Belgije i Nizozemske) ili neposredno nakon potpisivanja Ugovora o EZUČ-u (vidjeti, na primjer, članak XVI. točku (d) Konvencije od 27. ožujka 1953. između Belgije i Ujedinjene Kraljevine, članak 18. Konvencije od 1. travnja 1953. između Belgije i Švedske itd.), a u svakom slučaju prije potpisivanja Ugovora o EEZ-u i Ugovora u EZAE-u.
+Ako su u tim okolnostima visoke ugovorne stranke zaista imale namjeru dopustiti nacionalnim tijelima da u obzir uzmu prihode koje isplaćuje Zajednica u svrhu utvrđivanja stope prireza ili drugih poreza sličnog opsega, neobjašnjivo je zašto nisu uključile izričitu zadršku sličnu onoj koju sadržavaju prethodno navedene konvencije jer problem nije mogao biti nepoznat delegacijama koje su sastavile tekst dostavljen Sudu na ispitivanje.
+Neovisno o tome, Sud se ne može zadovoljiti donošenjem doslovnog tumačenja te smatra potrebnim ispitati je li to tumačenje potvrđeno drugim kriterijima koji se osobito odnose na zajedničku volju visokih ugovornih stranaka i ratio legis.
+3 U vezi s time valja utvrditi da nije moguće otkriti zajedničko stajalište država članica koje bi moglo poslužiti kao kriterij za tumačenje članka 11. točke (b) Protokola.
+Vlade se ne dotiču tog pitanja u mišljenjima koja su dostavile tijekom parlamentarnih rasprava o Ugovoru o EZUČ-u.
+Isto vrijedi i za parlamentarne izbore o Ugovoru o EEZ-u i Ugovoru o EZAE-u, koji uključuju sadržajno istovjetnu odredbu, te se u većini izjava vladâ to pitanje ne razmatra, a jedina je iznimka izjava luksemburške vlade o Ugovoru o EZAE-u. U njoj je navedeno da se donesenom odredbom „neće spriječiti nacionalne porezne uprave da u obzir uzmu izuzete iznose pri izračunu stope poreza koja se primjenjuje na dohodak za koji izuzeće ne vrijedi, odnosno dohodak ostvaren iz izvora koji nisu prihodi koje isplaćuje Zajednica”.
+Osim što se u njemu upućuje na protokole priložene Ugovorima iz Rima, a ne na Protokol EZUČ-a, tim se odlomkom samim po sebi ne dokazuje da su se svi autori Ugovora slagali s tim tumačenjem.
+Naprotiv, njime se ponovno otvara pitanje je li se zajednička volja ugovornih stranaka jednako odnosila i na sekundarne učinke dodijeljenog izuzeća o kojima je riječ u ovom sporu.
+Te su sumnje potkrijepljene usporedbom različitih nacionalnih zakonodavstava.
+Iako je točno da se Zakon o financijama Francuske Republike temelji na istim načelima kao sudska praksa i praksa u Belgiji, iz zakonodavstva Savezne Republike Njemačke proizlazi da je Protokol protumačila u smislu koji zagovara tužitelj.
+Njemačkim Zakonom o porezu na dohodak (Einkommensteuergesetz), u verzijama od 23. rujna 1958. (BGBl. I, str. 672.) i 11. listopada 1960. (BGBl. I, str. 789.), u njemačko je pravo ugrađen članak 11. točka (b) Protokola tako da je uključena u stavak 3. točku 34. pod dohodcima koji su oslobođeni od poreza.
+Stoga njemački zakonodavac ne zastupa isto stajalište kao belgijska uprava da Protokolom nije predviđeno oslobođenje dohotka, već samo izuzeće du��nosnika.
+4 U članku 13. prvom stavku Protokola utvrđeno je da se „... dužnosnicima institucija Zajednice priznaju... povlastice, imuniteti i olakšice isključivo u interesu Zajednice”.
+Stoga valja ispitati kakav je interes Zajednice u pogledu izuzimanja njezinih dužnosnika od plaćanja svih poreza na plaću koju isplaćuje Zajednica.
+(a) Valja utvrditi da se samo izuzećem primitaka od rada koje isplaćuje Zajednica od svih nacionalnih poreza institucijama Zajednice omogućuje da učinkovito ostvare svoje pravo na utvrđivanje stvarno plaćenog iznosa plaća svojih dužnosnika, pravo koje im je dodijeljeno Ugovorom (člankom 78. Ugovora o EZUČ-u te člancima 15. i 16. Protokola o Statusu Suda EZUČ-a).
+Ako bi države članice zadržale pravo oporezivanja plaća dužnosnika EZUČ-a u skladu sa svojim fiskalnim sustavom, Zajednica više ne bi mogla utvrditi neto dohodak svojih dužnosnika.
+Međutim, upravo utvrđivanje neto dohotka omogućuje institucijama da ocijene usluge svojih dužnosnika i dužnosnicima da ocijene radno mjesto koje im je ponuđeno.
+Primjena nacionalnih poreznih zakona na plaće koje isplaćuje Zajednica negativno bi utjecala na isključivu ovlast Zajednice za utvrđivanje iznosa tih plaća.
+To je obrazloženje potvrđeno Ugovorom o osnivanju EEZ-a i Ugovorom o osnivanju EZAE-a, kojima je predviđen porez na plaće koje isplaćuju Zajednice u korist Zajednica, ali je ovlast za utvrđivanje tog poreza i plaća rezervirana za instituciju Zajednice, odnosno njezino Vijeće (članak 12. prvi stavak Protokola o povlasticama i imunitetima EEZ-a i Protokola o povlasticama i imunitetima EZAE-a, članak 212. Ugovora o EEZ-u i članak 186. Ugovora o EZAE-u).
+Trima Ugovorima kao cjelini u tom je pogledu zajedničko da se njima primitci od rada koji se isplaćuju dužnosnicima Zajednice izuzimaju iz poreznog suvereniteta država članica.
+Na taj se način Ugovorima nastojala ojačati neovisnost upravnih odjela Zajednice u odnosu na nacionalne ovlasti.
+(b) Prethodno navedenim argumentima može se dodati još jedan odlučujući razlog, a to je činjenica da je potpuno izuzeće od nacionalnih poreza nužno kako bi se zajamčila jednakost plaća među dužnosnicima različitih državljanstava.
+Bilo bi izuzetno nepravedno kad bi dva dužnosnika, za koje je institucija Zajednice predvidjela istu bruto plaću, primala različite neto plaće.
+Zbog razlike u neto plaćama moglo bi se otežati zapošljavanje dužnosnika iz određenih država članica, čime bi se stvorila diskriminacija u pogledu stvarnih mogućnosti pristupa službama Zajednice za državljane svake države članice.
+(c) Budući da dužnosnike ne zanimaju bruto već neto primitci od rada, ako se ne bi osiguralo porezno izuzeće plaće koju isplaćuje Zajednica, pri utvrđivanju prihoda dužnosnika bilo bi potrebno uzeti u obzir fiskalna davanja.
+To davanje naposljetku bi bilo na teret proračuna Zajednice.
+Osim toga, ako bi država članica oporezivala predmetne primitke od rada, to bi moglo negativno utjecati na načelo jednakosti država članica.
+Takvo oporezivanje za posljedicu bi moglo imati da u određenim državama članicama poduzeća koja daju relativno velike doprinose Zajednice neizravno financiraju određene druge države čijim je poreznim zakonodavstvom propisano osobito visoko oporezivanje.
+Stoga izuzeće plaća koje isplaćuje Zajednica ispunjava legitiman interes, čija je zaštita zajamčena člankom 11. točkom (b) Protokola.
+5 Stajalištem koje zagovara tuženik onemogućuje se ostvarivanje prethodno opisanih ciljeva.
+Ono je protivno načelu priznatom u pravu Europskih zajednica kojim je predviđeno jasno razlikovanje između dohotka koji podliježe nadzoru nacionalne porezne uprave država članica, s jedne strane, i plaća dužnosnika Zajednice, s druge strane; potonje u skladu s Ugovorima iz Rima podliježu pravu Zajednice u pogledu njihova eventualnog oporezivanja, dok drugi dohodak dužnosnika i dalje podliježe oporezivanju država članica.
+Ta podjela uzajamnih fiskalnih nadležnosti mora isključivati svako izravno ili neizravno oporezivanje dohotka koji nije u nadležnosti država članica.
+(a) Sustav koji je donijela belgijska porezna uprava u vezi s primjenom prireza na dužnosnike EZUČ-a neizravno je oporezivanje plaća koje isplaćuje Zajednica.
+Tuženik tvrdi da sustav nije protivan odredbama članka 11. točke (b) Protokola jer plaće koje isplaćuje Zajednica ne podliježu nikakvom porezu.
+Porez se naplaćuje samo na drugi dohodak primjenjujući stopu koja bi se primjenjivala na platni razred dobiven fiktivnim dodavanjem plaće koju isplaćuje Zajednica drugom dohotku.
+U tom obrazloženju nisu priznate određene posljedice sustava oporezivanja predviđenog belgijskim Zakonom o prirezu (ili sličnim sustavima koji su na snazi u drugim državama članicama), prema kojemu je oporezivi dohodak podijeljen u razrede koji se progresivno oporezuju višim stopama.
+Primjena tog sustava oporezivanja ne dovodi do poteškoća ako cjelokupni dohodak poreznog obveznika podliježe porezu.
+Ne čini se da se primjenom različitih stopa na različite razrede onemogućuje naplata jedinstvenog ukupnog iznosa poreza kojim je obuhvaćen cjelokupni dohodak, tako da je najvišom stopom koja se primjenjuje na najviši razred u stvarnosti obuhvaćen i cjelokupni dohodak.
+Stoga obično nije važno je li određena stavka dohotka uključena u niže ili više razrede jer je ukupni iznos poreza na cjelokupni dohodak uvijek isti.
+Suprotno tomu, sustav koji belgijska porezna tijela upotrebljavaju u pogledu dužnosnika EZUČ-a sadržava, zbog razloga koji se ne mogu opravdati, klasifikaciju dohotka koji nije plaća koju isplaćuje Zajednica u više razrede i primjenu više stope na taj dohodak od one koja bi se primjenjivala da plaća koju isplaćuje Zajednica nije uzeta u obzir.
+Zbog toga se dohodak koji nije plaća koju isplaćuje Zajednica oporezuje stopom koja ne odgovara njegovu stvarnom iznosu.
+Posljedično, plaća koju isplaćuje Zajednica neizravno se oporezuje jer je samo njezinim uzimanjem u obzir omogućeno da se na drugi dohodak primjenjuje viša stopa od one koja bi na njega bila primjenjiva.
+(b) Osim toga, uzimajući u obzir razumna gospodarska i financijska razmatranja, ukupni dohodak poreznog obveznika organska je cjelina.
+Sama nacionalna zakonodavstva temelje se na tim razmatranjima.
+S obzirom na to, naplata poreza „na” kategoriju dohotka uz uzimanje u obzir drugog dohotka pri izračunu stope poreza u bitnome dovodi do neizravnog oporezivanja potonjeg.
+Izravno oporezivanje dohotka i neizravno oporezivanje dohotka njegovim zbrajanjem imaju zajednički temeljni element jer u oba slučaja postoji uzročna veza između tog dohotka i ukupnog iznosa koji je porezni obveznik dužan platiti.
+(c) Shodno tomu, država članica čini povredu Protokola ako u obzir uzima plaće koje Zajednica isplaćuje svojim dužnosnicima pri utvrđivanju stope poreza koji se duguje na drugi dohodak za koji izuzeće ne vrijedi ako je nacionalnim poreznim pravom propisan sustav progresivnog oporezivanja.
+Pravu Zajednice protivno je više oporezivanje privatnog dohotka dužnosnika zato što plaću prima od Zajednice jer takvo oporezivanje neizbježno dovodi do smanjenja plaće, čime se povrjeđuje načelo jednakosti plaća.
+Protiv tog utvrđenja ne može se iznijeti argument da se takvim oporezivanjem ne povrjeđuje načelo jednakosti u odnosu na fiskalna davanja jer ono utječe samo na dužnosnike koji uz prihode koje isplaćuje Zajednica ostvaruju i drugi dohodak.
+U toj argumentaciji ne uzima se u obzir činjenica da je ovdje bitno usporediti dužnosnike Zajednice različitih državljanstava koji primaju iste bruto primitke od rada i koji uz to u svojim zemljama ostvaruju dodatni oporezivi dohodak u istom iznosu.
+Ako bi države članice mogle uključiti primitke od rada dužnosnika Zajednice u ukupni oporezivi dohodak pri utvrđivanju stope koja se primjenjuje na drugi dohodak, prethodno navedeno razlikovanje bilo bi rezultat ne samo razlika među poreznim razredima u skladu s različitim nacionalnim zakonodavstvima, odnosno čimbenika izvan Zajednice, već i primjene različitih nacionalnih zakonodavstava na dohotke koji su obuhvaćeni zakonom Zajednice i koje u skladu s tim zakonom treba tretirati jednako.
+(d) S drugog stajališta, sustav koji primjenjuje tuženik utječe na slobodu Zajednice da utvrdi primitke od rada svojih dužnosnika.
+Dužnosnik Zajednice u skladu s tim sustavom ne bi bio samo obvezan poreznim tijelima prijaviti svoju plaću, već i navesti uobičajene odbitke (poslovne i druge troškove) u vezi s tom plaćom kako bi se izbjeglo prekomjerno oporezivanje njegova osobnog dohotka.
+Ako bi nacionalna porezna tijela morala ispitati osnovanost i iznos tih odbitaka, morala bi ocijeniti različite komponente plaće koju isplaćuje Zajednica.
+Osim nepovoljnih posljedica koje mogu proizaći iz razlika u ocjenjivanju među različitim poreznim upravama, to bi utjecalo i na pravo institucija Zajednice da potpuno neovisno utvrde primitke od rada svojih dužnosnika te tako odrede i opravdaju različite komponente ukupne plaće koja se isplaćuje svakom dužnosniku.
+Iako samo djelomično, stajalište koje zagovara tuženik dovodi do pogrešnog tumačenja smisla koji bi trebalo pripisati članku 11. točki (b) Protokola.
+Ono bi dovelo ne samo do uklanjanja predmetnih primitaka od rada iz područja jedinstvenog i ujednačenog zakona Zajednice, već bi ih i podvrgnulo različitim i zapravo neusklađenim pravnim poredcima.
+Stoga je protivno Ugovoru da se pri izračunu stope koja se primjenjuje na drugi dohodak predmetne osobe u obzir uzimaju primitci od rada iz članka 11. točke (b) Protokola.
+6 Valja uzeti u obzir i da se ovaj slučaj ne odnosi na oporezivanje imovine dužnosnika Zajednice, već njegove supruge, koja nije dužnosnica, i da zbog toga tuženik tvrdi da se Protokol ne primjenjuje na njezin osobni dohodak.
+Međutim, u belgijskom poreznom zakonu imovina dvaju bračnih drugova, čak i ako je u građanskopravnom smislu odvojena, smatra se jednom jedinicom sa stajališta poreznog zakona.
+Učinci spornog poreza na zajednički dohodak ne mogu se osporiti i ne osporavaju se.
+Budući da je u svrhu odvojenog oporezivanja bračnih drugova zabranjeno neizravno oporezivanje plaće dužnosnika Zajednice na način da se ona uzima u obzir pri utvrđivanju stope poreza, ista zabrana primjenjuje se i u slučaju pojedinačnog oporezivanja samo dužnosnika.
+To je zasigurno točno u slučajevima u kojima je i suprug osobno dužan platiti porez na imovinu svoje supruge.
+Sustav zajedničkog oporezivanja bračnih drugova, koji proizlazi iz članka 43. belgijskih usklađenih zakona, proizvodi taj učinak.
+Dakle, tuženik se ne može pozvati na činjenicu da osoba kojoj se Protokolom priznaje povlastica nije identična supruzi čiji se dohodak oporezuje.
+Naprotiv, načelo da se primitci od rada iz članka 11. točke (b) Protokola ne mogu uzeti u obzir pri utvrđivanju stope koja se primjenjuje na drugi dohodak jednako se primjenjuje i ako je potonji dohodak primio bračni drug dužnosnika koji je izuzet od plaćanja poreza.
+Zbog svih prethodno navedenih razloga prva dva zaključka tužitelja, isključujući zahtjev za proglašenje oporezivanja koje se primjenjuje na njega ništavim i bez učinka, osnovana su.
+Stoga su u skladu s člankom 86. Ugovora o EZUČ-u belgijska nadležna tijela obvezna poništiti učinke akata u skladu s kojima je oporezivanje provedeno i potvrđeno. Troškovi
+Tužitelj je uspio u svojim zahtjevima koji se odnose na tumačenje Protokola te stoga i u glavnoj točki spora.
+Sukladno članku 69. Poslovnika Suda, tuženiku valja naložiti snošenje troškova.
+SUD,
+odbijajući sve druge šire ili protivne zahtjeve, proglašava i presuđuje:
+1. Odbacuje se zahtjev tužitelja za poništenje spornog oporezivanja, proglašenje oporezivanja ništavim i bez učinka te izdavanje naloga tuženiku da vrati plaćene iznose, uključujući novčanu kaznu za nepotpunu prijavu poreza na dohodak i plaćanje kompenzacijskih kamata.
+2. Ostali tužbeni zahtjevi dopušteni su i osnovani jer je utvrđeno sljedeće:
+(a) Protokolom o povlasticama i imunitetima Europske zajednice za ugljen i čelik državama članicama zabranjuje se svako oporezivanje dužnosnika Zajednice koje se u cijelosti ili djelomično temelji na plaći koju tom dužnosniku isplaćuje Zajednica;
+(b) Protokolom se isto tako zabranjuje da se ta plaća uzme u obzir pri utvrđivanje stope poreza koja se primjenjuje na drugi dohodak dužnosnika;
+(c) isto vrijedi i u slučaju oporezivanja zajedničkog dohotka dužnosnika Zajednice i njegove supruge u vezi s porezom na njezin dohodak;
+(d) stoga je porez u iznosu od 9 035 belgijskih franaka naveden u obavijesti o procjeni obveze koju je tužitelju 18. ili 19. prosinca 1959. (članci 913., 321.) uputio poreznik u Engisu protivan Protokolu u mjeri u kojoj se temelji na postojanju plaće i prihoda koje je tužitelju isplatio EZUČ.
+3. Tuženiku se nalaže snošenje troškova.

data/principle-mvep-justice-court/mvep-099-en.aligned.txt

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+IN CASE 13/61
+REFERENCE TO THE COURT UNDER ARTICLE 177 OF THE EEC TREATY BY THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE HAGUE, SECOND CHAMBER, FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING IN THE ACTION PENDING BEFORE THAT COURT BETWEEN:
+KLEDINGVERKOOPBEDRIJF DE GEUS EN UITDENBOGERD, OF ROTTERDAM, REPRESENTED BY P. H. HOOGENBERGH, APPELLANT,
+AND
+(1) ROBERT BOSCH GMBH OF STUTTGART, A COMPANY INCORPORATED UNDER GERMAN LAW;
+(2) NV MAATSCHAPPIJ TOT VOORTZETTING VAN DE ZAKEN DER FIRMA WILLEM VAN RIJN, OF AMSTERDAM, REPRESENTED BY J. F. A. VERZIJL, RESPONDENTS,
+ON THE QUESTION WHETHER THE PROHIBITION ON EXPORT IMPOSED BY ROBERT BOSCH GMBH, OF STUTTGART, ON ITS CUSTOMERS AND ACCEPTED BY THEM BY WAY OF CONTRACT, IS VOID BY VIRTUE OF ARTICLE 85 (2) OF THE EEC TREATY AS FAR AS EXPORTS TO THE NETHERLANDS ARE CONCERNED,
+A - JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
+BOTH PLAINTIFFS IN THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE NETHERLANDS, BOSCH AND VAN RIJN, AS WELL AS THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, CAST DOUBT ON THE QUESTION WHETHER A PRELIMINARY RULING MAY BE GIVEN AT THE REQUEST OF THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE HAGUE, IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT A PETITION IN CASSATION HAS BEEN LODGED AGAINST THE JUDGMENT IN WHICH THE REQUEST WAS MADE.
+THIS DOUBT HAS RESULTED FROM AN INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 177 OF THE TREATY. THE ARGUMENT IS THAT A REQUEST TO THIS COURT UNDER ARTICLE 177 CANNOT BE MADE UNLESS THE JUDGMENT OR THE RULING OF THE NATIONAL COURT CONTAINING THE REFERENCE TO THIS COURT HAS THE FORCE OF RES JUDICATA.
+THIS INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 177 IS NOT ONLY NOT SUGGESTED BY THE LITERAL MEANING OF THE WORDING, BUT RESTS ALSO ON A FAILURE TO APPRECIATE THAT THE MUNICAPAL LAW OF ANY MEMBER STATE, WHOSE COURTS REQUEST A PRELIMINARY RULING FROM THIS COURT, AND COMMUNITY LAW CONSTITUTE TWO SEPARATE AND DISTINCT LEGAL ORDERS.
+JUST AS THE TREATY DOES NOT PREVENT THE NATIONAL COURT OF CASSATION FROM TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE PETITION BUT LEAVES THE DETERMINATION OF ITS ADMISSIBILITY TO THE NATIONAL LAW AND THE DECISION OF THE NATIONAL JUDGE, SO THE TREATY MAKES THE JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT DEPENDENT SOLELY ON THE EXISTENCE OF A REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 177. AND IT DOES SO WITHOUT REQUIRING THIS COURT TO DISCOVER WHETHER THE DECISION OF THE NATIONAL JUDGE HAS ACQUIRED THE FORCE OF RES JUDICATA UNDER THE NATIONAL LAW.
+THE PARTIES BOSCH AND VAN RIJN AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC FURTHER SUBMIT THAT THE REQUEST OF THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE HAGUE COULD NOT BE THE PROPER SUBJECT OF A PRELIMINARY RULING INASMUCH AS THE REQUEST IS NOT RESTRICTED TO A MERE QUESTION OF INTERPRETATION WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 177, BUT ON THE CONTRARY, AS THE WORDING OF THE REQUEST DISCLOSES, CALLS ON THIS COURT TO DECIDE ON THE APPLICATION OF THE TREATY TO AN ACTUAL CASE.
+HOWEVER, THE TREATY NEITHER EXPRESSLY NOR BY IMPLICATION PRESCRIBES A PARTICULAR FORM IN WHICH A NATIONAL COURT MUST PRESENT ITS REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING.
+MOREOVER, SINCE THE QUESTION WHAT IS MEANT IN ARTICLE 177 BY'THE INTERPRETATION OF THIS TREATY'MAY ITSELF BE A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, IT IS PERMISSIBLE FOR THE NATIONAL COURT TO FORMULATE ITS REQUEST IN A SIMPLE AND DIRECT WAY LEAVING TO THIS COURT THE DUTY OF RENDERING A DECISION ON THAT REQUEST ONLY IN SO FAR AS IT HAS JURISDICTION TO DO SO, THAT IS TO SAY, ONLY IN SO FAR AS THE DECISION RELATES TO THE INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY.
+THE DIRECT FORM IN WHICH THE REQUEST IN THE PRESENT CASE HAS BEEN DRAWN UP ENABLES THIS COURT TO ABSTRACT FROM IT WITHOUT DIFFICULTY THE QUESTIONS OF INTERPRETATION WHICH IT CONTAINS.
+THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC FURTHER CONTENDS THAT SO LONG AS THE REGULATIONS ENVISAGED BY ARTICLE 87 OF THE TREATY HAVE NOT BEEN PROMULGATED, THIS COURT IS INCAPABLE OF GIVING AN INTERPRETATION ON THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 85, THE APPLICATION OF WHICH IS, DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD BEFORE SUCH PROMULGATION, A MATTER FOR THE NATIONAL AUTHORITIES.
+THIS ARGUMENT CANNOT BE ACCEPTED.
+EVEN ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLES 85 ET SEQ. OF THE TREATY IS A MATTER FOR THE NATIONAL AUTHORITIES, IT IS NONETHELESS CLEAR THAT ARTICLE 177, RELATING TO THE INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY, REMAINS APPLICABLE, SO THAT THE NATIONAL COURT IS EMPOWERED, OR OBLIGED - AS THE CASE MAY BE - TO REQUEST A PRELIMINARY RULING.
+THIS REASONING IS SUPPORTED AS MUCH BY THE LETTER AS BY THE SPIRIT OF ARTICLE 177, FOR, WHILE THIS ARTICLE CONTAINS NO RESERVATIONS RELATIVE TO ARTICLES 85 ET SEQ., A HARMONIZING OF INTERPRETATION - WHICH IS THE PURPOSE OF ARTICLE 177 - IS OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE IN CASES IN WHICH THE APPLICATION OF THE TREATY IS ENTRUSTED TO NATIONAL AUTHORITIES.
+THUS THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO PRONOUNCE ON THE PRESENT REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING UNDER ARTICLE 177 OF THE TREATY.
+B - ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CASE
+THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE HAGUE RAISES THE QUESTION WHETHER ARTICLE 85 HAS BEEN APPLICABLE FROM THE TIME OF ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY.
+THE ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION MUST IN PRINCIPLE BE IN THE AFFIRMATIVE.
+ARTICLES 88 AND 89 OF THE TREATY, WHICH CONFER POWERS ON THE NATIONAL AUTHORITIES AND ON THE COMMISSION RESPECTIVELY FOR THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 85, PRESUPPOSE ITS APPLICABILITY FROM THE TIME OF ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY.
+ARTICLES 88 AND 89 ARE, HOWEVER, NOT OF SUCH A NATURE AS TO ENSURE A COMPLETE AND CONSISTENT APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 85 SO THAT THEIR MERE EXISTENCE WOULD PERMIT THE ASSUMPTION THAT ARTICLE 85 HAD BEEN FULLY EFFECTIVE FROM THE DATE OF ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY AND IN PARTICULAR THAT THE ANNULMENT ENVISAGED BY ARTICLE 85 (2) WOULD HAVE TAKEN EFFECT IN ALL THOSE CASES FALLING UNDER THE DEFINITION OF ARTICLE 85 (1) AND IN RESPECT OF WHICH A DECLARATION UNDER ARTICLE 85 (3) HAD NOT YET BEEN MADE.
+IN FACT, ARTICLE 88 ENVISAGES A DECISION BY THE AUTHORITIES OF MEMBER STATES ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF AGREEMENTS ONLY WHEN THE LATTER ARE SUBMITTED FOR THEIR APPROVAL WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE LAWS RELATING TO COMPETITION IN THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES.
+ARTICLE 89, WHILE CONFERRING ON THE COMMISSION A GENERAL POWER OF SURVEILLANCE AND CONTROL, ENABLES IT TO TAKE NOTE ONLY OF POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 85 AND 86 WITHOUT CLOTHING THE COMMISSION WITH POWER TO GRANT DECLARATIONS IN THE SENSE OF ARTICLE 85 (3).
+NEITHER OF THESE TWO ARTICLES, MOREOVER, CONTAINS TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS DEALING WITH AGREEMENTS EXISTING AT THE MOMENT THE TREATY CAME INTO FORCE.
+IT MAY BE NOTED, FURTHERMORE, THAT THE AUTHORS OF THE FIRST REGULATION IMPLEMENTING ARTICLES 85 AND 86 OF THE TREATY (OJ 204/62) TOOK THE SAME VIEW.
+THE COMBINED EFFECT OF ARTICLE 6 (2) AND ARTICLE 5 (1) OF THIS REGULATION IS THAT THE COMMISSION, FIRST, IS ABLE TO MAKE DECLARATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 85 (3) IN RESPECT OF AGREEMENTS SUBSISTING AT THE TIME OF ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE SAID REGULATION; AND SECONDLY IS EMPOWERED, TO GIVE SUCH DECLARATIONS A RETROACTIVE EFFECT, EVEN TO A DATE PRIOR TO THAT ON WHICH A PARTICULAR AGREEMENT HAS BEEN NOTIFIED TO THE COMMISSION.
+IT FOLLOWS THAT THE AUTHORS OF THE REGULATION SEEM TO HAVE ENVISAGED ALSO THAT AT THE DATE OF ITS ENTRY INTO FORCE THERE WOULD BE SUBSISTING AGREEMENTS TO WHICH ARTICLE 85 (1) APPLIED BUT IN RESPECT OF WHICH DECISIONS UNDER ARTICLE 85 (3) HAD NOT YET BEEN TAKEN, WITHOUT SUCH AGREEMENTS THEREBY BEING AUTOMATICALLY VOID.
+THE OPPOSITE INTERPRETATION WOULD LEAD TO THE INADMISSIBLE RESULT THAT SOME AGREEMENTS WOULD ALREADY HAVE BEEN AUTOMATICALLY VOID FOR SEVERAL YEARS WITHOUT HAVING BEEN SO DECLARED BY ANY AUTHORITY, AND EVEN THOUGH THEY MIGHT ULTIMATELY BE VALIDATED SUBSEQUENTLY WITH RETROACTIVE EFFECT.
+IN GENERAL IT WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF LEGAL CERTANTY - A RULE OF LAW TO BE UPHELD IN THE APPLICATION OF THE TREATY - TO RENDER AGREEMENTS AUTOMATICALLY VOID BEFORE IT IS EVEN POSSIBLE TO TELL WHICH ARE THE AGREEMENTS TO WHICH ARTICLE 85 AS A WHOLE APPLIES.
+MOREOVER, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TEXT OF ARTICLE 85 (2), WHICH IN REFERRING TO AGREEMENTS OR DECISIONs' pROHIBITED PURSUANT TO THIS ARTICLE'sEEMS TO REGARD ARTICLES 85 (1) AND (3) AS FORMING AN INDIVISIBLE WHOLE, THIS COURT IS BOUND TO ADMIT THAT UP TO THE TIME OF ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE FIRST REGULATION IMPLEMENTING ARTICLES 85 AND 86, THE NULLIFYING PROVISIONS HAD OPERATED ONLY IN RESPECT OF AGREEMENTS AND DECISIONS WHICH THE AUTHORITIES OF THE MEMBER STATES, ON THE BASIS OF ARTICLE 88, HAVE EXPRESSLY HELD TO FALL UNDER ARTICLE 85 (1), AND NOT TO QUALIFY FOR EXEMPTION UNDER 85 (3), OR IN RESPECT OF WHICH THE COMMISSION HAS TAKEN THE DECISION ENVISAGED BY ARTICLE 89 (2).
+AS THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE HAGUE WAS NOT ABLE TO STATE PRECISELY IN ITS REFERENCE TO THIS COURT THE RELEVANT DATE TO BE TAKEN IN ORDER TO DETERMINE THE POSSIBLE NULLITY OF THE AGREEMENT IN QUESTION, IT IS NECESSARY ALSO TO EXAMINE THIS QUESTION IN RESPECT OF THE PERIOD FOLLOWING THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE REGULATION.
+AGREEMENTS AND DECISIONS IN EXISTENCE AT THE DATE OF ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THIS REGULATION ARE NOT ANNULLED AUTOMATICALLY BY THE MERE FACT THAT THEY FALL WITHIN THE AMBIT OF ARTICLE 85 (1).
+SUCH AGREEMENTS AND DECISIONS MUST BE CONSIDERED VALID INSOFAR AS THEY FALL WITHIN ARTICLE 5 (2) OF THE REGULATION;
+THEY MUST BE CONSIDERED AS PROVISIONALLY VALID WHEN, ALTHOUGH NOT EXCEPTED BY OPERATION OF THAT PROVISION, THEY ARE NOTIFIED IN TIME TO THE COMMISSION IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 5 (1) OF THE SAID REGULATION.
+THIS VALIDITY IS NOT DEFINITIVE SINCE ARTICLE 85 (2) OPERATES TO MAKE AGREEMENTS AUTOMATICALLY VOID WHEN THE AUTHORITIES OF MEMBER STATES EXERCISE THE POWERS CONFERRED ON THEM BY ARTICLE 88 OF THE TREATY, AND MAINTAINED UNDER ARTICLE 9 OF THE REGULATION, TO APPLY ARTICLE 85 (1), AND TO DECLARE CERTAIN AGREEMENTS AND DECISIONS TO BE PROHIBITED.
+THE REFUSAL OF THE COMMISSION, MOREOVER, TO ISSUE A DECLARATION UNDER ARTICLE 85 (3) IN RESPECT OF AGREEMENTS AND DECISIONS FALLING WITHIN THAT ARTICLE, INVOLVES THEIR AUTOMATIC NULLITY AS FROM THE DATE OF ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE SAID REGULATION.
+NONETHELESS, EVEN IF THE AGREEMENT OR DECISION DOES NOT QUALIFY FOR EXEMPTION UNDER ARTICLE 85 (3), THE COMMISSION IS GIVEN A DISCRETION UNDER ARTICLE 7 OF THE REGULATION TO DECLARE THE PROHIBITION, IMPOSED BY ARTICLE 85 - THAT IS TO SAY, THE AUTOMATIC NULLITY - OPERATIVE ONLY UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE PARTIES MAY WITHDRAW OR AMEND SUCH AGREEMENT OR DECISION.
+THIS PROVISION OF ARTICLE 7 OF THE REGULATION CAN BE UNDERSTOOD ONLY ON THE BASIS THAT AGREEMENTS AND DECISIONS SHALL NOT BE AUTOMATICALLY VOID AS LONG AS THE COMMISSION HAS NOT REACHED A DECISION WITH REGARD TO THEM, OR UNLESS THE AUTHORITIES OF MEMBER STATES HAVE DECIDED THAT ARTICLE 85 IS APPLICABLE.
+THE REQUEST FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE HAGUE IS CONCERNED WITH THE QUESTION WHETHER THE RESTRICTION ON EXPORT IMPOSED BY THE PLAINTIFF, ROBERT BOSCH GMBH OF STUTTGART, ON AND ACCEPTED BY ITS CUSTOMERS, FALLS UNDER ARTICLE 85 (1) OF THE TREATY.
+THIS QUESTION CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS A PURE QUESTION OF INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY, SINCE THE DOCUMENT IN WHICH THIS SUMMARILY DESCRIBED RESTRICTION ON EXPORT APPEARS HAS NOT BEEN LAID BEFORE THIS COURT.
+THIS COURT CAN ACCORDINGLY MAKE NO DECISION WITHOUT A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF THE FACTS, AND THE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO CONDUCT SUCH AN INVESTIGATION WHEN PROCEEDING UNDER ARTICLE 177 OF THE TREATY.
+IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THIS COURT MUST CONFINE ITSELF TO RECORDING ITS OPINION THAT IT CANNOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE RESTRICTIONS ON EXPORT REFERRED TO BY THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE HAGUE COME WITHIN THE DEFINITION OF ARTICLE 85 (1), AND, MORE PARTICULARLY, WITHIN THE WORDs' aGREEMENTS... WHICH MAY AFFECT TRADE BETWEEN MEMBER STATEs'.
+MOREOVER, IF THESE RESTRICTIONS FALL UNDER ARTICLE 85 (1), IT CANNOT BE ADMITTED WITHOUT FURTHER ENQUIRY THAT ARTICLE 4 (2) OF THE FIRST REGULATION IMPLEMENTING ARTICLES 85 AND 86 OF THE TREATY IS APPLICABLE TO THEM IN SUCH A WAY THAT THEY MAY BE EXEMPTED FROM NOTIFICATION UNDER ARTICLE 5 (2) AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE HELD VALID.
+ACCORDING TO ARTICLE 4 (2) (1) OF THE REGULATION, AGREEMENTS RELATING TO IMPORTS OR EXPORTS BETWEEN MEMBER STATES CANNOT IN FACT QUALIFY FOR EXEMPTION FROM NOTIFICATION WHILE A RESTRICTION ON EXPORT HAS EFFECTS OTHER THAN THOSE REFERRED TO BY ARTICLE 4 (2) (3).
+Decision on costs
+THE COSTS INCURRED BY THE EEC COMMISSION AND BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF MEMBER STATES WHICH HAVE SUBMITTED THEIR OBSERVATIONS TO THIS COURT ARE NOT RECOVERABLE.
+WITH REGARD TO THE PARTIES, THE PROCEEDINGS IN THIS CASE ARE A STEP IN THE ACTION PENDING BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE HAGUE. THE DECISION AS TO COSTS IS THEREFORE A MATTER FOR THAT COURT.
+THE COURT
+IN ANSWER TO THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING UNDER ARTICLE 177 OF THE EEC TREATY, SUBMITTED BY THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE HAGUE BY LETTER DATED 10 JULY 1961, HEREBY RULES:
+1. UNTIL THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE REGULATION ENVISAGED BY ARTICLE 87 TOGETHER WITH ARTICLE 85 (3) OF THE TREATY, ARTICLE 85 (2) IS APPLICABLE ONLY TO THOSE AGREEMENTS AND DECISIONS WHICH THE AUTHORITIES OF THE MEMBER STATES, ACTING UNDER ARTICLE 88 OF THE TREATY, HAVE EXPRESSLY DECLARED TO COME WITHIN ARTICLE 85 (1) AND TO BE INELIGIBLE FOR EXEMPTION UNDER ARTICLE 85 (3), OR TO THOSE AGREEMENTS WHICH THE COMMISSION, BY DECISION UNDER ARTICLE 89 (2), HAS HELD TO BE CONTRARY TO ARTICLE 85.
+2. OTHER AGREEMENTS AND DECISIONS WHICH FALL WITHIN THE PROHIBITION OF ARTICLE 85 (1) AND WHICH WERE IN EXISTENCE AT THE TIME OF ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE FIRST REGULATION IMPLEMENTING ARTICLES 85 AND 86 OF THE TREATY ARE NOT TO BE CONSIDERED AUTOMATICALLY VOID PROVIDED THEY WERE NOTIFIED TO THE COMMISSION WITHIN THE TIME LIMIT SPECIFIED IN ARTICLE 5 OF THAT REGULATION EXCEPT IN SO FAR AS THE COMMISSION DECIDES THAT THEY CANNOT BE MADE THE SUBJECT EITHER OF A DECISION REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 85 (3) OR OF AN APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 7 (1) OF THE REGULATION, OR EXCEPT IN SO FAR AS THE AUTHORITIES OF MEMBER STATES DECIDE TO EXERCISE THE POWERS CONFERRED ON THEM BY ARTICLE 88 OF THE TREATY TOGETHER WITH ARTICLE 9 OF THE SAID REGULATION.
+3. AGREEMENTS AND DECISIONS PROHIBITED BY ARTICLE 85 (1), WHICH WERE IN EXISTENCE AT THE TIME OF ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE FIRST REGULATION IMPLEMENTING ARTICLES 85 AND 86 OF THE TREATY BUT DID NOT FALL UNDER ARTICLE 5 (2) AND WERE NOT NOTIFIED TO THE COMMISSION WITHIN THE TIME LIMIT SPECIFIED IN ARTICLE 5 (1) OF THAT REGULATION, ARE AUTOMATICALLY VOID FROM THE TIME OF ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THAT REGULATION.
+4. THE REMAINDER OF THE REQUEST CANNOT BE THE SUBJECT OF A PRELIMINARY RULING.
+5. COSTS ARE A MATTER FOR THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE HAGUE.

data/principle-mvep-justice-court/mvep-099-hr.aligned.txt

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+U predmetu C-13/61,
+povodom zahtjeva za prethodnu odluku koji je odlukom od 20. lipnja 1961. (101 R/60) uputio Cour d’appel u Hagu, drugo vijeće (Žalbeni sud, Nizozemska), u postupku
+društva Kledingverkoopbedrijf de Geus en Uitdenbogerd, sa sjedištem u Rotterdamu, koje zastupa odvjetnik P. H. Hoogenbergh, tužitelj,
+protiv
+1. društva osnovanog u skladu s njemačkim pravom Robert Bosch GmbH, sa sjedištem u Stuttgartu, i
+2. dioničkog društva Maatschappij tot voortzetting van de zaken der Firma Willem van Rijn, sa sjedištem u Amsterdamu, koja zastupa odvjetnik J. F. A. Verzijl, tuženikâ,
+o pitanju je li zabrana izvoza koju je društvo Robert Bosch GmbH sa sjedištem u Stuttgartu nametnulo svojim kupcima i koju su oni prihvatili ugovorom, ništava na temelju članka 85. stavka 2. Ugovora o EEZ-u, što se tiče izvoza u Nizozemsku, SUD,
+Presudu A – Nadležnost Suda
+Stranke Bosch i Van Rijn te vlada Francuske Republike izrazile su sumnju o tome može li Cour d’appel u Hagu (Žalbeni sud) uputiti zahtjev za prethodnu odluku zbog činjenice da je protiv presude u kojoj je formuliran ovaj zahtjev podnesena žalba u kasacijskom postupku.
+Ta sumnja proizlazi iz tumačenja članka 177. Ugovora o EEZ-u prema kojem se zahtjev za prethodnu odluku može uputiti samo ako je odluka ili presuda u kojoj je zahtjev formuliran postala pravomoćna.
+Ovo tumačenje članka 177. nije potvrđeno njegovim odredbama. Osim toga, u takvom tumačenju zanemaruje se činjenica da su nacionalno pravo suda koji upućuje zahtjev za prethodnu odluku i pravo Zajednice dva zasebna i različita pravna poretka.
+Naime, kao što Ugovor nacionalnom kasacijskom sudu ne zabranjuje odlučivanje o žalbi već ispitivanje dopuštenosti prepušta nacionalnom pravu i ocjeni nacionalnog suda, tako se u Ugovoru i nadležnost Suda uvjetuje samo postojanjem zahtjeva u smislu članka 177., bez potrebe da sud Zajednice ispita je li odluka nacionalnog suda, u skladu s odredbama njegovog nacionalnog prava, postala pravomoćna.
+Stranke Bosch i Van Rijn te vlada Francuske Republike zatim smatraju da Cour d’appel u Hagu (Žalbeni sud) ne može uputiti zahtjev za prethodnu odluku zato što se taj zahtjev ne ograničava samo na pitanje tumačenja u smislu članka 177. već u stvarnosti, kako je to navedeno u njegovom tekstu, poziva Sud da donese odluku o pitanju koje se odnosi na primjenu Ugovora na određen slučaj.
+Međutim, Ugovor ni izričito ni implicitno ne predviđa u kojem obliku nacionalni sud mora podnijeti svoj zahtjev za prethodnu odluku.
+Budući da značenje izraza „tumačenje Ugovora” iz članka 177. samo po sebi može biti predmet tumačenja, nacionalni sud može formulirati svoj zahtjev u izravnom i jednostavnom obliku koji Sudu omogućava da o tom zahtjevu donese odluku samo u granicama svoje nadležnosti tj. samo u mjeri u kojoj se zahtjev odnosi na tumačenje Ugovora.
+Budući da je ovaj zahtjev formuliran izravnim riječima, to omogućava da se iz njega jasno utvrde pitanja o tumačenju koja taj zahtjev sadržava.
+Vlada Francuske Republike još tvrdi da sve dok se ne donesu uredbe iz članka 87. Ugovora, Sud ne može odlučivati o tumačenju članka 85. jer je njegova primjena dotad u nadležnosti isključivo nacionalnih tijela.
+Ta se argumentacija ne može prihvatiti.
+Čak i uz pretpostavku da je primjena članka 85. i sljedećih članaka Ugovora u nadležnosti nacionalnih tijela, ostaje činjenica da se članak 177. koji se odnosi na tumačenje Ugovora i dalje primjenjuje, tako da je, ovisno o slučaju, nacionalnom sudu dopušteno, ili je dužan, zatražiti prethodnu odluku.
+Takav zaključak opravdavaju i tekst i smisao članka 177. Naime, s jedne strane ta odredba ne sadržava nikakvu rezervu u pogledu članka 85. i sljedećih, dok je s druge strane usklađivanje sudske prakse kako je predviđeno člankom 177. osobito potrebno u slučajevima kada je primjena Ugovora povjerena nacionalnim tijelima.
+Sud je dakle nadležan, u smislu članka 177. Ugovora, odlučivati o ovom zahtjevu za prethodnu odluku.
+B – Meritum
+Cour d’appel u Hagu (Žalbeni sud) u odluci kojom upućuje prethodno pitanje pita primjenjuje li se članak 85. od stupanja Ugovora na snagu.
+U načelu odgovor je potvrdan.
+Članci 88. i 89. Ugovora, koji nadležnost za primjenu članka 85. dodjeljuju nacionalnim tijelima, odnosno Komisiji, pretpostavljaju primjenjivost te odredbe odmah od stupanja Ugovora na snagu.
+Međutim, članci 88. i 89. nisu takve naravi da mogu osigurati potpunu i dosljednu primjenu članka 85. i sâmo njihovo postojanje nije dostatno da se zaključi da članak 85. proizvodi sve svoje učinke od stupanja Ugovora na snagu, a osobito, da automatska ništavost predviđena u stavku 2. tog članka nastaje u svim slučajevima koji potpadaju pod definiciju iz stavka 1., a koji još nisu proglašeni [ neprimjenjivima] u skladu sa stavkom 3.
+Naime, članak 88. predviđa da tijela država članica odlučuju o dopuštenosti zabranjenih sporazumâ samo ako potonji podliježu njihovom odobrenju sukladno važećem pravu njihove zemlje koje uređuje tržišno natjecanje.
+Članak 89., iako Komisiji dodjeljuje opću nadležnost za nadzor i kontrolu, daje joj samo ovlast za utvrđivanje eventualnih povreda članaka 85. i 86., bez nadležnosti za davanje proglašenja u smislu članka 85. stavka 3.
+Konačno, nijedan od ta dva članka ne sadržava odredbe o prijelaznom uređenju za zabranjene sporazume koji postoje u trenutku stupanja Ugovora na snagu.
+Nadalje, valja utvrditi da su autori Prve uredbe o provedbi članaka 85. i 86. (Službeni list, str. 204/62) (SL, posebno izdanje na hrvatskom jeziku, poglavlje 8., svezak 3., stranica 3.) preuzeli isto stajalište.
+Naime, iz zajedničke primjene odredaba članka 6. stavka 2. i članka 5. stavka 1. te uredbe proizlazi da Komisija još uvijek može davati izjave na temelju članka 85. stavka 3. za zabranjene sporazume koji postoje prije stupanja na snagu navedene uredbe i da joj je dopušteno tim izjavama dati retroaktivan učinak čak i ranije od datuma obavijesti o zabranjenom sporazumu.
+Iz toga slijedi da su autori uredbe također predvidjeli da u trenutku stupanja na snagu navedene uredbe postoje zabranjeni sporazumi na koje se primjenjuje članak 85. stavak 1., ali u odnosu na koje još nije donesena odluka u smislu stavka 3., a da ti sporazumi zbog toga nisu automatski ništavi.
+Suprotno tumačenje dovelo bi do nedopustive posljedice da određeni zabranjeni sporazumi najprije tijekom nekoliko godina budu ništavi, a da nijedno tijelo nikada ne utvrdi tu ništavost, i ona se kasnije izbriše s retroaktivnim učinkom.
+Općenitije, bilo bi protivno općem načelu pravne sigurnosti – pravnom pravilu koje u primjeni Ugovora treba poštovati – da se propiše da su određeni sporazumi automatski ništavi čak i prije nego što se može znati, dakle utvrditi, na koje se sporazume primjenjuje cijeli članak 85.
+Tako – sukladno tekstu članka 85. stavka 2. za koji se kada spominje sporazume ili odluke „zabranjene na temelju ovog članka” , prvi i treći stavak navedenog članka smatraju nedjeljivom cjelinom – valja priznati da se do stupanja na snagu Prve uredbe o provedbi članaka 85. i 86. Ugovora automatska ništavost odnosila samo na sporazume i odluke za koje su tijela država članica na temelju članka 88. smatrala da potpadaju pod područje primjene članka 85. stavka 1. i na koje se ne može primijeniti izuzeće zabrane u smislu članka 85. stavka 3. ili u odnosu na koje je Komisija donijela odluku predviđenu člankom 89. stavkom 2.
+Budući da Cour d’appel u Hagu (Žalbeni sud) u svojem zahtjevu za prethodnu odluku nije precizirao koje se razdoblje treba razmatrati da bi se odlučilo o eventualnoj ništavosti dotičnog sporazuma, to pitanje treba ispitati i u odnosu na razdoblje koje slijedi nakon stupanja uredbe na snagu.
+Što se tiče sporazuma i odluka koji postoje u trenutku stupanja na snagu te uredbe, automatska ništavost za njih ne vrijedi zbog puke činjenice da potpadaju pod područje primjene članka 85. stavka 1.
+Ti sporazumi i odluke moraju se smatrati valjanima ako potpadaju pod područje primjene članka 5. stavka 2. navedene uredbe.
+Oni se moraju smatrati privremeno valjanima kada je, iako nisu obuhvaćeni tom odredbom, Komisija o njima obaviještena u skladu s člankom 5. stavkom 1. navedene uredbe.
+Ta valjanost nije konačna jer automatska ništavost iz članka 85. stavka 2. nastupa kada tijela država članica izvršavaju nadležnost, koja im je dodijeljena člankom 88. Ugovora i koju zadržava članak 9. navedene uredbe, za primjenu članka 85. stavka 1. i za proglašenje određenih sporazuma i odluka zabranjenima.
+Štoviše, Komisijino odbijanje da donese odluku u smislu članka 85. stavka 3. o sporazumima i odlukama koji potpadaju pod područje primjene tog članka, dovodi do njihove ništavosti od dana stupanja na snagu navedene uredbe.
+Međutim, odredbe članka 7. te uredbe Komisiji daju mogućnost – čak ako sporazum ili odluka ne mogu biti izuzeti od zabrane primjenom članka 85. stavka 3. – da učinak zabrane iz članka 85. tj. automatsku ništavost ograniči na neko određeno razdoblje kada su dotične stranke voljne raskinuti ili izmijeniti te sporazume ili odluke.
+Odredba članka 7. navedene uredbe može se opravdati samo na temelju činjenice da nema automatske ništavosti sporazuma i odluka sve dok Komisija ne donese odluku o sporazumima i odlukama o kojima je obaviještena ili dok tijela država članica ne utvrde da je članak 85. primjenjiv.
+Cour d’appel u Hagu (Žalbeni sud) u svojem zahtjevu pita potpada li zabrana izvoza koju je društvo Robert Bosch sa sjedištem u Stuttgartu nametnulo svojim kupcima i koju su oni prihvatili ugovorom, pod područje primjene članka 85. stavka 1. Ugovora.
+To se pitanje ne može smatrati isključivo pitanjem o tumačenju Ugovora jer kontekst u kojem se ta zabrana javlja nije predočen Sudu i on o tome ne može odlučivati bez prethodnog ispitivanja činjenica.
+Takvo ispitivanje nije u nadležnosti Suda kada odlučuje na temelju članka 177. Ugovora.
+U tim okolnostima Sud se mora ograničiti na to da utvrdi kako nije isključeno da zabrane izvoza koje spominje Cour d’appel (Žalbeni sud) potpadaju pod definiciju iz članka 85. stavka 1. i da se na njih osobito može primijeniti tekst: „sporazumi [...] koji bi mogli utjecati na trgovinu među državama članicama [...]”.
+Štoviše, ako te zabrane potpadaju pod područje primjene članka 85. stavka 1., ne može se automatski prihvatiti da se članak 4. stavak 2. Prve uredbe o provedbi članaka 85. i 86. Ugovora na njih primijeni tako da na temelju članka 5. stavka 2. te uredbe zabrane budu izuzete od obveze obavješćivanja pa se stoga trebaju smatrati valjanima.
+Naime, prema članku 4. stavku 2. podstavku (1) sporazumi o uvozu ili izvozu među državama članicama ne ostvaruju pravo izuzeća od obveze obavješćivanja dok zabrana izvoza ima učinke koji su drukčiji od onih iz članka 4. stavka 2. podstavka (2) i drukčiju svrhu od onih predviđenih u podstavku (3) te odredbe.
+C - Troškovi
+Troškovi Komisije Europske ekonomske zajednice i vlada država članica koje su Sudu podnijele očitovanja, ne nadoknađuju se.
+Budući da ovaj postupak ima značaj prethodnog pitanja za stranke u postupku koji se vodi pred Cour d’appel u Hagu (Žalbeni sud), na tom je sudu da odluči o troškovima postupka.
+SUD,
+o zahtjevu za prethodnu odluku u smislu članka 177. Ugovora o EEZ-u, koji mu je dopisom od 10. srpnja 1961. uputio Cour d’appel u Hagu (Žalbeni sud), odlučuje:
+1. Do stupanja na snagu uredbe iz članka 87., u vezi s člankom 85. stavkom 3. Ugovora, članak 85. stavak 2. Ugovora proizvodi učinke samo u odnosu na sporazume i odluke za koje su na temelju članka 88. Ugovora tijela država članica izričito odlučila da potpadaju pod područje primjene članka 85. stavka 1. i da se na njih ne može primijeniti izuzeće iz stavka 3. ili za koje je Komisija odlukom donesenom na temelju članka 89. stavka 2. utvrdila da su protivni članku 85.
+2. Ostali sporazumi i odluke na koje se primjenjuje zabrana iz članka 85. stavka 1. i koji postoje na dan stupanja na snagu Prve uredbe o provedbi članaka 85. i 86. Ugovora ne trebaju se smatrati automatski ništavim ako je obavijest o njima pravodobno dostavljena sukladno članku 5. te uredbe, osim u mjeri u kojoj Komisija odluči da se o njima ne može donijeti odluka predviđena člankom 85. stavkom 3. niti se može primijeniti članak 7. stavak 1. uredbe ili ako tijela država članica odluče izvršiti ovlasti koje imaju na temelju članka 88. Ugovora, u vezi s člankom 9. navedene uredbe.
+3. Sporazumi i odluke zabranjeni člankom 85. stavkom 1. koji su postojali na dan stupanja na snagu Prve uredbe o provedbi članaka 85. i 86. Ugovora, ali nisu potpadali pod područje primjene članka 5. stavka 2. i o njima nije pravodobno dostavljena obavijest sukladno članku 5. stavku 1. te uredbe, automatski su ništavi od dana stupanja na snagu te uredbe.
+4. O preostalom dijelu zahtjeva ne može se uputi zahtjev za prethodnu odluku.
+5. Cour d’appel u Hagu (Žalbeni sud) odlučuje o snošenju troškova ovog postupka.

data/principle-mvep-justice-court/mvep-100-en.aligned.txt

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+IN JOINED CASES 16 AND 17/62
+16/62 1. CONFEDERATION NATIONALE DES PRODUCTEURS DE FRUITS ET LEGUMES, AN ASSOCIATION DECLAREE WITH ITS HEAD OFFICE IN PARIS, REPRESENTED BY ITS BOARD IN OFFICE,
+2. FEDERATION NATIONALE DES PRODUCTEURS DE FRUITS, AN ASSOCIATION DECLAREE WITH ITS HEAD OFFICE IN PARIS, REPRESENTED BY ITS BOARD IN OFFICE,
+3. FEDERATION NATIONALE DES PRODUCTEURS DE LEGUMES, AN ASSOCIATION DECLAREE WITH ITS HEAD OFFICE IN PARIS, REPRESENTED BY ITS BOARD IN OFFICE, 17/62
+FEDERATION NATIONALE DES PRODUCTEURS DE RAISINS DE TABLE, REPRESENTED BY ITS BOARD IN OFFICE,
+ALL WITH AN ADDRESS FOR SERVICE IN LUXEMBOURG AT THE CHAMBERS OF GEORGES MARGUE, 20 RUE PHILIPPE-II, ASSISTED BY PIERRE DE FONT-REAULX, ADVOCATE OF THE PARIS COUR D'APPEL, APPLICANTS,
+SUPPORTED BY ASSEMBLEE PERMANENTE DES PRESIDENTS DE CHAMBRES D'AGRICULTURE, A PUBLIC ORGANIZATION WITH ITS HEAD OFFICE IN PARIS, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT IN OFFICE, WITH AN ADDRESS FOR SERVICE IN LUXEMBOURG AT THE CHAMBERS OF GEORGES MARGUE, 20 RUE PHILIPPE-II, ASSISTED BY PIERRE DE FONT-REAULX, ADVOCATE OF THE PARIS COUR D'APPEL, INTERVENER,
+V
+COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, REPRESENTED BY ITS LEGAL ADVISER, JACQUES MEGRET, ACTING AS AGENT,
+DEFENDANT,
+APPLICATION FOR ANNULMENT OF REGULATION N. 23 OF THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, AND IN PARTICULAR THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 9 THEREOF,
+I - AS TO ADMISSIBILITY
+1. UNDER THE TERMS OF THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 173 OF THE EEC TREATY, ANY NATURAL OR LEGAL PERSON MAY INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST AN ACT OF THE COMMISSION OR THE COUNCIL ONLY IF THAT ACT CONSTITUTES EITHER A DECISION ADDRESSED TO THAT PERSON OR A DECISION WHICH, ALTHOUGH IN THE FORM OF A REGULATION OR A DECISION ADDRESSED TO ANOTHER PERSON, IS OF DIRECT AND INDIVIDUAL CONCERN TO THE FORMER.
+IT FOLLOWS THAT SUCH A PERSON IS NOT ENTITLED TO MAKE AN APPLICATION FOR ANNULMENT OF REGULATIONS ADOPTED BY THE COUNCIL OR THE COMMISSION.
+THE COURT ADMITS THAT THE SYSTEM THUS ESTABLISHED BY THE TREATIES OF ROME LAYS DOWN MORE RESTRICTIVE CONDITIONS THAN DOES THE ECSC TREATY FOR THE ADMISSIBILITY OF APPLICATIONS FOR ANNULMENT BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS.
+HOWEVER, IT WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE FOR THE COURT TO PRONOUNCE ON THE MERITS OF THIS SYSTEM WHICH APPEARS CLEARLY FROM THE TEXT UNDER EXAMINATION.
+THE COURT IS UNABLE IN PARTICULAR TO ADOPT THE INTERPRETATION SUGGESTED BY ONE OF THE APPLICANTS DURING THE ORAL PROCEDURE, ACCORDING TO WHICH THE TERM 'DECISION', AS USED IN THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 173, COULD ALSO COVER REGULATIONS.
+SUCH A WIDE INTERPRETATION CONFLICTS WITH THE FACT THAT ARTICLE 189 MAKES A CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE CONCEPT OF A 'DECISION' AND THAT OF A 'REGULATION'.
+IT IS INCONCEIVABLE THAT THE TERM 'DECISION' WOULD BE USED IN ARTICLE 173 IN A DIFFERENT SENSE FROM THE TECHNICAL SENSE AS DEFINED IN ARTICLE 189.
+IT FOLLOWS FROM THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS THAT THE PRESENT APPLICATIONS SHOULD BE DISMISSED AS INADMISSIBLE IF THE MEASURE IN DISPUTE CONSTITUTES A REGULATION.
+IN EXAMINING THIS QUESTION, THE COURT CANNOT RESTRICT ITSELF TO CONSIDERING THE OFFICIAL TITLE OF THE MEASURE, BUT MUST FIRST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ITS OBJECT AND CONTENT.
+2. UNDER THE TERMS OF ARTICLE 189 OF THE EEC TREATY, A REGULATION SHALL HAVE GENERAL APPLICATION AND SHALL BE DIRECTLY APPLICABLE IN ALL MEMBER STATES, WHEREAS A DECISION SHALL BE BINDING ONLY UPON THOSE TO WHOM IT IS ADDRESSED.
+THE CRITERION FOR THE DISTINCTION MUST BE SOUGHT IN THE GENERAL 'APPLICATION' OR OTHERWISE OF THE MEASURE IN QUESTION.
+THE ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF A DECISION ARISE FROM THE LIMITATION OF THE PERSONS TO WHOM IT IS ADDRESSED, WHEREAS A REGULATION, BEING ESSENTIALLY OF A LEGISLATIVE NATURE, IS APPLICABLE NOT TO A LIMITED NUMBER OF PERSONS, DEFINED OR IDENTIFIABLE, BUT TO CATEGORIES OF PERSONS VIEWED ABSTRACTLY AND IN THEIR ENTIRETY.
+CONSEQUENTLY, IN ORDER TO DETERMINE IN DOUBTFUL CASES WHETHER ONE IS CONCERNED WITH A DECISION OR A REGULATION, IT IS NECESSARY TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE MEASURE IN QUESTION IS OF INDIVIDUAL CONCERN TO SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALS.
+IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, IF A MEASURE ENTITLED BY ITS AUTHOR A REGULATION CONTAINS PROVISIONS WHICH ARE CAPABLE OF BEING NOT ONLY OF DIRECT BUT ALSO OF INDIVIDUAL CONCERN TO CERTAIN NATURAL OR LEGAL PERSONS, IT MUST BE ADMITTED, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE QUESTION WHETHER THAT MEASURE CONSIDERED IN ITS ENTIRETY CAN BE CORRECTLY CALLED A REGULATION, THAT IN ANY CASE THOSE PROVISIONS DO NOT HAVE THE CHARACTER OF A REGULATION AND MAY THEREFORE BE IMPUGNED BY THOSE PERSONS UNDER THE TERMS OF THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 173.
+3. IN THIS CASE THE MEASURE IN DISPUTE WAS ENTITLED BY ITS AUTHOR A 'REGULATION'.
+HOWEVER, THE APPLICANTS MAINTAIN THAT THE DISPUTED PROVISION IS IN FACT'A DECISION IN THE FORM OF A REGULATION'.
+IT IS POSSIBLE WITHOUT DOUBT FOR A DECISION ALSO TO HAVE A VERY WIDE FIELD OF APPLICATION.
+HOWEVER, A MEASURE WHICH IS APPLICABLE TO OBJECTIVELY DETERMINED SITUATIONS AND WHICH INVOLVES IMMEDIATE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES IN ALL MEMBER STATES FOR CATEGORIES OF PERSONS VIEWED IN A GENERAL AND ABSTRACT MANNER CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS CONSTITUTING A DECISION, UNLESS IT CAN BE PROVED THAT IT IS OF INDIVIDUAL CONCERN TO CERTAIN PERSONS WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 173.
+IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE, THE DISPUTED PROVISION INVOLVES IMMEDIATE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES IN ALL MEMBER STATES FOR CATEGORIES OF PERSONS VIEWED IN A GENERAL AND ABSTRACT MANNER.
+IN FACT, ARTICLE 9 OF THE MEASURE IN DISPUTE - THE PROVISION PARTICULARLY AT ISSUE IN THE PRESENT DISPUTE - ABOLISHES, FOR CERTAIN PRODUCTS AND SUBJECT TO CERTAIN TIME LIMITS, QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS AND MEASURES HAVING EQUIVALENT EFFECT.
+IT INVOLVES IN ADDITION THE REQUIREMENT THAT MEMBER STATES SHALL DISPENSE WITH RECOURSE TO THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 44 OF THE TREATY, IN PARTICULAR WITH REGARD TO THE RIGHT TEMPORARILY TO SUSPEND OR REDUCE IMPORTS.
+CONSEQUENTLY, THE SAID ARTICLE ELIMINATES THE RESTRICTIONS ON THE FREEDOM OF TRADERS TO EXPORT OR IMPORT WITHIN THE COMMUNITY.
+IT REMAINS TO BE CONSIDERED WHETHER THE DISPUTED PROVISION IS OF INDIVIDUAL CONCERN TO THE APPLICANTS.
+ALTHOUGH THIS PROVISION, BY OBLIGING MEMBER STATES TO PUT AN END TO OR TO DISPENSE WITH VARIOUS MEASURES CAPABLE OF FAVOURING AGRICULTURAL PRODUCERS, AFFECTS IN SO DOING THEIR INTERESTS AND THE INTERESTS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE APPLICANT ASSOCIATIONS, IT MUST BE STATED NEVERTHELESS THAT THOSE MEMBERS ARE CONCERNED BY THE SAID PROVISION IN THE SAME WAY AS ALL OTHER AGRICULTURAL PRODUCERS OF THE COMMUNITY.
+MOREOVER, ONE CANNOT ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE THAT AN ASSOCIATION, IN ITS CAPACITY AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF A CATEGORY OF BUSINESSMEN, COULD BE INDIVIDUALLY CONCERNED BY A MEASURE AFFECTING THE GENERAL INTERESTS OF THAT CATEGORY.
+SUCH A PRINCIPLE WOULD RESULT IN THE GROUPING, UNDER THE HEADING OF A SINGLE LEGAL PERSON, OF THE INTERESTS PROPERLY ATTRIBUTED TO THE MEMBERS OF A CATEGORY, WHO HAVE BEEN AFFECTED AS INDIVIDUALS BY GENUINE REGULATIONS, AND WOULD DEROGATE FROM THE SYSTEM OF THE TREATY WHICH ALLOWS APPLICATIONS FOR ANNULMENT BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS ONLY OF DECISIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED TO THEM OR OF ACTS WHICH AFFECT THEM IN A SIMILAR MANNER.
+IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT CANNOT BE ADMITTED THAT THE PROVISION IN DISPUTE IS OF INDIVIDUAL CONCERN TO THE APPLICANTS.
+IT FOLLOWS THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS CORRECT IN DESIGNATING THE PROVISION IN QUESTION AS A REGULATION.
+THE PRELIMINARY OBJECTION OF INADMISSIBILITY IS THEREFORE WELL FOUNDED AND THE APPLICATIONS MUST BE DECLARED INADMISSIBLE, WITHOUT ITS BEING NECESSARY TO EXAMINE THE QUESTION WHETHER ASSOCIATIONS ARE ENTITLED TO ACT EACH TIME THEIR MEMBERS ARE ENABLED TO DO SO.
+Decision on costs
+UNDER THE TERMS OF ARTICLE 69 (2) OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE COURT THE UNSUCCESSFUL PARTY SHALL BE ORDERED TO PAY THE COSTS.
+IN THE PRESENT CASE THE APPLICANTS AND THE INTERVENER, HAVING FAILED IN THEIR ACTION, MUST BEAR THE COSTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS.
+THE COURT
+HEREBY
+1. DISMISSES THE APPLICATIONS AS BEING INADMISSIBLE;
+2. ORDERS THE APPLICANTS TO BEAR THEIR OWN COSTS AND THOSE INCURRED BY THE DEFENDANT AS A RESULT OF THEIR APPLICATIONS;
+3. ORDERS THE INTERVENER TO BEAR ITS OWN COSTS AND THOSE INCURRED BY THE DEFENDANT AS A RESULT OF ITS INTERVENTION.

data/principle-mvep-justice-court/mvep-100-hr.aligned.txt

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+U spojenim predmetima
+1. Confédération nationale des producteurs de fruits et légumes, association déclarée sa sjedištem u Parizu, koji zastupa njegova trenutačna uprava,
+2. Fédération nationale des producteurs de fruits, association déclarée sa sjedištem u Parizu, koji zastupa njegova trenutačna uprava,
+3. Fédération nationale des producteurs de légumes, association déclarée sa sjedištem u Parizu, koji zastupa njegova trenutačna uprava,
+Fédération nationale des producteurs de raisins de table, koji zastupa njegova trenutačna uprava,
+svi s izabranom adresom za dostavu u Luxembourgu u uredu Georgesa Marguea, 20, rue Philippe-II, uz asistenciju Pierrea de Font-Réaulxa, odvjetnika Cour d ' appel de Paris (Žalbeni sud u Parizu), tužitelji, koje podupire
+Assemblée permanente des présidents de chambres d ' agriculture, javna organizacija sa sjedištem u Parizu, koju zastupa njezin trenutačni predsjednik, s izabranom adresom za dostavu u Luxembourgu u uredu Georgesa Marguea, 20, rue Philippe-II, uz asistenciju Pierrea de Font-Réaulxa, odvjetnika Cour d ' appel de Paris (Žalbeni sud u Parizu), intervenijent,
+protiv
+Vijeća Europske ekonomske zajednice, koje zastupa Jacques Mégret, pravni savjetnik, u svojstvu agenta,
+tuženika,
+povodom tužbe za poništenje Uredbe Vijeća Europske ekonomske zajednice br. 23, a posebno odredaba članka 9. te uredbe, SUD,
+donosi sljedeću
+Presudu I. – Dopuštenost 1 U skladu s člankom 173. drugim stavkom Ugovora o EEZ-u svaka fizička ili pravna osoba može podnijeti tužbu protiv akta Komisije ili Vijeća samo ako je taj akt odluka upućena toj osobi ili odluka koja se izravno i osobno na nju odnosi, iako je donesena u obliku uredbe ili odluke upućene drugoj osobi.
+Iz navedenoga proizlazi da takva osoba nema pravo podnijeti tužbu za poništenje uredaba Vijeća ili Komisije.
+Sud priznaje da se sustavom koji je tako uspostavljen Ugovorima iz Rima utvrđuju stroži uvjeti nego Ugovorom o EZUČ-u u vezi s dopuštenosti tužbi za poništenje koje podnose pojedinci.
+Međutim, nije na Sudu da odlučuje o vrijednostima tog sustava, koji jasno proizlazi iz teksta koji se ispituje.
+Sud osobito ne može donijeti tumačenje koje je jedan od tužitelja predložio tijekom usmenog dijela postupka, a u skladu s kojim bi izraz „odluka” , kako se upotrebljava u članku 173. drugom stavku, mogao obuhvaćati i uredbe.
+Takvo široko tumačenje protivi se činjenici da se u članku 189. pojam „odluka” jasno razlikuje od pojma „uredba”.
+Nezamislivo je da bi se pojam „odluka” u članku 173. upotrebljavao u drukčijem smislu nego u tehničkom smislu koji proizlazi iz članka 189.
+Iz prethodno navedenih razmatranja proizlazi da bi ove tužbe trebalo odbaciti kao nedopuštene ako je pobijani akt uredba.
+Pri ispitivanju tog pitanja Sud se ne može ograničiti na razmatranje službenog naslova akta, već prvo mora uzeti u obzir njegov cilj i sadržaj.
+2 U skladu s člankom 189. Ugovora o EEZ-u uredba ima opću primjenu i izravno se primjenjuje u svim državama članicama, dok je odluka obvezujuća samo za one kojima je upućena.
+Kriterij razlikovanja valja tražiti u općoj „primjeni” ili u predmetnom aktu.
+Bitne značajke odluke proizlaze iz ograničenja osoba kojima je upućena, dok se uredba, koja je u biti normativnog karaktera, ne primjenjuje na ograničeni broj utvrđenih osoba ili osoba koje se može utvrditi, već na kategorije osoba koje su određene apstraktno i u cijelosti.
+Stoga, kako bi se u slučajevima dvojbe utvrdilo je li riječ o odluci ili uredbi, valja provjeriti odnosi li se predmetni akt osobno na određene osobe.
+U tim okolnostima, ako akt koji je njegov autor označio kao uredbu sadržava odredbe koje se ne samo izravno već i osobno odnose na određene fizičke ili pravne osobe, valja priznati, ne dovodeći u pitanje može li se taj akt kao cjelina s pravom označiti kao uredba, da u svakom slučaj te odredbe nemaju karakter uredbe i stoga ih te osobe mogu pobijati na temelju članka 173. drugog stavka.
+3. U ovom slučaju autor je predmetni akt označio kao „uredbu”.
+Međutim, tužitelji tvrde da je pobijana odredba u stvarnosti „odluka u obliku uredbe”.
+Odluka bez sumnje može imati vrlo široko područje primjene.
+Međutim, akt koji se primjenjuje na objektivno utvrđene situacije i uključuje izravne pravne posljedice u svim državama članicama za kategorije osoba koje su određene općenito i apstraktno ne može se smatrati odlukom, osim ako se može dokazati da se osobno odnosi na određene osobe u smislu članka 173. drugog stavka.
+U ovom slučaju pobijana odredba uključuje izravne pravne posljedice u svim državama članicama za kategorije osoba koje su određene općenito i apstraktno.
+Člankom 9. pobijanog akta, odredbom o kojoj je osobito riječ u ovom sporu, za određene se proizvode ukidaju količinska ograničenja uvoza i mjere s istovrsnim učinkom unutar određenih rokova.
+Osim toga, on uključuje zahtjev da države članice ne primjenjuju odredbe članka 44. Ugovora, osobito u vezi s pravom na privremenu obustavu ili smanjenje uvoza.
+Stoga se navedenim člankom uklanjaju ograničenja slobode gospodarskih subjekata na izvoz ili uvoz unutar Zajednice.
+Valja još ispitati odnosi li se pobijana odredba osobno na tužitelje.
+Iako ta odredba utječe na interese poljoprivrednih proizvođača i interese članova udruženja tužitelja jer se njome države članice obvezuje da prestanu primjenjivati ili ukinu različite mjere kojima se može pogodovati tim proizvođačima, valja utvrditi da se navedena odredba na te članove odnosi na isti način kao na sve druge poljoprivredne proizvođače u Zajednici.
+Osim toga, ne može se prihvatiti načelo da bi se akt koji utječe na opće interese kategorije poduzetnika mogao osobno odnositi na udruženje u njegovu svojstvu predstavnika te kategorije.
+Takvo načelo dovelo bi do toga da su pod jednim pravnim subjektom objedinjeni interesi koji se pripisuju članovima kategorije, na koje kao pojedince utječu stvarne uredbe, te bi odstupalo od sustava Ugovora, kojim je privatnim osobama dopušteno da podnesu tužbu za poništenje samo protiv odluka koje su im upućene ili protiv akata koji na sličan način na njih utječu.
+U tim okolnostima ne može se prihvatiti da se sporna odredba osobno odnosi na tužitelje.
+Iz navedenoga proizlazi da je tuženik pobijanu odredbu s pravom označio kao uredbu.
+Stoga je prigovor nedopuštenosti osnovan i tužbe valja proglasiti nedopuštenima, pri čemu nije potrebno ispitati pitanje imaju li udruženja pravo postupati svaki put kad su njihovu članovi za to ovlašteni.
+II. – Troškovi
+U skladu s člankom 69. stavkom 2. Poslovnika Suda, stranka koja ne uspije u postupku dužna je snositi troškove.
+Budući da u ovom slučaju nisu uspjeli u svojoj tužbi, tužitelj i intervenijent snose troškove postupka.
+SUD,
+odbijajući sve druge šire ili protivne zahtjeve, proglašava i presuđuje:
+1. Tužbe se odbacuju kao nedopuštene.
+2. Tužiteljima se nalaže snošenje vlastitih troškova i troškova tuženika kao rezultat njihovih tužbi.
+3. Intervenijentu se nalaže snošenje vlastitih troškova i troškova tuženika kao rezultat njegove intervencije.

data/principle-mvep-justice-court/mvep-101-en.aligned.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+IN JOINED CASES 31/62 - MILCHWERKE HEINZ WOHRMANN & SOHN KG, WESEL/RHEIN,
+33/62 - ALFONS LUTTICKE GMBH, GERMINGHAUSEN/WESTPHALIA,
+REPRESENTED BY FRITZ MODEST, ARTUR HEEMANN, RENATE MENSSEN, JURGEN GUNDISCH, HEINZ BINDER, ADVOCATES OF THE HAMBURG BAR, WITH AN ADDRESS FOR SERVICE IN LUXEMBOURG AT THE OFFICE OF FELICIEN JANSEN, HUISSIER, 21 RUE ALDRINGER, APPLICANTS,
+V
+COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, REPRESENTED BY HUBERT EHRING, LEGAL ADVISER TO THE EUROPEAN EXECUTIVES, ACTING AS AGENT, ASSISTED BY PROFESSOR ERNST STEINDORFF OF TUBINGEN, WITH AN ADDRESS FOR SERVICE IN LUXEMBOURG AT THE OFFICE OF HENRI MANZANARES, SECRETARY OF THE LEGAL SERVICE OF THE EUROPEAN EXECUTIVES, 2 PLACE DE METZ, DEFENDANT, APPLICATIONS FOR THE ANNULMENT OF:
+(a) ARTICLE 3 OF THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF 15 MARCH 1961 CONCERNING THE FIXING OF A COUNTERVAILING CHARGE ON IMPORTS OF WHOLE POWDERED MILK INTO THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY MADE PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 46 OF THE EEC TREATY (OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES N. 26 OF 13 APRIL 1961, P. 505); AND
+(b) THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSION OF 13 DECEMBER 1961 EXTENDING THE DECISION OF 15 MARCH 1961 CONCERNING THE FIXING OF A COUNTERVAILING CHARGE ON IMPORTS OF WHOLE POWDERED MILK INTO THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY MADE PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 46 OF THE EEC TREATY (OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES N. 7 OF 27 JANUARY 1962, P. 137);
+OR ALTERNATIVELY FOR A DECLARATION THAT THE SAID DECISIONS DO NOT APPLY TO THE APPLICANTS;
+THE APPLICATIONS ARE MADE IN THE PRESCRIBED FORM; THEY ARE NOT CONTESTED ON THIS GROUND AND THERE ARE NO REASONS FOR THE COURT TO RAISE THE MATTER OF ITS OWN MOTION.
+THE APPLICANTS BASE THEIR PROCEEDINGS ON ARTICLE 184 OF THE EEC TREATY FROM WHICH THEY INFER THE EXISTENCE OF A RIGHT, SO FAR AS JURISDICTION IS CONCERNED, TO REFER TO THE COURT, FOR THE PURPOSE OF HAVING THEM DECLARED VOID OR INAPPLICABLE, ARTICLE 3 OF THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSION OF 15 MARCH 1961 AND THE WHOLE OF THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSION OF 13 DECEMBER 1961.
+BEFORE EXAMINING THE QUESTION WHETHER THE CONTESTED MEASURES ARE OF THEIR NATURE DECISIONS OR REGULATIONS, IT IS NECESSARY TO EXAMINE WHETHER ARTICLE 184 EMPOWERS THE COURT TO ADJUDICATE UPON THE INAPPLICABILITY OF A REGULATION WHEN THIS IS INVOKED IN PROCEEDINGS - AS IN THE PRESENT CASE - BEFORE A NATIONAL COURT OR TRIBUNAL.
+ARTICLE 184 ENABLES ANY PARTY, NOTWITHSTANDING THE EXPIRY OF THE PERIOD LAID DOWN IN THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 173, TO INVOKE BEFORE THE COURT OF JUSTICE, FOR THE PURPOSE OF MAKING AN APPLICATION FOR ANNULMENT, THE INAPPLICABILITY OF A REGULATION IN PROCEEDINGS IN WHICH IT IS AT ISSUE AND TO PLEAD THE GROUNDS SPECIFIED IN THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 173.
+BECAUSE ARTICLE 184 DOES NOT SPECIFY BEFORE WHICH COURT OR TRIBUNAL THE PROCEEDINGS IN WHICH THE REGULATION IS AT ISSUE MUST BE BROUGHT, THE APPLICANTS CONCLUDE THAT THE INAPPLICABILITY OF THAT REGULATION MAY IN ANY EVENT BE INVOKED BEFORE THE COURT OF JUSTICE.
+THIS WOULD MEAN THAT THERE WOULD EXIST A METHOD OF RECOURSE RUNNING CONCURRENTLY WITH THAT AVAILABLE UNDER ARTICLE 173.
+THIS IS HOWEVER NOT THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 184.
+IT IS CLEAR FROM THE WORDING AND THE GENERAL SCHEME OF THIS ARTICLE THAT A DECLARATION OF THE INAPPLICABILITY OF A REGULATION IS ONLY CONTEMPLATED IN PROCEEDINGS BROUGHT BEFORE THE COURT OF JUSTICE ITSELF UNDER SOME OTHER PROVISION OF THE TREATY, AND THEN ONLY INCIDENTALLY AND WITH LIMITED EFFECT.
+MORE PARTICULARLY, IT IS CLEAR FROM THE REFERENCE TO THE TIME LIMIT LAID DOWN IN ARTICLE 173 THAT ARTICLE 184 IS APPLICABLE ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF PROCEEDINGS BROUGHT BEFORE THE COURT OF JUSTICE AND THAT IT DOES NOT PERMIT THE SAID TIME LIMIT TO BE AVOIDED.
+THE SOLE OBJECT OF ARTICLE 184 IS THUS TO PROTECT AN INTERESTED PARTY AGAINST THE APPLICATION OF AN ILLEGAL REGULATION, WITHOUT THEREBY IN ANY WAY CALLING IN ISSUE THE REGULATION ITSELF, WHICH CAN NO LONGER BE CHALLENGED BECAUSE OF THE EXPIRY OF THE TIME LIMIT LAID DOWN IN ARTICLE 173.
+IT MUST BE STRESSED THAT THE TREATY CLEARLY DEFINES THE RESPECTIVE JURISDICTIONS OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE AND OF NATIONAL COURTS OR TRIBUNALS.
+IN FACT, BY VIRTUE OF BOTH ARTICLE 177 AND ARTICLE 20 OF THE PROTOCOL ON THE STATUTE OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, THE DECISION TO SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS AND TO REFER A CASE TO THIS COURT IS ONE FOR THE NATIONAL COURT OR TRIBUNAL.
+IF THE PARTIES TO AN ACTION PENDING BEFORE A NATIONAL COURT OR TRIBUNAL WERE ENTITLED TO MAKE A DIRECT REQUEST TO THIS COURT FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING, THEY COULD COMPEL THE NATIONAL COURT TO SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS PENDING A DECISION OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE.
+NEITHER THE TREATY NOR THE PROTOCOL, HOWEVER, IMPOSES SUCH A LIMITATION ON THE POWERS OF THE NATIONAL COURT.
+ALTHOUGH, THEREFORE, ARTICLE 184 DOES NOT PROVIDE SUFFICIENT GROUNDS TO ENABLE THE COURT OF JUSTICE TO GIVE A DECISION AT THE PRESENT STAGE, ARTICLE 177 DOES EMPOWER THE COURT TO GIVE A RULING IF A NATIONAL COURT OR TRIBUNAL WERE TO REFER PROCEEDINGS INSTITUTED BEFORE IT TO THE COURT.
+IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THESE CONSIDERATIONS, THE COURT MUST DECLARE THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER THE PRESENT APPLICATIONS, BOTH INSOFAR AS THEY SEEK THE ANNULMENT OF THE CONTESTED MEASURES AND INSOFAR AS THEY SEEK TO HAVE THEM DECLARED INAPPLICABLE.
+IT IS UNNECESSARY THEREFORE TO DECIDE UPON THE QUESTION OF THE COURT's JURISDICTION WITH REGARD TO THE EXACT NATURE OF THE MEASURES OF THE COMMISSION WHICH ARE CHALLENGED BY THE APPLICANTS.
+DURING THE ORAL PROCEDURE THE APPLICANTS ALTERNATIVELY PLEADED ARTICLE 173 AS GROUND FOR THEIR APPLICATIONS.
+WITH REGARD TO THIS IT DOES NOT APPEAR NECESSARY TO EXAMINE THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THIS CHANGE IN THE LEGAL BASIS OF THE REQUESTS OR THE QUESTION WHETHER THE CONTESTED MEASURES ARE DECISIONS UNDER THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 173 OF THE TREATY, SINCE THE APPLICANTS DID NOT IN FACT COMMENCE THEIR ACTION WITHIN THE PERIOD LAID DOWN BY THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 173.
+THIS PERIOD MUST BE REGARDED AS HAVING COMMENCED, AT THE LATEST, WITH THE PUBLICATION IN THE BUNDESGESETZBLATT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY ON 1 JULY 1961, OF THE NINTH ORDER AMENDING THE GERMAN CUSTOMS TARIFF OF 1961, OR IF NOT THEN WITH THE PUBLICATION ON 30 DECEMBER 1961 OF THE SECOND ORDER AMENDING THE GERMAN CUSTOMS TARIFF OF 1962.
+IT WAS THEN AT THE VERY LATEST THAT THE CONTESTED MEASURES MUST HAVE COME TO THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE APPLICANTS.
+THEIR APPLICATIONS, WHICH WERE MADE RESPECTIVELY ON 4 AND 9 OCTOBER 1962, ARE THEREFORE INADMISSIBLE INSOFAR AS THEY ARE BASED ON ARTICLE 173 SINCE THEY WERE MADE OUT OF TIME.
+THE APPLICATIONS ARE THEREFORE INADMISSIBLE IN THEIR ENTIRETY.
+Decision on costs
+UNDER ARTICLE 69 (2) OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE THE UNSUCCESSFUL PARTY SHALL BE ORDERED TO PAY THE COSTS.
+THE COURT
+HEREBY 1. DISMISSES THE APPLICATIONS AS BEING INADMISSIBLE;
+2. ORDERS THE APPLICANTS TO PAY THE COSTS.
+SINCE THE APPLICATIONS ARE INADMISSIBLE, THE APPLICANTS MUST BEAR THE COSTS.

data/principle-mvep-justice-court/mvep-101-hr.aligned.txt

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+U spojenim predmetima 31-62 – Milchwerke Heinz Wöhrmann & Sohn KG, Wesel/Rhein,
+33-62 – Alfons Lütticke GmbH, Germinghausen/Westphalia,
+tužitelji, koje zastupaju Fritz Modest, Artur Heemann, Renate Menssen, Jürgen Gündisch, Heinz Binder, odvjetnici odvjetničke komore u Hamburgu, s izabranom adresom za dostavu u Luxembourgu u uredu Féliciena Jansena, huissier, 21, rue Aldringer,
+protiv
+Komisije Europske ekonomske zajednice, tuženika, koju zastupa Hubert Ehring, pravni savjetnik europske izvršne vlasti, u svojstvu agenta, uz asistenciju profesora Ernsta Steindorffa, Tübingen, s izabranom adresom za dostavu u Luxembourgu u uredu Henrija Manzanaresa, tajnika pravne službe europske izvršne vlasti, 2, place de Metz, povodom zahtjevâ za poništenje ili proglašenje neprimjenjivosti:
+(a) članka 3. Odluke Komisije Europske ekonomske zajednice od 15. ožujka 1961. o određivanju kompenzacijskog davanja za uvoz punomasnog mlijeka u prahu u Saveznu Republiku Njemačku na temelju članka 46. Ugovora o EEZ-u (Službeni list Europskih zajednica br. 26 od 13. travnja 1961., str. 505.);
+(b) Odluke Komisije od 13. prosinca 1961. o produljenju Odluke od 15. ožujka 1961. o određivanju kompenzacijskog davanja za uvoz punomasnog mlijeka u prahu u Saveznu Republiku Njemačku na temelju članka 46. Ugovora o EEZ-u (Službeni list Europskih zajednica br. 7 od 27. siječnja 1962., str. 137.), SUD,
+tajnik: A. Van Houtte,
+donosi sljedeću Presudu Zahtjevi su podneseni u propisanom obliku i nisu osporeni na toj osnovi te stoga nema razloga za prigovor po službenoj dužnosti.
+Tužitelji svoje tužbe temelje na članku 184. Ugovora o EEZ-u, iz kojeg izvode zaključak da u pogledu pitanja nadležnosti postoji pravo na podnošenje tužbe Sudu za proglašenje članka 3. Odluke Komisije od 15. ožujka 1961. i cijele Odluke Komisije od 13. prosinca 1961. ništavima ili neprimjenjivima.
+Prije razmatranja pitanja jesu li pobijani akti po svojoj naravi odluke ili uredbe, valja provjeriti ovlašćuje li se člankom 184. Sud za odlučivanje o neprimjenjivosti uredbe ako je to pitanje postavljeno u postupku pred nacionalnim sudom, kao što je to u ovom slučaju.
+U skladu s člankom 184. svaka se stranka, neovisno o isteku roka utvrđenog u članku 173. trećem stavku, može pozvati pred Sudom, u svrhu podnošenja tužbe za poništenje, na neprimjenjivost uredbe u postupcima o toj uredbi iz razloga određenih u članku 173. prvom stavku.
+Budući da u članku 184. nije utvrđeno pred kojim se sudom mora pokrenuti postupak koji se odnosi na predmetnu uredbu, tužitelji zaključuju da se na neprimjenjivost te uredbe može u svakom slučaju pozvati pred Sudom.
+To bi značilo da postoji pravno sredstvo koje se primjenjuje istovremeno sa sredstvom iz članka 173.
+To, međutim, nije značenje članka 184. Ugovora.
+Iz teksta i opće strukture tog članka proizlazi da se proglašenje neprimjenjivosti uredbe razmatra samo u okviru postupka pokrenutog pred samim Sudom na temelju neke druge odredbe Ugovora, i to samo uzgredno i s ograničenim učinkom.
+Iz upućivanja na rok utvrđen u članku 173. prije svega proizlazi da se članak 184. primjenjuje samo u okviru postupka pokrenutog pred Sudom te da ne omogućava izbjegavanje roka propisanog u toj odredbi.
+Stoga je jedini cilj članka 184. zaštititi zainteresiranu stranu od primjene nezakonite uredbe, ne dovodeći pritom ni na koji način u pitanje samu uredbu, koja se više ne može pobijati jer je istekao rok utvrđen u članku 173.
+Treba istaknuti da su u Ugovoru jasno utvrđene nadležnosti Suda i nacionalnih sudova.
+U skladu s člankom 177. Ugovora i člankom 20. Protokola o Statutu Suda Europske ekonomske zajednice odluku o prekidu postupka i upućivanju predmeta Sudu donosi nacionalni sud.
+Ako bi stranke postupka koji se vodi pred nacionalnim sudom imale pravo izravno uputiti Sudu zahtjev za prethodnu odluku, mogle bi od nacionalnog suda zahtijevati da prekine postupak do donošenja odluke Suda.
+Međutim, Ugovorom i Protokolom nije određeno takvo ograničenje ovlasti nacionalnog suda.
+Stoga, iako člankom 184. nije predviđena dostatna osnova na temelju koje bi Sud donio odluku u ovom stadiju, člankom 177. Sud se ovlašćuje za donošenje odluke ako nacionalni sud postupak koji se pred njim vodi uputi Sudu.
+Iz prethodno navedenih razmatranja proizlazi da se Sud mora proglasiti nenadležnim za odlučivanje o ovim tužbama u pogledu zahtjeva za poništenje pobijanih akata i u pogledu zahtjeva za proglašenje njihove neprimjenjivosti.
+Stoga nije potrebno donijeti odluku o pitanju nadležnosti Suda u pogledu prave naravi akata Komisije koje tužitelji pobijaju.
+Tijekom usmenog dijela postupka tužitelji su se podredno pozvali na članak 173. kao osnovu svojih tužbi.
+U tom pogledu nije potrebno ispitati dopuštenost promjene pravne osnove zahtjeva ili pitanje jesu li pobijani akti odluke u skladu s člankom 173. drugim stavkom Ugovora jer tužitelji nisu pravodobno podnijeli svoje tužbe u roku propisanom u članku 173. trećem stavku.
+Valja smatrati da je taj rok počeo najkasnije objavom Devete uredbe o izmjeni njemačke carinske tarife iz 1961. u Bundesgesetzblattu Savezne Republike Njemačke od 1. srpnja 1961. ili, ako ne tada, objavom Druge uredbe o izmjeni njemačke carinske tarife iz 1962. u Bundesgesetzblattu od 30. prosinca 1961.
+Tužitelji su najkasnije tada morali saznati za pobijane mjere.
+Stoga su njihovi zahtjevi, koji su podneseni 4. i 9. listopada 1962. nedopušteni u mjeri u kojoj se temelje na članku 173. jer su podneseni izvan roka.
+Iz prethodno navedenoga proizlazi da su zahtjevi u cijelosti nedopušteni.
+Troškovi
+Sukladno članku 69. stavku 2. Poslovnika, stranka koja ne uspije u postupku dužna je snositi troškove. Budući da su tužbe nedopuštene, tužitelji su dužni snositi troškove.
+SUD,
+1. Tužbe se odbacuju kao nedopuštene.
+2. Tužiteljima se nalaže snošenje troškova.
+Objavljeno na javnoj raspravi u Luxembourgu 14. prosinca 1962.

data/principle-mvep-justice-court/mvep-102-en.aligned.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+IN CASE 13/63
+GOVERNMENT OF THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC, REPRESENTED BY PROFESSOR RICCARDO MONACO, HEAD OF THE LEGAL DEPARTMENT OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ACTING AS AGENT, ASSISTED BY PIETRO PERONACI, DEPUTY AVVOCATO GENERALE DELLO STATO, WITH AN ADDRESS FOR SERVICE IN LUXEMBOURG AT THE EMBASSY OF THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC, APPLICANT,
+V
+COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, REPRESENTED BY ALBERTO SCIOLLA-LAGRANGE, LEGAL ADVISER OF THE EUROPEAN EXECUTIVES, ACTING AS AGENT, WITH AN ADDRESS FOR SERVICE IN LUXEMBOURG AT THE OFFICE OF HENRI MANZANARES, SECRETARY OF THE LEGAL SERVICE OF THE EUROPEAN EXECUTIVES, 2 PLACE DE METZ, DEFENDANT,
+APPLICATION FOR ANNULMENT OF THE DECISION OF 17 JANUARY 1963 (OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF 13 FEBRUARY 1963, PP. 268 ET SEQ.) AUTHORIZING THE FRENCH REPUBLIC TO TAKE PROTECTIVE MEASURES UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE EEC TREATY AGAINST THE IMPORTATION OF DOMESTIC ELECTRIC REFRIGERATORS AND CERTAIN SPARE PARTS OF ITALIAN ORIGIN;
+I - ON THE INFRINGEMENT OF ESSENTIAL PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS
+1. ON THE FAILURE TO GIVE THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT A HEARING
+THE APPLICANT MAINTAINS THAT THE COMMISSION SHOULD HAVE GIVEN IT A HEARING BEFORE MAKING ITS DECISION.
+IT IS NOT NECESSARY IN THIS CASE TO EXAMINE TO WHAT EXTENT SUCH A PRELIMINARY CONSULTATION WAS REQUIRED.
+IN FACT, IT IS NOT DISPUTED THAT AFTER TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH THE OFFICE OF THE ITALIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE IN BRUSSELS INFORMING THE OFFICE OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT's REQUEST, THE DEFENDANT ADDRESSED TO THE SAID REPRESENTATIVE VARIOUS QUESTIONS IN WRITING RELATING TO THE REQUEST, TO WHICH THERE WAS NO REPLY.
+BECAUSE OF THE APPLICANT's SILENCE, WHICH LASTED A MONTH, THE DEFENDANT CANNOT BE REPROACHED FOR HAVING ADOPTED THE DISPUTED DECISION WITHOUT FURTHER ADO.
+THIS COMPLAINT MUST THEREFORE BE DISMISSED.
+2. ON THE COMPLAINT OF INSUFFICIENT REASONING
+THE APPLICANT HAS RAISED A SERIES OF COMPLAINTS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE STATEMENT OF REASONS ON WHICH THE DISPUTED DECISION IS BASED DOES NOT SATISFY THE CONDITIONS REQUIRED BY ARTICLE 190 OF THE TREATY AND CLAIMS THAT THE REASONS GIVEN FOR THE DECISION ARE INSUFFICIENT TO MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO SINGLE OUT IMPORTS FROM ITALY AS THE ORIGIN OF THE DIFFICULTIES IN QUESTION.
+HOWEVER, THE DECISION WAS NOT LIMITED TO CONSIDERING THE VOLUME OF THE VARIOUS IMPORTS, BUT ALSO MADE A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE PRICE OF THE ITALIAN PRODUCTS AND THE PRICES BOTH OF FRENCH PRODUCTS AND OF OTHER IMPORTED PRODUCTS, WHICH ACCORDING TO IT WERE NOTICEABLY HIGHER.
+IT IS INCORRECT TO ARGUE THAT THE DECISION SHOULD ALSO HAVE CONSIDERED THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SALE PRICES TO THE CONSUMER, SINCE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO MAKE A DEFINITE FINDING AT THIS STAGE BECAUSE OF THE DISCOUNTS GIVEN AND BECAUSE THE DIFFICULTIES HAVE TO BE ASSESSED IN RESPECT OF THE PRODUCERS; IT WAS THEREFORE NECESSARY TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE PRICES CHARGED TO THE WHOLE-SALERS.
+THERE WAS NO POINT IN EXAMINING WHETHER THE MARGIN OF PROFIT ALLOWED TO THE WHOLESALERS BY THE FRENCH PRODUCERS WAS REASONABLE OR NOT, SINCE IT WAS A MATTER OF JUDGING THE PRICE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE FRENCH PRODUCT AND THE ITALIAN PRODUCT ON ITS ARRIVAL ON FRENCH TERRITORY, THAT IS TO SAY, AT THE MOMENT WHEN THESE TWO PRODUCTS ARE IN THE SAME MARKET AND AT THE SAME COMMERCIAL STAGE.
+ACCORDING TO THE APPLICANT, THE PREAMBLE SHOULD HAVE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT THE QUESTION WHETHER THE GREATER MARGIN ALLOWED BY THE ITALIAN PRODUCERS TO THEIR DISTRIBUTORS IN FRANCE WAS JUSTIFIED BY THE HEAVIER CHARGES WHICH FELL UPON THE LATTER.
+HOWEVER, AS THE SAID PREAMBLE FINDS THAT THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE FREE-AT-FRONTIER PRICE OF THE ITALIAN PRODUCTS AND THE EX - FACTORY PRICE OF THE FRENCH PRODUCTS WAS 30% THE CLEAR CONSEQUENCE OF THIS, IN THE OPINION OF THE DEFENDANT, IS THAT THERE WERE NO OTHER ELEMENTS CAPABLE OF REDUCING IN ACTUAL FACT THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE REPRESENTED BY THIS PERCENTAGE.
+THE APPLICANT COMPLAINS THAT THE DEFENDANT OMITTED TO ASCERTAN WHETHER THE PRODUCERS OF OTHER EXPORTING COUNTRIES OFFERED THEIR DISTRIBUTORS IN FRANCE PROFITS COMPARABLE WITH THOSE ENJOYED BY THE IMPORTERS OF ITALIAN PRODUCTS.
+ALTHOUGH THE PREAMBLE STATES THAT THE ITALIAN PRICES WERE NOT COMPARABLE WITH THE PRICES OF PRODUCTS IMPORTED FROM OTHER COUNTRIES, IT IMPLIES CLEARLY THAT IMPORTERS OF ITALIAN PRODUCTS COULD BUY MORE CHEAPLY THAN OTHER IMPORTERS.
+CONSEQUENTLY THE REFERENCE DESIRED BY THE APPLICANT WAS SUPERFLUOUS.
+THE APPLICANT IS WRONG IN CLAIMING THAT THE DECISION COMPARES FRENCH PRODUCTION CALCULATED OVER TEN MONTHS WITH EXPORTS AND IMPORTS CALCULATED OVER SEVEN AND SIX MONTHS RESPECTIVELY; WHEREAS THE TABLE INCLUDED IN THE DECISION COMPARED DATA FROM CORRESPONDING PERIODS.
+FINALLY, THE APPLICANT MAKES THE POINT THAT THE RECITAL DEALING WITH THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FRENCH AND ITALIAN PRICES IS NOT CLEAR AND IS BASED UPON INACCURATE FACTS.
+FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF REASONING, THE WORDING IN QUESTION DOES NOT LACK CLARITY, SINCE IT SHOWS IN A CLEAR FORM THE DATA WHICH THE DEFENDANT CONSIDERED DECISIVE.
+IT FOLLOWS FROM THE FOREGOING THAT THE COMPLAINT OF INSUFFICIENT REASONING MUST BE DISMISSED.
+II - ON MISUSE OF POWERS
+THE APPLICANT COMPLAINS THAT THE COMMISSION USED ITS POWERS UNDER ARTICLE 226 TO REACH A RESULT FALLING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES OF ARTICLE 91.
+NOTHING, HOWEVER, EITHER IN THE DISPUTED DECISION OR IN THE ATTITUDE OF THE DEFENDANT ALLOWS THIS DECISION TO BE REGARDED AS A DISGUISED ANTI-DUMPING MEASURE, SINCE NO COMPLAINT OF DUMPING HAD BEEN MADE.
+THE FACT THAT THE DISPUTED DUTY WAS OF A LIMITED DURATION, AND WAS ON A DIMINISHING SCALE, IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH AN ANTI-DUMPING MEASURE WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE APPLIED ACCORDING TO THE DURATION OF THE PRACTICES TO BE RESISTED WHICH CANNOT NORMALLY BE FORESEEN.
+THIS COMPLAINT SHOULD, THEREFORE, BE DISMISSED.
+III - ON INFRINGEMENT OF THE TREATY
+1. ON THE CONCEPT OF 'sECTOR OF THE ECONOMY'
+THE APPLICANT DISPUTES THAT THE FRENCH REFRIGERATOR INDUSTRY IS A 'sECTOR OF THE ECONOMY' WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 226.
+THE PRODUCTION OF A COMMODITY CAN CONSTITUTE SUCH A 'sECTOR' IF THAT COMMODITY, ACCORDING TO GENERALLY ACCEPTED IDEAS, IS CLEARLY DIFFERENT FROM OTHER RELATED PRODUCTS.
+THESE CONDITIONS ARE FULFILLED HERE.
+2. ON THE TAXATION OF COMPRESSOR UNITS
+IT IS NOT DISPUTED THAT FOR COMPRESSOR UNITS THERE EXISTED NONE OF THE DIFFICULTIES ESTABLISHED BY THE DEFENDANT IN THE SECTOR OF COMPLETED REFRIGERATORS.
+HOWEVER, THE DEFENDANT HAS ALLEGED THE NEED TO AVOID DIVERSION OF TRADE, AND POINTS OUT THAT THE INSTALLATION OF COMPRESSOR UNITS IN REFRIGERATORS WHICH ARE NOT EQUIPPED WITH THEM IS A VERY EASY OPERATION.
+THE APPLICANT ITSELF MOREOVER MADE THE POINT THAT THE IMPORTERS OF ITALIAN PRODUCTS INTO FRANCE HAS TO UNDERTAKE THE REPAIR OF THE PRODUCTS SOLD.
+THEREFORE, IT SEEMS PROBABLE THAT THEY ARE SUFFICIENTLY WELL EQUIPPED TO ASSEMBLE COMPRESSOR UNITS ALSO, WITHOUT BEING FORCED TO SET UP NEW FACTORIES.
+CONSEQUENTLY THE APPLICANT HAS NOT SHOWN THAT THE DESIRE TO AVOID DIVERSION OF TRADE WAS WITHOUT FOUNDATION.
+THIS COMPLAINT MUST THEREFORE BE DISMISSED.
+3. ON THE APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF 'DIFFICULTIES WHICH ARE SERIOUS AND LIABLE TO PERSIST'
+UNDER ARTICLE 226 (1) OF THE TREATY, PROTECTIVE MEASURES MAY BE AUTHORIZED IN CASE OF DIFFICULTIES WHICH ARE SERIOUS AND LIABLE TO PERSIST IN ANY SECTOR OF THE ECONOMY.
+(a) TAKEN BY THEMSELVES, THE FIGURES PUT FORWARD BY THE DEFENDANT, MARKING THE DECREASE IN FRENCH PRODUCTION FROM 1961 TO 1962 AS WELL AS THE INCREASE IN IMPORTS INTO FRANCE DURING THE SAME PERIOD - FIGURES NOT DISPUTED BY THE APPLICANT -, ALLOW THE INFERENCE THAT SUCH DIFFICULTIES DID EXIST.
+HOWEVER, IT SHOULD BE EXAMINED WHETHER THE ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY THE APPLICANT ARE SUCH AS TO REBUT THIS PRESUMPTION.
+(b) THE APPLICANT STATES THAT FRENCH PRODUCTION FOR 1962, TO THE EXTENT OF 265000 APPLIANCES, WAS NOT ENOUGH TO SATISFY THE NEEDS OF THE DOMESTIC MARKET.
+THIS ALLEGATION IS IRRELEVANT.
+IN FACT, THIS CIRCUMSTANCE DOES NOT NECESSARILY PRESUPPOSE INSUFFICIENT MANUFACTURING CAPACITY, BUT MAY EQUALLY BE ASCRIBED TO THE FACT THAT THE IMPORTS THEMSELVES CAUSED THE RECESSION IN FRENCH PRODUCTION.
+(c) THE APPLICANT NEXT ATTEMPTS TO SHOW THAT, OF THE FRENCH PRODUCTION FOR 1962, THE NUMBER OF REFRIGERATORS UNSOLD AT THE END OF THE YEAR AMOUNTED TO ROUGHLY 8 000 AT MOST.
+HOWEVER, ADOPTING THE APPLICANT's METHOD OF CALCULATION, AND SUBSTITUTING FOR ITS ORIGINAL FIGURES THOSE WHICH WERE ACCEPTED AT THE HEARING BY BOTH PARTIES, APART FROM INSIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES, ONE ARRIVES AT A NUMBER BETWEEN 48 000 AND 57 000.
+ONE MUST TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION NOT ONLY THE SITUATION EXISTING IN 1962, BUT ABOVE ALL THE DEVELOPMENT WHICH HAS TAKEN PLACE SINCE THE LIBERALIZATION OF TRADE.
+IN THIS RESPECT, THE CONSIDERABLE SIZE OF THE STOCKS HELD BY THE PRODUCERS AT THE END OF 1961 AND 1962 (145000 AND 193000 RESPECTIVELY), AS WELL AS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THESE TWO FIGURES, TAKE ON THEIR FULL SIGNIFICANCE.
+THE APPLICANT MAINTAINS THAT THE STOCKPILED MODELS WERE OUT OF DATE.
+HOWEVER, A CRISIS AT THE RETAIL STAGE MAY EQUALLY BE DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE PRODUCER IS NOT SUCCEEDING IN DISPOSING OF THE PRODUCTION OF PREVIOUS YEARS.
+FINALLY, THE APPLICANT's ARGUMENT ASSUMES THAT THE FRENCH PRODUCTS SOLD IN 1962 CAME EXCLUSIVELY FROM THAT SAME YEAR's PRODUCTION, WHICH HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN.
+(d) FINALLY, THE PARTIES DISAGREE ON THE QUESTION WHETHER THE PRICE REDUCTION CARRIED OUT BY THE FRENCH PRODUCERS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE DISPUTED DECISION APPLIED TO THE WHOLE OR THE GREATER PART OF THE PRODUCTS, AS THE APPLICANT CONSIDERS, OR ONLY A SMALL QUANTITY OF THEM.
+THE APPLICANT's STATEMENT, SUPPOSING IT TO BE ACCURATE, REVEALS RATHER THE EXISTENCE OF 'sERIOUS DIFFICULTIEs', SINCE IT IS OBVIOUS THAT A CONSIDERABLE REDUCTION, SPONTANEOUSLY DECIDED UPON BY PRODUCERS, MAY BE A SYMPTOM OF KEEN COMPETITION.
+FURTHERMORE, ALTHOUGH ARTICLE 226 IS INTENDED TO PERMIT THE SECTOR IN DIFFICULTY TO ADJUST ITSELF TO THE COMMON MARKET, IT ASSUMES THAT THOSE INVOLVED ARE IN A POSITION TO SUPPORT THE COMMISSION's MEASURES BY THEIR OWN EFFORTS.
+THE FACT THAT SUCH EFFORTS ARE MADE DOES NOT THEREFORE PRECLUDE THE EXISTENCE OF 'sERIOUS DIFFICULTIEs'.
+(e) IT IS THUS NOT ESTABLISHED THAT THE DEFENDANT HAS WRONGLY APPLIED THE CONCEPT OF 'sERIOUS DIFFICULTIEs'.
+IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE COURT MUST DISMISS THIS COMPLAINT.
+4. AS TO DISCRIMINATION
+(a) COMPLAINT IS MADE THAT THE DECISION IMPROPERLY INFRINGED THE PRINCIPLE OF NON - DISCRIMINATION BY AUTHORIZING THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT TO IMPOSE A SPECIAL DUTY ON ITALIAN PRODUCTS ALONE, TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE SAME PRODUCTS ORIGINATING EITHER IN OTHER STATES OF THE COMMUNITY OR IN THIRD COUNTRIES.
+THE DIFFERENT TREATMENT OF NON-COMPARABLE SITUATIONS DOES NOT LEAD AUTOMATICALLY TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THERE IS DISCRIMINATION.
+AN APPEARANCE OF DISCRIMINATION IN FORM MAY THEREFORE CORRESPOND IN FACT TO AN ABSENCE OF DISCRIMINATION IN SUBSTANCE.
+DISCRIMINATION IN SUBSTANCE WOULD CONSIST IN TREATING EITHER SIMILAR SITUATIONS DIFFERENTLY OR DIFFERENT SITUATIONS IDENTICALLY.
+(b) FURTHER, AS THE COMMISSION IS REQUIRED TO LIMIT ITS INTERVENTIONS TO WHAT Is' sTRICTLY NECESSARY', IT MUST BE PERMISSIBLE FOR IT TO INTERVENE ONLY IN RESPECT OF THOSE PHENOMENA WHICH CONSTITUTE THE CAUSE OF THE DIFFICULTIES IN QUESTION.
+BESIDES, IT IS OBLIGED TO GIVE 'PRIORITY... TO SUCH MEASURES AS WILL LEAST DISTURB THE FUNCTIONING OF THE COMMON MARKET'.
+IN THIS RESPECT IT MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THAT IN CASES OF DOUBT THE 'COMMON' NATURE OF THE MARKET WILL SUFFER LESS IF DEROGATION FROM THE RULES OF THE TREATY IS MADE ONLY WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO MEMBER STATES.
+MOREOVER, THE ARGUMENT JUST REJECTED IS ITSELF LIABLE TO FAVOUR DISCRIMINATION WHICH MIGHT JUST AS WELL TAKE THE FORM OF DISSIMILAR SITUATIONS BEING TREATED IDENTICALLY.
+FINALLY, IN AUTHORIZING PROTECTIVE MEASURES, THE COMMISSION IS ENTITLED TO MAKE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN COUNTRIES RATHER THAN BETWEEN UNDERTAKINGS IN THE COMMON MARKET WHEN THERE ARE REASONABLE GROUNDS FOR SUCH A DISTINCTION.
+THIS IS SO WHEN IT IS POSSIBLE TO FIND, WITHIN A GIVEN COUNTRY, A PRICE LEVEL WHICH IS CLEARLY DIFFERENT FROM THE PRICE LEVEL IN OTHER COUNTRIES.
+(c) IT IS NECESSARY TO ASCERTAIN THEREFORE WHETHER THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN THIS CASE CAN JUSTIFY A LIMITATION OF THE PROTECTIVE MEASURES TO ITALIAN IMPORTS ALONE.
+THE DEFENDANT SAW THE ORIGIN OF THE FRENCH DIFFICULTIES IN 'THE HUGE INCREASE IN IMPORTS ORIGINATING IN THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC', AND CONSEQUENTLY IT LIMITED THE PROTECTIVE MEASURES TO ITALIAN PRODUCTS.
+IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY ITS JUDGMENT AND THE CHOICE OF THIS MEASURE, THE COMMISSION TOOK AS ITS PRINCIPAL BASIS THE FINDING THAT, ON THE ONE HAND, THE VOLUME OF IMPORTS FROM THIRD COUNTRIEs 'hAS NOT INCREASED TO AN ABNORMAL DEGREE' AND IS THEREFORE 'NOT LIABLE TO HINDER THE REORGANIZATION OF THE FRENCH SECTOR IN QUESTION' AND, ON THE OTHER HAND, THAT THE PRICE OF PRODUCTS IMPORTED FROM OTHER MEMBER STATEs' dOES NOT DIFFER APPRECIABLY FROM THE PRICE OF SIMILAR FRENCH PRODUCTS AND THAT THE INCREASE IN THE VOLUME OF IMPORTS, WHILST HIGHER, IS NOT CONSIDERED AS ABNORMAL'.
+IT DOES NOT APPEAR FROM THE EVIDENCE BROUGHT TO THE NOTICE OF THE COURT THAT THIS ASSESSMENT BY THE COMMISSION IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
+IT IS NOT DISPUTED THAT IMPORTS FROM THIRD COUNTRIES ARE INCONSIDERABLE.
+IT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN THAT THE COMMISSION WAS MISTAKEN IN STATING THAT THE PRICE OF PRODUCTS ORIGINATING IN OTHER MEMBER STATES DID NOT DIFFER APPRECIABLY FROM THE PRICE OF SIMILAR FRENCH PRODUCTS.
+IT WAS THEREFORE ABLE, BY THIS COMPARISON WITH THE VOLUME OF IMPORTS ORIGINATING IN OTHER MEMBER STATES (WHICH IT DID NOT CONSIDER TO BE ABNORMAL), TO COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE HUGE INCREASE IN IMPORTS FROM ITALY WAS A FACTOR CAPABLE OF JUSTIFYING THE SPECIFIC MEASURE WHICH WAS THE SUBJECT OF THE DECISION.
+(d) IN VIEW OF ALL THE PRECEDING CONSIDERATIONS, IT FOLLOWS THAT THE SIXTH TO THE ELEVENTH RECITALS IN THE PREAMBLE TO THE DISPUTED DECISION JUSTIFY THE IMPOSITION OF DUTY ON ITALIAN PRODUCTS ALONE.
+THE COMPLAINT OF DISCRIMINATION MUST THEREFORE BE DISMISSED.
+5. ON THE COMPLAINT RELATING TO MATERIAL ERROR IN THE CALCULATION OF THE PRICE DIFFERENCES
+IN THE WORDS OF THE DECISION, THE DIFFERENCE 'BETWEEN THE AVERAGE PRICE PER LITRE OF ITALIAN REFRIGERATORS FREE-AT-FRONTIER AND THE AVERAGE PRICE PER LITRE OF THE SAME FRENCH APPLIANCES AT THE WHOLSALE STAGE', THAT IS TO SAY, THE EX-FACTORY PRICE, AS THE DEFENDANT EXPLAINED DURING THE PROCEEDINGS,'AMOUNTED TO 30% OF THE ITALIAN PRICE FREE-AT-FRONTIER IN FRANCE WHILST THE EXISTING CUSTOMS PROTECTION IS NO HIGHER THAN 7.5%'.
+THE APPLICANT CONSIDERS THAT THE COMMISSION SHOULD ALSO HAVE TAKEN ACCOUNT OF OTHER FACTORS WHICH WOULD HAVE CONSIDERABLY REDUCED THIS DIFFERENCE.
+(a) THE APPLICANT DOES NOT DISPUTE THE FIGURES PUT FORWARD BY THE DEFENDANT RELATING TO THE FRENCH PRICE INVOICED TO THE WHOLESALERS (2 946 FFRS) AS WELL AS THE ITALIAN PRICE FREE-AT-FRONTIER (2 245 FFRS), FIGURES FROM WHICH AN ARITHMETICAL DIFFERENCE AMOUNTING TO AS MUCH AS 31.2% APPEARS.
+IT RESTRICTS ITSELF TO COMPARING THE METHOD OF CALCULATION CHOSEN BY THE DEFENDANT WITH ANOTHER METHOD OF CALCULATION BASED ON THE RESPECTIVE DISCOUNTS.
+HOWEVER, IT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN THAT THIS METHOD OF CALCULATION WOULD BE MORE SOUND AND MORE APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAN THAT ADOPTED BY THE COMMISSION.
+IN FACT, THE DEFENDANT CANNOT BE CRITICIZED FOR HAVING USED THE MOST IMPORTANT AND THE MOST CERTAIN PRICE FACTORS.
+FURTHER, THE APPLICANT HAS IN NO WAY EXPLAINED OR SPECIFIED HOW THE UNDISPUTED DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE PRICES OF THE FRENCH PRODUCTS AT THE MOMENT WHEN THEY LEAVE THE FACTORY AND THE PRICES OF THE ITALIAN PRODUCTS AT THE MOMENT WHEN THEY ARRIVE ON FRENCH TERRITORY IS REDUCED LATER BY THE OPERATION OF DISCOUNTS. NOR HAS IT INDICATED THE BASIS ON WHICH IT HAS CALCULATED THE SAID DISCOUNTS.
+(b) IN ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE THE EXISTENCE OF THE SPECIAL CHARGES WHICH THE DISTRIBUTORS OF ITALIAN PRODUCTS HAVE TO BEAR, THE APPLICANT MERELY SETS FORTH CERTAIN FIGURES EXTRACTED FROM THE BALANCE-SHEETS OF TWO IMPORTING COMPANIES.
+HOWEVER, THESE FIGURES HAVE NO PROBATIVE VALUE.
+FIRST, THEY WERE CALCULATED ON THE BASIS OF THE TURNOVER OF THE COMPANIES IN QUESTION, AND THUS ON A BASIS WHICH IT IS DIFFICULT TO COMPARE WITH THE PRICES IN PRACTICE PAID BY THE WHOLESALERS, WHICH IS THE ONLY ISSUE HERE.
+SECONDLY, THE SAID FIGURES LEAVE ENTIRELY OPEN THE QUESTION WHETHER THE BALANCE-SHEETS OF THE DISTRIBUTORS OF FRENCH PRODUCTS CONTAIN COMPARABLE ENTRIES.
+FINALLY, A CONSIDERABLE PROPORTION OF THE BALANCE-SHEET ENTRIES RELIED ON CONSISTS OF 'EXTRA COMMERCIAL EXPENSEs', A FORMULA TOO GENERAL TO ALLOW ANY CONCLUSIONS TO BE DRAWN FROM IT.
+FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS THIS COMPLAINT MUST BE DISMISSED.
+Decision on costs
+BY ARTICLE 69 (2) OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE, THE UNSUCCESSFUL PARTY SHALL BE ORDERED TO PAY THE COSTS.
+AS THE APPLICANT IN THIS CASE HAS FAILED IN ALL ITS SUBMISSIONS IT MUST BE ORDERED TO BEAR THE COSTS.
+1. DISMISSES THE APPLICATION AS UNFOUNDED;
+2. ORDERS THE APPLICANT TO PAY THE COSTS.

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+PRESUDA SUDA 17. srpnja 1963.
+U predmetu C-13/63, VLADA TALIJANSKE REPUBLIKE, koju zastupa prof. Riccardo Monaco, voditelj Pravnog odjela Ministarstva vanjskih poslova, u svojstvu agenta, uz asistenciju Pietra Peronacija, umjesto Avvocato generale dello Stato, s izabranom adresom za dostavu u Luxembourgu u veleposlanstvu Talijanske Republike, tužitelj,
+protiv
+KOMISIJE EUROPSKE EKONOMSKE ZAJEDNICE, koju zastupa Alberto Sciolla-Lagrange, pravni savjetnik tijela European Executives, u svojstvu agenta, s izabranom adresom za dostavu u Luxembourgu, u uredu Henrija Manzanarèsa, tajnika Pravne službe European Executives, 2 Place de Metz, tuženika,
+povodom zahtjeva za poništenje Odluke od 17. siječnja 1963. (Službeni list od 13. veljače 1963., str. 268. i sljedeće) kojom se Francuska Republika ovlašćuje za poduzimanje zaštitnih mjera na temelju članka 226. Ugovora o EEZ-u protiv uvoza električnih hladnjaka za kućanstva i određenih rezervnih dijelova talijanskog podrijetla, SUD, u sastavu:
+donosi sljedeću PRESUDU I. Povreda bitnih postupovnih pravila
+1. Uskraćivanje prava talijanske vlade na saslušanje
+Tužitelj tvrdi da ga je Komisija trebala saslušati prije donošenja Odluke.
+U ovom predmetu nema potrebe ispitivati u kojoj je mjeri bilo potrebno takvo prethodno savjetovanje.
+Ne osporava se da je, nakon telefonskih razgovora s uredom stalnog talijanskog predstavnika u Bruxellesu u kojima je taj ured obaviješten o zahtjevu francuske vlade, tuženik pisanim putem uputio dotičnom predstavniku različita pitanja koja su se odnosila na zahtjev, ali na njih nije dobio odgovor.
+Tužitelj se nije oglasio mjesec dana pa se tuženiku ne može prigovoriti to što je pobijanu Odluku donio bez daljnjeg odlaganja.
+Stoga taj prigovor treba odbiti.
+2. Prigovor koji se odnosi na nedostatnost obrazloženja
+Tužitelj je iznio niz prigovora tvrdeći da obrazloženje na kojem se temelji pobijana Odluka ne ispunjava uvjete iz članka 190. Ugovora. Navedeni razlozi za Odluku nisu dovoljan dokaz da je uvoz iz Italije jedini uzrok poteškoća o kojima je riječ.
+Međutim, Odluka se nije ograničila samo na razmatranje obujma različitih uvoza, nego je sadržavala i usporedbu cijena talijanskih proizvoda s cijenama obaju francuskih proizvoda i drugih uvezenih proizvoda, koje su prema toj usporedbi bile znatno više.
+Neopravdano je tvrditi da se u Odluci trebala razmotriti i razlika između prodajnih cijena naplaćivanih potrošačima, jer se u toj fazi ne može doći do nedvojbenih rezultata zbog popusta koji se odobravaju i zbog toga što poteškoće treba ocijeniti u odnosu na proizvođače; stoga su se u obzir morale uzeti cijene obračunane veletrgovcima.
+Nije imalo smisla ispitivati ni je li profitna marža koju su francuski proizvođači odobravali veletrgovcima bila razumna ili ne, jer je bila riječ o procjeni razlike u cijeni između francuskog proizvoda i talijanskog proizvoda po dolasku na francusko državno područje, odnosno u trenutku kada su se ta dva proizvoda našla na istom tržištu i u istoj fazi komercijalnog toka.
+Prema tvrdnji tužitelja, u obrazloženju je trebalo uzeti u obzir pitanje je li veća marža koju su talijanski proizvođači odobravali distributerima u Francuskoj bila opravdana većim davanjima kojima su opterećeni ti distributeri.
+Međutim, budući da se u obrazloženju zaključuje kako je razlika između cijene franko granica talijanskih proizvoda i cijene franko tvornica francuskih proizvoda iznosila 30% , iz toga, prema mišljenju tuženika, jasno proizlazi da nije bilo drugih elemenata koji su mogli praktično umanjiti prednost u tržišnom natjecanju koju predstavlja taj postotak.
+Tužitelj prigovara tuženiku da je propustio ispitati nude li proizvođači iz drugih država izvoznica distributerima u Francuskoj prednosti slične onima koje dobivaju uvoznici talijanskih proizvoda.
+U obrazloženju se, međutim, tvrdi da talijanske cijene nisu bile usporedive s cijenama proizvoda uvezenih iz drugih zemalja, što očito podrazumijeva da su uvoznici talijanskih proizvoda mogli kupovati jeftinije od drugih uvoznika.
+Stoga je napomena koju je tužitelj zatražio bila suvišna.
+Tužitelj pogrešno tvrdi da se u Odluci uspoređuje francuska proizvodnja izračunana tijekom deset mjeseci s izvozom i uvozom izračunanim tijekom sedam odnosno šest mjeseci; naime, u tablici sadržanoj u Odluci uspoređeni su podatci iz odgovarajućih razdoblja.
+Naposljetku, tužitelj ističe da uvodna izjava koja se odnosi na razliku između francuskih i talijanskih cijena nije jasna te da se temelji na netočnim podatcima.
+Što se tiče obrazloženja, tekst o kojem je riječ dovoljno je jasan jer u jasnom obliku prikazuje podatke koje je tuženik smatrao odlučujućima.
+Iz prethodno navedenog slijedi da prigovor koji se odnosi na nedostatnost obrazloženja treba odbiti.
+II. Zloporaba ovlasti
+Tužitelj prigovara Komisiji da je ovlasti koje ima na temelju članka 226. upotrijebila kako bi postigla rezultat koji ulazi u područje antidampinških mjera iz članka 91.
+No pobijana se Odluka ni zbog jednog elementa same te odluke ni zbog stava tuženika ne može smatrati prikrivenom antidampinškom mjerom, već i zbog toga što nije uložen prigovor zbog dampinga.
+Činjenica da je osporavana naknada bila ograničena trajanja i da se postupno smanjivala nespojiva je s antidampinškom mjerom, koja bi se morala primjenjivati u ovisnosti o trajanju aktivnosti koju treba spriječiti, a to se trajanje obično ne može predvidjeti.
+Stoga taj prigovor treba odbiti.
+III. Povreda Ugovora
+1. Pojam „sektor gospodarstva”
+Tužitelj osporava tvrdnju da je francuska industrija hladnjaka „sektor gospodarstva” u smislu članka 226.
+Proizvodnja neke robe može činiti takav „sektor” ako se ta roba, u skladu s opće prihvaćenim poimanjem, jasno razlikuje od drugih srodnih proizvoda.
+Ti su uvjeti ispunjeni u ovom slučaju.
+2. Oporezivanje kompresora
+Ne osporava se da poteškoće koje je tuženik utvrdio u sektoru gotovih hladnjaka nisu postojale u slučaju kompresora.
+Međutim, tuženik se pozvao na potrebu izbjegavanja zloporabe trgovine i naglasio da je ugradnja kompresora u hladnjake koji njima nisu opremljeni vrlo jednostavna radnja.
+Osim toga, i sam je tužitelj istaknuo da uvoznici talijanskih proizvoda u Francusku moraju preuzeti odgovornost za popravak proizvoda koje prodaju.
+Stoga su vjerojatno dovoljno dobro opremljeni i za montiranje kompresora, a da u tu svrhu ne moraju osnivati nova industrijska postrojenja.
+Iz toga slijedi da tužitelj nije dokazao kako je zabrinutost u pogledu mogućnosti zloporabe trgovine neutemeljena.
+Stoga taj prigovor treba odbiti.
+3. Primjena pojma „ozbiljne poteškoće koje bi mogle duže trajati”
+U skladu s člankom 226. stavkom 1. Ugovora, zaštitne mjere mogu se odobriti u slučaju ozbiljnih poteškoća koje bi mogle duže potrajati u bilo kojem sektoru gospodarstva.
+(a) Kada ih se samostalno promatra, brojke koje je iznio tuženik, a koje označavaju smanjenje francuske proizvodnje u razdoblju od 1961. do 1962. i povećanje uvoza u Francusku tijekom istog razdoblja – a koje tužitelj ne osporava – opravdavaju zaključak da su takve poteškoće postojale.
+Međutim, valja ispitati je li argumentacija koju je iznio tužitelj primjerena za opovrgavanje te pretpostavke.
+(b) Tužitelj tvrdi da francuska proizvodnja za 1962. nije mogla pokriti potrebe domaćeg tržišta te da je nedostajalo 265000 aparata.
+Ta tvrdnja nije relevantna.
+Zapravo, ta okolnost ne mora nužno dovesti do pretpostavke da je proizvodni kapacitet bio nedovoljan, nego se jednako tako može pripisati činjenici da je sam uvoz prouzročio smanjenje francuske proizvodnje.
+(c) Tužitelj potom pokušava dokazati da je od francuske proizvodnje za 1962. broj neprodanih hladnjaka na kraju godine iznosio najviše 8000.
+Međutim, ako se prihvati tužiteljeva metoda izračuna i ako se izvorne brojke zamijene onima koje su obje stranke, uz neznatna odstupanja, prihvatile na raspravi, dobije se broj između 48 000 i 57 000.
+U obzir valja uzeti ne samo situaciju 1962. godine nego povrh svega i kretanja nakon liberalizacije trgovine.
+U tom pogledu vrlo su važne velike zalihe koje su proizvođači imali na kraju 1961. (145000) i na kraju 1962. godine (193000) kao i razlika između te dvije brojke.
+Tužitelj tvrdi da su na zalihama bili zastarjeli modeli.
+Međutim, kriza u maloprodajnoj fazi može se u jednakoj mjeri pripisati i činjenici da se proizvođač nije uspio riješiti proizvoda iz prethodnih godina.
+Naposljetku, tužitelj pretpostavlja da su francuski proizvodi prodani 1962. bili isključivo proizvedeni te godine, što nije dokazano.
+(d) Naposljetku, stranke se razilaze oko pitanja je li se sniženje cijena koje su francuski proizvođači ponudili neposredno prije donošenja pobijane Odluke odnosilo na sve proizvode ili najveći dio njih, kao što smatra tužitelj, ili na samo malu količinu proizvoda.
+Tužiteljeva izjava, pod pretpostavkom da je točna, prije upućuje na postojanje „ozbiljnih poteškoća” jer znatno sniženje za koje su se proizvođači spontano odlučili može biti simptom zaoštrena tržišnog natjecanja.
+Osim toga, premda je svrha članka 226. dopustiti sektoru koji je u poteškoćama da se prilagodi zajedničkom tržištu, njime se pretpostavlja da su zainteresirane strane u stanju vlastitim naporima poduprijeti mjere Komisije.
+Činjenica da su takvi napori poduzeti stoga ne isključuje postojanje „ozbiljnih poteškoća”.
+(e) Nije, dakle utvrđeno da je tuženik pogrešno primijenio pojam „ozbiljnih poteškoća”.
+U tim okolnostima Sud treba odbiti taj prigovor.
+4. Diskriminacija
+(a) Uložen je prigovor da je Odlukom neopravdano povrijeđeno načelo nediskriminacije time što je njome francuska vlada ovlaštena naplaćivati posebnu naknadu samo na talijanske proizvode, dok su isti proizvodi podrijetlom iz drugih država članica Zajednice ili trećih zemalja izuzeti od plaćanja te naknade.
+Različito postupanje u neusporedivim situacijama ne dovodi automatski do zaključka o postojanju diskriminacije.
+Ono što po obliku, formalno, izgleda kao diskriminacija može zapravo po sadržaju, materijalno, ne biti diskriminacija.
+Materijalna diskriminacija značila bi ili različito postupanje u jednakim situacijama ili jednako postupanje u različitim situacijama.
+(b) Nadalje, budući da se, između ostalog, od Komisije zahtijeva da svoje intervencije ograniči na ono što je „nužno potrebno” , mora joj biti omogućeno intervenirati samo kada se radi o pojavama koje su uzrok dotičnih poteškoća.
+Osim toga, ona ima obvezu dati „prednost [...] mjerama koje će najmanje poremetiti funkcioniranje zajedničkog tržišta”.
+U vezi s tim ona mora uzeti u obzir da će u slučaju dvojbe „zajednička” narav tržišta manje patiti ako se od odredaba Ugovora odstupi samo u sklopu odnosa između dviju država članica.
+Štoviše, netom odbačena teza sama bi po sebi mogla pogodovati diskriminaciji, koja bi se mogla sastojati i u tome da se jednako postupa u nejednakim situacijama.
+Naposljetku, pri odobravanju zaštitnih mjera Komisija ima pravo napraviti razliku između država, a ne između poduzeća na zajedničkom tržištu, kada za to postoje opravdani razlozi.
+Takva je situacija kada se u određenoj državi može pronaći razina cijene koja se očito razlikuje od razine cijene u drugim državama.
+(c) Zato je važno utvrditi mogu li okolnosti ovog predmeta opravdati ograničenje zaštitnih mjera na uvoz iz Italije.
+Po mišljenju tuženika, uzrok francuskih poteškoća bilo je „golemo povećanje uvoza proizvoda podrijetlom iz Talijanske Republike” , zbog čega je tuženik ograničio zaštitne mjere na talijanske proizvode.
+Da opravda svoju prosudbu i odabir dotične mjere, Komisija se prije svega oslonila na zaključak da se, prvo, obujam uvoza iz trećih zemalja „nije povećao do neuobičajene razine” te stoga „nije mogao ometati reorganizaciju dotičnog francuskog sektora” i da se, drugo, cijena proizvoda uvezenih iz drugih država članica „ne razlikuje znatno od cijene sličnih francuskih proizvoda te da se povećanje obujma uvoza, premda je do njega došlo, ne smatra neuobičajenim”.
+Iz dokaza predočenih Sudu ne proizlazi očito da je ta prosudba Komisije pogrešna.
+Ne osporava se da je uvoz iz trećih zemalja bio neznatan.
+Nije dokazano da je Komisija pogriješila ustvrdivši da se cijena proizvoda podrijetlom iz drugih država članica nije znatno razlikovala od cijene sličnih francuskih proizvoda.
+Komisija je, dakle, mogla doći do zaključka da je golemo povećanje uvoza iz Italije, u usporedbi s obimom uvezenih proizvoda podrijetlom iz drugih država članica – koju nije smatrala neuobičajenom – čimbenik kojim se može opravdati mjera koja je predmet Odluke.
+(d) Iz svih prethodnih razmatranja proizlazi da šesta do devete uvodne izjave u preambuli pobijane Odluke opravdavaju nametanje naknade samo na talijanske proizvode.
+Stoga prigovor o diskriminaciji treba odbiti.
+5. Prigovor zbog materijalne pogreške u izračunu razlike u cijenama
+U skladu s tekstom Odluke, razlika „između prosječne cijene po litri talijanskih hladnjaka franko granica i prosječne cijene po litri jednakih francuskih aparata u fazi veletrgovine” , odnosno cijena franko tvornica, kao što je tuženik objasnio tijekom postupka, „iznosila je 30% talijanske cijene franko granica u Francuskoj, dok postojeća carinska zaštita ne premašuje 7,5%”.
+Tužitelj smatra da je Komisija trebala uzeti u obzir i druge čimbenike, koji bi znatno umanjili tu razliku.
+(a) Tužitelj ne osporava brojke koje je iznio tuženik kada je riječ o francuskoj cijeni koja se zaračunavala veletrgovcima (2946 FRF) i talijanskoj cijeni franko granica (2245 FRF), a čija aritmetička razlika iznosi čak 31,2% .
+On se ograničava na usporedbu metode izračuna koju je odabrao tuženik s drugom metodom izračuna utemeljenom na odobrenim popustima.
+Međutim, nije dokazano da je u dotičnim okolnostima ta metoda izračuna pouzdanija i primjerenija od metode koju je odabrala Komisija.
+Ustvari, tuženiku se ne može prigovoriti zbog toga što se poslužio najvažnijim i najizvjesnijim čimbenicima cijene.
+Nadalje, tužitelj nije objasnio ni opisao na koji se način neosporena razlika između cijena francuskih proizvoda u trenutku kada napuste tvornicu i cijena talijanskih proizvoda u trenutku kada stignu na francusko državno područje zatim smanjuje odobravanjem popusta, niti je naznačio osnovu po kojoj je izračunao navedene popuste.
+(b) Da bi dokazao postojanje posebnih naknada koje moraju plaćati distributeri talijanskih proizvoda, tužitelj je jednostavno iznio određene brojke izvučene iz bilanci dvaju poduzeća koja se bave uvozom.
+Te brojke, međutim, nemaju dokaznu snagu.
+Prvo, izračunane su na osnovi prometa dotičnih poduzeća, a to je osnova koju je teško usporediti s cijenama u praksi koje plaćaju veletrgovci i koje su ovdje jedino važne.
+Drugo, te brojke ostavljaju otvoreno pitanje sadržavaju li bilance distributera francuskih proizvoda usporedive stavke.
+Konačno, znatan dio bilančnih stavki na kojima se temelji izračun sastoji se od „izvanrednih distribucijskih troškova” , a to je suviše općenit pojam da bi se iz njega mogli izvući zaključci.
+Iz navedenih razloga taj prigovor treba odbiti.
+IV. Troškovi
+Na temelju članka 69. stavka 2. Poslovnika Suda, stranka koja ne uspije u postupku dužna je snositi troškove.
+Budući da tužitelj u ovom predmetu nije uspio u svojem tužbenom zahtjevu, treba mu se naložiti snošenje troškova.
+1. Zahtjev se odbija kao neosnovan.
+2. Tužitelju se nalaže snošenje troškova.

data/principle-mvep-justice-court/mvep-103-en.aligned.txt

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+IN CASE 6/68
+ZUCKERFABRIK WATENSTEDT GMBH, HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT WATENSTEDT UEBER SCHOENINGEN, KREIS HELMSTEDT, REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGERS RUDOLF MODROW AND ALFRED STEINMEIER, ASSISTED BY KONRAD REDEKER, ADVOCATE OF THE BONN BAR, WITH AN ADDRESS FOR SERVICE IN LUXEMBOURG AT THE CHAMBERS OF GEORGES REUTER, AVOCAT-AVOUE, 7 AVENUE DE L'ARSENAL,
+APPLICANT,
+COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, REPRESENTED BY ITS LEGAL ADVISER, HANS JUERGEN LAMBERS, ACTING AS AGENT, WITH AN ADDRESS FOR SERVICE IN LUXEMBOURG AT THE CHAMBERS OF EMILE REUTER, CENTRE EUROPEEN, LUXEMBOURG-KIRCHBERG,
+DEFENANT,
+APPLICATION RELATING AT THE PRESENT STAGE OF THE PROCEDURE TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE APPLICATION FOR THE ANNULMENT OF PARAGRAPH (3) OF ARTICLE 9 OF REGULATION NO 1009/67/EEC OF THE COUNCIL OF 18 DECEMBER 1967 ON THE COMMON ORGANIZATION OF THE MARKET IN SUGAR, WHICH PROVIDES THAT THE INTERVENTION SYSTEM PRESCRIBED BY PARAGRAPHS (1) AND (2) OF THE SAID ARTICLE 9 SHALL ONLY APPLY TO RAW BEET SUGAR UNTIL 31 DECEMBER 1969;
+THE APPLICATION SEEKS THE ANNULMENT OF ARTICLE 9 (3) OF REGULATION NO 1009/67 OF THE COUNCIL OF 18 DECEMBER 1967 ON THE COMMON ORGANIZATION OF THE MARKET IN SUGAR.
+BY VIRTUE OF THE CONTESTED PROVISION THE OBLIGATION, LAID DOWN BY ARTICLE 9 (1), ON THE PART OF THE INTERVENTION AGENCIES DESIGNATED BY THE MEMBER STATES TO BUY IN, SUBJECT TO CERTAIN CONDITIONS, AT THE INTERVENTION PRICE THE QUANTITIES OF RAW OR WHITE BEET OR CANE SUGAR OFFERED TO THEM, TERMINATES ON 31 DECEMBER 1969.
+THE DEFENDANT HAS RAISED AN OBJECTION OF INADMISSIBILITY UNDER ARTICLE 91 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE, ARGUING THAT THERE IS AT ISSUE NO DECISION WHICH IS OF DIRECT AND INDIVIDUAL CONCERN TO THE APPLICANT.
+IN ORDER TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE APPLICATION IS ADMISSIBLE, IT IS NECESSARY TO EXAMINE WHETHER THE CONTESTED MEASURE IS A REGULATION OR A DECISION WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLES 173 AND 189 OF THE TREATY.
+BY VIRTUE OF THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 189 OF THE TREATY THE CRITERION FOR DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN A REGULATION AND A DECISION IS WHETHER THE MEASURE AT ISSUE IS OF 'GENERAL APPLICATION' OR NOT.
+THE NATURE OF THE CONTESTED PROVISION MUST THEREFORE BE STUDIED AND IN PARTICULAR THE LEGAL EFFECTS WHICH IT IS INTENDED TO OR DOES ACTUALLY PRODUCE.
+HAVING OBSERVED THAT THIS PROVISION IS ADDRESSED TO VARIOUS CLASSES OF PERSONS, NAMELY, THE INTERVENTION AGENCIES, THE OTHER BUYERS AND THE SELLERS, INCLUDING THOSE PRODUCERS WHO MANUFACTURE EXCLUSIVELY RAW BEET SUGAR, THE APPLICANT SAYS THAT IN THE PRESENT CASE, IN ORDER TO DECIDE WHETHER THE MEASURE AT ISSUE IS IN THE NATURE OF A REGULATION OR AN INDIVIDUAL DECISION, IT IS NECESSARY TO EXAMINE SPECIFICALLY WHAT SIGNIFICANCE THE MEASURE HAS FOR THE APPLICANT OR FOR THE CLASS OF PERSONS TO WHICH IT BELONGS.
+ACCORDING TO THE APPLICANT THE EFFECTS OF THE CONTESTED MEASURE ARE OF DIRECT AND INDIVIDUAL CONCERN TO 'A SPECIFIC CLASS OF PERSONS: THE PRODUCERS OF RAW BEET SUGAR' BECAUSE THE CONTESTED MEASURE PRODUCES FOR THEM SPECIFIC EFFECTS WHICH ARE DIFFERENT FROM AND MORE BURDENSOME THAN THOSE WHICH IT PRODUCES ON THE OTHER PERSONS TO WHICH IT APPLIES.
+THE COMMON ORGANIZATION OF THE MARKET IN SUGAR, ESTABLISHED BY REGULATION NO 1009/67, IS ESSENTIALLY GOVERNED BY MEANS OF PRICE.
+IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT THE NECESSARY GUARANTEES IN RESPECT OF EMPLOYMENT AND STANDARDS OF LIVING ARE MAINTAINED FOR COMMUNITY GROWERS OF SUGAR BEET AND SUGAR CANE THIS REGULATION MAKES PROVISION FOR MEASURES TO STABILIZE THE SUGAR MARKET BY PROVIDING FOR THE FIXING OF A TARGET PRICE AND AN INTERVENTION PRICE FOR WHITE SUGAR, AS WELL AS DERIVED INTERVENTION PRICES WHICH TAKE ACCOUNT BOTH OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN REGIONAL PRICES AND OF THE STAGE OF PROCESSING OF THE PRODUCTS.
+THE OBLIGATION ON THE PART OF THE INTERVENTION AGENCIES TO BUY IN THE QUANTITIES OFFERED TO THEM IS AN ESSENTIAL CONDITION FOR MAINTAINING A LEVEL OF PRICES CORRESPONDING TO THE INTERVENTION PRICES.
+THUS, BY REQUIRING THESE AGENCIES TO BUY IN RAW SUGAR BEET UNTIL 31 DECEMBER 1969, ARTICLE 9 (3) OF REGULATION NO 1009/67 IN FACT STIPULATES THAT MEASURES RELATING TO THE COMMON ORGANIZATION OF THE MARKET IN SUGAR SHALL ONLY APPLY TO RAW BEET SUGAR UNTIL THE SAID DATE.
+THIS PROVISION THEREFORE REGULATES THE PRICES OF A PRODUCT AND, AS A RESULT, THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF BUYERS AND SELLERS, INCLUDING PRODUCERS.
+SUCH A MEASURE IS OF GENERAL APPLICATION WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 189 OF THE TREATY, FOR IT IS APPLICABLE TO OBJECTIVELY DETERMINED SITUATIONS AND INVOLVES LEGAL CONSEQUENCES FOR CATEGORIES OF PERSONS VIEWED IN A GENERAL AND ABSTRACT MANNER.
+IT AFFECTS THE APPLICANT SOLELY BY VIRTUE OF ITS CAPACITY AS A SELLER OF RAW BEET SUGAR, AND NOT BY REASON OF ANY MORE NARROWLY DEFINED CHARACTERISTIC.
+FURTHERMORE, A PROVISION WHICH, LIKE ARTICLE 9 (3), ABROGATES A PROVISION OF GENERAL APPLICATION OR PLACES A TIME-LIMIT ON ITS APPLICABILITY, PARTAKES OF THE GENERAL NATURE OF THE LATTER PROVISION.
+MOREOVER, A MEASURE DOES NOT LOSE ITS CHARACTER AS A REGULATION SIMPLY BECAUSE IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO ASCERTAIN WITH A GREATER OR LESSER DEGREE OF ACCURACY THE NUMBER OR EVEN THE IDENTITY OF THE PERSONS TO WHICH IT APPLIES AT ANY GIVEN TIME AS LONG AS THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE MEASURE IS APPLICABLE AS A RESULT OF AN OBJECTIVE SITUATION OF LAW OR OF FACT WHICH IT SPECIFIES AND WHICH IS IN HARMONY WITH ITS ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE.
+FURTHERMORE, THE FACT THAT A LEGAL PROVISION MAY HAVE DIFFERENT PRACTICAL EFFECTS ON THE DIFFERENT PERSONS TO WHOM IT APPLIES IN NO WAY CONTRADICTS ITS NATURE AS A REGULATION PROVIDED THAT THE SITUATION TO WHICH IT REFERS IS OBJECTIVELY DETERMINED.
+THE DEFENDANT HAS NOT CONTRAVENED THESE REQUIREMENTS IN NOT REGULATING THE SYSTEM OF PRICES FOR ONE PRODUCT IN THE SAME WAY AS FOR OTHER PRODUCTS.
+IF ONE WERE TO REFUSE TO RECOGNIZE A MEASURE REGULATING PRICES AS BEING IN THE NATURE OF A REGULATION SIMPLY BECAUSE IT CONCERNS A PARTICULAR PRODUCT AND AFFECTS THE PRODUCERS THEREOF BY REASON OF CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH THEY ARE DIFFERENTIATED FROM ALL OTHER PERSONS, THE CONCEPT OF A DECISION WOULD THEREBY BE EXPANDED TO SUCH AN EXTENT AS TO IMPERIL THE SYSTEM OF THE TREATY WHICH ONLY ALLOWS INDIVIDUALS TO BRING APPLICATIONS FOR ANNULMENT AGAINST INDIVIDUAL DECISIONS ADDRESSED TO THEM OR AGAINST MEASURES WHICH AFFECT THEM IN A SIMILAR MANNER.
+THE APPLICATION MUST THEREFORE BE DISMISSED AS INADMISSIBLE.
+UNDER ARTICLE 69 (2) OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE THE UNSUCCESSFUL PARTY SHALL BE ORDERED TO PAY THE COSTS. IN THE PRESENT CASE, AS THE APPLICANT HAS FAILED IN ITS ACTION IT MUST BEAR THE COSTS.
+THE COURT
+HEREBY:
+1. DISMISSES THE APPLICATION AS INADMISSIBLE;
+2. ORDERS THE APPLICANT TO PAY THE COSTS.

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+PRESUDA SUDA
+11. srpnja 1968. (*) U predmetu 6-68, Zuckerfabrik Watenstedt GmbH, sa sjedištem u Watenstedt über Schöningen, Kreis Helmstedt, koji zastupaju njegovi direktori Rudolf Modrow i Alfred Steinmeier, uz asistenciju Konrada Redekera, odvjetnika odvjetničke komore u Bonnu, s izabranom adresom za dostavu u Luxembourgu u uredu Georgesa Reutera, avocat-avoué, 7, avenue de l ' Arsenal,
+tužitelj,
+Vijeće Europskih zajednica, koje zastupa Hans Jürgen Lambers, pravni savjetnik, u svojstvu agenta, s izabranom adresom za dostavu u Luxembourgu u uredu Emilea Reutera, Centre Européen, Luxembourg-Kirchberg,
+tuženik,
+povodom zahtjeva, u trenutačnom stadiju postupka, koji se odnosi na dopuštenost tužbe za poništenje članka 9. stavka 3. Uredbe Vijeća br. 1009/67/EEZ od 18. prosinca 1967. o zajedničkoj organizaciji tržišta šećera, kojim je predviđeno da se sustav intervencija propisan stavcima 1. i 2. navedenog članka 9. primjenjuje na sirovi šećer od šećerne repe samo do 31. prosinca 1969., SUD, u sastavu: R. Lecourt, predsjednik, A. M. Donner, predsjednik vijeća, A. Trabucchi, J. Mertens de Wilmars (izvjestitelj) i P. Pescatore, suci,
+donosi sljedeću Presudu Tužbom se traži poništenje članka 9. stavka 3. Uredbe Vijeća br. 1009/67 od 18. prosinca 1967. o zajedničkoj organizaciji tržišta šećera.
+U skladu s pobijanom odredbom, 31. prosinca 1969. prestaje obveza interventnih agencija, predviđena člankom 9. stavkom 1., koje su odredile države članice da po interventnoj cijeni i pod određenim uvjetima kupuju ponuđene količine sirovog ili bijelog šećera od šećerne repe ili šećerne trske.
+Tuženik je iznio prigovor nedopuštenosti u skladu s člankom 91. Poslovnika uz tvrdnju da nije riječ o odluci koja se izravno i osobno odnosi na tužitelja.
+Kako bi se utvrdila dopuštenost tužbe, valja ispitati je li pobijani akt uredba ili odluka u smislu članaka 173. i 189. Ugovora.
+U skladu s člankom 189. drugim stavkom Ugovora kriterij razlikovanja uredbe i odluke jest ima li predmetni akt „opću primjenu” ili nema.
+Stoga valja ocijeniti narav pobijane odredbe, a osobito pravne učinke koje ta odredba namjerava proizvesti ili stvarno proizvodi.
+Tužitelj napominje da je ta odredba upućena različitim kategorijama pravnih subjekata, odnosno interventnim agencijama, drugim kupcima i prodavateljima, uključujući proizvođače koji proizvode isključivo sirovi šećer od šećerne repe, te navodi da, kako bi se u ovom sporu odlučilo je li predmetni akt uredba ili pojedinačna odluka, valja konkretno ispitati značenje tog akta za tužitelja ili kategoriju osoba kojoj on pripada.
+Prema mišljenju tužitelja, učinci pobijanog akta izravno se i osobno odnose na „određenu kategoriju osoba, proizvođače sirovog šećera od šećerne repe” , jer sporna mjera za njih proizvodi konkretne učinke koji se razlikuju od učinaka koje proizvodi za druge pravne subjekte na koje se primjenjuje te su veće opterećenje.
+Zajednička organizacija tržišta šećera, uspostavljena Uredbom br. 1009/67, u osnovi je uređena cijenama.
+Kako bi se osiguralo zadržavanje određenih nužnih jamstava zaposlenja i životnog standarda proizvođača šećerne repe i šećerne trske u Zajednici, tom uredbom predviđene su mjere za stabilizaciju tržišta šećera na način da su određene ciljna cijena i interventna cijena bijelog šećera te izvedene interventne cijene u kojima se u obzir uzimaju razlike među regionalnim cijenama i stadij prerade proizvoda.
+Obveza interventnih agencija da kupe ponuđene količine u biti je uvjet zadržavanja razine cijena koja odgovara interventnim cijenama.
+Stoga se, time što se te agencije obvezuje na kupnju sirovog šećera od šećerne repe do 31. prosinca 1969., člankom 9. stavkom 3. Uredbe br. 1009/67 u stvari propisuje da se mjere koje se odnose na zajedničku organizaciju tržišta šećera primjenjuju na sirovi šećer od šećerne repe samo do navedenog datuma.
+Stoga se tom odredbom uređuju sustav cijena proizvoda i, posljedično, prava i obveze kupaca i prodavatelja, uključujući proizvođače.
+Takva mjera ima opću primjenu u smislu članka 189. Ugovora jer se primjenjuje na objektivno utvrđene situacije i uključuje pravne učinke za kategorije osoba koje su predviđene općenito i apstraktno.
+Na tužitelja utječe isključivo u njegovu svojstvu prodavatelja sirovog šećera od šećerne repe, a ne na temelju bilo koje druge uže definirane osobine.
+Osim toga, odredba kojom se, kao člankom 9. stavkom 3., stavlja izvan snage odredba opće primjene ili vremenski ograničava njezina primjena dio je opće naravi potonje odredbe.
+S druge strane, regulatorna narav akta nije dovedena u pitanje mogućnošću više ili manje preciznog utvrđenja broja ili čak identiteta pravnih subjekata na koje se on odnosi u danom trenutku ako je nesporno da se primjenjuje slijedom objektivnih pravnih ili činjeničnih okolnosti utvrđenih tim aktom, a koje su u skladu s njegovim ciljem.
+Nadalje, činjenica da pravna odredba može imati razli��ite konkretne učinke na različite pravne subjekte na koje se primjenjuje ni na koji način nije u suprotnosti s regulatornom naravi te odredbe pod uvjetom da je situacija na koju se odnosi objektivno utvrđena.
+Tuženik nije povrijedio te zahtjeve time što sustav cijena za jedan proizvod nije uredio na isti način kao za druge proizvode.
+Ako bi se odbilo priznati da propis kojim se uređuju cijene ima regulatornu narav samo zato što se odnosi na određeni proizvod i utječe na njegove proizvođače zbog činjenične situacije u kojoj se njih razlikuje od svih drugih osoba, pojam odluke time bi se proširio u tolikoj mjeri da bi ugrozio sustav Ugovora, kojim je pojedincima dopušteno da podnesu tužbu za poništenje samo protiv pojedinačnih odluka koje su im upućene ili protiv akata koji na sličan način na njih utječu.
+Tužbu stoga valja odbaciti kao nedopuštenu.
+Sukladno članku 69. stavku 2. Poslovnika, stranka koja ne uspije u postupku dužna je snositi troškove. Budući da u ovom slučaju nije uspio u svojem tužbenom zahtjevu, tuženik snosi troškove.
+SUD,
+odbijajući sve druge šire ili protivne zahtjeve, proglašava i presuđuje:
+1. Tužba se odbacuje kao nedopuštena.
+2. Tužitelju se nalaže snošenje troškova.

data/principle-mvep-justice-court/mvep-104-en.aligned.txt

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+IN JOINED CASES 2 AND 3/69
+REFERENCE TO THE COURT UNDER ARTICLE 177 OF THE EEC TREATY BY THE VREDERECHTER, ANTWERP (SECOND CANTON), FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING IN THE ACTION PENDING BEFORE THAT COURT BETWEEN
+SOCIAAL FONDS VOOR DE DIAMANTARBEIDERS, ANTWERP,
+AND
+SA CH. BRACHFELD AND SONS, ANTWERP,
+(CASE 2/69)
+SOCIAAL FONDS VOOR DE DIAMANTARBEIDERS, ANTWERP,
+AND
+CHOUGAL DIAMOND CO., ANTWERP,
+(CASE 3/69)
+ON THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLES 9, 12, 13, 18, 37 AND 95 OF THE TREATY,
+1 BY JUDGMENT OF 24 DECEMBER 1968, RECEIVED AT THE COURT REGISTRY ON 16 JANUARY 1969, THE VREDERECHTER OF THE SECOND CANTON OF ANTWERP REFERRED TO THE COURT, UNDER ARTICLE 177 OF THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EEC, SEVERAL QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLES 9, 12, 13, 18 AND 95 OF THE EEC TREATY.
+2/4 WITH THE EXCEPTION OF QUESTION NO 5 (c), THE PURPOSE OF THESE QUESTIONS IS ESSENTIALLY TO CLARIFY THE CONCEPT OF A CHARGE HAVING AN EFFECT EQUIVALENT TO A CUSTOMS DUTY, REFERRED TO IN ARTICLES 9 AND 12 OF THE EEC TREATY, AND THE SCOPE OF THE PROHIBITION LAID DOWN THEREIN.
+THE SAME PURPOSE IS PRESENT IN THE REFERENCES MADE TO ARTICLES 18, 37 AND 95 WITH A VIEW TO COMPARING AND DISTINGUISHING ARTICLES 9 AND 12.
+THESE QUESTIONS MUST THEREFORE BE CONSIDERED IN THEIR ENTIRETY.
+5/6 ACCORDING TO ARTICLE 9, THE COMMUNITY SHALL BE BASED UPON A CUSTOMS UNION FOUNDED UPON THE PROHIBITION BETWEEN MEMBER STATES OF CUSTOMS DUTIES AND OF "ALL CHARGES HAVING EQUIVALENT EFFECT", AND THE ADOPTION OF A COMMON CUSTOMS TARIFF IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH THIRD COUNTRIES.
+ARTICLE 12 PROHIBITS THE INTRODUCTION OF "NEW CUSTOMS DUTIES ON IMPORTS... OR ANY CHARGES HAVING EQUIVALENT EFFECT".
+7/10 THE POSITION OF THESE ARTICLES AT THE BEGINNING OF THAT PART OF THE TREATY RESERVED FOR THE "FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMUNITY", ARTICLE 9 BEING THE FIRST PROVISION APPEARING AT THE VERY BEGINNING OF THE TITLE DEALING WITH THE "FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS" AND ARTICLE 12 HEADING THE SECTION ON THE "ELIMINATION OF CUSTOMS DUTIES BETWEEN MEMBER STATES", IS SUFFICIENT TO SHOW THE FUNDAMENTAL ROLE OF THE PROHIBITIONS LAID DOWN THEREIN.
+THE IMPORTANCE OF THESE PROHIBITIONS IS SUCH THAT, IN ORDER TO PREVENT THEIR CIRCUMVENTION BY MEANS OF VARIOUS CUSTOMS AND FISCAL MEASURES, THE TREATY WAS INTENDED TO PREVENT ANY POSSIBLE FAILURE IN THEIR IMPLEMENTATION.
+ARTICLE 17 THEREFORE SPECIFIES THAT THE PROHIBITIONS IN ARTICLE 9 SHALL ALSO APPLY TO CUSTOMS DUTIES OF A FISCAL NATURE.
+ARTICLE 95, WHICH APPEARS BOTH IN THAT PART OF THE TREATY WHICH DEALS WITH THE "POLICY OF THE COMMUNITY" AND IN THE CHAPTER ON "TAX PROVISIONS", IS INTENDED TO FILL IN ANY BREACHES WHICH A FISCAL MEASURE MIGHT OPEN IN THE PROHIBITIONS LAID DOWN, BY PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION ON IMPORTED PRODUCTS OF INTERNAL TAXATION IN EXCESS OF THAT IMPOSED ON DOMESTIC PRODUCTS.
+11/14 IN PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF CUSTOMS DUTIES, THE TREATY DOES NOT DISTINGUISH BETWEEN GOODS ACCORDING TO WHETHER OR NOT THEY ENTER INTO COMPETITION WITH THE PRODUCTS OF THE IMPORTING COUNTRY.
+THUS, THE PURPOSE OF THE ABOLITION OF CUSTOMS BARRIERS IS NOT MERELY TO ELIMINATE THEIR PROTECTIVE NATURE, AS THE TREATY SOUGHT ON THE CONTRARY TO GIVE GENERAL SCOPE AND EFFECT TO THE RULE ON THE ELIMINATION OF CUSTOMS DUTIES AND CHARGES HAVING EQUIVALENT EFFECT IN ORDER TO ENSURE THE FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS.
+IT FOLLOWS FROM THE SYSTEM AS A WHOLE AND FROM THE GENERAL AND ABSOLUTE NATURE OF THE PROHIBITION OF ANY CUSTOMS DUTY APPLICABLE TO GOODS MOVING BETWEEN MEMBER STATES THAT CUSTOMS DUTIES ARE PROHIBITED INDEPENDENTLY OF ANY CONSIDERATION OF THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH THEY WERE INTRODUCED AND THE DESTINATION OF THE REVENUE OBTAINED THEREFROM.
+THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THIS PROHIBITION IS BASED ON THE FACT THAT ANY PECUNIARY CHARGE - HOWEVER SMALL - IMPOSED ON GOODS BY REASON OF THE FACT THAT THEY CROSS A FRONTIER CONSTITUTES AN OBSTACLE TO THE MOVEMENT OF SUCH GOODS.
+15/18 THE EXTENSION OF THE PROHIBITION OF CUSTOMS DUTIES TO CHARGES HAVING EQUIVALENT EFFECT IS INTENDED TO SUPPLEMENT THE PROHIBITION AGAINST OBSTACLES TO TRADE CREATED BY SUCH DUTIES BY INCREASING ITS EFFICIENCY.
+THE USE OF THESE TWO COMPLEMENTARY CONCEPTS THUS TENDS, IN TRADE BETWEEN MEMBER STATES, TO AVOID THE IMPOSITION OF ANY PECUNIARY CHARGE ON GOODS CIRCULATING WITHIN THE COMMUNITY BY VIRTUE OF THE FACT THAT THEY CROSS A NATIONAL FRONTIER.
+THUS, IN ORDER TO ASCRIBE TO A CHARGE AN EFFECT EQUIVALENT TO A CUSTOMS DUTY, IT IS IMPORTANT TO CONSIDER THIS EFFECT IN THE LIGHT OF THE OBJECTIVES OF THE TREATY, IN THE PARTS, TITLES AND CHAPTERS IN WHICH ARTICLES 9 AND 12 ARE TO BE FOUND, PARTICULARLY IN RELATION TO THE FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS.
+CONSEQUENTLY, ANY PECUNIARY CHARGE, HOWEVER SMALL AND WHATEVER ITS DESIGNATION AND MODE OF APPLICATION, WHICH IS IMPOSED UNILATERALLY ON DOMESTIC OR FOREIGN GOODS BY REASON OF THE FACT THAT THEY CROSS A FRONTIER, AND WHICH IS NOT A CUSTOMS DUTY IN THE STRICT SENSE, CONSTITUTES A CHARGE HAVING EQUIVALENT EFFECT WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLES 9 AND 12 OF THE TREATY, EVEN IF IT IS NOT IMPOSED FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE STATE, IS NOT DISCRIMINATORY OR PROTECTIVE IN EFFECT OR IF THE PRODUCT ON WHICH THE CHARGE IS IMPOSED IS NOT IN COMPETITION WITH ANY DOMESTIC PRODUCT.
+19/21 IT FOLLOWS FROM ALL THE PROVISIONS REFERRED TO AND FROM THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY THAT THE PROHIBITION OF NEW CUSTOMS DUTIES OR CHARGES HAVING EQUIVALENT EFFECT, LINKED TO THE PRINCIPLE OF THE FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS, CONSTITUTES A FUNDAMENTAL RULE WHICH, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY, DOES NOT PERMIT OF ANY EXCEPTIONS.
+IN THIS RESPECT, IT FOLLOWS FROM ARTICLES 95 ET SEQ. THAT THE CONCEPT OF A CHARGE HAVING EQUIVALENT EFFECT DOES NOT INCLUDE TAXATION WHICH IS IMPOSED IN THE SAME WAY WITHIN A STATE ON SIMILAR OR COMPARABLE DOMESTIC PRODUCTS, OR AT LEAST WHICH FALLS, IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH PRODUCTS, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF GENERAL INTERNAL TAXATION, OR WHICH IS INTENDED TO COMPENSATE FOR SUCH INTERNAL TAXATION WITHIN THE LIMITS LAID DOWN BY THE TREATY.
+ALTHOUGH IT IS NOT IMPOSSIBLE THAT IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES A SPECIFIC SERVICE ACTUALLY RENDERED MAY FORM THE CONSIDERATION FOR A POSSIBLE PROPORTIONAL PAYMENT FOR THE SERVICE IN QUESTION, THIS MAY ONLY APPLY IN SPECIFIC CASES WHICH CANNOT LEAD TO THE CIRCUMVENTION OF THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLES 9 AND 12 OF THE TREATY.
+22/23 THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY LAYING DOWN THE ABOVEMENTIONED PROHIBITIONS IMPOSE PRECISE AND CLEARLY-DEFINED OBLIGATIONS ON MEMBER STATES WHICH DO NOT REQUIRE ANY SUBSEQUENT INTERVENTION BY COMMUNITY OR NATIONAL AUTHORITIES FOR THEIR IMPLEMENTATION.
+FOR THIS REASON, THESE PROVISIONS DIRECTLY CONFER RIGHTS ON INDIVIDUALS CONCERNED.
+24/26 IN PROHIBITING THE APPLICATION OF ANY NEW PECUNIARY CHARGE TO GOODS CIRCULATING WITHIN THE COMMUNITY WHEN THEY CROSS A FRONTIER, THE TREATY DOES NOT DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THE NATIONALS OF THE VARIOUS MEMBER STATES.
+IN FACT THE TREATY PROHIBITS ANY PECUNIARY CHARGE ON IMPORTS AND EXPORTS BETWEEN MEMBER STATES, IRRESPECTIVE OF THE NATIONALITY OF THE TRADERS WHO MIGHT BE PLACED AT A DISADVANTAGE BY SUCH MEASURES.
+THUS, IN APPLYING THESE PROVISIONS, THERE IS NO JUSTIFICATIONS FOR A DISTINCTION TO BE MADE ACCORDING TO WHETHER THE MEASURES IN QUESTION ADVERSELY AFFECT CERTAIN MEMBER STATES AND THEIR NATIONALS, OR ALL THE CITIZENS OF THE COMMUNITY, OR ONLY THE NATIONALS OF THE MEMBER STATE WHICH WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MEASURES IN QUESTION.
+27 QUESTION 5 (c) SUBMITTED BY THE VREDERECHTER OF THE SECOND CANTON OF ANTWERP ASKS WHETHER A NEW CHARGE ON IMPORTS FROM ALL FOREIGN COUNTRIES IS ALWAYS PROHIBITED AS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE TREATY ON THE GROUND THAT IT WOULD FORM AN OBSTACLE TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMON CUSTOMS TARIFF.
+28/32 AS REGARDS TRADE WITH THIRD COUNTRIES, THE TREATY CONTAINS NO EXPRESS PROVISIONS SIMILAR TO THOSE WHICH PROHIBIT THE IMPOSITION OF CHARGES HAVING AN EFFECT EQUIVALENT TO CUSTOMS DUTIES IN TRADE BETWEEN MEMBER STATES.
+THE EXISTENCE OF PECUNIARY CHARGES OTHER THAN CUSTOMS DUTIES IN THE STRICT SENSE WHICH, BEFORE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMON CUSTOMS TARIFF, WERE IMPOSED BY A MEMBER STATE AT THE TIME OF THE IMPORTATION INTO ITS TERRITORY OF GOODS COMING DIRECTLY FROM THIRD COUNTRIES, WAS NOT LIKELY TO ACT AS AN OBSTACLE TO THE ALIGNMENT OF THE CUSTOMS TARIFFS OF EACH MEMBER STATE WITH THE RATES OF THE COMMON CUSTOMS TARIFF.
+IT IS TRUE THAT THE OBJECTIVES SOUGHT BY THE UNIFORM APPLICATION OF THE COMMON CUSTOMS TARIFF BY ALL MEMBER STATES IN THE RELATIONS WITH THIRD COUNTRIES MIGHT BE HINDERED BY THE UNILATERAL ADOPTION OR RETENTION OF SUCH MEASURES BY A MEMBER STATE, ESPECIALLY WHERE THE PRINCIPLE OF THE FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS IN FREE CIRCULATION IN A MEMBER STATE WOULD BE INSUFFICIENT TO CORRECT THE EFFECTS OF SUCH NATIONAL MEASURES.
+IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, THE QUESTION MIGHT ARISE WHETHER THE TREATY IMPOSES LIMITS ON THE FREEDOM OF STATES TO ADOPT OR TO MAINTAIN MEASURES WHICH MIGHT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE OPERATION OF THE COMMON CUSTOMS TARIFF.
+HOWEVER, SUCH A QUESTION CAN ONLY ARISE IN RESPECT OF THE PERIOD AFTER THE INTRODUCTION OF THE COMMON CUSTOMS TARIFF.
+THE COSTS INCURRED BY THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF BELGIUM, WHICH HAVE BOTH SUBMITTED OBSERVATIONS TO THE COURT, ARE NOT RECOVERABLE AND AS THESE PROCEEDINGS ARE, IN SO FAR AS THE PARTIES TO THE MAIN ACTION ARE CONCERNED, IN THE NATURE OF A STEP IN THE ACTION PENDING BEFORE THE VREDERECHTER, ANTWERP, THE DECISION AS TO COSTS IS A MATTER FOR THAT COURT.
+THE COURT
+IN ANSWER TO THE QUESTIONS REFERRED TO IT BY THE VREDERECHTER, ANTWERP, BY JUDGMENT OF THAT COURT DATED 24 DECEMBER 1968, HEREBY RULES:
+1. THE CONCEPT OF A CHARGE HAVING EQUIVALENT EFFECT REFERRED TO IN ARTICLES 9 AND 12 OF THE EEC TREATY INCLUDES ANY PECUNIARY CHARGE, OTHER THAN A CUSTOMS DUTY IN THE STRICT SENSE, IMPOSED ON GOODS CIRCULATING WITHIN THE COMMUNITY BY REASON OF THE FACT THAT THEY CROSS A FRONTIER, IN SO FAR AS SUCH A CHARGE IS NOT PERMITTED BY A SPECIFIC PROVISION OF THE TREATY;
+2. WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO ANY LIMITATIONS WHICH MIGHT BE IMPOSED IN ORDER TO ATTAIN THE OBJECTIVES OF THE COMMON CUSTOMS TARIFF, PECUNIARY CHARGES OTHER THAN CUSTOMS DUTIES IN THE STRICT SENSE APPLIED BY A MEMBER STATE BEFORE THE INTRODUCTION OF THAT TARIFF ON GOODS IMPORTED DIRECTLY FROM THIRD COUNTRIES ARE NOT, ACCORDING TO THE TREATY, INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS CONCERNING THE GRADUAL ALIGNMENT OF NATIONAL CUSTOMS TARIFFS ON THE COMMON EXTERNAL TARIFF.

data/principle-mvep-justice-court/mvep-104-hr.aligned.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+PRESUDA SUDA 1. srpnja 1969. (*) U spojenim predmetima 2 i 3-69,
+povodom zahtjeva za prethodnu odluku na temelju članka 177. Ugovora o EEZ-u, koji je Sudu uputio Vredegerechter te Antwerpen (drugi kanton) (Mirovni sud u Antwerpenu, Belgija), u postupku koji se vodi pred tim sudom između
+Sociaal Fonds voor de Diamantarbeiders, Antwerpen,
+i
+S.A. Ch. Brachfeld & Sons, Antwerpen,
+(predmet 2-69),
+Sociaal Fonds voor de Diamantarbeiders, Antwerpen,
+i
+Chougol Diamond Co., Antwerpen,
+(predmet 3-69),
+o tumačenju članaka 9., 12., 13., 18., 37. i 95. Ugovora, SUD,
+donosi sljedeću Presudu 1 Presudom od 24. prosinca 1968., koju je tajništvo Suda zaprimilo 16. siječnja 1969., mirovni sudac drugog kantona u Antwerpenu uputio je na temelju članka 177. Ugovora o osnivanju EEZ-a nekoliko pitanja o tumačenju članaka 9., 12., 13., 18. i 95. Ugovora o EEZ-u.
+2 Osim pitanja br. 5 (c), svrha je tih pitanja u biti pojasniti pojam davanja s istovrsnim učinkom kao carina iz članaka 9. i 12. Ugovora o EEZ-u i područje primjene zabrane koja je u njima utvrđena.
+3 Istu svrhu imaju i upućivanja na članke 18., 37. i 95. koja služe usporedbi i razlikovanju članaka 9. i 12.
+4 Ta pitanja stoga valja razmotriti u cjelini.
+5 U skladu s člankom 9. Zajednica se temelji na carinskoj uniji koja se zasniva na zabrani carina i „svih davanja s istovrsnim učinkom” među državama članicama te donošenju Zajedničke carinske tarife u odnosima s trećim zemljama.
+6 Člankom 12. zabranjuje se uvođenje „novih uvoznih carina... ili davanja s istovrsnim učinkom”.
+7 Položaj tih članaka na početku dijela Ugovora „Temelji Zajednice” , pri čemu se članak 9. nalazi na samom početku glave „Slobodno kretanje robe” , a članak 12. na početku odjeljka „Ukidanje carina među državama članicama” , dovoljan je da pokaže temeljnu ulogu zabrana koje su u njima utvrđene.
+8 Važnost je tih odredaba tolika da se Ugovorom namjeravalo spriječiti sve moguće propuste u njihovoj provedbi kako bi se onemogućilo njihovo izbjegavanje pomoću različitih carinskih i fiskalnih praksi.
+9 Stoga je u članku 17. utvrđeno da se zabrane iz članka 9. primjenjuju i na carine fiskalne naravi.
+10 Cilj je članka 95., koji se nalazi u dijelu Ugovora „Politika Zajednice” i u poglavlju „Porezne odredbe” , popuniti sve praznine koje zbog fiskalnog postupka mogu nastati u utvrđenim zabranama tako da se zabrani uvođenje nacionalnih poreza na uvezene proizvode koji su viši od poreza na domaće proizvode.
+11 U Ugovoru se u pogledu zabrane uvođenja carina ne pravi razlika među robom ovisno o tome konkurira li ona proizvodima zemlje uvoznice ili ne.
+12 Stoga svrha ukidanja carinskih prepreka nije samo ukloniti njihovu zaštitnu narav; naprotiv, Ugovorom se nastoji dati opće značenje i učinak pravilu ukidanja carina i davanja s istovrsnim učinkom kako bi se osiguralo slobodno kretanje robe.
+13 Iz sustava u cjelini te iz opće i apsolutne naravi zabrane svih carina primjenjivih na robu koja se kreće među državama članicama proizlazi da su carine zabranjene neovisno o svim razmatranjima svrhe u koju su uvedene i o namjeni prihoda ostvarenih od njih.
+14 Opravdanje te zabrane temelji se na činjenici da svako novčano davanje, makar i minimalno, uvedeno na robu uz obrazloženje da ona prelazi granicu čini prepreku kretanju takve robe.
+15 Cilj je proširenja zabrane carina na davanja s istovrsnim učinkom dopuniti zabranu prepreka trgovini proizišlih iz tih carina i povećati njezinu učinkovitost.
+16 Uporabom tih dvaju komplementarnih pojmova stoga se nastoji izbjeći da se u trgovini među državama članicama uvedu novčana davanja na robu u prometu unutar Zajednice uz obrazloženje da ta roba prelazi nacionalnu granicu.
+17 Stoga, kako bi se davanju pripisao istovrsni učinak kao carina, važno je taj učinak razmotriti s obzirom na ciljeve Ugovora u dijelovima, glavama i poglavljima u kojima se nalaze članci 9. i 12., osobito u odnosu na slobodno kretanje robe.
+18 Slijedom toga, svako novčano davanje, makar i minimalno te neovisno o njegovoj namjeni i načinu primjene, koje je jednostrano uvedeno na domaću ili stranu robu uz obrazloženje da ta roba prelazi granicu i koje nije carina u užem smislu jest davanje s istovrsnim učinkom u smislu članaka 9. i 12. Ugovora, čak i ako nije uvedeno u korist države, nema diskriminirajući ili zaštitni učinak te proizvod na koji se davanje uvodi ne konkurira domaćem proizvodu.
+19 Iz svih navedenih odredaba te iz njihova odnosa s drugim odredbama Ugovora proizlazi da zabrana novih carina ili davanja s istovrsnim učinkom, koja je povezana s načelom slobodnog kretanja robe, čini temeljno pravilo kojim, ne dovodeći u pitanje druge odredbe Ugovora, nisu dopuštena nikakva izuzeća.
+20 Iz članaka 95. i sljedećih proizlazi da pojam davanja s istovrsnim učinkom ne uključuje poreze koji su unutar države uvedeni na isti način na slične ili usporedive domaće proizvode ili koji su barem, u nedostatku takvih proizvoda, obuhvaćeni okvirom općih nacionalnih poreza ili čija je svrha nadoknaditi takve nacionalne poreze unutar ograničenja utvrđenih Ugovorom.
+21 Iako nije isključeno da u određenim okolnostima posebna usluga koja je stvarno pružena može biti predmet naknade za moguće proporcionalno plaćanje za predmetnu uslugu, to se može primijeniti samo u posebnim slučajevima koji ne mogu dovesti do izbjegavanja odredaba članaka 9. i 12. Ugovora.
+22 Odredbama Ugovora u kojima su utvrđene prethodno navedene zabrane državama članicama određuju se precizne i jasno utvrđene obveze čija provedba ne zahtijeva nikakvu naknadnu intervenciju Zajednice ili nacionalnih tijela.
+23 Stoga se tim odredbama izravno dodjeljuju prava pojedincima.
+24 U Ugovoru se u pogledu zabrane primjene svih novih novčanih davanja na robu u prometu unutar Zajednice pri njezinu prelasku granice ne pravi razlika među državljanima različitih država članica.
+25 Ugovorom se zabranjuju sva novčana davanja na uvoz i izvoz među državama članicama, neovisno o državljanstvu gospodarskih subjekata koje se takvim mjerama može staviti u nepovoljan položaj.
+26 Stoga u primjeni tih odredaba nema opravdanja za razlikovanje ovisno o tome utječu li predmetne mjere negativno na određene države članice i njihove državljane ili na sve građane Zajednice ili samo na državljane države članice koja je bila odgovorna za predmetne mjere.
+27 Pitanjem 5 (c) koje je uputio mirovni sudac drugog kantona u Antwerpenu pita se je li novo davanje na uvoz iz svih stranih zemalja uvijek zabranjeno kao nespojivo s Ugovorom jer čini prepreku uspostavi Zajedničke carinske tarife.
+28 Kad je riječ o trgovini s trećim zemljama, Ugovor ne sadržava izričite odredbe slične onima kojima se zabranjuje uvođenje davanja s istovrsnim učinkom kao carine u trgovini među državama članicama.
+29 Postojanje novčanih davanja koja nisu carine u užem smislu i koja su prije uspostave Zajedničke carinske tarife države članice naplaćivale pri uvozu robe izravno iz trećih zemalja na svoje državno područje nije mogla biti prepreka usklađivanju carinskih tarifa svake države članice sa stopama Zajedničke carinske tarife.
+30 Točno je da bi ciljevi koje se nastoji ostvariti ujednačenom primjenom Zajedničke carinske tarife u svim državama članicama u odnosima s trećim zemljama mogli biti ugroženi jednostranim donošenjem ili zadržavanjem takvih mjera u državi članici, osobito ako načelo slobodnog kretanja robe u slobodnom prometu u državi članici ne bi bilo dovoljno da se isprave učinci takvih nacionalnih mjera.
+31 U takvim okolnostima može se postaviti pitanje ograničava li se Ugovorom sloboda država da donesu ili zadrže mjere koje mogu negativno utjecati na funkcioniranje Zajedničke carinske tarife.
+32 Međutim, takvo pitanje može se postaviti samo u pogledu razdoblja nakon uvođenja Zajedničke carinske tarife.
+33 Troškovi Komisije Europskih zajednica i vlade Kraljevine Belgije, koje su podnijele očitovanja Sudu, ne nadoknađuju se. 34 Budući da ovaj postupak ima značaj prethodnog pitanja za stranke glavnog postupka pred mirovnim sucem u Antwerpenu, na tom je sudu da odluči o troškovima postupka.
+SUD,
+odlučujući o pitanjima koja mu je presudom od 24. prosinca 1968. uputio mirovni sudac drugog kantona u Antwerpenu, odlučuje:
+1. Pojam davanja s istovrsnim učinkom iz članaka 9. i 12. Ugovora o EEZ-u uključuje sva novčana davanja, osim carine u užem smislu, koja se naplaćuju na robu u prometu unutar Zajednice uz obrazloženje da ta roba prelazi granicu, u mjeri u kojoj takvo davanje nije dopušteno posebnom odredbom Ugovora.
+2. Ne dovodeći u pitanje ograničenja koja se mogu odrediti kako bi se ostvarili ciljevi Zajedničke carinske tarife, u skladu s Ugovorom novčana davanja koja nisu carine u užem smislu i koja je država članica primjenjivala prije uvođenja te tarife na robu koja se izravno uvozi iz trećih zemalja nisu nespojiva sa zahtjevima postupnog usklađivanja nacionalnih carinskih tarifa sa zajedničkom vanjskom tarifom. Objavljeno na javnoj raspravi u Luxembourgu 1. srpnja 1969.

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+REFERENCE TO THE COURT UNDER ARTICLE 177 OF THE EEC TREATY BY THE VERWALTUNGSGERICHT STUTTGART FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING IN THE ACTION PENDING BEFORE THAT COURT BETWEEN
+ERICH STAUDER, 15 MARIENWEG, 79 ULM,
+AND
+CITY OF ULM, SOZIALAMT (SOCIAL WELFARE OFFICE),
+ON THE FOLLOWING QUESTION:
+"CAN THE FACT THAT THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES OF 12 FEBRUARY 1969 (69/71/EEC) MAKES THE SALE OF BUTTER AT A REDUCED PRICE TO BENEFICIARIES UNDER CERTAIN WELFARE SCHEMES DEPENDENT ON REVEALING THE NAME OF THE BENEFICIARY TO THE SELLERS BE CONSIDERED COMPATIBLE WITH THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY LAW IN FORCE?",
+1 BY AN ORDER OF 18 JUNE 1969 RECEIVED BY THE COURT REGISTRY ON 26 JUNE 1969 THE VERWALTUNGSGERICHT STUTTGART HAS REFERRED TO THE COURT FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING UNDER ARTICLE 177 OF THE EEC TREATY THE QUESTION WHETHER THE REQUIREMENT IN ARTICLE 4 OF DECISION NO 69/71/EEC OF THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES THAT THE SALE OF BUTTER AT REDUCED PRICES TO BENEFICIARIES UNDER CERTAIN SOCIAL WELFARE SCHEMES SHALL BE SUBJECT TO THE CONDITION THAT THE NAME OF BENEFICIARIES SHALL BE DIVULGED TO RETAILERS CAN BE CONSIDERED COMPATIBLE WITH THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY LAW IN FORCE.
+2 THE ABOVEMENTIONED DECISION IS ADDRESSED TO ALL THE MEMBER STATES AND AUTHORIZES THEM, WITH A VIEW TO STIMULATING THE SALE OF SURPLUS QUANTITIES OF BUTTER ON THE COMMON MARKET, TO MAKE BUTTER AVAILABLE AT A LOWER PRICE THAN NORMAL TO CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF CONSUMERS WHO ARE IN RECEIPT OF CERTAIN SOCIAL ASSISTANCE.
+THIS AUTHORIZATION IS SUBJECT TO CERTAIN CONDITIONS DESIGNED, INTER ALIA, TO ENSURE THAT THE PRODUCT, WHEN MARKETED IN THIS WAY, IS NOT PREVENTED FROM REACHING ITS PROPER DESTINATION.
+TO THAT END ARTICLE 4 OF DECISION NO 69/71 STIPULATES IN TWO OF ITS VERSIONS, ONE BEING THE GERMAN VERSION, THAT THE STATES MUST TAKE ALL NECESSARY MEASURES TO ENSURE THAT BENEFICIARIES CAN ONLY PURCHASE THE PRODUCT IN QUESTION ON PRESENTATION OF A "COUPON INDICATING THEIR NAMES", WHILST IN THE OTHER VERSIONS, HOWEVER, IT IS ONLY STATED THAT A "COUPON REFERRING TO THE PERSON CONCERNED" MUST BE SHOWN, THUS MAKING IT POSSIBLE TO EMPLOY OTHER METHODS OF CHECKING IN ADDITION TO NAMING THE BENEFICIARY.
+IT IS THEREFORE NECESSARY IN THE FIRST PLACE TO ASCERTAIN EXACTLY WHAT METHODS THE PROVISION AT ISSUE PRESCRIBES.
+3 WHEN A SINGLE DECISION IS ADDRESSED TO ALL THE MEMBER STATES THE NECESSITY FOR UNIFORM APPLICATION AND ACCORDINGLY FOR UNIFORM INTERPRETATION MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO CONSIDER ONE VERSION OF THE TEXT IN ISOLATION BUT REQUIRES THAT IT BE INTERPRETED ON THE BASIS OF BOTH THE REAL INTENTION OF ITS AUTHOR AND THE AIM HE SEEKS TO ACHIEVE, IN THE LIGHT IN PARTICULAR OF THE VERSIONS IN ALL FOUR LANGUAGES.
+4 IN A CASE LIKE THE PRESENT ONE, THE MOST LIBERAL INTERPRETATION MUST PREVAIL, PROVIDED THAT IT IS SUFFICIENT TO ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVES PURSUED BY THE DECISION IN QUESTION.
+IT CANNOT, MOREOVER, BE ACCEPTED THAT THE AUTHORS OF THE DECISION INTENDED TO IMPOSE STRICTER OBLIGATIONS IN SOME MEMBER STATES THAN IN OTHERS.
+5 THIS INTERPRETATION IS, MOREOVER, CONFIRMED BY THE COMMISSION's DECLARATION THAT AN AMENDMENT DESIGNED TO REMOVE THE REQUIREMENT THAT A NAME SHALL APPEAR ON THE COUPON WAS PROPOSED BY THE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE TO WHICH THE DRAFT OF DECISION NO 69/71 WAS SUBMITTED FOR ITS OPINION. THE LAST RECITAL OF THE PREAMBLE TO THIS DECISION SHOWS THAT THE COMMISSION INTENDED TO ADOPT THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT.
+6 IT FOLLOWS THAT THE PROVISION IN QUESTION MUST BE INTERPRETED AS NOT REQUIRING - ALTHOUGH IT DOES NOT PROHIBIT - THE IDENTIFICATION OF BENEFICIARIES BY NAME.
+THE COMMISSION WAS THUS ABLE TO PUBLISH ON 29 JULY 1969 AN AMENDING DECISION TO THIS EFFECT.
+EACH OF THE MEMBER STATES IS ACCORDINGLY NOW ABLE TO CHOOSE FROM A NUMBER OF METHODS BY WHICH THE COUPONS MAY REFER TO THE PERSON CONCERNED.
+7 INTERPRETED IN THIS WAY THE PROVISION AT ISSUE CONTAINS NOTHING CAPABLE OF PREJUDICING THE FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS ENSHRINED IN THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY LAW AND PROTECTED BY THE COURT.
+8 THE COSTS INCURRED BY THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, WHICH HAS SUBMITTED ITS OBSERVATIONS TO THE COURT, ARE NOT RECOVERABLE, AND AS THESE PROCEEDINGS ARE, IN SO FAR AS THE PARTIES TO THE MAIN ACTION ARE CONCERNED, A STEP IN THE ACTION PENDING BEFORE THE VERWALTUNGSGERICHT STUTTGART THE DECISION ON COSTS IS A MATTER FOR THAT COURT.
+THE COURT
+IN ANSWER TO THE QUESTION REFERRED TO IT BY THE VERWALTUNGSGERICHT STUTTGART BY ORDER OF THAT COURT OF 18 JUNE 1969 HEREBY RULES:
+1. THE SECOND INDENT OF ARTICLE 4 OF DECISION NO 69/71/(EEC) OF 12 FEBRUARY 1969, AS RECTIFIED BY DECISION NO 69/244/(EEC), IS TO BE INTERPRETED AS ONLY REQUIRING THE IDENTIFICATION OF THOSE BENEFITING FROM THE MEASURES FOR WHICH IT PROVIDES; IT DOES NOT, HOWEVER, REQUIRE OR PROHIBIT THEIR IDENTIFICATION BY NAME SO AS TO ENABLE CHECKS TO BE MADE;
+2. EXAMINATION OF THE QUESTION REFERRED TO THE COURT BY THE VERWALTUNGSGERICHT STUTTGART REVEALS NOTHING CAPABLE OF AFFECTING THE VALIDITY OF THE SAID DECISION.

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+„Zahtjev za prethodnu odluku” U predmetu 29-69, povodom zahtjeva za prethodnu odluku na temelju članka 177. Ugovora o EEZ-u, koji je Sudu uputio Verwaltungsgericht Stuttgart (Upravni sud u Stuttgartu, Njemačka), u sporu koji se vodi pred tim sudom između
+Ericha Staudera, 79 Ulm, Marienweg 15, tužitelja,
+i
+Stadt Ulm, Sozialamt, tuženika,
+o sljedećem pitanju:
+„Može li se činjenica da se Odlukom Komisije Europskih zajednica od 12. veljače 1969. (69/71/EEZ) prodaja maslaca po sniženoj cijeni korisnicima u okviru određenih programa socijalne zaštite uvjetuje otkrivanjem imena korisnika prodavateljima smatrati spojivom s općim načelima važećeg prava Zajednice?”, SUD,
+donosi sljedeću Presudu 1 Rješenjem od 18. lipnja 1969., koje je tajništvo Suda zaprimilo 26. lipnja 1969., Verwaltungsgerichta Stuttgart (Upravni sud u Stuttgartu) uputio je na temelju članka 177. Ugovora o EEZ-u prethodno pitanje o tome može li se činjenica da se člankom 4. Odluke Komisije Europskih zajednica br. 69/71/EEZ prodaja maslaca po sniženoj cijeni korisnicima u okviru određenih programa socijalne zaštite uvjetuje otkrivanjem imena korisnika prodavateljima smatrati spojivom s općim načelima važećeg prava Zajednice.
+2 Prethodno navedena odluka upućena je svim državama članicama i ovlašćuje ih da određenim kategorijama potrošača koji primaju socijalnu pomoć maslac stave na raspolaganje po nižoj cijeni od uobičajene kako bi se potaknula prodaja prekomjernih količina maslaca na zajedničkom tržištu.
+To ovlaštenje podliježe određenim uvjetima kojima se, među ostalim, osigurava da se proizvod koji se na taj način stavlja na tržište ne preusmjeri pa ne stigne na svoje pravo odredište.
+U tu je svrhu člankom 4. Odluke br. 69/71 u njezinim dvjema inačicama, od kojih je jedna na njemačkom jeziku, propisano da države moraju poduzeti sve potrebne mjere kako bi osigurale da korisnici predmetni proizvod mogu kupiti tek nakon što predoče „bon na kojemu su navedena njihova imena” , dok je u drugim inačicama samo navedeno da treba predočiti „individualizirani bon” , čime se omogućuje primjena drugih načina kontrole osim navođenja imena korisnika.
+Stoga prvo valja točno utvrditi koji su načini predviđeni spornom odredbom.
+3 Ako je pojedinačna odluka upućena svim državama članicama, nužnost ujednačene primjene i stoga tumačenja isključuje da se jedna inačica teksta razmatra izdvojeno, već zahtijeva tumačenje uzimajući u obzir stvarnu namjeru autora i cilj koji želi postići, osobito u svjetlu inačica utvrđenih na svim četirima jezicima.
+4 U slučaju kao što je ovaj prednost ima najslobodnije tumačenje, pod uvjetom da je ono dovoljno za ostvarenje ciljeva predmetne odluke.
+Osim toga, ne može se prihvatiti da su autori odluke namjeravali u određenim državama članicama odrediti strože obveze nego u drugima.
+5 Nadalje, to je tumačenje potvrđeno izjavom Komisije da je Upravljački odbor, kojemu je na mišljenje dostavljen nacrt Odluke br. 69/71, predložio izmjenu kojom bi se uklonio zahtjev navođenja imena na bonu te iz posljednje uvodne izjave te odluke proizlazi da je Komisija namjerava donijeti predloženu izmjenu.
+6 Iz navedenoga proizlazi da spornu odredbu treba tumačiti na način da se njome ne zahtijeva, ali se ni ne zabranjuje, identifikacija korisnika na temelju imena.
+Komisija je stoga mogla 29. srpnja 1969. objaviti odluku o ispravku u tom smislu.
+Stoga svaka država članica sada može birati među različitim načinima individualizacije.
+7 Ako se tumači na taj način, sporna odredba ne sadržava ništa čime se mogu dovesti u pitanje temeljna ljudska prava koja su sadržana u općim načelima prava Zajednice i čije poštovanje osigurava Sud.
+8 Troškovi Komisije Europskih zajednica, koja je podnijela očitovanja Sudu, ne nadoknađuju se. Budući da ovaj postupak ima značaj prethodnog pitanja za stranke glavnog postupka pred Verwaltungsgerichtom Stuttgart (Upravni sud u Stuttgartu), na tom je sudu da odluči o troškovima postupka.
+SUD,
+odlučujući o pitanju koje mu je rješenjem od 18. lipnja 1969. uputio Verwaltungsgericht Stuttgart (Upravni sud u Stuttgartu), odlučuje:
+1. Članak 4. drugu alineju Odluke br. 69/71/EEZ od 12. veljače 1969., kako je ispravljena Odlukom br. 69/244/EEZ, treba tumačiti na način da zahtijeva samo individualizaciju korisnika mjere koja je njome predviđena, ali ne zahtijeva ni ne zabranjuje njihovu identifikaciju na temelju imena u svrhu kontrole.
+2. Ispitivanjem pitanja koje je Sudu uputio Verwaltungsgericht Stuttgart (Upravni sud u Stuttgartu) nije otkriveno ništa što bi moglo utjecati na valjanost predmetne odredbe.

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+IN CASE 9/70
+REFERENCE TO THE COURT UNDER ARTICLE 177 OF THE EEC TREATY BY THE FINANZGERICHT MUENCHEN FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING IN THE ACTION PENDING BEFORE THAT COURT BETWEEN
+FRANZ GRAD, LINZ-URFAHR (AUSTRIA),
+AND FINANZAMT TRAUNSTEIN
+ON THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 4 OF COUNCIL DECISION NO 65/271/EEC OF 13 MAY 1965 AND OF ARTICLE 1 OF COUNCIL DIRECTIVE NO 67/227/EEC OF 11 APRIL 1967, AND, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, OF ARTICLES 5, 74, 80, 92 AND 93 OF THE EEC TREATY,
+1 BY AN ORDER DATED 23 FEBRUARY 1970, RECEIVED AT THE COURT ON 16 MARCH 1970, THE FINANZGERICHT MUENCHEN HAS REFERRED TO THE COURT, PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 177 OF THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, SEVERAL QUESTIONS ON THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 4 OF THE COUNCIL DECISION OF 13 MAY 1965 ON THE HARMONIZATION OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS AFFECTING COMPETITION IN TRANSPORT BY RAIL, ROAD AND INLAND WATERWAY (OJ SPECIAL EDITION 1965, P. 67) AND OF ARTICLE 1 OF THE FIRST COUNCIL DIRECTIVE OF 11 APRIL 1967 ON THE HARMONIZATION OF LEGISLATION OF MEMBER STATES CONCERNING TURNOVER TAXES (OJ SPECIAL EDITION 1967, P. 14).
+ALTERNATIVELY, IN CASE THE COURT SHOULD GIVE A NEGATIVE ANSWER TO THESE QUESTIONS, THE FINANZGERICHT HAS SUBMITTED FURTHER QUESTIONS ON THE INTERPRETATION IN PARTICULAR OF ARTICLES 90 AND 92 OF THE EEC TREATY.
+THE FIRST QUESTION
+2 IN ITS FIRST QUESTION THE FINANZGERICHT ASKS THE COURT FOR A RULING ON WHETHER THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 4 OF THE DECISION IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 1 OF THE DIRECTIVE PRODUCES DIRECT EFFECTS IN THE LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE MEMBER STATES AND THOSE SUBJECT TO THEIR JURISDICTION IN SUCH A WAY THAT THESE PROVISIONS CREATE RIGHTS FOR INDIVIDUALS WHICH THE NATIONAL COURTS MUST PROTECT.
+3 THE QUESTION CONCERNS THE COMBINED EFFECT OF PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN A DECISION AND A DIRECTIVE.
+ACCORDING TO ARTICLE 189 OF THE EEC TREATY A DECISION IS BINDING IN ITS ENTIRETY UPON THOSE TO WHOM IT IS ADDRESSED.
+FURTHERMORE, ACCORDING TO THIS ARTICLE A DIRECTIVE IS BINDING, AS TO THE RESULT TO BE ACHIEVED, UPON EACH MEMBER STATE TO WHICH IT IS ADDRESSED, BUT LEAVES TO THE NATIONAL AUTHORITIES THE CHOICE OF FORM AND METHODS.
+4 THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT IN ITS OBSERVATIONS DEFENDS THE VIEW THAT BY DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN THE EFFECTS OF REGULATIONS ON THE ONE HAND AND OF DECISIONS AND DIRECTIVES ON THE OTHER, ARTICLE 189 PRECLUDES THE POSSIBILITY OF DECISIONS AND DIRECTIVES PRODUCING THE EFFECTS MENTIONED IN THE QUESTION, WHICH ARE RESERVED TO REGULATIONS.
+5 HOWEVER, ALTHOUGH IT IS TRUE THAT BY VIRTUE OF ARTICLE 189, REGULATIONS ARE DIRECTLY APPLICABLE AND THEREFORE BY VIRTUE OF THEIR NATURE CAPABLE OF PRODUCING DIRECT EFFECTS, IT DOES NOT FOLLOW FROM THIS THAT OTHER CATEGORIES OF LEGAL MEASURES MENTIONED IN THAT ARTICLE CAN NEVER PRODUCE SIMILAR EFFECTS.
+IN PARTICULAR, THE PROVISION ACCORDING TO WHICH DECISIONS ARE BINDING IN THEIR ENTIRETY ON THOSE TO WHOM THEY ARE ADDRESSED ENABLES THE QUESTION TO BE PUT WHETHER THE OBLIGATION CREATED BY THE DECISION CAN ONLY BE INVOKED BY THE COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS AGAINST THE ADDRESSEE OR WHETHER SUCH A RIGHT MAY POSSIBLY BE EXERCISED BY ALL THOSE WHO HAVE AN INTEREST IN THE FULFILMENT OF THIS OBLIGATION.
+IT WOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE BINDING EFFECT ATTRIBUTED TO DECISIONS BY ARTICLE 189 TO EXCLUDE IN PRINCIPLE THE POSSIBILITY THAT PERSONS AFFECTED MAY INVOKE THE OBLIGATION IMPOSED BY A DECISION.
+PARTICULARLY IN CASES WHERE, FOR EXAMPLE, THE COMMUNITY AUTHORITIES BY MEANS OF A DECISION HAVE IMPOSED AN OBLIGATION ON A MEMBER STATE OR ALL THE MEMBER STATES TO ACT IN A CERTAIN WAY, THE EFFECTIVENES ("L'EFFET UTILE") OF SUCH A MEASURE WOULD BE WEAKENED IF THE NATIONALS OF THAT STATE COULD NOT INVOKE IT IN THE COURTS AND THE NATIONAL COURTS COULD NOT TAKE IT INTO CONSIDERATION AS PART OF COMMUNITY LAW.
+ALTHOUGH THE EFFECTS OF A DECISION MAY NOT BE IDENTICAL WITH THOSE OF A PROVISION CONTAINED IN A REGULATION, THIS DIFFERENCE DOES NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE END RESULT, NAMELY THE RIGHT OF THE INDIVIDUAL TO INVOKE THE MEASURE BEFORE THE COURTS, MAY BE THE SAME AS THAT OF A DIRECTLY APPLICABLE PROVISION OF A REGULATION.
+6 ARTICLE 177, WHEREBY THE NATIONAL COURTS ARE EMPOWERED TO REFER TO THE COURT ALL QUESTIONS REGARDING THE VALIDITY AND INTERPRETATION OF ALL ACTS OF THE INSTITUTIONS WITHOUT DISTINCTION, ALSO IMPLIES THAT INDIVIDUALS MAY INVOKE SUCH ACTS BEFORE THE NATIONAL COURTS.
+THEREFORE, IN EACH PARTICULAR CASE, IT MUST BE ASCERTAINED WHETHER THE NATURE, BACKGROUND AND WORDING OF THE PROVISION IN QUESTION ARE CAPABLE OF PRODUCING DIRECT EFFECTS IN THE LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE ADDRESSEE OF THE ACT AND THIRD PARTIES.
+7 THE COUNCIL DECISION OF 13 MAY 1965 ADDRESSED TO ALL THE MEMBER STATES IS BASED IN PARTICULAR ON ARTICLE 75 OF THE TREATY WHICH EMPOWERS THE COUNCIL TO LAY DOWN "COMMON RULES", "THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH NON-RESIDENT CARRIERS MAY OPERATE" AND "ANY OTHER APPROPRIATE PROVISION" TO IMPLEMENT A COMMON TRANSPORT POLICY.
+THE COUNCIL THEREFORE HAS EXTENSIVE FREEDOM IN THE CHOICE OF THE MEASURES TO ADOPT.
+THE DECISION IN QUESTION, TAKEN AS A WHOLE, LAYS DOWN THE OBJECTIVES TO BE ACHIEVED WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF A POLICY OF HARMONIZING NATIONAL PROVISIONS AND THE TIMETABLE FOR THEIR REALIZATION.
+IN VIEW OF THESE OBJECTIVES THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 4 OF THE DECISION PROVIDES THAT ONCE A COMMON SYSTEM OF TURNOVER TAX HAS BEEN ADOPTED BY THE COUNCIL AND BROUGHT INTO FORCE IN THE MEMBER STATES, THE LATTER SHALL APPLY THAT SYSTEM, IN A MANNER TO BE DETERMINED, TO THE CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY RAIL, ROAD AND INLAND WATERWAY.
+THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF THAT ARTICLE PROVIDES THAT THIS COMMON SYSTEM OF TURNOVER TAX SHALL, IN SO FAR AS THE CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY ROAD, BY RAIL AND BY INLAND WATERWAY IS SUBJECT TO SPECIFIC TAXES INSTEAD OF TO THE TURNOVER TAX, REPLACE SUCH SPECIFIC TAXES.
+8 THUS THIS PROVISION IMPOSES TWO OBLIGATIONS ON THE MEMBER STATES: FIRST, TO APPLY THE COMMON SYSTEM OF TURNOVER TAX TO THE CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY RAIL, ROAD AND INLAND WATERWAY BY A GIVEN DATE, AND SECONDLY TO REPLACE THE SPECIFIC TAXES REFERRED TO BY THE SECOND PARAGRAPH BY THIS SYSTEM NO LATER THAN THE DATE WHEN IT HAS BEEN BROUGHT INTO FORCE.
+THIS SECOND OBLIGATION OBVIOUSLY IMPLIES A PROHIBITION ON INTRODUCING OR REINTRODUCING SUCH TAXES SO AS TO PREVENT THE COMMON SYSTEM OF TURNOVER TAX FROM APPLYING CONCURRENTLY IN THE FIELD OF TRANSPORT WITH ADDITIONAL TAX SYSTEMS OF THE LIKE NATURE.
+9 IT IS APPARENT FROM THE FILE SUBMITTED BY THE FINANZGERICHT THAT THE QUESTION RELATES IN PARTICULAR TO THE SECOND OBLIGATION.
+THE SECOND OBLIGATION IS BY ITS NATURE MANDATORY AND GENERAL, ALTHOUGH THE PROVISION LEAVES OPEN THE DETERMINATION OF THE DATE ON WHICH IT BECOMES EFFECTIVE.
+IT THUS EXPRESSLY PROHIBITS THE MEMBER STATES FROM APPLYING THE COMMON SYSTEM OF TURNOVER TAX CONCURRENTLY WITH SPECIFIC TAXES LEVIED INSTEAD OF TURNOVER TAXES.
+THIS OBLIGATION IS UNCONDITIONAL AND SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR AND PRECISE TO BE CAPABLE OF PRODUCING DIRECT EFFECTS IN THE LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE MEMBER STATES AND THOSE SUBJECT TO THEIR JURISDICTION.
+10 THE DATE ON WHICH THIS OBLIGATION BECOMES EFFECTIVE WAS LAID DOWN BY THE COUNCIL DIRECTIVES ON THE HARMONIZATION OF THE LEGISLATION CONCERNING TURNOVER TAXES WHICH FIXED THE LATEST DATE BY WHICH THE MEMBER STATES MUST INTRODUCE INTO THEIR LEGISLATION THE COMMON SYSTEM OF VALUE-ADDED TAX.
+THE FACT THAT THIS DATE WAS FIXED BY A DIRECTIVE DOES NOT DEPRIVE THIS PROVISION OF ANY OF ITS BINDING FORCE.
+THUS THE OBLIGATION CREATED BY THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 4 OF THE DECISION OF 13 MAY 1965 WAS PERFECTED BY THE FIRST DIRECTIVE.
+THEREFORE THIS PROVISION IMPOSES ON THE MEMBER STATES OBLIGATIONS - IN PARTICULAR THE OBLIGATION NOT TO APPLY AS FROM A CERTAIN DATE THE COMMON SYSTEM OF VALUE-ADDED TAX CONCURRENTLY WITH THE SPECIFIC TAXES MENTIONED - WHICH ARE CAPABLE OF PRODUCING DIRECT EFFECTS IN THE LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE MEMBER STATES AND THOSE SUBJECT TO THEIR JURISDICTION AND OF CREATING THE RIGHT FOR THE LATTER TO INVOKE THESE OBLIGATIONS BEFORE THE COURTS.
+THE SECOND QUESTION
+11 THE SECOND QUESTION OF THE FINANZGERICHT ASKS THE COURT TO RULE WHETHER ARTICLE 4 OF THE DECISION IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 1 OF THE DIRECTIVE PROHIBITS A MEMBER STATE, WHICH HAS ALREADY BROUGHT THE COMMON SYSTEM OF VALUE-ADDED TAX INTO FORCE AND ABOLISHED SPECIFIC TAXES ON THE CARRIAGE OF GOODS, BEFORE 1 JANUARY 1970 FROM REINTRODUCING SPECIFIC TAXES WHICH ARE LEVIED ON THE CARRIAGE OF GOODS INSTEAD OF TURNOVER TAX.
+THIS QUESTION IS OBVIOUSLY AIMED AT ARTICLE 1 OF THE FIRST DIRECTIVE AS AMENDED BY THE THIRD COUNCIL DIRECTIVE OF 9 DECEMBER 1969 ON THE SAME SUBJECT (OJ SPECIAL EDITION 1969, P. 551) WHICH SUBSTITUTED THE DATE OF 1 JANUARY 1972 FOR THAT OF 1 JANUARY 1970.
+12 IT IS TRUE THAT A LITERAL INTERPRETATION OF THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 4 OF THE DECISION MIGHT LEAD TO THE VIEW THAT THIS PROVISION REFERS TO THE DATE ON WHICH THE MEMBER STATE CONCERNED HAS BROUGHT THE COMMON SYSTEM INTO FORCE IN ITS OWN TERRITORY.
+13 HOWEVER, SUCH AN INTERPRETATION WOULD NOT CORRESPOND TO THE AIM OF THE DIRECTIVES IN QUESTION.
+THE AIM OF THE DIRECTIVES IS TO ENSURE THAT THE SYSTEM OF VALUE-ADDED TAX IS APPLIED THROUGHOUT THE COMMON MARKET FROM A CERTAIN DATE ONWARDS.
+AS LONG AS THIS DATE HAS NOT YET BEEN REACHED THE MEMBER STATES RETAIN THEIR FREEDOM OF ACTION IN THIS RESPECT.
+14 MOREOVER, THE OBJECTIVE OF THE DECISION OF 13 MAY 1965 CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED AT THE COMMUNITY LEVEL AND THEREFORE CANNOT BE BROUGHT ABOUT SOLELY BY THE INTRODUCTION OF HARMONIZATION MEASURES ON THE PART OF MEMBER STATES INDIVIDUALLY AT DIFFERENT DATES AND ACCORDING TO DIFFERENT TIMETABLES.
+15 THE ANSWER TO THE QUESTION PUT MUST THEREFORE BE THAT THE PROHIBITION CONTAINED IN THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 4 OF THE DECISION CAN ONLY COME INTO EFFECT AS FROM 1 JANUARY 1972.
+THE THIRD QUESTION
+16 IN ITS THIRD QUESTION THE FINANZGERICHT ASKS THE COURT TO RULE WHETHER THE FEDERAL TAX ON THE CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY ROAD (STRASSENGUETER VERKEHRSTEUER) MUST BE CONSIDERED AS A SPECIFIC TAX LEVIED ON THE CARRIAGE OF GOODS INSTEAD OF TURNOVER TAX AND WHETHER IT THEREFORE COMES UNDER THE PROHIBITION IN THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 4 OF THE DECISION OF 13 MAY 1965.
+17 IT IS NOT FOR THE COURT IN THESE PROCEEDINGS TO ASSESS FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF COMMUNITY LAW THE FEATURES OF A TAX INTRODUCED BY ONE OF THE MEMBER STATES.
+ON THE OTHER HAND, IT IS WITHIN ITS JURISDICTION TO INTERPRET THE RELEVANT PROVISION OF COMMUNITY LAW IN ORDER TO ENABLE THE NATIONAL COURT TO APPLY IT CORRECTLY TO THE TAX AT ISSUE.
+18 ARTICLE 4 PROVIDES FOR THE ABOLITION OF "SPECIFIC TAXES" IN ORDER TO ENSURE A COMMON AND CONSISTENT SYSTEM OF TAXATION OF TURNOVER.
+BY FAVOURING IN THIS WAY THE TRANSPARENCY OF THE MARKET IN THE FIELD OF TRANSPORT THIS PROVISION CONTRIBUTES TO THE APPROXIMATION OF THE CONDITIONS OF COMPETITION AND MUST BE REGARDED AS AN ESSENTIAL MEASURE FOR THE HARMONIZATION OF THE TAX OF THE MEMBER STATES IN THE FIELD OF TRANSPORT.
+THIS OBJECTIVE DOES NOT PROHIBIT THE IMPOSITION ON TRANSPORT SERVICES OF OTHER TAXES WHICH ARE OF A DIFFERENT NATURE AND HAVE AIMS DIFFERENT FROM THOSE PURSUED BY THE COMMON SYSTEM OF TURNOVER TAX.
+19 A TAX WITH THE FEATURES DESCRIBED BY THE FINANZGERICHT WHICH IS NOT IMPOSED ON COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS BUT ON A SPECIFIC ACTIVITY, WITHOUT DISTINGUISHING, MOREOVER, BETWEEN ACTIVITIES ON ONE's OWN ACCOUNT AND THOSE ON THE ACCOUNT OF OTHERS, AND THE BASIS OF ASSESSMENT OF WHICH IS NOT THE CONSIDERATION FOR A SERVICE BUT THE PHYSICAL LOAD EXPRESSED IN METRIC TONNES/KILOMETRES TO WHICH THE ROADS ARE SUBJECTED THROUGH THE ACTIVITY TAXED DOES NOT CORRESPOND TO THE USUAL FORM OF TURNOVER TAX. FURTHERMORE THE FACT THAT IT IS INTENDED TO EFFECT A REDISTRIBUTION OF TRAFFIC IS CAPABLE OF DISTINGUISHING IT FROM THE "SPECIFIC TAXES" REFERRED TO IN THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 4.
+THE QUESTION PUT MUST THEREFORE BE ANSWERED TO THIS EFFECT.
+QUESTIONS 4 TO 11
+20 THE FINANZGERICHT HAS MERELY PUT THESE QUESTIONS AS ALTERNATIVES IN CASE THE FIRST THREE QUESTIONS SHOULD BE ANSWERED IN THE NEGATIVE.
+SINCE THIS IS NOT THE CASE PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO THE FIRST QUESTION, THERE IS NO REASON TO ANSWER QUESTIONS 4 TO 11.
+21 THE COSTS INCURRED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, WHICH HAVE SUBMITTED OBSERVATIONS TO THE COURT, ARE NOT RECOVERABLE.
+AS THESE PROCEEDINGS ARE, IN SO FAR AS THE PARTIES TO THE MAIN ACTION ARE CONCERNED, A STEP IN THE ACTION PENDING BEFORE THE FINANZGERICHT MUENCHEN, THE DECISION ON COSTS IS A MATTER FOR THAT COURT.
+THE COURT
+IN ANSWER TO THE QUESTIONS REFERRED TO IT BY THE FINANZGERICHT MUENCHEN, BY ORDER OF 23 FEBRUARY 1970, HEREBY RULES:
+1. THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 4 OF THE COUNCIL DECISION OF 13 MAY 1965, WHICH PROHIBITS THE MEMBER STATES FROM APPLYING THE COMMON SYSTEM OF TURNOVER TAX CONCURRENTLY WITH SPECIFIC TAXES LEVIED INSTEAD OF TURNOVER TAX, IS CAPABLE, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE COUNCIL DIRECTIVES OF 11 APRIL 1967 AND 9 DECEMBER 1969, OF PRODUCING DIRECT EFFECTS IN THE LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE MEMBER STATES TO WHICH THE DECISION IS ADDRESSED AND THOSE SUBJECT TO THEIR JURISDICTION AND OF CREATING FOR THE LATTER THE RIGHT TO INVOKE THESE PROVISIONS BEFORE THE COURTS;
+2. THE PROHIBITION ON APPLYING THE COMMON SYSTEM OF TURNOVER TAX CONCURRENTLY WITH SPECIFIC TAXES BECOMES EFFECTIVE ON THE DATE LAID DOWN IN THE THIRD COUNCIL DIRECTIVE OF 9 DECEMBER 1969, NAMELY ON 1 JANUARY 1972;
+3. A TAX WITH THE FEATURES DESCRIBED BY THE FINANZGERICHT WHICH IS NOT IMPOSED UPON COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS BUT MERELY BECAUSE GOODS ARE CARRIED BY ROAD AND THE BASIS OF ASSESSMENT OF WHICH IS NOT CONSIDERATION FOR A SERVICE BUT THE PHYSICAL LOAD EXPRESSED IN METRIC TONNES/KILOMETRES TO WHICH THE ROADS ARE SUBJECTED THROUGH THE ACTIVITY TAXED, DOES NOT CORRESPOND TO THE USUAL FORM OF TURNOVER TAX WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 4 OF THE DECISION OF 13 MAY 1965.

data/principle-mvep-justice-court/mvep-106-hr.aligned.txt

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+PRESUDA SUDA 6. listopada 1970. U predmetu C-9/70,
+povodom zahtjeva za prethodnu odluku na temelju članka 177. Ugovora o EEZ-u, koji je uputio Finanzgericht München (Financijski sud u Münchenu, Njemačka), u postupku koji se vodi pred tim sudom između
+FRANZ GRAD, Linz-Urfahr (Austrija),
+i Finanzamt Traunstein
+o tumačenju članka 4. Odluke Vijeća br. 65/271/EEZ od 13. svibnja 1965. i članka 1. Direktive Vijeća br. 67/227/EEZ od 11. travnja 1967. te, podredno, članaka 5., 74., 80., 92. i 93. Ugovora o EEZ-u, SUD, u sastavu: R. Lecourt, predsjednik, R. Monaco i P. Pescatore, predsjednici vijeća, A. M. Donner (izvjestitelj), A. Trabucchi, W. Strauß i J. Mertens de Wilmars, suci,
+donosi sljedeću PRESUDU 1 Rješenjem od 23. veljače 1970., koje je Sud zaprimio 16. ožujka 1970., Finanzgericht (Financijski sud) u Münchenu uputio je Sudu na temelju članka 177. Ugovora o osnivanju Europske ekonomske zajednice zahtjev za prethodnu odluku o tumačenju članka 4. Odluke Vijeća od 13. svibnja 1965. o usklađivanju određenih odredaba koje utječu na tržišno natjecanje u željezničkom i cestovnom prometu i prometu unutarnjim plovnim putovima (SL 1965., str. 1500.) i članka 1. Prve direktive Vijeća od 11. travnja 1967. o usklađivanju zakonodavstava država članica koja se odnose na poreze na promet (SL 1967., str. 1301.).
+Podredno, u slučaju da Sud niječno odgovori na ta pitanja, Finanzgericht (Financijski sud) uputio je daljnja pitanja o tumačenju osobito članaka 90. i 92. Ugovora o EEZ-u.
+Prvo pitanje
+2 Prvim pitanjem Finanzgericht (Financijski sud) traži od Suda da presudi proizvodi li drugi stavak članka 4. Odluke u vezi s člankom 1. Direktive izravne učinke u pravnim odnosima između država članica i pojedinaca koji podliježu njihovu zakonodavstvu na način da tim odredbama nastaju prava pojedinaca koja nacionalni sudovi moraju štititi.
+3 Pitanje se odnosi na zajednički učinak odredaba sadržanih u odluci i direktivi.
+U skladu s člankom 189. Ugovora o EEZ-u, odluka je u cijelosti obvezujuća za onog komu je upućena.
+Nadalje, u skladu s tim člankom direktiva je u pogledu rezultata koji je potrebno postići obvezujuća za svaku državu članicu kojoj je upućena, a odabir oblika i metoda postizanja tog rezultata prepušten je nacionalnim tijelima.
+4 Njemačka vlada u svojim očitovanjima brani stav da članak 189., time što pravi razliku između učinaka uredaba s jedne strane te odluka i direktiva s druge strane, isključuje mogućnost da odluke i direktive proizvode učinke spomenute u pitanju jer su takvi učinci rezervirani za uredbe.
+5 Međutim, premda je istina da su, u skladu s člankom 189., uredbe izravno primjenjive te stoga na temelju svoje naravi mogu proizvoditi izravne učinke, iz toga ne proizlazi da druge kategorije pravnih mjera spomenute u tom članku nikada ne mogu proizvesti slične učinke.
+Prije svega, odredba prema kojoj je odluka u cijelosti obvezujuća za onog komu je upućena omogućuje postavljanje pitanja mogu li se na obvezu stvorenu tom odlukom pozivati samo institucije Zajednice protiv onog komu je odluka upućena ili to pravo možda mogu ostvarivati svi koji su zainteresirani za ispunjenje te obveze.
+Bilo bi neusklađeno s obvezujućim učinkom koji se odlukama pripisuje člankom 189. kada bi se načelno isključila mogućnost zainteresiranih osoba da se pozovu na obvezu koja se propisuje odlukom.
+Posebno u slučajevima kada, na primjer, tijela Zajednice odlukom nametnu jednoj državi članici ili svim državama članicama obvezu postupanja na određen način, koristan učinak („l’effet utile”) takve mjere bio bi oslabljen kada se državljani te države ne bi mogli pozvati na nju pred sudovima i kada je nacionalni sudovi ne bi mogli uzeti u obzir kao dio prava Zajednice.
+Premda se učinci odluke mogu razlikovati od učinaka odredbe sadržane u uredbi, ta razlika ne isključuje mogućnost da krajnji ishod, a to je pravo pojedinca da se pozove na mjeru pred sudom, bude isti kao i kod izravno primjenjive odredbe uredbe.
+6 Članak 177., kojim se nacionalnim sudovima daje ovlast za upućivanje Sudu svih pitanja koja se tiču valjanosti i tumačenja svih akata institucija bez razlike, također podrazumijeva da se pojedinci mogu pozvati na te akte pred nacionalnim sudovima.
+Stoga se u svakom pojedinačnom slučaju mora utvrditi može li odredba o kojoj je riječ u pogledu svoje naravi, strukture i teksta proizvesti izravne učinke u pravnim odnosima između adresata dotičnog akta i trećih osoba.
+7 Odluka Vijeća od 13. svibnja 1965. upućena svim državama članicama prije svega se temelji na članku 75. Ugovora kojim se Vijeće ovlašćuje za propisivanje „zajedničkih pravila” , „uvjeta pod kojima prijevoznici nerezidentni u nekoj državi članici mogu pružati usluge” i „svih drugih odgovarajućih odredaba” u svrhu provedbe zajedničke prometne politike.
+Vijeće stoga ima veliku slobodu izbora mjera koje može donijeti.
+Odluka o kojoj je riječ, promatrana u cijelosti, propisuje ciljeve koje treba postići u vezi s politikom usklađivanja nacionalnih odredaba i satnicom njihova ostvarenja.
+S obzirom na te ciljeve, prvim stavkom članka 4. Odluke propisuje se da će države članice, nakon što Vijeće donese zajednički sustav poreza na promet i nakon što on stupi na snagu u državama članicama, primjenjivati taj sustav, na način koji još treba utvrditi, na prijevoz robe željeznicom, cestom i unutarnjim plovnim putovima.
+Drugim stavkom tog članka propisuje se da će najkasnije kada taj zajednički sustav poreza na promet stupi na snagu, on zamijeniti posebne poreze koji se umjesto poreza na promet možebitno naplaćuju na prijevoz robe cestom, željeznicom i unutarnjim plovnim putovima.
+8 Stoga se tom odredbom državama članicama nameću dvije obveze: prvo, primjena zajedničkog sustava poreza na promet na prijevoz robe željeznicom, cestom i unutarnjim plovnim putovima od određenog datuma; i drugo, zamjena posebnih poreza navedenih u drugom stavku dotičnim sustavom najkasnije na datum stupanja na snagu tog sustava.
+Ta druga obveza očito podrazumijeva zabranu uvođenja ili ponovna uvođenja tih poreza, kako bi se spriječilo da se u području prijevoza zajednički sustav poreza na promet primjenjuje istodobno s dodatnim poreznim sustavima slične naravi.
+9 Iz spisa koje je podnio Finanzgericht (Financijski sud) proizlazi da se pitanje prije svega odnosi na tu drugu obvezu.
+Ona je po naravi imperativna i općenita, premda u odredbi nije utvrđen datum od kojeg postaje učinkovita.
+Njome se državama članicama izričito zabranjuje primjena zajedničkog sustava poreza na promet istodobno s posebnim porezima koji se naplaćuju umjesto poreza na promet.
+Ta je obveza bezuvjetna, dovoljno jasna i precizna te stoga može proizvoditi izravne učinke u pravnim odnosima između država članica i pojedinaca koji podliježu njihovu zakonodavstvu.
+10 Datum od kojeg ta obveza počinje proizvoditi učinke propisan je direktivama Vijeća o usklađivanju zakonodavstava koja se odnose na poreze na promet, kojima je utvrđen najkasniji datum do kojeg države članice moraju uvesti u svoje zakonodavstvo zajednički sustav poreza na dodanu vrijednost.
+Činjenica da je taj datum utvrđen direktivom ne oduzima toj odredbi ništa od njezinog obvezujućeg učinka.
+Prema tome, obveza stvorena drugim stavkom članka 4. Odluke od 13. svibnja 1965. upotpunjena je Prvom direktivom.
+Stoga se tom odredbom državama članicama nameću obveze – a posebno obveza da od određenog datuma ne primjenjuju zajednički sustav poreza na dodanu vrijednost istodobno s navedenim posebnim porezima – koje mogu proizvesti izravne učinke u pravnim odnosima između država članica i pojedinaca te pojedincima dodijeliti pravo pozivanja na te obveze pred sudovima.
+Drugo pitanje
+11 Drugim pitanjem Finanzgericht (Financijski sud) traži od Suda da presudi zabranjuje li se Odlukom u vezi s člankom 1. Direktive državi članici koja je već uvela zajednički sustav poreza na dodanu vrijednost i ukinula posebne poreze na prijevoz robe da prije 1. siječnja 1970. umjesto poreza na promet ponovno uvede posebne poreze koji se naplaćuju na prijevoz robe.
+To se pitanje očito odnosi na članak 1. Prve direktive kako je izmijenjen Trećom direktivom Vijeća od 9. prosinca 1969. o istoj temi (SL 1969., L 320, str. 34.), kojom je datum 1. siječnja 1970. zamijenjen datumom 1. siječnja 1972.
+12 Istina je da bi doslovno tumačenje drugog stavka članka 4. Odluke moglo dovesti do mišljenja da se ta odredba odnosi na datum na koji je zajednički sustav stupio na snagu na državnom području dotične države članice.
+13 Međutim, takvo tumačenje ne bi odgovaralo cilju direktiva o kojima je riječ.
+Njihov je cilj osigurati primjenu sustava poreza na dodanu vrijednost na cijelom zajedničkom tržištu od određenog datuma nadalje.
+Sve do tog datuma države članice zadržavaju slobodu djelovanja u tom pogledu.
+14 Osim toga, cilj Odluke od 13. svibnja 1965. može se postići jedino na razini Zajednice te se stoga ne može ostvariti samo time da države članice pojedinačno uvedu mjere za usklađivanje, i to na različite datume i prema različitim satnicama.
+15 Stoga na upućeno pitanje valja odgovoriti da zabrana sadržana u drugom stavku članka 4. Odluke može stupiti na snagu tek od 1. siječnja 1972.
+Treće pitanje
+16 Trećim pitanjem Finanzgericht (Financijski sud) traži od Suda da presudi mora li se savezni porez na cestovni prijevoz robe („Straßengüterverkehrsteuer”) smatrati posebnim porezom koji se naplaćuje na prijevoz robe umjesto poreza na promet i je li on stoga obuhvaćen zabranom iz drugog stavka članka 4. Odluke od 13. svibnja 1965.
+17 Nije na Sudu da u ovom postupku obilježja poreza koji je uvela jedna od država članica ocjenjuje sa stajališta prava Zajednice.
+S druge strane, u njegovoj je nadležnosti protumačiti odgovarajuću odredbu prava Zajednice kako bi omogućio nacionalnom sudu da je ispravno primijeni na porez o kojem je riječ.
+18 Člankom 4. propisuje se ukidanje „posebnih poreza” kako bi se osigurao zajednički, dosljedan sustav oporezivanja prometa.
+Pogodujući na taj način transparentnosti tržišta u području prijevoza ta odredba doprinosi izjednačavanju uvjeta tržišnog natjecanja te je treba promatrati kao bitnu mjeru za usklađivanje poreza država članica u području prijevoza.
+Tim se ciljem ne zabranjuje da se na prijevozne usluge nametnu drugi porezi koji imaju drukčiju narav i ciljeve od onih koji se nastoje postići zajedničkim sustavom poreza na promet.
+19 Porez s obilježjima koja je opisao Finanzgericht (Financijski sud), koji se ne naplaćuje na trgovinske transakcije nego na određenu aktivnost, pri čemu se osim toga ne pravi razlika između aktivnosti za vlastiti račun i za tuđi račun i pri čemu osnova za izračun poreza nije naknada za uslugu nego fizičko opterećenje izraženo u tonama po kilometru kojem oporeziva aktivnost izlaže ceste, ne odgovara uobičajenom obliku poreza na promet. Osim toga, taj se porez razlikuje od „posebnih poreza” iz drugog stavka članka 4. i po tome što se njime nastoji postići preraspodjela prometa.
+Na upućeno pitanje stoga valja odgovoriti u tom smislu.
+Četvrto do jedanaestog pitanja
+20 Finanzgericht (Financijski sud) uputio je ta pitanja samo podredno, u slučaju da odgovor na prva tri pitanja bude niječan.
+Budući da to nije slučaj, posebno s obzirom na prvo pitanje, nema razloga odgovarati na ostala pitanja, od četvrtog do jedanaestog.
+21 Troškovi podnošenja očitovanja Sudu koje su imale vlada Savezne Republike Njemačke i Komisija Europskih zajednica ne nadoknađuju se.
+Budući da ovaj postupak ima značaj prethodnog pitanja za stranke glavnog postupka pred Finanzgerichtom München (Financijski sud u Münchenu), na tom je sudu da odluči o troškovima postupka.
+SUD,
+odlučujući o pitanjima koja mu je Finanzgericht München (Financijski sud u Münchenu) uputio rješenjem od 23. veljače 1970., odlučuje:
+1. Drugi stavak članka 4. Odluke Vijeća od 13. svibnja 1965., kojim se državama članicama zabranjuje primjena zajedničkog sustava poreza na promet istodobno s posebnim porezima koji se naplaćuju umjesto poreza na promet, može u vezi s odredbama direktiva Vijeća od 11. travnja 1967. i od 9. prosinca 1969. proizvesti izravne učinke u pravnim odnosima između država članica kojima je ta odluka upućena i pojedinaca te dodijeliti pojedincima pravo pozivanja na te odredbe pred sudovima.
+2. Zabrana primjene zajedničkog sustava poreza na promet istodobno s posebnim porezima proizvodi učinke od datuma utvrđenog Trećom direktivom od 9. prosinca 1969., odnosno od 1. siječnja 1972.
+3. Porez s obilježjima koja je opisao Finanzgericht (Financijski sud), koji se ne naplaćuje na trgovinske transakcije nego samo zbog činjenice da se roba prevozi cestom, pri čemu osnova za izračun poreza nije naknada za uslugu nego fizičko opterećenje izraženo u tonama po kilometru kojem oporeziva aktivnost izlaže ceste, ne odgovara uobičajenom obliku poreza na promet u smislu drugog stavka članka 4. Odluke od 13. svibnja 1965.

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+IN CASE 187/73
+REFERENCE TO THE COURT UNDER ARTICLE 177 OF THE EEC TREATY BY THE TRIBUNAL DU TRAVAIL OF TOURNAI (BELGIUM) FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING IN THE ACTION PENDING BEFORE THAT COURT BETWEEN
+MRS ODETTE CALLEMEYN, SPOUSE OF R. VERBEKE, RESIDING AT MOUSCRON (BELGIUM),
+AND
+THE BELGIAN STATE, REPRESENTED BY THE MINISTER FOR SOCIAL SECURITY, BRUSSELS,
+ON THE INTERPRETATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF REGULATION NO 1408/71 OF THE COUNCIL OF 14 JUNE 1971,'ON THE APPLICATION OF SOCIAL SECURITY SCHEMES TO EMPLOYED PERSONS AND THEIR FAMILIES MOVING WITHIN THE COMMUNITY'(OJ 1971 L 149), PARTICULARLY AS REGARDS BENEFITS FOR HANDICAPPED PERSONS,
+1 BY JUDGMENT DATED 27 NOVEMBER 1973, RECEIVED AT THE REGISTRY OF THE COURT ON 7 DECEMBER 1973, THE TRIBUNAL DU TRAVAIL OF TOURNAI REFERRED TO THE COURT OF JUSTICE, UNDER ARTICLE 177 OF THE TREATY, PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS ON THE INTERPRETATION OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF REGULATION NO 1408/71 OF THE COUNCIL OF 14 JUNE 1971 ON THE APPLICATION OF SOCIAL SECURITY SCHEMES TO EMPLOYED PERSONS AND THEIR FAMILIES MOVING WITHIN THE COMMUNITY (OJ 1971 L 149).
+2 THESE QUESTIONS ARE REFERRED IN THE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS CONCERNING THE REFUSAL BY THE BELGIAN STATE TO GRANT THE PLAINTIFF IN THE NATIONAL PROCEEDINGS - A PERSON OF FRENCH NATIONALITY MARRIED TO A BELGIAN AND RESIDING IN BELGIUM - THE BENEFIT OF THE BELGIAN LAW OF 27 JUNE 1969 RELATING TO THE GRANT OF BENEFITS TO HANDICAPPED PERSONS, ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE PARTY INTERESTED DOES NOT FULFIL ALL THE CONDITIONS FOR ENTITLEMENT IMPOSED BY THAT LAW AS WELL AS BY THE EUROPEAN INTERIM AGREEMENT OF 11 DECEMBER 1953 ON SOCIAL SECURITY SCHEMES IN RESPECT OF OLD AGE, INVALIDITY AND SURVIVORS.
+3 THE FIRST QUESTION ASKS WHETHER THE ADVANTAGES REFERRED TO BY ARTICLE 4 OF REGULATION NO 1408/71 OF THE COUNCIL INCLUDE MEASURES PROVIDED BY A NATIONAL LAW GRANTING BENEFITS TO HANDICAPPED PERSONS INSOFAR AS THESE MEASURES CONCERN WORKERS.
+4 UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 4 (1) THEREOF, REGULATION NO 1408/71 APPLIES TO ALL LEGISLATION CONCERNING BRANCHES OF SOCIAL SECURITY AS DEFINED BY THAT PROVISION.
+5 ON THE OTHER HAND PARAGRAPH 4 OF THE SAME ARTICLE PROVIDES THAT THE REGULATION DOES NOT APPLY TO 'sOCIAL AND MEDICAL ASSISTANCE'.
+6 ALTHOUGH IT MAY APPEAR DESIRABLE, FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE APPLICATION OF THE REGULATION, TO DRAW A CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN LEGISLATION CONCERNING SOCIAL SECURITY ON THE ONE HAND AND ASSISTANCE ON THE OTHER, THE POSSIBILITY CANNOT BE EXCLUDED THAT SOME LAWS MAY FALL WITHIN BOTH THESE CATEGORIES, BECAUSE OF THE CLASS OF PERSONS TO WHOM THEY APPLY, OF THEIR OBJECTIVES AND OF THEIR MANNER OF APPLICATION, AND THUS NOT BE AMENABLE TO ANY OVERALL CLASSIFICATION.
+7 WHILST IN SOME OF ITS FEATURES, LEGISLATION CONCERNING THE GRANT OF BENEFITS TO HANDICAPPED PERSONS IS AKIN TO SOCIAL ASSISTANCE, ESPECIALLY WHEN NEED IS THE ESSENTIAL CRITERION IN ITS IMPLEMENTATION AND THERE ARE NO CONDITIONS AS TO PERIODS OF EMPLOYMENT, OF MEMBERSHIP OR OF CONTRIBUTIONS, YET IT IS NEVERTHELESS CLOSE TO SOCIAL SECURITY TO THE EXTENT THAT, DEPARTING FROM THE CONSIDERATION OF EACH CASE ON ITS MERITS - A CHARACTERISTIC FEATURE OF ASSISTANCE - IT CONFERS UPON BENEFICIARIES A LEGALLY DEFINED POSITION.
+8 IN VIEW OF THE WIDELY-DRAWN DEFINITION OF PEOPLE ENTITLED TO BENEFIT, SUCH A LEGISLATION FULFILS IN FACT A DOUBLE FUNCTION, WHICH IS ON THE ONE HAND TO GUARANTEE A MINIMUM INCOME TO HANDICAPPED PERSONS WHO ARE ENTIRELY OUTSIDE THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM AND, ON THE OTHER HAND, TO PROVIDE SUPPLEMENTARY MEANS TO PERSONS ENTITLED TO SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS WHO ARE PERMANENTLY INCAPACITATED FROM WORK.
+9 UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 4 (1) (b) THEREOF, REGULATION NO 1408/71 APPLIES TO 'INVALIDITY BENEFITS, INCLUDING THOSE INTENDED FOR THE MAINTENANCE OR IMPROVEMENT OF EARNING CAPACITY'.
+10 UNDER ARTICLE 1 (t) OF THE SAME REGULATION, THE EXPRESSION 'BENEFITs' mUST BE UNDERSTOOD IN THE WIDEST POSSIBLE SENSE AS REFERRING TO ALL BENEFITs' iNCLUDING ALL ELEMENTS THEREOF PAYABLE OUT OF PUBLIC FUNDS, REVALORIZATION INCREASES AND SUPPLEMENTARY ALLOWANCES, SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF TITLE III'.
+11 THUS, AS REGARDS AN EMPLOYED PERSON OR A PERSON TREATED AS SUCH, WHO IS IN A MEMBER STATE ENTITLED TO AN INVALIDITY PENSION, LEGISLATION THAT ASSURES TO HANDICAPPED PERSONS A RIGHT TO 'BENEFIT', THAT IS LEGALLY PROTECTED, FALLS, SO FAR AS THESE WORKERS ARE CONCERNED, WITHIN THE FIELD OF SOCIAL SECURITY, WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 51 OF THE TREATY AND OF THE REGULATIONS MADE THEREUNDER, EVEN IF SUCH LEGISLATION MIGHT FALL OUTSIDE THIS FIELD SO FAR AS OTHER CATEGORIES OF BENEFICIARIES ARE CONCERNED.
+12 THE DIFFICULTIES THAT MIGHT ARISE FROM THE APPLICATION OF THE COMMUNITY REGULATIONS TO THESE PROVISIONS MUST NOT PREJUDICE THE RIGHTS WHICH THE WORKERS REFERRED TO BY ARTICLE 1 (a) OF REGULATION NO 1408/71 DERIVE FROM THE PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIAL LEGISLATION OF THE COMMUNITY.
+13 THIS IS THE CASE AT ANY RATE WHENEVER A PERSON WHO IS A WORKER WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ABOVEMENTIONED ARTICLE 1 (a) ALREADY FALLS, BY REASON OF EARLIER EMPLOYMENT, UNDER THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM OF THE MEMBER STATE WHOSE LEGISLATION, GUARANTEEING BENEFITS TO THE HANDICAPPED, IS INVOKED.
+14 MOREOVER, ARTICLE 7 (1) AND (2) OF REGULATION NO 1612/68 OF THE COUNCIL OF 15 OCTOBER 1968, ON FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR WORKERS WITHIN THE COMMUNITY (OJ 1968, NO L 257), PROVIDES THAT A WORKER WHO IS A NATIONAL OF A MEMBER STATE SHALL, ON THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER MEMBER STATES,'ENJOY THE SAME SOCIAL AND TAX ADVANTAGES AS NATIONAL WORKERs'.
+15 ACCORDINGLY, THE REPLY TO THE FIRST QUESTION MUST BE THAT THE BENEFITS MENTIONED IN ARTICLE 4 (1) (b) OF REGULATION NO 1408/71 OF THE COUNCIL OF 14 JUNE 1971 EMBRACE THOSE PROVIDED BY THE NATIONAL PROVISIONS GRANTING BENEFITS TO HANDICAPPED PERSONS, INSOFAR AS THESE PROVISIONS RELATE TO WORKERS WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 1 (a) OF THIS REGULATION AND CONFER UPON THEM A LEGALLY PROTECTED ENTITLEMENT FOR THE GRANT OF THESE BENEFITS.
+16 THE SECOND QUESTION ASKS WHETHER REGULATION NO 1408/71 OF THE COUNCIL OF 14 JUNE 1971, IN SO FAR AS IT IS MORE FAVOURABLE FOR THOSE ENTITLED, REPLACES THE EUROPEAN INTERIM AGREEMENT ON SOCIAL SECURITY SCHEMES IN RESPECT OF OLD AGE, INVALIDITY AND SURVIVORS SIGNED IN PARIS ON 11 DECEMBER 1963 AND REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 7 OF THE REGULATION.
+17 UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 6 (a) THEREOF, REGULATION NO 1408/71 REPLACES, SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLES 7, 8 AND 46 (4), AS REGARDS PERSONS AND MATTERS WHICH IT COVERS, THE PROVISIONS OF ANY SOCIAL SECURITY CONVENTION BINDING...'(a) TWO OR MORE MEMBER STATES EXCLUSIVELY'.
+18 UNDER ARTICLE 7 (1) (b) OF REGULATION NO 1408/71 THE PROVISIONS OF THE REGULATION SHALL NOT AFFECT OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM THE EUROPEAN INTERIM AGREEMENTS ON SOCIAL SECURITY OF 11 DECEMBER 1953 CONCLUDED BETWEEN THE MEMBER STATES OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE.
+19 FURTHERMORE, ARTICLE 5 OF THE EUROPEAN INTERIM AGREEMENTS PROVIDES THAT THESE DO NOT DEROGATE FROM THE PROVISIONS OF NATIONAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS, INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OR BILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS THAT ARE MORE FAVOURABLE TO THOSE ENTITLED.
+20 THUS, TO APPLY REGULATION NO 1408/71 IN PREFERENCE TO THE EUROPEAN INTERIM AGREEMENTS, TO THE EXTENT THAT IT IS MORE FAVOURABLE THAN THOSE AGREEMENTS FOR THOSE ENTITLED, DOES NOT INFRINGE THE OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM THESE AGREEMENTS AND IS NOT THEREFORE CAPABLE OF INFRINGING ARTICLE 7 (1) (b) OF THE REGULATION.
+21 FOR THESE REASONS IT MUST BE CONCLUDED THAT IN THE FRAMEWORK OF ITS FIELD OF APPLICATION TO PERSONS AND TO MATTERS COVERED, REGULATION NO 1408/71 TAKES PRECEDENCE OVER THE EUROPEAN INTERIM AGREEMENT ON SOCIAL SECURITY SCHEMES IN RESPECT OF OLD AGE, INVALIDITY AND SURVIVORS SIGNED IN PARIS ON 11 DECEMBER 1953 INSOFAR AS IT IS MORE FAVOURABLE FOR THOSE ENTITLED.
+22 THE COSTS INCURRED BY THE BELGIAN STATE, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC AND THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, WHICH HAVE SUBMITTED THEIR OBSERVATIONS TO THE COURT, ARE NOT RECOVERABLE, AND AS THESE PROVEEDINGS ARE, INSOFAR AS THE PARTIES TO THE MAIN ACTION ARE CONCERNED, A STEP IN THE ACTION PENDING BEFORE THE NATIONAL COURT, THE DECISION ON COSTS IS A MATTER FOR THAT COURT.
+THE COURT
+IN ANSWER TO THE QUESTIONS REFERRED TO IT BY THE TRIBUNAL DU TRAVAIL OF TOURNAI BY JUDGMENT OF 27 NOVEMBER 1973, HEREBY RULES:
+1. THE BENEFITS MENTIONED IN ARTICLE 4 (1) (b) OF REGULATION NO 1408 OF THE COUNCIL OF 14 JUNE 1971 INCLUDE THOSE PROVIDED BY NATIONAL PROVISIONS GRANTING BENEFITS TO THE HANDICAPPED TO THE EXTENT THAT THESE PROVISIONS CONCERN WORKERS WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 1 (a) OF THIS REGULATION AND CONFER ON THE LATTER A LEGALLY PROTECTED RIGHT TO THE GRANT OF THESE BENEFITS.
+2. WITHIN ITS FIELD OF APPLICATION TO PERSONS AND TO MATTERS COVERED, REGULATION NO 1408/71 TAKES PRECEDENCE OVER THE EUROPEAN INTERIM AGREEMENT ON SOCIAL SECURITY SCHEMES IN RESPECT OF OLD AGE, INVALIDITY AND SURVIVORS, SIGNED IN PARIS ON 11 DECEMBER 1953, AND REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 7 (1) (b) OF THE REGULATION, TO THE EXTENT THAT THIS REGULATION IS MORE FAVOURABLE THAN THE SAID AGREEMENT FOR THOSE ENTITLED.

data/principle-mvep-justice-court/mvep-107-hr.aligned.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+PRESUDA SUDA 28. svibnja 1974. (i) U predmetu 187/73,
+povodom zahtjeva koji je na temelju članka 177. Ugovora o EEZ-u uputio Tribunal du Travail, Tournai (Radni sud, Belgija), u postupku između
+Odette Callemeyn, supruge R. Verbekea, s boravištem u Mouscronu (Belgija),
+i
+État belge, koju zastupa ministar socijalne sigurnosti, Bruxelles,
+radi prethodne odluke o tumačenju odredaba Uredbe Vijeća br. 1408/71 od 14. lipnja 1971. „o primjeni sustava socijalne sigurnosti na zaposlene osobe i njihove obitelji koji se kreću unutar Zajednice” (SL 1971, br. L 149) (SL posebno izdanje na hrvatskom jeziku, poglavlje 5., svezak 5., str. 7.) osobito u pogledu davanja za osobe s invaliditetom, SUD,
+donosi sljedeću Presudu 1 Presudom od 27. studenoga 1973., koju je tajništvo Suda zaprimilo 7. prosinca 1973., Tribunal du Travail, Tournai (Radni sud, Belgija; u daljnjem tekstu: sud koji je uputio zahtjev) uputio je Sudu na temelju članka 177. Ugovora prethodna pitanja o tumačenju određenih odredbi Uredbe Vijeća br. 1408/71 od 14. lipnja 1971. o primjeni sustava socijalne sigurnosti na zaposlene osobe i njihove obitelji koji se kreću unutar Zajednice (SL 1971, br. L 149) (SL, posebno izdanje na hrvatskom jeziku, poglavlje 5., svezak 5., str. 7.).
+2 Ta su pitanja postavljena u okviru spora glede odbijanja État belge (Belgijska Država) da tužiteljici u glavnom postupku, francuskoj državljanki udanoj za Belgijanca s boravištem u Belgiji, dodijeli davanja predviđena belgijskim zakonom od 27. lipnja 1969. o dodjeli davanja osobama s invaliditetom, uz obrazloženje da ta osoba ne ispunjava sve uvjete za ostvarivanje prava predviđene tim zakonom kao i Europskim privremenim sporazumom od 11. prosinca 1953. o sustavima socijalne sigurnosti za starost, invalidnost i nadživjele osobe.
+3 Prvim se pitanjem želi saznati uključuju li davanja iz članka 4. Uredbe Vijeća br. 1408/71 mjere predviđene nacionalnim zakonodavstvom kojim se osobama s invaliditetom dodjeljuju davanja, ukoliko se te mjere odnose na radnike.
+4 Prema odredbama njezina članka 4. stavka 1., Uredba br. 1408/71 primjenjuje se na cjelokupno zakonodavstvo koje se odnosi na grane socijalne sigurnosti navedene u toj odredbi.
+5 S druge pak strane, stavkom 4. istoga članka predviđeno je da se Uredba ne primjenjuje na „socijalnu i medicinsku pomoć”.
+6 Iako se s aspekta primjene Uredbe može činiti poželjnim jasno razlikovati zakonodavstvo o socijalnoj sigurnosti od zakonodavstva koje uređuje socijalnu pomoć, ne smije se isključiti mogućnost da neki propisi zbog svojeg područja primjene ratione personae, svojih ciljeva i načina primjene istodobno potpadaju pod obje te kategorije pa se stoga ne mogu podvesti pod neku općevrijedeću klasifikaciju.
+7 Dok je u nekim svojim aspektima zakonodavstvo koje se odnosi na dodjelu davanja osobama s invaliditetom srodno socijalnoj pomoći, osobito kada je potreba ta koja čini bitan kriterij za njegovu primjenu, a apstrahiraju se uvjeti glede trajanja zaposlenja, uključenosti u sustav ili plaćanja doprinosa, ono je ipak blisko socijalnoj sigurnosti u mjeri u kojoj, za razliku od ocjene osobnih činjenica i okolnosti koja je obilježje socijalne pomoći, korisnicima dodjeljuje položaj koji je određen zakonski.
+8 S obzirom na široku definiciju osoba koje imaju pravo na davanje, takvo zakonodavstvo ima zapravo dvojnu ulogu jer s jedne strane osobama s invaliditetom koje nisu uključene u sustav socijalne sigurnosti jamči minimalna sredstva za preživljavanje, a s druge strane primateljima davanja iz socijalne sigurnosti koji su trajno nesposobni za rad osigurava dodatan prihod.
+9 Prema odredbama njezina članka 4. stavka 1. točke (b), Uredba br. 1408/71 primjenjuje se na sva „invalidska davanja, uključujući ona namijenjena održavanju ili poboljšavanju sposobnosti zarađivanja”.
+10 Prema članku 1. točki (t) iste uredbe, izraz „davanja” treba tumačiti na najširi mogući način tako da obuhvaća sva davanja „uključujući sve njihove dijelove koji se isplaćuju iz javnih fondova, revalorizacijska povećanja i dodatne doplatke, prema odredbama glave III.”.
+11 Stoga, u mjeri u kojoj se odnosi na zaposlenu osobu ili osobu koja se smatra takvom koja u državi članici ima pravo na invalidsku mirovinu, zakonodavstvo koje osobama s invaliditetom osigurava zakonski zaštićeno pravo na „davanje” ulazi u okvir socijalne sigurnosti u smislu članka 51. Ugovora i propisa za provedbu te odredbe čak i ako se to zakonodavstvo možda ne može tako okvalificirati kad je riječ o drugim kategorijama korisnika.
+12 Poteškoće koje bi mogla prouzročiti primjena propisa Zajednice na te odredbe ne smiju dovesti u pitanje prava koja za radnike iz članka 1. točke (a) Uredbe br. 1408/71 proizlaze iz načela socijalnog zakonodavstva Zajednice.
+13 To je svakako slučaj kada se na zakonodavstvo države članice o zajamčenim davanjima za osobe s invaliditetom poziva radnik u smislu gore navedenog članka 1. točke (a) koji je zbog prijašnjeg zaposlenja već uključen u sustav njezine socijalne sigurnosti.
+14 Osim toga, člankom 7. stavcima 1. i 2. Uredbe Vijeća br. 1612/68 od 15. listopada 1968. o slobodi kretanja radnika u Zajednici (SL 1968, br. L 257) predviđeno je da radnici koji su državljani jedne države članice na državnom području drugih država članica „uživaju iste socijalne i porezne pogodnosti kao domaći radnici”.
+15 Slijedom toga na prvo pitanje treba odgovoriti da davanja u smislu članka 4. stavka 1. točke (b) Uredbe Vijeća br. 1408/71 od 14. lipnja 1971. uključuju i ona predviđena nacionalnim odredbama kojima se osobama s invaliditetom dodjeljuju davanja, ukoliko se te odredbe odnose na radnike u smislu članka 1. točke (a) te uredbe, a njihovo pravo da im se te pogodnosti dodijele zakonski je zaštićeno.
+16 Drugo je pitanje zamjenjuje li Uredba Vijeća br. 1408/71 od 14. lipnja 1971., u mjeri u kojoj je povoljnija za imatelje prava, Europski privremeni sporazum o sustavima socijalne sigurnosti za starost, invalidnost i nadživjele osobe potpisan u Parizu 11. prosinca 1953. i naveden u članku 7. Uredbe.
+17 Na temelju odredbi njezina članka 6. točke (a), Uredba br. 1408/71, u okviru svojeg područja primjene ratione personae i ratione materiae te poštujući odredbe članaka 7. i 8. te članka 46. stavka 4., zamjenjuje odredbe svake konvencije o socijalnoj sigurnosti kojom se obvezuju „(a) […] samo dvije države članice ili više njih”.
+18 Prema članku 7. stavku 1. točki (b) Uredbe br. 1408/71, odredbe Uredbe ne utječu na obveze koje proizlaze iz Europskih privremenih sporazuma o socijalnoj sigurnosti od 11. prosinca 1953. sklopljenih među državama članicama Vijeća Europe.
+19 Osim toga, člankom 5. Europskih privremenih sporazuma predviđeno je da oni nisu iznimka od odredaba nacionalnih zakona i drugih propisa, međunarodnih konvencija ili dvostranih ili višestranih sporazuma koji su povoljniji za imatelja prava.
+20 Stoga davanje prednosti primjeni Uredbe br. 1408/71 pred primjenom Europskih privremenih sporazuma, u mjeri u kojoj je ona za imatelja prava povoljnija od tih sporazuma, ne predstavlja povredu obveza koje proizlaze iz tih sporazuma pa stoga ne može predstavljati povredu članka 7. stavka 1. točke (b) Uredbe.
+21 Zbog tih razloga valja zaključiti da u okviru područja primjene ratione personae i ratione materiae Uredba br. 1408/71, u mjeri u kojoj je povoljnija za imatelja prava, ima prednost pred Europskim privremenim sporazumom o sustavima socijalne sigurnosti za starost, invalidnost i nadživjele osobe potpisanim u Parizu 11. prosinca 1953.
+22 Troškovi Belgijske Države, vlade Talijanske Republike i Komisije Europskih zajednica, koje su podnijele očitovanja Sudu, ne nadoknađuju se. Budući da ovaj postupak ima značaj prethodnog pitanja za stranke glavnog postupka pred sudom koji je uputio zahtjev, na tom je sudu da odluči o troškovima postupka. Slijedom navedenog,
+SUD,
+u odgovoru na pitanja koja mu je presudom od 27. studenoga 1973. uputio Tribunal du Travail, Tournai (Radni sud, Belgija), odlučuje:
+1. Davanja u smislu članka 4. stavka 1. točke (b) Uredbe Vijeća br. 1408/71 od 14. lipnja 1971. uključuju i ona predviđena nacionalnim odredbama kojima se davanja dodjeljuju osobama s invaliditetom, ukoliko se te odredbe odnose na radnike u smislu članka 1. točke (a) te uredbe, a njihovo pravo da im se dodijele te pogodnosti zakonski je zaštićeno.
+2. U okviru svojeg područja primjene ratione personae i ratione materiae, Uredba br. 1408/71 ima prednost pred Europskim privremenim sporazumom o sustavima socijalne sigurnosti za starost, invalidnost i nadživjele osobe potpisanim u Parizu 11. prosinca 1953. i navedenim u članku 7. stavku 1. točki (b) Uredbe, u mjeri u kojoj je ta uredba povoljnija za imatelje prava od navedenog sporazuma. Objavljeno na javnoj raspravi u Luxembourgu 28. svibnja 1974.

data/principle-mvep-justice-court/mvep-108-en.aligned.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+IN CASE 9/74
+REFERENCE TO THE COURT UNDER ARTICLE 177 OF THE EEC TREATY BY THE BAYERISCHES VERWALTUNGSGERICHT, III CHAMBER, FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING IN THE ACTION PENDING BEFORE THAT COURT BETWEEN
+DONATO CASAGRANDE, MUNICH
+AND
+LANDESHAUPTSTADT MUENCHEN (CITY OF MUNICH)
+ON THE INTERPRETATION OF THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 12 OF REGULATION NO 1612/68 OF THE COUNCIL OF 15 OCTOBER 1968 (OJ 1968, L 257, P. 2),
+1 BY ORDER DATED 14 DECEMBER 1973, FILED AT THE REGISTRY ON 11 FEBRUARY 1974, THE BAYERISCHES VERWALTUNGSGERICHT (BAVARIAN ADMINISTRATIVE COURT), MUNICH, REFERRED TO THE COURT UNDER ARTICLE 177 OF THE EEC TREATY THE QUESTION OF INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 12 OF REGULATION (EEC) NO 1612/68 OF THE COUNCIL OF 15 OCTOBER 1968 ON FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR WORKERS WITHIN THE COMMUNITY.
+2 ACCORDING TO THE ORDER THE PLAINTIFF IN THE MAIN ACTION, WHO IS OF ITALIAN NATIONALITY AND A CHILD OF AN ITALIAN WORKER IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, ATTENDED SECONDARY SCHOOL FOR THE SCHOOL YEAR 1971/1972 IN MUNICH AND CLAIMED FROM THE CITY OF MUNICH, THE DEFENDANT IN THE MAIN ACTION, AN EDUCATIONAL GRANT AMOUNTING TO DM 70 PER MONTH, PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE 2 OF THE BAYERISCHES AUSBILDUNGSFOERDERUNGSGESETZ (BAVARIAN LAW ON EDUCATIONAL GRANTS).
+3 SINCE THE DEFENDANT IN THE MAIN ACTION REFUSED HIM THE BENEFIT OF THIS MEASURE ON THE GROUND THAT ARTICLE 3 OF THE SAID LAW REFERS ONLY TO GERMAN NATIONALS, STATELESS PERSONS AND ALIENS GRANTED ASYLUM, IT IS ASKED WHETHER THIS ARTICLE 3 IS COMPATIBLE WITH THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 12 OF REGULATION NO 1612/68.
+4 ALTHOUGH UNDER THE PROCEDURE OF ARTICLE 17, THE COURT CANNOT PRONOUNCE ON THE INTERPRETATION OR THE VALIDITY OF LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS OF A NATIONAL CHARACTER IT IS HOWEVER COMPETENT TO INTERPRET ARTICLE 12 OF REGULATION NO 1612/68 AND TO SAY WHETHER THIS ARTICLE DOES OR DOES NOT REFER TO MEASURES RELATING TO EDUCATIONAL GRANTS SUCH AS THE MEASURE IN DISPUTE.
+5 UNDER ARTICLE 12 'THE CHILDREN OF A NATIONAL OF A MEMBER STATE WHO IS OR HAS BEEN EMPLOYED IN THE TERRITORY OF ANOTHER MEMBER STATE SHALL BE ADMITTED TO THAT STATE's GENERAL EDUCATIONAL, APPRENTICESHIP AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING COURSES UNDER THE SAME CONDITIONS AS THE NATIONALS OF THAT STATE, IF SUCH CHILDREN ARE RESIDING IN ITS TERRITORY', AND MEMBER STATES ARE REQUIRED TO ENCOURAGE 'ALL EFFORTS TO ENABLE SUCH CHILDREN TO ATTEND THESE COURSES UNDER THE BEST POSSIBLE CONDITIONs'.
+6 ACCORDING TO THE FIFTH RECITAL OF THE REGULATION, THE LATTER WAS ISSUED, INTER ALIA, FOR THE REASON THAT 'THE RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT, IN ORDER THAT IT MAY BE EXERCISED, BY OBJECTIVE STANDARDS, IN FREEDOM AND DIGNITY, REQUIRES... THAT OBSTACLES TO THE MOBILITY OF WORKERS SHALL BE ELIMINATED, IN PARTICULAR AS REGARDS THE WORKER's RIGHT TO BE JOINED BY HIS FAMILY AND THE CONDITIONS FOR THE INTEGRATION OF THAT FAMILY INTO THE HOST COUNTRY'.
+7 SUCH INTEGRATION PRESUPPOSES THAT, IN THE CASE OF THE CHILD OF A FOREIGN WORKER WHO WISHES TO HAVE SECONDARY EDUCATION, THIS CHILD CAN TAKE ADVANTAGE OF BENEFITS PROVIDED BY THE LAWS OF THE HOST COUNTRY RELATING TO EDUCATIONAL GRANTS, UNDER THE SAME CONDITIONS AS NATIONALS WHO ARE IN A SIMILAR POSITION.
+8 IT FOLLOWS FROM THE PROVISION IN THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 12, ACCORDING TO WHICH MEMBER STATES ARE TO ENCOURAGE ALL EFFORTS TO ENABLE SUCH CHILDREN TO ATTEND THE COURSES UNDER THE BEST POSSIBLE CONDITIONS, THAT THE ARTICLE IS INTENDED TO ENCOURAGE SPECIAL EFFORTS, TO ENSURE THAT THE CHILDREN MAY TAKE ADVANTAGE ON AN EQUAL FOOTING OF THE EDUCATION AND TRAINING FACILITIES AVAILABLE.
+9 IT MUST BE CONCLUDED THAT IN PROVIDING THAT THE CHILDREN IN QUESTION SHALL BE ADMITTED TO EDUCATIONAL COURSEs' uNDER THE SAME CONDITIONS AS THE NATIONALs' oF THE HOST STATE, ARTICLE 12 REFERS NOT ONLY TO RULES RELATING TO ADMISSION, BUT ALSO TO GENERAL MEASURES INTENDED TO FACILITATE EDUCATIONAL ATTENDANCE.
+10 THE STAATSANWALTSCHAFT OF THE VERWALTUNGSGERICHT, THE THIRD PARTY IN THE MAIN ACTION, STATED THAT EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND EDUCATIONAL GRANTS WERE WITHIN THE COMPETENCE OF MEMBER STATES.
+11 IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY SUCH POLICY IS LARGELY WITHIN THE COMPETENCE OF THE LAENDER, AND THEREFORE IT MUST BE ASKED WHETHER ARTICLE 12 APPLIES NOT ONLY TO THE CONDITIONS LAID DOWN BY LAWS EMANATING FROM THE CENTRAL POWER BUT ALSO TO THOSE ARISING FROM MEASURES TAKEN BY THE AUTHORITIES OF A COUNTRY WHICH FORMS PART OF A FEDERAL STATE, OR OF OTHER TERRITORIAL ENTITIES.
+12 ALTHOUGH EDUCATIONAL AND TRAINING POLICY IS NOT AS SUCH INCLUDED IN THE SPHERES WHICH THE TREATY HAS ENTRUSTED TO THE COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS, IT DOES NOT FOLLOW THAT THE EXERCISE OF POWERS TRANSFERRED TO THE COMMUNITY IS IN SOME WAY LIMITED IF IT IS OF SUCH A NATURE AS TO AFFECT THE MEASURES TAKEN IN THE EXECUTION OF A POLICY SUCH AS THAT OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING.
+13 CHAPTERS 1 AND 2 OF TITLE III OF PART TWO OF THE TREATY IN PARTICULAR CONTAIN SEVERAL PROVISIONS THE APPLICATION OF WHICH COULD AFFECT THIS POLICY.
+14 AS REGARDS ARTICLE 12 OF REGULATION NO 1612/68, ALTHOUGH THE DETERMINATION OF THE CONDITIONS REFERRED TO THERE IS A MATTER FOR THE AUTHORITIES COMPETENT UNDER NATIONAL LAW, THEY MUST HOWEVER BE APPLIED WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN THE CHILDREN OF NATIONAL WORKERS AND THOSE OF WORKERS WHO ARE NATIONALS OF ANOTHER MEMBER STATE WHO RESIDE IN THE TERRITORY.
+15 FURTHER, SINCE REGULATIONS, UNDER ARTICLE 189 OF THE TREATY, HAVE GENERAL APPLICATION AND ARE BINDING IN THEIR ENTIRETY AND DIRECTLY APPLICABLE IN ALL MEMBER STATES, IT IS IRRELEVANT THAT THE CONDITIONS IN QUESTION ARE LAID DOWN BY RULES ISSUED BY THE CENTRAL POWER, BY THE AUTHORITIES OF A COUNTRY FORMING PART OF A FEDERAL STATE OR OF OTHER TERRITORIAL ENTITIES, OR EVEN BY AUTHORITIES WHICH THE NATIONAL LAW EQUATES WITH THEM.
+16 THE COSTS INCURRED BY THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, WHICH HAS SUBMITTED OBSERVATIONS TO THE COURT, ARE NOT RECOVERABLE, AND AS THESE PROCEEDINGS ARE, IN SO FAR AS THE PARTIES TO THE MAIN ACTION ARE CONCERNED, A STEP IN THE ACTION BEFORE THE NATIONAL COURT, COSTS ARE A MATTER FOR THAT COURT.
+ON THOSE GROUNDS, THE COURTIN ANSWER TO THE QUESTION REFERRED TO IT BY THE BAYERISCHES VERWALTUNGSGERICHT, MUNICH, BY ORDER DATED 13 DECEMBER 1973, HEREBY RULES:
+IN PROVIDING THAT THE CHILDREN OF A NATIONAL OF A MEMBER STATE WHO IS OR HAS BEEN EMPLOYED IN THE TERRITORY OF ANOTHER MEMBER STATE SHALL BE ADMITTED TO EDUCATIONAL COURSEs' uNDER THE SAME CONDITIONS AS THE NATIONALs' oF THE HOST STATE, ARTICLE 12 REFERS NOT ONLY TO RULES RELATING TO ADMISSION, BUT ALSO TO GENERAL MEASURES INTENDED TO FACILITATE EDUCATIONAL ATTENDANCE.

data/principle-mvep-justice-court/mvep-108-hr.aligned.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+U predmetu 9-74,
+povodom zahtjeva za prethodnu odluku na temelju članka 177. Ugovora o EEZ-u, koji je uputio Bayerisches Verwaltungsgericht (Upravni sud Bavarske, Njemačka), treće vijeće, u sporu koji se vodi pred tim sudom između
+Donata Casagrandea, München,
+i
+Landeshauptstadt München,
+o tumačenju članka 12. prvog stavka Uredbe Vijeća br. 1612/68 od 15. listopada 1968. (SL 1968, br. L 257, str. 2.), SUD,
+donosi sljedeću Presudu 1 Rješenjem od 14. prosinca 1973., koje je tajništvo Suda zaprimilo 11. veljače 1974., Bayerisches Verwaltungsgericht (Upravni sud Bavarske) u Münchenu uputio je Sudu na temelju članka 177. Ugovora o EEZ-u prethodno pitanje o tumačenju članka 12. Uredbe Vijeća (EEZ) br. 1612/68 od 15. listopada 1968. o slobodi kretanja radnika unutar Zajednice.
+Kako je navedeno u rješenju, tužitelj u glavnom postupku, koji je talijanski državljanin i dijete talijanskog radnika u Saveznoj Republici Njemačkoj, pohađao je u školskoj godini 1971./1972. srednju školu u Münchenu te je od Grada Münchena, tuženika u glavnom postupku, zatražio financijsku pomoć za obrazovanje u iznosu od 70 DM mjesečno, koja je predviđena člankom 2. Bayerisches Ausbildungsförderungsgesetz (bavarski Zakon o financijskoj pomoći za obrazovanje).
+Budući da mu je tuženik u glavnom postupku odbio dopustiti da iskoristi tu mjeru uz obrazloženje da se članak 3. tog zakona odnosi samo na njemačke državljane, osobe bez državljanstva i strance kojima je odobren azil, postavlja se pitanje je li taj članak 3. spojiv s člankom 12. prvim stavkom Uredbe br. 1612/68.
+2 Sud u skladu s postupkom iz članka 17. ne može odlučivati o tumačenju ili valjanosti nacionalnih zakonodavnih odredaba, međutim nadležan je tumačiti članak 12. Uredbe br. 1612/68 i utvrditi odnosi li se taj članak na primjenu mjera povezanih s financijskom pomoći za obrazovanje kao što je sporna mjera ili ne.
+3 U skladu s člankom 12. „djeca državljanina jedne države članice koji je zaposlen ili je bio zaposlen na državnom području druge države članice, ako borave na državnom području te države, imaju pravo pristupa općem obrazovanju, naukovanju i strukovnom osposobljavanju pod istim uvjetima kao državljani te države” te se od država članica zahtijeva da podupiru „sve napore čiji je cilj da se djeci tih radnika omogući pohađanje navedenih programa pod najboljim mogućim uvjetima”.
+Uredba je u skladu sa svojom petom uvodnom izjavom donesena, među ostalim, jer „prema objektivnim mjerilima, slobodno i dostojanstveno izvršavanje prava na slobodu kretanja zahtijeva [...] da se uklone prepreke pokretljivosti radnika, posebno s obzirom na pravo radnika na spajanje sa svojom obitelji i uvjete za integraciju te obitelji u zemlju domaćina”.
+4 Takva integracija pretpostavlja da dijete stranog radnika koje želi pohađati srednju školu može ostvariti koristi predviđene zakonodavstvom zemlje domaćina koje se odnose na financijsku pomoć za obrazovanje pod istim uvjetima kao državljani koji su u sličnom položaju.
+Iz odredbe članka 12. drugog stavka, u skladu s kojim države članice trebaju poduprijeti sva nastojanja da se toj djeci omogući pohađanje programa pod najboljim mogućim uvjetima, proizlazi da je svrha članka poduprijeti posebna nastojanja kako bi se osiguralo da djeca mogu pod jednakom uvjetima iskoristiti dostupne mogućnosti obrazovanja i osposobljavanja.
+Budući da je njime predviđeno da dotična djeca imaju pravo pristupa obrazovnim programima „pod istim uvjetima kao državljani” države domaćina, valja zaključiti da se članak 12. odnosi se ne samo na pravila o pristupu, već i na opće mjere čija je svrha olakšati sudjelovanje u obrazovanju.
+5 Staatsanwaltschaft (državno odvjetništvo) pri Verwaltungsgerichtu (Upravni sud Bavarske), intervenijent u glavnom postupku, navelo je da su politika obrazovanja i osposobljavanja u nadležnosti država članica.
+U Saveznoj Republici Njemačkoj ta je politika najvećim dijelom u nadležnosti „Ländera” te se stoga postavlja pitanje primjenjuje li se članak 12. ne samo na uvjete koji su utvrđeni zakonodavstvom središnje vlasti, već i zakonodavstvom proizišlim iz mjera koje su poduzela tijela zemlje koja je dio savezne države ili drugih teritorijalnih jedinica.
+6 Iako politika obrazovanja i osposobljavanja nije kao takva obuhvaćena područjima koja su Ugovorom povjerena institucijama Zajednice, iz navedenoga ne proizlazi da je izvršavanje ovlasti koje su prenesene na Zajednicu na neki način ograničeno ako može utjecati na mjere koje su poduzete za provedbu politike kao što je politika obrazovanja i osposobljavanja.
+Dio drugi glava III. poglavlja 1. i 2. Ugovora osobito sadržavaju nekoliko odredaba čija bi primjena mogla utjecati na tu politiku.
+Kad je riječ o članku 12. Uredbe br. 1612/68, iako uvjete koji su u njemu navedeni utvrđuju tijela koja su nadležna u skladu s unutarnjim pravom, oni se moraju primjenjivati bez diskriminacije između djece domaćih radnika i djece radnika koji su državljani druge države članice koja borave na državnom području.
+Nadalje, budući da u skladu s člankom 189. Ugovora uredbe imaju opću primjenu, obvezujuće su u cijelosti i izravno se primjenjuju u svim državama članicama, nije važno jesu li predmetni uvjeti utvrđeni pravilima koja je donijela središnja vlast, tijelâ zemlje koja je dio savezne države ili drugih teritorijalnih jedinica ili tijelâ koja su u nacionalnom pravu s njima izjednačena.
+7 Troškovi Komisije Europskih zajednica, koja je podnijela očitovanja Sudu, ne nadoknađuju se. Budući da ovaj postupak ima značaj prethodnog pitanja za stranke glavnog postupka pred sudom koji je uputio zahtjev, na tom je sudu da odluči o troškovima postupka.
+Slijedom navedenoga, SUD, odlučujući o pitanju koje mu je rješenjem od 14. prosinca 1973. uputio Bayerisches Verwaltungsgericht München (Upravni sud Bavarske u Münchenu), odlučuje:
+Budući da je njime predviđeno da djeca državljanina jedne države članice koji je zaposlen ili je bio zaposlen na državnom području druge države članice imaju pravo pristupa obrazovnim programima „pod istim uvjetima kao državljani” države domaćina, članak 12. odnosi se ne samo na pravila o pristupu, već i na opće mjere čija je svrha olakšati sudjelovanje u obrazovanju.

data/principle-mvep-justice-court/mvep-109-en.aligned.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+IN CASE 18/74
+SYNDICAT GENERAL DU PERSONNEL DES ORGANISMES EUROPEENS, (OFFICIAL ENGLISH TITLE: GENERAL UNION OF PERSONNEL OF EUROPEAN ORGANIZATIONS) OF LUXEMBOURG, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT M. METGE, ASSISTED BY R. BADINTER, ADVOCATE BEFORE THE COUR D'APPEL OF PARIS, WITH AN ADDRESS FOR SERVICE IN LUXEMBOURG AT THE CHAMBERS OF J. WELTER, 11 B, AVENUE DE LA PORTE-NEUVE, APPLICANT,
+V
+COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, REPRESENTED BY ITS LEGAL ADVISER, J. GRIESMAR, WITH AN ADDRESS FOR SERVICE IN LUXEMBOURG AT THE OFFICE OF P. LAMOUREUX, LEGAL ADVISER OF THE COMMISSION, 4, BOULEVARD ROYAL, DEFENDANT,
+IN THE MATTER, AT THE PRESENT STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS, OF THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF 'THE DECISION OF 21 SEPTEMBER 1973 IN WHICH THE COMMISSION ORDERED A DEDUCTION FROM THE SALARY FOR OCTOBER OR NOVEMBER 1973 OF OFFICIALS AND OTHER SERVANTS OF THE COMMISSION WHO TOOK PART IN THE STRIKES OF NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER 1972'.
+1 BY APPLICATION SUBMITTED ON 6 MARCH 1974, THE GENERAL UNION OF PERSONNEL OF EUROPEAN ORGANIZATIONS (OFFICIAL ENGLISH TITLE) ASKED THE COURT TO ANNUL A DECISION OF THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES ON 21 SEPTEMBER 1973 ARRANGING FOR A DEDUCTION TO BE MADE FROM THE SALARY OF OFFICIALS AND OTHER SERVANTS OF THE COMMISSION WHO TOOK PART IN THE STRIKES IN NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER 1972.
+2 THE APPLICATION WAS SUBMITTED UNDER ARTICLE 91 OF THE STAFF REGULATIONS AND ARTICLE 173 OF THE EEC TREATY BUT DURING THE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS THE APPLICANT WITHDREW THE PLEA BASED ON THE TREATY.
+3 BY WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF 5 APRIL 1974, THE DEFENDANT COMMISSION RAISED A PLEA OF INADMISSIBILITY AND ASKED THE COURT TO RULE ON IT WITHOUT ENTERING INTO THE MERITS.
+4 THE COMMISSION CLAIMS, FIRSTLY, THAT THE APPLICANT UNION LACKS CAPACITY TO INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS.
+5 UNDER ARTICLE 24 A OF THE STAFF REGULATIONS OFFICIALS ENJOY THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION AND, IN PARTICULAR, MAY BE MEMBERS OF TRADE UNIONS OR STAFF ASSOCIATIONS OF EUROPEAN OFFICIALS.
+6 THE APPLICANT UNION IS AN ASSOCIATION ORGANIZING A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF OFFICIALS AND SERVANTS OF THE COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS AND COMPONENT BODIES ESTABLISHED IN LUXEMBOURG AND THERE IS NO REASON TO DOUBT ITS REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER.
+7 UNDER ITS RULES, ITS CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE IS SUCH AS TO ENDOW IT WITH THE NECESSARY INDEPENDENCE TO ACT AS A RESPONSIBLE BODY IN LEGAL MATTERS.
+8 THE COMMISSION OFFICIALLY RECOGNIZES IT AS A NEGOTIATING BODY ON QUESTIONS INVOLVING THE COLLECTIVE INTERESTS OF THE STAFF.
+9 IT IS, THEREFORE, IMPOSSIBLE TO DENY THE APPLICANT UNION's CAPACITY TO INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS.
+10 UNDER THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LABOUR LAW, THE FREEDOM OF TRADE UNION ACTIVITY RECOGNIZED UNDER ARTICLE 24 A OF THE STAFF REGULATIONS MEANS NOT ONLY THAT OFFICIALS AND SERVANTS HAVE THE RIGHT WITHOUT HINDRANCE TO FORM ASSOCIATIONS OF THEIR OWN CHOOSING, BUT ALSO THAT THESE ASSOCIATIONS ARE FREE TO DO ANYTHING LAWFUL TO PROTECT THE INTERESTS OF THEIR MEMBERS AS EMPLOYEES.
+11 THE RIGHT OF ACTION IS ONE OF THE MEANS AVAILABLE FOR USE BY THESE ASSOCIATIONS.
+12 UNDER THE COMMUNITY LEGAL SYSTEM, HOWEVER, THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT IS SUBJECT TO THE CONDITIONS DETERMINED BY THE SYSTEM OF FORMS OF ACTION PROVIDED FOR UNDER THE TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE COMMUNITIES.
+13 THUS A STAFF ASSOCIATION WHICH FULFILS THESE CONDITIONS IS ENTITLED, BY VIRTUE OF THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 173 OF THE EEC TREATY, TO INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS FOR ANNULMENT AGAINST A DECISION ADDRESSED TO IT WITHIN THE MEANING OF THAT PROVISION.
+14 ON THE OTHER HAND, THE BRINGING OF A DIRECT ACTION IS INADMISSIBLE UNDER THE ARRANGEMENTS PROVIDED UNDER ARTICLES 90 AND 91 OF THE STAFF REGULATIONS FOR PROCEEDINGS TO BE BROUGHT BEFORE THE COURT, INSOFAR AS THESE PROVISIONS GIVE EFFECT TO ARTICLE 179 OF THE EEC TREATY AND THE CORRESPONDING ARTICLES OF THE ECSC AND THE EAEC TREATIES.
+15 THOUGH ARTICLE 179 IS AVAILABLE AS A BASIS ON WHICH ARRANGEMENTS MAY BE MADE FOR SETTLEMENT BY THE COURT OF COLLECTIVE AS WELL AS INDIVIDUAL DISPUTES BETWEEN THE COMMUNITY AND ITS SERVANTS, THIS DOES NOT ALTER THE FACT THAT THE PROCEDURE FOR COMPLAINT AND APPEAL ESTABLISHED BY ARTICLES 90 AND 91 OF THE STAFF REGULATIONS IS DESIGNED TO DEAL EXCLUSIVELY WITH INDIVIDUAL DISPUTES.
+16 THIS MEANS THAT THE CHANNEL OF APPEAL PROVIDED FOR UNDER ARTICLE 91 IS AVAILABLE ONLY TO OFFICIALS OR SERVANTS.
+17 UNDER THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 37 OF THE STATUTE OF THE COURT, THE RIGHT TO INTERVENE IS, ON THE OTHER HAND, OPEN TO ANY PERSON ESTABLISHING A LEGITIMATE INTEREST IN THE RESULT OF ANY CASE SUBMITTED TO THE COURT, INCLUDING THOSE COMING UNDER ARTICLE 91 OF THE STAFF REGULATIONS.
+18 IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE, THEREFORE, AS TO THE FACTS AND TO THE LAW, THE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN A DIRECT ACTION BROUGHT BY A STAFF ASSOCIATION UNDER ARTICLE 91 OF THE STAFF REGULATIONS.
+19 THE APPLICATION MUST THEREFORE BE DISMISSED AS INADMISSIBLE.
+20 BY ARTICLE 69 (2) OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE, THE UNSUCCESSFUL PARTY SHALL BE ORDERED TO PAY THE COSTS.
+21 IN VIEW, HOWEVER, OF THE GENERAL INTEREST OF THE ISSUE WHICH HAS BEEN RAISED, EACH PARTY SHOULD BEAR ITS OWN COSTS.
+ON THOSE GROUNDS, THE COURT HEREBY:
+1. DISMISSES THE APPLICATION AS INADMISSIBLE,
+2. ORDERS EACH PARTY TO BEAR ITS OWN COSTS.

data/principle-mvep-justice-court/mvep-109-hr.aligned.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+U predmetu C-18/74
+Syndicat général du personnel des organismes européens (Opći sindikat osoblja europskih organizacija) u Luxembourgu, koji zastupa njegov predsjednik M. Metge, uz asistenciju R. Badintera, odvjetnika na Cour d ' appel de Paris (Žalbeni sud u Parizu, Francuska) s izabranom adresom za dostavu u Luxembourgu kod J. Weltera, II B, avenue de la Porte-Neuve, tužitelj,
+protiv
+Komisije Europskih zajednica koju zastupa njezin pravni savjetnik, J. Griesmar s izabranom adresom za dostavu kod P. Lamoureuxa, pravnog savjetnika Komisije, 4, boulevard Royal, tuženice
+povodom, u ovoj fazi postupka, dopuštenosti tužbe za poništenje „Odluke Komisije od 21. rujna 1973. o odbitku na plaćama za mjesec listopad i studeni 1973. dužnosnika i drugih službenika Komisije koji su sudjelovali u štrajkovima u studenom i prosincu 1972.”. SUD,
+donosi sljedeću Presudu 1 Tužbom podnesenom 6. ožujka 1974. Syndicat général du personnel des organismes européens (Opći sindikat osoblja europskih organizacija) od Suda je zatražio poništenje Odluke od 21. rujna 1973. kojom bi Komisija Europskih zajednica provela odbitak na plaćama dužnosnika i drugih službenika Komisije koji su sudjelovali u štrajku u studenom i prosincu 1972.
+2 Nakon što je podnio tužbu na osnovi članka 91. Pravilnika o osoblju za dužnosnike i članka 173. Ugovora o EEZ-u, tijekom postupka tužitelj je odustao od pozivanja na potonju odredbu.
+3 Komisija, tuženica, podneskom od 5. travnja 1974. istaknula je prigovor nedopuštenosti kojim je od Suda zatražila da odluči bez ulaženja u raspravljanje o meritumu.
+4 Kao prvo, Komisija je istaknula da Sindikat, tužitelj, nema aktivnu procesnu legitimaciju.
+5 Sukladno članku 24.a Pravilnika o osoblju za dužnosnike potonji imaju pravo na udruživanje, a posebno mogu biti članovi sindikata ili udruženja osoblja europskih dužnosnika.
+6 Sindikat, tužitelj, je udruženje koje okuplja znatan broj dužnosnika i službenika institucija i tijela Zajednice sa sjedištem u Luxembourgu i nema razloga sumnjati u njegovu reprezentativnost.
+7 Prema njegovom statutu, unutarnja organizacijska struktura sindikata je takve prirode da mu osigurava autonomiju nužnu za djelovanje u svojstvu odgovornog subjekta u pravnim odnosima.
+8 Komisija ga je priznala sugovornikom u pregovorima o kolektivnim interesima osoblja.
+9 Stoga se sindikatu, tužitelju, ne može osporavati ovlast pokretanja postupka.
+10 Sindikalna sloboda priznata člankom 24.a Pravilnika o osoblju za dužnosnike podrazumijeva, prema općim načelima prava rada, ne samo pravo dužnosnika i službenika da slobodno osnivaju udruženja po svojem odabiru, nego i pravo tih udruženja da obavljaju svaku zakonsku aktivnost u obrani profesionalnih interesa svojih članova.
+11 Sudski postupak jedan je od načina koji su na raspolaganju tim udruženjima.
+12 Međutim, u pravnom poretku Zajednice ostvarivanje tog prava podliježe uvjetima koje utvrđuje sustav pravnih lijekova koje predviđaju Ugovori o osnivanju Zajednica.
+13 Odgovarajuće kvalificirano profesionalno udruženje ima pravo, na temelju članka 173. drugog stavka Ugovora o EEZ-u, podnijeti tužbu za poništenje odluke koja mu je upućena u smislu te odredbe.
+14 Međutim, podnošenje izravne tužbe ne može se dopustiti u okviru sudskih postupaka iz članaka 90. i 91. Pravilnika o osoblju za dužnosnike utoliko što te odredbe implementiraju članak 179. Ugovora o EEZ-u i odgovarajuće članke Ugovora o EZUČ-u i Euratomu.
+15 Iako članak 179. može služiti kao osnova za organiziranje sudskog rješavanja sporova, ne samo pojedinačnih nego i kolektivnih, između Zajednice i njezinih službenika, to ne mijenja činjenicu da je postupak žalbe i tužbe utvrđen člancima 90. i 91. Pravilnika zamišljen isključivo radi pojedinačnih sporova.
+16 U tim okolnostima pravni lijek predviđen člankom 91. dostupan je samo dužnosnicima i službenicima.
+17 Međutim, članak 37. drugi stavak Poslovnika Suda dopušta intervenciju svakoj osobi koja može dokazati svoj pravni interes za rješavanje spora koji se vodi pred Sudom, uključujući i one iz članka 90. Pravilnika o osoblju za dužnosnike.
+18 Stoga, uzimajući u obzir pravne i činjenične okolnosti, Sud nije nadležan razmotriti izravnu tužbu koju je podnijelo profesionalno udruženje u skladu s člankom 91. Pravilnika o osoblju za dužnosnike.
+19 Stoga tužbu valja odbaciti kao nedopuštenu.
+20 Sukladno članku 69. stavka 2. Poslovnika, stranka koja ne uspije u postupku dužna je snositi troškove.
+21 Međutim zbog općeg interesa upućenog pitanja valja odrediti da svaka stranka snosi svoje troškove.
+Slijedom navedenog, SUD, proglašava i presuđuje:
+1. Tužba se odbacuje kao nedopuštena.
+2. Svaka stranka snosit će svoje troškove.

data/principle-mvep-justice-court/mvep-110-en.aligned.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+IN CASE 33/74
+REFERENCE TO THE COURT UNDER ARTICLE 177 OF THE EEC TREATY BY THE CENTRALE RAAD VAN BEROEP (NETHERLANDS COURT OF LAST INSTANCE IN SOCIAL SECURITY MATTERS) FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING IN THE ACTION PENDING BEFORE THAT COURT BETWEEN
+JOHANNES HENRICUS MARIA VAN BINSBERGEN, FITTER, RESIDING AT BEESEL (NETHERLANDS),
+AND
+BESTUUR VAN DE BEDRIJFSVERENIGING VOOR DE METAALNIJVERHEID, (BOARD OF THE TRADE ASSOCIATION OF THE ENGINEERING INDUSTRY), REGISTERED AT THE HAGUE,
+ON THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLES 59 AND 60 OF THE EEC TREATY RELATING TO FREEDOM TO PROVIDE SERVICES WITHIN THE COMMUNITY,
+1 BY ORDER OF 18 APRIL 1974, LODGED AT THE REGISTRY OF THE COURT ON 15 MAY, THE CENTRALE RAAD VAN BEROEP PUT TO THE COURT, UNDER ARTICLE 177 OF THE EEC TREATY, QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLES 59 AND 60 OF THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY CONCERNING FREEDOM TO PROVIDE SERVICES WITHIN THE COMMUNITY.
+2 THESE QUESTIONS AROSE INCIDENTALLY, DURING THE COURSE OF AN ACTION BEFORE THE SAID COURT, AND ARE CONCERNED WITH THE ADMISSION BEFORE THAT COURT OF THE PERSON WHOM THE APPELLANT IN THE MAIN ACTION CHOSE TO ACT AS HIS LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE.
+3 IT APPEARS FROM THE FILE THAT THE APPELLANT HAD ENTRUSTED THE DEFENCE OF HIS INTERESTS TO A LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE OF NETHERLANDS NATIONALITY ENTITLED TO ACT FOR PARTIES BEFORE COURTS AND TRIBUNALS WHERE REPRESENTATION BY AN ADVOCAAT IS NOT OBLIGATORY.
+4 SINCE THIS LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE HAD, DURING THE COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS, TRANSFERRED HIS RESIDENCE FROM THE NETHERLANDS TO BELGIUM, HIS CAPACITY TO REPRESENT THE PARTY IN QUESTION BEFORE THE CENTRALE RAAD VAN BEROEP WAS CONTESTED ON THE BASIS OF A PROVISION OF NETHERLANDS LAW UNDER WHICH ONLY PERSONS ESTABLISHED IN THE NETHERLANDS MAY ACT AS LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES BEFORE THAT COURT.
+5 IN SUPPORT OF HIS CLAIM THE PERSON CONCERNED INVOKED THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY RELATING TO FREEDOM TO PROVIDE SERVICES WITHIN THE COMMUNITY, AND THE CENTRALE RAAD VAN BEROEP REFERRED TO THE COURT TWO QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLES 59 AND 60 OF THE TREATY.
+THE ACTUAL SCOPE OF ARTICLES 59 AND 60
+6 THE COURT IS REQUESTED TO INTERPRET ARTICLES 59 AND 60 IN RELATION TO A PROVISION OF NATIONAL LAW WHEREBY ONLY PERSONS ESTABLISHED IN THE TERRITORY OF THE STATE CONCERNED ARE ENTITLED TO ACT AS LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES BEFORE CERTAIN COURTS OR TRIBUNALS.
+7 ARTICLE 59, THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF WHICH IS THE ONLY PROVISION IN QUESTION IN THIS CONNEXION, PROVIDES THAT: "WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE PROVISIONS SET OUT BELOW, RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOM TO PROVIDE SERVICES WITHIN THE COMMUNITY SHALL BE PROGRESSIVELY ABOLISHED DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD IN RESPECT OF NATIONALS OF MEMBER STATES WHO ARE ESTABLISHED IN A STATE OF THE COMMUNITY OTHER THAN THAT OF THE PERSON FOR WHOM THE SERVICES ARE INTENDED".
+8 HAVING DEFINED THE CONCEPT "SERVICES" WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE TREATY IN ITS FIRST AND SECOND PARAGRAPHS, ARTICLE 60 LAYS DOWN IN THE THIRD PARAGRAPH THAT, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE CHAPTER RELATING TO THE RIGHT OF ESTABLISHMENT, THE PERSON PROVIDING A SERVICE MAY, IN ORDER TO PROVIDE THAT SERVICE, TEMPORARILY PURSUE HIS ACTIVITY IN THE STATE WHERE THE SERVICE IS PROVIDED, UNDER THE SAME CONDITIONS AS ARE IMPOSED BY THAT STATE ON ITS OWN NATIONALS.
+9 THE QUESTION PUT BY THE NATIONAL COURT THEREFORE SEEKS TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE REQUIREMENT THAT LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES BE PERMANENTLY ESTABLISHED WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF THE STATE WHERE THE SERVICE IS TO BE PROVIDED CAN BE RECONCILED WITH THE PROHIBITION, UNDER ARTICLES 59 AND 60, ON ALL RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOM TO PROVIDE SERVICES WITHIN THE COMMUNITY.
+10 THE RESTRICTIONS TO BE ABOLISHED PURSUANT TO ARTICLES 59 AND 60 INCLUDE ALL REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED ON THE PERSON PROVIDING THE SERVICE BY REASON IN PARTICULAR OF HIS NATIONALITY OR OF THE FACT THAT HE DOES NOT HABITUALLY RESIDE IN THE STATE WHERE THE SERVICE IS PROVIDED, WHICH DO NOT APPLY TO PERSONS ESTABLISHED WITHIN THE NATIONAL TERRITORY OR WHICH MAY PREVENT OR OTHERWISE OBSTRUCT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE PERSON PROVIDING THE SERVICE.
+11 IN PARTICULAR, A REQUIREMENT THAT THE PERSON PROVIDING THE SERVICE MUST BE HABITUALLY RESIDENT WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF THE STATE WHERE THE SERVICE IS TO BE PROVIDED MAY, ACCORDING TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES, HAVE THE RESULT OF DEPRIVING ARTICLE 59 OF ALL USEFUL EFFECT, IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE PRECISE OBJECT OF THAT ARTICLE IS TO ABOLISH RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOM TO PROVIDE SERVICES IMPOSED ON PERSONS WHO ARE NOT ESTABLISHED IN THE STATE WHERE THE SERVICE IS TO BE PROVIDED.
+12 HOWEVER, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE PARTICULAR NATURE OF THE SERVICES TO BE PROVIDED, SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED ON THE PERSON PROVIDING THE SERVICE CANNOT BE CONSIDERED INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE TREATY WHERE THEY HAVE AS THEIR PURPOSE THE APPLICATION OF PROFESSIONAL RULES JUSTIFIED BY THE GENERAL GOOD - IN PARTICULAR RULES RELATING TO ORGANIZATION, QUALIFICATIONS, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, SUPERVISION AND LIABILITY - WHICH ARE BINDING UPON ANY PERSON ESTABLISHED IN THE STATE IN WHICH THE SERVICE IS PROVIDED, WHERE THE PERSON PROVIDING THE SERVICE WOULD ESCAPE FROM THE AMBIT OF THOSE RULES BEING ESTABLISHED IN ANOTHER MEMBER STATE.
+13 LIKEWISE, A MEMBER STATE CANNOT BE DENIED THE RIGHT TO TAKE MEASURES TO PREVENT THE EXERCISE BY A PERSON PROVIDING SERVICES WHOSE ACTIVITY IS ENTIRELY OR PRINCIPALLY DIRECTED TOWARDS ITS TERRITORY OF THE FREEDOM GUARANTEED BY ARTICLE 59 FOR THE PURPOSE OF AVOIDING THE PROFESSIONAL RULES OF CONDUCT WHICH WOULD BE APPLICABLE TO HIM IF HE WERE ESTABLISHED WITHIN THAT STATE; SUCH A SITUATION MAY BE SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL CONTROL UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE CHAPTER RELATING TO THE RIGHT OF ESTABLISHMENT AND NOT OF THAT ON THE PROVISION OF SERVICES.
+14 IN ACCORDANCE WITH THESE PRINCIPLES, THE REQUIREMENT THAT PERSONS WHOSE FUNCTIONS ARE TO ASSIST THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE MUST BE PERMANENTLY ESTABLISHED FOR PROFESSIONAL PURPOSES WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF CERTAIN COURTS OR TRIBUNALS CANNOT BE CONSIDERED INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLES 59 AND 60, WHERE SUCH REQUIREMENT IS OBJECTIVELY JUSTIFIED BY THE NEED TO ENSURE OBSERVANCE OF PROFESSIONAL RULES OF CONDUCT CONNECTED, IN PARTICULAR, WITH THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE AND WITH RESPECT FOR PROFESSIONAL ETHICS.
+15 THAT CANNOT, HOWEVER, BE THE CASE WHEN THE PROVISION OF CERTAIN SERVICES IN A MEMBER STATE IS NOT SUBJECT TO ANY SORT OF QUALIFICATION OR PROFESSIONAL REGULATION AND WHEN THE REQUIREMENT OF HABITUAL RESIDENCE IS FIXED BY REFERENCE TO THE TERRITORY OF THE STATE IN QUESTION.
+16 IN RELATION TO A PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITY THE EXERCISE OF WHICH IS SIMILARLY UNRESTRICTED WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF A PARTICULAR MEMBER STATE, THE REQUIREMENT OF RESIDENCE WITHIN THAT STATE CONSTITUTES A RESTRICTION WHICH IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH ARTICLES 59 AND 60 OF THE TREATY IF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE CAN SATISFACTORILY BE ENSURED BY MEASURES WHICH ARE LESS RESTRICTIVE, SUCH AS THE CHOOSING OF AN ADDRESS FOR SERVICE.
+17 IT MUST THEREFORE BE STATED IN REPLY TO THE QUESTION PUT TO THE COURT THAT THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 59 AND THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 60 OF THE EEC TREATY MUST BE INTERPRETED AS MEANING THAT THE NATIONAL LAW OF A MEMBER STATE CANNOT, BY IMPOSING A REQUIREMENT AS TO HABITUAL RESIDENCE WITHIN THAT STATE, DENY PERSONS ESTABLISHED IN ANOTHER MEMBER STATE THE RIGHT TO PROVIDE SERVICES, WHERE THE PROVISION OF SERVICES IS NOT SUBJECT TO ANY SPECIAL CONDITION UNDER THE NATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE.
+THE QUESTION OF THE DIRECT APPLICABILITY OF ARTICLES 59 AND 60
+18 THE COURT IS ALSO ASKED WHETHER THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 59 AND THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 60 OF THE EEC TREATY ARE DIRECTLY APPLICABLE AND CREATE INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WHICH NATIONAL COURTS MUST PROTECT.
+19 THIS QUESTION MUST BE RESOLVED WITH REFERENCE TO THE WHOLE OF THE CHAPTER RELATING TO SERVICES, TAKING ACCOUNT, MOREOVER, OF THE PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE RIGHT OF ESTABLISHMENT TO WHICH REFERENCE IS MADE IN ARTICLE 66.
+20 WITH A VIEW TO THE PROGRESSIVE ABOLITION DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD OF THE RESTRICTIONS REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 59, ARTICLE 63 HAS PROVIDED FOR THE DRAWING UP OF A "GENERAL PROGRAMME" - LAID DOWN BY COUNCIL DECISION OF 18 DECEMBER 1961 (1962, P. 32) - TO BE IMPLEMENTED BY A SERIES OF DIRECTIVES.
+21 WITHIN THE SCHEME OF THE CHAPTER RELATING TO THE PROVISION OF SERVICES, THESE DIRECTIVES ARE INTENDED TO ACCOMPLISH DIFFERENT FUNCTIONS, THE FIRST BEING TO ABOLISH, DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOM TO PROVIDE SERVICES, THE SECOND BEING TO INTRODUCE INTO THE LAW OF MEMBER STATES A SET OF PROVISIONS INTENDED TO FACILITATE THE EFFECTIVE EXERCISE OF THIS FREEDOM, IN PARTICULAR BY THE MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS AND THE COORDINATION OF LAWS WITH REGARD TO THE PURSUIT OF ACTIVITIES AS SELF-EMPLOYED PERSONS.
+22 THESE DIRECTIVES ALSO HAVE THE TASK OF RESOLVING THE SPECIFIC PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM THE FACT THAT WHERE THE PERSON PROVIDING THE SERVICE IS NOT ESTABLISHED, ON A HABITUAL BASIS, IN THE STATE WHERE THE SERVICE IS PERFORMED HE MAY NOT BE FULLY SUBJECT TO THE PROFESSIONAL RULES OF CONDUCT IN FORCE IN THAT STATE.
+23 AS REGARDS THE PHASED IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CHAPTER RELATING TO SERVICES, ARTICLE 59, INTERPRETED IN THE LIGHT OF THE GENERAL PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 8 (7) OF THE TREATY, EXPRESSES THE INTENTION TO ABOLISH RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOM TO PROVIDE SERVICES BY THE END OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, THE LATEST DATE FOR THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF ALL THE RULES LAID DOWN BY THE TREATY.
+24 THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 59, THE APPLICATION OF WHICH WAS TO BE PREPARED BY DIRECTIVES ISSUED DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, THEREFORE BECAME UNCONDITIONAL ON THE EXPIRY OF THAT PERIOD.
+25 THE PROVISIONS OF THAT ARTICLE ABOLISH ALL DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE PERSON PROVIDING THE SERVICE BY REASON OF HIS NATIONALITY OR THE FACT THAT HE IS ESTABLISHED IN A MEMBER STATE OTHER THAN THAT IN WHICH THE SERVICE IS TO BE PROVIDED.
+26 THEREFORE, AS REGARDS AT LEAST THE SPECIFIC REQUIREMENT OF NATIONALITY OR OF RESIDENCE, ARTICLES 59 AND 60 IMPOSE A WELL-DEFINED OBLIGATION, THE FULFILMENT OF WHICH BY THE MEMBER STATES CANNOT BE DELAYED OR JEOPARDIZED BY THE ABSENCE OF PROVISIONS WHICH WERE TO BE ADOPTED IN PURSUANCE OF POWERS CONFERRED UNDER ARTICLES 63 AND 66.
+27 ACCORDINGLY, THE REPLY SHOULD BE THAT THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 59 AND THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 60 HAVE DIRECT EFFECT AND MAY THEREFORE BE RELIED ON BEFORE NATIONAL COURTS, AT LEAST IN SO FAR AS THEY SEEK TO ABOLISH ANY DISCRIMINATION AGAINST A PERSON PROVIDING A SERVICE BY REASON OF HIS NATIONALITY OR OF THE FACT THAT HE RESIDES IN A MEMBER STATE OTHER THAN THAT IN WHICH THE SERVICE IS TO BE PROVIDED.
+28/29 THE COSTS INCURRED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, WHICH HAVE SUBMITTED OBSERVATIONS TO THE COURT, ARE NOT RECOVERABLE AND AS THESE PROCEEDINGS ARE, IN SO FAR AS THE PARTIES TO THE MAIN ACTION ARE CONCERNED, A STEP IN THE ACTION PENDING BEFORE THE CENTRALE RAAD VAN BEROEP, COSTS ARE A MATTER FOR THAT COURT.
+ON THOSE GROUNDS, THE COURT IN ANSWER TO THE QUESTIONS REFERRED TO IT BY THE CENTRALE RAAD VAN BEROEP BY ORDER OF 18 APRIL 1974, HEREBY RULES:
+1. THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 59 AND THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 60 OF THE EEC TREATY MUST BE INTERPRETED AS MEANING THAT THE NATIONAL LAW OF A MEMBER STATE CANNOT, BY IMPOSING A REQUIREMENT AS TO HABITUAL RESIDENCE WITHIN THAT STATE, DENY PERSONS ESTABLISHED IN ANOTHER MEMBER STATE THE RIGHT TO PROVIDE SERVICES, WHERE THE PROVISION OF SERVICES IS NOT SUBJECT TO ANY SPECIAL CONDITION UNDER THE NATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE;
+2. THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 59 AND THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 60 HAVE DIRECT EFFECT AND MAY THEREFORE BE RELIED ON BEFORE NATIONAL COURTS, AT LEAST IN SO FAR AS THEY SEEK TO ABOLISH ANY DISCRIMINATION AGAINST A PERSON PROVIDING A SERVICE BY REASON OF HIS NATIONALITY OR OF THE FACT THAT HE RESIDES IN A MEMBER STATE OTHER THAN THAT IN WHICH THE SERVICE IS TO BE PROVIDED.

data/principle-mvep-justice-court/mvep-110-hr.aligned.txt

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+U predmetu C-33/74
+povodom zahtjeva za prethodnu odluku na temelju članka 177. Ugovora o EEZ-u koji je uputio Centrale Raad van Beroep (Središnje žalbeno vijeće, Nizozemska) u postupku koji se vodi pred tim sudom između
+Johannesa Henricusa Maria van Binsbergena, instalatera, s boravištem u Beeselu (Nizozemska),
+i
+Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalnijverheid (Uprava strukovne udruge metalurške industrije) sa sjedištem u Hagu,
+o tumačenju članaka 59. i 60. Ugovora o EEZ-u o slobodi pružanja usluga unutar Zajednice, SUD,
+donosi sljedeću Presudu 1 Rješenjem od 18. travnja 1974. koje je Tajništvo Suda zaprimilo 15. svibnja 1974. Centrale Raad van Beroep (Središnje žalbeno vijeće) na temelju članka 177. Ugovora o EEZ-u uputio je pitanja o tumačenju članaka 59. i 60. Ugovora o osnivanju Europske zajednice o slobodi pružanja usluga unutar Zajednice.
+2 Ta su pitanja upućena u postupku koji se vodi pred navedenim sudom vezano uz prihvat osobe koju je tužitelj u glavnom postupku izabrao za zastupnika.
+3 Iz spisa proizlazi da je dotična stranka obranu svojih interesa povjerila zastupniku nizozemskog državljanstva koji pojedince zastupa na sudovima pred kojima nije obvezno da zastupnik bude odvjetnik.
+4 Budući da je tijekom postupka zastupnik iz Nizozemske prenio svoje boravište u Belgiju, njegova je nadležnost za zastupanje stranke pred Centrale Raad van Beroep (Središnje žalbeno vijeće) osporena zbog odredbe nizozemskog zakona sukladno kojoj pred tim sudom kao zastupnici mogu nastupati samo osobe s poslovnim nastanom u Nizozemskoj.
+5 Budući da se zainteresirana osoba u svoju korist pozvala na odredbe Ugovora o EEZ-u o slobodi pružanja usluga unutar Zajednice, Centrale Raad van Beroep (Središnje žalbeno vijeće) Sudu je uputio dva pitanja o tumačenju članaka 59. i 60. Ugovora o EEZ-u.
+Stvaran doseg članaka 59. i 60.
+6 Zatraženo je tumačenje članaka 59. i 60. s obzirom na odredbu nacionalnog zakona prema kojoj samo osobe s poslovnim nastanom na nacionalnom državnom području imaju pravo pred određenim sudovima nastupati u svojstvu pravnog zastupnika.
+7 Članak 59. – čiji je prvi stavak jedini relevantan u ovom kontekstu – određuje da „u okviru odredaba navedenih u nastavku, tijekom prijelaznog razdoblja postupno se ukidaju ograničenja slobode pružanja usluga unutar Zajednice u odnosu na državljane država članica s poslovnim nastanom u državi Zajednice koja nije država kojoj su usluge namijenjene”.
+8 Članak 60. nakon što u svojem prvom i drugom stavku definira pojam usluga u smislu Ugovora, u svojem trećem stavku precizira da, ne dovodeći u pitanje odredbe poglavlja o pravu poslovnog nastana, osoba koja pruža neku uslugu može, u svrhu pružanja te usluge, privremeno obavljati svoju djelatnost u državi u kojoj se usluga pruža, i to prema istim uvjetima koje ta država propisuje za svoje državljane.
+9 Upućenim pitanjem želi se utvrditi može li, u slučaju pravnog zastupnika, zahtjev stalnog nastana na državnom području države u kojoj se usluga pruža biti u skladu sa zabranom, na temelju članaka 59. i 60., svih ograničenja slobode pružanja usluga u Zajednici.
+10 Ta ograničenja čije ukidanje predviđaju članci 59. i 60. uključuju sve zahtjeve nametnute osobi koja pruža uslugu osobito zbog njezinog državljanstva ili okolnosti da u državi u kojoj se usluga pruža nema stalno boravište, koji se ne primjenjuju na osobe s poslovnim nastanom na državnom području ili koji su takve naravi da zabranjuju ili na neki drugi način ometaju djelatnosti pružatelja usluge.
+11 Osobito, zahtjev da osoba pružatelj usluge ima stalno boravište na državnom području države u kojoj se usluga treba pružiti može, ovisno o okolnostima, članak 59. lišiti svakog korisnog učinka, a njegov je cilj upravo ukinuti ograničenja slobode pružanja usluga od strane osoba koje nemaju poslovni nastan na državnom području države u kojoj se usluga treba pružiti.
+12 Uzimajući u obzir posebnu narav pružanja usluga, s Ugovorom o EEZ-u ipak se ne mogu smatrati nespojivi specifični zahtjevi nametnuti pružatelju usluge koji su potaknuti provedbom pravila struke opravdanih općim interesom, osobito pravila koja se odnose na organizaciju, kvalifikaciju, profesionalnu etiku, nadzor i odgovornost – koja se primjenjuju na sve osobe s poslovnim nastanom na državnom području države u kojoj se usluga pruža, u mjeri u kojoj bi pružatelj usluge zbog okolnosti da ima poslovni nastan u drugoj državi članici izbjegao ta pravila.
+13 Isto tako državi članici se ne može uskratiti pravo da donosi mjere radi sprječavanja da slobodu zajamčenu člankom 59. pružatelj usluge čija je djelatnost potpuno ili uglavnom usmjerena prema vlastitom državnom području iskoristi kako bi izbjegao pravila koja bi se na njega primijenila da ima poslovni nastan na državnom području te države, pri čemu bi takva situacija mogla podlijegati sudskom nadzoru na temelju odredbi iz poglavlja o pravu poslovnog nastana, a ne odredbi iz poglavlja o pružanju usluga.
+14 Sukladno tim načelima, s odredbama članaka 59. i 60. ne može se smatrati nespojivim zahtjev da osobe koje surađuju s pravosudnom upravom imaju stalan poslovni nastan na području nadležnosti određenih sudova, ako je taj zahtjev objektivno potreban kako bi se zajamčilo poštovanje pravila struke, osobito onih pravila koja su povezana s djelovanjem pravosuđa i poštovanjem profesionalne etike.
+15 Međutim, to nije slučaj kada u državi članici za pružanje određenih usluga nije propisana nikakva kvalifikacija ni profesionalni kodeks ponašanja i kada je zahtjev stalnog boravišta utvrđen upućivanjem na državno područje države.
+16 Što se tiče profesionalne djelatnosti koja unutar države članice ima potpunu slobodu, zahtjev boravišta na državnom području te države predstavlja ograničenje nespojivo s člancima 59. i 60. Ugovora kada se nesmetano djelovanje pravosudnog sustava može osigurati manje ograničavajućim mjerama poput određivanja izabrane adrese za dostavu sudskih pismena.
+17 Stoga na upućeno pitanje valja odgovoriti da se članak 59. prvi stavak i članak 60. treći stavak Ugovora o EEZ-u trebaju tumačiti tako da nacionalni zakon, time što zahtijeva stalno boravište na državnom području, ne može onemogućavati osobe s poslovnim nastanom na državnom području druge države članice da pružaju usluge kada važeći nacionalni zakon za pružanje tih usluga ne propisuje nikakav poseban uvjet.
+Pitanje izravne primjenjivosti članaka 59. i 60.
+18 Osim toga pita se jesu li članci 59. i 60. izravno primjenjivi i daju li pojedincima prava koja nacionalni sudovi moraju štititi.
+19 Upućeno se pitanje treba riješiti s obzirom na cijelo poglavlje o uslugama, uzimajući u obzir i odredbe o pravu poslovnog nastana na koja upućuje članak 66.
+20 Radi postupnog ukidanja, tijekom prijelaznog razdoblja, ograničenja iz članka 59., članak 63. predvidio je sastavljanje „općeg programa” , utvrđenog Odlukom Vijeća od 18. prosinca 1961. (SL 1962., str. 32.), čija se provedba mora osigurati donošenjem niza direktiva.
+21 Te direktive u sustavu iz poglavlja o pružanju usluga imaju za cilj izvršiti različite funkcije: prva je ukidanje, tijekom prijelaznog razdoblja, ograničenja slobode pružanja usluga, druga je uvođenje u zakonodavstvo država članica niza odredaba namijenjenih olakšavanju učinkovitog ostvarivanja te slobode, osobito uzajamnim priznavanjem stručnih kvalifikacija i koordinacijom zakonodavstava o obavljanju djelatnosti samozaposlenih osoba.
+22 Te direktive također imaju zadaću riješiti specifične probleme koji proizlaze iz okolnosti da pružatelj usluge, zbog toga što nema stalni nastan, ne bi podlijegao pravilima struke važećim u državi u kojoj se usluga pruža.
+23 Što se tiče postupne provedbe poglavlja o uslugama, članak 59. tumačen s obzirom na opću odredbu članka 8. stavka 7. Ugovora, odražava volju da se ograničenja slobode pružanja usluga ukinu po isteku prijelaznog razdoblja, a to je najkasniji dan do kojeg sva pravila utvrđena Ugovorom moraju stupiti na snagu.
+24 Odredbe članka 59., čiju su primjenu tijekom prijelaznog razdoblja morale osiguravati direktive, po isteku tog roka postaju bezuvjetne.
+25 Te odredbe ukidaju svaku diskriminaciju u odnosu na pružatelja usluge na temelju njegovog državljanstva ili zbog okolnosti da ima poslovni nastan u državi članici različitoj od one u kojoj se usluga treba pružiti.
+26 Barem što se tiče specifičnog zahtjeva državljanstva ili boravišta, članci 59. i 60. tako sadržavaju preciznu obvezu postizanja određenog rezultata („obligation de résultat”), čije izvršenje države članice ne mogu odgoditi ili dovesti u pitanje zbog nepostojanja pravila koja su morala biti donesena u okviru ovlasti dodijeljenih na temelju članaka 63. i 66.
+27 Stoga valja odgovoriti da članak 59. prvi stavak i članak 60. treći stavak imaju izravan učinak i stoga se na njih pred nacionalnim sudovima može pozivati, svakako u dijelu u kojem se odnose na ukidanje svake diskriminacije u odnosu na pružatelja usluge zbog njegovog državljanstva ili okolnosti da boravi u državi članici različitoj od one u kojoj se usluga treba pružiti.
+28 Troškovi vlade Irske, vlade Ujedinjene Kraljevine Velike Britanije i Sjeverne Irske, vlade Savezne Republike Njemačke i Komisije Europskih zajednica, koje su Sudu podnijele očitovanja, ne nadoknađuju se. 29 Budući da ovaj postupak ima značaj prethodnog pitanja za stranke glavnog postupka pred Centrale Raad van Beroep (Središnje žalbeno vijeće), na njemu je da odluči o troškovima postupka.
+Slijedom navedenog, Sud, o pitanjima koja mu je rješenjem od 18. travnja 1974. uputio Centrale Raad van Beroep (Središnje žalbeno vijeće), odlučuje:
+1. Članak 59. prvi stavak i članak 60. treći stavak Ugovora o EEZ-u trebaju se tumačiti tako da nacionalni zakon, time što zahtijeva stalno boravište na državnom području, ne može onemogućavati osobe s poslovnim nastanom na državnom području druge države članice da pružaju usluge kada važeći nacionalni zakon za pružanje tih usluga ne propisuje nikakav poseban uvjet.
+2. Članak 59. prvi stavak i članak 60. treći stavak imaju izravan učinak i stoga se na njih pred nacionalnim sudovima može pozivati, svakako u dijelu u kojem se odnose na ukidanje svake diskriminacije u odnosu na pružatelja usluge zbog njegovog državljanstva ili okolnosti da boravi u državi članici različitoj od one u kojoj se usluga treba pružiti.

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+IN CASE 36/74 REFERENCE TO THE COURT UNDER ARTICLE 177 OF THE EEC TREATY BY THE ARRONDISSEMENTSRECHTBANK (DISTRICT COURT) UTRECHT, FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING IN THE ACTION PENDING BEFORE THAT COURT BETWEEN
+1. BRUNO NILS OLAF WALRAVE
+2. LONGINUS JOHANNES NORBERT KOCH
+AND
+1. ASSOCIATION UNION CYCLISTE INTERNATIONALE
+2. KONINKLIJKE NEDERLANDSCHE WIELREN UNIE
+3. FEDERACION ESPANOLA CICLISMO
+ON THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLES 7, 48 AND 59 OF THE EEC TREATY AND THE PROVISIONS OF REGULATION (EEC) NO 1612/68 ON FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR WORKERS WITHIN THE COMMUNITY (OJ L 257 OF 19.10.1968, P. 2),
+1 BY ORDER DATED 15 MAY 1974 FILED AT THE COURT REGISTRY ON 24 MAY 1974, THE ARRONDISSEMENTSRECHTBANK UTRECHT REFERRED UNDER ARTICLE 177 OF THE EEC TREATY VARIOUS QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE INTERPRETATION OF THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 7, ARTICLE 48 AND THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 59 OF THE EEC TREATY AND OF REGULATION NO 1612/68 OF THE COUNCIL OF 15 OCTOBER 1968 (OJ L 257, P. 2) ON FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR WORKERS WITHIN THE COMMUNITY.
+2 THE BASIC QUESTION IS WHETHER THESE ARTICLES AND REGULATION MUST BE INTERPRETED IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE PROVISION IN THE RULES OF THE UNION CYCLISTE INTERNATIONALE RELATING TO MEDIUM-DISTANCE WORLD CYCLING CHAMPIONSHIPS BEHIND MOTORCYCLES, ACCORDING TO WHICH "L'ENTRAINEUR DOIT ETRE DE LA NATIONALITE DE COUREUR"(THE PACEMAKER MUST BE OF THE SAME NATIONALITY AS THE STAYER) IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THEM.
+3 THESE QUESTIONS WERE RAISED IN AN ACTION DIRECTED AGAINST THE UNION CYCLISTE INTERNATIONALE AND THE DUTCH AND SPANISH CYCLING FEDERATIONS BY TWO DUTCH NATIONALS WHO NORMALLY TAKE PART AS PACEMAKERS IN RACES OF THE SAID TYPE AND WHO REGARD THE AFOREMENTIONED PROVISION OF THE RULES OF UCI AS DISCRIMINATORY.
+4 HAVING REGARD TO THE OBJECTIVES OF THE COMMUNITY, THE PRACTICE OF SPORT IS SUBJECT TO COMMUNITY LAW ONLY IN SO FAR AS IT CONSTITUTES AN ECONOMIC ACTIVITY WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE TREATY.
+5 WHEN SUCH ACTIVITY HAS THE CHARACTER OF GAINFUL EMPLOYMENT OR REMUNERATED SERVICE IT COMES MORE PARTICULARLY WITHIN THE SCOPE, ACCORDING TO THE CASE, OF ARTICLES 48 TO 51 OR 59 TO 66 OF THE TREATY.
+6 THESE PROVISIONS, WHICH GIVE EFFECT TO THE GENERAL RULE OF ARTICLE 7 OF THE TREATY, PROHIBIT ANY DISCRIMINATION BASED ON NATIONALITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THE ACTIVITY TO WHICH THEY REFER.
+7 IN THIS RESPECT THE EXACT NATURE OF THE LEGAL RELATIONSHIP UNDER WHICH SUCH SERVICES ARE PERFORMED IS OF NO IMPORTANCE SINCE THE RULE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION COVERS IN IDENTICAL TERMS ALL WORK OR SERVICES.
+8 THIS PROHIBITION HOWEVER DOES NOT AFFECT THE COMPOSITION OF SPORT TEAMS, IN PARTICULAR NATIONAL TEAMS, THE FORMATION OF WHICH IS A QUESTION OF PURELY SPORTING INTEREST AND AS SUCH HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH ECONOMIC ACTIVITY.
+9 THIS RESTRICTION ON THE SCOPE OF THE PROVISIONS IN QUESTION MUST HOWEVER REMAIN LIMITED TO ITS PROPER OBJECTIVE.
+10 HAVING REGARD TO THE ABOVE, IT IS FOR THE NATIONAL COURT TO DETERMINE THE NATURE OF THE ACTIVITY SUBMITTED TO ITS JUDGMENT AND TO DECIDE IN PARTICULAR WHETHER IN THE SPORT IN QUESTION THE PACEMAKER AND STAYER DO OR DO NOT CONSTITUTE A TEAM.
+11 THE ANSWERS ARE GIVEN WITHIN THE LIMITS DEFINED ABOVE OF THE SCOPE OF COMMUNITY LAW.
+12 THE QUESTIONS RAISED RELATE TO THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLES 48 AND 59 AND TO A LESSER EXTENT OF ARTICLE 7 OF THE TREATY.
+13 BASICALLY THEY RELATE TO THE APPLICABILITY OF THE SAID PROVISIONS TO LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS WHICH DO NOT COME UNDER PUBLIC LAW, THE DETERMINATION OF THEIR TERRITORIAL SCOPE IN THE LIGHT OF RULES OF SPORT EMANATING FROM A WORLD-WIDE FEDERATION AND THE DIRECT APPLICABILITY OF CERTAIN OF THOSE PROVISIONS.
+14 THE MAIN QUESTION IN RESPECT OF ALL THE ARTICLES REFERRED TO IS WHETHER THE RULES OF AN INTERNATIONAL SPORTING FEDERATION CAN BE REGARDED AS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE TREATY.
+15 IT HAS BEEN ALLEGED THAT THE PROHIBITIONS IN THESE ARTICLES REFER ONLY TO RESTRICTIONS WHICH HAVE THEIR ORIGIN IN ACTS OF AN AUTHORITY AND NOT TO THOSE RESULTING FROM LEGAL ACTS OF PERSONS OR ASSOCIATIONS WHO DO NOT COME UNDER PUBLIC LAW.
+16 ARTICLES 7, 48, 59 HAVE IN COMMON THE PROHIBITION, IN THEIR RESPECTIVE SPHERES OF APPLICATION, OF ANY DISCRIMINATION ON GROUNDS OF NATIONALITY.
+17 PROHIBITION OF SUCH DISCRIMINATION DOES NOT ONLY APPLY TO THE ACTION OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES BUT EXTENDS LIKEWISE TO RULES OF ANY OTHER NATURE AIMED AT REGULATING IN A COLLECTIVE MANNER GAINFUL EMPLOYMENT AND THE PROVISION OF SERVICES.
+18 THE ABOLITION AS BETWEEN MEMBER STATES OF OBSTACLES TO FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR PERSONS AND TO FREEDOM TO PROVIDE SERVICES, WHICH ARE FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVES OF THE COMMUNITY CONTAINED IN ARTICLE 3 (c) OF THE TREATY, WOULD BE COMPROMISED IF THE ABOLITION OF BARRIERS OF NATIONAL ORIGIN COULD BE NEUTRALIZED BY OBSTACLES RESULTING FROM THE EXERCISE OF THEIR LEGAL AUTONOMY BY ASSOCIATIONS OR ORGANIZATIONS WHICH DO NOT COME UNDER PUBLIC LAW.
+19 SINCE, MOREOVER, WORKING CONDITIONS IN THE VARIOUS MEMBER STATES ARE GOVERNED SOMETIMES BY MEANS OF PROVISIONS LAID DOWN BY LAW OR REGULATION AND SOMETIMES BY AGREEMENTS AND OTHER ACTS CONCLUDED OR ADOPTED BY PRIVATE PERSONS, TO LIMIT THE PROHIBITIONS IN QUESTION TO ACTS OF A PUBLIC AUTHORITY WOULD RISK CREATING INEQUALITY IN THEIR APPLICATION.
+20 ALTHOUGH THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 60, AND ARTICLES 62 AND 64, SPECIFICALLY RELATE, AS REGARDS THE PROVISION OF SERVICES, TO THE ABOLITION OF MEASURES BY THE STATE, THIS FACT DOES NOT DEFEAT THE GENERAL NATURE OF THE TERMS OF ARTICLE 59, WHICH MAKES NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE SOURCE OF THE RESTRICTIONS TO BE ABOLISHED.
+21 IT IS ESTABLISHED, MOREOVER, THAT ARTICLE 48, RELATING TO THE ABOLITION OF ANY DISCRIMINATION BASED ON NATIONALITY AS REGARDS GAINFUL EMPLOYMENT, EXTENDS LIKEWISE TO AGREEMENTS AND RULES WHICH DO NOT EMANATE FROM PUBLIC AUTHORITIES.
+22 ARTICLE 7 (4) OF REGULATION NO 1612/68 IN CONSEQUENCE PROVIDES THAT THE PROHIBITION ON DISCRIMINATION SHALL APPLY TO AGREEMENTS AND ANY OTHER COLLECTIVE REGULATIONS CONCERNING EMPLOYMENT.
+23 THE ACTIVITIES REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 59 ARE NOT TO BE DISTINGUISHED BY THEIR NATURE FROM THOSE IN ARTICLE 48, BUT ONLY BY THE FACT THAT THEY ARE PERFORMED OUTSIDE THE TIES OF A CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT.
+24 THIS SINGLE DISTINCTION CANNOT JUSTIFY A MORE RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE SCOPE OF THE FREEDOM TO BE ENSURED.
+25 IT FOLLOWS THAT THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLES 7, 48 AND 59 OF THE TREATY MAY BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT BY THE NATIONAL COURT IN JUDGING THE VALIDITY OR THE EFFECTS OF A PROVISION INSERTED IN THE RULES OF A SPORTING ORGANIZATION.
+26 THE NATIONAL COURT THEN RAISES THE QUESTION OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE RULE ON NON-DISCRIMINATION MAY BE APPLIED TO LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS ESTABLISHED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ACTIVITIES OF A SPORTING FEDERATION OF WORLD-WIDE PROPORTIONS.
+27 THE COURT IS ALSO INVITED TO SAY WHETHER THE LEGAL POSITION MAY DEPEND ON WHETHER THE SPORTING COMPETITION IS HELD WITHIN OR OUTSIDE THE COMMUNITY.
+28 BY REASON OF THE FACT THAT IT IS IMPERATIVE, THE RULE ON NON-DISCRIMINATION APPLIES IN JUDGING ALL LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS IN SO FAR AS THESE RELATIONSHIPS, BY REASON EITHER OF THE PLACE WHERE THEY ARE ENTERED INTO OR OF THE PLACE WHERE THEY TAKE EFFECT, CAN BE LOCATED WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF THE COMMUNITY.
+29 IT IS FOR THE NATIONAL JUDGE TO DECIDE WHETHER THEY CAN BE SO LOCATED, HAVING REGARD TO THE FACTS OF EACH PARTICULAR CASE, AND, AS REGARDS THE LEGAL EFFECT OF THESE RELATIONSHIPS, TO DRAW THE CONSEQUENCES OF ANY INFRINGEMENT OF THE RULE ON NON-DISCRIMINATION.
+30 FINALLY, THE NATIONAL COURT HAS RAISED THE QUESTION WHETHER THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 59, AND POSSIBLY THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 7, OF THE TREATY HAVE DIRECT EFFECTS WITHIN THE LEGAL ORDERS OF THE MEMBER STATES.
+31 AS HAS BEEN SHOWN ABOVE, THE OBJECTIVE OF ARTICLE 59 IS TO PROHIBIT IN THE SPHERE OF THE PROVISION OF SERVICES, INTER ALIA, ANY DISCRIMINATION ON THE GROUNDS OF THE NATIONALITY OF THE PERSON PROVIDING THE SERVICES.
+32 IN THE SECTOR RELATING TO SERVICES, ARTICLE 59 CONSTITUTES THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NON-DISCRIMINATION RULE FORMULATED BY ARTICLE 7 FOR THE GENERAL APPLICATION OF THE TREATY AND BY ARTICLE 48 FOR GAINFUL EMPLOYMENT.
+33 THUS, AS HAS ALREADY BEEN RULED (JUDGMENT OF 3 DECEMBER 1974 IN CASE 33/74, VAN BINSBERGEN) ARTICLE 59 COMPRISES, AS AT THE END OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, AN UNCONDITIONAL PROHIBITION PREVENTING, IN THE LEGAL ORDER OF EACH MEMBER STATE, AS REGARDS THE PROVISION OF SERVICES - AND IN SO FAR AS IT IS A QUESTION OF NATIONALS OF MEMBER STATES - THE IMPOSITION OF OBSTACLES OR LIMITATIONS BASED ON THE NATIONALITY OF THE PERSON PROVIDING THE SERVICES.
+34 IT IS THEREFORE RIGHT TO REPLY TO THE QUESTION RAISED THAT AS FROM THE END OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 59, IN ANY EVENT IN SO FAR AS IT REFERS TO THE ABOLITION OF ANY DISCRIMINATION BASED ON NATIONALITY, CREATE INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WHICH NATIONAL COURTS MUST PROTECT.
+35 THE COSTS INCURRED BY THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, WHICH HAS SUBMITTED OBSERVATIONS TO THE COURT, ARE NOT RECOVERABLE.
+36 SINCE THESE PROCEEDINGS ARE, IN SO FAR AS THE PARTIES TO THE MAIN ACTION ARE CONCERNED, A STEP IN THE ACTION PENDING BEFORE THE NATIONAL COURT, COSTS ARE A MATTER FOR THAT COURT.
+ON THOSE GROUNDS, THE COURT IN ANSWER TO THE QUESTIONS REFERRED TO IT BY THE ARRONDISSEMENTSRECHTBANK UTRECHT, HEREBY RULES:
+1. HAVING REGARD TO THE OBJECTIVES OF THE COMMUNITY, THE PRACTICE OF SPORT IS SUBJECT TO COMMUNITY LAW ONLY IN SO FAR AS IT CONSTITUTES AN ECONOMIC ACTIVITY WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE TREATY.
+2. THE PROHIBITION ON DISCRIMINATION BASED ON NATIONALITY CONTAINED IN ARTICLES 7, 48 AND 59 OF THE TREATY DOES NOT AFFECT THE COMPOSITION OF SPORT TEAMS, IN PARTICULAR NATIONAL TEAMS, THE FORMATION OF WHICH IS A QUESTION OF PURELY SPORTING INTEREST AND AS SUCH HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH ECONOMIC ACTIVITY.
+3. PROHIBITION ON SUCH DISCRIMINATION DOES NOT ONLY APPLY TO THE ACTION OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES BUT EXTENDS LIKEWISE TO RULES OF ANY OTHER NATURE AIMED AT COLLECTIVELY REGULATING GAINFUL EMPLOYMENT AND SERVICES.
+4. THE RULE ON NON-DISCRIMINATION APPLIES IN JUDGING ALL LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS IN SO FAR AS THESE RELATIONSHIPS, BY REASON EITHER OF THE PLACE WHERE THEY ARE ENTERED INTO OR OF THE PLACE WHERE THEY TAKE EFFECT, CAN BE LOCATED WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF THE COMMUNITY.
+5. THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 59, IN ANY EVENT IN SO FAR AS IT REFERS TO THE ABOLITION OF ANY DISCRIMINATION BASED ON NATIONALITY, CREATES INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WHICH NATIONAL COURTS MUST PROTECT.

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+U predmetu C-36/74, povodom zahtjeva za prethodnu odluku na temelju članka 177. Ugovora o EEZ-u, koji je uputio Arrondissementsrechtbank u Utrechtu (Okružni sud, Nizozemska), u postupku koji se vodi pred tim sudom između
+1. Bruna Nilsa Olafa Walravea
+2. Longinusa Johannesa Norberta Kocha
+i
+1. Association Union Cycliste Internationale
+2. Koninklijke Nederlandsche Wielren Unie
+3. Federación Española Ciclismo
+o tumačenju članaka 7., 48. i 59. Ugovora o EEZ-u i odredaba Uredbe Vijeća (EEZ) br. 1612/68 o slobodi kretanja radnika unutar Zajednice (SL L 257 od 19. listopada 1968., str. 2.).
+SUD, u sastavu: R. Lecourt, predsjednik, C. Ó Dálaigh i A. J. Mackenzie Stuart, predsjednici vijeća, A. M. Donner, R. Monaco, J. Mertens de Wilmars (izvjestitelj), P. Pescatore, H. Kutscher i M. Sørensen, suci, nezavisni odvjetnik: J. P. Warner, tajnik: A. Van Houtte, donosi sljedeću Presudu 1 Odlukom od 15. svibnja 1974. koju je tajništvo Suda zaprimilo 24. svibnja 1974. Arrondissementrechtbank u Utrechtu (Okružni sud) uputio je nekoliko pitanja o tumačenju članka 7. prvog stavka, članka 48. i članka 59. prvog stavka Ugovora te Uredbe Vijeća (EEZ) br. 1612/68 od 15. listopada 1968. o slobodi kretanja radnika unutar Zajednice (SL L 257, str. 2.).
+2 U bîti se pita trebaju li se te odredbe tumačiti tako da s njihovim sadržajem nije spojiva odredba pravila Union Cycliste Internationale o svjetskom prvenstvu biciklističkih utrka na srednje udaljenosti iza trenera na motociklu, prema kojem „trener mora biti istog državljanstva kao i njegov biciklist”.
+3 Ta su pitanja upućena u okviru tužbe koju su protiv Union Cyliste Inernationale te nizozemskog i španjolskog biciklističkog saveza podnijela dva nizozemska državljana koji na opisanim utrkama uobičajeno sudjeluju kao treneri, a koji navedenu odredbu pravila Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) smatraju diskriminirajućom.
+4 Uzimajući u obzir ciljeve Zajednice, bavljenje sportom potpada pod pravo Zajednice samo ako ono predstavlja gospodarsku djelatnost u smislu članka 2. Ugovora o EEZ-u.
+5 Kada takva aktivnost ima obilježje samostalnog rada ili pružanja usluge za plaću, ona konkretno potpada pod područje primjene, ovisno o slučaju, članaka 48. do 51. ili članaka 59. do 66. Ugovora.
+6 Te odredbe, koje provode opće pravilo iz članka 7. Ugovora, zabranjuju svaku diskriminaciju na temelju državljanstva u obavljanju aktivnosti na koje se one odnose.
+7 U tom je pogledu stvarna priroda pravnog odnosa na temelju kojeg se te usluge obavljaju nevažna, jer se pravilo nediskriminacije na isti način odnosi na svako obavljanje posla ili pružanje usluga.
+8 Međutim, ta se zabrana ne odnosi na sastav sportskih timova, osobito onih nacionalnih, jer je formiranje tih timova pitanje koje se odnosi isključivo na sport i kao takvo nema nikakve veze s gospodarskom djelatnošću.
+9 To ograničenje područja primjene odredaba o kojima je riječ ipak mora ostati u granicama svoje prave svrhe.
+10 S obzirom na prethodno navedeno, na nacionalnom je sudu da kvalificira aktivnost koju ocjenjuje i, osobito, da odluči jesu li u dotičnom sportu trener i biciklist tim ili nisu.
+11 Odgovori su dani u prethodno utvrđenim granicama područja primjene prava Zajednice.
+12 Upućena se pitanja odnose na tumačenje članaka 48. i 59. i, podredno, članka 7. Ugovora.
+13 Ona se u bîti odnose na primjenjivost navedenih odredaba na pravne odnose koji nisu uređeni javnim pravom, na utvrđivanje njihovog teritorijalnog područja primjene s obzirom na sportsko pravilo koje donosi sportski savez koji djeluje na svjetskoj razini te na izravnu primjenjivost nekih od tih odredaba.
+14 Kao prvo, u vezi sa svakim navedenim člankom pita se mogu li se odredbe pravila međunarodnog sportskog saveza smatrati nespojivima s Ugovorom.
+15 Tvrdilo se da se zabrane iz tih članaka odnose samo na ograničenja koja proizlaze iz akata javnog tijela, a ne na ona koja proizlaze iz pravnih akata koje izdaju subjekti ili udruženja koji nisu uređeni javnim pravom.
+16 Člancima 7., 48. i 59. zajedničko je to da u svojim područjima primjene zabranjuju svaku diskriminaciju na temelju državljanstva.
+17 Zabrana te diskriminacije ne odnosi se samo na djelovanje tijela javne vlasti nego se proteže i na pravila druge naravi kojima se kolektivno uređuje nesamostalni rad i pružanje usluga.
+18 Naime, uklanjanje prepreka slobodnom kretanju osoba i slobodnom pružanju usluga između država članica, a to su temeljni ciljevi Zajednice utvrđeni u članku 3. točki (c) Ugovora, bilo bi ugroženo ako bi se ukidanje prepreka koje su bile posljedica državnih granica moglo neutralizirati preprekama koje su posljedica pravne neovisnosti udruženja ili organizacija koje nisu uređene javnim pravom.
+19 Osim toga, budući da su uvjeti rada u različitim državama članicama ponekad uređeni zakonima ili propisima, a ponekad ugovorima i drugim aktima koje sklapaju ili usvajaju privatne osobe, ograničavanje dotičnih zabrana na akte tijela javne vlasti moglo bi uzrokovati nejednakost u njihovoj primjeni.
+20 Iako nema sumnje da se članak 60. treći stavak i članci 62. i 64. odnose, posebno u području pružanja usluga, na ukidanje državnih mjera, ta okolnost ne dozvoljava da se umanji općenitost odredaba članka 59. koji u pogledu podrijetla prepreka koje se trebaju ukloniti ne pravi nikakvu razliku.
+21 Nadalje, nesporno je da se što se tiče nesamostalnog rada članak 48. o ukidanju svake diskriminacije na temelju državljanstva proteže i na ugovore i na pravila koja ne donose tijela javne vlasti.
+22 Stoga članak 7. stavak 4. Uredbe br. 1612/68 predviđa da se zabrana diskriminacije primjenjuje na ugovore i druge kolektivne propise o radu.
+23 Aktivnosti iz članka 59. ne razlikuju se od onih iz članka 48. po svojoj prirodi nego samo po činjenici da obavljanje tih aktivnosti nije uređeno ugovorom o radu.
+24 Samo ta razlika ne može opravdati uže tumačenje područja primjene načela slobode koje se osigurava.
+25 Iz toga proizlazi da nacionalni sud, radi ocjene valjanosti ili učinaka odredbe iz pravila sportske organizacije, može uzeti u obzir odredbe članaka 7., 48. i 59. Ugovora.
+26 Nacionalni sud zatim upućuje pitanje kojim pita u kojoj se mjeri pravilo nediskriminacije može primijeniti na pravne odnose nastale u okviru aktivnosti sportskog saveza koji djeluje na svjetskoj razini.
+27 Od Suda se također traži da utvrdi može li pravna situacija biti drukčija već prema tome održava li se sportsko natjecanje na području Zajednice ili izvan tog područja.
+28 Zbog svoje obvezujuće prirode pravilo nediskriminacije primjenjuje se na ocjenu svih pravnih odnosa uvijek kada se ti odnosi, zbog mjesta na kojem su nastali ili zbog mjesta na kojem proizvode svoje učinke, mogu smjestiti na područje Zajednice.
+29 Na nacionalnom sudu je da lokaciju ocijeni s obzirom na okolnosti svakog pojedinačnog slučaja i da u pogledu pravnog učinka tih odnosa donese zaključke o eventualnoj povredi pravila nediskriminacije.
+30 Naposljetku, nacionalni je sud uputio pitanje kojim se pita proizvode li članak 59. prvi stavak i eventualno članak 7. prvi stavak Ugovora izravne učinke na pravni poredak država članica.
+31 Kako je to prethodno navedeno, članak 59. ima za cilj u sektoru pružanja usluga zabraniti, između ostalog, svaku diskriminaciju na temelju državljanstva pružatelja usluga.
+32 Pravilo o nediskriminaciji koje je u članku 7. formulirano za opće područje primjene Ugovora provedeno je člankom 59. u sektoru pružanja usluga i člankom 48. u sektoru zaposlenih radnika.
+33 Kako je to već presuđeno (presuda od 3. prosinca 1974. u predmetu C-33/74, Van Binsbergen), članak 59. uključuje, po isteku prijelaznog razdoblja, bezuvjetnu zabranu koja u pravnom poretku svake države članice sprječava, što se tiče pružanja usluga – i kada je riječ o državljanima država članica – nametanje prepreka ili ograničenja na temelju državljanstva pružatelja usluga.
+34 Stoga na upućeno pitanje valja odgovoriti da članak 59. prvi stavak, u dijelu u kojem se odnosi na ukidanje svake diskriminacije na temelju državljanstva, po isteku prijelaznog razdoblja pojedincima svakako daje prava koja su nacionalni sudovi dužni štititi.
+35 Troškovi Komisije Europskih zajednica koja je Sudu podnijela očitovanja, ne nadoknađuju se.
+36 Budući da ovaj postupak ima značaj prethodnog pitanja za stranke glavnog postupka pred nacionalnim sudom, na tom je sudu da odluči o troškovima postupka.
+Slijedom navedenog, Sud, o pitanjima koja mu je uputio Arrondissementsrechtbank u Utrechtu (Okružni sud), odlučuje:
+1. Uzimajući u obzir ciljeve Zajednice, bavljenje sportom potpada pod pravo Zajednice samo ako ono predstavlja gospodarsku djelatnost u smislu članka 2. Ugovora.
+2. Zabrana diskriminacije na temelju državljanstva utvrđena člancima 7., 48. i 59. Ugovora ne odnosi se na sastav sportskih timova, osobito onih nacionalnih, jer je formiranje tih timova pitanje koje se odnosi isključivo na sport i kao takvo nema nikakve veze s gospodarskom djelatnošću.
+3. Zabrana te diskriminacije ne odnosi se samo na djelovanje tijela javne vlasti nego se proteže i na pravila druge naravi kojima se kolektivno uređuje nesamostalni rad i pružanje usluga.
+4. Pravilo nediskriminacije primjenjuje se na ocjenu svih pravnih odnosa uvijek kada se ti odnosi, zbog mjesta na kojem su nastali ili zbog mjesta na kojem proizvode svoje učinke, mogu smjestiti na područje Zajednice.
+5. Članak 59. prvi stavak, u dijelu u kojem se odnosi na ukidanje svake diskriminacije na temelju državljanstva, po isteku prijelaznog razdoblja pojedincima svakako daje prava koja su nacionalni sudovi dužni štititi.

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+IN CASE 115/78 REFERENCE TO THE COURT UNDER ARTICLE 177 OF THE EEC TREATY BY THE COLLEGE VAN BEROEP VOOR HET BEDRIJFSLEVEN (ADMINISTRATIVE COURT OF LAST INSTANCE IN MATTERS OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY) FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING IN THE PROCEEDINGS PENDING BEFORE THAT COURT BETWEEN J. KNOORS, A CENTRAL HEATING CONTRACTOR, RESIDING AT DILSEN/STOKKEM (BELGIUM), AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, ON THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 1 (1) OF COUNCIL DIRECTIVE NO 64/427/EEC OF 7 JULY 1964 LAYING DOWN DETAILED PROVISIONS CONCERNING TRANSITIONAL MEASURES IN RESPECT OF ACTIVITIES OF SELF-EMPLOYED PERSONS IN MANUFACTURING AND PROCESSING INDUSTRIES FALLING WITHIN ISIC MAJOR GROUPS 23-40 (INDUSTRY AND SMALL CRAFT INDUSTRIES),
+1BY AN ORDER OF 9 MAY 1978 WHICH REACHED THE COURT ON 12 MAY, THE COLLEGE VAN BEROEP VOOR HET BEDRIJFSLEVEN (ADMINISTRATIVE COURT OF LAST INSTANCE IN MATTERS OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY) REFERRED TO THE COURT FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING IN PURSUANCE OF ARTICLE 177 OF THE EEC TREATY A QUESTION ON THE INTERPRETATION OF COUNCIL DIRECTIVE NO 64/427 OF 7 JULY 1964 LAYING DOWN DETAILED PROVISIONS CONCERNING TRANSITIONAL MEASURES IN RESPECT OF ACTIVITIES OF SELF-EMPLOYED PERSONS IN MANUFACTURING AND PROCESSING INDUSTRIES FALLING WITHIN ISIC (UNITED NATIONs' iNTERNATIONAL STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION OF ALL ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES) MAJOR GROUPS 23-40 (INDUSTRY AND SMALL CRAFT INDUSTRIES) (OFFICIAL JOURNAL, ENGLISH SPECIAL EDITION, 1963-1964, P. 148).
+2THE ORDER REFERRING THE MATTER TO THE COURT SHOWS THAT THE PLAINTIFF IN THE MAIN ACTION, A NETHERLANDS NATIONAL RESIDING IN BELGIUM, WAS ENGAGED, DURING LENGTHY RESIDENCE IN THAT MEMBER STATE, AS AN EMPLOYED PERSON IN A PLUMBING BUSINESS AND THAT SINCE 1970 HE HAS WORKED AS A PLUMBING CONTRACTOR AS THE HEAD OF AN INDEPENDENT BUSINESS.
+3THE PLAINTIFF APPLIED TO THE COMPETENT NETHERLANDS AUTHORITIES FOR AN AUTHORIZATION TO CARRY ON THE SAME TRADE IN HIS COUNTRY OF ORIGIN. HOWEVER, HIS APPLICATION WAS REFUSED BECAUSE HE DID NOT POSSESS THE QUALIFICATIONS REQUIRED FOR THAT TRADE BY NETHERLANDS LEGISLATION.
+4ON THAT OCCASION THE NETHERLANDS AUTHORITIES INFORMED THE PLAINTIFF THAT HE COULD NOT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 15 (1) (c) OF THE VESTIGINGSWET BEDRIJVEN (LAW ON ESTABLISHMENT 1954) UNDER WHICH AN AUTHORIZATION TO PRACTISE CERTAIN TRADES MAY BE GRANTED WHEN THE PROVISIONS OF A DIRECTIVE OF THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES RELATING TO ESTABLISHMENT REQUIRE THE GRANT OF SUCH AN AUTHORIZATION.
+5IN THIS RESPECT THE NETHERLANDS SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, IN TWO SUCCESSIVE DECISIONS, STATED THAT THE PLAINTIFF, AS A NETHERLANDS NATIONAL, COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AS A BENEFICIARY OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE DIRECTIVE IN QUESTION ACCORDING TO WHICH, WHEN ACCESS TO CERTAIN ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES IN A MEMBER STATE IS MADE SUBJECT TO THE POSSESSION OF GIVEN TRADE QUALIFICATIONS, THAT MEMBER STATE MUST RECOGNIZE AS A SUFFICIENT PROOF OF THOSE QUALIFICATIONS THE ACTUAL PRACTICE IN ANOTHER MEMBER STATE OF THE ACTIVITY IN QUESTION.
+6THE PLAINTIFF TAKES THE VIEW THAT DIRECTIVE NO 64/427 OUGHT TO HAVE REQUIRED THE NETHERLANDS AUTHORITIES TO GRANT HIM THE AUTHORIZATION FOR WHICH HE HAD APPLIED.
+7TO ENABLE IT TO GIVE JUDGMENT IN THIS MATTER THE COLLEGE VAN BEROEP VOOR HET BEDRIJFSLEVEN HAS SUBMITTED THE FOLLOWING QUESTION:
+''MUST DIRECTIVE NO 64/427/EEC OF THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF 7 JULY 1964 BE INTERPRETED AS MEANING THAT THE EXPRESSION 'BENEFICIARIEs' aS REFERRED TO AND AS DEFINED IN ARTICLE 1 (1) OF THE DIRECTIVE ALSO INCLUDES PERSONS WHO POSSESS AND HAVE ALWAYS POSSESSED SOLELY THE NATIONALITY OF THE HOST MEMBER STATE?''
+8THE DEFINITION OF THE PERSONS TO WHOM DIRECTIVE NO 64/427 APPLIES DEPENDS, FIRST, ON THE ACTUAL AIM OF THAT DIRECTIVE AND, SECONDLY, ON THE PROVISIONS WHICH FORM ITS BASIS AND ITS FRAMEWORK, NAMELY THE GENERAL PROGRAMMES FOR THE ABOLITION OF RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOM TO PROVIDE SERVICES AND FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT OF 18 DECEMBER 1961 (OFFICIAL JOURNAL, ENGLISH SPECIAL EDITION, SECOND SERIES, IX, PP. 3 AND 7 RESPECTIVELY) AS WELL AS ON THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY.
+9DIRECTIVE NO 64/427 IS INTENDED TO FACILITATE THE REALIZATION OF FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT AND OF FREEDOM TO PROVIDE SERVICES IN A LARGE GROUP OF TRADE ACTIVITIES RELATING TO INDUSTRY AND SMALL CRAFT INDUSTRIES, PENDING THE HARMONIZATION OF THE CONDITIONS FOR ACCESS TO THE TRADES IN QUESTION IN THE VARIOUS MEMBER STATES, WHICH IS AN INDISPENSABLE PRECONDITION FOR COMPLETE FREEDOM IN THIS SPHERE.
+10MORE PARTICULARLY THAT DIRECTIVE TAKES ACCOUNT OF THE DIFFICULTIES RESULTING FROM THE FACT THAT, IN CERTAIN MEMBER STATES, CERTAIN OF THE ACTIVITIES IN QUESTION MAY BE FREELY TAKEN UP AND PURSUED, WHILST OTHER MEMBER STATES APPLY MORE OR LESS STRICT CONDITIONS INVOLVING THE POSSESSION OF SPECIALIZED TRAINING FOR ADMISSION TO CERTAIN TRADES.
+11WITH A VIEW TO RESOLVING THE PROBLEMS CREATED BY THIS DISPARITY, ARTICLE 3 OF THE DIRECTIVE PROVIDES THAT, WHERE, IN A MEMBER STATE, THE TAKING UP OR PURSUIT OF ANY ACTIVITY REFERRED TO IN THE DIRECTIVE IS DEPENDENT ON THE POSSESSION OF CERTAIN QUALIFICATIONS, ''THAT MEMBER STATE SHALL ACCEPT AS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF SUCH KNOWLEDGE AND ABILITY THE FACT THAT THE ACTIVITY IN QUESTION HAS BEEN PURSUED IN ANOTHER MEMBER STATE''.
+12THAT ARTICLE FURTHER STATES WHAT IS TO BE UNDERSTOOD BY ''PURSUING'' AN ACTIVITY, IN PARTICULAR BY FIXING MINIMUM PERIODS DURING WHICH IT MUST HAVE BEEN PRACTISED.
+13AS A COUNTERPART, ARTICLE 5 OF THE SAME DIRECTIVE DEALING WITH MEMBER STATES IN WHICH THE TAKING UP OF ONE OF THE ACTIVITIES IN QUESTION IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE POSSESSION OF ANY GIVEN TRADE QUALIFICATIONS, GOVERNS THE SITUATION OF PERSONS COMING FROM A MEMBER STATE WHERE SUCH QUALIFICATIONS ARE REQUIRED.
+14THE PERSONS TO WHOM THE DIRECTIVE APPLIES ARE ESSENTIALLY DEFINED BY ARTICLE 1 (1), UNDER WHICH ''MEMBER STATES, ACTING IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS HEREINAFTER LAID DOWN, SHALL ADOPT THE FOLLOWING TRANSITIONAL MEASURES IN RESPECT OF ESTABLISHMENT OR PROVISION OF SERVICES IN THEIR TERRITORIES BY NATURAL PERSONS OR COMPANIES OR FIRMS COVERED BY TITLE I OF THE GENERAL PROGRAMMES (HEREINAFTER CALLED 'BENEFICIARIEs') WISHING TO ENGAGE IN ACTIVITIES AS SELF-EMPLOYED PERSONS IN MANUFACTURING AND PROCESSING INDUSTRIEs''.
+15THE GENERAL PROGRAMME FOR THE ABOLITION OF RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOM TO PROVIDE SERVICES, IN THE FIRST INDENT OF TITLE I, DEFINES AS BENEFICIARIES THE ''NATIONALS OF MEMBER STATES WHO ARE ESTABLISHED WITHIN THE COMMUNITY'', WITHOUT MAKING ANY DISTINCTION AS TO THE NATIONALITY OR RESIDENCE OF THE PERSONS CONCERNED.
+16THE SAME IDEA IS EXPRESSED BY TITLE I OF THE GENERAL PROGRAMME FOR THE ABOLITION OF RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT, WHICH DESIGNATES AS BENEFICIARIES, IN THE FIRST AND THIRD INDENTS, THE ''NATIONALS OF MEMBER STATEs'' WITHOUT ANY DISTINCTION AS REGARDS NATIONALITY OR RESIDENCE.
+17IT MAY THEREFORE BE STATED THAT DIRECTIVE NO 64/427 IS BASED ON A BROAD DEFINITION OF THE ''BENEFICIARIEs'' OF ITS PROVISIONS, IN THE SENSE THAT THE NATIONALS OF ALL MEMBER STATES MUST BE ABLE TO AVAIL THEMSELVES OF THE LIBERALIZING MEASURES WHICH IT LAYS DOWN, PROVIDED THAT THEY COME OBJECTIVELY WITHIN ONE OF THE SITUATIONS PROVIDED FOR BY THE DIRECTIVE, AND NO DIFFERENTIATION OF TREATMENT ON THE BASIS OF THEIR RESIDENCE OR NATIONALITY IS PERMITTED.
+18THUS THE PROVISIONS OF THE DIRECTIVE MAY BE RELIED UPON BY THE NATIONALS OF ALL THE MEMBER STATES WHO ARE IN THE SITUATIONS WHICH THE DIRECTIVE DEFINES FOR ITS APPLICATION, EVEN IN RESPECT OF THE STATE WHOSE NATIONALITY THEY POSSESS.
+19THIS INTERPRETATION IS JUSTIFIED BY THE REQUIREMENTS FLOWING FROM FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR PERSONS, FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT AND FREEDOM TO PROVIDE SERVICES, WHICH ARE GUARANTEED BY ARTICLES 3 (c), 48, 52 AND 59 OF THE TREATY.
+20IN FACT, THESE LIBERTIES, WHICH ARE FUNDAMENTAL IN THE COMMUNITY SYSTEM, COULD NOT BE FULLY REALIZED IF THE MEMBER STATES WERE IN A POSITION TO REFUSE TO GRANT THE BENEFIT OF THE PROVISIONS OF COMMUNITY LAW TO THOSE OF THEIR NATIONALS WHO HAVE TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF THE FACILITIES EXISTING IN THE MATTER OF FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND ESTABLISHMENT AND WHO HAVE ACQUIRED, BY VIRTUE OF SUCH FACILITIES, THE TRADE QUALIFICATIONS REFERRED TO BY THE DIRECTIVE IN A MEMBER STATE OTHER THAN THAT WHOSE NATIONALITY THEY POSSESS.
+21IN CONTESTING THIS SOLUTION THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT STATES, FIRST, THAT THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 52 PROVIDES FOR THE ABOLITION OF ''RESTRICTIONS ON THE FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONALS OF A MEMBER STATE IN THE TERRITORY OF ANOTHER MEMBER STATE'' AND, SECONDLY, THAT ACCORDING TO THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF THE SAME ARTICLE, FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT IS TO INCLUDE THE RIGHT TO TAKE UP ACTIVITIES AS SELF-EMPLOYED PERSONS UNDER THE CONDITIONS LAID DOWN BY THE LAW OF THE COUNTRY WHERE SUCH ESTABLISHMENT IS EFFECTED ''FOR ITS OWN NATIONALs''.
+22IT IS CLAIMED THAT THOSE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY SHOW THAT THE NATIONALS OF THE HOST STATE ARE NOT REGARDED BY THE TREATY AS BEING BENEFICIARIES OF THE LIBERALIZATION MEASURES FOR WHICH PROVISION IS MADE AND THAT THEY THEREFORE REMAIN ENTIRELY SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THEIR NATIONAL LEGISLATION.
+23MOREOVER, THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT DRAWS ATTENTION TO THE RISK THAT THE NATIONALS OF A MEMBER STATE MIGHT EVADE THE APPLICATION OF THEIR NATIONAL PROVISIONS IN THE MATTER OF TRAINING FOR A TRADE IF THEY WERE AUTHORIZED TO AVAIL THEMSELVES, AS AGAINST THEIR OWN NATIONAL AUTHORITIES, OF THE FACILITIES CREATED BY THE DIRECTIVE.
+24ALTHOUGH IT IS TRUE THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY RELATING TO ESTABLISHMENT AND THE PROVISION OF SERVICES CANNOT BE APPLIED TO SITUATIONS WHICH ARE PURELY INTERNAL TO A MEMBER STATE, THE POSITION NEVERTHELESS REMAINS THAT THE REFERENCE IN ARTICLE 52 TO ''NATIONALS OF A MEMBER STATE'' WHO WISH TO ESTABLISH THEMSELVEs ''IN THE TERRITORY OF ANOTHER MEMBER STATE'' CANNOT BE INTERPRETED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO EXCLUDE FROM THE BENEFIT OF COMMUNITY LAW A GIVEN MEMBER STATE's OWN NATIONALS WHEN THE LATTER, OWING TO THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE LAWFULLY RESIDED ON THE TERRITORY OF ANOTHER MEMBER STATE AND HAVE THERE ACQUIRED A TRADE QUALIFICATION WHICH IS RECOGNIZED BY THE PROVISIONS OF COMMUNITY LAW, ARE, WITH REGARD TO THEIR STATE OF ORIGIN, IN A SITUATION WHICH MAY BE ASSIMILATED TO THAT OF ANY OTHER PERSONS ENJOYING THE RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES GUARANTEED BY THE TREATY.
+25HOWEVER, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO DISREGARD THE LEGITIMATE INTEREST WHICH A MEMBER STATE MAY HAVE IN PREVENTING CERTAIN OF ITS NATIONALS, BY MEANS OF FACILITIES CREATED UNDER THE TREATY, FROM ATTEMPTING WRONGLY TO EVADE THE APPLICATION OF THEIR NATIONAL LEGISLATION AS REGARDS TRAINING FOR A TRADE.
+26IN THIS CASE, HOWEVER, IT SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND THAT, HAVING REGARD TO THE NATURE OF THE TRADES IN QUESTION, THE PRECISE CONDITIONS SET OUT IN ARTICLE 3 OF DIRECTIVE NO 64/427, AS REGARDS THE LENGTH OF PERIODS DURING WHICH THE ACTIVITY IN QUESTION MUST HAVE BEEN PURSUED, HAVE THE EFFECT OF EXCLUDING, IN THE FIELDS IN QUESTION, THE RISK OF ABUSE REFERRED TO BY THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT.
+27MOREOVER, IT SHOULD BE EMPHASIZED THAT IT IS ALWAYS POSSIBLE FOR THE COUNCIL, BY VIRTUE OF THE POWERS CONFERRED UPON IT BY ARTICLE 57 OF THE TREATY, TO REMOVE THE CAUSES OF ANY ABUSES OF THE LAW BY ARRANGING FOR THE HARMONIZATION OF THE CONDITIONS OF TRAINING FOR A TRADE IN THE VARIOUS MEMBER STATES.
+28THE ANSWER TO BE GIVEN TO THE QUESTION REFERRED TO THE COURT SHOULD THEREFORE BE THAT COUNCIL DIRECTIVE NO 64/427 OF 7 JULY 1964 LAYING DOWN DETAILED PROVISIONS CONCERNING TRANSITIONAL MEASURES IN RESPECT OF ACTIVITIES OF SELF-EMPLOYED PERSONS IN MANUFACTURING AND PROCESSING INDUSTRIES FALLING WITHIN ISIC MAJOR GROUPS 23-40 (INDUSTRY AND SMALL CRAFT INDUSTRIES) MUST BE UNDERSTOOD TO MEAN THAT PERSONS WHO POSSESS THE NATIONALITY OF THE HOST MEMBER STATE ARE ALSO ''BENEFICIARIEs'' WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 1 (1) OF THE DIRECTIVE.
+29THE COSTS INCURRED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS AND BY THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, WHICH HAVE SUBMITTED OBSERVATIONS TO THE COURT, ARE NOT RECOVERABLE.
+30AS THESE PROCEEDINGS ARE, SO FAR AS THE PARTIES TO THE MAIN ACTION ARE CONCERNED, IN THE NATURE OF A STEP IN THE ACTION PENDING BEFORE THE COLLEGE VAN BEROEP VOOR HET BEDRIJFSLEVEN, COSTS ARE A MATTER FOR THAT COURT.
+ON THOSE GROUNDS, THE COURT, IN ANSWER TO THE QUESTIONS REFERRED TO IT BY THE COLLEGE VAN BEROEP VOOR HET BEDRIJFSLEVEN BY ORDER OF 9 MAY 1978, HEREBY RULES:
+COUNCIL DIRECTIVE NO 64/427 OF 7 JULY 1964 LAYING DOWN DETAILED PROVISIONS CONCERNING TRANSITIONAL MEASURES IN RESPECT OF ACTIVITIES OF SELF-EMPLOYED PERSONS IN MANUFACTURING AND PROCESSING INDUSTRIES FALLING WITHIN ISIC MAJOR GROUPS 23-40 (INDUSTRY AND SMALL CRAFT INDUSTRIES) MUST BE UNDERSTOOD TO MEAN THAT PERSONS WHO POSSESS THE NATIONALITY OF THE HOST MEMBER STATE ARE ALSO ''BENEFICIARIEs'' WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 1 (1) OF THE DIRECTIVE.

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+Državnog tajnika za gospodarstvo, o tumačenju članka 1. stavka 1. Direktive Vijeća 64/427 od 7. srpnja 1964. o utvrđivanju detaljnih odredaba o prijelaznim mjerama u vezi s aktivnostima samozaposlenih osoba u prerađivačkoj industriji i proizvodnji koja ulazi u skupine 23-40 klasifikacije ISIC (Industrija i malo obrtništvo), SUD,
+donosi sljedeću PRESUDU 1 Rješenjem od 9. svibnja 1978., koje je Sud zaprimio 12. istog mjeseca, College van Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven (Žalbeni sud za upravne sporove u gospodarstvu) postavio je, na temelju članka 177. Ugovora o EEZ-u, prethodno pitanje o tumačenju Direktive Vijeća 64/427 od 7. srpnja 1964. o utvrđivanju detaljnih odredaba o prijelaznim mjerama u vezi s aktivnostima samozaposlenih osoba u prerađivačkoj industriji i proizvodnji koja ulazi u skupine 23-40 klasifikacije ISIC (Industrija i malo obrtništvo) (SL 1964., str. 1863.).
+2 Iz zahtjeva za prethodnu odluku proizlazi da je tužitelj u glavnom postupku, nizozemski državljanin koji ima domicil u Belgiji, tijekom duljeg boravka u toj državi članici bio zaposlen kao radnik u vodoinstalaterskoj tvrtki i da je od 1970. godine u toj državi obavljao djelatnost poduzetnika instalatera-vodoinstalatera u svojstvu neovisnog voditelja.
+3 Nakon što je nadležnim nizozemskim vlastima uputio zahtjev za odobrenje da tu istu djelatnost obavlja u svojoj zemlji podrijetla, odbijen je zbog okolnosti da ne posjeduje strukovne kvalifikacije koje traži nizozemsko zakonodavstvo.
+4 Tom prigodom nizozemske vlasti obavijestile su dotičnu osobu da se odredbe članka 15. stavka 1. c) Vestigingswet Bedrijvena 1954. (zakon o poslovnom nastanu) ne mogu na njega odnositi jer se prema toj odredbi odobrenje za obavljanje nekih profesija može dati ako odredbe neke direktive Vijeća Europskih zajednica iz područja poslovnog nastana podrazumijevaju dodjelu takvog odobrenja.
+5 U pogledu toga je u dvije sukcesivne odluke nizozemskog državnog tajnika za gospodarstvo pojašnjeno da se na tužitelja, kao nizozemskog građanina, ne mogu odnositi one odredbe relevantne direktive prema kojima, kad je u državi članici pristup nekim gospodarskim djelatnostima uvjetovan posjedovanjem određenih strukovnih kvalifikacija, ta država članica priznaje kao dovoljan dokaz tih kvalifikacija efektivno obavljanje predmetne djelatnosti u drugoj državi članici.
+6 Tužitelj pak procjenjuje da su mu nizozemske vlasti na temelju Direktive 64/427 trebale dati traženo odobrenje.
+7 Kako bi razriješio taj spor, College van Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven (Žalbeni sud za upravne sporove u gospodarstvu) uputio je sljedeće pitanje:
+Treba li Direktiva Vijeća 64/427 od 7. srpnja 1964. o utvrđivanju detaljnih odredaba o prijelaznim mjerama u vezi s aktivnostima samozaposlenih osoba u prerađivačkoj industriji i proizvodnji koja ulazi u skupine 23-40 klasifikacije ISIC (Industrija i malo obrtništvo), biti shvaćena na način da su „korisnici” , u smislu članka 1. stavka 1. Direktive, i osobe koje posjeduju isključivo državljanstvo države članice domaćina i koje su ga uvijek posjedovale?
+8 Osobno područje primjene Direktive 64/427 treba, s jedne strane, odrediti sukladno samom predmetu te direktive, a, s druge strane, sukladno odredbama koje čine njezinu osnovu i okvir, odnosno općim programima za ukidanje ograničenja slobodnog pružanja usluga i slobode poslovnog nastana od 18. prosinca 1961. (SL 1962., str. 32. i 36.), kao i pripadajućim odredbama Ugovora.
+9 Cilj Direktive 64/427 jest olakšati ostvarivanje slobode poslovnog nastana i slobode pružanja usluga u širokoj lepezi strukovnih djelatnosti koje ulaze u područje industrije i malog obrtništva, u očekivanju usklađivanja uvjeta pristupa predmetnim djelatnostima u različitim državama članicama, što je neophodan preduvjet za potpunu liberalizaciju u tom području.
+10 Konkretnije, u toj se direktivi vodi računa o teškoćama koje proizlaze iz okolnosti da u nekim državama članicama, što se tiče djelatnosti o kojima je riječ, postoji sustav slobode pristupa i obavljanja, dok druge države članice primjenjuju više ili manje stroge uvjete koji za pristup nekim profesijama obuhvaćaju posjedovanje dokaza o strukovnom osposobljavanju.
+11 Što se tiče rješavanja problema nastalih tom razlikom, članak 3. Direktive određuje da, kad je u državi članici pristup nekoj od djelatnosti na koje se odnosi direktiva ili obavljanje te djelatnosti uvjetovano posjedovanjem određenih kvalifikacija, „ta država članica priznaje kao dovoljan dokaz tih znanja i vještina efektivno obavljanje predmetne djelatnosti u drugoj državi članici”.
+12 Taj članak između ostalog pojašnjava što treba smatrati „efektivnim obavljanjem” profesije i između ostalog određuje minimalno potrebno trajanje prakticiranja profesije.
+13 S druge strane, što se tiče država članica u kojima pristup jednoj od spomenutih djelatnosti nije uvjetovan posjedovanjem određenih strukovnih kvalifikacija, članak 5. iste direktive uređuje položaj osoba iz države članice u kojoj su takve kvalifikacije potrebne.
+14 Osobno područje primjene uglavnom je definirano člankom 1. stavkom 1. Direktive, sukladno kojem „države članice u nadalje navedenim uvjetima poduzimaju sljedeće prijelazne mjere što se tiče poslovnog nastana na državnom području za fizičke osobe i društva spomenuta u glavi I. općih programa kao i što se tiče pružanja usluga od strane tih osoba i društava (u daljnjem tekstu: korisnici) u sektoru djelatnosti samostalno zaposlenih osoba u prerađivačkoj industriji”.
+15 Opći program za ukidanje ograničenja slobode pružanja usluga u prvoj alineji svoje glave I. korisnicima označava „državljane država članica s poslovnim nastanom unutar Zajednice” , ne čineći razliku ovisno o državljanstvu ili boravištu osoba o kojima je riječ.
+16 Isti je koncept preuzet u glavi I. općeg programa za ukidanje ograničavanja slobode poslovnog nastana, koja u svojoj prvoj i trećoj alineji kao korisnike označava „državljane država članica” , ne čineći razliku prema državljanstvu ili boravištu.
+17 Može se dakle utvrditi da Direktiva 64/427 počiva na širem konceptu „korisnika” njezinih odredaba, u smislu da državljani svih država članica moraju moći profitirati od mjera liberalizacije koje Direktiva predviđa kada su objektivno obuhvaćeni nekom od situacija predviđenih Direktivom, a da nije dopušteno različito postupanje ovisno o njihovu boravištu ili državljanstvu.
+18 Tako se na odredbe Direktive mogu pozvati državljani svih država članica koji su obuhvaćeni uvjetima primjene definiranim Direktivom, pa čak i u pogledu države čiji su nacionalni državljani.
+19 To se tumačenje opravdava zahtjevima koji proizlaze iz slobode kretanja osoba, slobode poslovnog nastana i slobode pružanja usluga zajamčenih člankom 3. točkom c), te člancima 48., 52. i 59. Ugovora.
+20 Naime, te slobode, kao temeljne slobode u sustavu Zajednice, nisu u potpunosti ostvarene ako države članice mogu uskratiti pogodnost iz odredaba prava Zajednice onim svojim državljanima koji su primijenili pogodnosti iz područja kretanja i poslovnog nastana i koji su, temeljem tih pogodnosti, strukovne kvalifikacije iz Direktive stekli u zemlji članici koja nije zemlja čije državljanstvo posjeduju.
+21 Osporavajući to rješenje, nizozemska vlada, s jedne strane, ističe da prvi stavak članka 52. predviđa ukidanje „ograničenja slobode poslovnog nastana državljana države članice na državnom području druge države članice” i, s druge strane, da na temelju drugog stavka istog članka sloboda poslovnog nastana obuhvaća pristup djelatnostima koje se obavljaju u svojstvu samostalno zaposlene osobe u uvjetima koje definira zakonodavstvo zemlje poslovnog nastana „za svoje državljane”.
+22 Iz tih odredaba proizlazi da Ugovor ne smatra korisnicima predviđenih mjera liberalizacije državljane države domaćina i da oni, dakle, u cijelosti podliježu odredbama svog nacionalnog zakonodavstva;
+23 Nadalje, nizozemska vlada skreće pozornost na opasnost da državljani neke države članice budu izuzeti iz primjene svojih nacionalnih propisa u području strukovnog osposobljavanja u slučaju da im je, u pogledu vlastitih nacionalnih tijela, dopušteno pozvati se na pogodnosti uvedene Direktivom.
+24 Iako je istina da se odredbe Ugovora u području poslovnog nastana i pružanja usluga ne mogu primijeniti na situacije koje su isključivo interne državi članici, svejedno se upućivanje u članku 52. na „državljane država članica” koji žele uzeti poslovni nastan „na državnom području druge države članice” ne može tumačiti kao da iz pogodnosti prava Zajednice isključuje vlastite državljane određene države članice kad se oni, zbog činjenice da su imali boravište na državnom području druge države članice i da su u njoj stekli strukovnu kvalifikaciju priznatu odredbama prava Zajednice, u pogledu svoje države podrijetla, nalaze u situaciji koja je usporediva situaciji svih ostalih osoba koje uživaju prava i slobode zajamčene Ugovorom.
+25 Ne može se međutim zanemariti legitiman interes koji država članica može imati da spriječi da, kao rezultat pogodnosti nastalih na temelju Ugovora, neki od njezinih državljana pokušaju nepošteno izbjeći utjecaj svog nacionalnog zakonodavstva u području strukovnog osposobljavanja.
+26 U ovom slučaju međutim valja smatrati da, s obzirom na prirodu profesija o kojima je riječ, točni uvjeti, što se tiče duljine trajanja strukovnog zaposlenja, navedeni u članku 3. Direktive 64/427 imaju za učinak da u predviđenim sektorima isključe rizik od zloporabe, na koji je pozornost skrenula nizozemska vlada.
+27 Nadalje, valja naglasiti da je Vijeću uvijek dopušteno da na temelju svojih ovlasti prema članku 57. Ugovora eliminira uzrok eventualnih zloporaba zakona, osiguravajući usklađivanje uvjeta za strukovno osposobljavanje u različitim državama članicama.
+28 Na postavljeno pitanje dakle valja odgovoriti da Direktivu Vijeća 64/427 od 7. srpnja 1964. o utvrđivanju detaljnih odredaba o prijelaznim mjerama u vezi s aktivnostima samozaposlenih osoba u prerađivačkoj industriji i proizvodnji koja ulazi u skupine 23-40 klasifikacije ISIC (Industrija i malo obrtništvo) treba shvatiti na način da su u smislu članka 1. stavka 1. Direktive „korisnici” i osobe koje posjeduju državljanstvo države članice domaćina.
+29 Troškovi vlade Kraljevine Nizozemske i Komisije Europskih zajednica, koje su Sudu podnijele očitovanja, ne nadoknađuju se.
+30 Budući da ovaj postupak ima značaj prethodnog pitanja za stranke glavnog postupka pred College van Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven (Žalbeni sud za upravne sporove u gospodarstvu), na tom je sudu da odluči o troškovima postupka.
+SUD u odnosu na pitanje koje mu je uputio College van Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven (Žalbeni sud za upravne sporove u gospodarstvu) rješenjem od 9. svibnja 1978. odlučuje:
+Direktivu Vijeća 64/427 od 7. srpnja 1964. o utvrđivanju detaljnih odredaba o prijelaznim mjerama u vezi s aktivnostima samozaposlenih osoba u prerađivačkoj industriji i proizvodnji koja ulazi u skupine 23-40 klasifikacije ISIC (Industrija i malo obrtništvo) treba shvatiti na način da su u smislu članka 1. stavka 1. Direktive „korisnici” i osobe koje posjeduju državljanstvo države članice domaćina.

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+IN CASE 170/78
+COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, REPRESENTED BY ITS LEGAL ADVISER, ANTHONY MCCLELLAN, ACTING AS AGENT, WITH AN ADDRESS FOR SERVICE IN LUXEMBOURG AT THE OFFICE OF ORESTE MONTALTO, A MEMBER OF THE LEGAL DEPARTMENT, JEAN MONNET BUILDING, KIRCHBERG,
+APPLICANT, SUPPORTED BY THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC, REPRESENTED BY ARNALDO SQUILLANTE, PRESIDENT OF SECTION AT THE CONSIGLIO DI STATO (STATE COUNCIL) AND HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT FOR CONTENTIOUS DIPLOMATIC AFFAIRS, ACTING AS AGENT, ASSISTED BY MARCELLO CONTI, AVVOCATO DELLO STATO, WITH AN ADDRESS FOR SERVICE IN LUXEMBOURG AT THE ITALIAN EMBASSY,
+INTERVENER,
+V
+UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, REPRESENTED BY R. N. RICKS, ASSISTANT TREASURY SOLICITOR, ACTING AS AGENT, ASSISTED BY PETER ARCHER QC, OF GRAY's INN, WITH AN ADDRESS FOR SERVICE IN LUXEMBOURG AT THE BRITISH EMBASSY,
+DEFENDANT,
+APPLICATION FOR A DECLARATION THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, BY FAILING TO REPEAL OR AMEND ITS NATIONAL PROVISIONS WITH REGARD TO EXCISE DUTY ON STILL LIGHT WINE, HAS FAILED TO FULFIL ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 95 OF THE EEC TREATY,
+1 BY APPLICATION LODGED ON 7 AUGUST 1978, THE COMMISSION INSTITUTED PROCEEDINGS UNDER ARTICLE 169 OF THE EEC TREATY FOR A DECLARATION THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM HAD FAILED TO FULFIL ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 95 OF THE EEC TREATY BY LEVYING EXCISE DUTY ON STILL LIGHT WINES MADE FROM FRESH GRAPES (HEREINAFTER REFERRED TO As ''WINEs '') AT A HIGHER RATE, IN RELATIVE TERMS, THAN ON BEER.
+2 ON 27 FEBRUARY 1980, THE COURT DELIVERED AN INTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENT ((1980) ECR 417) IN WHICH FIRST OF ALL IT RESOLVED SEVERAL POINTS OF LAW CONCERNING THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 95 AND, SECONDLY, UNDERTOOK A PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF CERTAIN QUESTIONS WHICH AT THE TIME DID NOT YET SEEM CAPABLE OF BEING SETTLED DEFINITIVELY.
+BEFORE GIVING JUDGMENT ON THE APPLICATION LODGED BY THE COMMISSION, THE COURT ORDERED THE PARTIES TO RE-EXAMINE THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE DISPUTE IN THE LIGHT OF THE LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS SET OUT IN THE JUDGMENT AND TO REPORT TO THE COURT BEFORE A SPECIFIED DATE EITHER ON ANY SOLUTION OF THE DISPUTE WHICH THEY HAD REACHED OR ON THEIR RESPECTIVE POINTS OF VIEW.
+THE COURT RESERVED THE RIGHT TO GIVE FINAL JUDGMENT AFTER THAT DATE AFTER EXAMINING THE REPORTS SUBMITTED TO IT OR IN THE ABSENCE OF THOSE REPORTS.
+3 IN THE LIGHT OF THAT JUDGMENT, THE PARTIES INITIALLY EXAMINED THE DISPUTE ON A BILATERAL BASIS.
+SUBSEQUENTLY, THE COMMISSION ATTEMPTED TO RESOLVE IT IN NEGOTIATIONS WITHIN THE COUNCIL BY MEANS OF A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT OF THE PROBLEM OF THE TAXATION OF SPIRITS.
+PENDING THE OUTCOME OF THOSE NEGOTIATIONS, THE PARTIES SOUGHT AND OBTAINED SEVERAL EXTENSIONS OF THE PERIOD PRESCRIBED BY THE COURT IN ITS JUDGMENT OF 27 FEBRUARY 1980.
+SINCE THEY WERE UNABLE TO REACH AN AMICABLE AGREEMENT, THEY SUBMITTED THEIR REPORTS ON 1 AND 2 DECEMBER 1981 RESPECTIVELY.
+THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT, WHICH INTERVENED IN THE PROCEEDINGS, WAS GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS ITS VIEWS.
+4 THE PARTIES PRESENTED ORAL ARGUMENT AT THE SITTING ON 19 MAY 1982. SINCE THE INFORMATION PROVIDED AT THAT STAGE WAS STILL INSUFFICIENT TO ENABLE IT TO DECIDE THE CASE, THE COURT, BY ORDER OF 15 JULY 1982, WHICH WAS MADE PURSUANT TO ARTICLES 46 AND 60 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE, ORDERED THE INQUIRY TO BE EXPANDED.
+IT SOUGHT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FROM THE PARTIES REGARDING CONSUMER PRICES AND PRICES NET OF TAX FOR WINE AND BEER OF POPULAR QUALITY, THAT IS TO SAY WINE AND BEER OF THE TYPES MOST COMMONLY SOLD AND CONSUMED IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND IN THE OTHER MEMBER STATES.
+IT ALSO SOUGHT INFORMATION CONCERNING THE TREND IN THE TOTAL ANNUAL CONSUMPTION OF WINE AND BEER IN THE COMMUNITY.
+5 THE PARTIES REPLIED TO THOSE QUESTIONS AND PRESENTED FURTHER ORAL ARGUMENT AT THE SITTING ON 15 MARCH 1983.
+SUBSTANCE
+6 IT MAY BE RECALLED THAT THE QUESTIONS WHICH WERE CONSIDERED AND LEFT PARTLY UNANSWERED IN THE JUDGMENT OF 27 FEBRUARY 1980 CONCERNED, FIRST OF ALL, THE NATURE OF THE COMPETITIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WINE AND BEER AND, SECONDLY, THE SELECTION OF A BASIS FOR COMPARISON AND THE DETERMINATION OF AN APPROPRIATE TAX RATIO BETWEEN THE TWO PRODUCTS.
+THOSE TWO QUESTIONS MUST BE RECONSIDERED IN THE LIGHT OF THE INFORMATION PROVIDED DURING THE TWO FURTHER STAGES OF THE INQUIRY.
+COMPETITIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WINE AND BEER
+7 IN ITS JUDGMENT OF 27 FEBRUARY 1980, THE COURT EMPHASIZED THAT THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 95 APPLIED TO THE TREATMENT FOR TAX PURPOSES OF PRODUCTS WHICH, WITHOUT FULFILLING THE CRITERION OF SIMILARITY LAID DOWN IN THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF THAT ARTICLE, WERE NEVERTHELESS IN COMPETITION, EITHER PARTIALLY OR POTENTIALLY, WITH CERTAIN PRODUCTS OF THE IMPORTING COUNTRY.
+IT ADDED THAT, IN ORDER TO DETERMINE THE EXISTENCE OF A COMPETITIVE RELATIONSHIP WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 95, IT WAS NECESSARY TO CONSIDER NOT ONLY THE PRESENT STATE OF THE MARKET BUT ALSO POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS REGARDING THE FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS WITHIN THE COMMUNITY AND THE FURTHER POTENTIAL FOR THE SUBSTITUTION OF PRODUCTS FOR ONE ANOTHER WHICH MIGHT BE REVEALED BY INTENSIFICATION OF TRADE, SO AS FULLY TO DEVELOP THE COMPLEMENTARY FEATURES OF THE ECONOMIES OF THE MEMBER STATES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE OBJECTIVES LAID DOWN BY ARTICLE 2 OF THE TREATY.
+8 AS REGARDS THE QUESTION OF COMPETITION BETWEEN WINE AND BEER, THE COURT CONSIDERED THAT, TO A CERTAIN EXTENT AT LEAST, THE TWO BEVERAGES IN QUESTION WERE CAPABLE OF MEETING IDENTICAL NEEDS, SO THAT IT HAD TO BE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE WAS A DEGREE OF SUBSTITUTION FOR ONE ANOTHER.
+IT POINTED OUT THAT, FOR THE PURPOSE OF MEASURING THE POSSIBLE DEGREE OF SUBSTITUTION, ATTENTION SHOULD NOT BE CONFINED TO CONSUMER HABITS IN A MEMBER STATE OR IN A GIVEN REGION.
+THOSE HABITS, WHICH WERE ESSENTIALLY VARIABLE IN TIME AND SPACE, COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED TO BE IMMUTABLE; THE TAX POLICY OF A MEMBER STATE MUST NOT THEREFORE CRYSTALLIZE GIVEN CONSUMER HABITS SO AS TO CONSOLIDATE AN ADVANTAGE ACQUIRED BY NATIONAL INDUSTRIES CONCERNED TO RESPOND TO THEM.
+9 THE COURT NONETHELESS RECOGNIZED THAT, IN VIEW OF THE SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN WINE AND BEER, IT WAS DIFFICULT TO COMPARE THE MANUFACTURING PROCESSES AND THE NATURAL PROPERTIES OF THOSE BEVERAGES, AS THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM HAD RIGHTLY OBSERVED.
+FOR THAT REASON, THE COURT REQUESTED THE PARTIES TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WITH A VIEW TO DISPELLING THE DOUBTS WHICH EXISTED CONCERNING THE NATURE OF THE COMPETITIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO PRODUCTS.
+10 THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM DID NOT GIVE ANY OPINION ON THAT QUESTION IN ITS SUBSEQUENT STATEMENTS.
+THE COMMISSION EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE DIFFERENCE IN THE CONDITIONS OF PRODUCTION, TO WHICH THE COURT HAD ATTACHED SOME IMPORTANCE, WAS NOT SIGNIFICANT FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE PRICE STRUCTURES OF THE TWO PRODUCTS, PARTICULARLY IN RELATION TO THE COMPETITIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BEER AND WINES OF POPULAR QUALITY.
+11 THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT CONTENDED IN THAT CONNECTION THAT IT WAS INAPPROPRIATE TO COMPARE BEER WITH WINES OF AVERAGE ALCOHOLIC STRENGTH OR, A FORTIORI, WITH WINES OF GREATER ALCOHOLIC STRENGTH.
+IN ITS OPINION, IT WAS THE LIGHTEST WINES WITH AN ALCOHOLIC STRENGTH IN THE REGION OF 9*, THAT IS TO SAY THE MOST POPULAR AND CHEAPEST WINES, WHICH WERE GENUINELY IN COMPETITION WITH BEER.
+IT THEREFORE TOOK THE VIEW THAT THOSE WINES SHOULD BE CHOSEN FOR PURPOSES OF COMPARISON WHERE IT WAS A QUESTION OF MEASURING THE INCIDENCE OF TAXATION ON THE BASIS OF EITHER ALCOHOLIC STRENGTH OR THE PRICE OF THE PRODUCTS.
+12 THE COURT CONSIDERS THAT OBSERVATION BY THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT TO BE PERTINENT.
+IN VIEW OF THE SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCES IN THE QUALITY AND, THEREFORE, IN THE PRICE OF WINES, THE DECISIVE COMPETITIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BEER, A POPULAR AND WIDELY CONSUMED BEVERAGE, AND WINE MUST BE ESTABLISHED BY REFERENCE TO THOSE WINES WHICH ARE THE MOST ACCESSIBLE TO THE PUBLIC AT LARGE, THAT IS TO SAY, GENERALLY SPEAKING, THE LIGHTEST AND CHEAPEST VARIETIES.
+ACCORDINGLY, THAT IS THE APPROPRIATE BASIS FOR MAKING FISCAL COMPARISONS BY REFERENCE TO THE ALCOHOLIC STRENGTH OR TO THE PRICE OF THE TWO BEVERAGES IN QUESTION.
+DETERMINATION OF AN APPROPRIATE TAX RATIO
+13 AS REGARDS THE SELECTION OF A METHOD OF COMPARISON WITH A VIEW TO DETERMINING AN APPROPRIATE TAX RATIO, THE COMMISSION CONSIDERS THAT THE SAFEST METHOD IS TO USE A CRITERION WHICH IS LINKED BOTH TO THE VOLUME OF THE BEVERAGES IN QUESTION AND TO THEIR ALCOHOLIC STRENGTH.
+THE COMMISSION CONSIDERS THAT TAXATION IN EXCESS OF THE RATIO 1: 2.8 BY REFERENCE TO VOLUME (WHICH THEREFORE REPRESENTS A TAX RATIO OF 1: 1 BY REFERENCE TO ALCOHOLIC STRENGTH ALONE) RAISES A ''PRESUMPTION'' THAT INDIRECT PROTECTION IS AFFORDED TO BEER.
+14 THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM REFERRED TO THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE COMMISSION IN 1963 BY THE FISCAL AND FINANCIAL COMMITTEE (THE NEUMARK REPORT) AND EMPHASIZED ONCE AGAIN THAT A PROPER COMPARISON SHOULD BE BASED ON THE INCIDENCE OF TAXATION ON THE PRICES NET OF TAX OF THE TWO PRODUCTS IN QUESTION.
+IN ITS OPINION, A COMPARISON BASED ON AVERAGE PRICES IS PREFERABLE TO A COMPARISON BASED ON AVERAGE ALCOHOLIC STRENGTH.
+THERE IS NO QUESTION OF A DISCRIMINATORY OR PROTECTIVE COMMERCIAL PRACTICE WHERE IT IS ESTABLISHED THAT THE TAXES CHARGED ON TWO COMPETING PRODUCTS REPRESENT THE SAME PROPORTION OF THE AVERAGE PRICES OF THOSE PRODUCTS.
+THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM CONSIDERS THAT, ACCORDING TO THAT CRITERION, ITS TAX SYSTEM HAS NO PROTECTIVE EFFECT.
+15 ON THAT POINT, THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT CHALLENGES THE ARGUMENTS PUT FORWARD BY THE UNITED KINGDOM AND BY THE COMMISSION.
+IT EMPHASIZES THE IMPORTANCE, FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE, OF THE FACT THAT WINE IS AN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCT AND BEER AN INDUSTRIAL PRODUCT.
+IN ITS OPINION, THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY SHOULD LEAD TO THE INTRODUCTION OF A RATE OF TAXATION FAVOURING THE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCT AND IT WOULD THEREFORE BE INCONSISTENT WITH THAT POLICY TO ELIMINATE ALTOGETHER, UNDER A NATIONAL TAX SYSTEM, THE EFFECTS OF COMMUNITY INTERVENTION IN SUPPORT OF WINE PRODUCTION.
+16 THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT ALSO CONTESTS THE IMPORTANCE WHICH THE COMMISSION ATTACHES TO THE QUESTION OF THE ALCOHOLIC STRENGTH OF THE TWO BEVERAGES IN QUESTION.
+IN ITS OPINION, THE DECISIVE CRITERION IS THE ASSESSMENT OF THE INCIDENCE OF TAXATION IN RELATION TO THE VOLUME OF THE TWO BEVERAGES.
+THERE ARE TWO REASONS FOR THIS: IN THE FIRST PLACE, THE UNITED KINGDOM's SYSTEM OF TAXATION IS BASED ON THE VOLUME OF THE PRODUCTS; SECONDLY, SINCE IN BOTH CASES THE BEVERAGES HAVE A LOW ALCOHOL CONTENT AND ARE SUITABLE FOR ACCOMPANYING MEALS OR FOR QUENCHING THIRST, THE CONSUMER's CHOICE IS INFLUENCED NOT BY THE ALCOHOLIC STRENGTH OF THE TWO PRUDUCTS BUT BY THEIR GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS SUCH AS TASTE AND FLAVOUR, WITH THE RESULT THAT THEY ARE CONSUMED FOR THE SAME PURPOSES AND IN MORE OR LESS THE SAME QUANTITIES.
+EXPERIENCE SHOWS THAT THE CONSUMPTION RATIO BETWEEN BEER AND WINE, IF NOT EXACTLY EQUAL, IS IN ANY EVENT NO HIGHER THAN 1.5: 1.
+17 THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT CONCLUDES THAT THE TWO CRITERIA RELATING TO VOLUME AND ALCOHOLIC STRENGTH SHOULD BE COMBINED IN THE SENSE THAT, ALTHOUGH, IN PRINCIPLE, THERE MUST BE EQUAL TAXATION BY REFERENCE TO THE VOLUME OF THE TWO BEVERAGES, THE EXISTENCE OF HIGHER TAXATION OF WINE BY REFERENCE TO ALCOHOLIC STRENGTH ALONE WOULD BE A RELIABLE INDICATION THAT THERE WAS DISCRIMINATION AND THAT THE TAX SYSTEM IN QUESTION HAD A PROTECTIVE EFFECT.
+18 THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BETWEEN THE PARTIES WHICH FOLLOWED THE JUDGMENT OF 27 FEBRUARY 1980 SHOWED THAT, ALTHOUGH NONE OF THE CRITERIA FOR COMPARISON APPLIED WITH A VIEW TO DETERMINING THE TAX RATIO BETWEEN THE TWO PRODUCTS IN QUESTION IS CAPABLE OF YIELDING RELIABLE RESULTS ON ITS OWN, IT IS NONE THE LESS THE CASE THAT EACH OF THE THREE METHODS USED, THAT IS TO SAY ASSESSMENT OF THE TAX BURDEN BY REFERENCE TO THE VOLUME, THE ALCOHOLIC STRENGTH AND THE PRICE OF THE PRODUCTS, CAN PROVIDE SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF THE CONTESTED TAX SYSTEM.
+19 IT IS NOT DISPUTED THAT COMPARISON OF THE TAXATION OF BEER AND WINE BY REFERENCE TO THE VOLUME OF THE TWO BEVERAGES REVEALS THAT WINE IS TAXED MORE HEAVILY THAN BEER IN BOTH RELATIVE AND ABSOLUTE TERMS.
+NOT ONLY WAS THE TAXATION OF WINE INCREASED SUBSTANTIALLY IN RELATION TO THE TAXATION OF BEER WHEN THE UNITED KINGDOM REPLACED CUSTOMS DUTY WITH EXCISE DUTY, AS THE COURT HAS ALREADY STATED IN ITS JUDGMENT OF 27 FEBRUARY 1980, BUT IT IS ALSO CLEAR THAT DURING THE YEARS TO WHICH THESE PROCEEDINGS RELATE, NAMELY 1976 AND 1977, THE TAXATION OF WINE WAS, ON AVERAGE, FIVE TIMES HIGHER, BY REFERENCE TO VOLUME, THAN THE TAXATION OF BEER; IN OTHER WORDS, WINE WAS SUBJECT TO AN ADDITIONAL TAX BURDEN OF 400% IN ROUND FIGURES.
+20 AS REGARDS THE CRITERION FOR COMPARISON BASED ON ALCOHOLIC STRENGTH, THE COURT HAS ALREADY STATED IN ITS JUDGMENT OF 27 FEBRUARY 1980 THAT, EVEN THOUGH IT IS TRUE THAT ALCOHOLIC STRENGTH IS ONLY A SECONDARY FACTOR IN THE CONSUMER's CHOICE BETWEEN THE TWO BEVERAGES IN QUESTION, IT NONE THE LESS CONSTITUTES A RELATIVELY RELIABLE CRITERION FOR COMPARISON.
+IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE RELEVANCE OF THAT CRITERION WAS RECOGNIZED BY THE COUNCIL IN THE COURSE OF ITS WORK WHICH IS STILL IN PROGRESS ON THE HARMONIZATION OF THE TAXATION OF ALCOHOL AND VARIOUS TYPES OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES.
+21 IN THE LIGHT OF THE INDICES WHICH THE COURT HAS ALREADY ACCEPTED, IT IS CLEAR THAT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM DURING THE PERIOD IN QUESTION WINE BORE A TAX BURDEN WHICH, BY REFERENCE TO ALCOHOLIC STRENGTH, WAS MORE THAN TWICE AS HEAVY AS THAT BORNE BY BEER, THAT IS TO SAY AN ADDITIONAL TAX BURDEN OF AT LEAST 100% .
+22 AS REGARDS THE CRITERION OF THE INCIDENCE OF TAXATION ON THE PRICE NET OF TAX, THE COURT EXPERIENCED CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTY IN FORMING AN OPINION, IN VIEW OF THE DISPARATE NATURE OF THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE PARTIES.
+IN PARTICULAR, THE INCOMPLETE NATURE OF THE INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY THE COMMISSION, WHICH CONSISTED OF LISTS OF SELLING PRICES WITHOUT PARALLEL INFORMATION REVEALING, WITHIN THOSE PRICES, THE INCIDENCE OF EXCISE DUTY, VALUE-ADDED TAX AND THE PRICE NET OF TAX, RENDERED ASSESSMENT OF THAT CRITERION, WHICH THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT CONSIDERED TO BE OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE, PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT.
+23 IN REPLY TO THE ORDER OF 15 JULY 1982, IN WHICH THE COURT REQUESTED THE PARTIES TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ON CONSUMER PRICES AND THE PRICES NET OF TAX FOR THE TYPES OF WINES AND BEER MOST COMMONLY SOLD AND CONSUMED IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT MERELY PROVIDED INFORMATION RELATING TO TWO GERMAN WINES (GOLDENER OKTOBER AND BLUE NUN) WHICH ARE UNDOUBTEDLY WIDELY CONSUMED BUT ARE SCARCELY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE STATE OF THE WINE MARKET WITHIN THE COMMUNITY.
+24 THE COMMISSION AND THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT DISPUTED THE RELEVANCE OF THE WINES SELECTED BY THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT AND SUBMITTED DETAILED INFORMATION RELATING TO ITALIAN WINES; THE COMMISSION ATTEMPTED TO ESTABLISH AVERAGE PRICES WHILST THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE APPROACH REFERRED TO ABOVE, COMPARED THE INCIDENCE OF TAXATION ON THE PRICE OF A TYPICAL BRITISH BEER WITH THE INCIDENCE OF TAXATION ON THE CHEAPEST ITALIAN WINE WHICH WAS AVAILABLE IN SIGNIFICANT QUANTITIES ON THE UNITED KINGDOM MARKET.
+25 THE COMMISSION's CALCULATIONS, WHICH RELATE TO THE UNITED KINGDOM MARKET IN ITS PRESENT STATE AND THE RELEVANCE OF WHICH IS NOT CHALLENGED BY THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT, SHOW THAT WINE IS SUBJECT TO AN ADDITIONAL TAX BURDEN OF AROUND 58% AND 77% , WHEREAS THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT's CALCULATIONS RELATING TO THE CHEAPEST WINE SHOW THAT WINE IS SUBJECT TO AN ADDITIONAL TAX BURDEN OF UP TO 286% .
+THOSE FINDINGS ARE INDIRECTLY CONFIRMED BY THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT's ANALYSIS OF THE SELLING PRICES OF THE TWO GERMAN WINES.
+INDEED, ONE OF THOSE TWO WINES REPRESENTS ALMOST EXACTLY THE POINT OF PARITY BETWEEN BEER AND WINE, FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE INCIDENCE OF TAXATION ON THE PRICE.
+THAT EXAMPLE SHOWS THAT ALL CHEAPER WINES MARKETED IN THE UNITED KINGDOM ARE TAXED, BY REFERENCE TO PRICE, MORE HEAVILY IN RELATIVE TERMS THAN BEER.
+IT APPEARS FROM THE PRICE LISTS PROVIDED BY THE COMMISSION THAT ON THE UNITED KINGDOM MARKET THERE ARE AN APPRECIABLE NUMBER OF WINES FALLING WITHIN THAT DEFINITION, AND AMONG THEM PRACTICALLY ALL THE ITALIAN WINES, WHICH ARE THEREFORE SUBJECT TO AN ADDITIONAL TAX BURDEN WHICH INCREASES IN INVERSE PROPORTION TO THEIR PRICE.
+26 AFTER CONSIDERING THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE PARTIES, THE COURT HAS COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT, IF A COMPARISON IS MADE ON THE BASIS OF THOSE WINES WHICH ARE CHEAPER THAN THE TYPES OF WINE SELECTED BY THE UNITED KINGDOM AND OF WHICH SEVERAL VARIETIES ARE SOLD IN SIGNIFICANT QUANTITIES ON THE UNITED KINGDOM MARKET, IT BECOMES APPARENT THAT PRECISELY THOSE WINES WHICH, IN VIEW OF THEIR PRICE, ARE MOST DIRECTLY IN COMPETITION WITH DOMESTIC BEER PRODUCTION ARE SUBJECT TO A CONSIDERABLY HIGHER TAX BURDEN.
+27 IT IS CLEAR, THEREFORE, FOLLOWING THE DETAILED INQUIRY CONDUCTED BY THE COURT - WHATEVER CRITERION FOR COMPARISON IS USED, THERE BEING NO NEED TO EXPRESS A PREFERENCE FOR ONE OR THE OTHER - THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM's TAX SYSTEM HAS THE EFFECT OF SUBJECTING WINE IMPORTED FROM OTHER MEMBER STATES TO AN ADDITIONAL TAX BURDEN SO AS TO AFFORD PROTECTION TO DOMESTIC BEER PRODUCTION, INASMUCH AS BEER PRODUCTION CONSTITUTES THE MOST RELEVANT REFERENCE CRITERION FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF COMPETITION.
+SINCE SUCH PROTECTION IS MOST MARKED IN THE CASE OF THE MOST POPULAR WINES, THE EFFECT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM TAX SYSTEM IS TO STAMP WINE WITH THE HALLMARKS OF A LUXURY PRODUCT WHICH, IN VIEW OF THE TAX BURDEN WHICH IT BEARS, CAN SCARCELY CONSTITUTE IN THE EYES OF THE CONSUMER A GENUINE ALTERNATIVE TO THE TYPICAL DOMESTICALLY PRODUCED BEVERAGE.
+28 IT FOLLOWS FROM THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS THAT, BY LEVYING EXCISE DUTY ON STILL LIGHT WINES MADE FROM FRESH GRAPES AT A HIGHER RATE, IN RELATIVE TERMS, THAN ON BEER, THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS FAILED TO FULFIL ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 95 OF THE EEC TREATY.
+29 UNDER ARTICLE 69 (2) OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE, THE UNSUCCESSFUL PARTY IS TO BE ORDERED TO PAY THE COSTS IF THEY HAVE BEEN ASKED FOR IN THE SUCCESSFUL PARTY's PLEADINGS.
+HOWEVER, UNDER ARTICLE 69 (3) THE COURT MAY ORDER THAT THE PARTIES BEAR THEIR OWN COSTS IN WHOLE OR IN PART WHERE THE CIRCUMSTANCES ARE EXCEPTIONAL.
+30 IT IS APPROPRIATE TO EXERCISE THAT DISCRETION IN THIS CASE.
+IT HAS BECOME CLEAR, IN THE COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS, THAT THE COMMISSION BROUGHT THIS ACTION WITHOUT CONDUCTING AN ADEQUATE PRELIMINARY INQUIRY; THAT LED TO REPEATED REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION AND EXTENSIONS OF THE PROCEEDINGS BY THE COURT.
+THE PARTIES MUST THEREFORE BEAR THEIR OWN COSTS, EXCEPT AS REGARDS THE COSTS OF THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC, WHICH ARE TO BE PAID BY THE UNITED KINGDOM.
+ON THOSE GROUNDS, THE COURT HEREBY:
+1. DECLARES THAT, BY LEVYING EXCISE DUTY ON STILL LIGHT WINES MADE FROM FRESH GRAPES AT A HIGHER RATE, IN RELATIVE TERMS, THAN ON BEER, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND HAS FAILED TO FULFIL ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 95 OF THE EEC TREATY.
+2.ORDERS THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM TO BEAR THEIR OWN COSTS.
+THE COSTS INCURRED BY THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC ARE TO BE PAID BY THE UNITED KINGDOM.

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+U predmetu 170/78,
+KOMISIJA EUROPSKIH ZAJEDNICA, koju zastupa njezin pravni savjetnik Anthony McClellan, u svojstvu agenta, s izabranom adresom za dostavu u Luxembourgu u uredu Orestea Montaltoa, člana pravne službe, zgrada Jean Monnet, Kirchberg, tužitelj, koju podupire
+TALIJANSKA REPUBLIKA, koju zastupa Arnaldo Squillante, predsjednik odsjeka u Consiglio di Stato (Državno vijeće, Italija) i voditelj službe za diplomatske sporove, u svojstvu agenta, uz asistenciju Marcella Contija, avvocato dello Stato, s izabranom adresom za dostavu u talijanskom veleposlanstvu u Luxembourgu,
+intervenijent,
+protiv
+UJEDINJENE KRALJEVINE VELIKE BRITANIJE I SJEVERNE IRSKE, koju zastupa R. N. Ricks, Assistant Treasury Solicitor, u svojstvu agenta, uz asistenciju Petera Archera, QC, Gray’ s Inn, s izabranom adresom za dostavu u britanskomveleposlanstvu u Luxembourgu,
+tuženika,
+povodom zahtjeva za utvrđenje da Ujedinjena Kraljevina Velike Britanije i Sjeverne Irske nije ispunila svoje obveze na temelju drugog stavka članka 95. Ugovora o EEZ-u jer nije stavila izvan snage ni izmijenila nacionalne odredbe koje se odnose na trošarine na nepjenušavo lagano vino, SUD,
+tajnik: P. Heim, donosi sljedeću PRESUDU 1 Zahtjevom od 7. kolovoza 1978. Komisija je pokrenula postupak na temelju članka 169. Ugovora o EEZ-u u svrhu utvrđenja da Ujedinjena Kraljevina Velike Britanije i Sjeverne Irske nije ispunila svoje obveze na temelju drugog stavka članka 95. Ugovora o EEZ-u zbog toga što naplaćuje trošarine na nepjenušavo lagano vino proizvedeno od svježa grožđa (u daljnjem tekstu: vino) po višoj stopi, u relativnom smislu, nego na pivo.
+2 Dana 27. veljače 1980. Sud je donio privremenu presudu (Zb., str. 417.) u kojoj je prije svega riješio nekoliko pravnih pitanja koja se tiču tumačenja članka 95. te je potom preliminarno proučio određena pitanja koja se u to doba još nisu mogla konačno riješiti.
+Prije donošenja presude o zahtjevu Komisije Sud je naložio strankama da još jednom preispitaju predmet spora s obzirom na pravna razmatranja iznesena u presudi i da mu do određenog roka podnesu izvješće ili o rješenju spora koje su postigle ili svaka o svojem stajalištu.
+Sud je zadržao pravo donošenja konačne presude nakon tog datuma, nakon što prouči podnesena izvješća stranaka ili u slučaju da ne primi ta izvješća.
+3 S obzirom na tu presudu stranke su prvo proučile spor na bilateralnoj osnovi.
+Potom ga je Komisija pokušala razriješiti u sklopu pregovora u Vijeću, sveobuhvatnim rješavanjem problema oporezivanja alkoholnih pića.
+Čekajući ishod tih pregovora stranke su nekoliko puta zatražile i dobile produženje roka koji je Sud propisao u presudi od 27. veljače 1980.
+Budući da nisu uspjele postići nagodbu, podnijele su svaka svoje izvješće, i to 1. odnosno 2. prosinca 1981.
+Talijanska vlada, koja je intervenirala u postupak, dobila je priliku iznijeti svoje stavove.
+4 Stranke su podnijele usmena očitovanja na raspravi 19. svibnja 1982. Budući da mu podatci koje je dobio u toj fazi i dalje nisu bili dovoljni za donošenje presude u tom predmetu, Sud je rješenjem od 15. srpnja 1982., donesenim na temelju članaka 46. i 60. Poslovnika, naredio proširenje istrage.
+Od stranaka je zatražio dodatne podatke o potrošačkim cijenama i neto cijenama bez poreza za vino i pivo popularne kvalitete, odnosno za vrste vina i piva koje se najčešće prodaju i konzumiraju u Ujedinjenoj Kraljevini i drugim državama članicama.
+Također je zatražio podatke o kretanjima ukupne godišnje potrošnje vina i piva u Zajednici.
+5 Stranke su odgovorile na ta pitanja i iznijele daljnja usmena očitovanja na raspravi 15. ožujka 1983.
+Meritum
+6 Treba podsjetiti da su se pitanja koja su se razmatrala i koja su ostala djelomično bez odgovora u presudi od 27. veljače 1980. ticala, kao prvo, prirode konkurentskog odnosa između vina i piva te, kao drugo, odabira osnove za usporedbu i utvrđivanja odgovarajućeg omjera oporezivanja između ta dva proizvoda.
+Ta dva pitanja treba ponovno razmotriti s obzirom na podatke koji su predočeni tijekom dodatne dvije faze istrage.
+Konkurentski odnos između vina i piva
+7 U presudi od 27. veljače 1980. Sud je naglasio da se drugi stavak članka 95. primjenjuje na oporezivanje proizvoda koji su, iako ne ispunjavaju kriterij sličnosti propisan prvim stavkom tog članka, ipak u tržišnom natjecanju, djelomično ili potencijalno, s određenim proizvodima zemlje uvoznice.
+Dodao je da je u svrhu utvrđivanja postojanja konkurentskog odnosa u smislu drugog stavka članka 95. potrebno razmotriti ne samo sadašnje stanje na tržištu nego i moguće buduće promjene povezane sa slobodnim kretanjem robe unutar Zajednice te daljnje mogućnosti zamjene jednih proizvoda drugima koje bi mogle proizaći iz intenziviranja trgovine, kako bi se u potpunosti istaknule komplementarnosti gospodarstava država članica u skladu s ciljevima utvrđenima člankom 2. Ugovora.
+8 Što se tiče pitanja konkurentskog odnosa između vina i piva, Sud smatra da ta dva pića, barem u određenoj mjeri, mogu ispunjavati iste potrebe, što znači da treba priznati kako su u određenom stupnju međusobno zamjenjiva.
+Sud naglašava da u svrhu mjerenja mogućeg stupnja zamjenjivosti pozornost ne treba ograničiti na potrošačke navike u pojedinoj državi članici ili regiji.
+Te navike, koje se mogu znatno razlikovati ovisno o prostoru i vremenu, ne mogu se smatrati nepromjenjivima te stoga porezna politika države članice ne smije cementirati određene potrošačke navike kako bi zadržala prednosti koje uživaju nacionalni industrijski sektori koji služe zadovoljenju tih navika.
+9 Sud je ipak priznao da je, s obzirom na znatne razlike između vina i piva, bilo teško usporediti proizvodne procese i prirodna svojstva tih pića, kao što je vlada Ujedinjene Kraljevine ispravno primijetila.
+Iz tog razloga Sud je zatražio od stranaka da predoče dodatne podatke kako bi se odbacile sumnje u pogledu prirode konkurentskog odnosa između tih dvaju proizvoda.
+10 Vlada Ujedinjene Kraljevine u daljnjim očitovanjima nije dala mišljenje o tom pitanju.
+Komisija je izrazila stav da razlika u uvjetima proizvodnje, kojoj je Sud dodijelio stanovitu važnost, nije važna sa stajališta strukture cijena tih dvaju proizvoda, osobito u pogledu konkurentskog odnosa piva i vina popularne kvalitete.
+11 Talijanska vlada izjavila je u vezi s tim da je neprimjereno pivo uspoređivati s vinom prosječna sadržaja alkohola ili pogotovo s vinom s većim sadržajem alkohola.
+Prema njezinu mišljenju najlaganija vina, koja imaju sadržaj alkohola otprilike 9°, a to su ujedno najpopularnija i najjeftinija vina, prava su konkurencija pivu.
+Stoga smatra da za usporedbu treba odabrati ta vina ako je riječ o mjerenju utjecaja oporezivanja na temelju sadržaja alkohola ili cijene proizvoda.
+12 Sud smatra da je ta primjedba talijanske vlade primjerena.
+Što se tiče znatnih razlika u kvaliteti te stoga i u cijeni vina, odlučujući konkurentski odnos između piva, koje je popularno piće čija je potrošnja vrlo raširena, i vina mora se utvrditi upućivanjem na vina koja su najdostupnija širokoj javnosti, odnosno, općenito govoreći, na najlaganije i najjeftinije sorte.
+Stoga je to odgovarajuća osnova za fiskalnu usporedbu s obzirom na sadržaj alkohola ili na cijenu dvaju pića o kojima je riječ.
+Utvrđivanje odgovarajućeg omjera oporezivanja
+13 Što se tiče odabira metode usporedbe u svrhu utvrđivanja odgovarajućeg omjera oporezivanja, Komisija smatra da je najsigurnija metoda upotreba kriterija koji je povezan i s volumenom dotičnih pića i s njihovim sadržajem alkohola.
+Komisija smatra da oporezivanje koje prekoračuje omjer 1: 2, 8 s obzirom na volumen (koji odgovara omjeru 1: 1 s obzirom samo na sadržaj alkohola) dovodi do „pretpostavke33333333333333333333333333333333333333” da se pivu dodjeljuje neizravna zaštita.
+14 Vlada Ujedinjene Kraljevine uputila je na zaključke izvješća iz 1963. koje je Komisiji podnio Fiskalni i financijski odbor („Izvješće iz Neumarka”) i još jednom naglasila da pravilna usporedba treba biti utemeljena na utjecaju oporezivanja na neto cijene bez poreza dvaju dotičnih proizvoda.
+Prema njezinu mišljenju usporedba utemeljena na prosječnoj cijeni poželjnija je od usporedbe utemeljene na prosječnom sadržaju alkohola.
+Ona također tvrdi kako nema govora o diskriminirajućoj ili zaštitnoj trgovačkoj praksi ako se utvrdi da porez koji se naplaćuje na dva konkurentska proizvoda odgovara jednakom udjelu u prosječnoj cijeni tih proizvoda.
+Vlada Ujedinjene Kraljevine smatra da prema tom kriteriju njezin porezni sustav nema zaštitni učinak.
+15 U tom pogledu talijanska vlada osporava argumente koje su iznijele vlada Ujedinjene Kraljevine i Komisija.
+Ona ističe kako je za razrješenje spora važna činjenica da je vino poljoprivredni proizvod, a pivo industrijski proizvod.
+Prema njezinu mišljenju zahtjevi zajedničke poljoprivredne politike trebali bi dovesti do uvođenja porezne stope kojom se poljoprivredni proizvodi stavljaju u povoljniji položaj te bi stoga bilo neusklađeno s tom politikom kada bi nacionalni porezni sustav u potpunosti uklonio učinke intervencije Zajednice u potporu proizvodnji vina.
+16 Talijanska vlada također se protivi važnosti koju Komisija pripisuje pitanju sadržaja alkohola u dvama pićima o kojima je riječ.
+Prema njezinu mišljenju odlučujući je kriterij utjecaj oporezivanja s obzirom na volumen tih dvaju pića.
+Dva su razloga za to: prvo, porezni sustav Ujedinjene Kraljevine utemeljen je na volumenu proizvoda; drugo, budući da u oba slučaja pića imaju nizak sadržaj alkohola te su pogodna za ispijanje uz jelo i gašenje žeđi, na odabir potrošača ne utječe sadržaj alkohola u tim proizvodima nego njihove opće osobine kao što su okus i miris, te se stoga ta pića konzumiraju u istu svrhu i u manje-više istim količinama.
+Iskustvo pokazuje da omjer potrošnje piva i vina ako i nije sasvim jednak, ni u kojem slučaju nije veći od 1,5: 1.
+17 Talijanska vlada predlaže da ta dva kriterija koja se odnose na volumen i sadržaj alkohola treba objediniti u smislu da premda u načelu mora postojati jednaka stopa oporezivanja s obzirom na volumen dvaju pića, postojanje više stope poreza na vino samo s obzirom na sadržaj alkohola bio bi pouzdan pokazatelj diskriminacije i činjenice da porezni sustav o kojem je riječ ima zaštitni učinak.
+18 Razmjena stavova između stranaka koja je uslijedila nakon presude od 27. veljače 1980. pokazala je sljedeće: iako nijedan od kriterija za usporedbu koji je primijenjen za utvrđivanje poreznog omjera između dvaju proizvoda o kojima je riječ ne može samostalno donijeti pouzdane rezultate, ipak svaka od te tri upotrijebljene metode, a to je procjena poreznog opterećenja s obzirom na volumen, sadržaj alkohola i cijenu proizvoda, može pružiti važne informacije za ocjenu osporavanog poreznog sustava.
+19 Nije sporno da usporedba oporezivanja piva i vina s obzirom na volumen tih dvaju pića pokazuje kako se vino više oporezuje i u relativnom i u apsolutnom smislu.
+Ne samo što se oporezivanje vina znatno povećalo u odnosu na oporezivanje piva kada je Ujedinjena Kraljevina carinu zamijenila trošarinom, kao što je Sud već utvrdio u presudi od 27. veljače 1980., nego je jasno i da je tijekom razdoblja na koje se odnosi ovaj postupak, a to su 1976. i 1977. godina, porez na vino u prosjeku bio pet puta viši, s obzirom na volumen, nego porez na pivo; drugim riječima, vino je podlijegalo dodatnom poreznom opterećenju od, zaokruženo, 400% .
+20 Što se tiče kriterija za usporedbu utemeljenog na sadržaju alkohola, Sud je već u presudi od 27. veljače 1980. utvrdio da iako je sadržaj alkohola doista samo sekundaran čimbenik pri odabiru između ta dva pića, ipak je relativno pouzdan kriterij za usporedbu.
+Treba primijetiti da je Vijeće priznalo važnost tog kriterija u postupku usklađivanja poreza na alkohol i različite vrste alkoholnih pića, koji je još u tijeku.
+21 Kada se promatraju pokazatelji koje je Sud već prihvatio, jasno je da je tijekom razdoblja o kojem je riječ vino u Ujedinjenoj Kraljevini bilo opterećeno porezom koji je, s obzirom na sadržaj alkohola, bio više nego dvostruko viši od poreza na pivo, odnosno porezno opterećenje bilo je najmanje 100% više.
+22 Što se tiče kriterija utjecaja oporezivanja na neto cijenu bez poreza, Sud je pri donošenju mišljenja naišao na poprilične poteškoće zbog nesuglasnih podataka koje su mu podnijele stranke.
+Procjena tog kriterija, koji Ujedinjena Kraljevina smatra najmjerodavnijim, bila je osobito teška zbog nepotpunosti podataka koje je predočila Komisija, a koji su se sastojali od popisa prodajnih cijena bez usporednih podataka koji bi unutar tih cijena pokazali utjecaj trošarine, poreza na dodanu vrijednost i cijene bez poreza.
+23 U odgovoru na rješenje od 15. srpnja 1982., u kojem je Sud zahtijevao od stranaka da mu dostave podatke o potrošačkim cijenama i neto cijenama bez poreza onih vrsta vina i piva koje se najčešće prodaju i konzumiraju u Ujedinjenoj Kraljevini, vlada Ujedinjene Kraljevine dala je samo podatke o dva njemačka vina (Goldener Oktober i Blue Nun), koja su nedvojbeno u širokoj potrošnji, ali se ne može reći da su reprezentativna za stanje tržišta vina unutar Zajednice.
+24 Komisija i talijanska vlada osporile su mjerodavnost vina koja je odabrala vlada Ujedinjene Kraljevine i dostavile detaljne podatke o talijanskim vinima; Komisija je pokušala utvrditi prosječne cijene, dok je talijanska vlada, u skladu s gore navedenim pristupom, usporedila utjecaj oporezivanja na cijenu tipičnog britanskog piva s utjecajem oporezivanja na najjeftinije talijansko vino koje je dostupno u znatnim količinama na tržištu Ujedinjene Kraljevine.
+25 Izračuni Komisije, koji se odnose na tržište Ujedinjene Kraljevine u sadašnjem stanju i čiju relevantnost vlada Ujedinjene Kraljevine nije osporavala, pokazuju da vino podliježe višem poreznom opterećenju od otprilike 58% i 77% , dok izračuni talijanske vlade koji se odnose na najjeftinije vino pokazuju da to vino podliježe višem poreznom opterećenju koje iznosi do 286% .
+Te rezultate neizravno je potvrdila analiza prodajnih cijena dvaju njemačkih vina koju je provela vlada Ujedinjene Kraljevine.
+I doista, jedno od ta dva vina gotovo točno predstavlja točku pariteta između piva i vina sa stajališta utjecaja oporezivanja na cijenu.
+Taj primjer pokazuje da se sva jeftinija vina koja se stavljaju na tržište Ujedinjene Kraljevine, s obzirom na cijenu, u relativnom smislu oporezuju više nego pivo.
+Iz popisa cijena koji je predočila Komisija proizlazi da na tržištu Ujedinjene Kraljevine postoji prilično velik broj vina koja se mogu svrstati pod tu definiciju, a među njima su praktički sva talijanska vina, koja stoga podliježu višem poreznom opterećenju koje se povećava obrnuto proporcionalno njihovoj cijeni.
+26 Razmotrivši podatke koje su mu dostavile stranke Sud je zaključio da ako se uspoređuju vina koja su jeftinija od onih vrsta vina koje je odabrala Ujedinjena Kraljevina i čijih se nekoliko sorti prodaje u velikim količinama na tržištu Ujedinjene Kraljevine, postaje očito da upravo ta vina, koja s obzirom na cijenu najizravnije konkuriraju domaćoj proizvodnji piva, podliježu znatno većem poreznom opterećenju.
+27 Stoga je nakon detaljne istrage koju je proveo Sud očito – ma koji se kriterij za usporedbu upotrijebio, jer nema potrebe izražavati veću sklonost jednom ili drugom – da porezni sustav Ujedinjene Kraljevine ima učinak nametanja višeg poreznog opterećenja na vino uvezeno iz drugih država članica kako bi se zaštitila domaća proizvodnja piva, koja sa stajališta tržišnog natjecanja čini najmjerodavniju referentnu veličinu.
+Budući da je ta zaštita najizraženija u slučaju najpopularnijih vina, učinak poreznog sustava Ujedinjene Kraljevine jest dodjeljivanje vinu karaktera luksuznog proizvoda te ono stoga, s obzirom na porezno opterećenje kojem podliježe, u očima potrošača teško može biti prava zamjena za tipično piće domaće proizvodnje.
+28 Iz gore navedenih razmatranja proizlazi da Ujedinjena Kraljevina, time što je na nepjenušavo lagano vino proizvedeno od svježa grožđa nametnula trošarine po većoj stopi, u relativnom smislu, nego na pivo, nije ispunila svoje obveze na temelju drugog stavka članka 95. Ugovora o EEZ-u.
+29 Na temelju članka 69. stavka 2. Poslovnika, stranka koja ne uspije u postupku dužna je, na zahtjev protivne stranke, snositi troškove.
+Međutim, na temelju članka 69. stavka 3., Sud može u iznimnim okolnostima naložiti strankama da snose vlastite troškove.
+30 U ovom predmetu prikladno je iskoristiti to diskrecijsko pravo.
+U tijeku postupka pokazalo se da je Komisija podnijela tužbu, a da nije provela odgovarajuću prethodnu istragu, što je prouzročilo opetovane zahtjeve Suda za dostavu podataka i produženje postupka.
+Stoga stranke snose vlastite troškove, osim troškova Talijanske Republike, koje će platiti Ujedinjena Kraljevina.
+Slijedom navedenog, SUD, proglašava i presuđuje:
+1. Time što je na nepjenušavo lagano vino proizvedeno od svježa grožđa nametnula trošarine po većoj stopi, u relativnom smislu, nego na pivo, Ujedinjena Kraljevina Velike Britanije i Sjeverne Irske nije ispunila svoje obveze na temelju drugog stavka članka 95. Ugovora o EEZ-u.
+2. Komisiji Europskih zajednica i Ujedinjenoj Kraljevini nalaže se snošenje vlastitih troškova.
+Troškove Talijanske Republike snosi Ujedinjena Kraljevina.

data/principle-mvep-justice-court/mvep-114-en.aligned.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+IN CASE 34/79
+REFERENCE TO THE COURT UNDER ARTICLE 177 OF THE EEC TREATY BY THE HOUSE OF LORDS FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING IN THE PROCEEDINGS PENDING BEFORE THEM BETWEEN
+REGINA
+AND
+MAURICE DONALD HENN AND JOHN FREDERICK ERNEST DARBY
+ON THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLES 30 AND 36 OF THE TREATY, BEARING IN MIND THE NATIONAL AND CONVENTIONAL PROVISIONS PROHIBITING THE IMPORTATION OF ARTICLES WHICH ARE OF A PORNOGRAPHIC CHARACTER.
+1 BY ORDER OF 22 FEBRUARY 1979, RECEIVED AT THE COURT OF JUSTICE ON 1 MARCH 1979, THE HOUSE OF LORDS, PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 177 OF THE EEC TREATY, REFERRED TO THE COURT A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLES 30, 36 AND 234 OF THE TREATY. THESE QUESTIONS HAVE ARISEN IN THE CONTEXT OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE APPELLANTS WHO, ON 14 JULY 1977, WERE CONVICTED AT IPSWICH CROWN COURT OF A NUMBER OF OFFENCES.
+ONLY ONE OF THE CHARGES BROUGHT AGAINST THE APPELLANTS IS RELEVANT TO THE PRESENT REFERENCE - THAT OF BEING ''KNOWINGLY CONCERNED IN THE FRAUDULENT EVASION OF THE PROHIBITION OF THE IMPORTATION OF INDECENT OR OBSCENE ARTICLES, CONTRARY TO SECTION 42 OF THE CUSTOMS CONSOLIDATION ACT, 1876, AND SECTION 304 OF THE CUSTOMS AND EXCISE ACT, 1952.''
+2 THE ARTICLES INVOLVED IN THE CHARGE AGAINST THE APPELLANTS FORMED PART OF A CONSIGNMENT OF SEVERAL BOXES OF OBSCENE FILMS AND MAGAZINES WHICH HAD BEEN BROUGHT INTO THE UNITED KINGDOM ON 14 OCTOBER 1975 BY A LORRY WHICH ARRIVED AT FELIXSTOWE BY FERRY FROM ROTTERDAM.
+THE CHARGE RELATED TO SIX FILMS AND SEVEN MAGAZINES, ALL OF DANISH ORIGIN.
+3 THE APPELLANTS APPEALED AGAINST THEIR CONVICTION TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF ENGLAND AND WALES.
+THAT COURT DISMISSED THEIR APPEALS BY JUDGMENT OF 13 JULY 1978. ON 9 NOVEMBER 1978 THE HOUSE OF LORDS GRANTED BOTH APPELLANTS LEAVE TO APPEAL.
+ON 29 JANUARY 1979, AFTER HEARING THE APPELLANTS, THE HOUSE OF LORDS DECIDED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO REFER TO THE COURT OF JUSTICE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 177 OF THE TREATY, THE QUESTIONS SET FORTH IN THE ORDER SEEKING A PRELIMINARY RULING.
+4 THE APPELLANTS CONTENDED THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM HAD NO CONSISTENT POLICY OF PUBLIC MORALITY IN REGARD TO INDECENT OR OBSCENE ARTICLES.
+IN THAT RESPECT THEY POINTED TO DIFFERENCES IN THE LAW APPLIED IN THE DIFFERENT CONSTITUENT PARTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM.
+THEY CONTENDED FURTHERMORE THAT A COMPLETE PROHIBITION OF THE IMPORTATION OF INDECENT OR OBSCENE ARTICLES RESULTED IN THE APPLICATION TO IMPORTATION OF STRICTER RULES THAN THOSE WHICH APPLIED INTERNALLY AND CONSTITUTED ARBITRARY DISCRIMINATION WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 36 OF THE TREATY.
+5 ACCORDING TO THE AGREED STATEMENT OF LAW ACCOMPANYING THE ORDER SEEKING THE PRELIMINARY RULING, IT IS TRUE THAT, IN THIS FIELD, THE LAWS OF THE DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THAT IS TO SAY, ENGLAND AND WALES, SCOTLAND, NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE ISLE OF MAN, DIFFER FROM EACH OTHER AND THAT EACH IS DERIVED FROM A NUMBER OF DIFFERENT SOURCES, SOME OF WHICH ARE TO BE FOUND IN THE COMMON LAW AND OTHERS IN STATUTE.
+6 ACCORDING TO THE SAME STATEMENT, THE VARIOUS LAWS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM RECOGNIZE AND APPLY TWO DIFFERENT AND DISTINCT CRITERIA.
+THE FIRST, REFERRED TO IN THE STATEMENT As ''sTANDARD A'', RELATES TO THE WORDs ''INDECENT OR OBSCENE'' WHICH APPEAR IN THE CUSTOMS LEGISLATION AND IN CERTAIN OTHER LEGISLATION AND ARE ALSO USED TO INDICATE THE AMBIT OF THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW OFFENCE OF ''OUTRAGING PUBLIC DECENCY''.
+THESE WORDS CONVEY, ACCORDING TO THE STATEMENT, A SINGLE IDEA, THAT OF OFFENDING AGAINST RECOGNIZED STANDARDS OF PROPRIETY, ''INDECENT'' BEING AT THE LOWER END OF THE SCALE, AND ''OBSCENE'' AT THE UPPER END.
+7 THE SECOND CRITERION, REFERRED TO IN THE STATEMENT As ''sTANDARD B'', RELATES TO THE WORD ''OBSCENE'' AS USED ALONE IN THE OBSCENE PUBLICATIONS ACTS, 1959 AND 1964, (WHICH APPLY TO ENGLAND AND WALES ONLY) AND IN DESCRIBING THE AMBIT OF CERTAIN COMMON LAW OFFENCES IN ENGLAND AND WALES, SCOTLAND AND NORTHERN IRELAND.
+ACCORDING TO THE STATEMENT, THIS WORD APPLIES TO A MORE RESTRICTED CLASS OF MATERIAL, NAMELY THAT WHICH TENDS TO ''DEPRAVE AND CORRUPT'' THOSE EXPOSED TO THE MATERIAL.
+8 THE OBSCENE PUBLICATIONS ACTS, 1959 AND 1964, CREATE CERTAIN OFFENCES IN REGARD TO THE PUBLICATION OF OBSCENE ARTICLES BUT EXCLUDE FROM THEIR FIELD OF APPLICATION ''OBSCENE ARTICLEs'', AS DEFINED THEREIN, IF THEIR PUBLICATION IS JUSTIFIED ON THE GROUND THAT IT IS IN THE INTERESTS OF SCIENCE, LITERATURE, ART OR LEARNING OR OTHER OBJECTS OF GENERAL CONCERN.
+9 THE MERE POSSESSION, FOR NON-COMMERCIAL PURPOSES, OF ARTICLES WHICH OFFEND AGAINST EITHER STANDARD A OR STANDARD B IS NOT A CRIMINAL OFFENCE IN ANY PART OF THE UNITED KINGDOM.
+10 THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS CONCERNING THE IMPORTATION OF PORNOGRAPHIC ARTICLES ARE SECTION 42 OF THE CUSTOMS CONSOLIDATION ACT, 1876, AND SECTION 304 OF THE CUSTOMS AND EXCISE ACT, 1952.
+THEY APPLY THROUGHOUT THE UNITED KINGDOM.
+PUT SHORTLY, THEY PROVIDE THAT INDECENT OR OBSCENE ARTICLES ARE LIABLE FOR FORFEITURE AND DESTRUCTION UPON ARRIVAL IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THAT WHOEVER ATTEMPTS FRAUDULENTLY TO BRING SUCH ARTICLES INTO THE UNITED KINGDOM SHALL BE GUILTY OF AN OFFENCE.
+THE SEVENTH SCHEDULE TO THE CUSTOMS AND EXCISE ACT, 1952, PROVIDES A PROCEDURE FOR TESTING BEFORE A COURT THE LIABILITY OF GOODS TO FORFEITURE.
+FIRST QUESTION
+11 THE FIRST QUESTION ASKS WHETHER A LAW OF A MEMBER STATE WHICH PROHIBITS THE IMPORT INTO THAT STATE OF PORNOGRAPHIC ARTICLES IS A MEASURE HAVING EQUIVALENT EFFECT TO A QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTION ON IMPORTS WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 30 OF THE TREATY.
+12 THAT ARTICLE PROVIDES THAT ''QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS AND ALL MEASURES HAVING EQUIVALENT EFFECT'' sHALL BE PROHIBITED BETWEEN MEMBER STATES.
+IT IS CLEAR THAT THIS PROVISION INCLUDES A PROHIBITION ON IMPORTS INASMUCH AS THIS IS THE MOST EXTREME FORM OF RESTRICTION.
+THE EXPRESSION USED IN ARTICLE 30 MUST THEREFORE BE UNDERSTOOD AS BEING THE EQUIVALENT OF THE EXPRESSION ''PROHIBITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTs'' OCCURRING IN ARTICLE 36.
+13 THE ANSWER TO THE FIRST QUESTION IS THEREFORE THAT A LAW SUCH AS THAT REFERRED TO IN THIS CASE CONSTITUTES A QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTION ON IMPORTS WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 30 OF THE TREATY.
+SECOND AND THIRD QUESTIONS
+14 THE SECOND AND THIRD QUESTIONS ARE FRAMED IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS:
+''2. IF THE ANSWER TO QUESTION 1 IS IN THE AFFIRMATIVE, DOES THE FIRST SENTENCE OF ARTICLE 36 UPON ITS TRUE CONSTRUCTION MEAN THAT A MEMBER STATE MAY LAWFULLY IMPOSE PROHIBITIONS ON THE IMPORTATION OF GOODS FROM ANOTHER MEMBER STATE WHICH ARE OF AN INDECENT OR OBSCENE CHARACTER AS UNDERSTOOD BY THE LAWS OF THAT MEMBER STATE?
+3. IN PARTICULAR:
+(i) IS THE MEMBER STATE ENTITLED TO MAINTAIN SUCH PROHIBITIONS IN ORDER TO PREVENT, TO GUARD AGAINST OR TO REDUCE THE LIKELIHOOD OF BREACHES OF THE DOMESTIC LAW OF ALL CONSTITUENT PARTS OF THE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF THE STATE?
+(ii)IS THE MEMBER STATE ENTITLED TO MAINTAIN SUCH PROHIBITIONS HAVING REGARD TO THE NATIONAL STANDARDS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THAT STATE AS DEMONSTRATED BY THE DOMESTIC LAWS OF THE CONSTITUENT PARTS OF THE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF THAT STATE INCLUDING THE LAW IMPOSING THE PROHIBITION, NOTWITHSTANDING VARIATIONS BETWEEN THE LAWS OF THE CONSTITUENT PARTS? ''
+IT IS CONVENIENT TO CONSIDER THESE QUESTIONS TOGETHER.
+15 UNDER THE TERMS OF ARTICLE 36 OF THE TREATY THE PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS WITHIN THE COMMUNITY ARE NOT TO PRECLUDE PROHIBITIONS ON IMPORTS WHICH ARE JUSTIFIED INTER ALIA ''ON GROUNDS OF PUBLIC MORALITY ''.
+IN PRINCIPLE, IT IS FOR EACH MEMBER STATE TO DETERMINE IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS OWN SCALE OF VALUES AND IN THE FORM SELECTED BY IT THE REQUIREMENTS OF PUBLIC MORALITY IN ITS TERRITORY.
+IN ANY EVENT, IT CANNOT BE DISPUTED THAT THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS APPLIED BY THE UNITED KINGDOM IN REGARD TO THE IMPORTATION OF ARTICLES HAVING AN INDECENT OR OBSCENE CHARACTER COME WITHIN THE POWERS RESERVED TO THE MEMBER STATES BY THE FIRST SENTENCE OF ARTICLE 36.
+16 EACH MEMBER STATE IS ENTITLED TO IMPOSE PROHIBITIONS ON IMPORTS JUSTIFIED ON GROUNDS OF PUBLIC MORALITY FOR THE WHOLE OF ITS TERRITORY, AS DEFINED IN ARTICLE 227 OF THE TREATY, WHATEVER THE STRUCTURE OF ITS CONSTITUTION MAY BE AND HOWEVER THE POWERS OF LEGISLATING IN REGARD TO THE SUBJECT IN QUESTION MAY BE DISTRIBUTED.
+THE FACT THAT CERTAIN DIFFERENCES EXIST BETWEEN THE LAWS ENFORCED IN THE DIFFERENT CONSTITUENT PARTS OF A MEMBER STATE DOES NOT THEREBY PREVENT THAT STATE FROM APPLYING A UNITARY CONCEPT IN REGARD TO PROHIBITIONS ON IMPORTS IMPOSED, ON GROUNDS OF PUBLIC MORALITY, ON TRADE WITH OTHER MEMBER STATES.
+17 THE ANSWER TO THE SECOND AND THIRD QUESTIONS MUST THEREFORE BE THAT THE FIRST SENTENCE OF ARTICLE 36 UPON ITS TRUE CONSTRUCTION MEANS THAT A MEMBER STATE MAY, IN PRINCIPLE, LAWFULLY IMPOSE PROHIBITIONS ON THE IMPORTATION FROM ANY OTHER MEMBER STATE OF ARTICLES WHICH ARE OF AN INDECENT OR OBSCENE CHARACTER AS UNDERSTOOD BY ITS DOMESTIC LAWS AND THAT SUCH PROHIBITIONS MAY LAWFULLY BE APPLIED TO THE WHOLE OF ITS NATIONAL TERRITORY EVEN IF, IN REGARD TO THE FIELD IN QUESTION, VARIATIONS EXIST BETWEEN THE LAWS IN FORCE IN THE DIFFERENT CONSTITUENT PARTS OF THE MEMBER STATE CONCERNED.
+FOURTH, FIFTH AND SIXTH QUESTIONS
+18 THE FOURTH, FIFTH AND SIXTH QUESTIONS ARE FRAMED IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS:
+''4. IF A PROHIBITION ON THE IMPORTATION OF GOODS IS JUSTIFIABLE ON GROUNDS OF PUBLIC MORALITY OR PUBLIC POLICY, AND IMPOSED WITH THAT PURPOSE, CAN THAT PROHIBITION NEVERTHELESS AMOUNT TO A MEANS OF ARBITRARY DISCRIMINATION OR A DISGUISED RESTRICTION ON TRADE CONTRARY TO ARTICLE 36?
+5. IF THE ANSWER TO QUESTION 4 IS IN THE AFFIRMATIVE, DOES THE FACT THAT THE PROHIBITION IMPOSED ON THE IMPORTATION OF SUCH GOODS IS DIFFERENT IN SCOPE FROM THAT IMPOSED BY THE CRIMINAL LAW UPON THE POSSESSION AND PUBLICATION OF SUCH GOODS WITHIN THE MEMBER STATE OR ANY PART OF IT NECESSARILY CONSTITUTE A MEANS OF ARBITRARY DISCRIMINATION OR A DISGUISED RESTRICTION ON TRADE BETWEEN MEMBER STATES SO AS TO CONFLICT WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE SECOND SENTENCE OF ARTICLE 36?
+6. IF IT BE THE FACT THAT THE PROHIBITION IMPOSED UPON IMPORTATION IS, AND A PROHIBITION SUCH AS IS IMPOSED UPON POSSESSION AND PUBLICATION IS NOT, CAPABLE AS A MATTER OF ADMINISTRATION OF BEING APPLIED BY CUSTOMS OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE FOR EXAMINING GOODS AT THE POINT OF IMPORTATION, WOULD THAT FACT HAVE ANY BEARING UPON THE ANSWER TO QUESTION 5?''
+19 IN THESE QUESTIONS THE HOUSE OF LORDS TAKES ACCOUNT OF THE APPELLANTs' sUBMISSIONS BASED UPON CERTAIN DIFFERENCES BETWEEN, ON THE ONE HAND, THE PROHIBITION ON IMPORTING THE GOODS IN QUESTION, WHICH IS ABSOLUTE, AND, ON THE OTHER, THE LAWS IN FORCE IN THE VARIOUS CONSTITUENT PARTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, WHICH APPEAR TO BE LESS STRICT IN THE SENSE THAT THE MERE POSSESSION OF OBSCENE ARTICLES FOR NON-COMMERCIAL PURPOSES DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A CRIMINAL OFFENCE ANYWHERE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THAT, EVEN IF IT IS GENERALLY FORBIDDEN, TRADE IN SUCH ARTICLES IS SUBJECT TO CERTAIN EXCEPTIONS, NOTABLY THOSE IN FAVOUR OF ARTICLES HAVING SCIENTIFIC, LITERARY, ARTISTIC OR EDUCATIONAL INTEREST.
+HAVING REGARD TO THOSE DIFFERENCES THE QUESTION HAS BEEN RAISED WHETHER THE PROHIBITION ON IMPORTS MIGHT NOT COME WITHIN THE SECOND SENTENCE OF ARTICLE 36.
+20 ACCORDING TO THE SECOND SENTENCE OF ARTICLE 36 THE RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS REFERRED TO IN THE FIRST SENTENCE MAY NOT ''CONSTITUTE A MEANS OF ARBITRARY DISCRIMINATION OR A DISGUISED RESTRICTION ON TRADE BETWEEN MEMBER STATEs''.
+21 IN ORDER TO ANSWER THE QUESTIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN REFERRED TO THE COURT IT IS APPROPRIATE TO HAVE REGARD TO THE FUNCTION OF THIS PROVISION, WHICH IS DESIGNED TO PREVENT RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE BASED ON THE GROUNDS MENTIONED IN THE FIRST SENTENCE OF ARTICLE 36 FROM BEING DIVERTED FROM THEIR PROPER PURPOSE AND USED IN SUCH A WAY AS EITHER TO CREATE DISCRIMINATION IN RESPECT OF GOODS ORIGINATING IN OTHER MEMBER STATES OR INDIRECTLY TO PROTECT CERTAIN NATIONAL PRODUCTS.
+THAT IS NOT THE PURPORT OF A PROHIBITION, SUCH AS THAT IN FORCE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, ON THE IMPORTATION OF ARTICLES WHICH ARE OF AN INDECENT OR OBSCENE CHARACTER.
+WHATEVER MAY BE THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE LAWS ON THIS SUBJECT IN FORCE IN THE DIFFERENT CONSTITUENT PARTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THEY CONTAIN CERTAIN EXCEPTIONS OF LIMITED SCOPE, THESE LAWS, TAKEN AS A WHOLE, HAVE AS THEIR PURPOSE THE PROHIBITION, OR AT LEAST, THE RESTRAINING, OF THE MANUFACTURE AND MARKETING OF PUBLICATIONS OR ARTICLES OF AN INDECENT OR OBSCENE CHARACTER.
+IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES IT IS PERMISSIBLE TO CONCLUDE, ON A COMPREHENSIVE VIEW, THAT THERE IS NO LAWFUL TRADE IN SUCH GOODS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM.
+A PROHIBITION ON IMPORTS WHICH MAY IN CERTAIN RESPECTS BE MORE STRICT THAN SOME OF THE LAWS APPLIED WITHIN THE UNITED KINGDOM CANNOT THEREFORE BE REGARDED AS AMOUNTING TO A MEASURE DESIGNED TO GIVE INDIRECT PROTECTION TO SOME NATIONAL PRODUCT OR AIMED AT CREATING ARBITRARY DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN GOODS OF THIS TYPE DEPENDING ON WHETHER THEY ARE PRODUCED WITHIN THE NATIONAL TERRITORY OR ANOTHER MEMBER STATE.
+22 THE ANSWER TO THE FOURTH QUESTION MUST THEREFORE BE THAT IF A PROHIBITION ON THE IMPORTATION OF GOODS IS JUSTIFIABLE ON GROUNDS OF PUBLIC MORALITY AND IF IT IS IMPOSED WITH THAT PURPOSE THE ENFORCEMENT OF THAT PROHIBITION CANNOT, IN THE ABSENCE WITHIN THE MEMBER STATE CONCERNED OF A LAWFUL TRADE IN THE SAME GOODS, CONSTITUTE A MEANS OF ARBITRARY DISCRIMINATION OR A DISGUISED RESTRICTION ON TRADE CONTRARY TO ARTICLE 36.
+23 IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO ANSWER THE FIFTH AND SIXTH QUESTIONS.
+SEVENTH QUESTION
+24 THE SEVENTH QUESTION ASKS WHETHER, INDEPENDENTLY OF THE QUESTIONS POSED ABOVE, A MEMBER STATE MAY LAWFULLY IMPOSE PROHIBITIONS ON THE IMPORTATION OF SUCH GOODS FROM ANOTHER MEMBER STATE BY REFERENCE TO OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM THE GENEVA CONVENTION, 1923, FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF TRAFFIC IN OBSCENE PUBLICATIONS AND THE UNIVERSAL POSTAL CONVENTION (RENEWED AT LAUSANNE IN 1974, WHICH CAME INTO FORCE ON 1 JANUARY 1976), BEARING IN MIND THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 234 OF THE TREATY.
+25 ARTICLE 234 PROVIDES THAT THE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED BEFORE THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY BETWEEN ONE OR MORE MEMBER STATES ON THE ONE HAND, AND ONE OR MORE THIRD COUNTRIES ON THE OTHER, ARE NOT TO BE AFFECTED BY THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY.
+HOWEVER, TO THE EXTENT TO WHICH SUCH AGREEMENTS ARE NOT COMPATIBLE WITH THE TREATY, THE MEMBER STATE CONCERNED IS TO TAKE ALL APPROPRIATE STEPS TO ELIMINATE THE INCOMPATIBILITIES ESTABLISHED.
+26 IT APPEARS FROM A COMPARISON OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONVENTIONS TO WHICH THE HOUSE OF LORDS REFERS THAT THE OBSERVANCE BY THE UNITED KINGDOM OF THOSE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS IS NOT LIKELY TO RESULT IN A CONFLICT WITH THE PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS IF ACCOUNT IS TAKEN OF THE EXCEPTION MADE BY ARTICLE 36 IN REGARD TO ANY PROHIBITIONS ON IMPORTS BASED ON GROUNDS OF PUBLIC MORALITY.
+27 THE ANSWER TO THE SEVENTH QUESTION SHOULD THEREFORE BE THAT, IN SO FAR AS A MEMBER STATE AVAILS ITSELF OF THE RESERVATION RELATING TO THE PROTECTION OF PUBLIC MORALITY PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE 36 OF THE TREATY, THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 234 DO NOT PRECLUDE THAT STATE FROM FULFILLING THE OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM THE GENEVA CONVENTION, 1923, FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF TRAFFIC IN OBSCENE PUBLICATIONS AND FROM THE UNIVERSAL POSTAL CONVENTION (RENEWED AT LAUSANNE IN 1974, WHICH CAME INTO FORCE ON 1 JANUARY 1976).
+28 THE COSTS INCURRED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND BY THE COMMISSION, WHICH HAVE SUBMITTED OBSERVATIONS TO THE COURT, ARE NOT RECOVERABLE.
+29 AS THESE PROCEEDINGS ARE, IN SO FAR AS THE PARTIES TO THE MAIN ACTION ARE CONCERNED, A STEP IN THE ACTION PENDING BEFORE THE NATIONAL COURT, THE DECISION ON COSTS IS A MATTER FOR THAT COURT.
+ON THOSE GROUNDS, THE COURT, IN ANSWER TO THE QUESTIONS REFERRED TO IT BY THE HOUSE OF LORDS BY ORDER OF 22 FEBRUARY 1979, HEREBY RULES:
+1. A LAW OF A MEMBER STATE PROHIBITING ANY IMPORTATION OF PORNOGRAPHIC ARTICLES INTO THAT STATE CONSTITUTES A QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTION ON IMPORTS WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 30 OF THE TREATY.
+2. THE FIRST SENTENCE OF ARTICLE 36 UPON ITS TRUE CONSTRUCTION MEANS THAT A MEMBER STATE MAY, IN PRINCIPLE, LAWFULLY IMPOSE PROHIBITIONS ON THE IMPORTATION FROM ANY OTHER MEMBER STATE OF ARTICLES WHICH ARE OF AN INDECENT OR OBSCENE CHARACTER AS UNDERSTOOD BY ITS DOMESTIC LAWS AND THAT SUCH PROHIBITIONS MAY LAWFULLY BE APPLIED TO THE WHOLE OF ITS NATIONAL TERRITORY EVEN IF, IN REGARD TO THE FIELD IN QUESTION, VARIATIONS EXIST BETWEEN THE LAWS IN FORCE IN THE DIFFERENT CONSTITUENT PARTS OF THE MEMBER STATE CONCERNED.
+3. IF A PROHIBITION ON THE IMPORTATION OF GOODS IS JUSTIFIABLE ON GROUNDS OF PUBLIC MORALITY AND IF IT IS IMPOSED WITH THAT PURPOSE THE ENFORCEMENT OF THAT PROHIBITION CANNOT, IN THE ABSENCE WITHIN THE MEMBER STATE CONCERNED OF A LAWFUL TRADE IN THE SAME GOODS, CONSTITUTE A MEANS OF ARBITRARY DISCRIMINATION OR A DISGUISED RESTRICTION ON TRADE CONTRARY TO ARTICLE 36.
+4. IN SO FAR AS A MEMBER STATE AVAILS ITSELF OF THE RESERVATION RELATING TO THE PROTECTION OF PUBLIC MORALITY PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE 36 OF THE TREATY, THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 234 DO NOT PRECLUDE THAT STATE FROM FULFILLING THE OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM THE GENEVA CONVENTION, 1923, FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF TRAFFIC IN OBSCENE PUBLICATIONS AND FROM THE UNIVERSAL POSTAL CONVENTION (RENEWED AT LAUSANNE IN 1974, WHICH CAME INTO FORCE ON 1 JANUARY 1976).

data/principle-mvep-justice-court/mvep-114-hr.aligned.txt

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+U predmetu 34/79,
+povodom zahtjeva koji je na temelju članka 177. Ugovora o EEZ-u uputio House of Lords (Ujedinjena Kraljevina) u postupku između
+Regine
+i
+Mauricea Donalda Henna te Johna Fredericka Ernesta Darbyja,
+radi prethodne odluke o tumačenju članaka 30. i 36. Ugovora o EEZ-u s obzirom na odredbe nacionalnog prava i međunarodnog ugovornog prava o zabrani uvoza proizvoda pornografske naravi, SUD,
+Presudu 1 Rješenjem od 22. veljače 1979., koje je Sud zaprimio 1. ožujka 1979., House of Lords (u daljnjem tekstu: sud koji je uputio zahtjev) uputio je Sudu na temelju članka 177. Ugovora o EEZ-u više pitanja o tumačenju članaka 30., 36. i 234. Ugovora. Ta su pitanja upućena u okviru kaznenog postupka protiv žalitelja koje je 14. srpnja 1977. Ipswich Crown Court (Kraljevski sud u Ipswichu, Ujedinjena Kraljevina) proglasio krivima za više kaznenih djela.
+Zahtjev se odnosi na samo jedno od tih kaznenih djela – ono koje se tiče „svjesnog kršenja zabrane uvoza neprimjerenih ili nećudorednih proizvoda, što je u suprotnosti s člankom 42. Customs Consolidation Acta (u daljnjem tekstu: Zakon o carinama) iz 1876. i člankom 304. Customs and Excise Acta (u daljnjem tekstu: Zakon o carinama i trošarinama) iz 1952.”
+2 Proizvodi u svezi s kojima se terete žalitelji bili su dio pošiljke od nekoliko kutija neprimjerenih filmova i časopisa koji su bili uneseni u Ujedinjenu Kraljevinu kombijem koji je 14. listopada 1975. iz Rotterdama trajektom stigao u Felixstowe.
+Optužnica se odnosila na šest filmova i sedam časopisa koji su svi danskog podrijetla.
+3 Žalitelji su protiv presude podnijeli žalbe pred Court of Appeal of England and Wales (Žalbeni sud, Engleska i Wales, Ujedinjena Kraljevina).
+Taj je sud presudom od 13. srpnja 1978. odbio njihove žalbe. Dana 9. studenoga 1978. sud koji je uputio zahtjev dopustio je obama žaliteljima da podnesu pravozaštitno sredstvo.
+Nakon što je 29. siječnja 1979. saslušao oba žalitelja, sud koji je uputio zahtjev odlučio je da se na temelju članka 177. Ugovora Sudu upute pitanja koja su navedena u rješenju kojim se upućuje zahtjev za prethodnu odluku.
+4 Žalitelji su ustvrdili da u Ujedinjenoj Kraljevini ne postoji jedinstvena politika javnog morala u pogledu neprimjerenih ili nećudorednih proizvoda.
+S tim u svezi upozorili su na razlike u propisima koji se primjenjuju u različitim konstitutivnim dijelovima državnog područja Ujedinjene Kraljevine.
+Osim toga ustvrdili su da se zbog potpune zabrane uvoza neprimjerenih ili nećudorednih proizvoda na uvoz primjenjuju stroža pravila od onih koja vrijede unutar države te da je to proizvoljna diskriminacija u smislu članka 36. Ugovora.
+5 Prema prikazu pravnih pitanja danom u prilogu rješenju kojim se upućuje zahtjev za prethodnu odluku proizlazi da se odgovarajući zakoni koji se primjenjuju u različitim dijelovima državnog područja Ujedinjene Kraljevine, odnosno u Engleskoj i Walesu, Škotskoj, Sjevernoj Irskoj i na otoku Manu, međusobno razlikuju te da svaki od njih potječe iz niza različitih izvora od kojih neki pripadaju common law, a drugi pisanom pravu.
+6 Prema istom prikazu, različiti zakoni Ujedinjene Kraljevine priznaju i primjenjuju dva međusobno različita kriterija.
+Prvi, u prikazu označen kao „kriterij A” , odnosi se na riječi „neprimjereni ili nećudoredni” koje se javljaju u carinskim propisima i nekim drugim propisima, a koriste se i za označivanje sadržaja kaznenog djela prema engleskom common law, tj. „uvredu dobrim običajima”.
+Te se riječi, prema prikazu, odnose na jedinstven pojam vrijeđanja prihvaćenih pravila uljudnosti, pri čemu se izraz „neprimjeren” nalazi na dnu, a „nećudoredan” pri vrhu ljestvice.
+7 Drugi kriterij, u prikazu označen kao „kriterij B” , odnosi se na izraz „nećudoredan” korišten samostalno kao što je to slučaj u Obscene Publications Acts (Zakoni o nećudorednim tiskovinama) iz 1959. i 1964. (koji vrijede samo u Engleskoj i Walesu) te za opisivanje sadržaja određenih djela koja se prema common law smatraju kaznenim djelima u Engleskoj i Walesu, Škotskoj i Sjevernoj Irskoj.
+Kao što je navedeno u prikazu, taj izraz označava užu kategoriju proizvoda, odnosno one proizvode kojima se nastoji „izopačiti i pokvariti” osobe koje su im izložene.
+8 Zakonima o nećudorednim tiskovinama iz 1959. i 1964. podrobno se određuju određena kaznena djela koja se odnose na objavu nećudorednih članaka, ali se iz njihova područja primjene isključuju takvi „nećudoredni članci” u smislu navedenih zakona ako je objava tih članaka opravdana znanstvenim, književnim, umjetničkim ili obrazovnim razlozima ili drugim razlozima od općeg interesa.
+9 Puko posjedovanje, u nekomercijalne svrhe, proizvoda koji pripadaju kategoriji A ili kategoriji B nije kazneno djelo nigdje u Ujedinjenoj Kraljevini.
+10 Relevantne odredbe o uvozu pornografskih proizvoda su odredbe članka 42. Zakona o carinama iz 1876. i članka 304. Zakona o carinama i trošarinama iz 1952.
+One se primjenjuju u cijeloj Ujedinjenoj Kraljevini.
+Ukratko, njima se predviđa da neprimjereni ili nećudoredni proizvodi podliježu zapljeni i uništenju po prispijeću u Ujedinjenu Kraljevinu i da će svatko tko pokuša te proizvode nezakonito uvesti u Ujedinjenu Kraljevinu kazneno odgovarati.
+Prilogom 7. Zakonu o carinama i trošarinama iz 1952. predviđen je postupak kojim se pred sudom utvrđuje podliježe li proizvod zapljeni.
+Prvo pitanje
+11 Prvim se pitanjem pita je li zakon države članice kojim se zabranjuje uvoz pornografskih proizvoda u tu državu mjera s učinkom istovrsnim količinskom ograničenju uvoza u smislu članka 30. Ugovora.
+12 Tim je člankom predviđena zabrana „količinskih ograničenja uvoza i svih mjera s istovrsnim učinkom” među državama članicama.
+Jasno je da se ta odredba odnosi i na zabrane uvoza u mjeri u kojoj su te zabrane najekstremniji oblik ograničenja.
+Stoga izraz iz članka 30. valja razumjeti kao istoznačan izrazu „zabrane ili ograničenja uvoza” iz članka 36.
+13 Stoga na prvo pitanje valja odgovoriti da zakon kao što je dotični jest količinsko ograničenje uvoza u smislu članka 30. Ugovora.
+Drugo i treće pitanje
+14 Drugo i treće pitanje glase kako slijedi:
+„2. Ako je odgovor na prvo pitanje potvrdan, treba li prvu rečenicu članka 36. tumačiti tako da država članica smije zakonito zabraniti uvoz, iz druge države članice, robe neprimjerene ili nećudoredne naravi u smislu zakonodavstva te države članice?
+3. Konkretno:
+(i) ima li država članica pravo zadržati takve zabrane kako bi spriječila, ograničila ili smanjila opasnost od povreda unutarnjeg prava svih konstitutivnih dijelova svojeg državnog carinskog područja?
+(ii) ima li država članica pravo, pozivajući se na vlastite standarde i značajke koji se odražavaju u unutarnjim propisima konstitutivnih dijelova njezinog carinskog područja, uključujući propis kojim se te zabrane propisuju, zadržati zabrane bez obzira na razlike među propisima navedenih konstitutivnih dijelova?”
+Ta pitanja valja razmotriti zajedno.
+15 Prema članku 36. Ugovora, odredbe koje se odnose na slobodno kretanje robe u Zajednici ne isključuju mogućnost zabrane uvoza koja je među ostalim opravdana „razlozima javnog morala”.
+Načelno je na svakoj državi članici da na svojem državnom području odredi, u skladu sa svojom ljestvicom vrijednosti i u obliku koji sama odabere, zahtjeve javnog morala.
+U svakom je slučaju nesporno da su zakonske odredbe koje se u Ujedinjenoj Kraljevini primjenjuju na uvoz proizvoda neprimjerene ili nećudoredne naravi dio nadležnosti koje države članice imaju na temelju prve rečenice članka 36.
+16 Svaka država članica ima pravo odrediti zabrane uvoza koje su opravdane razlozima javnog morala za čitavo svoje državno područje, kako je određeno u članku 227. Ugovora, bez obzira na svoje ustavno ustrojstvo i raspodjelu zakonodavnih nadležnosti za dotično područje.
+Činjenica da postoje određene razlike između propisa koji su na snazi u različitim konstitutivnim dijelovima države članice ne sprečava tu državu da primjenjuje jedinstveno poimanje zabrana uvoza koje se zbog razloga javnog morala primjenjuju u trgovini s drugim državama članicama.
+17 Stoga na drugo i treće pitanje valja odgovoriti da prvu rečenicu članka 36. treba tumačiti tako da država članica načelno smije zakonito zabraniti uvoz proizvoda neprimjerene ili nećudoredne naravi u smislu unutarnjih propisa iz bilo koje druge države članice i da se takve zabrane smiju legitimno primjenjivati na čitavom njezinom državnom području čak i ako u tom području postoje razlike među propisima koji su na snazi u različitim konstitutivnim dijelovima predmetne države članice.
+Četvrto, peto i šesto pitanje
+18 Četvrto, peto i šesto pitanje sročeni su kako slijedi:
+„4. Ako je zabranu uvoza robe moguće opravdati razlozima javnog morala ili javnog poretka te je u tu svrhu ona i uvedena, može li ta zabrana svejedno biti sredstvo proizvoljne diskriminacije ili prikriveno ograničenje trgovine koje je protivno članku 36.?
+5. Ako je odgovor na četvrto pitanje potvrdan, znači li to da činjenica da zabrana uvoza takve robe ima različito područje primjene od kaznenim pravom predviđene zabrane posjedovanja i objave takve robe u državi članici ili bilo kojem njezinom dijelu nužno jest sredstvo proizvoljne diskriminacije ili ograničenje koje bi moglo biti protivno zahtjevima iz druge rečenice članka 36.?
+6. Ako je istina da je, za razliku od zabrane koja vrijedi za posjedovanje i objavu, zabrana uvoza stvar upravne nadležnosti koju imaju carinski službenici koji su nadležni za pregled uvozne robe na graničnim prijelazima, može li ta činjenica ikako utjecati na odgovor na peto pitanje?”
+19 U tim pitanjima sud koji je uputio zahtjev uzima u obzir navode žalitelja koji se pozivaju na određene razlike između, s jedne strane, zabrane uvoza sporne robe, koja je apsolutna, i, s druge strane, zakonodavstva koje je na snazi u različitim konstitutivnim dijelovima Ujedinjene Kraljevine i manje je strogo u smislu da samo posjedovanje nećudorednih proizvoda u nekomercijalne svrhe nije kazneno djelo nigdje u Ujedinjenoj Kraljevini i da, iako je općenito zabranjena, trgovina takvim proizvodima podliježe određenim iznimkama, kao npr. kada se radi konkretno o proizvodima znanstvene, književne, umjetničke ili obrazovne vrijednosti.
+S obzirom na te razlike, postavlja se pitanje je li moguće da se druga rečenica članka 36. ne odnosi na zabranu uvoza.
+20 Prema drugoj rečenici članka 36., ograničenja uvoza iz prve rečenice ne smiju „biti sredstvo proizvoljne diskriminacije ili prikriveno ograničenje trgovine među državama članicama”.
+21 Kako bi se odgovorilo na postavljena pitanja, valja razmotriti svrhu odredbe kojom se želi spriječiti da se ograničenja trgovine opravdana razlozima iz prve rečenice članka 36. zloporabe i da se primjenjuju tako da uzrokuju diskriminaciju u pogledu proizvoda podrijetlom iz drugih država članica ili da neizravno štite određene domaće proizvode.
+Tu se ne radi o području primjene zabrane uvoza predmeta neprimjerene ili nećudoredne naravi koja je na snazi u Ujedinjenoj Kraljevini.
+Bez obzira na razlike među propisima koji su u tom području na snazi u različitim konstitutivnim dijelovima Ujedinjene Kraljevine te unatoč određenim iznimkama koje su ograničenoga dosega, svrha tih zakonodavstava kao cjeline je zabraniti ili barem ograničiti proizvodnju i stavljanje na tržište tiskovina ili proizvoda neprimjerene ili nećudoredne naravi.
+U tim je okolnostima dopustivo zaključiti da sve u svemu u Ujedinjenoj Kraljevini ne postoji zakonita trgovina takvom robom.
+Stoga se zabrana uvoza koja je u određenim aspektima stroža od nekih propisa koji se primjenjuju unutar Ujedinjene Kraljevine ne može smatrati mjerom osmišljenom kako bi se posredno zaštitio bilo koji domaći proizvod ili uspostavila proizvoljna diskriminacija među robom ove vrste ovisno o tome je li ona proizvedena na nacionalnom državnom području ili na području druge države članice.
+22 Stoga na četvrto pitanje valja odgovoriti da ako je zabrana uvoza robe opravdana razlozima javnog morala i ako je zbog toga uvedena, primjena te zabrane, ako u dotičnoj državi članici ne postoji zakonita trgovina tom istom robom, ne može biti sredstvo proizvoljne diskriminacije ili prikriveno ograničenje trgovine protivno članku 36.
+23 U tim okolnostima nije potrebno odgovoriti na peto i šesto pitanje.
+Sedmo pitanje
+24 Sedmim se pitanjem neovisno o prethodnim pitanjima pita može li država članica, s obzirom na odredbe članka 234. Ugovora, zakonito zabraniti uvoz takve robe iz drugih država članica pozivajući se na obveze koje proizlaze iz Ženevske konvencije o suzbijanju prometa nećudorednim tiskovinama iz 1923. i Svjetske poštanske konvencije (obnovljena u Lausannei 1974., stupila na snagu 1. siječnja 1976.).
+25 Prema članku 234., odredbe Ugovora ne utječu na prava i obveze koje proizlaze iz sporazuma koje su prije stupanja na snagu Ugovora sklopile jedna ili više država članica s jedne strane te jedna ili više trećih zemalja s druge strane.
+Međutim, u mjeri u kojoj ti sporazumi nisu usklađeni s Ugovorom, dotična država članica treba poduzeti sve odgovarajuće mjere radi otklanjanja utvrđenih neusklađenosti.
+26 Na temelju usporedbe prethodnih razmatranja s odredbama konvencija na koje se poziva sud koji je uputio zahtjev nije vjerojatno da će poštovanje tih međunarodnih konvencija od strane Ujedinjene Kraljevine biti protivno odredbama o slobodnom kretanju robe ako se pritom poštuje iznimka iz članka 36. o možebitnoj zabrani uvoza zbog razloga javnog morala.
+27 Stoga na sedmo pitanje valja odgovoriti da u mjeri u kojoj se država članica koristi rezervom koja je u pogledu zaštite javnog morala predviđena člankom 36. Ugovora, odredbe članka 234. ne sprečavaju je da ispuni obveze koje proizlaze iz Ženevske konvencije o suzbijanju prometa nećudorednim tiskovinama iz 1923. i Svjetske poštanske konvencije (obnovljena u Lausannei 1974., stupila na snagu 1. siječnja 1976.).
+28 Troškovi vlade Ujedinjene Kraljevine i Komisije, koje su podnijele očitovanja Sudu, ne nadoknađuju se.
+29 Budući da ovaj postupak ima značaj prethodnog pitanja za stranke glavnog postupka pred sudom koji je uputio zahtjev, na tom je sudu da odluči o troškovima postupka.
+Slijedom navedenog, SUD, odlučujući o pitanjima koja mu je rješenjem od 22. veljače 1979. postavio sud koji je uputio zahtjev, odlučuje:
+1. Zakon države članice kojim se zabranjuje svaki uvoz pornografskih proizvoda u tu državu jest količinsko ograničenje uvoza u smislu članka 30. Ugovora.
+2. Prvu rečenicu članka 36. treba tumačiti tako da država članica načelno smije zakonito zabraniti uvoz proizvoda neprimjerene ili nećudoredne naravi u smislu unutarnjih propisa iz bilo koje druge države članice i da se takve zabrane smiju legitimno primjenjivati na čitavom njezinom državnom području čak i ako u tom području postoje razlike među propisima koji su na snazi u različitim konstitutivnim dijelovima dotične države članice.
+3. Ako je zabrana uvoza robe opravdana razlozima javnog morala i ako je zbog toga uvedena, primjena te zabrane, ako u dotičnoj državi članici ne postoji zakonita trgovina tom istom robom, ne može biti sredstvo proizvoljne diskriminacije ili prikriveno ograničenje trgovine protivno članku 36.
+4. U mjeri u kojoj se država članica koristi rezervom koja je u pogledu zaštite javnog morala predviđena člankom 36. Ugovora, odredbe članka 234. ne sprečavaju tu državu da ispuni obveze koje proizlaze iz Ženevske konvencije o suzbijanju prometa nećudorednim tiskovinama iz 1923. i Svjetske poštanske konvencije (obnovljena u Lausannei 1974., stupila na snagu 1. siječnja 1976.).

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+IN JOINED CASES 35 AND 36/82
+REFERENCE TO THE COURT UNDER ARTICLE 177 OF THE EEC TREATY BY THE HOGE RAAD DER NEDERLANDEN (SUPREME COURT OF THE NETHERLANDS) FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING IN THE INTERLOCUTORY PROCEEDINGS PENDING BEFORE THAT COURT BETWEEN ELESTINA ESSELINA CHRISTINA MORSON AND
+(1) THE STATE OF THE NETHERLANDS,
+(2)THE HEAD OF THE PLAATSELIJKE POLITIE (LOCAL POLICE) WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE VREEMDELINGENWET (ALIENS LAW) AND BETWEEN SEWRADJIE JHANJAN
+AND THE STATE OF THE NETHERLANDS ON THE INTERPRETATION OF THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 177 OF THE EEC TREATY AND ARTICLE 10 OF REGULATION (EEC) NO 1612/68 OF THE COUNCIL OF 15 OCTOBER 1968 ON FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR WORKERS WITHIN THE COMMUNITY (OFFICIAL JOURNAL, ENGLISH SPECIAL EDITION 1968 (ii), P. 475),
+1 BY JUDGMENTS DATED 15 JANUARY 1982 WHICH WERE RECEIVED AT THE COURT ON 21 JANUARY 1982 THE HOGE RAAD DER NEDERLANDEN (SUPREME COURT OF THE NETHERLANDS) REFERRED TO THE COURT FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING UNDER ARTICLE 177 OF THE EEC TREATY TWO QUESTIONS, WHICH ARE THE SAME IN BOTH JOINED CASES, AS TO THE INTERPRETATION OF, FIRST, THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 177 OF THE EEC TREATY AND, SECONDLY, ARTICLE 10 OF REGULATION (EEC) NO 1612/68 OF THE COUNCIL OF 15 OCTOBER 1968 ON FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR WORKERS WITHIN THE COMMUNITY (OFFICIAL JOURNAL, ENGLISH SPECIAL EDITION 1968 (ii), P. 475).
+2 THE APPLICANTS IN THE MAIN PROCEEDINGS, MRS MORSON AND MRS JHANJAN, WHO ARE NATIONALS OF SURINAME, APPLIED FOR PERMISSION TO RESIDE IN THE NETHERLANDS IN ORDER TO TAKE UP RESIDENCE WITH THEIR DAUGHTER AND SON RESPECTIVELY, WHO ARE NETHERLANDS NATIONALS OF WHOM THEY ARE DEPENDANTS.
+ACCORDING TO THE PAPERS BEFORE THE COURT THE DAUGHTER AND SON HOLD EMPLOYMENT IN THE NETHERLANDS BUT HAVE NEVER BEEN EMPLOYED IN ANOTHER MEMBER STATE.
+THEIR APPLICATIONS WERE REFUSED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR JUSTICE WHEREUPON MRS MORSON AND MRS JHANJAN LODGED WITH HIM REQUESTS FOR REVIEW.
+3 AS A GENERAL RULE UNDER NETHERLANDS LEGISLATION ON ALIENS SUCH APPLICATIONS FOR REVIEW SUSPEND DEPORTATION ORDERS.
+HOWEVER, THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR JUSTICE MAY REFUSE TO GIVE SUCH APPLICATIONS SUSPENSORY EFFECT IN WHICH CASE AN INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATION MAY BE MADE TO THE COURT OR JUDGE ORDINARILY HAVING JURISDICTION.
+THE RELEVANT INTERLOCUTORY PROCEEDINGS ARE GOVERNED BY ARTICLES 289 TO 297 OF THE WETBOEK VAN BURGERLIJKE RECHTSVORDERING (NETHERLANDS CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE), ARTICLE 292 OF WHICH PROVIDES THAT ''PROVISIONALLY ENFORCEABLE DECISIONS SHALL BE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE MAIN PROCEEDINGs''.
+4 IN THIS CASE THE APPLICANTS IN THE MAIN PROCEEDINGS SOUGHT AN INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTION RESTRAINING THE NETHERLANDS STATE FROM DEPORTING THEM AT LEAST UNTIL THEIR APPLICATION FOR REVIEW HAD BEEN DECIDED AT THE HIGHEST INSTANCE.
+THEY RELIED ON ARTICLE 10 (1) OF RGULATION NO 1612/68, CITED ABOVE, WHICH GIVES CERTAIN MEMBERS OF A WORKER's FAMILY, INCLUDING DEPENDENT RELATIVES IN THE ASCENDING LINE, THE RIGHT TO INSTALL THEMSELVES WITH THE WORKER IF HE IS A NATIONAL OF ONE MEMBER STATE AND EMPLOYED WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF ANOTHER MEMBER STATE.
+THEY ALSO RELIED ON THE PROHIBITION OF DISCRIMINATION EMBODIED IN ARTICLES 7 AND 48 OF THE EEC TREATY.
+5 THE HOGE RAAD, WITH WHICH MRS MORSON AND MRS JHANJAN LODGED APPEALS ON A POINT OF LAW IN THE INTERLOCUTORY PROCEEDINGS, CONSIDERED THAT THE DECISION TO BE GIVEN DEPENDED ON THE INTERPRETATION OF PROVISIONS OF COMMUNITY LAW AND SUBMITTED THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING:
+''1. ON AN APPLICATION FOR AN INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTION, IS THE HOGE RAAD OBLIGED, PURSUANT TO THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 177 OF THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, WHEN A QUESTION OF INTERPRETATION WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF THAT ARTICLE IS RAISED IN AN APPEAL ON A POINT OF LAW, TO REFER THE MATTER TO THE COURT OF JUSTICE FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING, HAVING REGARD TO THE FACT THAT A JUDGMENT OF THE HOGE RAAD DELIVERED ON AN APPLICATION FOR AN INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTION IS NOT BINDING ON A COURT WHICH LATER HAS TO DEAL WITH THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CASE.
+IF THIS QUESTION CANNOT BE ANSWERED GENERALLY IN THE NEGATIVE OR AFFIRMATIVE, WHAT ARE THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH DETERMINE WHETHER SUCH AN OBLIGATION SHOULD BE DEEMED TO EXIST?
+2. DOES ARTICLE 10 OF REGULATION (EEC) NO 1612/68 OF THE COUNCIL OF 15 OCTOBER 1968 ON FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR WORKERS WITHIN THE COMMUNITY, WHETHER OR NOT IN CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER PROVISIONS OF COMMUNITY LAW, PREVENT A MEMBER STATE FROM REFUSING TO ADMIT A RELATIVE MENTIONED IN ARTICLE 10 (1) OF THE REGULATION, OF A WORKER EMPLOYED WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF THAT MEMBER STATE, WHERE THE RELATIVE WISHES TO TAKE UP RESIDENCE THERE WITH THAT WORKER, IF THE WORKER HAS THE NATIONALITY OF THE STATE IN WHICH HE WORKS AND THE RELATIVE HAS ANOTHER NATIONALITY?''
+FIRST QUESTION
+6 IN SUBSTANCE THE FIRST QUESTION SEEKS TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 177 OF THE EEC TREATY MUST BE CONSTRUED AS MEANING THAT A COURT OR TRIBUNAL OF A MEMBER STATE AGAINST WHOSE DECISIONS THERE IS NO JUDICIAL REMEDY UNDER NATIONAL LAW MUST REFER TO THE COURT A QUESTION OF INTERPRETATION AS REFERRED TO IN THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF THAT ARTICLE IF THE QUESTION IS RAISED IN INTERLOCUTORY PROCEEDINGS AND THE DECISION TO BE GIVEN IS NOT BINDING ON THE COURT OR TRIBUNAL WHICH LATER HAS TO DEAL WITH THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CASE EVEN IF THAT COURT OR TRIBUNAL BELONGS TO A DIFFERENT JURISDICTIONAL SYSTEM.
+7 THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 177 PROVIDES THAT A COURT OR TRIBUNAL OF A MEMBER STATE BEFORE WHICH IS RAISED A QUESTION OF INTERPRETATION OR VALIDITY AS MENTIONED IN THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF THAT ARTICLE MAY REQUEST THE COURT TO GIVE A PRELIMINARY RULING ON THE QUESTION IF IT CONSIDERS THAT A DECISION THEREON IS NECESSARY TO ENABLE IT TO GIVE JUDGMENT.
+HOWEVER, THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 177 PROVIDES THAT WHERE ANY SUCH QUESTION IS RAISED BEFORE A NATIONAL COURT OR TRIBUNAL AGAINST WHOSE DECISIONS THERE IS NO JUDICIAL REMEDY UNDER NATIONAL LAW THAT COURT OR TRIBUNAL MUST BRING THE MATTER BEFORE THE COURT.
+8 AS THE COURT HAS ALREADY HELD IN ITS JUDGMENT OF 24 MAY 1977 IN CASE 107/76 HOFFMANN-LA ROCHE (1977) ECR 957, THE PURPOSE OF ARTICLE 177 IS TO ENSURE THAT COMMUNITY LAW IS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED IN A UNIFORM MANNER IN ALL THE MEMBER STATES.
+VIEWED IN THAT LIGHT THE PARTICULAR PURPOSE OF THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 177 IS TO PREVENT A BODY OF NATIONAL CASE-LAW THAT IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE RULES OF COMMUNITY LAW FROM COMING INTO EXISTENCE IN ANY MEMBER STATE.
+THE REQUIREMENTS ARISING FROM THAT PURPOSE ARE OBSERVED AS REGARDS SUMMARY AND URGENT PROCEEDINGS SUCH AS THOSE IN THE PRESENT CASE, WHERE ORDINARY PROCEEDINGS AS TO THE SUBSTANCE, PERMITTING THE RE-EXAMINATION OF ANY QUESTION OF COMMUNITY LAW PROVISIONALLY DECIDED IN THE SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS, MUST BE INSTITUTED EITHER IN ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES OR WHEN THE UNSUCCESSFUL PARTY SO REQUIRES.
+9 THEREFORE THE SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE UNDERLYING THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 177 IS PRESERVED IF THE OBLIGATION TO REFER PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS TO THE COURT APPLIES WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF PROCEEDINGS AS TO THE SUBSTANCE EVEN IF THAT ACTION IS TRIED BEFORE THE COURTS OR TRIBUNALS BELONGING TO A JURISDICTIONAL SYSTEM DIFFERENT FROM THAT UNDER WHICH THE INTERLOCUTORY PROCEEDINGS ARE CONDUCTED, PROVIDED THAT IT IS STILL POSSIBLE TO REFER TO THE COURT UNDER ARTICLE 177 ANY QUESTIONS OF COMMUNITY LAW WHICH ARE RAISED.
+10 THE ANSWER TO THE FIRST QUESTION SUBMITTED BY THE HOGE RAAD MUST THEREFORE BE THAT THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 177 OF THE EEC TREATY MUST BE INTERPRETED AS MEANING THAT A NATIONAL COURT OR TRIBUNAL AGAINST WHOSE DECISIONS THERE IS NO JUDICIAL REMEDY UNDER NATIONAL LAW IS NOT REQUIRED TO REFER TO THE COURT A QUESTION OF INTERPRETATION AS REFERRED TO IN THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF THAT ARTICLE IF THE QUESTION IS RAISED IN INTERLOCUTORY PROCEEDINGS AND THE DECISION TO BE TAKEN IS NOT BINDING ON THE COURT OR TRIBUNAL WHICH LATER HAS TO DEAL WITH THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CASE, PROVIDED THAT EACH OF THE PARTIES IS ENTITLED TO INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS OR TO REQUIRE PROCEEDINGS TO BE INSTITUTED ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CASE EVEN BEFORE THE COURTS OR TRIBUNALS OF ANOTHER JURISDICTIONAL SYSTEM AND THAT DURING SUCH PROCEEDINGS ANY QUESTION OF COMMUNITY LAW PROVISIONALLY DECIDED IN THE SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS MAY BE RE-EXAMINED AND BE THE SUBJECT OF A REFERENCE TO THE COURT UNDER ARTICLE 177.
+SECOND QUESTION
+11 IN SUBSTANCE THE SECOND QUESTION SEEKS TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER, AND IF SO IN WHICH CIRCUMSTANCES, COMMUNITY LAW PROHIBITS A MEMBER STATE FROM REFUSING TO ALLOW A RELATIVE, AS REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 10 OF REGULATION NO 1612/68 CITED ABOVE, OF A WORKER EMPLOYED WITHIN THAT MEMBER STATE's TERRITORY TO ENTER OR RESIDE WITHIN ITS TERRITORY IF THE WORKER HAS THE NATIONALITY OF THAT STATE AND THE RELATIVE THE NATIONALITY OF A NON-MEMBER COUNTRY.
+12 ARTICLE 48 OF THE TREATY PROVIDES THAT FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OF WORKERS WITHIN THE COMMUNITY IS TO ENTAIL THE ABOLITION OF ANY DISCRIMINATION BASED ON NATIONALITY BETWEEN WORKERS OF THE MEMBER STATES.
+ARTICLE 10 OF REGULATION NO 1612/68 OF THE COUNCIL OF 15 OCTOBER 1968 ON FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR WORKERS WITHIN THE COMMUNITY, CITED ABOVE, PROVIDES THAT SPECIFIED MEMBERS OF A WORKER's FAMILY, INCLUDING DEPENDENT RELATIVES IN THE ASCENDING LINE, ''sHALL, IRRESPECTIVE OF THEIR NATIONALITY, HAVE THE RIGHT TO INSTALL THEMSELVES WITH A WORKER WHO IS A NATIONAL OF ONE MEMBER STATE AND WHO IS EMPLOYED IN THE TERRITORY OF ANOTHER MEMBER STATE''.
+13 SINCE THAT PROVISION DOES NOT COVER THE POSITION OF DEPENDENT RELATIVES OF A WORKER WHO IS A NATIONAL OF THE MEMBER STATE WITHIN WHOSE TERRITORY HE IS EMPLOYED, THE ANSWER TO THE PRELIMINARY QUESTION DEPENDS ON WHETHER IT MAY BE INFERRED FROM THE CONTEXT OF THE PROVISIONS AND THE PLACE WHICH THEY OCCUPY IN THE COMMUNITY LEGAL SYSTEM AS A WHOLE THAT THEY HAVE A RIGHT OF ENTRY AND RESIDENCE.
+14 IN THIS REGARD THE APPLICANTS IN THE MAIN PROCEEDINGS RELY ON THE RULE PROHIBITING DISCRIMINATION ON GROUNDS OF NATIONALITY WHICH ARTICLE 7 OF THE TREATY ENUNCIATES IN GENERAL TERMS AND TO WHICH ARTICLE 48 GIVES MORE SPECIFIC EXPRESSION.
+15 IT IS HOWEVER CLEAR THAT ARTICLE 7 AND ARTICLE 48 MAY BE INVOKED ONLY WHERE THE CASE IN QUESTION COMES WITHIN THE AREA TO WHICH COMMUNITY LAW APPLIES, WHICH IN THIS CASE IS THAT CONCERNED WITH FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OF WORKERS WITHIN THE COMMUNITY.
+NOT ONLY DOES THAT CONCLUSION EMERGE FROM THE WORDING OF THOSE ARTICLES, BUT IT ALSO ACCORDS WITH THEIR PURPOSE, WHICH IS TO ASSIST IN THE ABOLITION OF ALL OBSTACLES TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMMON MARKET IN WHICH THE NATIONALS OF THE MEMBER STATES MAY MOVE FREELY WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF THOSE STATES IN ORDER TO PURSUE THEIR ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES.
+16 IT FOLLOWS THAT THE TREATY PROVISIONS ON FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR WORKERS AND THE RULES ADOPTED TO IMPLEMENT THEM CANNOT BE APPLIED TO CASES WHICH HAVE NO FACTOR LINKING THEM WITH ANY OF THE SITUATIONS GOVERNED BY COMMUNITY LAW.
+17 SUCH IS UNDOUBTEDLY THE CASE WITH WORKERS WHO HAVE NEVER EXERCISED THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WITHIN THE COMMUNITY.
+18 THE ANSWER TO THE SECOND QUESTION SUBMITTED BY THE HOGE RAAD MUST THEREFORE BE THAT COMMUNITY LAW DOES NOT PROHIBIT A MEMBER STATE FROM REFUSING TO ALLOW A RELATIVE, AS REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 10 OF REGULATIONS NO 1612/68 OF THE COUNCIL OF 15 OCTOBER 1968 ON FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR WORKERS WITHIN THE COMMUNITY, OF A WORKER EMPLOYED WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF THAT STATE WHO HAS NEVER EXERCISED THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WITHIN THE COMMUNITY TO ENTER OR RESIDE WITHIN ITS TERRITORY IF THAT WORKER HAS THE NATIONALITY OF THAT STATE AND THE RELATIVE THE NATIONALITY OF A NON-MEMBER COUNTRY.
+19 THE COSTS INCURRED BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED KINGDOM AND BY THE COMMISSION, WHICH HAVE SUBMITTED OBSERVATIONS TO THE COURT, ARE NOT RECOVERABLE.
+AS THESE PROCEEDINGS ARE, IN SO FAR AS THE PARTIES TO THE MAIN ACTION ARE CONCERNED, IN THE NATURE OF A STEP IN THE ACTION PENDING BEFORE THE NATIONAL COURT, THE DECISION ON COSTS IS A MATTER FOR THAT COURT.
+ON THOSE GROUNDS, THE COURT, IN ANSWER TO THE QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO IT BY THE HOGE RAAD DER NEDERLANDEN BY JUDGMENTS OF 15 JANUARY 1982, HEREBY RULES:
+1. THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 177 OF THE EEC TREATY MUST BE INTERPRETED AS MEANING THAT A NATIONAL COURT OR TRIBUNAL AGAINST WHOSE DECISIONS THERE IS NO JUDICIAL REMEDY UNDER NATIONAL LAW IS NOT REQUIRED TO REFER TO THE COURT A QUESTION OF INTERPRETATION AS REFERRED TO IN THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF THAT ARTICLE IF THE QUESTION IS RAISED IN INTERLOCUTORY PROCEEDINGS AND THE DECISION TO BE TAKEN IS NOT BINDING ON THE COURT OR TRIBUNAL WHICH LATER HAS TO DEAL WITH THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CASE, PROVIDED THAT EACH OF THE PARTIES IS ENTITLED TO INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS OR TO REQUIRE PROCEEDINGS TO BE INSTITUTED ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CASE EVEN BEFORE THE COURTS OR TRIBUNALS OF ANOTHER JURISDICTIONAL SYSTEM AND THAT DURING SUCH PROCEEDINGS ANY QUESTION OF COMMUNITY LAW PROVISIONALLY DECIDED IN THE SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS MAY BE RE-EXAMINED AND BE THE SUBJECT OF A REFERENCE TO THE COURT UNDER ARTICLE 177.
+2. COMMUNITY LAW DOES NOT PROHIBIT A MEMBER STATE FROM REFUSING TO ALLOW A RELATIVE, AS REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 10 OF REGULATION NO 1612/68 OF THE COUNCIL OF 15 OCTOBER 1968 ON FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR WORKERS WITHIN THE COMMUNITY, OF A WORKER EMPLOYED WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF THAT STATE WHO HAS NEVER EXERCISED THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WITHIN THE COMMUNITY TO ENTER OR RESIDE WITHIN ITS TERRITORY IF THAT WORKER HAS THE NATIONALITY OF THAT STATE AND THE RELATIVE THE NATIONALITY OF A NON-MEMBER COUNTRY.

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+U spojenim predmetima 35 i 36/82,
+povodom zahtjeva za prethodnu odluku na temelju članka 177. Ugovora o EEZ-u, koji je uputio Hoge Raad der Nederlanden (Vrhovni sud Nizozemske) u postupku privremene pravne zaštite koji se vodi pred tim sudom između Elestina Esselina Christina Morson i
+1. Staat der Nederlanden,
+2. Hoofd van de Plaatselijke Politie in de zin van de Vreemdelingenwet (šefa lokalne policije u smislu nizozemskog zakona o strancima),
+i između Sewradjie Jhanjan i Staat der Nederlanden, o tumačenju članka 177. trećeg stavka Ugovora o EEZ-u kao i članka 10. Uredbe Vijeća br. 1612/68 od 15. listopada 1968. o slobodi kretanja radnika unutar Zajednice (SL L 257 str. 2.), SUD, u sastavu: J. Mertens de Wilmars, predsjednik, A. O ' Keeffe i U. Everling, predsjednici vijeća, P. Pescatore, Mackenzie Stuart, G. Bosco i T. Koopmans, suci, nezavisni odvjetnik: Sir Gordon Slynn, tajnik: H. A. Rühl, glavni administrator, donosi sljedeću: Presudu
+1 Rješenjima od 15. siječnja 1982. koja je Sud zaprimio 21. siječnja 1982. Hoge Raad der Nederlanden (Vrhovni sud Nizozemske) uputio je, na temelju članka 177. Ugovora o EEZ-u dva prethodna pitanja, istovjetna u dva spojena predmeta, o tumačenju, s jedne strane, članka 177. trećeg stavka Ugovora i, s druge strane, članka 10. Uredbe Vijeća br. 1612/68 od 15. listopada 1968. o slobodi kretanja radnika unutar Zajednice (SL L 257 str. 2.).
+2 Tužiteljice u glavnom postupku E. E. C. Morson i S. Jhanjan, surinamske državljanke, u Nizozemskoj su zatražile dozvolu boravka kako bi boravile kod kćeri odnosno sinova koji su nizozemski državljani i koji bi ih uzdržavali.
+Iz spisa proizlazi da su potonji zaposleni u Nizozemskoj, ali da nikada nisu bili zaposleni u nekoj drugoj državi članici.
+Budući da je državni tajnik za pravosuđe odbio njihove zahtjeve, E. E. C. Morson i S. Jhanjan uputile su državnom tajniku za pravosuđe prijedloge za ponavljanje postupka.
+3 Na temelju nizozemskog zakona o strancima takvi prijedlozi za ponavljanje postupka uobičajeno odgađaju izvršenje naloga za protjerivanje.
+Državni tajnik za pravosuđe može ipak odbiti priznavanje učinka odgode, ali u tom slučaju nadležnom se sucu treba uputiti zahtjev za privremenu pravnu pomoć.
+Postupak za privremenu pravnu pomoć uređen je člancima 289. do 297. Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering (nizozemski zakon o parničnom postupku). Članak 292. tog zakona propisuje da „privremeno izvršive odluke ne dovode u pitanje glavni postupak”.
+4 U ovom slučaju tužiteljice u glavnom postupku u zahtjevu za privremenu pravnu pomoć zatražile su da se Staat der Nederlandenu (Nizozemska Država) zabrani da ih se protjera barem dok se u zadnjem stupnju ne odluči o njihovim prijedlozima za ponavljanje postupka.
+U tu svrhu pozvale su se na članak 10. stavak 1. navedene Uredbe br. 1621/68 koji određenim članovima obitelji radnika, uključujući njegove srodnike u uzlaznoj liniji, koji je državljanin neke države članice, a radi na području druge države članice, daje pravo nastaniti se kod tog radnika.
+One su se također pozvale na zabranu diskriminacije iz članaka 7. i 48. Ugovora.
+5 Smatrajući da odluka koja se treba donijeti ovisi o tumačenju odredaba prava Zajednice, Hoge Raad (Vrhovni sud) pred kojim se u kasacijskom postupku odlučuje o zahtjevima za privremenu pravnu pomoć uputio je sljedeća prethodna pitanja:
+„1. Uzimajući u obzir da odluka Hoge Raada (Vrhovni sud) u postupku privremene pravne zaštite ne obvezuje suca pred kojim će se kasnije pokrenuti postupak o meritumu, je li Hoge Raad (Vrhovni sud) dužan, na temelju članka 177. trećeg stavka Ugovora o osnivanju Europske ekonomske zajednice, uputiti Sudu zahtjev za prethodnu odluku u slučaju kada se pitanje o tumačenju u smislu prvog stavka tog članka postavlja u kasacijskom postupku?
+Ako na to pitanje općenito nije moguće odgovoriti ni potvrdno ni niječno, o kojim okolnostima ovisi postojanje te obveze?
+2. Je li članku 10. Uredbe Vijeća br. 1612/68 o slobodi kretanja radnika unutar Zajednice, sâmom po sebi ili u vezi s drugim odredbama prava Zajednice, protivno da država članica nekom od članova obitelji radnika koji je zaposlen na njezinom državnom području, a koji su navedeni u članku 10. stavku 1. te uredbe, odbije pravo da se nastane kod tog radnika, kada potonji ima državljanstvo države na čijem državnom području radi, a dotični član obitelji ima drugo državljanstvo?”
+Prvo pitanje
+6 Prvim se pitanjem u biti pita treba li se članak 177. treći stavak Ugovora tumačiti tako da je nacionalni sud protiv čijih odluka prema nacionalnom pravu ne postoji pravni lijek dužan Sudu uputiti pitanje o tumačenju u smislu prvog stavka tog članka kada se pitanje javi u postupku za privremenu pravnu pomoć i kada odluka koja se donosi ne obvezuje sud pred kojim se kasnije pokreće postupak o meritumu, čak i ako taj sud pripada drugom pravosudnom sustavu.
+7 Na temelju članka 177. drugog stavka, ako se pred sudom države članice pojavi pitanje o tumačenju ili valjanosti u smislu prvog stavka tog članka, taj sud može, ako smatra da je odluka o tom pitanju potrebna da bi mogao donijeti presudu, zatražiti od Suda da o tome odluči.
+Međutim, na temelju članka 177. trećeg stavka, ako se takvo pitanje pojavi u predmetu koji je u tijeku pred nacionalnim sudom protiv čijih odluka prema nacionalnom pravu nema pravnog lijeka, taj je sud dužan uputiti to pitanje Sudu.
+8 Kako je to Sud već utvrdio u presudi od 24. svibnja 1977. (Hoffmann-Laroche, predmet 107/76, Zb., str. 957.) člankom 177. želi se osigurati da se pravo Zajednice u svim državama članicama jednako tumači i primjenjuje.
+U tom smislu njegov treći stavak ima osobito za cilj spriječiti da se u bilo kojoj državi članici uspostavi nacionalna sudska praksa koja nije u skladu s pravilima prava Zajednice.
+Obvezni zahtjevi koje treba ispuniti zbog takve svrhe poštuju se u skraćenim i hitnim postupcima, a takav je ovdje slučaj, ako mogućnost ponovnog razmatranja svakog pitanja prava Zajednice o kojem je privremeno odlučeno u skraćenom postupku postoji u redovnom postupku o meritumu koji se pokreće u svakom slučaju ili na zahtjev stranke koja nije uspjela u postupku.
+9 Stoga je specifični cilj iz članka 177. trećeg stavka osiguran ako se obveza upućivanja prethodnih pitanja Sudu primjenjuje u okviru postupka o meritumu pa iako se on odvija pred sudovima iz pravosudnog sustava drukčijeg od onog u kojem se odvija postupak privremene pravne pomoći, uz uvjet da postoji mogućnost, na temelju članka 177., upućivanja Sudu pitanja prava Zajednice koja se pojave.
+10 Stoga na prvo pitanje koje je uputio Hoge Raad (Vrhovni sud) valja odgovoriti da se članak 177. treći stavak Ugovora treba tumačiti tako da nacionalni sud protiv čijih odluka prema nacionalnom pravu ne postoji pravni lijek nije dužan Sudu uputiti pitanje o tumačenju u smislu prvog stavka tog članka kada se pitanje javi u postupku za privremenu pravnu pomoć i kada odluka koja se donosi ne obvezuje sud pred kojim se kasnije pokreće postupak o meritumu, uz uvjet da svaka stranka može pokrenuti ili zahtijevati pokretanje postupka o meritumu čak i pred sudovima iz drugog pravosudnog sustava, tijekom kojeg se svako pitanje prava Zajednice o kojem je privremeno odlučeno u skraćenom postupku može ponovno razmatrati i uputiti Sudu na temelju članka 177.
+Drugo pitanje
+11 Drugim se pitanjem u biti pita zabranjuje li pravo Zajednice državi članici, ako je takav slučaj, i u kojim okolnostima, da odbije ulazak ili boravak na njezinom državnom području članu obitelji, u smislu članka 10. navedene Uredbe br. 1612/68, radnika koji je zaposlen na državnom području te države, kada taj radnik ima državljanstvo te države, a dotični član obitelji ima državljanstvo treće zemlje.
+12 Na temelju članka 48. Ugovora, sloboda kretanja radnika unutar Zajednice podrazumijeva ukidanje svake diskriminacije na temelju državljanstva među radnicima iz država članica.
+Na temelju članka 10. navedene Uredbe Vijeća br. 1612/68 od 15. listopada 1968. o slobodi kretanja radnika unutar Zajednice određeni članovi obitelji radnika, među kojima i srodnici u uzlaznoj liniji koji su uzdržavanici, bez obzira na njihovo državljanstvo, imaju pravo nastaniti se kod radnika državljanina neke države članice koji je zaposlen na državnom području druge države članice.
+13 Budući da tekst navedene uredbe ne obuhvaća članove obitelji koji su uzdržavanici radnika državljanina države članice na čijem je državnom području zaposlen, odgovor na prethodno pitanje ovisi o tomu može li se o njihovom pravu ulaska i boravka zaključiti iz konteksta propisa i njihovog mjesta u cijelom sustavu prava Zajednice.
+14 U tom pogledu tužiteljice u glavnom postupku pozivaju se na načelo nediskriminacije na temelju državljanstva, načelo koje je općenito navedeno u članku 7. Ugovora i koje je specifično izraženo u članku 48. Ugovora.
+15 Ipak, očito je da se na navedene odredbe može pozvati samo ako dotična situacija potpada pod područje primjene prava Zajednice, to jest u ovom slučaju pod područje slobode kretanja radnika unutar Zajednice.
+Taj zaključak proizlazi ne samo iz teksta tih članaka, on je također u skladu s njihovim ciljem koji teži doprinijeti uklanjanju svih prepreka uspostavi zajedničkog tržišta na kojemu se državljani država članica mogu slobodno kretati na državnom području država članica radi obavljanja svojih gospodarskih djelatnosti.
+16 Iz toga proizlazi da se odredbe Ugovora i propisi doneseni za njihovu provedbu u području slobode kretanja radnika ne mogu primijeniti na situacije koje nisu povezane s bilo kojom situacijom uređenom pravom Zajednice.
+17 Takav je svakako slučaj radnika koji nikad nisu ostvarili pravo slobode kretanja unutar Zajednice.
+18 Stoga na drugo pitanje koje je uputio Hoge Raad (Vrhovni sud) valja odgovoriti da pravo Zajednice državi članici ne zabranjuje odbijanje ulaska ili boravka na njezinom državnom području članu obitelji, u smislu članka 10. Uredbe Vijeća br. 1612/68 od 15. listopada 1968. o slobodi kretanja radnika unutar Zajednice, radnika koji je zaposlen na državnom području te države i koji nikada nije ostvario pravo slobode kretanja unutar Zajednice, ako taj radnik ima državljanstvo te države, a član obitelji ima državljanstvo treće zemlje.
+19 Troškovi nizozemske i britanske vlade te Komisije, koje su podnijele očitovanja Sudu, ne nadoknađuju se.
+Budući da ovaj postupak ima značaj prethodnog pitanja za stranke glavnog postupka pred sudom koji je uputio zahtjev, na tom je sudu da odluči o troškovima postupka.
+Slijedom navedenoga, Sud, o pitanjima koja mu je rješenjima od 15. siječnja 1982. uputio Hoge Raad der Nederlanden (Vrhovni sud), odlučuje:
+1. Članak 177. treći stavak Ugovora treba se tumačiti tako da nacionalni sud protiv čijih odluka prema nacionalnom pravu ne postoji pravni lijek nije dužan Sudu uputiti pitanje o tumačenju u smislu prvog stavka tog članka kada se pitanje javi u postupku za privremenu pravnu pomoć i kada odluka koja se donosi ne obvezuje sud pred kojim će se kasnije pokrenuti postupak o meritumu, uz uvjet da svaka stranka može pokrenuti ili zahtijevati pokretanje postupka o meritumu čak i pred sudovima iz drugog pravosudnog sustava, tijekom kojeg se svako pitanje prava Zajednice o kojem je privremeno odlučeno u skraćenom postupku može ponovno razmatrati i uputiti Sudu na temelju članka 177.
+2. Pravo Zajednice državi članici ne zabranjuje odbijanje ulaska ili boravka na njezinom državnom području članu obitelji, u smislu članka 10. Uredbe Vijeća br. 1612/68 od 15. listopada 1968. o slobodi kretanja radnika unutar Zajednice, radnika koji je zaposlen na državnom području te države i koji nikada nije ostvario pravo na slobodu kretanja unutar Zajednice, ako taj radnik ima državljanstvo te države, a član obitelji ima državljanstvo treće zemlje.

data/principle-mvep-justice-court/mvep-116-en.aligned.txt

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+IN CASE 84/82
+FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, REPRESENTED BY MARTIN SEIDEL, MINISTERIALRAT IN THE BUNDESMINISTERIUM FUR WIRTSCHAFT (FEDERAL MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS), ASSISTED BY PROFESSOR GERHARD FELS, ACTING AS AGENTS, WITH AN ADDRESS FOR SERVICE IN LUXEMBOURG AT THE EMBASSY OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, APPLICANT, V
+COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, REPRESENTED BY MARIE-JOSE JONCZY AND GOTZ ZUR HAUSEN, MEMBERS OF ITS LEGAL DEPARTMENT, ACTING AS AGENTS, WITH AN ADDRESS FOR SERVICE IN LUXEMBOURG AT THE OFFICE OF ORESTE MONTALTO, A MEMBER OF THE LEGAL DEPARTMENT OF THE COMMISSION, JEAN MONNET BUILDING,
+DEFENDANT,
+APPLICATION FOR (i) THE ANNULMENT OF THE AUTHORIZATION, LIMITED TO A PERIOD OF ONE YEAR, GIVEN BY THE COMMISSION ALLEGEDLY IN BREACH OF ARTICLE 92 (1) AND (3) (c) AND THE SECOND SENTENCE OF ARTICLE 93 (3) OF THE EEC TREATY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF BELGIUM, ALLOWING IT TO IMPLEMENT THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN FOR RESTRUCTURING THE BELGIAN TEXTILE AND CLOTHING INDUSTRY, AND (ii) A DECLARATION THAT THE COMMISSION, IN BREACH OF THE SECOND SENTENCE OF ARTICLE 93 (3) AND ARTICLE 93 (2) OF THE TREATY, HAS WRONGFULLY FAILED TO ACT,
+1 BY AN APPLICATION LODGED ON 9 MARCH 1982 THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY CLAIMED THAT THE COURT SHOULD:
+(i) PURSUANT TO THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 173 OF THE EEC TREATY, DECLARE THE AUTHORIZATION, LIMITED TO A PERIOD OF ONE YEAR, GIVEN ON 18 NOVEMBER 1981 BY THE COMMISSION TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF BELGIUM TO IMPLEMENT THE PLAN FOR RESTRUCTURING THE BELGIAN TEXTILE AND CLOTHING INDUSTRY SUBMITTED TO THE COMMISSION ON 28 JULY 1980 TO BE VOID ON THE GROUND THAT IT INFRINGES THE SECOND SENTENCE OF ARTICLE 93 (3) AND ARTICLE 92 (1) AND (3) (c) OF THE TREATY;
+(ii) IN THE ALTERNATIVE, DECLARE, PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 175 OF THE TREATY, THAT THE COMMISSION HAS INFRINGED ARTICLE 92 (1) AND (3) AND THE SECOND SENTENCE OF ARTICLE 93 (3) OF THE TREATY BY FAILING TO INITIATE THE MAIN REVIEW PROCEDURE REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 93 (2) AND BY FAILING TO ADOPT A FORMAL DECISION DECLARING THE BELGIAN PLAN INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE COMMON MARKET.
+2 BY LETTERS DATED 22 JULY AND 11 AUGUST 1980 THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT NOTIFIED THE COMMISSION OF THE GENERAL OUTLINE OF A PLAN FOR RESTRUCTURING THE BELGIAN TEXTILE AND CLOTHING INDUSTRY.
+THE COMMISSION TREATED THAT PLAN AS HAVING BEEN NOTIFIED PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 93 (3) OF THE TREATY AND BY A LETTER DATED 15 SEPTEMBER 1980 REQUESTED THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT TO SUPPLY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, WHICH IT RECEIVED ONLY AT THE BEGINNING OF 1981.
+3 IT IS APPARENT FROM THE DOCUMENTS BEFORE THE COURT THAT THE PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF THE PLAN IN QUESTION GAVE RISE TO MUCH CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE COMMISSION AND THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT WHICH LED TO THE DRAFTING OF A NEW PLAN ON 5 AUGUST 1981.
+BY A LETTER OF 18 NOVEMBER 1981, ADDRESSED TO THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT, THE COMMISSION STATED THAT IT DID NOT OBJECT TO IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESTRUCTURING PLAN FOR ONE YEAR, SUBJECT TO OBSERVANCE OF THE LIMITS AND CONDITIONS LAID DOWN BY IT AND ACCEPTED BY THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT.
+4 IT IS NOT DENIED THAT THE CONTESTED DECISION WAS TAKEN AFTER THE OTHER MEMBER STATES HAD BEEN CONSULTED IN MULTILATERAL MEETINGS HELD PERIODICALLY AND DEVOTED TO ALL THE CASES PENDING.
+WITHIN THAT FRAMEWORK THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT HAD REQUESTED THE COMMISSION NOT TO AUTHORIZE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN ON THE GROUND THAT ITS SOLE EFFECT WOULD BE TO UNLOAD THE PROBLEMS OF THE BELGIAN INDUSTRY ONTO THE CORRESPONDING INDUSTRY OF THE OTHER MEMBER STATES.
+THE CLAIM FOR A DECLARATION THAT THE COMMISSION DECISION OF 18 NOVEMBER 1981 IS VOID
+5 IN SUPPORT OF ITS CLAIM FOR A DECLARATION THAT THE DECISION IS VOID THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY MAKES TWO SUBMISSIONS, NAMELY THAT THE PROCEDURAL RULES LAID DOWN IN ARTICLE 93 (2) AND (3) OF THE TREATY FOR THE REVIEW OF AIDS WERE INFRINGED AND THAT THE BELGIAN RESTRUCTURING PLAN IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE COMMON MARKET.
+INFRINGEMENT OF THE PROCEDURAL RULES
+6 IN THE VIEW OF THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT, THE COMMISSION WAS BOUND TO INITIATE THE PROCEDURE FOR THE REVIEW OF AID REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 93 (2) OF THE TREATY AND COULD NOT, AS IT DID, CONFINE ITSELF TO THE PRELIMINARY STAGE OF REVIEW PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE 93 (3).
+7 IN SUPPORT OF THAT SUBMISSION THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT CONTENDS THAT THE VARIOUS STEPS IN THE PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION CONDUCTED BY THE COMMISSION AND THE TERMS OF ITS DECLARATION OF 18 NOVEMBER 1981 SHOW THAT IT ENTERTAINED DOUBTS ABOUT THE COMPATIBILITY OF THE SCHEME IN QUESTION WITH THE COMMON MARKET.
+IN DISREGARDING THE OBLIGATION LAID DOWN IN SUCH A CASE BY THE SECOND SENTENCE OF ARTICLE 93 (3) OF THE TREATY TO INITIATE THE PROCEDURE REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 93 (2) THE COMMISSION CONFUSED THE OBJECT AND NATURE OF THE TWO STAGES OF THE PROCEDURE FOR REVIEWING AID, EXCESSIVELY EXTENDED THE PERIOD FOR THE INVESTIGATION WHICH IT COULD UNDERTAKE IN THE PRELIMINARY STAGE AND FAILED TO FULFIL ITS OBLIGATION UNDER ARTICLE 93 (2) TO CONSULT THE OTHER MEMBER STATES AND THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SECTORS CONCERNED.
+8 THE COMMISSION ARGUES AS FOLLOWS: ACCORDING TO ARTICLE 93 (3), IT IS NECESSARY TO INITIATE THE MAIN STAGE OF THE PROCEDURE ONLY IF AT THE END OF THE PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION THE PLAN NOTIFIED IS CONSIDERED INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE COMMON MARKET.
+HOWEVER, THE PERIOD WITHIN WHICH IT IS REQUIRED TO CARRY OUT THAT EXAMINATION BEGINS TO RUN ONLY FROM THE TIME WHEN IT IS IN A POSITION TO FORM A VIEW ON THE PLAN NOTIFIED, THAT IS TO SAY AFTER IT HAS OBTAINED NECESSARY SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION AND ESTABLISHED APPROPRIATE CONTACTS WITH THE MEMBER STATE CONCERNED CAPABLE, PERHAPS, OF LEADING TO THE PREPARATION OF AN AMENDED AID SCHEME.
+HOWEVER, THE AFORESAID PERIOD BEGINS TO RUN FROM NOTIFICATION OF THE PLAN IF THE COMMISSION MAINTAINS SILENCE.
+9 ARTICLE 93 (3) OF THE TREATY PROVIDES:
+''THE COMMISSION SHALL BE INFORMED, IN SUFFICIENT TIME TO ENABLE IT TO SUBMIT ITS COMMENTS, OF ANY PLANS TO GRANT OR ALTER AID.
+IF IT CONSIDERS THAT ANY SUCH PLAN IS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH THE COMMON MARKET HAVING REGARD TO ARTICLE 92, IT SHALL WITHOUT DELAY INITIATE THE PROCEDURE PROVIDED FOR IN PARAGRAPH 2.
+THE MEMBER STATE CONCERNED SHALL NOT PUT ITS PROPOSED MEASURES INTO EFFECT UNTIL THIS PROCEDURE HAS RESULTED IN A FINAL DECISION. ''
+10 IN THE ABSENCE OF THE IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS WHICH ARTICLE 94 OF THE TREATY EMPOWERS THE COUNCIL TO ADOPT, THE COURT HAS ALREADY HAD OCCASION TO EXPLAIN THE OBJECT AND SCOPE OF ARTICLE 93 (3).
+11 THUS IN JUDGMENTS OF 11 DECEMBER 1973 (CASE 120/73, LORENZ V GERMANY, (1973) ECR 1471; CASE 121/73, MARKMANN V GERMANY, (1973) ECR 1495; CASE 122/73, NORDSEE V GERMANY, (1973) ECR 1511; AND CASE 141/73 LOHREY V GERMANY, (1973) ECR 1527) THE COURT RECOGNIZED THAT THE PRELIMINARY STAGE OF THE PROCEDURE FOR REVIEWING AIDS UNDER ARTICLE 93 (3) IS INTENDED MERELY TO ALLOW THE COMMISSION TO FORM A PRIMA FACIE OPINION ON THE PARTIAL OR COMPLETE CONFORMITY WITH THE TREATY OF THE AID SCHEMES NOTIFIED TO IT.
+THE PURPOSE OF THAT PROVISION, WHICH SEEKS TO PREVENT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AID CONTRARY TO THE TREATY, REQUIRES THAT THE PROHIBITION LAID DOWN IN THAT RESPECT BY THE LAST SENTENCE OF ARTICLE 93 (3) SHOULD BE EFFECTIVE DURING THE WHOLE OF THE PRELIMINARY STAGE.
+THEREFORE THE COMMISSION MUST ACT WITH DUE EXPEDITION IN ORDER TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE INTEREST OF THE MEMBER STATES IN OBTAINING CLARIFICATION IN CASES IN WHICH THERE MAY BE AN URGENT NEED TO TAKE ACTION; OTHERWISE, AFTER THE EXPIRY OF AN APPROPRIATE PERIOD, WHICH THE COURT SET AT TWO MONTHS, THE MEMBER STATE CONCERNED MAY IMPLEMENT THE MEASURES IN QUESTION AFTER GIVING THE COMMISSION PRIOR NOTICE THEREOF.
+12 ACCORDING TO THOSE SAME JUDGMENTS, THE COMMISSION MUST INFORM THE MEMBER STATE CONCERNED IF, AFTER THE PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION, IT COMES TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE SYSTEM OF AID NOTIFIED IS COMPATIBLE WITH THE TREATY.
+IF, AFTER NOTIFICATION OF A POSITIVE DECISION BY THE COMMISSION, THE AID IN QUESTION IS IMPLEMENTED IT BECOMES AS AN ''EXISTING AID'' AND AS SUCH IS SUBJECT TO THE CONSTANT REVIEW PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE 93 (1).
+IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE COMMISSION CONSIDERS THAT THE AID IS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH THE COMMON MARKET IT MUST WITHOUT DELAY INITIATE THE PROCEDURE PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE 93 (2), WHICH INVOLVES THE OBLIGATION TO GIVE THE PARTIES CONCERNED NOTICE TO SUBMIT THEIR COMMENTS.
+13 THE ARGUMENTS PUT FORWARD IN THE PRESENT CASE BY THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT LEAD THE COURT TO ADD THAT ONE OF THE MAIN CHARACTERISTICS DISTINGUISHING THE EXAMINATION UNDER ARTICLE 93 (2) FROM THE PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION UNDER ARTICLE 93 (3) RESIDES IN THE FACT THAT THE COMMISSION IS UNDER NO OBLIGATION AT THE PRELIMINARY STAGE TO GIVE NOTICE TO THE PARTIES CONCERNED TO SUBMIT THEIR COMMENTS.
+HOWEVER, SUCH A PROCEDURE, WHICH GUARANTEES THE OTHER MEMBER STATES AND THE SECTORS CONCERNED AN OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE THEIR VIEWS KNOWN AND ALLOWS THE COMMISSION TO BE FULLY INFORMED OF ALL THE FACTS OF THE CASE BEFORE TAKING ITS DECISION, IS ESSENTIAL WHENEVER THE COMMISSION HAS SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES IN DETERMINING WHETHER A PLAN TO GRANT AID IS COMPATIBLE WITH THE COMMON MARKET.
+IT FOLLOWS THAT THE COMMISSION MAY RESTRICT ITSELF TO THE PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION UNDER ARTICLE 93 (3) WHEN TAKING A DECISION IN FAVOUR OF A PLAN TO GRANT AID ONLY IF IT IS CONVINCED AFTER THE PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION THAT THE PLAN IS COMPATIBLE WITH THE TREATY.
+IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE INITIAL EXAMINATION LEADS THE COMMISSION TO THE OPPOSITE CONCLUSION OR IF IT DOES NOT ENABLE IT TO OVERCOME ALL THE DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED IN DETERMINING WHETHER THE PLAN IS COMPATIBLE WITH THE COMMON MARKET, THE COMMISSION IS UNDER A DUTY TO OBTAIN ALL THE REQUISITE OPINIONS AND FOR THAT PURPOSE TO INITIATE THE PROCEDURE PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE 93 (2).
+14 THE APPLICATION OF THOSE PRINCIPLES TO THE FACTS OF THE PRESENT CASE LEADS TO THE CONCLUSION THAT, IN THE FIRST PLACE, THE COMMISSION WAS NOT ABLE TO ACCEPT THE BELGIAN PLAN AS NOTIFIED TO IT AND WAS LED TO ENTER INTO EXTENSIVE BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT AIMED AT MAKING SUBSTANTIAL AMENDMENTS TO THE ORIGINAL PLAN IN ORDER TO MAKE IT COMPATIBLE WITH THE COMMON MARKET.
+THUS THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT AGREED INTER ALIA TO AMEND ALL THE RULES GOVERNING THE FINANCING OF ITS PLAN, NOT TO ALLOW THE BENEFICIARIES OF THE PLAN TO RECEIVE ANY OTHER FORM OF AID, TO EXCLUDE CERTAIN BRANCHES OF THE BELGIAN TEXTILE AND CLOTHING INDUSTRY FROM ITS SCOPE AND TO GIVE PRIOR NOTICE TO THE COMMISSION OF ANY MEASURES OF AID CONTEMPLATED IN FAVOUR OF UNDERTAKINGS BELONGING TO CERTAIN OTHER BRANCHES, A LIST OF WHICH WAS DRAWN UP BY COMMON AGREEMENT.
+15 IN THE SECOND PLACE, IT MUST BE POINTED OUT THAT BY REASON OF THOSE VERY NEGOTIATIONS 16 MONTHS ELAPSED BETWEEN NOTIFICATION OF THE PLAN AND THE FAVOURABLE DECISION OF THE COMMISSION; THAT WELL EXCEEDS THE PERIOD NORMALLY REQUIRED FOR A PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION UNDER ARTICLE 93 (3).
+16 FINALLY, IT MUST BE OBSERVED THAT ALTHOUGH THE COMMISSION ULTIMATELY AGREED TO RECOGNIZE THE AMENDED BELGIAN PLAN AS COMPATIBLE WITH THE COMMON MARKET, SUBJECT TO COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS LAID DOWN, IT DID NOT CONSIDER THAT ALL THE DIFFICULTIES RAISED BY THE CASE HAD BEEN RESOLVED.
+IN THE CONTESTED DECISION OF 18 NOVEMBER 1981 THE COMMISSION STATED THAT DESPITE THE IMPORTANT AMENDMENTS MADE TO THE ORIGINAL PLAN IT ''REMAINS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE EFFECTS WHICH APPLICATION OF THE PLAN MAY HAVE ON COMPETITION WITHIN THE COMMUNITY'' AND THEREFORE RESTRICTED THE DURATION OF ITS APPLICATION TO A SINGLE YEAR.
+17 THE VARIOUS FACTORS REFERRED TO ABOVE LEAD TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE COMMISSION ENCOUNTERED SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES IN CONSIDERING WHETHER THE PLAN FOR RESTRUCTURING THE BELGIAN TEXTILE AND CLOTHING INDUSTRY NOTIFIED TO IT ON 28 JULY AND 11 AUGUST 1980 WAS COMPATIBLE WITH THE TREATY.
+THE COMMISSION WAS THEREFORE UNDER AN OBLIGATION TO INITIATE THE CONSULTATION PROCEDURE PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE 93 (2) BEFORE TAKING ITS DECISION.
+18 ALTHOUGH IT IS TRUE THAT THE COMMISSION KEPT THE OTHER MEMBER STATES INFORMED THROUGH MULTILATERAL MEETINGS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT, IT IS CLEAR FROM THE ARGUMENT BEFORE THE COURT THAT THOSE CONSULTATIONS DID NOT OFFER THOSE CONCERNED OR THE COMMISSION ITSELF THE SAME GUARANTEES AND ADVANTAGES WHICH THE FORMAL CONSULTATIONS PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE 93 (2) OFFER.
+19 IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING IT MUST BE RECOGNIZED THAT THE COMMISSION's DECISION OF 18 NOVEMBER 1981 INFRINGED AN ESSENTIAL PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENT AND MUST BE DECLARED VOID ON THAT GROUND WITHOUT ITS BEING NECESSARY TO CONSIDER THE OTHER SUBMISSION PLEADED IN THE APPLICATION.
+THE ALTERNATIVE CLAIM FOR A DECLARATION THAT THE COMMISSION WRONGFULLY FAILED TO ACT
+20 IT MUST BE OBSERVED THAT THE ALTERNATIVE CLAIM WAS MADE IN VIEW OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE COURT MIGHT DECLARE THE CONTESTED DECISION OF 18 NOVEMBER 1981 VOID FOR INFRINGEMENT OF PROCEDURAL RULES WITHOUT RULING ON THE SUBMISSION THAT THE BELGIAN RESTRUCTURING PLAN IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE COMMON MARKET.
+SINCE THAT IS PRECISELY WHAT HAS HAPPENED IT IS NECESSARY TO GIVE A RULING ON THAT CLAIM IN SPITE OF THE DECLARATION THAT THE CONTESTED DECISION IS VOID.
+21 THE COMMISSION CONSIDERS THAT THE CLAIM IS INADMISSIBLE SINCE THE CONDITIONS LAID DOWN BY ARTICLE 175 OF THE TREATY ARE NOT SATISFIED.
+22 THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT POINTS OUT THAT AT A MEETING ON 4 DECEMBER 1981 BETWEEN THE GERMAN FEDERAL MINISTER FOR THE ECONOMY AND THE MEMBER OF THE COMMISSION RESPONSIBLE FOR COMPETITION MATTERS IT INFORMED THE LATTER THAT IT EXPECTED THE BELGIAN PLAN FOR RESTRUCTURING TO BE DECLARED INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE COMMON MARKET; IT ALSO CONTENDS THAT THE LETTER OF 7 JANUARY 1982 WITH WHICH THE COMMISSION FORWARDED TO THE OTHER MEMBER STATES A COPY OF THE LETTER SENT ON 18 NOVEMBER 1981 TO THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT CANNOT BE REGARDED AS A DEFINITION OF ITS POSITION WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 175 OF THE TREATY.
+23 THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 175 PROVIDES THAT AN ACTION FOR FAILURE TO ACT ''sHALL BE ADMISSIBLE ONLY IF THE INSTITUTION CONCERNED HAS FIRST BEEN CALLED UPON TO ACT''.
+ALTHOUGH IT IS APPARENT FROM THE DOCUMENTS BEFORE THE COURT THAT THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT THE BELGIAN PLAN WAS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE COMMON MARKET, IT DID NOT EXPRESSLY CALL UPON THE COMMISSION TO ACT.
+THE FIRST CONDITION REQUIRED BY ARTICLE 175 IS THEREFORE NOT SATISFIED.
+24 ACCORDINGLY, THE ALTERNATIVE CLAIM FOR A DECLARATION THAT THE COMMISSION WRONGFULLY FAILED TO ACT IS INADMISSIBLE AND MUST BE DISMISSED.
+25 PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 69 (2) OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE, THE UNSUCCESSFUL PARTY IS TO BE ORDERED TO PAY THE COSTS.
+26 SINCE THE DEFENDANT HAS BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL IT MUST BE ORDERED TO PAY THE COSTS.
+ON THOSE GROUNDS, THE COURT HEREBY:
+1. DECLARES VOID THE COMMISSION DECISION OF 18 NOVEMBER 1981;
+2. DISMISSES THE REMAINING CLAIMS IN THE ACTION BROUGHT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY;
+3. ORDERS THE COMMISSION TO PAY THE COSTS.

data/principle-mvep-justice-court/mvep-116-hr.aligned.txt

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+U predmetu 84/82,
+SAVEZNA REPUBLIKA NJEMAČKA, koju zastupa Martin Seidel, Ministerialrat u Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft (Savezno ministarstvo gospodarstva, Njemačka), uz asistenciju profesora Gerharda Felsa, u svojstvu agenata, s izabranom adresom za dostavu u Luxembourgu, kod tajnika Veleposlanstva Savezne Republike Njemačke,
+tužitelj, protiv KOMISIJE EUROPSKIH ZAJEDNICA, koju zastupaju Marie-Josée Jonczy i Götz zur Hausen, zaposleni u njezinoj pravnoj službi, u svojstvu agenata, s izabranom adresom za dostavu u Luxembourgu, kod Orestea Montalta, člana pravne službe Komisije, zgrada Jean Monnet,
+tuženika,
+povodom tužbe, s jedne strane za poništenje odobrenja, ograničenog na razdoblje od jedne godine, koje je protivno članku 92. stavku 1. i stavku 3. točki (c) te članku 93. stavku 3. drugoj rečenici Ugovora Komisija dala vladi Kraljevine Belgije za provedbu petogodišnjeg plana restrukturiranja belgijske tekstilne i odjevne industrije i s druge strane za utvrđenje povrede, od strane Komisije, članka 93. stavka 3. druge rečenice i članka 93. stavka 2. Ugovora, SUD,
+donosi sljedeću Presudu 1 Tužbom podnesenom 9. ožujka 1982. vlada Savezne Republike Njemačke zahtijeva od Suda:
+1. da na temelju prvog stavka članka 173. Ugovora poništi odobrenje, ograničeno na razdoblje od jedne godine, koje je 18. studenoga 1981. Komisija dala vladi Kraljevine Belgije za provedbu plana restrukturiranja belgijske tekstilne i odjevne industrije, koji je Komisiji predan 28. srpnja 1980., zbog povrede članka 93. stavka 3. druge rečenice te članka 92. stavka 1. i stavka 3. točke (c) Ugovora;
+2. podredno, da na temelju članka 175. Ugovora utvrdi da je Komisija povrijedila članak 92. stavke 1. i 3. te članak 93. stavak 3. drugu rečenicu Ugovora jer, kao prvo, nije pokrenula postupak pravne zaštite iz članka 93. stavka 2. i, kao drugo, nije formalnom odlukom proglasila belgijski plan nespojivim sa zajedničkim tržištem.
+2 U dopisima od 28. srpnja i 11. kolovoza 1980. belgijska je vlada obavijestila Komisiju o glavnim crtama plana za restrukturiranje belgijske tekstilne i odjevne industrije.
+Razmatrajući taj plan potpore, o kojem je bila obaviještena u smislu članka 93. stavka 3. Ugovora, Komisija je dopisom od 15. rujna 1980. od belgijske vlade zatražila dostavu dodatnih informacija, koje je primila tek početkom 1981. godine.
+3 Iz spisa proizlazi da je preliminarno preispitivanje predmetnog plana potpore rezultiralo opsežnom korespondencijom između Komisije i belgijske vlade, što je 5. kolovoza 1981. dovelo do izrade novog plana potpore.
+U dopisu od 18. studenoga 1981. upućenom belgijskoj vladi Komisija je navela da se ne protivi provedbi plana restrukturiranja tijekom jedne godine, uz pridržavanje ograničenja i uvjeta koje je Komisija utvrdila, a belgijska vlada prihvatila.
+4 Nije sporno da je pobijana odluka donesena nakon konzultacija s drugim državama članicama na multilateralnim sastancima koji su se održavali periodički i koji su bili posvećeni nizu otvorenih pitanja.
+Tom je prilikom njemačka vlada zatražila od Komisije da ne odobri provedbu tog plana potpora, čiji bi jedini učinak bio probleme belgijske industrije prebaciti na odgovarajuću industriju drugih država članica.
+Glavni tužbeni zahtjev kojim se traži poništenje odluke Komisije od 18. studenoga 1981.
+5 U prilog svojem glavnom tužbenom zahtjevu kojim se traži poništenje, vlada Savezne Republike Njemačke ističe dva tužbena razloga, to jest, kao prvo, povredu pravila postupka preispitivanja potpora koja su utvrđena u članku 93. stavcima 2. i 3. Ugovora i, kao drugo, nespojivost belgijskog plana restrukturiranja sa zajedničkim tržištem.
+Povreda pravila postupka
+6 Prema mišljenju njemačke vlade, Komisija je morala pokrenuti kontradiktornu fazu postupka preispitivanja potpore iz članka 93. stavka 2. Ugovora, a ne, kako je učinila, ograničiti se na preliminarno preispitivanje predviđeno člankom 93. stavkom 3.
+7 U prilog tom tužbenom razlogu njemačka vlada ističe da različite faze preliminarnog preispitivanja koje je provela Komisija i tekst njezine izjave od 18. studenoga 1981. pokazuju da je ta institucija dvojila o spojivosti predmetnog sustava potpora sa zajedničkim tržištem.
+Ne poštujući obvezu pokretanja kontradiktorne faze postupka iz članka 93. stavka 2. Ugovora, koja je u tom slučaju utvrđena u članku 93. stavku 3. drugoj rečenici, Komisija je zamijenila cilj i karakteristike dviju faza postupka preispitivanja potpore, previše produljila razdoblje provjere koju je mogla obaviti u preliminarnoj fazi te nije ispunila svoju obvezu iz članka 93. stavka 2., u pogledu savjetovanja s drugim državama članicama i zainteresiranim gospodarskim i socijalnim sektorima u Zajednici.
+8 Komisija smatra da je u skladu s člankom 93. stavkom 3. nužno pokrenuti kontradiktorni postupak samo ako se po završetku preliminarnog ispitivanja smatra da je plan o kojem je obaviještena nespojiv sa zajedničkim tržištem.
+Međutim, rok u kojem je potrebno provesti to ispitivanje počinje teći tek od trenutka kad je Komisija u poziciji iznijeti stav o planu potpore o kojemu je obaviještena, odnosno nakon što dobije potrebne dodatne informacije i uspostavi korisne kontakte s dotičnom državom članicom, što prema potrebi može dovesti do izrade izmijenjenog programa potpora.
+Međutim, ako se Komisija ne očituje, navedeno razdoblje počinje teći od trenutka obavijesti o planu potpore.
+9 Valja podsjetiti da članak 93. stavak 3. Ugovora navodi:
+„Komisija se pravodobno obavješćuje o svim planovima za dodjelu ili izmjenu potpora kako bi se o njima mogla očitovati.
+Ako smatra da je svaki takav plan nespojiv sa zajedničkim tržištem s obzirom na članak 92., Komisija bez odgode pokreće postupak predviđen stavkom 2.
+Dotična država članica ne primjenjuje predložene mjere sve dok se taj postupak ne okonča konačnom odlukom.”
+10 U nedostatku uredbi za primjenu tih odredaba koje, prema članku 94. Ugovora, donosi Vijeće, Sud je već imao priliku objasniti svrhu i područje primjene članka 93. stavka 3.
+11 Stoga je Sud u presudama od 11. prosinca 1973. (Lorenz, 120/73, Zb. 1973, str. 1471.; Markmann, 121/73, Zb. 1979, str. 1495.; Nordsee, 122/73, Zb. 1973, str. 1511.; Lohrey, 141/73, Zb. 1973, str. 1527.) prihvatio da je svrha prethodnog preispitivanja potpore, propisanog člankom 93. stavkom 3., tek omogućiti Komisiji da stekne prvi dojam o djelomičnoj ili potpunoj spojivosti s Ugovorom programâ potpore o kojima je obaviještena.
+Svrha takve odredbe, kojom se želi spriječiti provedba potpora koje su protivne Ugovoru, podrazumijeva da zabrana koja je u tom pogledu propisana zadnjom rečenicom članka 93. stavka 3. bude na snazi tijekom cijele prethodne faze.
+Komisija stoga mora postupati s dužnom pažnjom kako bi u obzir uzela interes država članica da budu žurno informirane u područjima u kojima može postojati hitna potreba za djelovanjem. U protivnom, nakon isteka razumnog roka, za koji je Sud odredio da je dva mjeseca, dotična država članica može provoditi predmetne mjere ako o njima prethodno obavijesti Komisiju.
+12 U skladu s istom sudskom praksom, ako se nakon preliminarnog preispitivanja Komisija uvjeri da je sustav potpora o kojemu je obaviještena spojiv s Ugovorom, ona o tome mora obavijestiti dotičnu državu članicu.
+Ako se nakon obavijesti o pozitivnoj odluci Komisije predmetna potpora provede, ona postaje „zatečena potpora” te kao takva podliježe neprestanom nadzoru predviđenom člankom 93. stavkom 1.
+S druge strane, ako Komisija smatra da dotični sustav potpora nije spojiv sa zajedničkim tržištem, dužna je bez odlaganja pokrenuti fazu preispitivanja predviđenu člankom 93. stavkom 2., koja sadržava obvezu da odnosne stranke pozove da podnesu svoje primjedbe.
+13 Argumenti koje je u ovom slučaju iznijela njemačka vlada naveli su Sud da pojasni, između ostalog, da je jedna od glavnih značajki koja fazu preispitivanja iz članka 93. stavka 2. razlikuje od preliminarnog preispitivanja iz članka 93. stavka 3. to što Komisija u preliminarnoj fazi nije obvezna prije nego donese odluku odnosne stranke pozvati da podnesu primjedbe.
+No takav postupak, koji drugim državama članicama i zainteresiranim skupinama jamči priliku da se izjasne o svojim stavovima i koji Komisiji omogućuje potpunu informiranost o svim činjenicama predmeta prije donošenja odluke, ključan je kad god Komisija ima ozbiljnih poteškoća pri ocjeni je li plan potpore spojiv sa zajedničkim tržištem.
+To znači da se Komisija može ograničiti na fazu preliminarnog preispitivanja iz članka 93. stavka 3. kada donosi odluku u prilog plana potpore samo ako je nakon preliminarnog preispitivanja uvjerena da je taj plan spojiv s Ugovorom.
+Ako, s druge strane, preliminarnog preispitivanje Komisiju dovede do suprotnog zaključka ili ako joj ne pomogne u rješavanju svih poteškoća pri ocjeni je li plan spojiv sa zajedničkim tržištem, Komisija ima obvezu pribaviti sva potrebna mišljenja te u tu svrhu pokrenuti postupak predviđen člankom 93. stavkom 2.
+14 Primjena tih načela na činjenice ovog predmeta vodi do zaključka da Komisija, kao prvo, nije mogla prihvatiti belgijski plan u obliku u kojemu je o njemu bila obaviještena te je morala sudjelovati u opsežnim bilateralnim pregovorima s belgijskom vladom, čiji je cilj bio uvođenje znatnih izmjena u prvotni plan kako bi on postao spojiv sa zajedničkim tržištem.
+Stoga je belgijska vlada među ostalim pristala izmijeniti sva pravila kojima se uređuje financiranje njezina plana, zabraniti korisnicima tog plana korištenje bilo kojeg drugog oblika potpore, isključiti iz njegovog područja primjene određene grane belgijske tekstilne i odjevne industrije te prethodno obavijestiti Komisiju o svim mjerama potpore predviđenim u korist poduzeća koja pripadaju drugim granama, čiji je popis sastavljen sporazumno.
+15 Drugo, valja istaknuti da je upravo zbog tih pregovora između obavijesti o planu i povoljne odluke Komisije proteklo 16 mjeseci, što uvelike prelazi razdoblje koje je uobičajeno potrebno za preliminarno preispitivanje u skladu s člankom 93. stavkom 3.
+16 Konačno, treba napomenuti da iako se Komisija u konačnici složila prihvatiti da je izmijenjeni belgijski plan spojiv sa zajedničkim tržištem ako se pridržava utvrđenih uvjeta, ona nije smatrala da su riješene sve poteškoće ovog predmeta.
+U spornoj odluci od 18. studenoga 1981. Komisija je navela da je, unatoč važnim izmjenama unesenima u prvotni plan, „i dalje vrlo zabrinuta zbog učinaka koje provedba plana može imati na tržišno natjecanje u zajednici” te je stoga ograničila trajanje njegove primjene na jednu godinu.
+17 Različiti gore navedeni čimbenici vode do zaključka da je Komisija naišla na brojne poteškoće pri razmatranju je li plan restrukturiranja belgijske tekstilne i odjevne industrije, o kojemu je obaviještena 28. srpnja i 11. kolovoza 1980., spojiv s Ugovorom.
+Komisija je stoga prije donošenja odluke bila obvezna pokrenuti postupak konzultacija predviđen člankom 93. stavkom 2.
+18 Iako je točno da je Komisija na multilateralnim sastancima informirala druge države članice o pregovorima s belgijskom vladom, iz rasprava vođenih pred Sudom proizlazi da se tim konzultacijama zainteresiranim stranama ili samoj Komisiji nisu ponudila jednaka jamstva i jednake prednosti koje nude formalne konzultacije predviđene člankom 93. stavkom 2.
+19 Uzimajući u obzir prethodno navedeno, valja priznati da je odlukom Komisije od 18. studenoga 1981. došlo do bitne povrede postupka te se ona zbog toga mora poništiti, a da pritom nije neophodno razmotriti drugi tužbeni razlog.
+Podredni tužbeni zahtjev iz tužbe zbog propusta
+20 Valja napomenuti da je podredni tužbeni zahtjev podnesen jer postoji mogućnost da bi Sud spornu odluku od 18. studenoga 1981. mogao poništiti zbog povrede pravila postupka bez donošenja odluke o tužbenom zahtjevu na temelju nespojivosti belgijskog plana restrukturiranja sa zajedničkim tržištem.
+Budući da se ta pretpostavka ostvarila, valja odlučiti o tom tužbenom zahtjevu unatoč poništenju pobijane odluke.
+21 Komisija smatra da je tužba nedopuštena budući da nisu zadovoljeni uvjeti koji su u tom pogledu propisani člankom 175. Ugovora.
+22 Njemačka vlada ističe da je, s jedne strane, na sastanku između njemačkoga saveznog ministra gospodarstva i člana Komisije nadležnog za pitanja tržišnog natjecanja, održanom 4. prosinca 1981., potonjega obavijestila da se očekuje da se belgijski plan restrukturiranja proglasi nespojivim sa zajedničkim tržištem i, s druge strane, da se dopis od 7. siječnja 1982., kojim je Komisija svim državama članicama proslijedila dopis poslan belgijskoj vladi 18. studenoga 1981., ne može smatrati stajalištem u smislu članka 175. Ugovora.
+23 Drugim stavkom članka 175. predviđeno je da pokretanje postupka zbog propusta „dopušteno je samo ako je dotična institucija prethodno bila pozvana da djeluje”.
+Iz spisa proizlazi da iako je iskazala svoje mišljenje o tome da je belgijski plan nespojiv sa zajedničkim tržištem, njemačka vlada nije izričito pozvala Komisiju da djeluje.
+Stoga nije zadovoljen prvi uvjet iz članka 175.
+24 Zbog toga valja priznati da je podredni tužbeni zahtjev zbog propusta nedopušten te ga je potrebno odbiti.
+25 U skladu s člankom 69. stavkom 2. Poslovnika, stranka koja ne uspije u postupku snosi troškove.
+25 Budući da tuženik nije uspio u postupku, valja mu naložiti snošenje troškova.
+Slijedom navedenog, Sud proglašava i presuđuje:
+1. Poništava se odluka Komisije od 18. studenoga 1981.
+2. Tužbeni zahtjevi vlade Savezne Republike Njemačke u preostalom dijelu odbijaju se.
+3. Komisiji se nalaže snošenje troškova.

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+IN CASE 107/82
+ALLGEMEINE ELEKTRICITATS-GESELLSCHAFT AEG-TELEFUNKEN AG, FRANKFURT AM MAIN, REPRESENTED BY MARTIN HIRSCH AND FRITZ OESTERLE, OF THE FIRM OF RECHTSANWALTE GLEISS, LUTZ, HOOTZ, HIRSCH AND PARTNERS, STUTTGART, WITH AN ADDRESS FOR SERVICE IN LUXEMBOURG AT THE CHAMBERS OF ERNEST ARENDT, 34 B RUE PHILIPPE-II, APPLICANT, V
+COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, REPRESENTED BY CHRISTOPH BAIL AND GOTZ ZUR HAUZEN, MEMBERS OF ITS LEGAL DEPARTMENT, ACTING AS AGENTS, WITH AN ADDRESS FOR SERVICE IN LUXEMBOURG AT THE OFFICE OF ORESTE MONTALTO, A MEMBER OF ITS LEGAL DEPARTMENT, JEAN MONNET BUILDING, KIRCHBERG,
+DEFENDANT,
+APPLICATION FOR A DECLARATION THAT COMMISSION DECISION NO 82/267/EEC OF 6 JANUARY 1982 RELATING TO A PROCEEDING UNDER ARTICLE 85 OF THE EEC TREATY (IV/28.748 - AEG-TELEFUNKEN; OFFICIAL JOURNAL, L 117, P. 15) IS VOID,
+1 BY APPLICATION LODGED AT THE COURT REGISTRY ON 24 MARCH 1982 ALLGEMEINE ELEKTRICITATS-GESELLSCHAFT AEG-TELEFUNKEN AG (HEREINAFTER REFERRED TO As ''AEG''), FRANKFURT AM MAIN, BROUGHT AN ACTION UNDER THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 173 OF THE EEC TREATY FOR A DECLARATION THAT COMMISSION DECISION NO 82/267/EEC OF 6 JANUARY 1982 RELATING TO A PROCEEDING UNDER ARTICLE 85 OF THE EEC TREATY (IV/28.748 - AEG-TELEFUNKEN) WAS VOID.
+2 THE APPLICANT, A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY INCORPORATED UNDER GERMAN LAW, IS ENGAGED, INTER ALIA, IN DEVELOPING, MANUFACTURING AND MARKETING CONSUMER ELECTRONIC PRODUCTS (TELEVISION SETS, RADIOS, TAPE-RECORDERS, RECORD-PLAYERS AND AUDIO-VISUAL EQUIPMENT).
+SINCE 1970 THOSE PRODUCTS HAVE BEEN MANUFACTURED AND MARKETED BY TELEFUNKEN FERNSEH- UND RUNDFUNK-GMBH (HEREINAFTER REFERRED TO As ''TFR''), A SUBSIDIARY OF AEG, WHICH SINCE 1 JUNE 1979 HAS BEEN AN INDEPENDENT DIVISION OF AEG.
+THE MARKETING OF TELEFUNKEN PRODUCTS IS CARRIED OUT IN GERMANY BY AEG SALES OFFICES OR BRANCHES AND IN THE OTHER MEMBER STATES OF THE COMMUNITY BY AEG SUBSIDIARIES RESPONSIBLE IN EACH OF THE COUNTRIES FOR MARKETING ACTIVITIES, THAT IS, AS FAR AS THIS CASE IS CONCERNED, AEG-TELEFUNKEN FRANCE (HEREINAFTER REFERRED TO As ''ATF'') IN FRANCE AND AEG-TELEFUNKEN BELGE (HEREINAFTER REFERRED TO As ''ATBG'') IN BELGIUM.
+3 FOR THE MARKETING IN THE COMMON MARKET OF A NUMBER OF TELEFUNKEN PRODUCTS COMING UNDER A SO-CALLED ''FIVE-POINT'' PROGRAMME, WHICH COVERS THE ABOVE-MENTIONED CONSUMER ELECTRONIC PRODUCTS, AEG NOTIFIED THE COMMISSION ON 6 NOVEMBER 1973 OF A SYSTEM OF SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION FOR TELEFUNKEN BRAND PRODUCTS (VERTRIEBSBINDUNG FUR TELEFUNKEN-MARKENWAREN) BASED ON STANDARD AGREEMENTS (EG-VERPFLICHTUNGSSCHEINE) CONCLUDED WITH QUALIFIED RE-SELLERS AT VARIOUS STAGES OF MARKETING.
+AT THE REQUEST OF THE COMMISSION AEG SUBSEQUENTLY MADE CERTAIN AMENDMENTS TO THE SYSTEM.
+BY LETTER OF 17 MAY 1976 THE DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR COMPETITION INFORMED AEG THAT HE SAW NO OBJECTION TO THE USE OF THE VERSION OF THE STANDARD SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION AGREEMENT NOTIFIED ON 16 MARCH 1976 FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF ARTICLE 85 (1) OF THE EEC TREATY.
+4 AS TIME PASSED THE COMMISSION, WHICH HAD RECEIVED NUMEROUS COMPLAINTS WITH REGARD TO AEG FROM TRADERS IN THE CONSUMER ELECTRONICS SECTOR, GAINED THE IMPRESSION THAT THE ACTUAL APPLICATION OF THE SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM BY AEG AND ITS SUBSIDIARIES DID NOT CORRESPOND TO THE SCHEME NOTIFIED TO IT.
+CONSEQUENTLY ON 26 AND 27 JUNE 1979 IT CARRIED OUT INSPECTIONS ON THE PREMISES OF TFR, ATBG AND ATF AND, TAKING THE VIEW THAT THE DOCUMENTS OF WHICH IT TOOK COGNIZANCE ON THAT OCCASION WERE SUCH AS TO CONFIRM ITS SUSPICIONS, BY DECISION OF 29 MAY 1980 IT INITIATED A PROCEDURE UNDER ARTICLE 9 (3) OF REGULATION NO 17 AGAINST AEG.
+FOLLOWING THAT PROCEDURE, ON 6 JANUARY 1982 THE COMMISSION ADOPTED THE DISPUTED DECISION IN WHICH IT FOUND THAT AEG HAD IMPROPERLY APPLIED ITS SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM BY DISCRIMINATING AGAINST CERTAIN DISTRIBUTORS AND BY INFLUENCING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY DEALERs' rESALE PRICES AND THAT THAT HAD BEEN DONE WITH A VIEW TO EXCLUDING IN PRINCIPLE CERTAIN FORMS OF DISTRIBUTION AND MAINTAINING PRICES AT A GIVEN LEVEL.
+THE DECISION STATES THAT AEG HAS INFRINGED ARTICLE 85 (1) OF THE EEC TREATY BY THE WAY IN WHICH IT HAS APPLIED ITS SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION AGREEMENT, REQUIRES IT TO TERMINATE WITHOUT DELAY THE INFRINGEMENTS FOUND AND IMPOSES ON IT A FINE OF ONE MILLION EUROPEAN CURRENCY UNITS OR DM 2 445 780.
+6 IN THE SUBMISSIONS WHICH IT PUTS FORWARD IN SUPPORT OF ITS APPLICATION THE APPLICANT CLAIMS THAT:
+I. THE PROCEDURE LEADING UP TO THE ADOPTION OF THE CONTESTED DECISION WAS IRREGULAR INASMUCH AS, IN AEG's VIEW:
+A. THE FACTS WERE INSUFFICIENTLY INVESTIGATED;
+B. DOCUMENTS WERE SELECTED AND USED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARBITRARY CRITERIA;
+C. THE ACTUAL MARKET CONDITIONS WERE MISINTERPRETED;
+D. THE RESULTS OF PREVIOUS INQUIRIES WERE NOT MENTIONED;
+E. THE RIGHTS OF THE DEFENCE WERE INFRINGED;
+II. THE CONDITIONS LAID DOWN FOR THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 85 (1) OF THE EEC TREATY WERE LACKING BY REASON OF FACTORS SUCH AS:
+A. THE UNILATERAL NATURE OF THE ACTS FOR WHICH AEG AND ITS SUBSIDIARIES ARE CRITICIZED;
+B. THE LAWFUL NATURE OF ACTS DIRECTED TOWARDS GUARANTEEING THE MAINTENANCE OF A MINIMUM PROFIT MARGIN IN THE CONTEXT OF A SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM;
+C. THE ATYPICAL NATURE OF THE CONDUCT TO WHICH THE OBJECTIONS RELATE;
+D. THE FACT THAT THE CONDUCT TO WHICH THE OBJECTIONS RELATE CANNOT BE ASCRIBED TO AEG;
+E. THE ABSENCE OF OBSTACLES TO INTRA-COMMUNITY TRADE;
+III. THE OBJECTIONS ON WHICH THE CONTESTED DECISION IS BASED ARE UNFOUNDED SINCE IN PARTICULAR;
+THERE WAS NO DISTRIBUTION POLICY CONTRARY TO THE SYSTEM AND THERE WERE NO INDIVIDUAL CASES IN WHICH THAT POLICY WAS APPLIED;
+THERE WAS NO POLICY OF INFLUENCING SELLING PRICES IN A WAY INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM AND THERE WERE NO INDIVIDUAL CASES IN WHICH THAT POLICY WAS APPLIED.
+7 A DISPUTE HAS ALSO ARISEN BETWEEN THE PARTIES AS TO THE DEFAULT INTEREST WHICH, IN THE COMMISSION's VIEW, AEG SHOULD PAY IF, IN THE FINAL OUTCOME OF THE PROCEEDINGS, IT REMAINS SUBJECT TO PAY A FINE.
+THE COMMISSION HAD DECLARED ITSELF DISPOSED TO SUSPEND THE PROVISIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE DECISION ON CONDITION THAT THE APPLICANT UNDERTOOK TO PAY SUCH INTEREST IN THE EVENT OF THE COURT's JUDGMENT BEING UNFAVOURABLE TO IT AND AEG AGREED SUBJECT TO THE RESERVATION THAT THE COURT SHOULD DECLARE THAT SUCH INTEREST WAS IN FACT PAYABLE.
+8 BY ORDER OF 6 MAY 1982 MADE ON AN APPLICATION LODGED BY AEG AT THE SAME TIME AS THE MAIN ACTION WAS BROUGHT, THE PRESIDENT OF THE COURT SUSPENDED EXECUTION SUBJECT TO THE MAINTENANCE OF THE SECURITY FURNISHED ON 17 MARCH 1982 IN FAVOUR OF THE COMMISSION.
+THE ORDER MOREOVER EMPHASIZED THAT AEG's RESERVATION WAS LAWFUL AND MUST BE ACCEPTED AND THAT THE QUESTION WHETHER OR NOT INTEREST WAS DUE DID INDEED FALL WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT SEISED OF THE MAIN PROCEEDINGS.
+I - THE SUBMISSIONS CHALLENGING THE REGULARITY OF THE PROCEEDINGS WHICH LED TO THE ADOPTION OF THE DISPUTED DECISION
+A - INSUFFICIENT INVESTIGATION OF THE FACTS
+9 AEG CLAIMS THAT THE COMMISSION IGNORED ALL THE FACTORS CAPABLE OF EXPLAINING THE SPECIFIC DETAILS OF THE APPLICATION OF THE SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM AT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LEVEL AND THAT IT RESTRICTED ITSELF TO IMPOUNDING SOME 500 DOCUMENTS AND TO USING AT THE MOST PASSAGES DRAWN FROM SOME 40 OF SUCH DOCUMENTS.
+10 IN THAT CONNECTION IT MUST BE OBSERVED, AS THE COMMISSION RIGHTLY CLAIMS, THAT THE COMMISSION IS BY NO MEANS REQUIRED TO IMPOUND OR COPY FOR THE PURPOSES OF AN INQUIRY ALL THE DOCUMENTS RELATING TO A SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM.
+IN FACT ONLY THOSE DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE IMPROPER APPLICATION OF THE SYSTEM NEED BE CONSIDERED.
+B - SELECTION AND USE OF DOCUMENTS ACCORDING TO ARBITRARY CRITERIA
+11 ACCORDING TO AEG THOSE OF THE DOCUMENTS TAKEN BY THE COMMISSION DURING THE INSPECTIONS ON 26 AND 27 JUNE 1979 WHICH MIGHT HAVE SERVED TO EXCULPATE IT WERE NOT CONSIDERED.
+EQUALLY THE COMMISSION DISCARDED CERTAIN CONCLUSIONS WHICH IT ARRIVED AT DURING ITS INQUIRY AND WHICH WERE FAVOURABLE TO AEG, AND USED OTHER EVIDENCE ACCORDING TO ENTIRELY ARBITRARY CRITERIA.
+12 IN SUPPORT OF THIS SUBMISSION AEG ADVANCES THE FOLLOWING ALLEGATIONS:
+(i) TO SUPPORT ITS OBJECTION WITH REGARD TO PRICE CONCERTATION, IN POINT (28) OF THE DECISION, THE COMMISSION RELIED ON INFORMATION SUPPLIED, IN RESPONSE TO A MERE REQUEST FOR INFORMATION, BY MR IFFLI WITHOUT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE FACT THAT HE WAS HABITUALLY OPPOSED TO ANY SYSTEM OF SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION.
+(ii)IN THE CASE OF THE RATIO STORE THE COMMISSION IGNORED THE FACT THAT THE MANAGERS OF RATIO THEMSELVES ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THEIR SHOP IN KASSEL DID NOT SATISFY THE SPECIALIST TRADE CONDITIONS.
+(iii) THE TRADER VERBINNEN NEVER STATED THAT HE HAD BEEN SUBJECTED TO PRESSURE BY ATBG.
+(IV)REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ABOUT AN IMPROPER USE OF THE SYSTEM BY ATBG, ADDRESSED TO BELGIAN TRADERS, RECEIVED NEGATIVE ANSWERS.
+HOWEVER, NEITHER THE QUESTIONS NOR THE ANSWERS WERE MENTIONED IN THE DECISION.
+(v)THE COMMISSION TOOK INTO CONSIDERATION ONLY A SINGLE ONE OF THE MANY DOCUMENTS PRODUCED BY AEG - WHICH IT MOREOVER USED ARBITRARILY - BUT NONE OF THE EVIDENCE WHICH AEG HAD PRESENTED OR OFFERED DURING THE PROCEDURE.
+13 IN THIS CONNECTION IT SHOULD BE STRESSED THAT THE CASES IN RESPECT OF WHICH NO OBJECTION HAS BEEN RAISED DO NOT NECESSARILY PROVE THE CORRECT APPLICATION OF THE SYSTEM IN AS MUCH AS AN IMPROPER APPLICATION WOULD HAVE REQUIRED THE INTERVENTION OF AEG ONLY IN COMPARATIVELY RARE CASES WHERE AEG FELT THAT THERE WAS A RISK OF PARALLEL IMPORTS OR OF VERY KEEN PRICE COMPETITION.
+IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THE COMMISSION WAS NOT THEREFORE REQUIRED TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE CASES IN WHICH NO INFRINGEMENT WAS UNDER DISCUSSION.
+14 ON THE OTHER HAND AEG's ALLEGATIONS MUST BE EXAMINED IN DETAIL AS REGARDS THE CASES OF IFFLI, RATIO AND VERBINNEN, INASMUCH AS THEY AMOUNT TO A CLAIM THAT THE COMMISSION FOUND THAT AN INFRINGEMENT HAD OCCURRED AFTER IT HAD ARBITRARILY BRUSHED ASIDE FACTORS WHICH WOULD NECESSARILY HAVE LED IT TO ANOTHER CONCLUSION.
+15 THESE ALLEGATIONS, VIEWED IN THAT LIGHT, ARE TANTAMOUNT TO A STATEMENT THAT, WHEN IT CAME TO ESTABLISHING WHETHER CERTAIN CASES CONSTITUTED AN IMPROPER APPLICATION OF THE SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM, THE COMMISSION MISINTERPRETED THE EVIDENCE RELATING TO THOSE CASES.
+IT IS THEREFORE IN REALITY A QUESTION OF THE APPRAISAL OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE INDIVIDUAL CASES - WHICH WILL BE DEALT WITH SEPARATELY WHEN MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE ARE CONSIDERED - AND NOT OF THE REGULARITY OF THE PROCEDURE FOLLOWED BY THE COMMISSION.
+C - INCORRECT INTERPRETATION OF ACTUAL MARKET CONDITIONS
+16 AEG CLAIMS THAT THE COMMISSION DID NOT TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE MARKET SITUATION AS REGARDS CONSUMER ELECTRONIC PRODUCTS AS A WHOLE AND IGNORED FACTORS SUCH AS THE FIERCE COMPETITION IN THE SECTOR, WHICH MEANT THAT A DISTRIBUTION POLICY AIMED AT LIMITING THE NUMBER OF APPROVED DISTRIBUTORS AND MAINTAINING HIGH SELLING PRICES WOULD HAVE BEEN UNREASONABLE.
+17 AS REGARDS THIS SUBMISSION, IT SHOULD BE STATED AT THE OUTSET THAT TO ESTABLISH THE EXISTENCE OF A SITUATION WHICH OUGHT TO HAVE MADE IT INADVISABLE FOR AN UNDERTAKING TO ENGAGE IN CERTAIN CONDUCT CANNOT BY ITSELF PROVE THAT SUCH CONDUCT DID NOT TAKE PLACE, SINCE IT MAY WELL BE CONCEIVED THAT THE UNDER TAKING IN QUESTION MAY HAVE RELIED UPON AN INCORRECT APPRECIATION OF THE ACTUAL MARKET SITUATION OR, WHILST BEING WELL AWARE OF THE SITUATION, HAVE TAKEN TOO OPTIMISTIC A VIEW OF THE ADVANTAGES RESULTING FROM A PRICE MAINTENANCE POLICY, THINKING THAT THEY WOULD OUTWEIGH THE DISADVANTAGES INVOLVED IN THE LOSS OF COMPETITIVE POSITIONS.
+18 THUS, AS THE COMMISSION HAS PERTINENTLY OBSERVED, THE VIEW MAY BE TAKEN THAT AEG WAS NOT TAKING EXCESSIVE RISKS, EVEN IN A SITUATION OF VERY KEEN COMPETITION, BY ADOPTING A HIGH PRICE POLICY, SINCE DISTRIBUTORS WERE IN ANY EVENT ANXIOUS TO SUPPLEMENT THEIR RANGE BY TELEFUNKEN BRAND PRODUCTS AND WERE GENERALLY WILLING TO ACCEPT A HIGH TRADE MARGIN.
+D - THE FAILURE TO MENTION THE RESULTS OF PREVIOUS INQUIRIES
+19 AEG STATES THAT THE COMMISSION, HAVING RECEIVED, AFTER THE INTRODUCTION OF THE SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM IN 1973, NUMEROUS COMPLAINTS CALLING IN QUESTION THE CONDUCT OF AEG AND ITS SUBSIDIARIES, HAD INITIATED PROCEEDINGS WHICH IT HAD SUBSEQUENTLY ABANDONED.
+THAT INDICATES, IT IS CLAIMED, THAT THE COMMISSION HAD NOT, IN THE COURSE OF ITS INQUIRIES, ESTABLISHED AN IMPROPER APPLICATION OF THE SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM.
+THE FAILURE TO MENTION THOSE PRECEDENTS, WHICH WERE INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE DISPUTED DECISION, PROVES, IT IS ALLEGED, THAT THE COMMISSION EMBARKED ON THE PRESENT CASE WITH ITS MIND MADE UP.
+20 THE COMMISSION CORRECTLY DENIES THAT THE FACT THAT THE COMPLAINTS IN QUESTION WERE NOT PURSUED MAY BE INTERPRETED AS A FAVOURABLE JUDGMENT ON THE APPLICATION BY AEG OF THE SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM.
+IT SHOULD BE STATED THAT, EVEN IF THE COMMISSION TAKES THE VIEW THAT AN ISOLATED CASE DOES NOT REPRESENT A CORRECT APPLICATION OF THE SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM, IT IS NOT REQUIRED TO PURSUE A LARGE-SCALE INQUIRY SUCH AS THAT PROVIDED FOR BY ARTICLE 9 OF REGULATION NO 17 IN THE ABSENCE OF GROUNDS FOR SUSPECTING THAT THAT CASE INDICATES A POLICY ON THE PART OF THE UNDERTAKING.
+IT IS THEREFORE NATURAL THAT THE COMMISSION SHOULD HAVE DECIDED TO INITIATE A PROCEDURE WITHIN THE MEANING OF REGULATION NO 17 ONLY AFTER NUMEROUS COMPLAINTS AND REPORTS HAD CONVINCED IT THAT THE SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM WAS IN FACT BEING IMPROPERLY APPLIED.
+E - INFRINGEMENT OF THE RIGHTS OF THE DEFENCE
+21 AEG CLAIMS THAT THE RIGHTS OF THE DEFENCE WERE INFRINGED INASMUCH AS THE COMMISSION:
+(a) DID NOT PROVIDE IT WITH THE COMPLETE TEXT OF A LETTER OF 12 AUGUST 1980 FROM MR IFFLI REFERRING TO ALLEGED IMPROPER CONDUCT ON THE PART OF THE APPLICANT, WHICH WAS THEREFORE PREVENTED FROM MAKING ITS VIEWS ON THE MATTER KNOWN;
+(b)USED IN THE CONTESTED DECISION DOCUMENTS WHICH HAD NOT BEEN MENTIONED IN THE STATEMENT OF OBJECTIONS OF 2 JUNE 1980, EVEN THOUGH THEY WERE ALREADY IN THE COMMISSION's POSSESSION AT THAT TIME;
+(c)ADOPTED A DECISION BASED, INTER ALIA, ON INDIVIDUAL CASES NOT MENTIONED IN THE STATEMENT OF OBJECTIONS (MAMMOUTH, VERBINNEN).
+22 AS REGARDS THE LETTER FROM MR IFFLI, AEG CONTENDS THAT THE FACT THAT IT WAS ABLE TO CONSULT IT IN ITS ENTIRETY ONLY AFTER THE DECISION WAS ADOPTED SHOWS THAT OBVIOUSLY THE APPLICANT HAD NO OPPORTUNITY TO USE IT IN REPLYING TO THE STATEMENT OF OBJECTIONS.
+23 THE COMMISSION CLAIMS THAT MR IFFLI's LETTER COULD NOT AT FIRST BE COMMUNICATED TO THE APPLICANT IN ITS ENTIRETY FOR REASONS OF CONFIDENTIALITY AND THE PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRECY.
+24 IN THIS RESPECT IT MUST BE OBSERVED THAT SUCH CONSIDERATIONS OUGHT TO HAVE CAUSED THE COMMISSION TO ABSTAIN FROM USING THAT DOCUMENT AS EVIDENCE.
+AEG IS JUSTIFIED IN TAKING THE VIEW THAT IT COULD NOT ALLOW TO BE USED AGAINST IT A DOCUMENT PART OF WHICH HAD NOT BEEN COMMUNICATED TO IT AND THAT IT WAS NOT FOR THE DEFENDANT TO JUDGE WHETHER A DOCUMENT OR A PART THEREOF WAS OR WAS NOT OF USE FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE UNDERTAKING CONCERNED.
+25 IT FOLLOWS THAT MR IFFLI's LETTER OF 12 AUGUST 1980 CANNOT BE REGARDED AS ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS CASE.
+26 AS REGARDS THE DOCUMENTS MENTIONED ONLY IN THE DECISION (LETTER OF 29 JUNE 1976 FROM TFR's MUNSTER SALES OFFICE; ATF MEMORANDUM OF 7 JULY 1977; ATF MEMORANDUM OF 20 OCTOBER 1978), THE COMMISSION CONTENDS THAT THESE WERE DOCUMENTS WITH WHICH THE APPLICANT WAS ALREADY FAMILIAR AS THEY CAME FROM ITS OWN OFFICES AND THAT THEY WERE USED ONLY TO CONFIRM OBJECTIONS ALREADY RAISED.
+27 IN THIS CONNECTION IT MUST BE OBSERVED THAT THE IMPORTANT POINT IS NOT THE DOCUMENTS AS SUCH BUT THE CONCLUSIONS WHICH THE COMMISSION HAS DRAWN FROM THEM.
+SINCE THESE DOCUMENTS WERE NOT MENTIONED IN THE STATEMENT OF OBJECTIONS AEG WAS ENTITLED TO TAKE THE VIEW THAT THEY WERE OF NO IMPORTANCE FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE CASE.
+BY NOT INFORMING THE APPLICANT THAT THESE DOCUMENTS WOULD BE USED IN THE DECISION, THE COMMISSION PREVENTED AEG FROM PUTTING FORWARD AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME ITS VIEW OF THE PROBATIVE VALUE OF SUCH DOCUMENTS.
+IT FOLLOWS THAT THESE DOCUMENTS CANNOT BE REGARDED AS ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS CASE.
+28 FOR THE SAME REASONS THE MAMMOUTH CASE CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS IT WAS NOT MENTIONED IN THE STATEMENT OF OBJECTIONS.
+29 AS REGARDS THE VERBINNEN CASE, ON THE OTHER HAND, IT MUST BE OBSERVED THAT, WHILST IT WAS NOT MENTIONED IN THE STATEMENT OF OBJECTIONS, IT WAS COMMUNICATED TO AEG IN SUFFICIENT TIME TO ALLOW IT TO PREPARE ITS OBSERVATIONS BEFORE THE CONTESTED DECISION WAS ADOPTED.
+30 IN CONCLUSION IT MUST BE STATED THAT AEG's SUBMISSIONS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE PROCEDURE WHICH LED UP TO THE ADOPTION OF THE CONTESTED DECISION WAS IRREGULAR HAVE PROVED TO BE GROUNDLESS EXCEPT THAT RELATING TO THE INFRINGEMENT OF THE RIGHTS OF THE DEFENCE.
+HOWEVER, THAT SUBMISSION IS NOT OF GENERAL SCOPE AS IT IS RESTRICTED TO ALLEGING INFRINGEMENTS WITH REGARD TO CERTAIN INDIVIDUAL CASES AND CANNOT THEREFORE IMPLY THAT THE PROCEDURE AS A WHOLE WAS IRREGULAR.
+IT THUS FOLLOWS THAT THE EXCLUSION OF CERTAIN DOCUMENTS USED BY THE COMMISSION IN INFRINGEMENT OF THE RIGHTS OF THE DEFENCE IS OF NO SIGNIFICANCE EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE COMMISSION's OBJECTIONS CAN BE PROVED ONLY BY REFERENCE TO THOSE DOCUMENTS.
+II - THE SUBMISSIONS DISPUTING THE EXISTENCE OF THE CONDITIONS LAID DOWN FOR THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 85 (1) OF THE EEC TREATY
+A - THE UNILATERAL NATURE OF THE ACTS ATTRIBUTED TO AEG AND ITS SUBSIDIARIES
+31 AEG CONTENDS THAT THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF IN THE CONTESTED DECISION, NAMELY THE FAILURE TO ADMIT CERTAIN TRADERS AND STEPS TAKEN TO EXERT AN INFLUENCE ON PRICES, ARE UNILATERAL ACTS AND DO NOT THEREFORE, AS SUCH, FALL WITHIN ARTICLE 85 (1), WHICH RELATES ONLY TO AGREEMENTS BETWEEN UNDERTAKINGS, DECISIONS BY ASSOCIATIONS OF UNDERTAKINGS AND CONCERTED PRACTICES.
+32 IN ORDER PROPERLY TO APPRECIATE THAT ARGUMENT IT IS APPROPRIATE TO CONSIDER THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS.
+33 IT IS COMMON GROUND THAT AGREEMENTS CONSTITUTING A SELECTIVE SYSTEM NECESSARILY AFFECT COMPETITION IN THE COMMON MARKET.
+HOWEVER, IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN RECOGNIZED IN THE CASE-LAW OF THE COURT THAT THERE ARE LEGITIMATE REQUIREMENTS, SUCH AS THE MAINTENANCE OF A SPECIALIST TRADE CAPABLE OF PROVIDING SPECIFIC SERVICES AS REGARDS HIGH-QUALITY AND HIGH-TECHNOLOGY PRODUCTS, WHICH MAY JUSTIFY A REDUCTION OF PRICE COMPETITION IN FAVOUR OF COMPETITION RELATING TO FACTORS OTHER THAN PRICE.
+SYSTEMS OF SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION, IN SO FAR AS THEY AIM AT THE ATTAINMENT OF A LEGITIMATE GOAL CAPABLE OF IMPROVING COMPETITION IN RELATION TO FACTORS OTHER THAN PRICE, THEREFORE CONSTITUTE AN ELEMENT OF COMPETITION WHICH IS IN CONFORMITY WITH ARTICLE 85 (1).
+34 THE LIMITATIONS INHERENT IN A SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM ARE HOWEVER ACCEPTABLE ONLY ON CONDITION THAT THEIR AIM IS IN FACT AN IMPROVEMENT IN COMPETITION IN THE SENSE ABOVE MENTIONED.
+OTHERWISE THEY WOULD HAVE NO JUSTIFICATION INASMUCH AS THEIR SOLE EFFECT WOULD BE TO REDUCE PRICE COMPETITION.
+35 SO AS TO GUARANTEE THAT SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS MAY BE BASED ON THAT AIM ALONE AND CANNOT BE SET UP AND USED WITH A VIEW TO THE ATTAINMENT OF OBJECTIVES WHICH ARE NOT IN CONFORMITY WITH COMMUNITY LAW, THE COURT SPECIFIED IN ITS JUDGMENT OF 25 OCTOBER 1977 (METRO V COMMISSION, (1977) ECR 1875) THAT SUCH SYSTEMS ARE PERMISSIBLE, PROVIDED THAT RE-SELLERS ARE CHOSEN ON THE BASIS OF OBJECTIVE CRITERIA OF A QUALITATIVE NATURE RELATING TO THE TECHNICAL QUALIFICATIONS OF THE RESELLER AND HIS STAFF AND THE SUITABILITY OF HIS TRADING PREMISES AND THAT SUCH CONDITIONS ARE LAID DOWN UNIFORMLY FOR ALL POTENTIAL RESELLERS AND ARE NOT APPLIED IN A DISCRIMINATORY FASHION.
+36 IT FOLLOWS THAT THE OPERATION OF A SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM BASED ON CRITERIA OTHER THAN THOSE MENTIONED ABOVE CONSTITUTES AN INFRINGEMENT OF ARTICLE 85 (1).
+THE POSITION IS THE SAME WHERE A SYSTEM WHICH IS IN PRINCIPLE IN CONFORMITY WITH COMMUNITY LAW IS APPLIED IN PRACTICE IN A MANNER INCOMPATIBLE THEREWITH.
+37 SUCH A PRACTICE MUST BE CONSIDERED UNLAWFUL WHERE THE MANUFACTURER, WITH A VIEW TO MAINTAINING A HIGH LEVEL OF PRICES OR TO EXCLUDING CERTAIN MODERN CHANNELS OF DISTRIBUTION, REFUSES TO APPROVE DISTRIBUTORS WHO SATISFY THE QUALITATIVE CRITERIA OF THE SYSTEM.
+38 SUCH AN ATTITUDE ON THE PART OF THE MANUFACTURER DOES NOT CONSTITUTE, ON THE PART OF THE UNDERTAKING, UNILATERAL CONDUCT WHICH, AS AEG CLAIMS, WOULD BE EXEMPT FROM THE PROHIBITION CONTAINED IN ARTICLE 85 (1) OF THE TREATY.
+ON THE CONTRARY, IT FORMS PART OF THE CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNDERTAKING AND RESELLERS.
+INDEED, IN THE CASE OF THE ADMISSION OF A DISTRIBUTOR, APPROVAL IS BASED ON THE ACCEPTANCE, TACIT OR EXPRESS, BY THE CONTRACTING PARTIES OF THE POLICY PURSUED BY AEG WHICH REQUIRES INTER ALIA THE EXCLUSION FROM THE NETWORK OF ALL DISTRIBUTORS WHO ARE QUALIFIED FOR ADMISSION BUT ARE NOT PREPARED TO ADHERE TO THAT POLICY.
+39 THE VIEW MUST THEREFORE BE TAKEN THAT EVEN REFUSALS OF APPROVAL ARE ACTS PERFORMED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS WITH AUTHORIZED DISTRIBUTORS INASMUCH AS THEIR PURPOSE IS TO GUARANTEE OBSERVANCE OF THE AGREEMENTS IN RESTRAINT OF COMPETITION WHICH FORM THE BASIS OF CONTRACTS BETWEEN MANUFACTURERS AND APPROVED DISTRIBUTORS.
+REFUSALS TO APPROVE DISTRIBUTORS WHO SATISFY THE QUALITATIVE CRITERIA MENTIONED ABOVE THEREFORE SUPPLY PROOF OF AN UNLAWFUL APPLICATION OF THE SYSTEM IF THEIR NUMBER IS SUFFICIENT TO PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT THEY ARE ISOLATED CASES NOT FORMING PART OF SYSTEMATIC CONDUCT.
+B - THE LAWFUL NATURE OF ACTIONS INTENDED TO GUARANTEE THE MAINTENANCE OF A MINIMUM PROFIT MARGIN WITH A SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
+40 AEG CLAIMS THAT THE CONDUCT TO WHICH OBJECTION IS MADE IS DESIGNED TO MAINTAIN A LEVEL OF PRICES INDISPENSABLE FOR THE SURVIVAL OF THE SPECIALIST TRADE AND THAT, IF SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS ARE JUSTIFIED BY THE NEED TO GUARANTEE THE EXISTENCE OF THAT TRADE, WHOSE COSTS ARE MUCH HIGHER THAN THOSE OF THE NON-SPECIALIST TRADE, SUCH SYSTEMS CANNOT BE CONSIDERED CONTRARY TO COMMUNITY LAW IN SO FAR AS THEY ARE STRUCTURED OR APPLIED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO GUARANTEE TO APPROVED DEALERS THE ENJOYMENT OF A MINIMUM MARGIN.
+IN THAT CONNECTION IT MENTIONS THE FIFTH SUBPARAGRAPH OF PARAGRAPH 21 OF THE AFOREMENTIONED METRO JUDGMENT, ACCORDING TO WHICH: ''FOR SPECIALIST WHOLESALERS AND RETAILERS THE DESIRE TO MAINTAIN A CERTAIN PRICE LEVEL, WHICH CORRESPONDS TO THE DESIRE TO PRESERVE, IN THE INTERESTS OF CONSUMERS, THE POSSIBILITY OF THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF THIS CHANNEL OF DISTRIBUTION IN CONJUNCTION WITH NEW METHODS OF DISTRIBUTION BASED ON A DIFFERENT TYPE OF COMPETITION POLICY, FORMS ONE OF THE OBJECTIVES WHICH MAY BE PURSUED WITHOUT NECESSARILY FALLING UNDER THE PROHIBITION CONTAINED IN ARTICLE 85 (1), AND, IF IT DOES FALL THEREUNDER, EITHER WHOLLY OR IN PART, COMING WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF ARTICLE 85 (3)''.
+41 HOWEVER, IT SHOULD BE EMPHASIZED THAT, IN THE METRO CASE, THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF CONDUCT DESIGNED TO PREVENT THE ADMISSION TO THE DISTRIBUTION NETWORK OF TRADERS WHO WERE NOT READY TO CHARGE CERTAIN PRICES.
+THE APPLICANT METRO WAS NOT OBJECTING TO THE SELECTION CRITERIA CHOSEN FOR THE ADMISSION OF TRADERS TO THE COMPANY SABA's SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM, FOR WHICH THE COMMISSION HAD GIVEN NEGATIVE CLEARANCE UNDER ARTICLE 2 OF REGULATION NO 17, BUT WAS ONLY CLAIMING THAT THE SYSTEM LED TO A CONGEALING OF THE PRICE STRUCTURE AT THE LEVEL OF THE RETAIL TRADE AND THUS TO THE ELIMINATION OF PRICE COMPETITION.
+42 A RESTRICTION OF PRICE COMPETITION MUST HOWEVER BE REGARDED AS BEING INHERENT IN ANY SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT PRICES CHARGED BY SPECIALIST TRADERS NECESSARILY REMAIN WITHIN A MUCH NARROWER SPAN THAN THAT WHICH MIGHT BE ENVISAGED IN THE CASE OF COMPETITION BETWEEN SPECIALIST AND NON-SPECIALIST TRADERS.
+THAT RESTRICTION IS COUNTERBALANCED BY COMPETITION AS REGARDS THE QUALITY OF THE SERVICES SUPPLIED TO CUSTOMERS, WHICH WOULD NOT NORMALLY BE POSSIBLE IN THE ABSENCE OF AN APPROPRIATE PROFIT MARGIN MAKING IT POSSIBLE TO SUPPORT THE HIGHER EXPENSES CONNECTED WITH THOSE SERVICES.
+THE MAINTENANCE OF A CERTAIN LEVEL OF PRICES IS THEREFORE LAWFUL, BUT ONLY TO THE EXTENT TO WHICH IT IS STRICTLY JUSTIFIED BY THE REQUIREMENTS OF A SYSTEM WITHIN WHICH COMPETITION MUST CONTINUE TO PERFORM THE FUNCTIONS ASSIGNED TO IT BY THE TREATY.
+IN FACT THE OBJECT OF SUCH A SYSTEM IS SOLELY THE IMPROVEMENT OF COMPETITION IN SO FAR AS IT RELATES TO FACTORS OTHER THAN PRICES AND NOT THE GUARANTEE OF A HIGH PROFIT MARGIN FOR APPROVED RE-SELLERS.
+43 AEG WAS THEREFORE NOT JUSTIFIED IN TAKING THE VIEW THAT THE ACCEPTANCE OF AN UNDERTAKING TO CHARGE PRICES MAKING POSSIBLE A SUFFICIENTLY HIGH PROFIT MARGIN CONSTITUTED A LAWFUL CONDITION FOR ADMISSION TO A SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM.
+BY THE VERY FACT THAT IT WAS AUTHORIZED NOT TO ADMIT TO AND NOT TO KEEP IN ITS DISTRIBUTION NETWORK TRADERS WHO WERE NOT, OR WERE NO LONGER, IN A POSITION TO PROVIDE SERVICES TYPICAL OF THE SPECIALIST TRADE, IT HAD AT ITS DISPOSAL ALL THE MEANS NECESSARY TO ENABLE IT TO ENSURE THE EFFECTIVE APPLICATION OF THE SYSTEM.
+IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES THE EXISTENCE OF A PRICE UNDERTAKING CONSTITUTES A CONDITION WHICH IS MANIFESTLY FOREIGN TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF A SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM AND THUS ALSO AFFECTS FREEDOM OF COMPETITION.
+C - THE NON-SYSTEMATIC NATURE OF THE CONDUCT TO WHICH THE OBJECTIONS RELATE
+44 BY THIS SUBMISSION AEG DENIES THAT IT NORMALLY AND INTENTIONALLY MADE AN IMPROPER USE OF ITS SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM.
+IF ACCOUNT IS TAKEN OF THE THOUSANDS OF DISTRIBUTORS WHO APPLY TO BE ADMITTED TO THE SYSTEM OR WHO ARE ALREADY ACTIVE WITHIN IT, IT IS EASY TO UNDERSTAND, ACCORDING TO AEG, THAT VAGARIES ARE INEVITABLE.
+EVEN ON THE SUPPOSITION THAT THEY WERE INTENTIONAL, A FEW INFREQUENT CASES OF INFRINGEMENT CANNOT IN ANY CASE CALL IN QUESTION A CORRECT APPLICATION OF THE SYSTEM.
+45 BEFORE THOSE ARGUMENTS ARE CONSIDERED, IT MUST FIRST BE STATED THAT, AS THE COMMISSION HAS PERTINENTLY OBSERVED, THE SMALL NUMBER OF INFRINGEMENTS WITH WHICH AEG IS CHARGED IN COMPARISON WITH THE WHOLE OF THE CASES IN WHICH THE SYSTEM IS APPLIED DOES NOT BY ITSELF PROVE THE NON-SYSTEMATIC NATURE OF THE INFRINGEMENTS.
+INDEED, THE GREAT MAJORITY OF DISTRIBUTORS ARE ALREADY HABITUALLY OPPOSED TO A LOW PRICE POLICY AND NORMALLY WILLINGLY ACCEPT ANY INITIATIVE DESIGNED TO MAINTAIN A HIGH PROFIT MARGIN, SO THAT A PRODUCER WHO WISHES TO MAKE AN IMPROPER APPLICATION OF THE SYSTEM WOULD BE FORCED TO REFUSE ADMISSION OR TO THREATEN REPRISALS ONLY IN THE CASE OF TRADERS OPERATING A VERY AGGRESSIVE PRICE POLICY.
+46 IT FOLLOWS THAT THE NON-SYSTEMATIC NATURE OF THE INFRINGEMENTS IS NOT NECESSARILY PROVED BY THEIR RELATIVELY RESTRICTED NUMBER AND THE POSSIBILITY THAT THERE HAS BEEN A SYSTEMATIC USE OF THE CONDITIONS FOR ADMISSION IN A MANNER INCOMPATIBLE WITH COMMUNITY LAW CAN BE RULED OUT ONLY AFTER IT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED THAT THERE WAS NO GENERAL POLICY ON THE PART OF AEG OR ITS SUBSIDIARIES DESIGNED TO EXCLUDE RE-SELLERS WHO WERE TOO AGGRESSIVE OR TO INFLUENCE PRICES.
+D - THE SUBMISSION THAT THE CONDUCT TO WHICH THE OBJECTIONS RELATE CANNOT BE ASCRIBED TO AEG
+47 AEG STATES THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR ANY INFRINGEMENTS WHICH MAY BE ESTABLISHED TO BE ASCRIBED TO IT AS IT NEVER PLAYED AN INDEPENDENT PART IN THE APPLICATION OF THE SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM AS EFFECTED BY TFR, ATF OR ATBG.
+INDEED, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO ASCRIBE A ''GENERAL DISTRIBUTION POLICY'' TO AEG ON THE BASIS OF DOCUMENTS IN A FILE WHICH WERE DRAWN UP EXCLUSIVELY BY ITS SUBSIDIARIES AND IN WHICH IT PLAYED NO PART.
+STILL LESS CAN IT BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR INDIVIDUAL INFRINGEMENTS ALLEGED BY THE COMMISSION TO HAVE BEEN COMMITTED BY ITS SUBSIDIARIES.
+48 THE COMMISSION REPLIES THAT THE SYSTEM INTRODUCED BY AEG WAS IMPLEMENTED IN THE VARIOUS MEMBER STATES CONCERNED BY ITS SUBSIDIARIES TFR, ATF AND ATBG, WHICH ARE CONTROLLED BY THE APPLICANT, ARE MADE RESPONSIBLE BY IT FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE SYSTEM AND ARE REQUIRED IN THIS RESPECT TO CARRY OUT AEG's INSTRUCTIONS.
+IT OBSERVES THAT TFR, ATF AND ATBG FORM PART OF THE AEG-TELEFUNKEN GROUP AND THAT TFR, FOR EXAMPLE, IS A WHOLLY-OWNED SUBSIDIARY OF AEG-TELEFUNKEN. 49 AS THE COURT HAS ALREADY EMPHASIZED, PARTICULARLY IN ITS JUDGMENT OF 14 JULY 1972 INTERNATIONAL CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES, CASE 48/69 ((1972) ECR 619) ''THE FACT THAT A SUBSIDIARY HAS SEPARATE LEGAL PERSONALITY IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF IMPUTING ITS CONDUCT TO THE PARENT COMPANY... IN PARTICULAR WHERE THE SUBSIDIARY, ALTHOUGH HAVING SEPARATE LEGAL PERSONALITY, DOES NOT DECIDE INDEPENDENTLY UPON ITS OWN CONDUCT ON THE MARKET, BUT CARRIES OUT, IN ALL MATERIAL RESPECTS, THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN TO IT BY THE PARENT COMPANY.''
+50 AS AEG HAS NOT DISPUTED THAT IT WAS IN A POSITION TO EXERT A DECISIVE INFLUENCE ON THE DISTRIBUTION AND PRICING POLICY OF ITS SUBSIDIARIES, CONSIDERATION MUST STILL BE GIVEN TO THE QUESTION WHETHER IT ACTUALLY MADE USE OF THIS POWER.
+HOWEVER, SUCH A CHECK APPEARS SUPERFLUOUS IN THE CASE OF TFR WHICH, AS A WHOLLY-OWNED SUBSIDIARY OF AEG, NECESSARILY FOLLOWS A POLICY LAID DOWN BY THE SAME BODIES AS, UNDER ITS STATUTES, DETERMINE AEG's POLICY.
+51 AEG's INFLUENCE ON ATF EMERGES INDIRECTLY FROM AN INTERNAL MEMORANDUM OF ATF DATED 30 JUNE 1978, WHERE IT IS STATED THAT A DISTRIBUTOR WITH WHOM ATF WAS NEGOTIATING WITH A VIEW TO HIS ACCEPTANCE WAS AWARE OF ''TELEFUNKEN's POLICY, WHICH SUCCEEDS IN KEEPING RETAIL PRICES STABLE AND THUS IN MAINTAINING AN APPROPRIATE PROFIT MARGIN FOR RETAILERs''.
+THE WORD ''TELEFUNKEN'' sHOWS THAT IN FACT ATF WAS REFERRING TO COMMERCIAL POLICY PERCEIVED AS BEING THE RESULT OF AN INITIATIVE ON THE PART OF AEG WHICH ALONE WAS IN A POSITION TO DRAW UP A UNITARY POLICY TO BE FOLLOWED BY ITS VARIOUS SUBSIDIARIES RESPONSIBLE FOR DISTRIBUTING TELEFUNKEN PRODUCTS.
+52 AS TO ATBG, IT MAY BE SEEN FROM THE DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE CASE OF THE BELGIAN WHOLESALER DIEDERICHS THAT ATBG CONSTANTLY INFORMED TFR ABOUT ITS NEGOTIATIONS WITH DIEDERICHS (SEE ATBG's LETTERS OF 19 AND 24 OCTOBER 1977).
+FURTHERMORE, IT EMERGES FROM THOSE DOCUMENTS THAT TFR MADE DIRECT CONTACT WITH DIEDERICHS TO CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF REGULARIZING HIS ACTIVITIES, ALTHOUGH THEY DID NOT INVOLVE THE GERMAN MARKET (SEE TFR's MEMORANDUM OF 29 SEPTEMBER 1977), THAT IT RAISED WITHIN ITS ORGANIZATION PROBLEMS RAISED BY DIEDERICHs' s APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION (SEE TFR's TELEX MESSAGE OF 11 OCTOBER 1977) AND THAT IT FINALLY STATED THAT: ''AT PRESENT THERE IS NO REASON TO PURSUE THE DISCUSSIONS INITIATED WITH MR DIEDERICHs''(SEE TFR MEMORANDUM OF 28 OCTOBER 1977). THESE MATTERS SHOW CLEARLY THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF ATBG's HAVING ANY INDEPENDENT POWER OF DECISION-MAKING AS AGAINST AEG AND TFR.
+53 IT MUST THEREFORE BE CONCLUDED THAT THE CONDUCT OF TFR, ATF AND ATBG IN RESTRAINT OF COMPETITION ARE TO BE ASCRIBED TO AEG.
+E - THE ABSENCE OF OBSTACLES TO INTRA-COMMUNITY TRADE
+54 BY THIS SUBMISSION AEG CLAIMS THAT THE APPLICATION OF ITS SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM IS NOT IN ITSELF CAPABLE OF AFFECTING TRADE BETWEEN MEMBER STATES OR THUS OF FALLING WITHIN ARTICLE 85 (1) OF THE TREATY.
+THAT REMAINS TRUE, IT ALLEGES, EVEN IF IT WERE TO BE ESTABLISHED THAT THE SYSTEM HAD BEEN IMPROPERLY APPLIED.
+55 THE COMMISSION ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM ESTABLISHED BY AEG DOES NOT IN ITSELF CONTAIN PROVISIONS FORMING AN OBSTACLE TO TRADE BETWEEN APPROVED DISTRIBUTORS IN THE DIFFERENT MEMBER STATES AND CANNOT THEREFORE AS SUCH AFFECT INTRA-COMMUNITY TRADE.
+IT CLAIMS HOWEVER THAT IT IS PRECISELY THE IMPROPER APPLICATION OF THE SYSTEM ALLEGED AGAINST AEG WHICH HAS MADE IT POSSIBLE TO ELIMINATE LARGE-SCALE TRADERS FROM THE DISTRIBUTION NETWORK, IN A DISCRIMINATORY MANNER, AND WHICH HAS THUS PREVENTED CONSIDERABLE TRADE WHICH THOSE DEALERS MIGHT HAVE EFFECTED BETWEEN MEMBER STATES.
+56 ACCORDING TO AEG THE ABSENCE OF PERCEPTIBLE OBSTACLES, ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL, TO TRADE BETWEEN THE MEMBER STATES, MAY BE SEEN FIRST FROM THE VERY MODEST SHARE OF THE MARKET BELONGING TO TFR, ATF AND ATBG, SECONDLY FROM THE FACT THAT THE TRADERS CONCERNED DID NOT CARRY OUT TRADE BETWEEN MEMBER STATES OR WERE NOT IN A POSITION TO DO SO AND THIRDLY FROM THE FACT THAT AS REGARDS COLOUR TELEVISION SETS ALL INTRA-COMMUNITY TRADE IS TO A LARGE EXTENT IMPEDED BY SERIOUS TECHNICAL DIFFICULTIES.
+57 IN THIS CONNECTION IT MUST BE OBSERVED THAT WHEREAS THE FIRST TWO ARGUMENTS RELATE TO ALL THE PRODUCTS COMPRISED IN THE ''FIVE-POINT'' PROGRAMME, WHICH COVERS PRODUCTS SUCH AS TELEVISION SETS, RADIOS, TAPE-RECORDERS, RECORD-PLAYERS AND AUDIO-VISUAL MATERIAL, THE THIRD REFERS ONLY TO COLOUR TELEVISION SETS.
+58 AEG's ARGUMENT RELATING TO THE MODEST SHARE OF THE MARKET BELONGING TO TFR, ATF AND ATBG CANNOT BE UPHELD IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT EACH OF THOSE COMPANIES HAD, IN ITS OWN COUNTRY DURING THE YEARS 1973 TO 1980, AT LEAST 50% OF THE CONSUMER ELECTRONICS MARKET.
+AS THE COURT HAS ALREADY STATED IN ITS JUDGMENT OF 1 FEBRUARY 1978 (MILLER, CASE 19/77, (1978) ECR 131), AN UNDERTAKING POSSESSING ROUGHLY 5% OF THE MARKET CONCERNED Is ''AN UNDERTAKING OF SUFFICIENT IMPORTANCE FOR ITS BEHAVIOUR TO BE, IN PRINCIPLE, CAPABLE OF AFFECTING TRADE ''.
+59 AS REGARDS THE SECOND ARGUMENT PUT FORWARD BY AEG, IT MUST BE POINTED OUT THAT THE RISK OF OBSTACLES TO POTENTIAL TRADE CANNOT BE RULED OUT ON THE BASIS OF A MERE ALLEGATION THAT THE TRADERS DID NOT OR WERE NOT IN A POSITION TO CARRY ON TRADE BETWEEN MEMBER STATES.
+IN THAT CONNECTION IT IS IMPORTANT TO STRESS THAT SEVERAL OF THE UNDERTAKINGS MENTIONED IN THE DECISION (FOR EXAMPLE, DIEDERICHS IN BELGIUM AND THE AUCHAN, DARTY, FNAC AND CONFORAMA SHOPS IN FRANCE) ACTUALLY UNDERTOOK OR WERE PREPARED TO UNDERTAKE PARALLEL IMPORTS.
+THE RATIO CHAIN OF STORES IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS EFFECTED RE-IMPORTS OF TELEFUNKEN PRODUCTS FROM AUSTRIA AND WOULD NO DOUBT HAVE DONE SO FROM MEMBER STATES OF THE EEC IF THE RE-IMPORTATION FROM THOSE STATES HAD BROUGHT IT THE SAME ADVANTAGES.
+60 IN ANY CASE IT MUST BE RECALLED THAT, ACCORDING TO THE MILLER JUDGMENT TO WHICH REFERENCE HAS ALREADY BEEN MADE, THE MERE FACT AT A CERTAIN TIME TRADERS APPLYING FOR ADMISSION TO A DISTRIBUTION NETWORK OR WHO HAVE ALREADY BEEN ADMITTED ARE NOT ENGAGED IN INTRA-COMMUNITY TRADE CANNOT SUFFICE TO EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT RESTRICTIONS ON THEIR FREEDOM OF ACTION MAY IMPEDE INTRA-COMMUNITY TRADE, SINCE THE SITUATION MAY CHANGE FROM ONE YEAR TO ANOTHER IN TERMS OF ALTERATIONS IN THE CONDITIONS OR COMPOSITION OF THE MARKET BOTH IN THE COMMON MARKET AS A WHOLE AND IN THE INDIVIDUAL NATIONAL MARKETS.
+61 AS REGARDS COLOUR TELEVISION SETS AEG HAS CLAIMED THAT IN ANY EVENT THE APPLICATION OF ITS DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM COULD NOT HAVE AFFECTED PARALLEL IMPORTS INTO FRANCE, WHICH WERE NOT PRACTICABLE BY REASON OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE STANDARDS USED IN GERMANY (PAL) AND IN FRANCE (SECAM) AND OF THE CONSIDERABLE COST OF CONVERTING SETS.
+62 THE COMMISSION HAS CONTENDED THAT, WHILST DIFFERENCES OF A TECHNICAL NATURE WERE LIABLE TO MAKE TRADE BETWEEN MEMBER STATES MORE DIFFICULT, THEY NEVERTHELESS DID NOT HAVE THE EFFECT OF MAKING SUCH TRADE IMPOSSIBLE BETWEEN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND FRANCE.
+63 IN REPLY TO A QUESTION PUT BY THE COURT, AEG STATED, IN A LETTER OF 28 JANUARY 1983, THAT UNTIL SEPTEMBER 1981 SECAM TELEVISION STANDARDS WERE COMPULSORY IN FRANCE AND THAT ''THERE WAS NO PRACTICABLE POSSIBILITY THEREFORE OF OVERCOMING THE OBSTACLES TO TRADE RESULTING FROM DIFFERENT STANDARDS IN FRANCE AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC''.
+INSURMOUNTABLE DIFFICULTIES ALSO EXISTED IN RELATION TO IMPORTS FROM THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC INTO BELGIUM, BECAUSE SETS INTENDED FOR BELGIUM HAD TO BE EQUIPPED FOR THE CABLE TELEVISION SYSTEM WHICH IS WIDESPREAD THERE BUT ON THE OTHER HAND DOES NOT EXIST IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY.
+64 DURING THE ORAL PROCEDURE THE COMMISSION POINTED OUT THAT THE FACT THAT VERBINNEN SOLD IN BELGIUM COLOUR TELEVISION SETS BOUGHT IN GERMANY IS A CLEAR DEMONSTRATION THAT THERE ARE NO INSURMOUNTABLE TECHNICAL PROBLEMS IN MARKETING SUCH SETS IN BELGIUM.
+IT MAY ALSO BE SEEN FROM THE FILE THAT DIEDERICHS TOO IMPORTED INTO BELGIUM TELEVISION SETS ORIGINATING IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY.
+65 AS REGARDS IMPORTS OF COLOUR TELEVISION SETS INTO FRANCE, EVEN THOUGH IT MAY BE ADMITTED THAT THEY WERE LIMITED BECAUSE OF THE DIFFERENCE IN BROADCASTING SYSTEMS (SECAM IN FRANCE AND PAL IN GERMANY) IT MUST NEVERTHELESS BE OBSERVED THAT, AS THE COMMISSION MADE CLEAR AT THE HEARING WITHOUT BEING CONTRADICTED BY THE APPLICANT, TFR ALSO MANUFACTURED DURING THE PERIOD UNDER REVIEW SETS WHICH COULD OPERATE WITH BOTH SYSTEMS, WHICH ARE IN SPECIAL DEMAND IN THE FRONTIER REGIONS OF GERMANY AND FRANCE.
+THAT FACT IS SUFFICIENT FOR THE CONCLUSION TO BE DRAWN THAT AEG's POLICY WAS CAPABLE OF AFFECTING ALSO THE EXPORT OF COLOUR TELEVISION SETS FROM THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY TO FRANCE.
+66 IT FOLLOWS FROM THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS THAT THE ARGUMENTS INTENDED TO SHOW THAT TRADE BETWEEN MEMBER STATES COULD NOT HAVE BEEN AFFECTED BY THE DISPUTED CONDUCT CANNOT BE UPHELD.
+III - THE SUBMISSIONS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE COMMISSION's OBJECTIONS RAISED AGAINST AEG ARE UNFOUNDED
+67 THE COMMISSION COMPLAINS THAT AEG, BY AN IMPROPER APPLICATION OF ITS SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM FOR TELEFUNKEN BRAND PRODUCTS, REFUSED TO ADMIT TO ITS DISTRIBUTION NETWORK CERTAIN DISTRIBUTORS WHO NEVERTHELESS SATISFIED THE CONDITIONS FOR ADMISSION AND THAT IT FIXED DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY THE SELLING PRICES TO BE APPLIED BY APPROVED DISTRIBUTORS, THUS INFRINGING ARTICLE 85 (1) OF THE EEC TREATY.
+68 ACCORDING TO THE COMMISSION, THAT DISCRIMINATION AND THAT FIXING OF SELLING PRICES WERE NOT ISOLATED MISTAKES COMMITTED BY OVERZEALOUS MEMBERS OF THE EXTERNAL STAFF BUT INFRINGEMENTS DELIBERATELY AND SYSTEMATICALLY COMMITTED.
+THE EXISTENCE OF A POLICY DESIGNED TO APPLY THE SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM IN SUCH A WAY AS TO ATTAIN OBJECTS NOT IN CONFORMITY WITH COMMUNITY LAW EMERGES CLEARLY, IT IS ALLEGED, FROM THE DOCUMENTS OF THE TFR, ATF AND ATBG SALES DIRECTORATES.
+69 AEG DENIES BOTH THE EXISTENCE OF A GENERAL POLICY DESIGNED TO MAKE AN IMPROPER APPLICATION OF THE SYSTEM AND THE INFRINGEMENTS ALLEGED BY THE COMMISSION IN THE INDIVIDUAL CASES MENTIONED.
+70 ALTHOUGH THE CONTESTED DECISION RELATES EXCLUSIVELY TO THE PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE SYSTEM, IT IS APPROPRIATE TO CONSIDER FIRST THE NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE GENERAL DISTRIBUTION POLICY PURSUED BY AEG.
+71 THE COMMISSION's OBJECTION REGARDING THE DISTRIBUTION POLICY IS BASED ON NUMEROUS DOCUMENTS IMPOUNDED BY THE COMMISSION's INSPECTORS ON THE OCCASION OF THE INSPECTIONS ON THE PREMISES OF TFR, ATF AND ATBG.
+IT IS SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR FROM THOSE DOCUMENTS, TAKEN AS A WHOLE, THAT IT WAS AEG's VIEW THAT THE MAINTENANCE OF A HIGH PROFIT MARGIN WAS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL FOR THE SURVIVAL OF THE SPECIALIST TRADE AND THAT UNDERTAKINGS DISPENSING WITH A HIGH PROFIT MARGIN MUST AUTOMATICALLY BE REGARDED AS INCAPABLE OF PROVIDING THE VERY EXPENSIVE SERVICES ASSOCIATED WITH THE SPECIALIST TRADE.
+72 THAT ATTITUDE CANNOT BE REGARDED AS BEING IN KEEPING WITH A CORRECT APPLICATION OF THE SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM, SINCE THE MAINTENANCE OF A MINIMUM PROFIT MARGIN FOR TRADERS CANNOT IN ANY CASE BE, AS SUCH, ONE OF THE OBJECTS PURSUED BY MEANS OF SUCH A SYSTEM.
+73 THE METRO JUDGMENT REFERRED TO ABOVE, ON WHICH AEG RELIES TO JUSTIFY ITS ATTITUDE, ESTABLISHED IN REALITY A CAUSAL LINK BETWEEN THE MAINTENANCE OF A CERTAIN PRICE LEVEL AND THE POSSIBILITY OF THE SURVIVAL OF THE SPECIALIST TRADE IN CONJUNCTION WITH AN IMPROVEMENT IN COMPETITION AND PERMITS A RESTRICTION OF PRICE COMPETITION ONLY TO THE EXTENT TO WHICH SUCH A RESTRICTION APPEARS NECESSARY TO ENSURE COMPETITION AT THE LEVEL OF THE SERVICES PROVIDED BY THE SPECIALIST TRADE.
+HOWEVER, IF SUCH SERVICES WERE PROVIDED ALSO BY THE SPECIALIST DEPARTMENTS OF DISCOUNT STORES OR OTHER NEW FORMS OF DISTRIBUTION WHICH, THANKS TO THEIR TYPE OF ORGANIZATION, WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO PROVIDE THEM AT A LESSER PRICE, THE MAINTENANCE OF A MINIMUM PROFIT MARGIN WOULD BE DEPRIVED OF ANY JUSTIFICATION INASMUCH AS SUCH A MARGIN WOULD NO LONGER SERVE TO GUARANTEE COMPETITION AFFECTING FACTORS OTHER THAN PRICE.
+74 NOR IS THE ATTITUDE WHICH IS REVEALED BY THE DOCUMENTS MENTIONED IN THE DECISION ACCEPTABLE EITHER IN SO FAR AS, QUITE APART FROM THE PROBLEM OF THE MAINTENANCE OF A HIGH LEVEL OF PRICES, IT PRESUPPOSES THAT THE NEW FORMS OF DISTRIBUTION ARE NOT, BY THEIR VERY NATURE AND TYPE OF ORGANIZATION, CAPABLE OF SATISFYING THE SPECIALIST TRADE CONDITIONS.
+75 SUCH A GENERALIZED APPRAISAL CANNOT BE ACCEPTED, SINCE THERE IS NOTHING TO PREVENT A DISCOUNT STORE FROM ORGANIZING ITS CONSUMER ELECTRONICS DEPARTMENT IN SUCH A WAY AS TO SATISFY THE QUALITATIVE SPECIALIST TRADE CONDITIONS.
+A MANUFACTURER WHO HAS INTRODUCED A SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM CANNOT THEREFORE ABSOLVE HIMSELF, ON THE BASIS OF AN A PRIORI EVALUATION OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE VARIOUS FORMS OF DISTRIBUTION, FROM THE DUTY OF CHECKING IN EACH CASE WHETHER A CANDIDATE FOR ADMISSION SATISFIES THE SPECIALIST TRADE CONDITIONS.
+MOREOVER IT MAY BE SEEN FROM THE FILE THAT AEG WAS COMPELLED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THERE WAS A TENDENCY TO CREATE SPECIALIST DEPARTMENTS EVEN IN THE DISCOUNT STORES AND EVEN TO ADMIT THAT IN CERTAIN CASES THE SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION CONDITIONS WERE SATISFIED.
+76 IT MUST THEREFORE BE CONCLUDED THAT THE DOCUMENTS MENTIONED BY THE COMMISSION DO IN FACT DEMONSTRATE THE EXISTENCE OF A DISTRIBUTION POLICY MOTIVATED BOTH BY A DESIRE TO GUARANTEE A HIGH PROFIT MARGIN FOR APPROVED RESELLERS AND TO IMPEDE, SO FAR AS AT ALL POSSIBLE, THE ADMISSION OF NEW FORMS OF TRADE, WHICH ARE REGARDED A PRIORI AS BEING INCAPABLE OF SATISFYING THE SPECIALIST TRADE CONDITIONS.
+THAT POLICY THEREFORE EXHIBITS CHARACTERISTICS WHICH CANNOT BE RECONCILED WITH A CORRECT APPLICATION OF THE SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM.
+77 THE IMPROPER APPLICATION OF THE SYSTEM BY AEG IS MOREOVER CONFIRMED BY A NUMBER OF INDIVIDUAL CASES MENTIONED BY THE COMMISSION.
+78 THE INDIVIDUAL CASES IN WHICH AEG HAS ARBITRARILY APPLIED ITS SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM HAVE BEEN SUBDIVIDED BY THE COMMISSION INTO THREE CATEGORIES ACCORDING TO THE TYPE OF CONDUCT WHICH IT ALLEGES GAVE RISE TO THE INFRINGEMENT:
+AEG MADE ADMISSION SUBJECT TO A PRICE UNDERTAKING AND EXCLUDED AUTOMATICALLY ALL THOSE WHO WERE NOT PREPARED TO GIVE THAT UNDERTAKING.
+AEG APPLIED THE SYSTEM ON THE BASIS OF A TERRITORIAL CRITERION AND NOT OF A CHECK ON THE REQUIRED CONDITIONS.
+AEG ATTEMPTED TO REQUIRE ITS DISTRIBUTORS, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, TO MAINTAIN CERTAIN PRICES.
+A - THE CASES OF IMPROPER REFUSAL OF ADMISSION
+1. IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
+(A) RATIO STORE
+79 IN POINT (16) OF THE DECISION OF 6 JANUARY 1982 THE COMMISSION STATED THAT: ''THE REFUSAL TO ACCEPT RATIO WAS NOT DUE TO THE ALLEGED ABSENCE OF A SPECIALIST DEPARTMENT, BUT TO THE FACT THAT RATIO WAS A DISCOUNT STORE ''.
+AEG CLAIMS THAT THE REFUSAL TO ADMIT RATIO WAS DUE SOLELY TO THE FACT THAT THAT UNDERTAKING, PARTICULARLY ITS SHOP IN KASSEL, AT NO TIME SATISFIED THE SPECIALIST TRADE CONDITIONS.
+80 IT MAY BE SEEN FROM THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN TFR AND RATIO THAT THE REFUSAL TO SUPPLY RATIO WITH TELEFUNKEN PRODUCTS INCLUDED IN THE ''FIVE-POINT'' PROGRAMME WAS NEVER EXPLAINED BY REFERENCE TO THE FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH PRECISE CONDITIONS OF THE SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION SCHEME.
+THE LETTER OF REFUSAL OF 29 JUNE 1976 CONTAINS ONLY A VERY VAGUE REFERENCE TO THE EFFECT THAT TFR HAD TAKEN ITS DECISION ''AFTER WEIGHING UP ALL THE QUESTIONS INVOLVED'' IN THE CONTEXT OF ARTICLE 85 (1).
+THAT EXPLANATION IN NO WAY CLARIFIES IN WHAT RESPECT RATIO FAILED TO FULFIL THE SPECIALIST TRADE CONDITIONS.
+81 A LETTER OF 22 DECEMBER 1976 FROM RATIO, IN WHICH IT DISPUTED CERTAIN ORAL OBSERVATIONS MADE BY TFR EMPLOYEES ON THE OCCASION OF A VISIT TO THE RATIO STORE IN KASSEL ON 20 MAY 1976 RECEIVED NO REPLY FROM TFR WHICH, MOREOVER, NEVER EXPLAINED WHETHER OR TO WHAT EXTENT THOSE ORAL OBSERVATIONS HAD BEEN TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT AS A BASIS FOR THE REFUSAL.
+82 IT MUST THEREFORE BE STATED THAT TFR NOT ONLY NEVER GAVE ANY REASONS FOR ITS REFUSAL TO SUPPLY, UNLESS AN ALTOGETHER GENERAL AND INDETERMINATE REFERENCE TO THE COMPETITION RULES OF THE TREATY MAY BE REGARDED AS A STATEMENT OF REASONS, BUT DID NOT ENTER EITHER INTO ANY DISCUSSION OF THE REMARKS RECALLED AND DISPUTED BY RATIO WHICH MIGHT HAVE BEEN REGARDED BY TFR AS REASONS JUSTIFYING A REFUSAL TO SUPPLY.
+83 IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO MAINTAIN THAT THE RATIO CASE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN EXAMPLE OF IMPROPER APPLICATION OF THE SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM.
+THE FACT THAT RATIO ABSTAINED FROM BRINGING AN ACTION TO OBTAIN SUPPLIES OF TELEFUNKEN PRODUCTS CANNOT BE INTERPRETED AS MEANING THAT RATIO ACKNOWLEDGED THAT TFR's REFUSAL WAS WELL FOUNDED.
+IN FACT THE BRINGING OF AN ACTION MAY WELL NOT HAVE BEEN IN RATIO's INTERESTS BECAUSE EITHER OF THE FAIRLY HEAVY COSTS WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN INCURRED OR OF THE FACT THAT UNDER GERMAN LAW A RIGHT TO RECEIVE SUPPLIES CAN BE ESTABLISHED ONLY IF THE UNDERTAKING IN QUESTION PROVES THAT IT IS NOT IN A POSITION TO OBTAIN SUPPLIES OF THE PRODUCT CONCERNED FROM OTHER MANUFACTURERS.
+(B) HARDER
+84 IN POINT (17) OF THE DECISION THE COMMISSION STATES THAT THE WHOLESALER HARDER, WHO HAD BEEN BANNED FROM THE DISTRIBUTION NETWORK, WAS REQUIRED AS A CONDITION OF RE-ACCEPTANCE TO UNDERTAKE NOT TO SUPPLY DISCOUNT STORES OR SIMILAR UNDERTAKINGS WITH AEG PRODUCTS AND NOT TO EXPORT THOSE PRODUCTS TO OTHER COMMUNITY COUNTRIES.
+85 AEG CLAIMS THAT THOSE CONDITIONS ARE MENTIONED ONLY IN A LETTER OF 15 DECEMBER 1976 FROM THE FREIBURG SALES OFFICE AND ARE MERELY THE RESULT OF AN INITIATIVE TAKEN BY THE EMPLOYEE IN CHARGE OF THAT OFFICE; THEY SHOW, FURTHERMORE, THAT IT WAS FOR TFR HEAD OFFICE TO TAKE A DECISION ON HARDER's RE-ADMISSION.
+IT MAY BE SEEN, IT IS CLAIMED, FROM TWO LETTERS FROM TFR's LAWYERS OF 29 AUGUST AND 7 SEPTEMBER 1977 THAT THE SUSPENSION OF SUPPLIES TO HARDER, DECIDED UPON BY TFR BY REASON OF NUMEROUS INFRINGEMENTS OF THE AGREEMENT COMMITTED BY HIM, COULD BE TERMINATED ONLY WHEN HARDER HAD HELPED TO EXPLAIN THE INFRINGEMENTS AS PROVIDED BY THE STANDARD SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION AGREEMENT.
+SUPPLIES WERE NOT RESUMED BECAUSE HARDER NEVER COMPLIED WITH THOSE CONDITIONS.
+IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES THERE IS NO REASON FOR TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE PROPOSAL FROM THE FREIBURG SALES OFFICE, WHICH TFR NEVER FOLLOWED UP.
+86 IT MUST BE AGREED THAT IN THE LIGHT OF THE DOCUMENTS IN THE FILE THE FAILURE TO RE-ADMIT HARDER APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN DUE SOLELY TO HARDER's NOT HAVING COMPLIED WITH THE OBLIGATIONS LAID DOWN BY THE STANDARD AGREEMENT SO AS TO EXPUNGE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN INFRINGEMENT THEREOF AND THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY EXPRESSION OF OPINION ON THE PART OF THE COMPETENT OFFICERS OF TFR THERE IS NO EVIDENCE JUSTIFYING THE SUPPOSITION THAT IF HARDER HAD SATISFIED THE ABOVE-MENTIONED CONDITIONS ADDITIONAL UNDERTAKINGS WOULD HAVE BEEN REQUIRED OF HIM OVER AND ABOVE THE OBLIGATIONS RESULTING FROM THE SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM.
+THE CASE OF HARDER CANNOT THEREFORE BE REGARDED AS ADEQUATELY PROVED.
+2. IN FRANCE (A) AUCHAN
+87 ACCORDING TO THE COMMISSION (POINT (23) OF THE DECISION), ATF, AEG's SUBSIDIARY FOR FRANCE, WAS BY NO MEANS DISPOSED TO ADMIT AUCHAN TO ITS DISTRI BUTION NETWORK.
+AUCHAN's ADMISSION, IT IS ALLEGED, TOOK PLACE ONLY AFTER AUCHAN HAD UNDERTAKEN TO ADHERE TO THE PRICES RECOMMENDED BY ATF AND TO TERMINATE ALL PRESS ADVERTISEMENTS FOR TELEFUNKEN PRODUCTS.
+88 AEG CLAIMS THAT IT COULD NOT HAVE ADMITTED AUCHAN BEFORE IT HAD UNDERTAKEN NOT TO INFRINGE COMPETITION RULES.
+89 AEG's ASSERTION IS BY NO MEANS SUPPORTED BY THE DOCUMENTS IN THE FILE, WHICH, LIKE THE ATF MEMORANDUM OF 21 MARCH 1978, SHOW ONLY THAT AUCHAN WAs ''ONE OF THE KEENEST DISCOUNTERs'' CHARGING EXTREMELY LOW PRICES BUT PROVIDE NO EVIDENCE WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY A STATEMENT THAT SUCH PRICES WERE CONTRARY TO NATIONAL LEGISLATION ON COMPETITION.
+90 ON THE OTHER HAND IT APPEARS FROM AN ATF MEMORANDUM OF 20 OCTOBER 1978 THAT AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN ATF AND AUCHAN WAS POSSIBLE ON THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS, NAMELY THAT AUCHAN ''WOULD BE WILLING, IN EXCHANGE FOR OUR DELIVERIES, WHICH IT CLAIMS ARE URGENT AS IT IS NO LONGER PREPARED TO WORK WITH GRUNDIG, TO WITHDRAW ALL PRESS ADVERTISEMENTS FEATURING OUR TELEVISION SETS AND TO ADHERE TO OUR RECOMMENDED PRICES ON CONDITION THAT IN THE TOWN WHERE THE PRODUCTS ARE SOLD NO SHOP OF ANY KIND CHARGES LOWER PRICES, IN WHICH CASE IT WOULD HAVE TO BRING ITS OWN INTO LINE''.
+AUCHAN WAS ADMITTED TO THE AEG DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM ON 3 NOVEMBER 1978.
+91 IT MAY BE SEEN FROM THE FOREGOING THAT, TO OBTAIN SUPPLIES OF TELEFUNKEN CONTRACT GOODS, AUCHAN WAS PREPARED TO IMPOSE ITS OWN LIMITATIONS ON ITS FREEDOM TO ENGAGE IN PRICE COMPETITION BY REFRAINING FROM CHARGING PRICES BELOW THE LOWEST PRICES CHARGED BY TRADERS IN THE TOWN WHERE THE PRODUCTS WERE SOLD.
+SUCH AN UNDERTAKING IS CLEARLY NOT IN CONFORMITY WITH THE CONDITIONS OF THE STANDARD AGREEMENT.
+(B) IFFLI
+92 IN AN ATF MEMORANDUM OF 30 JUNE 1978, REFERRED TO IN POINT (26) OF THE DECISION, IT IS ACTUALLY STATED THAT: ''MR IFFLI UNDERTAKES TO ADHERE TO OUR PRICES AND GIVES AN ASSURANCE THAT HIS PURPOSE IN CHOOSING TELEFUNKEN IS NOT TO SMASH THE BRAND''.
+93 AEG's EXPLANATIONS, ACCORDING TO WHICH THE EXPRESSION ''OUR PRICEs'' REFERS TO ATF SELLING PRICES TO IFFLI AND THE UNDERTAKING ''NOT TO SMASH THE BRAND'' AMOUNTS TO AN UNDERTAKING NOT TO SELL AT PRICES CONTRARY TO COMPETITION RULES, DO NOT RING TRUE.
+IN FACT THE EXPRESSION ''OUR PRICEs'' USED BY ATF COULD NOT BE IMMEDIATELY UNDERSTOOD IF IT REFERRED TO ANYTHING OTHER THAN RETAIL SELLING PRICES AND THE EXPRESSION ''sMASH THE BRAND'' WOULD GENERALLY IMPLY NOTHING OTHER THAN A SALE AT PRICES WHICH A MANUFACTURER MIGHT REGARD AS PREJUDICIAL TO THE WELL-ESTABLISHED REPUTATION OF HIS PRODUCTS.
+THAT POINT OF VIEW, WHICH IS ASSERTED BY THE COMMISSION, MOREOVER FINDS ADDITIONAL SUPPORT IN THE SAME MEMORANDUM OF 30 JUNE, IN WHICH IT IS STATED THAT IFFLI HAD ASKED ATF FOR ITS CONDITIONS FOR PURCHASE AND THAT ATF HAD EXPLAINED TO HIM ITS PRICE POLICY, IN PARTICULAR THE CRITERIA TO BE ADOPTED IN ORDER TO CALCULATE ''THE RETAIL SELLING PRICE INCLUDING ALL TAXES WITH A 25% MARGIN ''.
+94 ATF's CONCERN TO AVOID PRICE COMPETITION MAY BE SEEN MOREOVER FROM ANOTHER PASSAGE IN THE SAME MEMORANDUM IN WHICH IT IS STATED THAT: ''WE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO ARRANGE A FIXED PRICE POLICY AGREEMENT FOR METZ BETWEEN LE ROI DE LA TELE, IFFLI AND DARTY THAN TO LEAVE IFFLI ON THE SIDELINES.
+THE LATTER WOULD IN ANY CASE MANAGE TO OBTAIN TELEFUNKEN EQUIPMENT AND WE SHOULD THEN NO LONGER BE ABLE TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH OUR PRICE POLICY''.
+3. IN BELGIUM (A) DIEDERICHS
+95 AEG ASSERTS THAT THE REFUSAL TO ADMIT THE WHOLESALER DIEDERICHS (POINTS (36) TO (39) OF THE DISPUTED DECISION) WAS BASED ON CONSIDERATIONS RELATING TO DIEDERICHs' s INABILITY TO SATISFY THE SPECIALIST TRADE CONDITIONS.
+96 THAT ARGUMENT CANNOT BE UPHELD. IN ACTUAL FAST IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO FIND IN THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN ATBG AND DIEDERICHS OR IN THE TFR OR ATBG INTERNAL DOCUMENTS ANY MENTION OF THE CONDITIONS WHICH DIEDERICHS IS SUPPOSED NOT TO HAVE MET, EXCEPT FOR A REFERENCE TO THE FACT THAT DIEDERICHS HAD ACTED CONTRARY TO COMPETITION RULES IN IMPORTING TELEFUNKEN CONTRACT GOODS FROM GERMANY AND THAT, TO BE ADMITTED AS AN APPROVED DISTRIBUTOR, HE WOULD HAVE TO UNDERTAKE TO ABSTAIN FROM SUCH CONDUCT IN FUTURE.
+HOWEVER, EFFECTING PARALLEL IMPORTS CANNOT BE REGARDED AS AN INFRINGEMENT OF THE RULES OF COMPETITION, WHEREAS AN UNDERTAKING NO LONGER TO EFFECT SUCH IMPORTS IS MANIFESTLY AN INFRINGEMENT OF COMMUNITY LAW SINCE IT WOULD ALLOW A MANUFACTURER TO WALL OFF NATIONAL MARKETS AND THUS TO CIRCUMVENT THE PRINCIPLE OF THE FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS.
+97 IT MUST THUS BE CONCLUDED THAT THE ONLY REASONS FOR THE REFUSAL TO ADMIT DIEDERICHS WERE REASONS RELATING TO THE MAINTENANCE OF A SPECIFIC DISTRIBUTION STRUCTURE OVER THE VARIOUS NATIONAL MARKETS, AS EMERGES MOREOVER VERY CLEARLY FROM THE STATEMENT IN A TFR MEMORANDUM OF 28 OCTOBER 1977 THAT AEG-BRUSSELS WAs ''OPPOSED TO THE INCLUSION OF DIEDERICHS IN THE INTERESTS OF DISTRIBUTION POLICY''.
+B - THE CASES OF TERRITORIAL PROTECTION
+98 POINT (29) OF THE DECISION STATES THAT ATF ALLOCATED TO THE DISTRIBUTORS WHOM IT HAD RECRUITED A SPECIFIED SALES TERRITORY IN WHICH IT PROMISED THEM A TOTAL ABSENCE OF COMPETITORS IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF TELEFUNKEN PRODUCTS.
+ATF IS SAID TO HAVE REFUSED ALL APPLICATIONS FOR ADMISSION FROM OTHER DEALERS WITHIN THAT AREA.
+99 AEG CLAIMS THAT A CORRECT APPLICATION OF THE SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM REQUIRED FROM ATF ONLY A NEGATIVE OBLIGATION CONSISTING IN NOT REFUSING TO ACCEPT INTO THE SYSTEM APPLICANTS WHO SATISFIED THE SPECIALIST TRADE CONDITIONS, BUT NOT A POSITIVE OBLIGATION CONSISTING IN CANVASSING ALL DISTRIBUTORS WHO SATISFIED THOSE CONDITIONS SO AS TO PERSUADE THEM TO JOIN THE AEG-TELEFUNKEN SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM.
+IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT CLAIMS, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO SPEAK OF AN IMPROPER APPLICATION OF THE SYSTEM UNLESS IT CAN BE SHOWN THAT APPLICANTS SATISFYING THE CONDITIONS FOR ADMISSION WERE REJECTED FOR REASONS OF TERRITORIAL PROTECTION.
+100 THE QUESTION WHETHER ANY TERRITORIAL PROTECTION EXISTED MUST BE CONSIDERED BOTH FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF A GUARANTEE AGAINST THE INITIATIVES OF APPROVED RE-SELLERS FROM OTHER AREAS AND FROM THAT OF A GUARANTEE AGAINST THE ADMISSION OF FRESH DEALERS IN A GIVEN AREA.
+1. THE CASE OF LE ROI DE LA TELE
+101 IT MAY BE SEEN FROM A LETTER OF 9 NOVEMBER 1972 FROM ATF THAT ATF FELT IT COULD NOT COMPLY WITH A REQUEST FOR SUPPLIES FROM MR IFFLI BECAUSE OF ITS COMMITMENTS WITH REGARD TO DISTRIBUTION IN THE METZ AREA WITH LE ROI DE LA TELEVISION.
+AN ATF INTERNAL MEMORANDUM OF 30 JUNE 1978 STATES: ''WE ARE AWARE OF THE PROBLEM WHICH THIS APPLICATION RAISES AS REGARDS METZ IN VIEW OF THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS WHICH LE ROI DE LA TELE HAS HAD UP TO NOW.
+BUT A DECISION WILL HAVE TO BE TAKEN.
+''THAT INDICATES THAT TERRITORIAL PROTECTION HAD BEEN GRANTED TO LE ROI DE LA TELE EVEN BEFORE THE INTRODUCTION OF THE SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM UNTIL 1978 AND WAS ABANDONED ONLY WHEN ATF, CONFRONTED WITH A FRESH APPLICATION FROM IFFLI, TOOK THE VIEW THAT BOTH FINANCIAL AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS MILITATED STRONGLY AGAINST THE REJECTION OF THE APPLICATION.
+2. LAMA
+102 POINT (34) OF THE DECISION MENTIONS IN A LETTER OF 23 OCTOBER 1978 IN WHICH ATF WROTE TO THE WHOLESALER LAMA IN PARIS THAT: ''IN THE CASE OF WHOLESALERS IT IS NORMAL THAT WE SHOULD GRANT THEM DE FACTO EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS OVER A GIVEN TERRITORY, ALTHOUGH THAT IS BECOMING ILLEGAL IN THE LIGHT OF THE SCRIVENER CIRCULAR''.
+103 AEG CLAIMS THAT THAT LETTER DOES NOT PROVE SPECIFIC CONDUCT ON THE PART OF ATF DESIGNED TO REFUSE ADMISSION OF A TRADER TO ITS DISTRIBUTION NETWORK SO AS TO GRANT TERRITORIAL PROTECTION TO AN APPROVED RE-SELLER AND THAT THE SENTENCE QUOTED BY THE COMMISSION WAS USED SIMPLY TO STRESS, WITH SOME EXAGGERATIONS NORMAL IN TRADE REPORTS, ATF's READINESS TO OBLIGE A TRADE ASSOCIATE.
+104 IT MUST HOWEVER BE OBSERVED THAT A GRANT OF DE FACTO EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS CANNOT BE PUT INTO EFFECT EXCEPT BY EXCLUDING OTHER DISTRIBUTORS ACTIVE IN THE SAME AREA AS THE APPROVED RE-SELLER.
+BY ACKNOWLEDGING THAT THE GRANT OF DE FACTO EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS WAS IN KEEPING WITH ITS NORMAL PRACTICE AND BY CONFIRMING ITS UNDERTAKING TO MAINTAIN THAT PRACTICE WITH REGARD TO LAMA, ATF THEREFORE ITSELF PROVIDED EVIDENCE OF IMPROPER CONDUCT.
+3. RADIO DU CENTRE
+105 IN A LETTER OF 2 MARCH 1978 ATF WROTE TO RADIO DU CENTRE THAT ITS COMMERCIAL OBJECTIVES IN THE COLOUR TELEVISION AND RADIO-ELECTRO-ACOUSTICS SECTOR FOR 1978 ''OBLIGE US TO RECONSIDER OUR 1977 AGREEMENTS AS FAR AS THE ALLOCATION OF YOUR AREA OF ACTIVITY FOR OUR BRAND IS CONCERNED''.
+IF ATF WAS OBLIGED, IN ORDER TO ARRANGE A JOINT OPERATION BY RADIO DU CENTRE AND SNER IN THE DEPARTMENT OF PUY-DE-DOME, TO AMEND THE AGREEMENTS ENTERED INTO WITH RADIO DU CENTRE, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO AVOID THE CONCLUSION THAT THOSE AGREEMENTS GUARANTEED RADIO DU CENTRE TERRITORIAL PROTECTION WHICH PREVENTED ATF FROM ACCEPTING IN THE SAME AREA APPLICATIONS FOR ADMISSION FROM OTHER TRADERS.
+4. SCHADROFF
+106 THE WHOLESALER SCHADROFF, BOURG ST ANDEOL, COMPLAINED THAT A WHOLESALER FROM MARSEILLE HAD MADE OFFERS IN ITS SALES AREA AND ATF WROTE TO SCHADROFF ON 13 APRIL 1979 TO THE EFFECT THAT ONE OF ITS EMPLOYEES HAD ''ASKED THE MARSEILLE WHOLESALER TO STOP MAKING SUCH OFFERS IN YOUR SALES AREA'' AND REMINDED SCHADROFF THAT HE ENJOYED ''DE FACTO EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS... WHICH WE HAVE ALWAYS DEFENDED, AS WE HAVE PROVED ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONs''.
+THAT LETTER SHOWS THAT ATF TOOK ACTIVE STEPS TO PREVENT OTHER APPROVED TRADERS FROM INVADING THE EXCLUSIVE SALES AREA GRANTED TO SCHADROFF.
+C - THE CASES OF INFLUENCE BROUGHT TO BEAR ON PRICES
+1. DIRECT INFLUENCE
+(A) IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
+(I) SUMA
+107 THE MEMORANDUM FROM THE AEG SALES OFFICE IN MUNICH DATED 20 APRIL 1977 IN WHICH IT IS STATED THAT SUMA HAD PROMISED ''NOT TO ACT AS A PRICE LEADER BUT, AT MOST, TO TAKE THE LOWEST PRICE ON THE MARKET AND, IF POSSIBLE, TO ADOPT A POSITION SOMEWHERE BETWEEN AVERAGE SHOP PRICES AND THE LOWEST PRICEs'' LEAVES NO DOUBT THAT SUMA WAS INDUCED TO RESTRICT ITS FREEDOM OF COMPETITION IN THE MATTER OF SELLING PRICES.
+(II) HOLDER
+108 A TFR MEMORANDUM OF 30 NOVEMBER 1976, MENTIONED IN POINT (41) OF THE DECISION, STATES THAT TFR HAD ''EXPLAINED IN DETAIL TO HOLDER THE DISTRIBUTION AND PRICE-FIXING POLICY''.
+109 AEG HAS CLAIMED IN THAT CONNECTION THAT THAT CASE CONCERNED A CONVERSATION RELATING TO THE INTRODUCTION OF A QUITE NEW ITEM OF TFR EQUIPMENT, THE TRX 2000, WHICH HOWEVER WAS VERY DEAR.
+THE NEED FOR IT TO BE VERY CAREFULLY LAUNCHED MADE IT NECESSARY TO EXPLAIN IN DETAIL TO RE-SELLERS THE METHOD OF DISTRIBUTION OF THE EQUIPMENT AND THE PRICES WHICH COULD BEST ENSURE ITS COMMERCIAL SUCCESS.
+110 EVEN ON THE SUPPOSITION THAT, AS IS PROBABLE, TFR DID NOT RESTRICT ITSELF TO GIVING HOLDER INFORMATION AS TO THE PRICE WHICH, REGARD BEING HAD TO THE MARKET SITUATION, WAS BEST ADAPTED TO THE LAUNCH OF THE NEW EQUIPMENT, BUT ACTUALLY INTENDED TO FIX A SELLING PRICE FOR IT, NEVERTHELESS, IN CONTRAST TO THE SUMA CASE IN WHICH THE PRICE UNDERTAKING COVERED THE WHOLE RANGE OF TELEFUNKEN CONTRACT GOODS, THE INFRINGEMENT OF THE COMPETITION RULES WOULD CONCERN HERE ONLY A SINGLE MODEL WITHIN A SINGLE CATEGORY OF CONTRACT GOODS AND IN RESPECT OF ONE SMALL RETAILER, WHICH WOULD MEAN THAT THIS SHORTCOMING WAS DEPRIVED OF MOST OF ITS SIGNIFICANCE.
+(B) IN FRANCE
+(I) DARTY
+111 AN ATF LETTER OF 26 MAY 1978, MENTIONED IN POINT (42) OF THE DECISION, REFERS TO AN ''UNDERTAKING GIVEN BY THE DARTY COMPANY TO INCREASE ITS RETAIL PRICEs''.
+112 THE FACT THAT THE UNDERTAKING GIVEN BY DARTY CONSISTED IN BRINGING TO AN END A PROMOTIONAL CAMPAIGN IN THE PARIS REGION AND IN REVERTING TO ITS ORIGINAL PRICES IN NO WAY MEANS THAT THE STEPS TAKEN BY ATF TO ACHIEVE THAT RESULT DID NOT AMOUNT TO UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE BROUGHT TO BEAR ON PRICES.
+AEG's STATEMENT THAT THE WORD ''UNDERTAKING'' WAS USED IN ERROR, WHEREAS WHAT WAS INVOLVED WAS A UNILATERAL DECISION ON DARTY's PART, LACKS PLAUSIBILITY, THE MORE SO AS A VISIT TO DARTY OF ONE OF ATF's MANAGERS CONCERNED, AS A MEMORANDUM OF 5 JUNE 1978 EXPRESSLY SHOWS, ''PRICES CHARGED FOR COLOUR TELEVISION SETS IN PARIs''.
+(ii) THE PARIS DISTRIBUTORS
+113 THE AFOREMENTIONED MEMORANDUM ALSO REFERS, AS REGARDS THE PARIS REGION, TO THE FACT THAT ON 2 JUNE 1978 ''EVERYBODY'' sEEMED WILLING TO INCREASE PRICES AND THAT ONLY FNAC HAD NOT ALREADY DONE SO, FOR WHICH REASON ATF's MR HONDRE WAS TO MAKE CONTACT WITH FNAC.
+114 AEG DENIES THAT THE EXPRESSION ''EVERYBODY'' CAN RELATE TO ''THE RETAILERS IN PARIS SUPPLIED BY ATF'' AS IS STATED IN POINT (43) OF THE DECISION, BUT THE THIRD HEADING IN THE MEMORANDUM ( ''PRICES CHARGED IN PARIs''), TOGETHER WITH THE WORD ''EVERYBODY'', IS IN CONFLICT WITH THE VIEW THAT THAT MEMORANDUM CONCERNED ONLY DARTY AND FNAC.
+115 IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES THE EXISTENCE OF AN AGREEMENT ON PRICES BETWEEN AEG AND THE RETAILERS IN THE PARIS REGION MAY BE REGARDED AS PROVED.
+(III) CAMIF
+116 POINT (44) OF THE DECISION BASES THE CAMIF CASE ON THE FOLLOWING PASSAGE FROM AN ATF MEMORANDUM OF 5 JUNE 1978: ''IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT CERTAIN RETAILERS, INCLUDING DARTY, REGARD CAMIF AS A NORMAL CUSTOMER AND THUS AS A COMPETITOR AND ARE THEREFORE INCLINED TO ALIGN THEMSELVES ON CAMIF PRICE CATALOGUES, WE TOOK STEPS ON 2 INST. TO ASK MR DECHAMBRE TO INCREASE THE RETAIL PRICES OF GOODS IN HIS 1978 WINTER CATALOGUE''.
+IN VIEW OF THIS VERBATIM QUOTATION AEG's MERE ASSERTION THAT ATF INVITED CAMIF TO INCREASE ITS PRICES SO AS TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF AN INCREASE IN AEG's SELLING PRICES WHICH WAS TO TAKE PLACE IN SEPTEMBER 1978 SEEMS VERY UNCONVINCING.
+(IV) CART
+117 IN A LETTER OF 4 NOVEMBER 1977, MENTIONED IN POINT (46) OF THE DECISION, ATF REMINDS CART OF THE PRICE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO UNDERTAKINGS AND EMPHASIZES THAT CART's FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THOSE COMMITMENTS CAN ONLY ''CAST A SHADOW OVER OUR COMMERCIAL RELATIONs''.
+IT ADDS THAT: ''THE REACTION OF CERTAIN OF OUR REPRESENTATIVES HAS INEVITABLY COME TO OUR NOTICE, SINCE THEY FEEL THAT CART, INSTEAD OF ENCOURAGING THE KEEPING UP OF PRICES, IS SELLING OFF DIRT CHEAP''.
+ATF FINALLY ASKS CART IF IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO STOP THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE CART CATALOGUE CONTAINING THE DISPUTED PRICES OR IF NECESSARY TO WITHDRAW IT.
+118 THE REQUEST TO KEEP PRICES UP, WHICH WAS THE PURPOSE OF THE LETTER OF 4 NOVEMBER 1977 CAN IN NO WAY BE JUSTIFIED BY REFERENCE TO THE NEED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF AN INCREASE IN SELLING PRICES TO THE WHOLESALE TRADE WHICH TOOK PLACE ONLY IN SEPTEMBER 1978.
+FURTHERMORE THE LETTER OF 21 JULY 1978, INFORMING CART OF THAT INCREASE, IS NOT RESTRICTED SIMPLY TO INDICATING THE RETAIL SELLING PRICES WHICH MIGHT BE CHARGED TO TAKE ACCOUNT THEREOF, BUT ADDS: ''AS AGREED BETWEEN US, WE ASK YOU TO TAKE ACCOUNT IN THE PUBLICATION OF YOUR CATALOGUE OF THE RETAIL SELLING PRICES SET OUT ABOVE AND TO REGARD THEM AS MINIMUM PRICEs''.
+(V) FNAC, DARTY AND GRANDS MAGASINS
+119 AN ATF MEMORANDUM OF 13 OCTOBER 1978 (POINT (45) OF THE DECISION), ENTITLED ''RETAIL PRICES AS FROM 18.9.1978'', CONTAINS THE FOLLOWING PASSAGE: ''WE ARE ARRANGING WITH OUR CUSTOMERS SIEGE,'' THAT IS TO SAY DARTY, ''FNAC AND GRANDS MAGASINS FOR ALL THESE PRICES TO BE APPLIED ON 2 NOVEMBER 1978''.
+EVEN IF, AS AEG ASSERTS, THAT PASSAGE RELATES ONLY TO THE PASSING ON IN THE RETAIL PRICES OF THE INCREASE IN THE WHOLESALE PRICES, THE FACT REMAINS THAT ATF EXERTED PRESSURE ON CERTAIN OF ITS DISTRIBUTORS TO PASS THE INCREASE ON AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND EVEN CONCLUDED AN AGREEMENT WITH THEM TO THAT EFFECT.
+(VI) CAPOFERM
+120 IT MAY BE SEEN FROM AN ATF INTERNAL MEMORANDUM OF 3 APRIL 1979 THAT THE RETAIL GROUPS CAPOFERM/DARTY HAD GIVEN AN UNDERTAKING TO ATF THAT A SPECIAL PREMIUM WHICH HAD BEEN GRANTED TO THEM TO PAY FOR OLD TELEVISION SETS HANDED IN AS A MEANS OF PROMOTING THE SALE OF NEW SETS WOULD NOT BE USED TO REDUCE RETAIL PRICES.
+121 IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THAT PREMIUM WAS ALREADY DEDUCTED FROM THE PRICE INVOICED BY ATF, THE DISTRIBUTOR WAS IN PRACTICE UNDERTAKING TO PRESERVE THE SAME PROFIT MARGIN BOTH IN THE EVENT OF THE HANDING IN OF AN OLD SET AND THUS OF THE PAYMENT OF THE PREMIUM TO THE CUSTOMER AND IN THE EVENT OF THE SET's BEING SOLD WITHOUT THE PRODUCTION OF AN OLD ONE.
+THAT UNDERTAKING TO RETAIN A MINIMUM PRICE EVEN WHERE, IN THE ABSENCE OF THE HANDING IN OF AN OLD SET, THE PREMIUM MAY BE REGARDED AS A MERE ADVANTAGE GRANTED TO THE DISTRIBUTOR, AMOUNTS TO A PRICE AGREEMENT WHICH IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH COMMUNITY COMPETITION LAW.
+(C) IN BELGIUM (I) VERBINNEN
+122 POINT (39) OF THE CONTESTED DECISION REFERS TO THE FACT THAT, ACCORDING TO INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE BELGIAN RETAILER VERBINNEN, ATBG HAD REQUESTED HIM IN JANUARY OR FEBRUARY TO INCREASE THE PRICE OF A TELEFUNKEN TELEVISION SET SO AS TO BRING IT UP TO THE RETAIL PRICE LEVEL IN THAT PART OF BELGIUM.
+123 THE INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY VERBINNEN TO THE COMMISSION IN TWO LETTERS OF 3 AND 27 NOVEMBER 1980 DOES NOT SHOW THAT ATBG EXERTED PRESSURE TO REQUIRE HIM TO KEEP TO CERTAIN RETAIL SELLING PRICES.
+NOR DOES IT EMERGE FROM THE LETTER OF 27 NOVEMBER THAT ATBG ATTEMPTED TO FORCE VERBINNEN TO CHARGE THE PRICES FIXED BY TELEFUNKEN.
+VERBINNEN HIMSELF USES IN HIS LETTER THE DUTCH WORD ''VOORSTELLEN'', WHICH MEANs ''sUGGESTIONs'' AND IT WOULD NO DOUBT BE GOING TOO FAR TO TAKE THE VIEW THAT A REFERENCE IN AN INFORMAL CONVERSATION TO A PRICE WHICH ATBG REGARDED AS CHARGEABLE FOR A GIVEN TYPE OF EQUIPMENT IS IN ITSELF TANTAMOUNT TO BRINGING AN UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE TO BEAR ON PRICES.
+2. INDIRECT INFLUENCE
+(A) SUMA
+124 POINT (49) OF THE DECISION STATES, WITH REFERENCE TO A TFR MEMORANDUM OF 20 APRIL 1977 THAT A GOOD CONDUCT BONUS OF 2% ON TURNOVER HAD BEEN PROMISED TO SUMA AS A REWARD FOR THE RESTRAINT IT HAD SHOWN IN THE FIELD OF PRICE COMPETITION.
+125 AEG HAS PROVIDED VARIOUS EXPLANATIONS REGARDING THE NATURE OF THAT BONUS: AT THE HEARING ON 19 AUGUST 1980 IT STATED THAT IT WAS A RECOMPENSE FOR MAKING AVAILABLE ADVERTISING SPACE IN SHOP WINDOWS AND SHOPS; SUBSEQUENTLY IT CLAIMED THAT IT WAS IN FACT ONLY AN EXTRA REBATE IN VIEW OF SUMA's IMPORTANCE AS A CUSTOMER.
+126 MR WALTENBERGER, SUMA's MANAGER, FOR HIS PART STATED ON 2 SEPTEMBER 1980 TO AN OFFICER OF THE COMMISSION THAT: ''THE GOOD CONDUCT BONUS OF 2% OFFERED BY AEG IN TALKS WITH SUMA ON 20 APRIL 1977''(CF. AEG MEMORANDUM OF THAT DATE) ''WAS TO BE GRANTED ON THE GROUND THAT AEG WAS IN PRINCIPLE TO BE INFORMED OF THE ARTICLE TO WHICH THE PUBLICITY CAMPAIGN RELATED BEFORE PRESS ADVERTISEMENTS APPEARED.
+IN ADDITION AEG-TELEFUNKEN SECURED AGREEMENT THAT PARTICULARLY AGGRESSIVE PRICES OFFERED BY COMPETITORS WOULD BE COMMUNICATED TO TELEFUNKEN AND WOULD NOT BE IMMEDIATELY ADOPTED BY SUMA UNLESS IT WAS CLEAR THAT THEY WERE CAMPAIGNS BY COMPETITORS OF UNLIMITED DURATION ''.
+127 A LETTER OF 15 OCTOBER SENT TO THE COMMISSION BY AEG's LAWYERS, WHICH MR WALTENBERGER BY A TELEX MESSAGE OF 29 OCTOBER 1980 DECLARED TO BE FULLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FACTS, DENIES THAT ANY INFLUENCE WAS BROUGHT TO BEAR ON PRICES BUT EXPRESSLY CONCEDES THAT THE ''BONUs'' WAS OFFICIALLY PRESENTED AS A REWARD FOR INFORMATION WITH WHICH SUMA SUPPLIED TELEFUNKEN ON MARKET TRENDS.
+128 EVEN IF, INTERPRETING ALL THE STATEMENTS MENTIONED ABOVE IN THE WAY MOST FAVOURABLE TO AEG, THE COURT WERE TO TAKE THE VIEW THAT THE 2% BONUS RELATED SIMPLY TO AN UNDERTAKING ON THE PART OF SUMA TO INFORM TFR OF THE PRICES CHARGED BY SUMA ITSELF AND THE OTHER DISTRIBUTORS, THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT SUCH AN UNDERTAKING WAS SUCH AS TO ALLOW TFR TO KEEP A CHECK ON THE PRICES CHARGED BY SUMA, WHICH HAD EXPRESSLY AGREED, AS IS CLEAR FROM THE MEMORANDUM OF 20 APRIL 1977 FROM THE AEG SALES OFFICE IN MUNICH, TO ADOPT A MODERATE ATTITUDE WITH REGARD TO COMPETITION AND TO FACILITATE TFR's INTERVENTION IF OTHER APPROVED DISTRIBUTORS OPERATED TOO AGGRESSIVE A PRICE POLICY.
+SINCE THE OBLIGATION LINKED WITH THE BONUS THUS HAD THE EFFECT OF FACILITATING TFR's CONTROL OVER PRICES, IT MUST BE CONCLUDED THAT THE BONUS AMOUNTED IN FACT TO A MEANS OF EXERTING AN INDIRECT INFLUENCE ON PRICES.
+3. OTHER INDIVIDUAL CASES OF INFLUENCE BROUGHT TO BEAR ON PRICES
+(a) WILHELM
+129 IN A LETTER OF 22 JULY 1976 TO THE SAARBRUCKEN SALES OFFICE, TFR ASKED FOR INFORMATION ABOUT WILHELM's ''VERY DISTURBING PRICEs'' AND ASKED THE REASONS FOR ''THIS FRESH PRICE-OFFENSIVE''.
+HOWEVER, CONTRARY TO THE COMMISSION's VIEW, AN IMPLIED REQUEST TO TAKE STEPS AGAINST AN UNDERTAKING CHARGING REDUCED PRICES CANNOT BE DEDUCED FROM THAT LETTER, WHICH MAY VERY WELL BE INTERPRETED AS REQUESTING THE ADDRESSEE TO CHECK WHETHER WILHELM's CONDUCT WAS CORRECT.
+IN FACT THAT WAS THE SENSE IN WHICH THE LETTER WAS UNDERSTOOD BY THE SAARBRUCKEN SALES OFFICE, WHICH REPLIED ON 22 JULY 1976 THAT WILHELM's OFFERS FORMED PART OF NORMAL PRICE COMPETITION.
+(B) SCHLEMBACH
+130 IN A MEMORANDUM OF 9 SEPTEMBER 1977, MENTIONED IN POINT (51) OF THE DECISION, THE EMPLOYEE IN CHARGE OF TFR's COLOGNE OFFICE REPORTED THAT ON 8 SEPTEMBER 1977 HE HAD HELD A ''FRANK AND AT TIMES HEATED DISCUSSION'' WITH THE RETAILER SCHLEMBACH CONCERNING HIS NEWSPAPER ADVERTISING OF TELEFUNKEN PRODUCTS AND THAT HE HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT ''A REPETITION OF THE ADVERTISEMENTS WOULD LEAD TO A CONSIDERABLE WORSENING OF RELATIONs''.
+SINCE AEG HAS NOT SUCCEEDED IN ADDUCING ANY EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF ITS ALLEGATION THAT THE ADVERTISEMENTS IN QUESTION CONSTITUTED AN INFRINGEMENT OF GERMAN COMPETITION LAW, IT MUST BE STATED THAT THE THREATS OF AN INTERRUPTION OF TRADE RELATIONS WERE COMPLETELY UNJUSTIFIED AND WERE SIMPLY DESIGNED TO EXERT AN IMPROPER INFLUENCE ON THE PRICES OF THE TRADER IN QUESTION.
+(C) GRUONER, SUDSCHALL AND MASSA
+131 THE CASES OF GRUONER, SUDSCHALL AND MASSA WERE WRONGLY MENTIONED IN THE DECISION SINCE, AS MAY BE SEEN FROM A REPORT OF 31 OCTOBER 1978 FROM THE MANNHEIM SALES OFFICE, THOSE UNDERTAKINGS HAD MARKETED, AT VERY LOW PRICES STIGMATIZED BY TFR AS DISRUPTIVE, IMPERIAL MODEL TELEVISION SETS WHICH WERE NOT SUBJECT TO THE TELEFUNKEN SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM.
+IN SUCH CASES THERE CAN THEREFORE BE NO QUESTION OF AN IMPROPER APPLICATION OF THAT SYSTEM.
+(D) KAUFHOF (KASSEL) AND HERTIE (FRANKFURT)
+132 IN THE REPORT OF 31 OCTOBER 1978 PREVIOUSLY REFERRED TO, IT IS STATED THAT OFFERS AT VERY LOW PRICES MADE INTER ALIOS BY KAUFHOF (KASSEL) AND HERTIE (FRANKFURT) HAD DISRUPTED THE MARKET AND THAT ''CONSIDERABLE EFFORTS WERE NEEDED BEFORE ORDER COULD BE RESTORED''.
+133 AEG STATES THAT THAT EXPRESSION REFERS TO THE EFFORTS WHICH IT HAD TO MAKE TO CONVINCE THE OTHER DISTRIBUTORS, WHO WERE ALARMED BY THOSE TWO RETAILERs' vERY LOW PRICES, THAT THE SPECIAL OFFERS MADE BY KAUFHOF AND HERTIE WERE NOT BASED ON SPECIALLY ADVANTAGEOUS CONDITIONS OF SUPPLY OFFERED TO THEM BY TFR.
+134 AS THE COMMISSION HAS NOT ATTEMPTED TO CLARIFY THAT POINT, THE RATHER VAGUE SENTENCE IN THE DOCUMENT REFERRED TO ABOVE CANNOT BE REGARDED AS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH TH EXISTENCE OF AN INFRINGEMENT.
+D - CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE INDIVIDUAL CASES
+135 AN EXAMINATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL CASES REFERRED TO BY THE COMMISSION MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO REACH THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS:
+(a) AN IMPROPER APPLICATION OF THE SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM MUST BE REGARDED AS SUFFICIENTLY PROVED IN LAW IN THE FOLLOWING CASES: RATIO, AUCHAN, IFFLI, DIEDERICHS (ADMISSION SUBJECT TO IMPROPER CONDITIONS); LE ROI DE LA TELE, LAMA, RADIO DU CENTRE, SCHADROFF (TERRITORIAL PROTECTION); SUMA, DARTY, CAMIF, CART, FNAC (DIRECT INFLUENCE BROUGHT TO BEAR ON PRICES); DARTY, FNAC, DEALERS IN PARIS AND GRANDS MAGASINS (PRICE AGREEMENT); SUMA (INDIRECT INFLUENCE BROUGHT TO BEAR ON PRICES); AND SCHLEMBACH (ATTEMPT TO INFLUENCE PRICES).
+(b)ON THE OTHER HAND THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE COMMISSION IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO PROVE AN INFRINGEMENT OF THE COMPETITION RULES IN THE CASES OF HARDER, HOLDER, WILHELM, GRUONER, SUDSCHALL, MASSA, KAUFHOF (KASSEL), HERTIE (FRANKFURT) AND VERBINNEN, WHILST THE MAMMOUTH CASE CANNOT BE CONSIDERED BECAUSE IT WAS NOT MENTIONED IN THE STATEMENT OF OBJECTIONS AND WAS NOT COMMUNICATED TO AEG BEFORE THE DECISION WAS ADOPTED.
+136 IT IS CLEAR FROM THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS THAT AEG's SYSTEMATIC CONDUCT IN THE IMPROPER APPLICATION OF THE SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM MUST BE REGARDED AS HAVING BEEN SUFFICIENTLY PROVED IN LAW.
+THE FACT THAT THE COMMISSION HAS NOT SUCCEEDED IN PROVING A NUMBER OF INDIVIDUAL CASES DOES NOT CALL IN QUESTION THE SYSTEMATIC NATURE OF AEG's IMPROPER CONDUCT AND DOES NOT AFFECT THE SCOPE OF THE INFRINGEMENT AS DETERMINED BY THE COMMISSION IN ITS DECISION OF 6 JANUARY 1982.
+137 THE COURT FEELS THAT IT MUST EMPHASIZE THE GRAVITY OF SUCH AN INFRINGEMENT, WHICH CONSISTS IN APPLYING A SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM, AFTER ITS APPROVAL BY THE COMMISSION, IN A MANNER CONTRARY TO THE UNDERTAKINGS ENTERED INTO BY THE APPLICANT, UPON WHICH THE COMPATIBILITY OF THE SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM WITH ARTICLE 85 OF THE TREATY DEPENDED.
+138 IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THERE ARE NO GROUNDS FOR FIXING THE FINE AT AN AMOUNT OTHER THAN THAT DETERMINED BY THE COMMISSION.
+AEG's APPLICATION FOR A DECLARATION THAT THE COMMISSION's DECISION OF 6 JANUARY 1982 IS VOID MUST THEREFORE BE DISMISSED IN ITS ENTIRETY.
+IV - INTEREST
+139 THE QUESTION WHETHER AEG IS REQUIRED TO PAY INTEREST ON THE AMOUNT OF THE FINE UNTIL THE DATE OF THE ACTUAL PAYMENT REMAINS TO BE CONSIDERED.
+140 DURING THE PROCEEDINGS AEG CLAIMED THAT THERE WAS NO LEGAL BASIS IN COMMUNITY LAW FOR ANY REQUIREMENT TO PAY DEFAULT INTEREST.
+141 THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THAT, PARTICULARLY IN A SITUATION TYPIFIED BY VERY HIGH INTEREST RATES, THERE MAY BE A CONSIDERABLE ADVANTAGE FOR AN UNDERTAKING IN DELAYING THE PAYMENT OF A FINE AS LONG AS POSSIBLE.
+IF THE VIEW WERE TO BE TAKEN THAT MEASURES DESIGNED TO OFFSET THAT ADVANTAGE WERE NOT PERMISSIBLE IN COMMUNITY LAW THAT WOULD AMOUNT TO ENCOURAGING MANIFESTLY UNFOUNDED ACTIONS WITH THE SOLE OBJECT OF DELAYING PAYMENT OF THE FINE.
+IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO IMAGINE THAT SUCH AN EFFECT WAS INTENDED WHEN THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY CONCERNING LEGAL REMEDIES AGAINST MEASURES ADOPTED BY THE INSTITUTIONS WERE DRAFTED.
+142 MOREOVER THE SAME PRINCIPLE IS EXPRESSED IN ARTICLE 86 (2) OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE COURT ACCORDING TO WHICH, IF THE COURT ADOPTS AN ORDER SUSPENDING THE OPERATION OF A MEASURE OR ANY OTHER INTERIM ORDER, ''THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE ORDER MAY BE MADE CONDITIONAL ON THE LODGING BY THE APPLICANT OF SECURITY OF AN AMOUNT AND NATURE TO BE FIXED IN THE LIGHT OF THE CIRCUMSTANCEs''.
+143 ON THE BASIS OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS IT IS CLEAR THAT AEG MUST PAY THE COMMISSION DEFAULT INTEREST ON THE AMOUNT OF THE FINE.
+AS REGARDS THE AMOUNT TO BE PAID IN THAT CONNECTION, AS AEG HAS NOT DISPUTED EITHER THE RATE OF INTEREST DUE TO THE COMMISSION OR THE DATE FROM WHICH THE INTEREST IS PAYABLE, THERE IS NO NEED FOR THE COURT TO ARRIVE AT A DECISION IN THAT RESPECT.
+144 UNDER ARTICLE 69 (2) OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE, THE UNSUCCESSFUL PARTY IS TO BE ORDERED TO PAY THE COSTS IF THEY HAVE BEEN ASKED FOR IN THE SUCCESSFUL PARTY's PLEADING.
+AS THE APPLICANT HAS FAILED IN ITS SUBMISSIONS IT MUST BE ORDERED TO PAY THE COSTS.
+ON THOSE GROUNDS THE COURT HEREBY:
+1. DISMISSES THE APPLICATION;
+2. ORDERS AEG-TELEFUNKEN AG TO PAY TO THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES DEFAULT INTEREST ON THE FINE IMPOSED;
+3. ORDERS THE APPLICANT TO PAY THE COSTS INCURRED BY THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES.

data/principle-mvep-justice-court/mvep-117-hr.aligned.txt

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+U predmetu 107/82,
+ALLGEMEINE ELEKTRICITÄTS-GESELLSCHAFT AEG-TELEFUNKEN AG, Frankfurt na Majni, koji zastupaju Martin Hirsch i Fritz Oesterle iz odvjetničkog ureda Gleiss, Lutz, Hootz, Hirsch i partneri, Stuttgart, s izabranom adresom za dostavu u Luxembourgu, pri odvjetničkom uredu Ernesta Arendta, 34 b, Rue Philippe-II,
+tužitelj, protiv KOMISIJE EUROPSKIH ZAJEDNICA, koju zastupaju Christoph Bail i Götz zur Hausen, članovi pravne službe, u svojstvu agenata, s izabranom adresom za dostavu u Luxembourgu, kod Orestea Montalta, člana njezine pravne službe, zgrada Jean Monnet, Kirchberg,
+tuženika,
+povodom tužbe za poništenje Odluke Komisije br. 82/267/EEZ od 6. siječnja 1982. o postupku u skladu s člankom 85. UEZ-a (IV/28.748 – AEG-Telefunken; SL L 117, str. 15.), SUD,
+donosi sljedeću Presudu 1 Tužbom podnesenom tajništvu Suda 24. ožujka 1982. društvo Allgemeine Elektricitäts-Gesellschaft AEG-Telefunken AG (u daljnjem tekstu: AEG), u Frankfurtu na Majni, pokrenulo je postupak na temelju drugog stavka članka 173. Ugovora o EEZ-u za poništenje Odluke Komisije br. 82/267/EEZ od 6. siječnja 1982. o postupku u skladu s člankom 85. UEZ-a (IV/28.748/EEZ – AEG-Telefunken).
+2 Tužitelj, dioničko društvo osnovano u skladu s njemačkim pravom, među ostalim sudjeluje u razvoju, proizvodnji i stavljanju na tržište potrošačkih elektroničkih proizvoda (televizora, radijskih prijamnika, magnetofona, gramofona i audiovizualne opreme).
+Od 1970. te proizvode proizvodi i na tržište stavlja Telefunken Fernseh- und Rundfunk-GmbH (u daljnjem tekstu: TFR), društvo kći AEG-a koje je od 1. lipnja 1979. neovisan dio AEG-a.
+Proizvode Telefunkena u Njemačkoj na tržište stavljaju prodajni uredi ili poslovnice AEG-a, dok ih u drugim državama članicama Zajednice na tržište stavljaju društva kćeri AEG-a koja su u svakoj od zemalja odgovorna za aktivnosti stavljanja na tržište odnosno, u mjeri u kojoj se to odnosi na ovaj predmet, AEG-Telefunken France (u daljnjem tekstu: ATF) u Francuskoj i AEG-Telefunken Belge (u daljnjem tekstu: ATBG) u Belgiji.
+3 Kad je riječ o stavljanju na zajedničko tržište određenog broja proizvoda društva Telefunken koji potpadaju pod takozvani program „u pet točaka” , a kojim su obuhvaćeni prethodno navedeni potrošački elektronički proizvodi, društvo AEG obavijestilo je 6. studenoga 1973. Komisiju o sustavu selektivne distribucije za proizvode robne marke Telefunken (Vertriebsbindung für Telefunken-Markenwaren) na temelju standardnih sporazuma (EG-Verpflichtungsscheine) sklopljenih s ovlaštenim distributerima u različitim fazama stavljanja na tržište.
+Na zahtjev Komisije društvo AEG naknadno je unijelo određene izmjene u sustav.
+Dopisom od 17. svibnja 1976. glavni direktor za tržišno natjecanje obavijestio je društvo AEG da smatra da, s obzirom na članak 85. stavak 1. Ugovora o EEZ-u, ne postoji zapreka za primjenu inačice standardnog sporazuma o selektivnoj distribuciji o kojoj je obaviješten 16. ožujka 1976.
+4 Kako je vrijeme prolazilo, Komisija, koja je od prodavača u sektoru potrošačke elektronike zaprimila brojne prigovore u vezi s AEG-om, stekla je dojam da stvarna provedba sustava selektivne distribucije koju provode društvo AEG i njegova društva kćeri ne odgovara sporazumu o kojem je Komisija bila obaviještena.
+Posljedično, Komisija je 26. i 27. lipnja 1979. provela inspekciju u prostorijama TFR-a, ATBG-a i ATF-a te je, zauzevši stav da su dokumenti koje je tom prilikom razmotrila potvrdili njezine sumnje, odlukom od 29. svibnja 1980. pokrenula postupak protiv AEG-a u skladu s člankom 9. stavkom 3. Uredbe br. 17/62.
+5 Nakon obavljenog postupka Komisija je 6. siječnja 1982. donijela osporavanu odluku, u kojoj je utvrdila da društvo AEG nepropisno primjenjuje svoj sustav selektivne distribucije diskriminirajući određene distributere te vršeći izravan ili neizravan utjecaj na prodajne cijene koje primjenjuju distributeri, i to s ciljem da se načelno isključe određeni oblici distribucije i da se cijene održe na određenoj razini.
+U odluci se navodi da je AEG načinom primjene svojeg sporazuma o selektivnoj distribuciji prekršio članak 85. stavak 1. Ugovora o EEZ-u, od njega se zahtijeva da odmah prekine provoditi utvrđene povrede te mu se propisuje kazna u iznosu od jednog milijuna ECU, odnosno 2 445 780 DM.
+6 U tužbenim razlozima koje ističe u prilog svojoj tužbi tužitelj osporava sljedeće:
+I. regularnost postupka koji je doveo do donošenja osporavane odluke, a koji, prema mišljenju AEG-a, karakteriziraju:
+A. nedovoljno pojašnjene činjenice;
+B. izbor i upotreba dokumenata u skladu s proizvoljnim kriterijima;
+C. pogrešno tumačenje stvarnih tržišnih uvjeta;
+D. nenavođenje rezultata prethodnih istraga;
+E. povreda prava obrane.
+II. postojanje uvjeta utvrđenih za primjenu članka 85. stavka 1. Ugovora o EEZ-u zbog čimbenika kao što su:
+A) jednostranost djelovanja koja se prigovara AEG-u i njegovim društvima kćerima;
+B) zakonitost djelovanja čiji je cilj jamčiti održavanje minimalne profitne marže u okviru sustava selektivne distribucije;
+C) netipična ponašanja na koja se odnose prigovori;
+D) nepripisivanje AEG-u ponašanja na koje se odnose prigovori;
+E) nepostojanje prepreka za trgovinu unutar Zajednice.
+III. utemeljenost prigovora na kojima se temelji osporavana odluka, a osobito:
+– postojanje politike distribucije koja je protivna sustavu te pojedinačnih slučajeva u kojima se ta politika primjenjivala,
+– postojanje politika utjecanja na prodajne cijene na način koji nije u skladu sa sustavom selektivne distribucije te pojedinačnih slučajeva u kojima se ta politika primjenjivala.
+7 Stranke se spore i u vezi sa zateznim kamatama koje prema mišljenju Komisije treba platiti društvo AEG ako po svršetku postupka ono i dalje bude odgovorno za plaćanje kazne.
+Komisija se izjasnila da je voljna obustaviti privremeno izvršenje odluke pod uvjetom da se tužitelj obveže platiti navedene kamate ukoliko presuda Suda ne bude u njegovu korist. AEG je tu obvezu prihvatio pod uvjetom da Sud utvrdi da su te kamate zaista trebale biti plaćene.
+8 Rješenjem od 6. svibnja 1982. o zahtjevu za privremenu pravnu zaštitu koji je AEG uložio u isto vrijeme kad je pokrenut glavni postupak, predsjednik Suda naložio je suspenziju primjene radi zadržavanja jamstva koje je 17. ožujka 1982. dano u korist Komisije.
+U rješenju je među ostalim naglašeno da je AEG-ov uvjet zakonit i da mora biti prihvaćen te da pitanje o tome trebaju li se ili ne trebaju zaračunati kamate zaista potpada pod nadležnost Suda koji odlučuje u glavnom postupku.
+I – Tužbeni razlozi kojima se osporava regularnost postupka koji je doveo do donošenj a osporavane odluke
+A – Nedovoljno pojašnjene činjenice
+9 AEG tvrdi da je Komisija zanemarila sve elemente kojima se mogu objasniti specifični načini primjene sustava selektivne distribucije na razini Europske zajednice te da se ograničila na zapljenu oko 500 dokumenata i na upotrebu, u svakom pogledu, odlomaka izdvojenih iz 40-ak dokumenata.
+10 U tom pogledu valja uzeti u obzir, kako ispravno ističe Komisija, da ona ni u kojem slučaju nije dužna u svrhu istrage zaplijeniti ili kopirati sve dokumente koji se odnose na sustav selektivne distribucije.
+U stvarnosti, treba razmotriti samo one dokumente koji se odnose na nepropisnu primjenu sustava.
+B – Izbor i upotreba dokumenata u skladu s proizvoljnim kriterijima
+11 Prema AEG-u, Komisija nije uzela u obzir dokumente koje je zaplijenila tijekom inspekcije 26. i 27. lipnja 1979., a koji su ga mogli osloboditi krivnje.
+Komisija je jednako tako odbacila određene zaključke do kojih je došla tijekom istrage koju je vodila, a koji su išli u prilog AEG-u, a druge je dokaze upotrebljavala prema potpuno proizvoljnim kriterijima.
+12 U prilog tom tužbenom razlogu AEG navodi:
+1. Komisija je svoj prigovor u vezi s usklađivanjem cijena u točki 28. odluke temeljila na informacijama koje je, u okviru običnog zahtjeva za informacijama, dostavio gospodin Iffli, ne uzimajući u obzir činjenicu da se on ionako protivio svakom sustavu selektivne distribucije.
+2. U slučaju Ratio-Markt Komisija je zanemarila činjenicu da su sami voditelji Ratio-Markta priznali da njihova trgovina u Kasselu ne zadovoljava uvjete specijalizirane trgovine.
+3. Trgovac Verbinnen nikada nije izjavio da je ATBG na njega vršio pritisak.
+4. Na zahtjeve za informacijama o nepropisnoj primjeni sustava koju je provodio ATBG, upućene belgijskim trgovcima, odgovoreno je negativno.
+Međutim, ni pitanja ni odgovori nisu bili spomenuti u odluci.
+5. Komisija je razmotrila samo jedan od brojnih dokumenata koje je dostavilo društvo AEG, a koji je usto koristila proizvoljno, ali nijedan dokaz koji je društvo AEG predstavilo ili ponudilo tijekom postupka.
+13 S tim u vezi treba naglasiti da slučajevi za koje nisu uloženi prigovori ne dokazuju nužno pravilnu primjenu sustava, utoliko što bi nepropisna primjena zahtijevala intervenciju društva AEG samo u dosta rijetkim slučajevima u kojima je AEG smatrao da postoji rizik od usporednih uvoza ili od vrlo oštrog cjenovnog tržišnog natjecanja.
+Stoga Komisija u tim okolnostima nije trebala razmatrati slučajeve u kojima se nije raspravljalo ni o kakvoj povredi.
+14 S druge strane, potrebno je detaljno ispitati navode društva AEG kad se radi o slučajevima Iffli, Ratio i Verbinnen budući da se u tim navodima ponavlja da je Komisija utvrdila da je došlo do povrede nakon što je prethodno proizvoljno isključila elemente koji bi je nužno doveli do drukčijeg zaključka.
+15 Navodi razmotreni na taj način zapravo znače da je Komisija, kada se utvrđivalo ukazuju li određeni slučajevi na nepropisnu primjenu sustava selektivne distribucije, pogrešno tumačila dokaze povezane s njima.
+Dakle, zapravo se radi o ocjeni utemeljenosti pojedinačnih slučajeva, što će se zasebno razmatrati prilikom razmatranja merituma, a ne regularnosti postupka koji je primijenila Komisija.
+C – Pogrešno tumačenje stvarnih tržišnih uvjeta
+16 Društvo AEG tvrdi da Komisija nije uzela u obzir stanje na tržištu u pogledu potrošačkih elektroničkih proizvoda u cjelini te da je zanemarila elemente poput oštrog tržišnog natjecanja u tom sektoru, što je značilo da bi distribucijska politika čiji je cilj ograničavanje broja ovlaštenih preprodavatelja i održavanje visokih prodajnih cijena bila nerazumna.
+17 U vezi s ovim podneskom, važno je na početku istaknuti da utvrđivanje stanja koje je poduzetnika trebalo odvratiti od određenog ponašanja ne može samo po sebi isključiti postojanje takvog ponašanja, s obzirom na to da je moguće zamisliti da se dotični poduzetnik pouzdao u netočnu procjenu stvarnog stanja na tržištu ili da je, iako je bio dobro upoznat s tim stanjem, očekivao da će prednosti koje su rezultat politike održavanja cijene nadjačati nedostatke koji su rezultat gubitka konkurentnih položaja.
+18 Stoga se, kako je Komisija opravdano napomenula, može smatrati da društvo AEG čak ni u situaciji vrlo jakog tržišnog natjecanja usvajanjem politike visokih cijena nije preuzimalo pretjerane rizike, jer su distributeri u svakom slučaju željeli obogatiti svoj asortiman proizvodima robne marke Telefunken te su općenito bili spremni prihvatiti visoku trgovačku maržu.
+D – Nenavođenje rezultata prethodnih istraga
+19 AEG navodi da je Komisija, koja je nakon uvođenja sustava selektivne distribucije 1973. zaprimila brojne prigovore koji su dovodili u pitanje ponašanje AEG-a i njegovih društava kćeri, započela postupke od kojih je potom odustala.
+To upućuje na to da Komisija tijekom istraga koje je provodila nije ustanovila nikakvu nepropisnu primjenu sustava selektivne distribucije.
+Nenavođenje tih prethodnih predmeta, koji nisu bili kompatibilni s osporavanom odlukom, dokazuje pristranost Komisije u ovom predmetu.
+20 Komisija s pravom osporava da se činjenica da se u pogledu predmetnih prigovora nije ništa poduzelo može tumačiti kao pozitivna presuda o AEG-ovoj primjeni sustava selektivne distribucije.
+Ustvari valja napomenuti da, čak i ako Komisija procijeni da u jednom izoliranom slučaju sustav selektivne distribucije nije ispravno primijenjen, ona nema obvezu provoditi opsežnu istragu, kao što je navedeno u članku 9. Uredbe br. 17., ako ne postoje temelji za sumnju da je taj slučaj u skladu s politikom društva.
+Stoga je logično da je Komisija odlučila pokrenuti istragu u smislu Uredbe br. 17. tek nakon što su je brojni prigovori i izvješća uvjerili da postoji nepropisna primjena sustava selektivne distribucije.
+E – Povreda prava obrane
+21 Društvo AEG tvrdi da su prava obrane povrijeđena zbog toga što Komisija:
+(a) društvu nije podnijela cjeloviti tekst dopisa gospodina Ifflija od 12. kolovoza 1980. u kojem se upućuje na navodnu nepoštenu praksu tužitelja, čime mu je onemogućeno da iznese svoj stav o tome;
+(b) u osporavanoj odluci upotrijebila je dokumente koji nisu bili navedeni u obavijesti o preliminarno utvrđenim činjenicama od 2. lipnja 1980. iako ih je u to vrijeme već posjedovala;
+(c) je donijela odluku utemeljenu među ostalim na pojedinačnim slučajevima koji nisu navedeni u obavijesti o preliminarno utvrđenim činjenicama (Mammouth, Verbinnen).
+22 Što se tiče dopisa gospodina Ifflija, AEG tvrdi da činjenica da je uvid u cjelovit dopis dobio tek nakon donošenja odluke očigledno pokazuje da ga tužitelj nije mogao upotrijebiti u odgovoru na obavijest o prethodno utvrđenim činjenicama.
+23 Komisija tvrdi da se dopis gospodina Ifflija u početku tužitelju nije mogao dostaviti u cijelosti zbog povjerljivosti i zaštite poslovne tajne.
+24 U tom pogledu valja napomenuti da se Komisija zbog takvih uvjeta trebala suzdržati od upotrebe tog dokumenta kao dokaza.
+AEG opravdano smatra da se protiv njega nije smio upotrijebiti dokument koji mu nije bio predočen u cijelosti te da nije bilo na tuženiku da ocijeni je li dokument ili neki njegov dio koristan za obranu dotičnog poduzetnika.
+25 Iz toga proizlazi da se dopis gospodina Ifflija od 12. kolovoza 1980. ne može smatrati valjanim dokazom za potrebe ovog predmeta.
+26 Što se tiče dokumenata koji su spomenuti samo u odluci (dopis TFR-ova prodajna ureda u Münsteru od 29. lipnja 1976.; ATF-ova bilješka od 7. srpnja 1977.; ATF-ova bilješka od 20. listopada 1978.), Komisija tvrdi da je riječ o dokumentima koji su tužitelju već bili poznati s obzirom na to da potječu iz njegovih ureda te da su oni upotrebljavani samo radi potvrde već uloženih prigovora.
+27 S tim u vezi valja napomenuti da ono što je važno nisu dokumenti kao takvi, već zaključci do kojih je Komisija došla na temelju tih dokumenata.
+Budući da ti dokumenti nisu navedeni u obavijesti o preliminarno utvrđenim činjenicama, AEG je s pravom smatrao da su irelevantni za ovaj predmet.
+Time što nije obavijestila tužitelja da će se ti dokumenti upotrebljavati u odluci, Komisija je onemogućila AEG-u da pravovremeno iznese svoj stav o dokaznoj snazi tih dokumenata.
+Iz toga proizlazi da se ti dokumenti ne mogu smatrati valjanim dokazom za potrebe ovog predmeta.
+28 Iz istih se razloga ne smije razmatrati slučaj Mammouth, jer nije naveden u obavijesti o preliminarno utvrđenim činjenicama.
+29 S druge strane, u pogledu slučaja Verbinnen treba istaknuti da je o njemu, iako nije naveden u obavijesti o preliminarno utvrđenim činjenicama, AEG bio obaviješten dovoljno rano da može pripremiti očitovanja prije donošenja osporavane odluke.
+30 Zaključno valja utvrditi da su tužbeni razlozi koje je AEG istaknuo kako bi osporio regularnost postupka koji je rezultirao donošenjem osporavane odluke neutemeljeni, osim onoga koji se odnosi na povredu prava obrane.
+No taj tužbeni razlog nema opću primjenu jer se ograničava na kritiku povreda u nekim pojedinačnim slučajevima i stoga ne može implicirati neregularnost postupka u cjelini.
+Iz toga proizlazi da je isključivanje određenih dokumenata koje je Komisija upotrijebila u povredi prava obrane irelevantno, osim u mjeri u kojoj se prigovori Komisije mogu dokazati samo upućivanjem na te dokumente.
+II – Tužbeni razlozi kojima se osporava postojanje uvjeta utvrđenih za primjenu članka 85. stavka 1. UEZ-a
+A – Jednostranost djelovanja koja se prigovara AEG-u i njegovim društvima kćerima
+31 AEG tvrdi da su ponašanja zbog kojih mu se prigovara u osporavanoj odluci, konkretno nedozvoljavanje pristupa određenim trgovcima i poduzimanje mjera kako bi se utjecalo na cijene, jednostrana postupanja koja zbog toga, kao takva, ne potpadaju pod članak 85. stavak 1. koji se odnosi samo na sporazume među poduzetnicima, odluke udruženja poduzetnika i usklađena djelovanja.
+32 Kako bi se ocijenio ovaj argument, valja razmotriti pravni doseg sustava selektivne distribucije.
+33 Neosporno je da sporazumi koji čine sustav selektivne distribucije nužno utječu na tržišno natjecanje na zajedničkom tržištu.
+No u sudskoj praksi Suda uvijek se prihvaćalo da postoje legitimni zahtjevi, kao što je održavanje specijalizirane trgovine koja može pružati posebne usluge u pogledu visokokvalitetnih i visokotehnoloških proizvoda, koje mogu opravdati ograničavanje cjenovnog tržišnog natjecanja u korist tržišnog natjecanja povezanog s drugim čimbenicima osim cijene.
+Sustavi selektivne distribucije, u mjeri u kojoj su usmjereni ka postizanju legitimnog cilja koji može unaprijediti tržišno natjecanje koje se ne provodi samo u poglesu cijena, čine stoga element tržišnog natjecanja koji je u skladu s člankom 85. stavkom 1.
+34 Međutim, ograničenja inherentna sustavu selektivne distribucije prihvatljiva su samo pod uvjetom da im je cilj zapravo unaprjeđenje tržišnog natjecanja u prethodno navedenom smislu.
+U suprotnome ona ne bi imala opravdanja jer bi njihov jedini učinak bio smanjenje cjenovnog tržišnog natjecanja.
+35 Kako bi se jamčilo da se sustavi selektivne distribucije mogu temeljiti samo na tom cilju te da se ne mogu uspostavljati i upotrebljavati radi postizanja ciljeva koji nisu u skladu s pravom Zajednice, Sud je u svojoj presudi od 25. listopada 1977. (Metro/Komisija, Zb., str. 1875.) ustvrdio da su takvi sustavi dopustivi pod uvjetom da se odabir preprodavateljâ vrši na temelju objektivnih kriterija kvalitativne prirode koji se odnose na stručne kvalifikacije preprodavatelja i njegova osoblja te na prikladnost njegova poslovnog prostora, kao i da su takvi uvjeti ujednačeno propisani za sve potencijalne preprodavatelje i da se ne primjenjuju na diskriminatoran način.
+36 Iz toga proizlazi da upravljanje sustavom selektivne distribucije koje se ne temelji na prethodno navedenim kriterijima čini povredu članka 85. stavka 1.
+Isto vrijedi i kada se sustav, koji je načelno u skladu s pravom Zajednice, u praksi primjenjuje na način koji je protivan tom pravu.
+37 Takva se praksa ustvari mora smatrati nezakonitom ako proizvođač, s namjerom da zadrži visoke cijene ili da isključi određene moderne kanale prodaje, odbije ovlastiti distributere koji zadovoljavaju kvalitativne kriterije sustava.
+38 Takav stav proizvođača ne predstavlja jednostrano ponašanje poduzetnika koje bi, kako tvrdi AEG, bilo izuzeto od zabrane iz članka 85. stavka 1. Ugovora.
+Naprotiv, taj stav je dio ugovornih odnosa između poduzetnika i preprodavateljâ.
+Naime, u slučaju prijema distributera u sustav, odobrenje se temelji na tome da ugovorne stranke izričito ili prešutno prihvaćaju politiku poslovanja AEG-a kojom se, inter alia, zahtijeva isključivanje iz mreže distributera koji nisu spremni pridržavati se takve politike, iako ispunjavaju uvjete za prijem,.
+39 Stoga valja smatrati da je odbijanje davanja odobrenja također postupak koji je dio ugovornih odnosa s ovlaštenim distributerima budući da je njegov cilj jamčiti pridržavanje ograničenja tržišnog natjecanja koja su temelj ugovorâ između proizvođačâ i distributerâ.
+Stoga je odbijanje davanja odobrenja onim distributerima koji zadovoljavaju gore navedene kvalitativne kriterije dokaz nezakonite primjene sustava, ako njegova učestalost isključuje mogućnost da je riječ o izoliranim slučajevima koji nisu dio sustavnog ponašanja.
+B – Zakonitost djelovanja čiji je cilj jamčiti održavanje minimalne profitne marže u okviru sustava selektivne distribucije
+40 AEG tvrdi da se ponašanjem na koje se ulaže prigovor nastoji zadržati razina cijena neophodna za opstanak specijalizirane trgovine i da se, ako se opravdavaju potrebom da se jamči postojanje takve trgovine, čiji su troškovi mnogo viši od troškova nespecijalizirane trgovine, sustavi selektivne distribucije ne mogu smatrati protivnima pravu Zajednice ako su strukturirani ili se primjenjuju na način koji ovlaštenim prodavačima jamči minimalnu profitnu maržu.
+U vezi s time AEG navodi peti podstavak stavka 21. prethodno navedene presude u predmetu Metro, prema kojemu „želja specijaliziranih trgovaca na veliko i malo da zadrže određenu razinu cijene koja odgovara želji da se, u interesu potrošača, zadrži taj kanal distribucije zajedno s novim oblicima distribucije koji se temelje na drukčijoj politici tržišnog natjecanja, jedan je od ciljeva kojima se može težiti, a da nužno ne potpada pod zabranu iz članka 85. stavka 1. te, ako potpada pod taj članak, u cijelosti ili djelomice, da budu u okviru članka 85. stavka 3.”.
+41 Međutim, valja naglasiti da se u predmetu Metro nije radilo o ponašanju kojim se željelo spriječiti da se u distribucijsku mrežu primaju trgovci koji nisu bili spremni zadržati određene cijene.
+Tužitelj Metro nije ulagao prigovor na odabir kriterija za prijem trgovaca u sustav selektivne distribucije društva SABA, za koji je Komisija izdala potvrdu o neosporavanju prema članku 2. Uredbe br. 17., već je samo tvrdio da je sustav doveo do zamrzavanja strukture cijena na razini maloprodaje te time i do eliminacije cjenovnog tržišnog natjecanja.
+42 Ograničenje cjenovnog tržišnog natjecanja mora se svakako smatrati inherentnim u svakom sustavu selektivne distribucije budući da cijene koje zaračunavaju specijalizirani trgovci nužno ostaju u mnogo užem rasponu od onoga koji se može predvidjeti u slučaju tržišnog natjecanja između specijaliziranih i nespecijaliziranih trgovaca.
+Protuteža tom ograničenju jest tržišno natjecanje u pogledu kvalitete usluga isporučenih kupcima, što u uobičajenim okolnostima ne bi bilo moguće ako nema odgovarajuće profitne marže koja omogućuje pokrivanje viših troškova povezanih s tim uslugama.
+Održavanje određene razine cijena stoga je zakonito, ali samo u mjeri u kojoj je strogo opravdano zahtjevima sustava unutar kojega tržišno natjecanje mora nastaviti ispunjavati funkcije koje su mu dodijeljene ugovorom.
+Cilj takva sustava zapravo je isključivo unaprjeđenje tržišnog natjecanja u mjeri u kojoj se ono odnosi na druge elemente osim cijene, a ne jamstvo visoke marže za ovlaštene preprodavatelje.
+43 AEG stoga nije opravdano smatrao da prihvaćanje obveze zaračunavanja cijena koje omogućuju dovoljno visoku profitnu maržu čini zakonit uvjet za prijem u sustav selektivne distribucije.
+Samom činjenicom da mu je bilo dopušteno ne primati i u svojoj distribucijskoj mreži ne zadržavati trgovce koji nisu ili koji više nisu bili u mogućnosti pružati usluge uobičajene za specijaliziranu trgovinu, na raspolaganju je imao sva potrebna sredstva da osigura učinkovitu primjenu sustava.
+U takvim okolnostima zahtijevanje cjenovne obveze uvjet je koji očigledno nije povezan sa zahtjevima sustava selektivne distribucije te time utječe i na slobodu tržišnog natjecanja.
+C – Nesustavnost ponašanja na koja se odnose prigovori
+44 Ovim podneskom AEG poriče da je redovito i namjerno zloupotrebljavao svoj sustav selektivne distribucije.
+Ako se u obzir uzmu tisuće distributera koji se prijavljuju za prijem u sustav ili koji su već aktivni u sustavu, AEG smatra razumljivim da su greške neizbježne.
+Čak i pod pretpostavkom da su bile namjerne, nekoliko rijetkih slučajeva povrede ne može nikako dovesti u pitanje pravilnu primjenu sustava.
+45 Prije razmatranja tih argumenata najprije treba utvrditi, kako je Komisija ispravno primijetila, da mali broj povreda koje se pripisuju AEG-u u usporedbi s ukupnim brojem slučajeva primjene sustava ne dokazuje sam po sebi nesustavnost tih povreda.
+Ustvari se velika većina distributera već uobičajeno protivi politici niskih cijena i obično rado prihvaća sve inicijative čiji je cilj zadržavanje visoke profitne marže, tako da proizvođač koji želi sustav primjenjivati nepošteno mora uskratiti prijem u sustav ili zaprijetiti sankcijama samo kada se radi o trgovcima koji provode vrlo agresivnu cjenovnu politiku.
+46 Iz toga slijedi da nesustavnost povreda ne proizlazi nužno iz njihovog relativno ograničenog broja, a mogućnost da su se uvjeti za prijem sustavno primjenjivali na način koji nije u skladu s pravom Zajednice može se isključiti samo nakon što se utvrdi da nije bilo nikakve opće politike AEG-a ili njegovih društava kćeri čiji je cilj bio isključivanje preagresivnih preprodavatelja ili utjecanje na cijene.
+D – Nepripisivanje AEG-u ponašanja koje je predmet prigovora
+47 AEG tvrdi da mu se ne može pripisati nijedna eventualno utvrđena povreda jer nikada nije samostalno sudjelovao u primjeni sustava selektivne distribucije koju su provodili TFR, ATF ili ATBG.
+Naime, „opća politika distribucije” AEG-u se ne može pripisati na temelju dokumentacije koju su isključivo sastavila njegova društva kćeri bez njegova sudjelovanja.
+AEG se, a fortiori, ne može smatrati odgovornim za pojedinačne povrede koje su prema mišljenju Komisije počinila njegova društva kćeri.
+48 Komisija odgovara da su sustav koji je uveo AEG u različitim dotičnim državama članicama provodila AEG-ova društva kćeri TFR, ATF i ATBG, koje kontrolira tužitelj, kojima je AEG naložio primjenu sustava te koja su u tom smislu dužna provoditi AEG-ove upute.
+Ona navodi da su TFR, ATF i ATBG dio grupacije AEG-Telefunken te da je, primjerice, TFR društvo kći u 100% -tnom vlasništvu AEG-Telefunkena. 49 Kao što je Sud već bio naglasio, osobito u svojoj presudi od 14. srpnja 1972. (International Chemical Industries, predmet 48/69, Zb., str. 619.), „Okolnost da društvo kći ima odvojenu pravnu osobnost nije dovoljna za odbacivanje mogućnosti da njegovo postupanje bude pripisano društvu majci [...] Osobito kada društvo kći, iako ima odvojenu pravnu osobnost, ne odlučuje samostalno o svojem ponašanju na tržištu, već u bitnome provodi upute koje je dobilo od društva majke”.
+50 Budući da AEG nije osporio da je bio u poziciji presudno utjecati na politiku distribucije i cijena svojih društava kćeri, treba ispitati je li zaista iskoristio tu ovlast.
+Međutim, takva se provjera čini suvišnom u slučaju TFR-a koji, kao društvo kći u 100% -tnom vlasništvu AEG-a, nužno poštuje politiku koju su utvrdila ista tijela koja sukladno statutu društva određuju politiku AEG-a.
+51 Utjecaj AEG-a na ATF neizravno proistječe iz interne bilješke ATF-a od 30. lipnja 1978. u kojoj se navodi da je distributer s kojim je ATF pregovarao radi njegova uključivanja u mrežu upućen u „trgovinsku politiku Telefunkena, zahvaljujući kojoj maloprodajne cijene ostaju stabilne, dok se preprodavateljima jamče odgovarajuće profitne marže”.
+Riječ „Telefunken” zapravo ukazuje na to da se ATF pozivao na komercijalnu politiku koja je prema njegovom mišljenju rezultat inicijative AEG-a, koji je jedini mogao sastaviti jedinstvenu politiku koju njegova različita društva kćeri zadužena za distribuciju Telefunkenovih proizvoda moraju poštovati.
+52 Što se tiče ATBG-a, iz dokumenata povezanih sa slučajem belgijskog veletrgovca Diederichsa proizlazi da je ATBG cijelo vrijeme informirao TFR o svojim pregovorima s Diederichsom (vidjeti ATBG-ove dopise od 19. i 24. listopada 1977.).
+Iz tih dokumenata nadalje proizlazi da je TFR ostvario izravan kontakt s Diederichsom kako bi ispitao mogućnost reguliranja njegovih aktivnosti iako one nisu utjecale na njemačko tržište (vidjeti TFR-ovu bilješku od 29. rujna 1977.), da se osvrnuo na probleme u organizaciji nastale na temelju Diederichsovog zahtjeva za prijemom u sustav (vidjeti TFR-ovu teleks poruku od 11. listopada 1977.) te da je na kraju ustvrdio da „trenutačno ne postoji razlog da se nastave razgovori započeti s gospodinom Diederichsom” (vidjeti TFR-ovu bilješku od 28. listopada 1977.). Iz tih elemenata jasno proizlazi da ATBG u odnosu na AEG i TFR nije imao samostalnost pri odlučivanju.
+53 Stoga valja zaključiti da se ponašanje društava kćeri TFR-a, ATF-a i ATBG-a kojim se krše pravila tržišnog natjecanja može pripisati AEG-u.
+E – Nepostojanje prepreka za trgovinu unutar Zajednice
+54 U ovom tužbenom razlogu AEG tvrdi da primjena njegova sustava selektivne distribucije ne može sama po sebi utjecati na trgovinu među državama članicama i da stoga ne podliježe članku 85. stavku 1. Ugovora.
+To vrijedi čak i da se utvrdi da se sustav primjenjivao nepošteno.
+55 Komisija priznaje da sustav selektivne distribucije koji je uspostavio AEG sam po sebi ne sadržava odredbe koje čine prepreku trgovini između ovlaštenih distributera sa sjedištem u različitim državama članicama te stoga kao takav ne može utjecati na trgovinu unutar Zajednice.
+Komisija međutim tvrdi da je upravo nepoštena primjena sustava ono što se stavlja na teret AEG-u, koji je dozvolio, na diskriminirajući način, eliminaciju velikih trgovaca iz distribucijske mreže te time spriječio značajnu trgovinu koju bi ti trgovci mogli ostvariti među državama članicama.
+56 Prema AEG-u, izostanak osjetnih stvarnih ili potencijalnih prepreka trgovini među državama članica proizlazi najprije iz vrlo skromnog tržišnog udjela koji pripada TFR-u, ATF-u i ATBG-u, potom iz činjenice da dotični trgovci nisu trgovali među državama članicama ili nisu bili u poziciji to činiti i, kao treće, iz činjenice da, kad je riječ o televizorima u boji, cjelokupan promet unutar Zajednice u velikoj mjeri onemogućuju ozbiljne tehničke poteškoće.
+57 S tim u vezi treba napomenuti da dok se prva dva argumenta odnose na sve proizvode iz programa „pet točaka” , kojim su obuhvaćeni proizvodi kao što su televizori, radijski prijamnici, magnetofoni, gramofoni i audiovizualni materijal, treći se odnosi samo na televizore u boji.
+58 Argument AEG-a koji se odnosi na skroman udio tržišta koji pripada TFR-u, ATF-u i ATBG-u ne može se prihvatiti s obzirom na činjenicu da je svako od tih društava u vlastitoj zemlji u razdoblju od 1973. do 1980. imalo najmanje 5% tržišta potrošačke elektronike.
+Kao što je Sud već utvrdio u presudi od 1. veljače 1978. (Miller, predmet 19/77, Zb., str. 131.), poduzetnik koji posjeduje otprilike 5% predmetnog tržišta jest „poduzetnik dovoljno važan da njegovo ponašanje u načelu može utjecati na trgovinu”.
+59 Što se tiče drugog argumenta AEG-a, valja istaknuti da se rizik od prepreka potencijalnoj trgovini ne može isključiti samo na temelju tvrdnje da predmetni trgovci nisu trgovali među državama članicama ili da nisu bili u poziciji to činiti.
+S tim u vezi važno je naglasiti da je nekoliko poduzetnika spomenutih u odluci (primjerice, Diederichs u Belgiji i trgovine Auchan, Darty, FNAC i Conforama u Francuskoj) zaista provodilo paralelne uvoze ili je bilo spremno to činiti.
+Lanac trgovina Ratio u Saveznoj Republici Njemačkoj u više je navrata ponovno uvezao proizvode Telefunkena iz Austrije te bi bez dvojbe to učinio i iz država članica EEZ-a ako bi mu ponovni uvoz iz tih država donio iste prednosti.
+60 U svakom slučaju valja podsjetiti da prema gore navedenoj presudi Miller sama činjenica da u određenom trenutku trgovci koji se prijavljuju za prijem u distribucijsku mrežu ili koji su već u nju primljeni ne sudjeluju u trgovini unutar Zajednice nije dostatna da se isključi mogućnost da ograničenja njihove slobode djelovanja mogu onemogućavati trgovinu unutar Zajednice, jer se situacija može mijenjati iz godine u godinu u smislu promjena uvjeta ili strukture tržišta kako na zajedničkom tržištu u cjelini tako i na pojedinačnim nacionalnim tržištima.
+61 Što se tiče televizora u boji, AEG je istaknuo da ni u kojem slučaju primjena njegova sustava distribucije nije mogla utjecati na paralelne uvoze u Francusku koji zbog razlike među standardima korištenima u Njemačkoj (PAL) i u Francuskoj (SECAM) te zbog znatnog troška konvertiranja uređaja nisu bili izvedivi.
+62 Komisija je tvrdila da, iako su razlike tehničke prirode bile takve da su otežavale trgovinu među državama članicama, one ipak nisu imale takav utjecaj da bi onemogućile takvu trgovinu između Savezne Republike Njemačke i Francuske.
+63 Odgovarajući na pitanje Suda AEG je u dopisu od 28. siječnja 1983. izjavio da su televizijski standardi SECAM u Francuskoj bili obvezni do rujna 1981. te da „stoga nije postojala praktična mogućnost nadilaženja prepreka trgovini, koje su rezultat različitih standarda u Francuskoj i Saveznoj Republici”.
+Nepremostive teškoće postojale su i u vezi s robom koja se iz Savezne Republike uvozila u Belgiju jer su uređaji namijenjeni Belgiji morali biti opremljeni za široko rasprostranjen sustav kabelske televizije koji u Saveznoj Republici Njemačkoj nije postojao.
+64 Komisija je na raspravi istaknula da činjenica da je Verbinnen u Belgiji prodavao televizore u boji kupljene u Njemačkoj predstavlja jasan dokaz da ne postoje nepremostivi tehnički problemi u stavljanju takvih televizora na tržište u Belgiji.
+Iz spisa je također razvidno da je i Diederichs u Belgiju uvozio televizore čija je zemlja podrijetla bila Savezna Republika Njemačka.
+65 Što se tiče uvoza televizora u boji u Francusku, čak i ako se može priznati da je bio ograničen zbog razlika u sustavima emitiranja (SECAM u Francuskoj i PAL u Njemačkoj), ipak valja primijetiti da je, kao što je to Komisija pojasnila na raspravi, a što tužitelj nije osporio, TFR tijekom revidiranog razdoblja također proizvodio televizore koji mogu funkcionirali s oba sustava, a koji su osobito traženi u pograničnom dijelu Njemačke i Francuske.
+Ta je činjenica dovoljna kako bi se zaključilo da je AEG-ova politika mogla utjecati i na izvoz televizora u boji iz Savezne Republike Njemačke u Francusku.
+66 Iz prethodnih razmatranja proizlazi da se argumenti kojima se željelo pokazati da sporno postupanje nije moglo utjecati na trgovinu među državama članicama moraju odbiti.
+III – Tužbeni razl ozi kojima se osporava ut emelj enost pri govora Komisije upućenih AEG-u
+67 Komisija prigovara AEG-u da je nepoštenom primjenom svojeg sustava selektivne distribucije za proizvode robne marke Telefunken u svoju distribucijsku mrežu odbio prihvatiti određene dobavljače, koji su u svakom slučaju zadovoljavali uvjete za prijem, te da je izravno ili neizravno utvrdio fikse prodajne cijene koje trebaju primjenjivati ovlašteni distributeri, kršeći tako članak 85. stavak 1. UEEZ-a.
+68 Prema Komisiji, takva diskriminacija i takvo utvrđivanje prodajnih cijena nisu bile izolirane pogreške koje su počinili prerevni članovi vanjskog osoblja, već je riječ o namjerno i sustavno počinjenim povredama.
+Iz dokumenata odjela za prodaju TFR-a, ATF-a i ATBG-a jasno proizlazi postojanje politike čiji je cilj primjena sustava selektivne distribucije na način kako bi se postizali ciljevi koji nisu u skladu s pravom Zajednice.
+69 AEG osporava kako postojanje opće politike kojoj je cilj nepoštena primjena sustava, tako i postojanje povreda koje u pojedinačnim slučajevima navodi Komisija.
+70 Iako se osporavana odluka odnosi isključivo na praktičnu primjenu sustava, valja najprije razmotriti narav i značajke opće politike distribucije koju provodi AEG.
+71 Prigovor Komisije u vezi s politikom distribucije temelji se na brojnim dokumentima koje su zaplijenili Komisijini inspektori tijekom inspekcije u prostorima TFR-a, ATF-a i ATBG-a.
+Iz tih je dokumenata, sagleda li ih se u cjelini, dostatno jasno da je stav AEG-a bio da je održavanje visokoprofitne marže u korist distributera bilo apsolutno nužno za preživljavanje specijalizirane trgovine te da se poduzetnici koji ne primjenjuju visokoprofitnu maržu moraju a priori smatrati nesposobnima pružati vrlo skupe usluge karakteristične za specijaliziranu trgovinu.
+72 Takvo se stajalište ne može smatrati u skladu s ispravnom primjenom sustava selektivne distribucije jer održavanje minimalne profitne marže za trgovce ni u kojem slučaju ne može biti cilj kojemu se takvim sustavom teži.
+73 Gore navedena presuda Metro, na koju se AEG oslanja kako bi opravdala svoje stajalište, ustvari utvrđuje postojanje uzročno-posljedične veze između održavanja određene razine cijene i mogućnosti preživljavanja specijalizirane trgovine te unaprjeđenja tržišnog natjecanja te dozvoljava ograničenje tržišnog natjecanja cijenama samo u mjeri u kojoj se takvo ograničenje čini nužnim da bi se tržišno natjecanje osiguralo na razini usluga koje pruža specijalizirana trgovina.
+No ako takve usluge pružaju i specijalizirani odjeli supermarketa ili drugi novi oblici distribucije koji bi zbog svoje organizacije bili u poziciji pružati ih po nižoj cijeni, održavanje minimalne profitne marže izgubilo bi svako opravdanje jer marža više ne bi jamčila tržišno natjecanje u pogledu drugih elemenata osim cijene.
+74 Nije prihvatljiv ni stav koji proizlazi iz dokumenata navedenih u odluci jer, osim problema održavanja visokih razina cijena, pretpostavlja da novi oblici distribucije po svojoj samoj naravi i organizaciji ne mogu zadovoljiti uvjete specijalizirane trgovine.
+75 Takva se opća ocjena ne može prihvatiti jer ne postoji ništa što može spriječiti supermarket da svoj odjel potrošačke elektronike organizira na način koji zadovoljava kvalitativne uvjete specijalizirane trgovine.
+Proizvođač koji je uveo sustav selektivne distribucije ne može se stoga osloboditi, na temelju a priori ocjenjivanja značajki različitih oblika distribucije, od dužnosti da u svakom slučaju provjeri zadovoljava li kandidat za prijem uvjete specijalizirane trgovine.
+Štoviše, iz spisa se vidi da je AEG morao priznati da je postojala tendencija da se otvore specijalizirani odjeli čak i u supermarketima te da je čak morao priznati da su u određenim slučajevima zadovoljeni uvjeti selektivne distribucije.
+76 Stoga treba zaključiti da dokumenti koje navodi Komisija zaista ukazuju na postojanje politike distribucije koja se vodi i željom da jamči visokoprofitnu maržu za ovlaštene preprodavatelje i da u mjeri u kojoj je to moguće onemogućava prijem novih oblika trgovine za koje se a priori smatra da ne mogu zadovoljiti uvjete specijalizirane trgovine.
+Ta politika stoga iskazuje značajke koje se ne mogu uskladiti s ispravnom primjenom sustava selektivne distribucije.
+77 Nadalje, AEG-ovu nepoštenu primjenu sustava potvrđuje određeni broj pojedinačnih slučajeva koje je navela Komisija.
+78 Komisija je pojedinačne slučajeve u kojima je AEG proizvoljno primjenjivao svoj sustav selektivne distribucije dodatno podijelila u tri kategorije prema vrsti ponašanja koje je navodno dovelo do povrede:
+– AEG je prijem podredio cjenovnoj obvezi i automatski isključio sve one koji nisu bili spremni preuzeti tu obvezu,
+– AEG je sustav primjenjivao na temelju teritorijalnog kriterija, a ne na temelju provjere potrebnih uvjeta,
+– AEG je od svojih distributera pokušao, izravno ili neizravno, zahtijevati zadržavanje određenih cijena.
+A – Slučajevi nepoštenog odbijanja prijema
+1. U Saveznoj Republici Njemačkoj
+a) Ratio Markt
+79 U točki 16. odluke od 6. siječnja 1982. Komisija je navela da „razlog odbijanja Ratio Markta nije bio u navodnom nepostojanju specijaliziranog odjela, već je razlog u činjenici da je Ratio supermarket”.
+AEG tvrdi da je isključiv razlog neprijema Ratio Markta činjenica da taj poduzetnik, osobito njegova trgovina u Kasselu, ni u jednom trenutku nije zadovoljavao uvjete za specijaliziranu trgovinu.
+80 Iz korespondencije između TFR-a i Ratio Markta može se vidjeti da odbijanje opskrbljivanja Ratio Markta proizvodima Telefunken uključenima u program „pet zvjezdica” nikada nije objašnjeno upućivanjem na nepridržavanje preciznih uvjeta sustava selektivne distribucije.
+Odbijenica od 29. lipnja 1976. samo vrlo nejasno upućuje na to da je TFR svoju odluku donio „nakon razmatranja svih pitanja postavljenih” u kontekstu članka 85. stavka 1.
+To obrazloženje nikako ne pojašnjava u kojem smislu Ratio Markt nije uspio ispuniti uvjete za specijaliziranu trgovinu.
+81 TFR nije odgovorio na dopis Ratio Markta od 22. prosinca 1976. u kojemu je on osporio određena usmena očitovanja zaposlenika TFR-a dana prilikom posjeta Ratio Marktu u Kasselu 20. svibnja 1976. Štoviše, TFR nije nikada objasnio jesu li i u kojoj mjeri ta usmena očitovanja uzeta u obzir kao osnova za odbijanje.
+82 Stoga valja utvrditi da TFR nije nikada naveo bilo kakav razlog za svoje odbijanje da opskrbljuje Ratio Markt, osim ako se općenito i neodređeno upućivanje na pravila tržišnog natjecanja iz Ugovora smatra obrazloženjem, kao i da se nikada nije upustio u raspravu o napomenama koje je Ratio Markt naveo, a koje je TFR mogao smatrati razlozima kojima se opravdava odbijanje opskrbe.
+83 U tim okolnostima nemoguće je tvrditi da slučaj Ratio nije primjer nepoštene primjene sustava selektivne distribucije.
+Činjenica da se Ratio Markt suzdržao od pokretanja postupka kako bi ishodio opskrbu proizvodima Telefunken ne može se tumačiti kao da je prihvatio da je TFR-ovo odbijanje opskrbe utemeljeno.
+Ustvari, moguće je da pokretanje postupka nije bilo u interesu Ratio Markta kako zbog prilično velikih troškova koji bi iz toga proizašli ili zbog činjenice da se, prema njemačkom pravu, pravo na opskrbu može utvrditi samo ako dotični poduzetnik dokaže da ne može dobiti zalihe dotičnog proizvoda od drugih proizvođača.
+(b) Harder
+84 U točki 17. odluke Komisija navodi da je za veletrgovca Hardera, koji je bio isključen iz distribucijske mreže, uvjet za ponovno prihvaćanje u mrežu bio da se obveže da AEG-ovim proizvodima neće opskrbljivati diskontne trgovine ili slična poduzeća te da te proizvode neće izvoziti u druge zemlje Zajednice.
+85 AEG tvrdi da ti uvjeti proizlaze ponajviše iz dopisa prodajnog ureda u Freiburgu od 15. prosinca 1976. koji je samo rezultat inicijative koju je pokrenuo predstavnik tog ureda te koji pokazuje da je odluka o ponovnom prijemu Hardera bila na glavnom uredu TFR-a.
+Iz dva dopisa TFR-ovih odvjetnika, od 29. kolovoza i 7. rujna 1977., razvidno je da se odluka o suspenziji opskrbe Hardera, koju je donio TFR zbog brojnih povreda ugovora koja je Harder počinio, može ukinuti samo ako Harder objasni na koji je način došlo do povreda, kako je to i predviđeno standardnim ugovorom o selektivnoj distribuciji.
+Opskrba nije ponovo uspostavljena jer Harder nikada nije zadovoljio te uvjete.
+U tim okolnostima ne postoji razlog zašto bi se u obzir uzeo prijedlog prodajnog ureda iz Freiburga, na koji TFR nije nikada odgovorio.
+86 Treba priznati da je, s obzirom na dokumente u spisu, jasno da Harder nije ponovno primljen isključivo zato što nije ispunio obveze utvrđene standardnim ugovorom kako bi uklonio posljedice povrede tog ugovora te da u nedostatku bilo kakva iskaza mišljenja nadležnih službi TFR-a ne postoje dokazi koji opravdavaju pretpostavku da bi se od Hardera, da je zadovoljio prethodno navedene uvjete, tražilo ispunjavanje dodatnih obveza uz obveze koje su rezultat sustava selektivne distribucije.
+Stoga se ne može smatrati da Harder raspolaže s dovoljno dokaza.
+2. U Francuskoj (a) Auchan
+87 Prema mišljenju Komisije (točka 23. odluke), ATF, AEG-ovo društvo kći za Francusku, nije nikako mogao primiti društvo Auchan u svoju distribucijsku mrežu.
+Kako se navodi, Auchan je primljen tek nakon što se obvezao pridržavati se cijena koje preporučuje ATF te prekinuti svako oglašavanje proizvoda Telefunken u medijima.
+88 AEG tvrdi da nije mogao primiti društvo Auchan prije nego li se obvezalo da neće kršiti pravila tržišnog natjecanja.
+89 AEG-ov navod ni na koji način ne podržavaju dokumenti u spisu koji, kao i ATF-ova bilješka od 21. ožujka 1978., pokazuju samo da je Auchan bio „jedan od najvećih diskontnih trgovaca” koji je zaračunavao ekstremno niske cijene, no ne pružaju dokaze koji bi opravdali tvrdnju da su te cijene bile u raskoraku s nacionalnim zakonodavstvom o tržišnom natjecanju.
+90 S druge strane, iz ATF-ove bilješke od 20. listopada 1978. proizlazi da je sporazum između ATF-a i Auchana bio moguć pod uvjetom da je Auchan „u zamjenu za naše isporuke, za koje tvrdi da su hitne jer više ne želi surađivati s Grundigom, voljan ponovno uvesti sve reklame za naše televizore i pridržavati se naših preporučenih cijena, pod uvjetom da u gradu u kojemu se proizvodi stavljaju u prodaju ne postoji trgovina bilo koje vrste koja zaračunava niže cijene, u kojem slučaju bi morao uskladiti svoje cijene”.
+Auchan je bio primljen u AEG-ov sustav distribucije 3. studenoga 1978.
+91 Iz prethodno navedenoga proizlazi da je Auchan, kako bi dobio zalihu ugovornih proizvoda marke Telefunken, bio spreman nametnuti si ograničenja vlastite slobode uključivanjem u tržišno natjecanje cijenama, suzdržavajući se od zaračunavanja cijena nižih od najnižih cijena koje zaračunavaju ostali trgovci u gradu u kojemu su proizvodi prodavani.
+Takva obveza očigledno nije u skladu s uvjetima standardnog ugovora.
+(b) Iffli
+92 U ATF-ovoj bilješci od 30. lipnja 1978., na koju se upućuje u točki 26. odluke, navodi se: „Gospodin Iffli obvezuje se pridržavati se naših cijena te jamči da se za marku Telefunken nije odlučio da bi nanio štetu toj robnoj marki.”.
+93 AEG-ova objašnjenja, prema kojima se izraz „naše cijene” odnosi na ATF-ove prodajne cijene prema gospodinu Iffliju, dok se obveza „da neće nanijeti štetu robnoj marki” odnosi na obvezu da neće prodavati po cijenama koje su protivne pravilima tržišnog natjecanja, nisu uvjerljiva.
+Naime, izraz „naše cijene” koji upotrebljava ATF ne može se odmah razumjeti ako se odnosi na bilo što osim na maloprodajne cijene, dok bi izraz „nanošenje štete robnoj marki” općenito upućivao isključivo na prodaju po cijenama koje proizvođač može smatrati štetnima za reputaciju svojih proizvoda.
+Taj stav, koji zauzima Komisija, dodatno potvrđuje ista bilješka od 30. lipnja u kojoj se navodi da je gospodin Iffli od ATF-a zatražio da mu navede uvjete kupnje te da mu je ATF objasnio svoju politiku određivanja cijena, osobito kriterije koje treba poštovati kako bi se izračunala „ maloprodajna cijena koja uključuje sve poreze, uz maržu od 25%”.
+94 ATF-ovo nastojanje u pogledu izbjegavanja tržišnog natjecanja cijenama može se dodatno vidjeti u još jednom odlomku iste bilješke u kojemu se navodi: „Bolje je usuglasiti politiku fiksnih cijena za grad Metz između Le Roi de la Télé, gospodina Ifflija i trgovine Darty nego isključiti gospodina Ifflija.
+Oni bi u svakom slučaju uspjeli dobiti Telefunkenovu opremu i tada više ne bismo mogli osigurati da se naša cjenovna politika poštuje.”.
+3. U Belgiji (a) Diederichs
+95 AEG navodi da se odbijanje veleprodajnog trgovca Diederichs (točke 36. do 39. osporavane odluke) temeljilo na razmatranjima povezanima s Diederichsovom nemogućnosti zadovoljenja uvjeta specijalizirane trgovine.
+96 Ovo se stajalište ne bi moglo prihvatiti. Ustvari je nemoguće u korespondenciji između ATBG-a i Diederichsa ili u internim dokumentima TFR-a i ATBG-a pronaći bilo kakvo spominjanje uvjeta koje Diederichs navodno nije zadovoljio, osim upućivanja na činjenicu da je Diederichs, time što je ugovorne proizvode Telefunken uvozio iz Njemačke, djelovao protivno pravilima tržišnog natjecanja te da se, da bi ga se primilo kao ovlaštenog distributera, trebao obvezati da će se ubuduće suzdržati od takva ponašanja.
+Međutim, usporedni uvoz ne može se smatrati povredom pravila tržišnog natjecanja, dok je obveza da se takvi uvozi više neće provoditi očigledna povreda prava Zajednice jer bi proizvođaču omogućila da izolira nacionalna tržišta i tako zaobiđe načelo slobodnog kretanja robe.
+97 Stoga valja zaključiti da su jedini razlozi zbog kojih je Diederichs odbijen bili razlozi u vezi s održavanjem određene strukture distribucije na različitim nacionalnim tržištima jer iz TFR-ove bilješke od 28. listopada 1977. jasno proizlazi da se AEG-Bruxelles „prijemu Diederichsa protivio u interesu politike distribucije”.
+B – Slučajevi zaštite teritorija
+98 U točki 29. odluke navodi se da je ATF distributerima koje je odabrao dodijelio određeno prodajno područje obećavši im da na tom području neće imati konkurenata u distribuciji proizvoda Telefunken.
+Navodi se da je ATF odbio sve zahtjeve za prijem ostalih distributera na tom području.
+99 AEG tvrdi da je ispravna primjena sustava selektivne distribucije od ATF-a zahtijevala samo negativnu obvezu da ne odbije prihvatiti u sustav podnositelje zahtjeva koji su zadovoljili uvjete specijalizirane trgovine, ali ne i pozitivnu obvezu agitiranja kod svih distributera koji su zadovoljili te uvjete kako bi ih se uvjerilo da se pridruže sustavu selektivne distribucije AEG-Telefunken.
+Tvrdi da je u tim okolnostima nemoguće govoriti o nepoštenoj primjeni sustava osim ako se može dokazati da su podnositelji zahtjeva koji su zadovoljili uvjete za prijem bili odbijeni zbog zaštite teritorija.
+100 Pitanje je li postojala zaštita teritorija mora se razmotriti i sa stajališta jamstva protiv inicijativa ovlaštenih preprodavatelja iz ostalih područja i sa stajališta jamstva protiv prijema novih distributera u određenom području.
+1. Slučaj Le Roi de la Télé
+101 Iz dopisa ATF-a od 9. studenoga 1972. razvidno je da je ATF smatrao da ne može ispuniti zahtjev gospodina Ifflija za opskrbu zbog svojih obveza u pogledu distribucijena području grada Metza s društvom Le Roi de la Télévision.
+U internoj bilješci ATF-a od 30. lipnja 1978. u vezi sa zahtjevom gospodina Ifflija navodi se: „Imajući u vidu ekskluzivna prava koje je dosad imalo društvo Le Roi de la Télé, svjesni smo problema koji ovaj zahtjev predstavlja za grad Metz.
+No odluka se mora donijeti.”
+To pokazuje da je društvu Le Roi de la Télé bila dodijeljena zaštita teritorija čak prije uvođenja sustava selektivne distribucije do 1978. te da se od nje odustalo tek nakon što je ATF, suočen s novim zahtjevom gospodina Ifflija, zauzeo stav da i financijska i pravna razmatranja snažno idu u prilog neodbijanju zahtjeva.
+2. Lama
+102 U točki 34. odluke spominje se dopis od 23. listopada 1978. u kojemu je ATF veletrgovini Lama u Parizu pisao: „kada se radi o veletrgovcima, uobičajeno je, iako to postaje nezakonito u okviru okružnice Scrivener, da im dodjeljujemo de facto ekskluzivna prava nad određenim teritorijem”.
+103 AEG tvrdi da taj dopis ne dokazuje stvarno ponašanje ATF-a čiji je cilj bio odbiti primiti trgovca u vlastitu distribucijsku mrežu kako bi ovlaštenom preprodavatelju zajamčio zaštitu teritorija te da je rečenica koju je navela Komisija upotrijebljena samo da bi se, uz određena preuveličavanja uobičajena za trgovačke izvještaje, naglasila ATF-ova spremnost da obveže trgovačkog partnera.
+104 Međutim, valja napomenuti da se dodjela de facto ekskluzivnih prava može provesti samo ako se isključe ostali distributeri koji djeluju na istom području kao i ovlašteni preprodavatelj.
+Navodeći da je dodjela de facto ekskluzivnih prava bila u skladu s njegovom uobičajenom praksom i potvrđujući svoju obvezu održavanja te prakse u vezi s Lamom, ATF je stoga sam pružio dokaze o nepoštenoj praksi.
+3. Radio du Centre
+105 U dopisu od 2. ožujka 1978. ATF je društvu Radio du Centre naveo da ga njegovi komercijalni ciljevi u pogledu televizora u boji i radio te elektro-akustičnog sektora za 1978. obvezuju da „ponovno razmotrimo naše sporazume iz 1977. što se tiče dodjele vašeg područja djelovanja našoj robnoj marki”.
+Ako je ATF, kako bi dozvolio zajedničko djelovanje društava Radio du Centre i SNER u departmanu Puy-de-Dôme, imao obvezu izmijeniti sporazume sklopljene s društvom Radio du Centre, nemoguće je izbjeći zaključak da su ti sporazumi navedenom preprodavatelju jamčili zaštitu teritorija koja je sprječavala ATF da za isto područje prihvaća zahtjeve za prijem drugih trgovaca.
+4. Schadroff
+106 Tvrtka Schadroff iz Bourg St Andéola žalila se da je u njegovu prodajnom području nudio jedan veletrgovac iz Marseillea pa je ATF 13. travnja 1979. poslao Schadroffu dopis u kojem je naveo da je jedan od njegovih zaposlenika „od veletrgovca u Marseilleu tražio da prekine nuditi na vašem prodajnom području” te je podsjetio da Schadroff uživa „de facto ekskluzivna prava koja smo uvijek branili, kako smo dokazali u brojnim slučajevima”.
+Iz tog je dopisa razvidno da je ATF poduzimao aktivne korake kako bi druge ovlaštene trgovce spriječio u uđu na područje ekskluzivne prodaje koje je dodijeljeno Schadroffu.
+C – Slučajevi utjecanja na cijene
+1. Izravan utjecaj
+(a) U Saveznoj Republici Njemačkoj
+(i) Suma
+107 Bilješka prodajnog ureda AEG-a u Münchenu od 20. travnja 1977., u kojoj je AEG naveo da je Suma obećala „da se neće ponašati kao cjenovni predvodnik već da će barem prihvatiti najnižu cijenu na tržištu i, ako je to moguće, zauzeti položaj negdje između prosječnih maloprodajnih cijena i najnižih cijena” , ne ostavlja sumnje da je Suma bila navedena da ograniči svoju slobodu tržišnog natjecanja u pitanju prodajnih cijena.
+(ii) Holder
+108 U bilješci TFR-a od 30. studenoga 1976., koja se spominje u točki 41. odluke, navodi se da je TFR „Holderu detaljno objasnio politiku distribucije i utvrđivanja cijena”.
+109 AEG je s tim u vezi tvrdio da se u tom slučaju radilo o razgovoru u vezi s uvođenjem potpuno novog uređaja TFR, TRX 2000, koji je bio vrlo skup.
+Potreba da ga se vrlo pažljivo plasira na tržište zahtijevala je da se preprodavateljima detaljno objasni način distribucije tog uređaja i cijene koje bi najbolje osigurale njegov komercijalni uspjeh.
+110 Čak i pod pretpostavkom da se, kao što je vjerojatno, TFR nije ograničio na to da Holderu pruži informacije o cijeni koja je, uzme li se u obzir situacija na tržištu, bila najbolje prilagođena stavljanju na tržište novog uređaja, već je namjeravao utvrditi prodajnu cijenu za njega, za razliku od slučaja Suma, u kojemu preuzimanje obveze u pogledu cijena obuhvaća cijeli raspon ugovornih proizvoda Telefunken, povreda pravila tržišnog natjecanja ovdje se odnosi samo na jedan model unutar samo jedne kategorije ugovornih proizvoda i u odnosu na jednog malog maloprodajnog trgovca, što bi značilo da ovaj nedostatak većim dijelom gubi na važnosti.
+(b) U Francuskoj
+(i) Darty
+111 U dopisu ATF-a od 26. svibnja 1978., koji se spominje u točki 42. odluke, upućuje se na „obvezu koju je propisalo društvo Darty kako bi povećalo svoje maloprodajne cijene”.
+112 Činjenica da je obveza koju je preuzelo društvo Darty značila završetak promotivne kampanje u pariškoj regiji i vraćanje na njegove originalne cijene nipošto ne znači da koraci koje je poduzeo ATF kako bi postigao taj rezultat ne predstavljaju nezakonit utjecaj na cijene.
+Malo je vjerojatno utvrđenje AEG-a o tome da je riječ „obveza” pogrešno upotrijebljena, jer se ustvari radilo o jednostranoj odluci Dartyja, pogotovo uzme li se u obzir da se posjet jednog od ATF-ovih menadžera društvu Darty, kako jasno proizlazi iz bilješke od 5. lipnja 1978., odnosio na „cijene koje se za televizore u boji zaračunavaju u Parizu”.
+(ii) Pariški distributeri
+113 U prethodno navedenoj bilješci također se, u pogledu pariške regije, upućuje na činjenicu da se 2. lipnja 1978. činilo da je „cijeli svijet” voljan povećati cijene te da to još nije učinio samo FNAC pa je gospodin Hondré iz ATF-a trebao uspostaviti kontakt s FNAC-om.
+114 AEG osporava da se izraz „cijeli svijet” može odnositi na „trgovce u maloprodaji u Parizu koje opskrbljuje ATF” , kako je navedeno u točki 43. odluke, no treći stavak bilješke („Cijene koje se zaračunavaju u Parizu”), zajedno s izrazom „cijeli svijet” u proturječju je s mišljenjem prema kojem se ta bilješka odnosila samo na Darty i FNAC.
+115 U tim se okolnostima može smatrati da je dokazano postojanje sporazuma o cijenama između AEG-a i prodavača u maloprodaji u pariškoj regiji.
+(iii) Camif
+116 Na temelju točke 44. odluke slučaj Camif temelji se na sljedećem odlomku iz ATF-ove bilješke od 5. lipnja 1978.: „S obzirom da određeni preprodavatelji, uključujući Darty, smatraju Camif uobičajenim kupcem, a time i tržišnim konkurentom, te da su stoga skloni uskladiti se s katalozima cijena Camifa, zamolili smo 2. ovog mjeseca gospodina Dechambrea da poveća maloprodajnu cijenu robe u svojem katalogu za zimu 1978.”.
+Uzimajući u obzir ovaj doslovni citat, sama tvrdnja AEG-a da je ATF pozvao Camif da poveća svoje cijene kako bi uzeo u obzir povećanje prodajnih cijena AEG-a do kojega je trebalo doći u rujnu 1978., čini se neuvjerljivom.
+(iv) Cart
+117 U dopisu od 4. studenoga 1977., navedenom u točki 46. odluke, ATF podsjeća Cart o cjenovnom sporazumu između dva poduzetnika te naglašava da Cartovo nepridržavanje tih obveza može samo „ ugroziti naše trgovinske odnose”.
+Dodaje: „Nije bilo potrebno čekati reakciju nekih naših zastupnika jer oni smatraju da Cart ruši cijene umjesto da potiče na održavanje cijena”.
+ATF u konačnici pita društvo Cart bi li bilo moguće obustaviti distribuciju Cartova kataloga s osporavanim cijenama ili ga, ako to bude nužno, povući.
+118 Zahtjev da se cijene održavaju, što je bila svrha dopisa od 4. studenoga 1977., nikako se ne može opravdati upućivanjem na potrebu da se u obzir uzme povećanje prodajnih cijena u veletrgovini do kojega je došlo tek u rujnu 1978.
+S druge strane, dopis od 21. srpnja 1978., kojim se Cart obavještava o takvu povećanju, ne ograničava se samo na navođenje maloprodajnih cijena koje se mogu zaračunavati kako bi se to povećanje uzelo u obzir, nego se u njemu dodaje: „ Kao što smo se dogovorili, tražimo od vas da u svojem katalogu poštujete gore navedene maloprodajne cijene te da ih smatrate minimalnim cijenama”.
+(v) FNAC, Darty i Grands Magasins
+119 ATF-ova bilješka od 13. listopada 1978. (točka 45. odluke), pod naslovom „Maloprodajne cijene od 18.9.1978.”, sadržava sljedeći odlomak: „Sa svojim kupcima centrale, odnosno Dartyjem, FNAC-om i Grands Magasinsom, dogovaramo da sve cijene vrijede od 2. studenoga 1978.”.
+Čak i ako se taj odlomak, kako navodi AEG, odnosi samo na prijenos povećanja veleprodajnih cijena na maloprodajne cijene, ostaje činjenica da je ATF izvršio pritisak na neke svoje distributere kako bi čim prije primijenili povećanje cijena te je s njima čak sklopio sporazum s tom namjerom.
+(vi) Capoferm
+120 Iz interne bilješke ATF-a od 3. travnja 1979. proizlazi da su se maloprodajni lanci Capoferm/Darty obvezali prema ATF-u da se posebna premija, koja im je dodijeljena za financiranje povrata starih televizora kako bi se potaknula prodaja novih televizora, neće upotrebljavati za smanjenje maloprodajnih cijena.
+121 Budući da je premija već bila odbijena od cijene koju je ATF fakturirao, distributer se praktički obvezao na očuvanje jednake profitne marže kako u slučaju povrata starog uređaja te isplate premije kupcu, tako i u slučaju prodaje televizora bez povrata staroga.
+Ta obveza zadržavanja minimalne cijene čak i kada se premija, ako se ne vrati stari uređaj, može smatrati tek prednošću koja se daje distributeru, čini cjenovni sporazum koji je protivan pravu Zajednice o tržišnom natjecanju.
+(c) U Belgiji (i) Verbinnen
+122 Točka 39. osporavane odluke odnosi se na činjenicu da je, u skladu s informacijama koje je dao belgijski distributer Verbinnen, ATF od njega u siječnju ili veljači tražio da poveća cijenu Telefunkenova televizora za 3000 belgijskih franaka kako bi je ujednačio s razinom maloprodajnih cijena u tom dijelu Belgije.
+123 Iz informacija koje je Verbinnen dao Komisiji u dvama dopisima od 3. i 27. studenoga 1980. nije razvidno da je ATBG vršio pritisak zahtijevajući od njega zadržavanje određenih maloprodajnih cijena.
+Iz dopisa od 27. studenoga također ne proizlazi da je ATBG pokušao nametnuti društvu Verbinnen obvezu da zaračunava cijene koje je odredio Telefunken.
+Samo društvo Verbinnen u svojem dopisu upotrebljava nizozemsku riječ „voorstellen” , što znači „prijedlozi” , te bi bez sumnje bilo pretjerano smatrati da je spominjanje cijene, tijekom neformalnog razgovora, za koju je ATBG smatrao da se treba zaračunavati za određenu vrstu uređaja, jednako nezakonitom utjecaju na cijene.
+2. Neizravan utjecaj
+(a) Suma
+124 U točki 49. odluke tvrdi se, upućujući na TFR-ovu bilješku od 20. travnja 1977., da je Sumi obećan bonus za dobro vladanje u iznosu od 2% prometa kao naknada za suzdržanost u području tržišnog natjecanja cijenama.
+125 AEG je ponudio razna objašnjenja u vezi s naravi tog bonusa: na raspravi 19. kolovoza 1980. naveo je da je to bila kompenzacija za to što je Suma odvojila reklamni prostor u izlozima i trgovinama. Naknadno je tvrdio da se zapravo radilo samo o dodatnom popustu zbog važnosti Sume kao kupca.
+126 Gospodin Waltenberger, direktor Sume, u svojem je iskazu 2. rujna 1980. dužnosniku Komisije naveo sljedeće: „Bonus za dobro vladanje u iznosu od 2% koji je AEG ponudio tijekom pregovora sa Sumom 20. travnja 1977. (usp. AEG-ov dopis od tog datuma), trebao je biti dodijeljen na temelju toga što će Suma u načelu informirati AEG o artiklu na koji se odnosi reklamna kampanja prije nego što se u medijima pojave oglasi.
+Dodatno, AEG-Telefunken osigurao je da se o posebno agresivnim cijenama koje ponude konkurenti obavijesti Telefunken te da ih Suma neće odmah prihvatiti osim ako ne bude jasno da je riječ o kampanjama konkurenata neograničena trajanja.”
+127 U dopisu od 15. listopada 1980., koji su Komisiji poslali AEG-ovi odvjetnici, a za koji je gospodin Waltenberger teleks porukom od 29. listopada 1980. potvrdio da je potpuno u skladu s činjenicama, osporava se nametanje bilo kakva utjecaja na cijene, ali se izričito utvrđuje da je „bonus” službeno predstavljen kao nagrada za informacije o tržišnim trendovima koje je Suma dostavila Telefunkenu.
+128 Čak i ako se, tumačeći sve prethodno navedene izjave na način koji najviše ide u prilog društvu AEG, zauzme stajalište da se bonus od 2% odnosio samo na obvezu Sume da obavijesti TFR o cijenama koje zaračunava sama Suma kao i ostali distributeri, nema sumnje da je takva obveza TFR-u trebala omogućiti kontrolu cijena koje zaračunava Suma, s čime se Suma izričito složila, što je jasno iz dopisa od 20. travnja 1977. koji je poslao prodajni ured AEG-a u Münchenu, da se zauzme umjeren stav u pogledu tržišnog natjecanja i da se olakša TFR-ova intervencija ako su drugi ovlašteni distributeri preagresivno provodili cjenovnu politiku.
+Budući da je obveza povezana s bonusom stoga dovela do olakšavanja TFR-ove kontrole nad cijenama, mora se zaključiti da je bonus zapravo sredstvo provedbe neizravnog utjecaja na cijene.
+3. Drugi pojedinačni slučajevi utjecanja na cijene
+(a) Wilhelm
+129 U dopisu od 22. srpnja 1976. prodajnom uredu u Saarbrückenu, TFR je tražio informacije o „vrlo uznemirujućim cijenama” tvrtke Wilhelm kao i razloge „ove nove ofenzive” u pogledu cijena.
+No suprotno stavu Komisije, implicirani zahtjev da se poduzmu koraci protiv poduzetnika koji zaračunava smanjene cijene nije se mogao iščitati iz tog dopisa, koji se svakako može protumačiti kao zahtjev da adresat provjeri je li ponašanje tvrtke Wilhelm bilo korektno.
+Dopis je zapravo u tom smislu protumačio prodajni ured u Saarbrückenu, koji je 22. srpnja 1976. odgovorio da su ponude tvrtke Wilhelm činile dio uobičajenog tržišnog natjecanja cijenama.
+(b) Schlembach
+130 U bilješci od 9. rujna 1977., koja je spomenuta u točki 51. odluke, predstavnik ureda TFR-a u Kölnu podsjeća da je 8. rujna 1977. sudjelovao u „iskrenoj i povremeno žustroj raspravi” s maloprodajnim trgovcem Schlembachom u vezi s njegovim oglašavanjem proizvoda Telefunken te je naveo da mu je jasno dao do znanja da bi „ponavljanje oglasa znatno narušilo suradnju”.
+Budući da AEG nije uspio predočiti nikakav dokaz koji bi potkrijepio njegov navod da je dotično oglašavanje predstavljalo povredu njemačkog prava o tržišnom natjecanju, valja navesti da su prijetnje o prekidu trgovinskih odnosa bile potpuno neopravdane te da su osmišljene samo zato kako bi se nepošteno utjecalo na cijene dotičnog trgovca.
+(c) Gruoner, Südschall i Massa
+131 Slučajevi Gruoner, Südschall i Massa nisu s pravom spomenuti u odluci jer su ti poduzetnici, kao što se može vidjeti u izvješću prodajnog ureda u Mannheimu od 31. listopada 1978., stavljali na tržište po vrlo niskim cijenama, koje je TFR označio rušilačkim, model televizora „ Imperial” koji nije podlijegao Telefunkenovu sustavu selektivne distribucije.
+Stoga se u tim slučajevima ne može govoriti o nepoštenoj primjeni tog sustava.
+(d) Kaufhof (Kassel) i Hertie (Frankfurt)
+132 U gore navedenom izvješću od 31. listopada 1978. navodi se da su ponude po vrlo niskim cijenama koje su, među ostalim, davali Kaufhof (Kassel) i Hertie (Frankfurt) remetile tržište te da je „tek nakon znatnih napora ponovno uspostavljen red”.
+133 AEG tvrdi da se ta formulacija odnosi na napore koje je trebao uložiti da uvjeri druge distributere koji su bili uznemireni zbog vrlo niskih cijena tih dvaju maloprodajnih trgovca da se posebne ponude Kaufhofa i Hertiea nisu temeljile na posebno povoljnim uvjetima opskrbe koje im je ponudio TFR.
+134 Budući da Komisija nije pokušala razjasniti tu točku, prilično nejasna rečenica iz gore spomenutog dokumenta ne može se smatrati dostatnim dokazom za utvrđivanje postojanja povrede.
+D – Zaključci u vezi s pojedinačnim slučajevima
+135 Ispitivanje pojedinačnih slučajeva na koje je uputila Komisija omogućuje donošenje sljedećih zaključaka:
+(a) Nepoštena primjena sustava selektivne distribucije mora se smatrati u dovoljnoj mjeri dokazanom u sljedećim slučajevima: Ratio, Auchan, Iffli, Diederichs (prijem pod nepoštenim uvjetima); Le Roi de la Télé, Lama, Radio du Centre, Schadroff (zaštita teritorija); Suma, Darty, Camif, Cart, FNAC (izravan utjecaj na cijene); Darty, FNAC, dobavljači u Parizu i Grands Magasins (cjenovni sporazum); Suma (neizravan utjecaj na cijene) i Schlembach (pokušaj utjecaja na cijene).
+(b) S druge strane, dokazi koje je iznijela Komisija nisu dostatni da se dokaže povreda pravila tržišnog natjecanja u slučajevima Harder, Holder, Wilhelm, Gruoner, Südschall, Massa, Kaufhof (Kassel) i Hertie (Frankfurt), Verbinnen, dok se slučaj Mammouth ne može uzeti u obzir jer nije naveden u obavijesti o preliminarno utvrđenim činjenicama te AEG nije obaviješten o njemu prije donošenja odluke.
+136 Iz prethodnih razmatranja proizlazi da se sustavno ponašanje AEG-a u nepoštenoj primjeni sustava selektivne distribucije mora smatrati u dovoljnoj mjeri dokazanim.
+Činjenica da Komisija nije uspjela u dokazivanju niza pojedinačnih slučajeva ne dovodi u pitanje sustavno nepropisno ponašanje AEG-a i ne utječe na doseg povrede kako je utvrđen u odluci Komisije od 6. siječnja 1982.
+137 Sud naglašava ozbiljnost takve povrede, koja se sastoji od primjene sustava selektivne distribucije, nakon što ga odobri Komisija, na način koji je protivan obvezama koje je preuzeo predmetni poduzetnik, a o čemu je ovisila usklađenost sustava selektivne distribucije s člankom 85. Ugovora.
+138 U takvim okolnostima nema temelja za određivanje novčane kazne u iznosu koji bi se razlikovao od iznosa koji je utvrdila Komisija.
+Zahtjev AEG-a za proglašavanje odluke Komisije od 6. siječnja 1982. ništavom mora se stoga u potpunosti odbaciti.
+IV – Kamate
+139 Preostaje razmotriti pitanje je li AEG dužan platiti kamate na iznos novčane kazne do datuma stvarnog plaćanja kazne.
+140 AEG je tijekom postupka tvrdio da u pravu Zajednice ne postoji pravna osnova za obvezu plaćanja zateznih kamata.
+141 Neosporno je da, osobito u situaciji koju karakteriziraju vrlo visoke kamate, poduzetnik može steći znatnu korist što dužim odgađanjem plaćanja novčane kazne.
+Ako se zauzme stav da mjere za ujednačavanje te prednosti nisu dopustive u pravu Zajednice, to bi potaknulo podizanje očito neosnovanih tužbi čiji je isključivi cilj odgoda plaćanja novčane kazne.
+Nemoguće je zamisliti da se kod sastavljanja odredaba Ugovora o pravnim lijekovima protiv akata institucija želio postići takav učinak.
+142 Nadalje, isto načelo iskazano je u članku 86. stavku 2. Poslovnika Suda prema kojemu ako Sud donese rješenje o suspenziji izvršenja ili o drugim privremenim mjerama, primjena rješenja „može se uvjetovati time da podnositelj zahtjeva položi jamstvo, čiji iznos i vrsta se određuju ovisno o okolnostima”.
+143 Iz prethodnih razmatranja proizlazi da AEG mora Komisiji platiti zatezne kamate na iznos novčane kazne.
+Što se tiče iznosa koji s tim u vezi treba platiti, budući da AEG nije osporio kamatnu stopu koju duguje Komisiji kao ni datum od kada kamata dospijeva, u tom pogledu nije potrebno donijeti odluku. Troškovi
+144 U skladu s člankom 69. stavkom 2. Poslovnika, stranka koja ne uspije u postupku dužna je, na zahtjev protivne stranke, snositi troškove.
+Budući da tužitelj nije uspio u postupku, nalaže mu se snošenje troškova.
+Slijedom navedenog, Sud proglašava i presuđuje:
+1. Tužba se odbija.
+2. Društvu AEG-Telefunken AG nalaže se da Komisiji Europskih zajednica plati zatezne kamate na izrečenu novčanu kaznu.
+3. Tužitelju se nalaže da Komisiji Europskih zajednica plati troškove.

data/principle-mvep-justice-court/mvep-118-en.aligned.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+IN CASE 197/84
+REFERENCE TO THE COURT UNDER ARTICLE 177 OF THE EEC TREATY BY THE TRIBUNAL ADMINISTRATIF (ADMINISTRATIVE COURT), PAU (FRANCE), FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING IN THE PROCEEDINGS PENDING BEFORE THAT COURT BETWEEN
+P. STEINHAUSER
+AND
+CITY OF BIARRITZ
+ON THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 52 OF THE EEC TREATY,
+1 BY ORDER OF 20 JULY 1984, WHICH WAS RECEIVED AT THE COURT REGISTRY ON 31 JULY 1984, THE TRIBUNAL ADMINISTRATIF (ADMINISTRATIVE COURT), PAU, REFERRED TO THE COURT FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING UNDER ARTICLE 177 OF THE EEC TREATY A QUESTION CONCERNING THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 52 OF THE EEC TREATY; IT SEEKS, IN PARTICULAR, TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER ARTICLE 52 APPLIES TO A PROVISION WHICH MAKES NATIONALITY A CONDITION FOR THE ACCEPTANCE OF APPLICATIONS TO PARTICIPATE IN A TENDERING PROCEDURE FOR THE ALLOCATION OF PUBLIC PROPERTY BELONGING TO A MUNICIPALITY.
+2 THAT QUESTION WAS RAISED IN A DISPUTE BETWEEN THE CITY OF BIARRITZ AND P. STEINHAUSER, A PROFESSIONAL ARTIST OF GERMAN NATIONALITY RESIDING IN THAT CITY.
+3 ON 27 FEBRUARY 1983 THE PLAINTIFF IN THE MAIN PROCEEDINGS SUBMITTED AN APPLICATION TO THE CITY OF BIARRITZ TO PARTICIPATE IN A TENDERING PROCEDURE FOR THE ALLOCATION OF RENTED LOCK-UPS BELONGING TO THE MUNICIPALITY; THE LOCK-UPS ARE SITUATED IN THE PORT DES PECHEURS AND ARE AT PRESENT USED FOR THE EXHIBITION AND SALE OF CRAFT PRODUCTS.
+4 ON 1 MARCH 1983 THE CITY OF BIARRITZ REFUSED TO ALLOW MR STEINHAUSER TO PARTICIPATE IN THE TENDERING PROCEDURE ON THE GROUND THAT ARTICLE 3 (2) OF THE CONDITIONS OF TENDER PROVIDED THAT 'NO PERSON SHALL BE ALLOWED TO SUBMIT A TENDER UNLESS HE PROVES HIS FRENCH NATIONALITY...'
+5 MR STEINHAUSER BROUGHT AN ACTION FOR THE ANNULMENT OF THE MUNICIPALITY's DECISION BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL ADMINISTRATIF, PAU, ON THE GROUND THAT ARTICLE 3 (2) OF THE CONDITIONS OF TENDER WAS INCOMPATIBLE WITH ARTICLE 52 OF THE EEC TREATY, RELATING TO FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT.
+6 THE TRIBUNAL ADMINISTRATIF, PAU, WHILST RECOGNIZING THAT ARTICLE 52 OF THE EEC TREATY WAS DIRECTLY APPLICABLE, CONSIDERED THAT IT WAS NOT CLEAR FROM ITS WORDING WHETHER IT EXTENDED TO NATIONAL MEASURES SUCH AS THAT RELIED UPON BY THE CITY OF BIARRITZ WHICH ARE NOT INTENDED DIRECTLY TO REGULATE THE RIGHT TO TAKE UP A SPECIFIC OCCUPATION, BUT MERELY LAY DOWN RULES FOR THE ALLOCATION, UNDER A TENDERING PROCEDURE, OF PUBLIC PROPERTY BELONGING TO A LOCAL AUTHORITY IN A MEMBER STATE AND MAKE SUCH ALLOCATION CONDITIONAL UPON NATIONALITY.
+7 IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES THE NATIONAL COURT STAYED THE PROCEEDINGS AND REFERRED THE FOLLOWING QUESTION TO THE COURT OF JUSTICE FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING: 'DOES ARTICLE 52 OF THE TREATY OF 25 MARCH 1957 APPLY TO THE MEASURES ADOPTED BY THE CITY OF BIARRITZ UNDER ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONDITIONS OF TENDER DATED 25 JANUARY 1983, WHEN THAT PROVISION IS NOT INTENDED DIRECTLY TO GOVERN THE RIGHT TO TAKE UP AN ACTIVITY AS A SELF-EMPLOYED PERSON, BUT LAYS DOWN RULES FOR THE ALLOCATION, ON THE BASIS OF TENDERS, OF PREMISES OWNED AND MADE AVAILABLE FOR LETTING BY THE CITY OF BIARRITZ AND MAKES THE ACCEPTANCE OF APPLICATIONS CONDITIONAL UPON NATIONALITY?'
+8 IN ITS QUESTION THE NATIONAL COURT SEEKS IN SUBSTANCE TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER ARTICLE 52 OF THE EEC TREATY ALLOWS THE CONDITIONS OF TENDER IN A TENDERING PROCEDURE FOR THE ALLOCATION OF PUBLIC PROPERTY BELONGING TO A MUNICIPALITY TO MAKE THE ACCEPTANCE OF APPLICATIONS CONDITIONAL UPON NATIONALITY.
+9 THE PLAINTIFF OBSERVES THAT THE REFERENCE IN ARTICLE 52 OF THE EEC TREATY TO THE PURSUIT OF AN ACTIVITY AS A SELF-EMPLOYED PERSON MUST BE GIVEN A BROAD INTERPRETATION AND THAT THE RENTING OF THE PREMISES WHICH THE CITY OF BIARRITZ HAS SET ASIDE FOR USE BY CRAFTSMEN MAY BE REGARDED AS NECESSARY TO ENABLE HIM TO PURSUE HIS OCCUPATION AS AN ARTIST.
+IT FOLLOWS, IN HIS VIEW, THAT THE REFUSAL TO ALLOW HIM TO PARTICIPATE IN THE TENDERING PROCEDURE ON GROUNDS OF NATIONALITY, UNDER ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONDITIONS OF TENDER ISSUED BY THE CITY OF BIARRITZ, HINDERS HIM IN THE PURSUIT OF HIS OCCUPATION AND CONSTITUTES A DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICE WHICH IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH ARTICLE 52 OF THE EEC TREATY, A PROVISION WHICH IS DIRECTLY APPLICABLE.
+10 THE COMMISSION IS ALSO IN FAVOUR OF A BROAD INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 52 OF THE TREATY.
+IT EMPHASIZES THAT ARTICLE 52, WHICH IS DIRECTLY APPLICABLE, CONSTITUTES A SPECIFIC APPLICATION OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE THAT THERE MUST BE NO DISCRIMINATION ON GROUNDS OF NATIONALITY, EMBODIED IN ARTICLE 7 OF THE EEC TREATY, AND PROHIBITS ANY DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN A MEMBER STATE's OWN NATIONALS AND THOSE OF OTHER MEMBER STATES.
+IT THEREFORE REQUIRES THE ABOLITION OF PROVISIONS AND PRACTICES WHICH PROHIBIT OR HINDER NOT ONLY THE RIGHT TO TAKE UP, BUT ALSO THE PURSUIT OF, AN ACTIVITY AS A SELF-EMPLOYED PERSON WITHIN THE COMMUNITY.
+11 THE COMMISSION CONSIDERS THAT THE LATTER REQUIREMENT IS APPARENT BOTH FROM THE WORDING OF ARTICLE 52 OF THE TREATY AND FROM THE GENERAL PROGRAMME FOR THE ABOLITION OF RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT (OFFICIAL JOURNAL, ENGLISH SPECIAL EDITION IX, RESOLUTIONS OF THE COUNCIL AND OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MEMBER STATES, P. 7, TITLE III: RESTRICTIONS, SECTION A), WHICH LISTS AMONGST THE EXAMPLES OF RESTRICTIONS TO BE ABOLISHED THOSE CONCERNING THE RIGHT TO ENTER INTO CONTRACTS, THE RIGHT TO SUBMIT TENDERS FOR CONTRACTS WITH THE STATE OR WITH ANY OTHER LEGAL PERSON GOVERNED BY PUBLIC LAW, THE RIGHT TO OBTAIN LICENCES OR AUTHORIZATIONS ISSUED BY THE STATE AND THE RIGHT TO ACQUIRE, USE OR DISPOSE OF MOVABLE OR IMMOVABLE PROPERTY OR RIGHTS THEREIN.
+12 FINALLY, THE COMMISSION CONSIDERS THAT THE PROHIBITIONS LAID DOWN BY ARTICLE 52 OF THE TREATY APPLY NOT ONLY TO THE RULES LAID DOWN BY THE CENTRAL AUTHORITIES OF EACH MEMBER STATE OR BY PROFESSIONAL OR TRADE ASSOCIATIONS, AS IS ALREADY APPARENT FROM THE CASE-LAW OF THE COURT, BUT ALSO TO THE REGULATIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES OF THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES OF THE MEMBER STATES.
+13 IT FOLLOWS, IN THE COMMISSION's VIEW, THAT THE DECISION REFUSING, ON GROUNDS OF NATIONALITY, TO ALLOW THE PLAINTIFF TO PARTICIPATE IN THE CONTESTED TENDERING PROCEDURE ORGANIZED BY THE CITY OF BIARRITZ IS BASED ON A PROVISION WHICH IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE GOVERNING ESTABLISHMENT, NAMELY THAT A MEMBER STATE MUST TREAT NATIONALS OF OTHER MEMBER STATES IN THE SAME WAY AS ITS OWN NATIONALS.
+NOR CAN THAT PROVISION BE JUSTIFIED BY EITHER OF THE TWO EXCEPTIONS LAID DOWN IN THAT REGARD, NAMELY THE RESERVATION CONCERNING ACTIVITIES CONNECTED WITH THE EXERCISE OF OFFICIAL AUTHORITY, PROVIDED FOR BY ARTICLE 55 OF THE EEC TREATY, AND THE RESERVATION RELATING TO PUBLIC POLICY, PROVIDED FOR BY ARTICLE 56 OF THE EEC TREATY.
+14 IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT, AS THE COURT HAS STATED ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS, ARTICLE 52 OF THE TREATY, WHICH HAS BEEN DIRECTLY APPLICABLE IN THE MEMBER STATES SINCE THE END OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, CONSTITUTES ONE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL PROVISIONS OF THE COMMUNITY.
+BY PROHIBITING ANY DISCRIMINATION ON GROUNDS OF NATIONALITY RESULTING FROM NATIONAL LAWS, REGULATIONS OR PRACTICES, THAT ARTICLE SEEKS TO ENSURE THAT, AS REGARDS THE RIGHT OF ESTABLISHMENT, A MEMBER STATE ACCORDS TO NATIONALS OF OTHER MEMBER STATES THE SAME TREATMENT AS IT ACCORDS TO ITS OWN NATIONALS.
+AS THE COURT HELD IN ITS JUDGMENT OF 28 APRIL 1977 IN CASE 71/76 (THIEFFRY V CONSEIL DE L'ORDRE DES AVOCATS A LA COUR DE PARIS (1977) ECR 765), IT IS INCUMBENT UPON ALL THE COMPETENT PUBLIC AUTHORITIES, INCLUDING LEGALLY RECOGNIZED PROFESSIONAL BODIES, TO OBSERVE THAT RULE.
+15 IN THAT REGARD, IT MUST ALSO BE BORNE IN MIND THAT, IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ABOLITION OF RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT, THE GENERAL PROGRAMME ADOPTED BY THE COUNCIL ON 18 DECEMBER 1961 PROVIDES, AS THE COURT POINTED OUT IN ITS AFOREMENTIONED JUDGMENT, USEFUL GUIDANCE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY. THE PROGRAMME PROVIDES (IN SECTION A OF TITLE III: 'RESTRICTIONs') FOR THE ABOLITION OF PROVISIONS AND PRACTICES WHICH, IN RESPECT OF FOREIGN NATIONALS, EXCLUDE, LIMIT OR IMPOSE CONDITIONS ON THE POWER TO EXERCISE RIGHTS NORMALLY ATTACHING TO THE ACTIVITY OF A SELF-EMPLOYED PERSON.
+THOSE RIGHTS INCLUDE, IN PARTICULAR, THE POWER: (a) TO ENTER INTO CONTRACTS FOR WORK, BUSINESS OR AGRICULTURAL TENANCIES, AND CONTRACTS OF EMPLOYMENT, AND TO ENJOY ALL RIGHTS ARISING UNDER SUCH CONTRACTS; (b) TO SUBMIT TENDERS FOR OR TO ACT DIRECTLY AS A PARTY OR AS A SUBCONTRACTOR IN CONTRACTS WITH THE STATE OR WITH ANY OTHER LEGAL PERSON GOVERNED BY PUBLIC LAW; (c) TO OBTAIN LICENCES OR AUTHORIZATIONS ISSUED BY THE STATE OR BY ANY OTHER LEGAL PERSON GOVERNED BY PUBLIC LAW; AND (d) TO ACQUIRE, USE OR DISPOSE OF MOVABLE OR IMMOVABLE PROPERTY OR RIGHTS THEREIN.
+16 IT FOLLOWS FROM THE FOREGOING THAT ANY PRACTICE OR RULE ADOPTED BY A LOCAL AUTHORITY OF A MEMBER STATE WHICH DISCRIMINATES AGAINST NATIONALS OF OTHER MEMBER STATES FALLS WITHIN THE PROHIBITION LAID DOWN BY ARTICLE 52 OF THE TREATY.
+MOREOVER, IT MUST BE EMPHASIZED THAT FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT, AS PROVIDED FOR BY THAT ARTICLE, INCLUDES THE RIGHT NOT ONLY TO TAKE UP ACTIVITIES AS A SELF-EMPLOYED PERSON BUT ALSO TO PURSUE THEM IN THE BROAD SENSE OF THE TERM.
+THE RENTING OF PREMISES FOR BUSINESS PURPOSES FURTHERS THE PURSUIT OF AN OCCUPATION AND THEREFORE FALLS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF ARTICLE 52 OF THE EEC TREATY.
+17 THE ANSWER TO THE QUESTION SUBMITTED BY THE TRIBUNAL ADMINISTRATIF, PAU, MUST THEREFORE BE THAT ARTICLE 52 OF THE EEC TREATY DOES NOT ALLOW THE CONDITIONS OF TENDER IN A TENDERING PROCEDURE FOR THE ALLOCATION OF PUBLIC PROPERTY BELONGING TO A MUNICIPALITY TO MAKE THE ACCEPTANCE OF APPLICATIONS CONDITIONAL UPON NATIONALITY.
+18 THE COSTS INCURRED BY THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, WHICH HAS SUBMITTED OBSERVATIONS TO THE COURT, ARE NOT RECOVERABLE.
+AS THESE PROCEEDINGS ARE, IN SO FAR AS THE PARTIES TO THE MAIN PROCEEDINGS ARE CONCERNED, IN THE NATURE OF A STEP IN THE ACTION PENDING BEFORE THE NATIONAL COURT, THE DECISION ON COSTS IS A MATTER FOR THAT COURT.
+ON THOSE GROUNDS, THE COURT (FIFTH CHAMBER), IN ANSWER TO THE QUESTION REFERRED TO IT BY THE TRIBUNAL ADMINISTRATIF, PAU, BY ORDER OF 20 JULY 1984, HEREBY RULES:
+ARTICLE 52 OF THE EEC TREATY DOES NOT ALLOW THE CONDITIONS OF TENDER IN A TENDERING PROCEDURE FOR THE ALLOCATION OF PUBLIC PROPERTY BELONGING TO A MUNICIPALITY TO MAKE THE ACCEPTANCE OF APPLICATIONS CONDITIONAL UPON NATIONALITY.

data/principle-mvep-justice-court/mvep-118-hr.aligned.txt

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+U predmetu 197/84,
+povodom zahtjeva za prethodnu odluku na temelju članka 177. Ugovora o EEZ-u, koji je uputio Tribunal administratif de Pau (Upravni sud u Pauu, Francuska), u postupku između
+P. Steinhausera
+i
+Grada Biarritza,
+o tumačenju članka 52. Ugovora o EEZ-u, SUD (peto vijeće),
+PRESUDU (Dio „Činjenice” nije naveden) 1 Rješenjem od 20. srpnja 1984., koje je Sud zaprimio 31. srpnja 1984., Tribunal administratif de Pau (Upravni sud u Pauu) uputio je na temelju članka 177. Ugovora o EEZ-u prethodno pitanje o tumačenju članka 52. Ugovora koje se osobito odnosi na pitanje ulazi li u područje primjene tog članka odredba koja prihvaćanje kandidature za javni natječaj za dodjelu lokala koji je dio javne imovine općine uvjetuje državljanstvom.
+2 Pitanje je upućeno u okviru spora između gradskog vijeća Biarritza i P. Steinhausera, profesionalnog slikara s njemačkim državljanstvom nastanjenog u tom gradu.
+3 Dana 27. veljače 1983. tužitelj u glavnom postupku podnio je gradskom vijeću Biarritza zahtjev za sudjelovanje u javnom natječaju za dodjelu prava na najam jedne od kućica koje su dio javne imovine općine, smještenih u ribarskoj luci i trenutačno namijenjenih izlaganju ručno rađenih proizvoda za prodaju.
+4 Dana 1. ožujka 1983. grad Biarritz uskratio je g. Steinhauseru pravo da sudjeluje u javnom natječaju zato što se u članku 3. podstavku 2. dokumentacije za nadmetanje navodi da „nikomu neće biti dopušteno da podnese ponudu ako ne dokaže francusko državljanstvo...”.
+5 G. Steinhauser tražio je pri Tribunal administratif de Pau (Upravni sud u Pauu) poništenje te odluke kojom se odbija njegov zahtjev, pozivajući se na neusklađenost članka 3. podstavka 2. predmetne dokumentacije za nadmetanje s člankom 52. Ugovora o EEZ-u, vezano uz slobodu poslovnog nastana.
+6 Iako je Tribunal administratif de Pau (Upravni sud u Pauu) priznao izravnu primjenjivost članka 52. Ugovora o EEZ-u, smatrao je da iz odredaba tog članka jasno ne proizlazi da se one tiču i nacionalnih mjera, poput ove na koju se pozvao grad Biarritz, čiji izravan cilj nije reguliranje pristupa određenoj profesiji, nego se ograničavaju na to da se u javnom natječaju definiraju načini dodjele u najam lokala koji su dio javne imovine lokalne zajednice države članice, a tu dodjelu uvjetuju državljanstvom.
+7 U tim je uvjetima nacionalni sud prekinuo postupak i postavio Sudu prethodno pitanje kako bi saznao „odnosi li se članak 52. Ugovora od 25. ožujka 1957. na odredbe koje je grad Biarritz donio u članku 3. dokumentacije za nadmetanje dana 25. siječnja 1983., a da mu pritom izravni cilj nije bio regulirati pristup djelatnosti koju obavljaju samozaposlene osobe i da je u javnom natječaju definirao način dodjele u najam lokala koji su dio njegove javne imovine, te na kraju, da je prihvaćanje kandidata uvjetovao državljanstvom [...]”.
+8 Svojim pitanjem nacionalni sud u biti želi znati protivi li se članku 52. Ugovora o EEZ-u da se u dokumentaciji za nadmetanje u okviru javnog natječaja za dodjelu lokala koji je dio javne imovine neke općine prihvaćanje kandidatura uvjetuje državljanstvom.
+9 Tužitelj u glavnom postupku primjećuje da pojam djelatnosti koje obavljaju samozaposlene osobe na koje se odnosi članak 52. Ugovora treba shvatiti u širem smislu i da se najam lokala koje je općina Biarritz namijenila za ručno rađene proizvode može smatrati nužnim za obavljanje njegove umjetničke profesije.
+Iz toga proizlazi da mu se uskraćivanjem sudjelovanja u postupku dodjele zbog državljanstva, prema odredbama članka 3. dokumentacije za nadmetanje grada Biarritza, šteti u obavljanju njegove profesije i da je to diskriminirajuća praksa koja nije u skladu s izravno primjenjivim odredbama članka 52. Ugovora.
+10 Komisija izjavljuje da je i ona sklona širem tumačenju članka 52. Ugovora.
+Naglašava da taj izravno primjenjiv članak čini posebnu primjenu općeg načela nediskriminacije na osnovi državljanstva iz članka 7. Ugovora i zabranjuje svaku diskriminaciju u postupanju prema nacionalnim državljanima i državljanima drugih država članica.
+Članak dakle podrazumijeva ukidanje odredaba i praksi koje zabranjuju ili ometaju ne samo pristup djelatnostima koje obavljaju samozaposlene osobe nego i obavljanje tih djelatnosti u Zajednici.
+11 Komisija smatra da taj zahtjev proizlazi koliko iz teksta članka 52. samog Ugovora toliko i iz općeg programa za ukidanje ograničenja slobode poslovnog nastana (SL 1962, str. 36., glava III. „Ograničenja” , dio A), gdje su indikativno nabrojana ograničenja koja treba ukinuti što se, između ostalog, tiče mogućnosti sklapanja ugovora, podnošenja ponuda za državne nabave i nabave drugih javnih pravnih osoba, uživanja koncesija i javnih dozvola, stjecanja, iskorištavanja prava na pokretnine i nekretnine ili odricanja tog prava.
+12 Naposljetku, Komisija procjenjuje da se zabrane uvedene člankom 52. Ugovora odnose ne samo na pravila koja je uvelo javno tijelo svake države članice ili koja su uvele profesionalne korporacije, što već proizlazi iz sudske prakse Suda, nego i na odredbe propisa ili administrativne prakse decentraliziranih tijela država članica.
+13 Komisija iz toga zaključuje da je uskraćivanje tužitelju u glavnom postupku da zbog svojeg državljanstva sudjeluje u spornom javnom natječaju grada Biarritza utemeljeno na odredbi koja nije u skladu s temeljnim načelom poslovnog nastana, a to je izjednačenost s nacionalnim državljaninom.
+Nadalje, ta odredba nije opravdana nijednom od dvije iznimke predviđene u tom pogledu, odnosno izuzimanjem koje se odnosi na djelatnosti koje obuhvaćaju izvršavanje javnih ovlasti predviđenim člankom 55. Ugovora o EEZ-u, i izuzimanjem od javnog poretka predviđenim člankom 56.
+14 Valja podsjetiti na to da, kao što je Sud utvrdio u više navrata, članak 52. Ugovora, koji je izravno primjenjiv u državama članicama sa završetkom prijelaznog razdoblja, čini jednu od temeljnih pravnih odredaba Zajednice.
+Taj članak u pogledu prava poslovnog nastana nameće poštovanje pravila izjednačavanja državljana drugih država članica s nacionalnim državljanima, zabranjujući svaku diskriminaciju na osnovi državljanstva koja proizlazi iz zakonodavstava, propisa ili nacionalnih praksa.
+Obveza poštovanja tog pravila odnosi se, kao što je Sud rekao u presudi od 28. travnja 1977. (Thieffry, 71/76, Zb., str. 765.), na sva nadležna javna tijela, poput zakonski priznatih profesionalnih korporacija.
+15 U pogledu toga, također valjda podsjetiti da opći program koji je Vijeće donijelo 18. prosinca 1961. (SL 1962, str. 36.), imajući u vidu ukidanje ograničenja slobode poslovnog nastana, osigurava, kao što je Sud istaknuo u svojoj gore navedenoj presudi, korisne smjernice u pogledu provođenja pripadajućih odredaba Ugovora predviđajući (glava III. „Ograničenja” , dio A) ukidanje odredaba i praksi koje, kad su u pitanju stranci, isključuju, ograničavaju ili uvjetuju mogućnost ostvarivanja prava koja se obično odnose na djelatnosti koje obavljaju samozaposlene osobe.
+Među tim pravima je osobito mogućnost: a) sklapanja poduzetničkih ugovora i ugovora o najmu poput ugovora o radu i komercijalnih najmova ili poljoprivrednih zakupa, kao i uživanja svih prava koja proizlaze iz tih ugovora, b) podnošenja ponuda ili sudjelovanja u svojstvu suugovaratelja ili podugovaratelja u državnim nabavama ili u nabavama drugih javnih pravnih osoba, c) uživanja koncesija ili dopuštenja koja dodjeljuju država ili druge javne pravne osobe, d) stjecanja, iskorištavanja prava na pokretnine i nekretnine ili odricanja tog prava.
+16 Iz svega prethodno navedenog proizlazi da svaka diskriminirajuća praksa ili propis u pogledu državljana drugih država članica, koje su donijele decentralizirane lokalne zajednice država članica, ulazi u područje zabrane članka 52. Ugovora.
+Usto treba naglasiti da se sloboda poslovnog nastana predviđena tim člankom odnosi ne samo na pristup djelatnostima koje obavljaju samozaposlene osobe, nego i na njihovo obavljanje u širem smislu.
+Najam lokala za poslovnu uporabu potreban je za obavljanje poslovne djelatnosti i ulazi u područje primjene članka 52. Ugovora o EEZ-u.
+17 Stoga na pitanje koje je postavio Tribunal administratif de Pau (Upravni sud u Pauu) valja odgovoriti da se članku 52. Ugovora o EEZ-u protivi da se u okviru dodjele lokala koji je dio javne imovine općine, u dokumentaciji za nadmetanje prihvaćanje kandidatura uvjetuje državljanstvom.
+18 Troškovi Komisije, koja je podnijela očitovanja Sudu, ne nadoknađuju se.
+Budući da ovaj postupak ima značaj prethodnog pitanja za stranke glavnog postupka pred nacionalnim sudom, na tom je sudu da odluči o troškovima postupka.
+Slijedom navedenog, SUD (peto vijeće), odlučujući o pitanju koje je rješenjem od 20. srpnja 1984. uputio Tribunal administratif de Pau (Upravni sud u Pauu), odlučuje:
+Članku 52. Ugovora o EEZ-u protivi se da u okviru dodjele lokala koji je dio javne imovine općine, u dokumentaciji za nadmetanje prihvaćanje kandidatura uvjetuje državljanstvom.

data/principle-mvep-justice-court/mvep-119-en.aligned.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+IN CASE 121/85
+REFERENCE TO THE COURT UNDER ARTICLE 177 OF THE EEC TREATY BY THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING IN PROCEEDINGS PENDING BEFORE THAT COURT BETWEEN
+CONEGATE LIMITED
+AND
+HM CUSTOMS AND EXCISE
+ON THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLES 36 AND 234 OF THE EEC TREATY,
+1 BY AN ORDER OF 30 NOVEMBER 1984, WHICH WAS RECEIVED AT THE COURT ON 29 APRIL 1985, THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE, QUEEN's BENCH DIVISION, REFERRED TO THE COURT FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING UNDER ARTICLE 177 OF THE EEC TREATY A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLES 36 AND 234 OF THE EEC TREATY IN ORDER TO ENABLE IT TO ASSESS THE COMPATIBILITY WITH COMMUNITY LAW OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF DOMESTIC CUSTOMS LEGISLATION.
+2 THOSE QUESTIONS WERE RAISED IN PROCEEDINGS CONCERNING THE SEIZURE BY THE UNITED KINGDOM CUSTOMS AUTHORITIES OF VARIOUS CONSIGNMENTS OF GOODS IMPORTED FROM THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY BY CONEGATE LIMITED (HEREINAFTER REFERRED TO AS CONEGATE).
+IN THE COURSE OF AN INSPECTION AT THE AIRPORT WHERE THE CONSIGNMENTS ARRIVED, CUSTOMS OFFICIALS DISCOVERED THAT THE GOODS CONSISTED ESSENTIALLY OF INFLATABLE DOLLS WHICH WERE CLEARLY OF A SEXUAL NATURE AND OTHER EROTIC ARTICLES. THEY CONSIDERED THESE GOODS TO BE 'INDECENT OR OBSCENE' ARTICLES WHOSE IMPORTATION INTO THE UNITED KINGDOM IS PROHIBITED UNDER SECTION 42 OF THE CUSTOMS CONSOLIDATION ACT 1876.
+3 FOLLOWING A COMPLAINT LAID BY THE CUSTOMS AUTHORITIES, THE UXBRIDGE MAGISTRATES COURT ORDERED THE FORFEITURE OF THE GOODS.
+THAT DECISION WAS UPHELD BY THE SOUTHWARK CROWN COURT.
+CONEGATE APPEALED BY WAY OF CASE STATED AGAINST THE CROWN COURT's DECISION TO THE HIGH COURT, CONTENDING THAT IN THE PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES THE FORFEITURE OF THE GOODS IN QUESTION CONSTITUTED AN INFRINGEMENT OF ARTICLE 30 OF THE EEC TREATY WHICH COULD NOT BE JUSTIFIED ON GROUNDS OF PUBLIC MORALITY WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 36 OF THE TREATY.
+4 IN SUPPORT OF ITS VIEW, CONEGATE SUBMITTED THAT ALTHOUGH IN ITS JUDGMENT OF 14 DECEMBER 1979 (CASE 34/79 HENN AND DARBY (1979) ECR 3795) THE COURT RECOGNIZED THAT THE PROHIBITION ON THE IMPORTATION OF GOODS MIGHT BE JUSTIFIED ON GROUNDS OF PUBLIC MORALITY AND THAT IN PRINCIPLE IT WAS FOR EACH MEMBER STATE TO DETERMINE THE REQUIREMENTS OF PUBLIC MORALITY IN ITS TERRITORY, THE OPERATION OF SUCH A PROHIBITION NEVERTHELESS CONSTITUTED A MEANS OF ARBITRARY DISCRIMINATION, WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE SECOND SENTENCE OF ARTICLE 36, WHERE A LAWFUL TRADE IN THE SAME GOODS EXISTED IN THE MEMBER STATE CONCERNED.
+CONEGATE ARGUED THAT THAT WAS THE CASE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM WHERE THE MANUFACTURE AND THE MARKETING OF EROTIC ARTICLES WAS NOT SUBJECT TO A GENERAL PROHIBITION, UNLIKE THE PUBLICATION AND MARKETING OF OBSCENE PUBLICATIONS, WHICH WAS AT ISSUE IN THE ABOVE-MENTIONED JUDGMENT OF 14 DECEMBER 1979.
+5 IN THAT RESPECT CONEGATE POINTED OUT THAT THE MANUFACTURE OF THE ARTICLES IN QUESTION IN THESE PROCEEDINGS WAS SUBJECT TO NO RESTRICTION UNDER UNITED KINGDOM LAW, WHILST THE MARKETING OF THE GOODS WAS SUBJECT ONLY TO PROHIBITIONS REGARDING THEIR TRANSMISSION BY POST AND THEIR DISPLAY IN PUBLIC PLACES.
+OTHER RESTRICTIONS WERE IN FORCE IN CERTAIN OF THE CONSTITUENT PARTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM. THUS, IN ENGLAND AND WALES THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES MIGHT CHOOSE WHETHER TO LEAVE DISTRIBUTION UNRESTRICTED OR TO LIMIT THE POINTS OF SALE BY ALLOWING DISTRIBUTION ONLY FROM AUTHORIZED SEX SHOPS.
+6 THE HIGH COURT TOOK THE VIEW THAT THE DISPUTE RAISED A PROBLEM OF INTERPRETATION OF COMMUNITY LAW. IT THEREFORE STAYED THE PROCEEDINGS AND REQUESTED THE COURT TO GIVE A PRELIMINARY RULING ON THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:
+'(1) WHERE CERTAIN ARTICLES ARE SUBJECT TO A NATIONAL ABOSLUTE PROHIBITION ON IMPORTATION INTO A MEMBER STATE FROM ANOTHER MEMBER STATE, ON THE GROUNDS THAT THEY ARE INDECENT OR OBSCENE, IN ORDER TO CONSTITUTE WITHIN THE MEMBER STATE OF IMPORTATION AN ABSENCE OF ''LAWFUL TRADE'' IN THE ARTICLES IN QUESTION, AS REFERRED TO IN CONSIDERATIONS 21 AND 22 OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE IN CASE 34/79 HENN AND DARBY (1979) ECR 3795:
+(A) IS IT SUFFICIENT THAT THESE ARTICLES MAY BE MANUFACTURED AND MARKETED WITHIN THE MEMBER STATE OF IMPORTATION, SUBJECT ONLY TO
+(I) AN ABSOLUTE PROHIBITION ON THEIR TRANSMISSION BY POST
+(II)A RESTRICTION ON THEIR PUBLIC DISPLAY AND
+(III)A SYSTEM OF LICENSING OF PREMISES FOR THEIR SALE TO CUSTOMERS AGED 18 YEARS AND OVER, IN CERTAIN AREAS OF THE MEMBER STATE AND WHICH LICENSING SYSTEM IN NO WAY AFFECTS THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW ON INDECENCY OR OBSCENITY IN THAT MEMBER STATE;
+OR
+(B)IS IT NECESSARY THAT THERE BE AN ABSOLUTE PROHIBITION ON THEIR MANUFACTURING OR MARKETING WITHIN THE MEMBER STATE OF IMPORTATION?
+(2)IF THERE IS A ''LAWFUL TRADE'' WITHIN A MEMBER STATE OF IMPORTATION IN ARTICLES SUBJECT TO A NATIONAL ABSOLUTE PROHIBITION ON IMPORTATION FROM ANOTHER MEMBER STATE, ON THE GROUNDS THAT THEY ARE INDECENT OR OBSCENE, IS THE MEMBER STATE OF IMPORTATION, IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, JUSTIFIED ON THE GROUNDS OF PUBLIC MORALITY UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY TREATY, IN PROHIBITING THE IMPORTATION FROM ANOTHER MEMBER STATE, OF SUCH ARTICLES, ON THE BASIS THAT THEY ARE INDECENT OR OBSCENE, OR DOES SUCH A PROHIBITION CONSTITUTE A MEANS OF ARBITRARY DISCRIMINATION OR A DISGUISED RESTRICTION ON TRADE BTWEEN THE MEMBER STATES?
+(3)DOES THE PROHIBITION ON THE IMPORTATION OF INDECENT OR OBSCENE ARTICLES BY SECTION 42 OF THE CUSTOMS CONSOLIDATION ACT 1876 CONSTITUTE A MEANS OF ARBITRARY DISCRIMINATION OR A DISGUISED RESTRICTION ON TRADE WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 36 OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY TREATY IN SO FAR AS IT APPLIES TO ARTICLES PROHIBITED UNDER THAT ACT BUT NOT PROHIBITED UNDER THE OBSCENE PUBLICATIONS ACT 1959?
+(4)NOTWITHSTANDING THE ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS ABOVE, IF, ACTING IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE GENEVA CONVENTION 1923 FOR THE SUPRESSION OF TRAFFIC IN OBSCENE PUBLICATIONS AND THE UNIVERSAL POSTAL CONVENTION (RENEWED AT LAUSANNE IN 1974, WHICH CAME INTO FORCE ON 1 JANUARY 1976) A MEMBER STATE IMPOSES AN ABSOLUTE PROHIBITION ON THE IMPORTATION FROM ANOTHER MEMBER STATE OF ARTICLES WHICH ARE CLASSED AS INDECENT OR OBSCENE, IS SUCH A PROHIBITION THEREBY CONSISTENT WITH ARTICLE 234 OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY TREATY?'
+7 OBSERVATIONS WERE SUBMITTED BY CONEGATE, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE COMMISSION.
+THE FIRST QUESTION
+8 CONEGATE REFERS TO ITS SUBMISSIONS BEFORE THE NATIONAL COURTS AND ARGUES THAT, INASMUCH AS IT PROHIBITS IN GENERAL TERMS THE IMPORTATION OF INDECENT OR OBSCENE ARTICLES, SECTION 42 OF THE CUSTOMS CONSOLIDATION ACT 1876 IMPOSES A RESTRICTION WHICH IS MORE SEVERE THAN THAT ARISING UNDER THE LEGISLATION APPLICABLE TO THE TRADE IN THOSE PRODUCTS IN THE DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE COUNTRY, SUCH AS ENGLAND AND WALES.
+THAT OBSERVATION APPLIES A FORTIORI TO THE SITUATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND WHERE THE LEGISLATION IMPOSES NO RESTRICTIONS ON THE MARKETING OF THE PRODUCTS IN QUESTION OTHER THAN THOSE CONCERNING THEIR TRANSMISSION BY POST AND DISPLAY IN PUBLIC.
+9 THE UNITED KINGDOM NOTES IN THE FIRST PLACE THAT THE FIRST QUESTION AS FORMULATED BY THE HIGH COURT CORRECTLY STATES THE POSITION REGARDING THE RESTRICTIONS ON THE MARKETING OF INDECENT OR OBSCENE ARTICLES EXISTING IN ENGLAND, WALES AND NORTHERN IRELAND, BUT FAILS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE MORE RIGOROUS RESTRICTIONS APPLYING IN SCOTLAND AND THE ISLE OF MAN.
+IN SCOTLAND THE APPLICABLE LEGISLATION PROHIBITS THE DISTRIBUTION OF 'OBSCENE MATERIAL' WITH A VIEW TO ITS EVENTUAL SALE;'MATERIAL' IS DEFINED AS INCLUDING, INTER ALIA, REPRESENTATIONS AND MODELS.
+HOWEVER, THE COURTS HAVE NOT YET RULED ON WHETHER THE EXPRESSION 'OBSCENE MATERIAL' COVERS PRODUCTS SUCH AS THOSE IMPORTED BY CONEGATE.
+ON THE OTHER HAND, SUCH PRODUCTS CLEARLY COME WITHIN THE SCOPE OF 'INDECENT OR OBSCENE REPRESENTATIONs', WHOSE MANUFACTURE AND DISTRIBUTION IS PROHIBITED UNDER THE LEGISLATION APPLICABLE IN THE ISLE OF MAN.
+IN THE UNITED KINGDOM's VIEW, A STATE WHICH IS COMPRISED OF DIFFERENT CONSTITUENT PARTS AND WHICH ALLOWS DIFFERENCES TO SUBSIST IN THE LEGISLATION APPLICABLE THERETO BUT WHICH NEVERTHELESS HAS A COMMON CUSTOMS REGIME, MUST OF NECESSITY BRING THAT REGIME INTO LINE WITH THE MOST RIGOROUS INTERNAL RULES.
+10 THE UNITED KINGDOM ADDS THAT, TAKEN AS A WHOLE, THE PROVISIONS APPLICABLE IN THE DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM REFLECT AN APPROACH WHICH IS UNCOMPROMISING IN ITS HOSTILITY TO THE MARKETING OF INDECENT ARTICLES.
+IN THAT CONNECTION IT IS RELEVANT TO NOTE THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM LEGISLATION HAS BEEN MADE STRICTER IN RECENT YEARS, IN PARTICULAR WITH REGARD TO PORNOGRAPHIC PHOTOGRAPHS, THE CONDITIONS FOR THE AUTHORIZATION OF SEX SHOPS AND THE WAY IN WHICH OBSCENE MATERIAL MAY BE DISPLAYED IN PUBLIC.
+THE UNITED KINGDOM CONSIDERS THAT ACCORDINGLY, IN SUBSTANCE, THE CRITERIA DO NOT DIFFER ACCORDING TO WHETHER THE PRODUCTS CONCERNED ARE DOMESTIC OR IMPORTED.
+11 THE COMMISSION MAINTAINS IN THE FIRST PLACE THAT THE EXPRESSION 'LAWFUL TRADE' WHICH APPEARS IN THE JUDGMENT OF 14 DECEMBER 1979, CITED ABOVE, TO WHICH THE FIRST QUESTION REFERS, DOES NOT MEAN LEGITIMATE OR RESPECTABLE BUSINESS.
+IT SIMPLY REFERS TO ALL TRADE WHICH IS LAWFUL IN THE MEMBER STATE CONCERNED.
+IN THE COMMISSION's VIEW THAT IS THE CASE FOR THE GOODS IN QUESTION IN THIS INSTANCE, SINCE THE RESTRICTIONS DESCRIBED BY THE HIGH COURT IN ITS FIRST QUESTION DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN ABSENCE OF LAWFUL TRADE IN THOSE ARTICLES.
+12 THE COMMISSION ARGUES IN ADDITION THAT, ALTHOUGH IN THE PRESENT STATE OF DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNITY LAW MEMBER STATES ARE FREE TO ESTABLISH THEIR OWN STANDARDS CONCERNING PUBLIC MORALITY, THAT FREEDOM IS SUBJECT TO THE PRINCIPLE THAT MEMBER STATES MAY NOT APPLY CONDITIONS TO IMPORTS WHICH ARE STRICTER THAN THOSE APPLICABLE TO THE MANUFACTURE AND MARKETING OF THE SAME PRODUCTS WITHIN THEIR TERRITORY.
+13 THE COURT WOULD OBSERVE THAT THE FIRST QUESTION RAISES, IN THE FIRST PLACE, THE GENERAL PROBLEM OF WHETHER A PROHIBITION ON THE IMPORTATION OF CERTAIN GOODS MAY BE JUSTIFIED ON GROUNDS OF PUBLIC MORALITY WHERE THE LEGISLATION OF THE MEMBER STATE CONCERNED CONTAINS NO PROHIBITION ON THE MANUFACTURE OR MARKETING OF THE SAME PRODUCTS WITHIN THE NATIONAL TERRITORY.
+14 SO FAR AS THAT PROBLEM IS CONCERNED, IT MUST BE BORNE IN MIND THAT ACCORDING TO ARTICLE 36 OF THE EEC TREATY THE PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS WITHIN THE COMMUNITY DO NOT PRECLUDE PROHIBITIONS ON IMPORTS JUSTIFIED 'ON GROUNDS OF PUBLIC MORALITY'.
+AS THE COURT HELD IN ITS JUDGMENT OF 14 DECEMBER 1979, CITED ABOVE, IN PRINCIPLE IT IS FOR EACH MEMBER STATE TO DETERMINE IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS OWN SCALE OF VALUES AND IN THE FORM SELECTED BY IT THE REQUIREMENTS OF PUBLIC MORALITY IN ITS TERRITORY.
+15 HOWEVER, ALTHOUGH COMMUNITY LAW LEAVES THE MEMBER STATES FREE TO MAKE THEIR OWN ASSESSMENTS OF THE INDECENT OR OBSCENE CHARACTER OF CERTAIN ARTICLES, IT MUST BE POINTED OUT THAT THE FACT THAT GOODS CAUSE OFFENCE CANNOT BE REGARDED AS SUFFICIENTLY SERIOUS TO JUSTIFY RESTRICTIONS ON THE FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS WHERE THE MEMBER STATE CONCERNED DOES NOT ADOPT, WITH RESPECT TO THE SAME GOODS MANUFACTURED OR MARKETED WITHIN ITS TERRITORY, PENAL MEASURES OR OTHER SERIOUS AND EFFECTIVE MEASURES INTENDED TO PREVENT THE DISTRIBUTION OF SUCH GOODS IN ITS TERRITORY.
+16 IT FOLLOWS THAT A MEMBER STATE MAY NOT RELY ON GROUNDS OF PUBLIC MORALITY IN ORDER TO PROHIBIT THE IMPORTATION OF GOODS FROM OTHER MEMBER STATES WHEN ITS LEGISLATION CONTAINS NO PROHIBITION ON THE MANUFACTURE OR MARKETING OF THE SAME GOODS ON ITS TERRITORY.
+17 IT IS NOT FOR THE COURT, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE POWERS CONFERRED UPON IT BY ARTICLE 177 OF THE EEC TREATY, TO CONSIDER WHETHER, AND TO WHAT EXTENT, THE UNITED KINGDOM LEGISLATION CONTAINS SUCH A PROHIBITION.
+HOWEVER, THE QUESTION WHETHER OR NOT SUCH A PROHIBITION EXISTS IN A STATE COMPRISED OF DIFFERENT CONSTITUENT PARTS WHICH HAVE THEIR OWN INTERNAL LEGISLATION, CAN BE RESOLVED ONLY BY TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION ALL THE RELEVANT LEGISLATION.
+ALTHOUGH IT IS NOT NECESSARY, FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE APPLICATION OF THE ABOVE-MENTIONED RULE, THAT THE MANUFACTURE AND MARKETING OF THE PRODUCTS WHOSE IMPORTATION HAS BEEN PROHIBITED SHOULD BE PROHIBITED IN THE TERRITORY OF ALL THE CONSTITUENT PARTS, IT MUST AT LEAST BE POSSIBLE TO CONCLUDE FROM THE APPLICABLE RULES, TAKEN AS A WHOLE, THAT THEIR PURPOSE IS, IN SUBSTANCE, TO PROHIBIT THE MANUFACTURE AND MARKETING OF THOSE PRODUCTS.
+18 IN THIS INSTANCE, IN THE ACTUAL WORDING OF ITS FIRST QUESTION THE HIGH COURT TOOK CARE TO DEFINE THE SUBSTANCE OF THE NATIONAL LEGISLATION THE COMPATIBILITY OF WHICH WITH COMMUNITY LAW IS A QUESTION WHICH IT PROPOSES TO DETERMINE.
+THUS IT REFERS TO RULES IN THE IMPORTING MEMBER STATE UNDER WHICH THE GOODS IN QUESTION MAY BE MANUFACTURED FREELY AND MARKETED SUBJECT ONLY TO CERTAIN RESTRICTIONS, WHICH IT SETS OUT EXPLICITLY, NAMELY AN ABSOLUTE PROHIBITION ON THE TRANSMISSION OF SUCH GOODS BY POST, A RESTRICTION ON THEIR PUBLIC DISPLAY AND, IN CERTAIN AREAS OF THE MEMBER STATE CONCERNED, A SYSTEM OF LICENSING OF PREMISES FOR THE SALE OF THOSE GOODS TO CUSTOMERS AGED 18 YEARS AND OVER.
+SUCH RESTRICTIONS CANNOT HOWEVER BE REGARDED AS EQUIVALENT IN SUBSTANCE TO A PROHIBITION ON MANUFACTURE AND MARKETING.
+19 AT THE HEARING, THE UNITED KINGDOM AGAIN STRESSED THE FACT THAT AT PRESENT NO ARTICLES COMPARABLE TO THOSE IMPORTED BY CONEGATE ARE MANUFACTURED ON UNITED KINGDOM TERRITORY, BUT THAT FACT, WHICH DOES NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF MANUFACTURING SUCH ARTICLES AND WHICH, MOREOVER, WAS NOT REFERRED TO BY THE HIGH COURT, IS NOT SUCH AS TO LEAD TO A DIFFERENT ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION.
+20 IN REPLY TO THE FIRST QUESTION IT MUST THEREFORE BE STATED THAT A MEMBER STATE MAY NOT RELY ON GROUNDS OF PUBLIC MORALITY WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 36 OF THE TREATY IN ORDER TO PROHIBIT THE IMPORTATION OF CERTAIN GOODS ON THE GROUNDS THAT THEY ARE INDECENT OR OBSCENE, WHERE THE SAME GOODS MAY BE MANUFACTURED FREELY ON ITS TERRITORY AND MARKETED ON ITS TERRITORY SUBJECT ONLY TO AN ABSOLUTE PROHIBITION ON THEIR TRANSMISSION BY POST, A RESTRICTION ON THEIR PUBLIC DISPLAY AND, IN CERTAIN REGIONS, A SYSTEM OF LICENSING OF PREMISES FOR THE SALE OF THOSE GOODS TO CUSTOMERS AGED 18 AND OVER.
+21 THAT CONCLUSION DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE AUTHORITIES OF THE MEMBER STATE CONCERNED FROM APPLYING TO THOSE GOODS, ONCE IMPORTED, THE SAME RESTRICTIONS ON MARKETING WHICH ARE APPLIED TO SIMILAR PRODUCTS MANUFACTURED AND MARKETED WITHIN THE COUNTRY.
+THE SECOND AND THIRD QUESTIONS
+22 IN THE LIGHT OF THE REPLY GIVEN TO THE FIRST QUESTION, THE SECOND AND THIRD QUESTIONS NO LONGER CALL FOR AN ANSWER.
+THE FOURTH QUESTION
+23 CONEGATE, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE COMMISSION ALL TAKE THE VIEW THAT THE FOURTH QUESTION IS NOT RELEVANT TO THE SOLUTION OF THE DISPUTE IN THE MAIN PROCEEDINGS.
+THE GENEVA CONVENTION OF 1923 CONCERNS ONLY OBSCENE 'PUBLICATIONs', WHICH ARE NOT AT ISSUE IN THESE PROCEEDINGS, WHILST THE UNIVERSAL POSTAL CONVENTION CANNOT APPLY TO IMPORTED GOODS WHICH WERE NOT SENT BY POST.
+24 THE COMMISSION ALSO DREW ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT THE COURT HAS CONSISTENTLY HELD THAT IN PROTECTING 'THE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONs' dERIVING FROM AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED PRIOR TO THE TREATY, ARTICLE 234 OF THAT TREATY CONCERNS ONLY THE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS ESTABLISHED BETWEEN MEMBER STATES AND NON-MEMBER COUNTRIES.
+SUCH AGREEMENTS CANNOT THEREFORE BE RELIED UPON IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE BETWEEN THE MEMBER STATES OF THE COMMUNITY.
+25 THE COMMISSION's ARGUMENT MUST BE ACCEPTED.
+AS THE COURT STATED IN ITS JUDGMENT OF 14 OCTOBER 1980 (CASE 812/79 ATTORNEY GENERAL V BURGOA (1980) ECR 2787), ARTICLE 234 IS INTENDED TO ENSURE THAT THE APPLICATION OF THE TREATY DOES NOT AFFECT EITHER THE DUTY TO OBSERVE THE RIGHTS OF NON-MEMBER COUNTRIES UNDER AN AGREEMENT PREVIOUSLY CONCLUDED WITH A MEMBER STATE, OR THE OBSERVANCE BY THAT MEMBER STATE OF ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THAT AGREEMENT.
+AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED PRIOR TO THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY MAY NOT THEREFORE BE RELIED UPON IN RELATIONS BETWEEN MEMBER STATES IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE WITHIN THE COMMUNITY.
+26 IN REPLY TO THE FOURTH QUESTION IT MUST THEREFORE BE STATED THAT ARTICLE 234 OF THE TREATY MUST BE INTERPRETED AS MEANING THAT AN AGREEMENT CONCLUDED PRIOR TO THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY MAY NOT BE RELIED UPON IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE BETWEEN MEMBER STATES.
+27 THE COSTS INCURRED BY THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE COMMISSION, WHICH HAVE SUBMITTED OBSERVATIONS TO THE COURT, ARE NOT RECOVERABLE.
+AS THESE PROCEEDINGS ARE, IN SO FAR AS THE PARTIES TO THE MAIN PROCEEDINGS ARE CONCERNED, IN THE NATURE OF A STEP IN THE PROCEEDINGS PENDING BEFORE THE NATIONAL COURT, THE DECISION ON COSTS IS A MATTER FOR THAT COURT.
+ON THOSE GROUNDS, THE COURT (FOURTH CHAMBER), IN ANSWER TO THE QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO IT BY THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE BY ORDER OF 30 NOVEMBER 1984, HEREBY RULES:
+(1) A MEMBER STATE MAY NOT RELY ON GROUNDS OF PUBLIC MORALITY WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 36 OF THE TREATY IN ORDER TO PROHIBIT THE IMPORTATION OF CERTAIN GOODS ON THE GROUND THAT THEY ARE INDECENT OR OBSCENE, WHERE THE SAME GOODS MAY BE MANUFACTURED FREELY IN ITS TERRITORY AND MARKETED IN THAT TERRITORY SUBJECT ONLY TO AN ABSOLUTE PROHIBITION ON THEIR TRANSMISSION BY POST, A RESTRICTION ON THEIR PUBLIC DISPLAY AND, IN CERTAIN REGIONS, A SYSTEM OF LICENSING OF PREMISES FOR THE SALE OF THOSE GOODS TO CUSTOMERS AGED 18 YEARS AND OVER.
+(2)ARTICLE 234 OF THE EEC TREATY MUST BE INTERPRETED AS MEANING THAT AN AGREEMENT CONCLUDED PRIOR TO THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE EEC TREATY MAY NOT BE RELIED UPON IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE BETWEEN MEMBER STATES.

data/principle-mvep-justice-court/mvep-119-hr.aligned.txt

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+U predmetu 121/85,
+povodom zahtjeva koji je na temelju članka 177. Ugovora o EEZ-u uputio High Court of Justice (Visoki sud, Ujedinjena Kraljevina) u postupku između
+Conegate Limited
+i
+HM Customs & Excise
+radi prethodne odluke o tumačenju članaka 36. i 234. Ugovora o EEZ-u, SUD (četvrto vijeće),
+Presudu 1 Rješenjem od 30. studenoga 1984., koje je Sud zaprimio 29. travnja 1985., High Court of Justice, Queen ' s Bench Division (Visoki sud, Odjel Queen ' s Bench, Ujedinjena Kraljevina) (u daljnjem tekstu: sud koji je uputio zahtjev), uputio je Sudu na temelju članka 177. Ugovora o EEZ-u više prethodnih pitanja o tumačenju članaka 36. i 234. Ugovora o EEZ-u radi ocjene spojivosti određenih odredaba nacionalnog carinskog zakonodavstva s pravom Zajednice.
+2 Ta su pitanja bila upućena u okviru postupka u svezi s privremenim oduzimanjem od strane carinskih tijela Ujedinjene Kraljevine određenih pošiljaka robe koje je iz Savezne Republike Njemačke uvezlo društvo Conegate Limited (u daljnjem tekstu: društvo Conegate).
+Carinski su službenici u okviru nadzora u zračnoj luci u koju su pošiljke pristigle utvrdili da se roba sastoji uglavnom od lutaka na napuhavanje očito seksualne naravi i drugih erotskih predmeta koji su prema mišljenju carinskih službenika „neprimjereni ili nećudoredni” u smislu članka 42. Customs Consolidation Act (u daljnjem tekstu: Zakon o carinama) iz 1876. kojim se zabranjuje uvoz takve robe u Ujedinjenu Kraljevinu.
+3 Magistrates Court, Uxbridge (Magistratski sud u Uxbridgeu, Ujedinjena Kraljevina), je na zahtjev carinskog tijela odredio oduzimanje robe.
+Tu je odluku potvrdio Crown Court, Southward (Kraljevski sud u Southwardu, Ujedinjena Kraljevina).
+Društvo Conegate je sudu koji je uputio zahtjev podnijelo žalbu protiv te odluke ističući da je u konkretnim okolnostima oduzimanje dotične robe povreda članka 30. Ugovora o EEZ-u koja se ne može opravdati razlozima javnog morala u smislu članka 36. Ugovora.
+4 U prilog svojem stajalištu društvo Conegate navelo je da je u presudi od 14. prosinca 1979. (Henn i Darby, 34/79, Zb., str. 3795.) Sud doista priznao da zabrana uvoza robe može biti opravdana razlozima javnog morala i da je u načelu na svakoj državi članici da odredi zahtjeve javnog morala na svojem državnom području, ali da unatoč tomu primjena takve zabrane jest sredstvo proizvoljne diskriminacije u smislu druge rečenice članka 36. ako u dotičnoj državi članici postoji zakonita trgovina istom robom.
+Društvo Conegate ustvrdilo je da je to slučaj u Ujedinjenoj Kraljevini gdje, za razliku od objavljivanja i stavljanja na tržište tiskovina nećudorednog sadržaja, što je bio predmet presude od 14. prosinca 1979., proizvodnja i stavljanje na tržište erotskih predmeta ne podliježu općoj zabrani.
+5 S tim u svezi društvo Conegate podsjetilo je da prema pravu Ujedinjene Kraljevine izrada proizvoda koji su predmet ovog spora ne podliježe nikakvom ograničenju, dok za stavljanje te robe na tržište vrijede zabrane samo u pogledu njezina slanja poštom i njezina izlaganja na javnim mjestima.
+U određenim dijelovima Ujedinjene Kraljevine na snazi su druga ograničenja; tako lokalne vlasti u Engleskoj i Walesu mogu dopustiti neograničenu prodaju ili pak broj prodajnih mjesta ograničiti na način da prodaju dopuste samo u ovlaštenim erotskim trgovinama (sex shop).
+6 Smatrajući da se u sporu javlja problem tumačenja prava Zajednice, sud koji je uputio zahtjev odlučio je prekinuti postupak i Sudu uputiti sljedeća prethodna pitanja:
+„1. Ako za određene proizvode vrijedi potpuna nacionalna zabrana uvoza u državu članicu iz druge države članice jer su ti proizvodi neprimjereni ili nećudoredni tako da u državi članici uvoza ne postoji „zakonita trgovina” dotičnim proizvodima u smislu točaka 21. i 22. presude Suda Europskih zajednica u predmetu Henn i Darby (34/79, Zb., 1979., str. 3795.), je li u tom slučaju:
+(a) za dopuštenost proizvodnje i stavljanja na tržišta te robe u državi članici uvoza dovoljno da za tu robu vrijedi
+(i) samo potpuna zabrana slanja poštom,
+(ii) samo ograničenje u pogledu izlaganja na javnom mjestu i
+(iii) u određenim regijama države članice, samo sustav izdavanja dozvola prodajnim mjestima na kojima se ta roba prodaje kupcima koji su navršili 18 godina života, pri čemu taj sustav ni na koji način ne utječe na pozitivno pravo te države članice u području robe neprimjerene ili nećudoredne naravi;
+ili
+(b) u državi članici uvoza mora postojati potpuna zabrana proizvodnje ili prodaje takve robe?
+2. Ako u državi članici uvoza postoji „zakonita trgovina” proizvodima za koje vrijedi potpuna nacionalna zabrana uvoza iz druge države članice jer su ti proizvodi neprimjereni ili nećudoredni, je li u tom slučaju opravdano da zbog razloga javnog morala u smislu članka 36. Ugovora o osnivanju Europske ekonomske zajednice država članica zabrani uvoz takve robe iz druge države članice uz obrazloženje da je ta roba neprimjerena ili nećudoredna, ili je takva zabrana sredstvo proizvoljne diskriminacije ili prikrivenog ograničavanja trgovine među državama članicama?
+3. Je li zabrana uvoza neprimjerene ili nećudoredne robe propisana člankom 42. Zakona o carinama iz 1876. sredstvo proizvoljne diskriminacije ili prikrivenog ograničavanja trgovine u smislu članka 36. Ugovora o Europskoj ekonomskoj zajednici ukoliko se odnosi na predmete koji su zabranjeni tim zakonom, ali ne i Obscene Publications Actom 1959 (Zakon o nećudorednim tiskovinama iz 1959.)?
+4. Bez obzira na odgovore na prethodna pitanja, ako država članica koja u skladu sa svojim međunarodnim obvezama na temelju Ženevske konvencije o suzbijanju prometa nećudorednim tiskovinama iz 1923. i Svjetske poštanske konvencije (obnovljena u Lausannei 1974., stupila na snagu 1. siječnja 1976.) potpuno zabrani uvoz iz druge države članice robe neprimjerene ili nećudoredne naravi, je li takva zabrana spojiva s člankom 234. Ugovora o Europskoj zajednici?”
+7 Očitovanja su podnijeli društvo Conegate, vlada Ujedinjene Kraljevine i Komisija.
+Prvo pitanje
+8 Društvo Conegate poziva se na svoja očitovanja iznesena pred nacionalnim sudovima i tvrdi da članak 42. Zakona o carinama iz 1876., u mjeri u kojoj se njime općenito zabranjuje uvoz predmeta neprimjerene ili nećudoredne naravi, sadržava strože ograničenje od onoga koje proizlazi iz propisa koji se primjenjuju na trgovinu tim proizvodima u različitim dijelovima države, npr. u Engleskoj i Walesu.
+To je očitovanje još više primjenjivo na Sjevernu Irsku gdje nisu propisana nikakva druga ograničenja u pogledu stavljanja dotičnih proizvoda na tržište osim onih koja se odnose na njihovo slanje poštom i izlaganje na javnom mjestu.
+9 Vlada Ujedinjene Kraljevine prvo navodi da prvo pitanje suda koji je uputio zahtjev ispravno rezimira ograničenja u pogledu stavljanja na tržište proizvoda neprimjerene ili nećudoredne naravi kakva postoje u Engleskoj, Walesu i Sjevernoj Irskoj, ali da ne uzima u obzir stroža ograničenja koja vrijede u Škotskoj i na Otoku Manu.
+Propisi koji vrijede u Škotskoj zabranjuju distribuciju „proizvoda nećudoredne naravi” u svrhu njihove kasnije prodaje, pri čemu izraz „proizvod” označava, među ostalim, slike i modele.
+Sudovi, međutim, još nisu odlučili obuhvaća li izraz „proizvodi nećudoredne naravi” i proizvode kakve uvozi društvo Conegate.
+S druge pak strane, nesporno je da takvi proizvodi pripadaju u kategoriju „slike neprimjerene ili nećudoredne naravi” , čija su proizvodnja i distribucija zabranjene propisima koji vrijede na Otoku Manu.
+Prema mišljenju Ujedinjene Kraljevine, država takvog uređenja kakvo ima Ujedinjena Kraljevina, koja dopušta postojanje razlika među propisima svojih konstitutivnih dijelova, ali koja svejedno ima jedinstven carinski sustav, nužno mora taj carinski sustav uskladiti s najstrožim unutarnjim propisima.
+10 Ujedinjena Kraljevina dodaje da, gledane zajedno, odredbe koje vrijede u različitim dijelovima Ujedinjene Kraljevine odražavaju jasno negativno opredjeljenje prema stavljanju na tržište proizvoda nećudoredne naravi.
+S tim u svezi valja napomenuti da je zadnjih godina Ujedinjena Kraljevina postrožila propise, osobito u pogledu pornografskih fotografija, uvjeta za odobravanje erotskih trgovina i načina izlaganja nećudorednih proizvoda u javnosti.
+Ujedinjena Kraljevina stoga smatra da se u biti kriteriji ne razlikuju ovisno o tome je li riječ o domaćim ili uvezenim proizvodima.
+11 Komisija u prvom redu tvrdi da izraz „zakonita trgovina” iz gore navedene presude od 14. prosinca 1979., na koji se odnosi prvo pitanje, ne označava legitimne ili ugledne gospodarske djelatnosti.
+On samo označava bilo koju trgovinu koja je u dotičnoj državi članici dopuštena.
+Prema mišljenju Komisije, to je slučaj sa spornom robom jer ograničenja koja je u svojem prvom pitanju opisao sud koji je uputio zahtjev ne znače da u pogledu tih proizvoda ne postoji zakonita trgovina.
+12 Komisija navodi i da, iako na trenutačnoj razini razvoja prava Zajednice države članice mogu slobodno uspostaviti vlastite standarde u pogledu javnog morala, ta je sloboda ograničena načelom prema kojem države članice ne smiju na uvoz primjenjivati strože zahtjeve od onih koji za proizvodnju i stavljanje na tržište istih proizvoda vrijede na njihovom državnom području.
+13 Sud primjećuje da se u prvom pitanju prvo postavlja opći problem može li se zabrana uvoza određenih proizvoda opravdati razlozima javnog morala ako propisi dotične države članice ne sadržavaju nikakvu zabranu proizvodnje ili stavljanja na tržište istih proizvoda na nacionalnom državnom području.
+14 U svezi s tim valja podsjetiti da u skladu s člankom 36. Ugovora odredbe o slobodnom kretanju robe u Zajednici ne isključuju zabrane uvoza koje su opravdane „razlozima javnog morala”.
+Kao što je Sud presudio u gore navedenoj presudi od 14. prosinca 1979., načelno je na svakoj državi članici da u skladu s vlastitim vrijednosnim sustavom i na način koji sama odabere odredi zahtjeve u pogledu javnog morala na svojem državnom području.
+15 Međutim, iako pravo Zajednice državama članicama ostavlja slobodu da same ocijene neprimjerenost ili nećudorednost određenih proizvoda, valja napomenuti da skandalozna narav određene robe sama po sebi nije dovoljno ozbiljna da opravda ograničenja slobodnog kretanja robe ako dotična država članica u pogledu iste robe koja se proizvodi ili stavlja na tržište na njezinom državnom području ne donese kaznene mjere ili druge ozbiljne i učinkovite mjere namijenjene sprečavanju distribucije takve robe na svojem državnom području.
+16 Iz toga proizlazi da se država članica ne može pozivati na razloge javnog morala kako bi zabranila uvoz robe iz drugih država članica kada njezini propisi ne sadržavaju nikakvu zabranu proizvodnje ili stavljanja na tržište iste robe na njezinom državnom području.
+17 Sud u okviru svojih nadležnosti na temelju članka 177. nije nadležan utvrđivati sadržavaju li, i u kojoj mjeri, propisi Ujedinjene Kraljevine takvu zabranu.
+Valja, međutim, napomenuti da se na pitanje postojanja takve zabrane u državi čiji različiti dijelovi imaju vlastite unutarnje propise može odgovoriti samo uzimanjem u obzir svih tih propisa.
+Iako u svrhu primjene gore navedenog pravila nije nužno da proizvodnja i stavljanje na tržište proizvoda čiji je uvoz zabranjen budu zabranjeni na području svih konstitutivnih dijelova takve države, iz važećih pravila gledanih zajedno treba barem moći zaključiti da im je cilj u biti zabraniti proizvodnju i stavljanje na tržište tih proizvoda.
+18 U ovom slučaju sud koji je uputio zahtjev samim je tekstom svojega prvog pitanja rezimirao sadržaj nacionalnih propisa čiju spojivost s pravom Zajednice želi utvrditi.
+Pritom se poziva na propise u državi članici uvoznici prema kojima se sporna roba može slobodno proizvoditi, dok za njezino stavljanje na tržište vrijede određena ograničenja koja sud koji je uputio zahtjev izrijekom navodi, a to su potpuna zabrana slanja te robe poštom, ograničenja u pogledu njezina izlaganja u javnosti i, u određenim dijelovima dotične države članice, sustav izdavanja dozvola prodajnim mjestima na kojima se ta roba smije prodavati kupcima koji su navršili 18 godina života.
+Takva se ograničenja ne mogu, međutim, smatrati sadržajno istovjetnima zabrani proizvodnje i stavljanja na tržište.
+19 Na raspravi je Ujedinjena Kraljevina još jednom istaknula činjenicu da trenutačno na njezinom državnom području ne postoji proizvodnja proizvoda koji bi bili usporedivi s onima koje uvozi društvo Conegate, ali ta činjenica, koja ne isključuje mogućnost proizvodnje takvih proizvoda i na koju se osim toga sud koji je uputio zahtjev ne poziva, ne može dovesti do drukčije ocjene okolnosti.
+20 Stoga na prvo pitanje valja odgovoriti da se država članica ne može, kako bi zabranila uvoz određene robe uz obrazloženje da je ta roba neprimjerene ili nećudoredne naravi ako se na njezinom državnom području ista roba smije slobodno proizvoditi, pozivati na razloge javnog morala u smislu članka 36. Ugovora i ako za njezino stavljanje na tržište na tom državnom području vrijedi samo potpuna zabrana slanja poštom, ograničenje u pogledu izlaganja u javnosti i, u određenim dijelovima države, sustav izdavanja dozvola prodajnim mjestima na kojima se ta roba smije prodavati kupcima koji su navršili 18 godina života.
+21 Taj zaključak ne znači da tijela vlasti dotične države članice ne smiju na tu robu nakon njezina uvoza primjenjivati ista ograničenja u pogledu njezina stavljanja na tržište kao što su ona koja se primjenjuju na istovrsne proizvode koji se proizvode i stavljaju na tržište u državi.
+Drugo i treće pitanje
+22 S obzirom na odgovor na prvo pitanje, drugo i treće pitanje postalo je bespredmetno.
+Četvrto pitanje
+23 Društvo Conegate, Ujedinjena Kraljevina i Komisija slažu se da četvrto pitanje nije relevantno za rješenje spora u glavnom postupku.
+Ženevska konvencija iz 1923. odnosi se samo na nećudoredne „tiskovine” koje nisu predmet spora u ovoj stvari, dok se Svjetska poštanska konvencija ne može primjenjivati na robu koja nije uvezena poštom.
+24 Komisija je podsjetila i na činjenicu da se prema ustaljenoj praksi Suda članak 234. Ugovora, koji štiti „prava i obveze” koji proizlaze iz sporazuma sklopljenih prije stupanja na snagu Ugovora, odnosi samo na prava i obveze između država članica i trećih zemalja.
+Stoga se na te sporazume nije moguće pozivati kako bi se opravdala ograničenja u trgovini među državama članicama Zajednice.
+25 Taj argument Komisije valja prihvatiti.
+Kao što je Sud već rekao u presudi od 14. listopada 1980. (Burgoa, 812/79, Zb., str. 2787.), cilj članka 234. je osigurati da primjena Ugovora ne utječe ni na obvezu poštovanja prava trećih zemalja koja proizlaze iz sporazuma prethodno sklopljenog s državom članicom ni na ispunjenje obveza koje za tu državu članicu proizlaze iz tog sporazuma.
+Stoga se u odnosima među državama članicama na sporazume sklopljene prije stupanja na snagu Ugovora nije moguće pozivati kako bi se opravdala ograničenja u trgovini u Zajednici.
+26 Stoga na četvrto pitanje valja odgovoriti da članak 234. Ugovora treba tumačiti tako da se na sporazum sklopljen prije stupanja na snagu Ugovora nije moguće pozivati kako bi se opravdala ograničenja u trgovini među državama članicama.
+27 Troškovi vlade Ujedinjene Kraljevine i Komisije, koje su podnijele očitovanja Sudu, ne nadoknađuju se.
+Budući da ovaj postupak ima značaj prethodnog pitanja za stranke glavnog postupka pred sudom koji je uputio zahtjev, na tom je sudu da odluči o troškovima postupka.
+Slijedom navedenog, SUD (četvrto vijeće), U odgovoru na pitanja koja mu je rješenjem od 30. studenoga 1984. uputio High Court of Justice, (Visoki sud, Ujedinjena Kraljevina), odlučuje:
+1. Država članica ne može se pozivati na razloge javnog morala u smislu članka 36. Ugovora kako bi zabranila uvoz određene robe uz obrazloženje da je ta roba neprimjerene ili nećudoredne naravi ako se na njezinom državnom području ista roba smije slobodno proizvoditi i ako za njezino stavljanje na tržište na tom državnom području vrijedi samo potpuna zabrana slanja poštom, ograničenje u pogledu izlaganja u javnosti i, u određenim dijelovima države, sustav izdavanja dozvola prodajnim mjestima na kojima se ta roba smije prodavati kupcima koji su navršili 18 godina života.
+2. Članak 234. Ugovora o EEZ-u treba tumačiti tako da se na sporazum sklopljen prije stupanja na snagu Ugovora o EEZ-u nije moguće pozivati kako bi se opravdala ograničenja u trgovini između država članica.

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+In Case 302/87
+European Parliament, represented by F. Pasetti Bombardella, Jurisconsult of the Parliament, assisted by C. Pennera and J. Schoo, members of the Parliament's Legal Department, acting as Agents, with an address for service at the Secretariat-General of the European Parliament, Kirchberg, Luxembourg, applicant, v
+Council of the European Communities, represented by A. A. Dashwood, Director, F. Van Craeyenest, a Principal Administrator in the Council's Legal Department, and B. Laloux, a member of that department, acting as Agents, with an address for service at the office of J. Kaeser, Manager of the Legal Directorate of the European Investment Bank, 100 boulevard Konrad-Adenauer, Luxembourg,
+defendant,
+APPLICATION for a declaration that Council Decision 87/373/EEC of 13 July 1987 laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission is void,
+THE COURT composed of: Lord Mackenzie Stuart, President, G. Bosco, O. Due, J. C. Moitinho de Almeida, G. C. Rodríguez Iglesias (Presidents of Chambers), T. Koopmans, U. Everling, K. Bahlmann, Y. Galmot, C. N. Kakouris, R. Joliet, T. F. O'Higgins and F. A. Schockweiler, Judges,
+Advocate General: M. Darmon
+Registrar: J. A. Pompe, Deputy Registrar
+having regard to the Report for the Hearing and further to the hearing on 24 March 1988,
+after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General delivered at the sitting on 26 May 1988,
+gives the following
+Judgment
+1 By an application lodged at the Court Registry on 2 October 1987, the European Parliament brought an action pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 173 of the EEC Treaty for a declaration that Council Decision 87/373/EEC of 13 July 1987 (Official Journal 1987, L 197, p. 33) laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission was void.
+2 By that decision, which is based on Article 145 of the EEC Treaty as amended by Article 10 of the Single European Act, the Council laid down the procedures which it may require to be observed for the exercise of the powers conferred by it on the Commission for the implementation of the rules laid down by the Council and adopted the provisions governing the composition, the functioning and the role of the committees of the representatives of the Member States called upon to act.
+3 The Council raised an objection of inadmissibility pursuant to Article 91 (1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court and requested the Court to give a decision on that objection without considering the substance of the case.
+4 In support of its objection, the Council makes the point that the first paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty does not expressly provide that the European Parliament may bring an action for annulment.
+Nor, according to the Council, can the Parliament be recognized as having that capacity on the basis of reasoning founded on the need to ensure the coherence of legal remedies.
+Intervention and the action for failure to act which are available to the Parliament, as the Court held in its judgments of 29 October 1980 (in Case 138/79 Roquette Frères v Council ((1980)) ECR 3333 and in Case 139/79 Maïzena GmbH v Council ((1980)) ECR 3393) and of 22 May 1985 (in Case 13/83 European Parliament v Council - The "Transport" case - ((1985)) ECR 1513), are wholly separate from the action for annulment.
+5 The Council also maintains that neither the judgment of 23 April 1986 (in Case 294/83 Parti écologiste "Les Verts" v European Parliament ((1986)) ECR 1339) nor the judgment of 3 July 1986 (in Case 34/86 Council v European Parliament - The "Budget" case - ((1986)) ECR 2155) allow it to be inferred that the Court recognized by implication that the European Parliament has the capacity to bring an action for annulment.
+The judgment in "Les Verts" was based on the need to ensure that judicial protection was available against all measures intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties, regardless of which institution adopted the measure.
+It does not follow from this, according to the Council, that there must be a parallelism between the active and passive participation of the Parliament in proceedings for judicial review of legality.
+Nor can such parallelism be inferred from the "Budget" judgment since all the measures adopted by the Council in connection with the budgetary procedure are in any event merely preparatory.
+6 On 20 January 1988 the Court decided to give its decision on the Council's objection without considering the substance of the case.
+7 Reference is made to the Report for the Hearing for a fuller account of the facts of the case, the course of the procedure and the submissions and arguments of the parties, which are mentioned or referred to hereinafter only in so far as is necessary for the reasoning of the Court.
+8 It must be observed in limine that the parties have correctly placed the issue between them in the context of the first paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty.
+9 Article 173 contrasts the right of action of the institutions to which it refers in its first paragraph with the right of action of individuals, be they natural or legal persons, for which the conditions are laid down in its second paragraph.
+The European Parliament, which is one of the institutions of the Community listed in Article 4 of the Treaty, is not a legal person.
+10 Moreover, it may be observed that the scheme of the second paragraph of Article 173 would in any event be inappropriate to an action by the European Parliament for annulment.
+The applicants referred to in the second paragraph of Article 173 must be directly and individually concerned by the actual content of the act which they challenge.
+However, it is not the content of the act which could adversely affect the European Parliament but a failure to comply with the procedural rules requiring its involvement.
+Moreover, the second paragraph of Article 173 refers only to a limited class of acts, namely those which are individual in their application, whereas the European Parliament seeks recognition of the right to bring actions against acts which have general application.
+11 It should therefore be considered whether it is possible, by means of an interpretation of the first paragraph of Article 173, for the European Parliament to be recognized as having capacity to bring actions for the annulment of acts of the Council or the Commission.
+12 As is apparent from Articles 143 and 144 of the Treaty, the European Parliament is empowered, on the one hand, to exercise political control over the Commission which, pursuant to Article 155, is required to "ensure that the provisions of this Treaty and the measures taken by the institutions pursuant thereto are applied", and on the other, to censure the Commission, where necessary, if the latter should fail properly to discharge that task.
+The European Parliament's political control is also exercised by means of the debates that it may organize on specific or general questions, which enable it to pass motions on the policy followed by the Council or the Commission.
+13 Moreover, irrespective of the budgetary powers conferred on it by the Luxembourg Treaty of 22 April 1970 and the Brussels Treaty of 22 July 1975, and the power of joint decision vested in it regarding accession and association agreements since the adoption of the Single European Act, the European Parliament is in a position to exercise influence over the content of the legislative measures adopted by the Council, either by means of the opinions which it issues under the consultation procedure or by means of the positions which it adopts under the cooperation procedure.
+14 It should be emphasized that, as is apparent from the first paragraph of Article 175 of the Treaty, the European Parliament was vested with the power to obtain a declaration by the Court establishing a failure to act on the part of the Commission or the Council and thus to bring to an end any immobilization of the decision-making machinery which might prevent it from exercising its powers.
+It is also open to the European Parliament to make its views heard before the Court by intervening in proceedings before it, as is apparent from Article 37 of the Statute of the Court.
+15 Contrary to the assertion of the European Parliament, it does not follow that, because it is entitled to have a failure to act established and to intervene in proceedings before the Court, the Parliament must be recognized as having the possibility of bringing actions for annulment.
+16 There is no necessary link between the action for annulment and the action for failure to act.
+This follows from the fact that the action for failure to act enables the European Parliament to induce the adoption of measures which cannot in all cases be the subject of an action for annulment.
+Thus, as is shown by the judgment of 12 July 1988 in Case 377/87 European Parliament v Council ((1988)) ECR, as long as a draft budget has not been presented by the Council, the European Parliament can obtain a judgment establishing the Council's failure to act, whereas the draft budget, which is a preparatory measure, could not be challenged under Article 173.
+17 The argument has also been put forward that, in the absence of any power to bring an action for annulment, the European Parliament would be unable, after calling upon the Council or the Commission to act, in accordance with Article 175, to challenge an express refusal to act issued in response to that request.
+However, that argument is based on a false premise.
+A refusal to act, however explicit it may be, can be brought before the Court under Article 175 since it does not put an end to the failure to act.
+18 Nor is there any necessary link between the right to intervene and the possibility of bringing an action.
+On the one hand, according to the second paragraph of Article 37 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the EEC, the right of individuals to intervene is conditional merely upon "an interest in the result of any case" before the Court, whereas the admissibility of an action for annulment brought by individuals is subject to the condition that they must be the addressees of the measure which they seek to have annulled or at least that the measure should be of direct and individual concern to them.
+On the other hand, under the first paragraph of Article 37, the European Parliament is entitled to intervene in cases such as those concerning the failure by States to fulfil their obligations, whereas the right to bring such cases before the Court is reserved to the Commission and the Member States.
+19 The European Parliament goes on to state that the first paragraph of Article 173 reflects a principle of equality between the institutions expressly mentioned in that provision, in the sense that each of them is entitled to bring an action against measures adopted by the other and, conversely, its own measures can be submitted by the other institution for review by the Court.
+Since it has held that measures of the European Parliament capable of producing legal effects can be the subject of an action for annulment, the Court should, with a view to maintaining the institutional balance, decide that the European Parliament has the capacity to challenge acts of the Council and the Commission.
+20 In that connection, it must be borne in mind that although the Court held in its judgment of 23 April 1986 (Parti écologiste "Les Verts" v European Parliament, cited above) that an action for annulment may lie against measures adopted by the European Parliament intended to have legal effects vis-à-vis third parties, it did so because an interpretation excluding such measures from the scope of that action would have produced a result contrary to the system of the Treaty, which was intended to establish a complete system of judicial protection against acts of Community institutions which are capable of having legal effects.
+21 However, a comparison between Article 38 of the ECSC Treaty, which was specifically referred to by the Court in the judgment in "Les Verts", and Article 33 of the same Treaty shows that, according to the scheme of the Treaties, in those cases where provision was made for acts of the European Parliament to be subject to review of their legality, the European Parliament was not thereby empowered to bring a direct action on its own initiative against acts of other institutions.
+The European Parliament's argument that there must be a parallelism between the capacity of defendant and the capacity of applicant in proceedings for judicial review must therefore be rejected.
+22 The European Parliament then claims that the Court recognized by implication in its judgment of 3 July 1986 (Council v European Parliament - the "Budget" case - cited above) that it had the capacity to bring an action for annulment.
+23 It must be observed that the budgetary procedure described in Article 203 (4), (5) and (6) of the Treaty is characterized by successive deliberations of the two arms of the budgetary authority in the course of which each of them may, in accordance with the voting conditions laid down in the Treaty, react to the positions taken by the other.
+Those deliberations constitute measures preparatory to the drawing-up of the budget.
+As is apparent from the judgment of 3 July 1986 (Council v Parliament - the "Budget" case - cited above) the budget does not become legally binding until completion of the procedure, that is to say when the President of the European Parliament, in his capacity as an organ of that institution, declares that the budget has been finally adopted.
+24 It follows that as far as the approval of the budget is concerned, the only measure which can be declared void emanates from an organ of the European Parliament and must therefore be attributed to that institution itself.
+Consequently, the European Parliament cannot rely upon the budgetary powers conferred upon it by the Luxembourg and Brussels Treaties cited above - powers which, moreover, are not at issue in the present case - in order to obtain recognition of its right to bring actions for the annulment of measures emanating from the Commission and the Council.
+25 The European Parliament then goes on to state that if it had no power to bring actions for annulment it would not be in a position to defend its prerogatives vis-à-vis the other institutions.
+26 It must be observed that the European Parliament has, from the outset, been endowed with the power to participate, on a consultative basis, in the legislative process, but that it was not thereby accorded the possibility of bringing actions for annulment.
+The prerogatives of the European Parliament have been augmented by the Single European Act, which has vested in it a power of joint decision with respect to accession and association agreements and has established a cooperation procedure in certain specified cases, but without any changes having been made to Article 173 of the Treaty.
+27 Apart from the abovementioned rights granted to the European Parliament by Article 175, the Treaty provides means for submitting for review by the Court acts of the Council adopted in disregard of the Parliament's prerogatives.
+Whilst the first paragraph of Article 173 grants to all the Member States in general terms the right to bring an action for the annulment of such acts, Article 155 of the Treaty confers more specifically on the Commission the responsibility for ensuring that the Parliament's prerogatives are respected and for bringing for that purpose such actions for annulment as might prove to be necessary.
+Moreover, any natural or legal person may, if the prerogatives of the European Parliament are disregarded, plead an infringement of essential procedural requirements or an infringement of the Treaty in order to obtain the annulment of the measure adopted or, indirectly, a declaration pursuant to Article 184 of the Treaty that that measure is inapplicable.
+Similarly, the illegality of a measure on the ground of breach of the prerogatives of the European Parliament may be raised as an issue before a national court and the measure in question may be the subject of a reference to the Court for a preliminary ruling as to its validity.
+28 It follows from all the foregoing considerations that the applicable provisions, as they stand at present, do not enable the Court to recognize the capacity of the European Parliament to bring an action for annulment.
+29 The objection of inadmissibility must therefore be upheld and the application must be dismissed as inadmissible.
+30 Under Article 69 (2) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party must be ordered to pay the costs if they have been asked for in the successful party's pleading.
+Since the European Parliament has failed in its action it must be ordered to bear the costs.
+On those grounds, THE COURT hereby:
+(1) Dismisses the application as inadmissible.
+(2) Orders the European Parliament to bear the costs.

data/principle-mvep-justice-court/mvep-120-hr.aligned.txt

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+U predmetu 302/87,
+Europski parlament, koji zastupaju F. Pasetti Bombardella, pravni savjetnik Parlamenta uz asistenciju C. Pennere i J. Schooa, članova pravne službe Parlamenta, u svojstvu agenata, s izabranom adresom za dostavu pri glavnom tajništvu Europskog parlamenta, Plateau du Kirchberg, Luxembourg,
+tužitelj, protiv Vijeća Europskih zajednica, koje zastupaju A. A. Daschwood, direktor, F. Van Craeyenest, glavni administrator, i B. Laloux, članica Pravne službe Vijeća, u svojstvu agenata, s izabranom adresom za dostavu pri uredu J. Kaesera, direktora uprave za pravne poslove Europske investicijske banke, 100, Boulevard Konrad-Adenauer, Luxembourg,
+tuženika,
+povodom zahtjeva za poništenje Odluke Vijeća 87/373/EEZ od 13. srpnja 1987. o utvrđivanju postupaka za izvršavanje provedbenih ovlasti dodijeljenih Komisiji,
+SUD, u sastavu: Mackenzie Stuart, predsjednik, G. Bosco, O. Due, J. C. Moitinho De Almeida i G. C. Rodriguez Iglesias, predsjednici Vijeća, T. Koopmans, U. Everling, K. Bahlmann, Y. Galmot, C. N. Kakouris, R. Joliet, T. F. OʼHiggins, F. A. Schockweiler, suci,
+nezavisni odvjetnik: M. Darmon,
+tajnik: J. A. Pompe, zamjenik tajnika,
+uzimajući u obzir izvještaj za raspravu i nakon usmenog postupka od 24. ožujka 1988.,
+saslušavši mišljenje nezavisnog odvjetnika na raspravi održanoj 26. svibnja 1988.,
+donosi sljedeću
+Presudu
+1 Zahtjevom podnesenim Tajništvu Suda 2. listopada 1987. Europski je parlament na temelju članka 173. prvog stavka Ugovora o EEZ-u podnio tužbu za poništenje Odluke Vijeća 87/373/EEZ od 13. srpnja 1987. o utvrđivanju postupaka za izvršavanje provedbenih ovlasti dodijeljenih Komisiji (SL L 197, str. 33.).
+2 Tom odlukom, koja se temelji na članku 145. Ugovora o EEZ-u kako je izmijenjen člankom 10. Jedinstvenog europskog akta, Vijeće je utvrdilo uvjete u pogledu izvršavanja ovlasti koje dodjeljuje Komisiji za provedbu pravila koja utvrđuje i donijelo je odredbe kojima se uređuju sastav, funkcioniranje i uloga odborâ predstavnika država članica pozvanih da interveniraju.
+3 Vijeće je na temelju članka 91. stavka 1. Poslovnika Suda podnijelo prigovor nedopuštenosti i zatražilo od Suda da o tom prigovoru odluči ne ulazeći u raspravu o meritumu.
+4 U prilog svom prigovoru Vijeće ističe da člankom 173. prvim stavkom Ugovora nije izričito predviđeno da Europski parlament može podnijeti tužbu za poništenje.
+Ta mu se ovlast ne može priznati ni na osnovi obrazloženja utemeljenog na potrebi osiguranja koherentnosti pravnih lijekova.
+Naime, intervencija i tužba zbog propusta, koje su Europskom parlamentu dostupne, kako je to Sud utvrdio u presudama od 29. listopada 1980. (Roquette frères/Vijeće, 138/79, Zb., str. 3333. i Maïzena GmbH/Vijeće, 139/79, Zb., str. 3393.) i od 22. svibnja 1985. (Europski parlament/Vijeće, „Prijevozi” , 13/83, Zb., str. 1513.) neovisne su o tužbi za poništenje.
+5 Vijeće također tvrdi da ni presuda od 23. travnja 1986. (Ekološka stranka „Zeleni”/Europski parlament, 294/83, Zb., str. 1339.) ni presuda od 3. srpnja 1986. (Vijeće/Europski parlament, „Proračun” , 34/86, Zb., str. 2155.) ne omogućavaju da se donese zaključak da je Sud Europskom parlamentu implicitno priznao aktivnu procesnu legitimaciju za podnošenje tužbe za poništenje.
+Prethodno navedena presuda „Zeleni” od 23. travnja 1986. utemeljena je na potrebi osiguranja sudske zaštite od svih akata koji mogu proizvoditi pravne učinke u odnosu na treće osobe, bez obzira na to koja je institucija taj akt donijela.
+Iz toga ne proizlazi da mora postojati podudarnost između pasivnog i aktivnog sudjelovanja Europskog parlamenta u sporu o zakonitosti.
+Ta se podudarnost ne može zaključiti ni iz prethodno navedene presude „Proračun” od 3. srpnja 1986. jer su svi akti koje u proračunskom postupku donosi Vijeće u svakom slučaju samo pripremne naravi.
+6 Sud je 20. siječnja 1988. odredio da će o prigovoru Vijeća odlučivati ne ulazeći u raspravu o meritumu.
+7 Za širi prikaz činjenica u predmetu, tijeka postupka i tužbenih zahtjeva i argumenata stranaka upućuje se na izvještaj za raspravu. Ti su dijelovi spisa preuzeti u nastavku samo u onoj mjeri u kojoj je to nužno za odlučivanje Suda.
+8 Najprije valja istaknuti da su stranke raspravu ispravno usredotočile na članak 173. prvi stavak Ugovora.
+9 Naime u članku 173. razlikuje se pravo institucija na pokretanje postupka, koje je uređeno njegovim prvim stavkom, od prava na pokretanje postupka pojedinaca, fizičkih ili pravnih osoba, za koje se u njegovom drugom stavku utvrđuju uvjeti.
+Europski parlament, koji je jedna od institucija Zajednice navedenih u članku 4. Ugovora, nije pravna osoba.
+10 Osim toga, može se primijetiti da bi sustav iz drugog stavka članka 173. u svakom slučaju bio neprikladan za tužbu za poništenje koju podnosi Europski parlament.
+Naime, sâm sadržaj akta koji tužitelji iz članka 173. drugog stavka pobijaju mora ih se neposredno i osobno ticati.
+Dakle, Europski parlament ne bi mogao kao tužbeni razlog isticati sadržaj akta nego nepoštovanje postupovnih pravila koje zahtijeva njegovu intervenciju.
+Nadalje, članak 173. drugi stavak odnosi se samo na ograničenu kategoriju akata, to jest na pojedinačne akte, dok Europski parlament želi da mu se prizna pravo na pokretanje postupka protiv akata opće primjene.
+11 Stoga valja ispitati može li se tumačenjem članka 173. prvog stavka Europskom parlamentu priznati aktivna procesna legitimacija za podnošenje tužbe za poništenje akata Vijeća ili Komisije.
+12 Kako proizlazi iz članaka 143. i 144. Ugovora, Europski parlament ima ovlast provedbe političkog nadzora nad Komisijom koja, u skladu s člankom 155. „osigurava primjenu odredaba ovog Ugovora i mjera koje na temelju ovog Ugovora provode institucije” i prema potrebi prigovoriti joj ako tu zadaću propisno ne obavlja.
+Politički nadzor Europski parlament provodi i putem rasprava koje on može organizirati o pojedinačnim ili općim pitanjima i koje mu omogućuju da donosi prijedloge o politici koju provodi Vijeće ili Komisija.
+13 Usto, neovisno o proračunskim ovlastima koje su mu priznate Ugovorima iz Luxembourga od 22. travnja 1970. i iz Bruxellesa od 22. srpnja 1975. i o ovlasti suodlučivanja koju, od donošenja Jedinstvenog europskoga akta ima u području pristupanja i ugovorâ o pridruživanju, Europski parlament može, bilo mišljenjima koje daje u okviru postupka savjetovanja, bilo stajalištima koje zauzima u postupku suradnje, utjecati na sadržaj normativnih akata koje donosi Vijeće.
+14 Valja naglasiti da je Europskome parlamentu, kako to proizlazi iz članka 175. prvog stavka Ugovora, dodijeljeno pravo da pokrene postupak radi utvrđivanja propusta Komisije ili Vijeća i da tako pokrene postupak za prekid neaktivnosti mehanizama odlučivanja koja bi ga mogla spriječiti u provedbi njegovih ovlasti.
+Europski parlament ima također mogućnost iznositi svoja stajališta na Sudu, gdje se uključuje u postupak pred Sudom, kako proizlazi iz članka 37. Statuta Suda.
+15 Iz tog prava na pokretanje postupka radi utvrđivanja propusta i na uključivanje u postupak pred Sudom ne proizlazi, protivno onomu što tvrdi Europski parlament, da mu se mora priznati mogućnost podnošenja tužbe za poništenje.
+16 Između tužbe za poništenje i tužbe zbog propusta nema nužne veze.
+To proizlazi iz činjenice da tužba zbog propusta omogućava Europskom parlamentu da potakne donošenje akata koji ne mogu uvijek biti predmetom tužbe za poništenje.
+Kako to pokazuje presuda od 12. srpnja 1988. (Europski parlament/Vijeće, 377/87, Zb., str. 4017.), sve dok Vijeće nije podnijelo nacrt proračuna Europski parlament može ishoditi presudu koja utvrđuje propust Vijeća, dok se nacrt koji predstavlja pripremni akt ne bi mogao osporavati na temelju članka 173.
+17 Također je istaknut argument da, zbog nemogućnosti podnošenja tužbe za poništenje, Europski parlament, nakon što je, u smislu članka 175., pozvao Vijeće i Komisiju da djeluju, ne može osporavati izričito odbijanje djelovanja kao odgovor na taj poziv.
+Međutim, taj je argument utemeljen na netočnoj pretpostavci.
+Naime, odgovor o odbijanju poziva na djelovanje, ma kako izričito ono bilo, može se predati Sudu na temelju članka 175. s obzirom na to da o propustu djelovanja nije konačno odlučeno.
+18 Ne postoji ni nužna veza između prava uključivanja u postupak i mogućnosti podnošenja tužbe.
+S jedne strane, u skladu s člankom 37. drugim stavkom Statuta Suda EEZ-a pravo uključivanja pojedinaca u postupak jednostavno pretpostavlja „pravni interes za ishod postupka” pred Sudom, dok dopuštenost njihove tužbe za poništenje podliježe uvjetu da oni budu adresati akta čije poništenje zahtijevaju ili da ih se taj akt barem neposredno i osobno tiče.
+S druge strane, na temelju članka 37. prvog stavka Europski parlament ima pravo uključiti se u postupke poput onih o povredama obveza država, dok je inicijativa za pokretanje postupka pred Sudom namijenjena isključivo Komisiji i državama članicama.
+19 Europski parlament također tvrdi da članak 173. prvi stavak Ugovora izražava načelo jednakosti među institucijama koje se tu izričito spominju u smislu da svaka od njih može podnijeti tužbu protiv akata druge institucije i obrnuto, njezine akte druga institucija može predati na ispitivanje Sudu.
+Budući da je Sud presudio da akti Europskog parlamenta koji mogu proizvoditi pravne učinke mogu biti predmet tužbe za poništenje, radi održavanja institucionalne ravnoteže Sud treba odlučiti da Europski parlament ima legitimaciju pobijati akte Vijeća i Komisije.
+20 U tom pogledu valja podsjetiti da, ako je Sud u svojoj prethodno navedenoj presudi od 23. travnja 1986. (Ekološka stranka „Zeleni”/Europski parlament) presudio da akti Europskog parlamenta koji proizvode pravne učinke u odnosu na treće osobe mogu biti predmet tužbe za poništenje, to je zato jer bi ih tumačenje koje bi ih isključilo iz područja te tužbe dovelo do ishoda protivnog sustavu Ugovora kojim se željelo uvesti potpuni sustav sudske zaštite od akata institucija Zajednice koji mogu proizvoditi pravne učinke.
+21 Usporedba između članka 38. Ugovora o EZUČ-u na koji se Sud osobito poziva u svojoj presudi „Zeleni” i članka 33. istog Ugovora ipak pokazuje da u sustavu Ugovora, kada su se akti Europskog parlamenta podvrgavali nadzoru zakonitosti, Europski parlament ipak nije bio ovlašten samoinicijativno podnijeti izravnu tužbu protiv akata drugih institucija.
+Argument Europskog parlamenta da u sporovima o zakonitosti postoji podudarnost između pasivne i aktivne legitimacije stoga valja odbaciti.
+22 Europski parlament zatim tvrdi da mu je Sud u prethodno navedenoj presudi od 3. srpnja 1986. (Vijeće/Europski parlament, „Proračun”) implicitno priznao aktivnu procesnu legitimaciju za podnošenje tužbe.
+23 U tom pogledu valja primijetiti da proračunski postupak opisan u stavcima 4., 5. i 6. članka 203. Ugovora kojem su svojstvena uzastopna vijećanja dviju ogranaka proračunskog tijela, tijekom kojih svaki ogranak može, pod uvjetima glasovanja utvrđenima Ugovorom, reagirati na stajališta drugog ogranka.
+Ta su vijećanja dio pripremnih akata u izradi proračuna.
+Ovaj potonji, kako to proizlazi iz prethodno navedene presude od 3. srpnja 1986. (Vijeće/Europski parlament, „Proračun”) postaje pravno obvezujući tek po završetku postupka, to jest kad predsjednik Europskog parlamenta, u svojstvu tijela te institucije, u skladu sa stavkom 7. članka 203. Ugovora utvrdi da je proračun konačno donesen.
+24 Iz toga proizlazi, što se tiče odobrenja proračuna, da jedini akt koji se može poništiti dolazi iz tijela Europskog parlamenta pa ga se stoga treba dodijeliti upravo toj instituciji.
+Slijedom navedenog Europski se parlament na proračunske ovlasti koje su mu dodijeljene prethodno navedenim Ugovorima iz Luxembourga i Bruxellesa, ovlasti o kojima se, uostalom, ne raspravlja u ovom predmetu, ne može pozvati kako bi mu se priznalo pravo podnošenja tužbe za poništenje akata koje donose Komisija i Vijeće.
+25 Europski je parlament još tvrdio da, u nemogućnosti podnošenja tužbe za poništenje, ne bi bio u stanju braniti svoje ovlasti u odnosu na druge institucije.
+26 U tom pogledu valja istaknuti da je Europski parlament u postupku izrade normativnih akata od početka imao savjetodavne ovlasti, ali da mu je zbog toga bilo onemogućeno podnošenje tužbe za poništenje.
+Ovlasti Europskog parlamenta povećane su Jedinstvenim europskim aktom kojim je Parlamentu dodijeljena ovlast suodlučivanja u području pristupanja i ugovorâ o pridruživanju i kojim je u određenim slučajevima uveden postupak suradnje, ali članak 173. Ugovora ipak nije mijenjan.
+27 Osim gore spomenutih prava priznatih Europskom parlamentu člankom 175., Ugovor nudi mogućnosti da se akti Vijeća doneseni nepoštovanjem ovlasti Parlamenta predaju na ispitivanje Sudu.
+Ako se člankom 173. prvim stavkom općenito svim državama članicama otvara mogućnost podnošenja tužbe za poništenje protiv takvih akata, člankom 155. Ugovora posebno se Komisiji daje odgovornost da vodi računa o poštovanju ovlasti Parlamenta i da u tom cilju podnosi tužbe za poništenje koje bi se pokazale nužnima.
+Osim toga, u slučaju nepoštovanja ovlasti Europskog parlamenta, svaka fizička ili pravna osoba može se pozvati na povredu bitnih postupovnih odredaba ili na povredu Ugovora kako bi ishodila poništenje donesenog akta ili na izjavu o neprimjenjivosti tog akta na temelju članka 184. Ugovora.
+Također, pitanje nezakonitosti nekog akta zbog povrede ovlasti Europskog parlamenta može se postaviti nacionalnom sudu, a dotični akt može biti predmet zahtjeva za prethodnu odluku Suda o ocjeni valjanosti.
+28 Iz prethodno navedenog proizlazi da sadašnje stanje važećih odredaba Sudu ne omogućava da Europskom parlamentu prizna aktivnu procesnu legitimaciju za podnošenje tužbe za poništenje.
+29 Stoga se prigovor nedopuštenosti mora prihvatiti i tužba odbaciti kao nedopuštena.
+30 Sukladno odredbama članka 69. stavka 2. Poslovnika, stranka koja ne uspije u postupku snosi troškove, ako je takav zahtjev postavljen.
+Budući da Europski parlament nije uspio u postupku, valja mu naložiti snošenje troškova.
+Slijedom navedenoga, SUD proglašava i presuđuje:
+1. Tužba se odbija kao nedopuštena.
+2. Europskom parlamentu nalaže se snošenje troškova.