Società editrice il Mulino it 1120-9550 Editoriale 2017 10.1422/87752 10.1422/87752 1 225 232 La decisione nel regno dell'incertezza Real life problems are experienced inside complex environments. They are typically ill-defined problems, that is, the goals are not definite; we don't know what counts as an alternative and how many alternatives there are; it's unclear what the consequences might be and how to estimate their probabilities and utilities. This environment might be called Large World (Savage 1954) and it is characterized by uncertainty. Small Worlds instead are in principle predictable and without surprises, and they are characterized by risk, that is, by the knowledge of all relevant variables, their consequences and probabilities. The conditions of the Small World are the requirements of Neoclassical Rationality. In any case, the real world is most of the time large, and these conditions of knowledge are rarely met. Hence, the normative rational requirements of neoclassical economics are unjustified and the application of their theories can easily lead to a disaster (Stiglitz 2010). Unfortunately, behavioural economics, despite its critiques of the descriptive side of neoclassical economics, still retains the normative one. On the contrary, in a Large World the axioms of rationality can't be applied. Therefore they can't be considered feasible normative canons of rationality. Is the label of irrational behaviour attributed to biases and errors discovered by behavioral economics justified? The answer is no, as in a Large World rationality must be judged in relation to the proper adaptation of the choices and problem solutions to a given environment. Rationality can't be formal but only Ecological. What kind of reasoning processes are able to match the environmental tasks and solve these problems? This is an empirical question that has been faced some years ago by some cognitive scientists, as Herbert Simon, Vernon Smith, Richard Selten, and in particular and more directly by Gerd Gigerenzer and the Abc group (Gigerenzer, Todd and Abc Group 1999). The adaptive toolbox of formalized simple heuristics is the result of these empirical investigation. In a number of problems, simple heuristics were more accurate than standard statistical methods that have the same amount of information or more. The results became known as the «less-is-more effect». There is a point where more is not better, but harmful. There is an inverse-U-shaped relation between level of accuracy and amount of information, computation, or time (Gigerenzer and Gassmaier 2011 p. 453). Riccardo Viale 2017 10.1422/87753 10.1422/87753 2 233 248 Gli aspetti emotivi delle scelte in condizioni di rischio in una prospettiva comparata One aspect of decision-making concerns the choice between a risky option, linked to uncertain results, and a safe option. According to Lopes (1983), an individual exposes herself to a «risk» when she makes a decision being aware of the probability of loss associated with it; in contrast, Vlek and Stallen (1981) define «risk» on the basis of how negatively an individual evaluates the effect of a loss originated by her decision. Some authors (Fischhoff et al. 1981) assert that risk propensity is a stable trait during development and under all circumstances; according to others, risk proneness is an inclination influenced by personal judgement as to whether a determined decision is able to determine a benefit or not (Sitkin and Pablo 1992). More recently, risk proneness has been investigated even in children, in order to identify the onset and the tendency to potentially develop hazardous behaviors. It was found that risk proneness depends on age: for example, in situations in which there is a small probability of a great loss, children in primary school are more inclined to choose the risky option rather than the safe one, while adults behave in the opposite way (Harbaugh et al. 2002). In order to investigate the evolutionary roots of risk proneness, this aspect of decision-making has been also examined in non-human primates, where the scenario seems to be rather complicated. Chimpanzees, rhesus macaques and capuchin monkeys prefer risky options (De Petrillo et al. 2015, Hayden e Platt 2007; Heilbronner et al. 2008; McCoy e Platt 2005), bonobos, cotton-top tamarins and lemurs are risk averse (Heilbronner et al. 2008, MacLean, Mandalaywala e Brannon 2012, Stevens 2010), whereas common marmosets are indifferent between options (Stevens 2010). The most accredited hypothesis sustains that these differences are due to the environment in which these species evolved and their feeding ecology (Gigerenzer e Todd 1999, Heilbronner et al. 2008). Nevertheless, the evolutionary trajectory of the ability to face with risky decisions is still not entirely understood. Furthermore, given the multiplicity of theoretical and methodological approaches that have investigated these questions, neither the mechanisms underlying decision-making under risk are yet well defined, nor which are the cognitive, social and emotional factors that influence this construct. Recently, the focus has shifted from the cognitive to the emotional aspects of decisional processes in risky situations. As Schwarz (2000) affirms, the relationship between decision making and emotions is preeminent and bidirectional: the positive or negative result of a decision can deeply influence the feelings of the decision maker and consequently her choice ability; besides, an emotional dysregulation (i.e., a particularly high level of impulsiveness and anger) could be at the basis of the assumption of hazardous choices. In this paper, we will review, in a comparative perspective, the studies that have investigated the emotional aspects of decision-making under risk in children and in non-human primates, highlighting the possible elements of continuity and difference in the emotional mechanisms at the basis of decisions in contexts of risk. Melania Paoletti, Francesca De Petrillo, Francesca Bellagamba, Elsa Addessi 2017 10.1422/87754 10.1422/87754 3 249 270 L'influenza dei processi comunicativi nella percezione del rischio e nella presa di decisione In the present article we discuss the cognitive processes involved in risk assessment contexts, with reference to empirical researches (medical risk assessment, framing effect, disjunctive effect). In this respect, it will be shown that contextual and communicative factors help to determine the risk perception, as well as the direction of decision making. The text of every decision-making problem can be considered a conversation between a speaker and a listener. In particular, it is conceived as a cooperative venture: the context, the characteristics of the speaker and the listener, the shared knowledge and the intention of the speaker, all these aspects shape the interpretation of the problem. That is possible through sophisticated, inferential processes of meaning attribution, that are known to be immediate and adaptive. Therefore, pragmatic analysis of a decision-making problem allows us to investigate the interpretation of the problem itself. This perspective have a great impact on the theory of thought and, consequently, on the explanation of errors in decision making, and the concept of rationality. Laura Macchi, Veronica Cucchiarini, Maria Bagassi 2017 10.1422/87755 10.1422/87755 4 271 294 Il rischio nel fidarsi. La fiducia nel rischiare. Equilibratori cognitivi del comportamento Trust and risk are inextricably intertwined in the mind of anyone who wants to pursue a goal, because one must rely on actions where the possibility of failure can be predictable. The relation between risk and trust is intrinsic: on the one hand, there cannot be any trust if there is no perceived risk, such as the uncertainty of success of those actions. Trusting someone implies the decision of exposing oneself to vulnerability. On the other hand, perceived risks entail actions that always rely on some degree of trust. Especially because uncertainty and perceived risk are necessarily ingrained in any state of trust, we need a sophisticated ontology of «risk», «uncertainty», and «trust». Moreover, we need to provide an explanation for all the relationships that these conceptual categories entertain with each other and how they get processed and assessed by means of cognition. In this work, we will try to define in detail these relationships and these sophisticated differences. In particular, we will try to describe the role they play; the difference between risk and uncertainty; the difference between taking a risk and undergo a risk independently from one's willingness; the importance of the different degrees of risk people attribute when they decide whether or not to trust somebody; and how non-linear factors linked with trust and risk intervene in people's decisions. Moreover, we believe that there exist also some generative dynamics between trust and risk: trust not only exposes people to risks, but increases risks and creates new risks (e.g.: risks of failure, disappointment, loss, helplessness, or betrayal). However, trust may even reduce risks because it has an effect on trustees' behaviors and it changes the probability of success, reciprocation and loyalty. In this sense, we would like to argue that trust (just like many other types of positive expectancies) is a selffulfilling prophecy that may radically modify the probability of an outcome. Cristiano Castelfranchi, Rino Falcone 2017 10.1422/87756 10.1422/87756 5 295 312 Fiducia e rischi naturali: inquadramento teorico e studi sperimentali Understanding and cooperation between experts and laypeople, as well as between citizens and institutions is often difficult in the management of societal risks such as natural disasters or technological and biological hazards. These hardships often result from incongruences in risk assessment from expert and non-expert sources and from a general lack of trust in the risk-management policies and in institutional communications about risk and prevention. Our studies investigate the role of trust in the mitigation of the harmful effects of natural disasters, both on communities and on individuals. Specifically, we will focus on how traumatic experience with natural disasters and trust in the institutional sources of risk information influence laypeople's decisions on safe behaviors. Silvia Felletti, Laura Bonelli, Alessandro Sapienza, Rino Falcone, Fabio Paglieri 2017 10.1422/87757 10.1422/87757 6 313 350 Piove, governo ladro. Emozioni e cognizione nell'analisi dei rischi a seguito di un evento alluvionale The night of October 9th 2014, a major flood due to heavy rainfalls devastated Genoa. That event followed a previous flood, occurred just two years before, which had very similar dynamics in terms of damages to belongings and loss of lives. Genoa is particularly exposed to the risk of floods, due to the complex interaction of factors like the urban development, the orographic nature of the area, the meteorological events and citizens' behaviours. Community resilience is therefore based on the shared commitment of stakeholders to cope with the abovementioned factors. Citizens' risk perception and safe behaviours will be based on trust towards political and technical institutions that regulate the territory, monitor the weather, issue the alerts and manage the emergency response. If citizens lack trust, the connection between stakeholders will be weak and the system, eventually, will be brittle. In this paper we describe the reaction of media after the flood, analysing titles of news reports on newspapers and television. We observed four clusters of themes: the debate about the funds for the recovery, an emotionally charged description of the flood outcomes, a description of hydraulic works that should have been done in advance, and, eventually, accusations against the political or technical institutions that allegedly mismanaged the situation. We claim that the clusters represent an emotionally driven mood of public opinion after the event, which will set the ground for cognitive biases like hindsight bias and outcome bias. These biases trigger a simplistic approach in explaining the events, and, most of all, they stimulate a blame culture, where the need for a scapegoat is the primary goal. This will lead to a lack of trust towards political and technical institutions and, eventually, to the development of uncontrolled and not coherent attitudes towards risk in a town, like Genoa, that may easily undergo a similar event in the future. Fabrizio Bracco, Cinzia Modafferi, Luca Ferraris 2017 10.1422/87758 10.1422/87758 7 351 370 Crisis management della comunicazione: istituzioni e social media Emergency communication is central, particularly in relation to the ways Institutions approach the issue. As a matter of fact, institutional communication is frequently accused of not being exhaustive, timely and meaningful. This is usually due to the combination of necessarily different roles and different degrees of responsivity among different communication actors (mainly media and Institutions) during a crisis that results in an ineffective crisis management. Two are the main causes for this failure. Firstly, the public is more reluctant to receive information about possible critical events, before and during the event itself, due to a drastically changed risk scenarios: the use of communication by terrorism, which made it a source of threat itself, significantly influenced public demand to receive information. The second reason has to do with the always more pervasive use of the new ways of communication, which made it immediate but at the same time less controllable. The article aims at addressing these issues starting from: the change of risk scenarios that makes communication a central asset for the crisis management; the different «risk perception» and its impact on the information demand; the role that traditional media have and the ones that new communication technologies are gaining; the issues that Institutions have to deal with, especially in relation to the use of new technologies; possible strategic suggestions to improve institutional communication in emergency. Marco Lombardi, Alessandro Burato 2017 10.1422/87759 10.1422/87759 8 371 392 Gravità del rischio temuto nella modificazione genica dei sistemi biologici negli organismi viventi: confronto tra le percezioni di soggetti esperti e ingenui The core aim of this study is to evaluate the degree of acceptability/ rejection of risks associated with the use of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). The role of scientific knowledge («Expertise») about different types of biotechnologies was investigated. The «Psychometric paradigm» introduced by Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read & Combs (1978) was used to create a questionnaire investigating sixteen qualitative risk characteristics associated with seven biotechnology applications: food-related vs. medical-pharmaceutical. The questionnaire was administered to a sample of 114 «experts» in biotechnology and 162 randomly selected «non experts». Both groups rated, on a 11-points scale, a total number of 16 × 7 items. Data were analyzed at the individual level. Nevertheless statistical analysis for aggregate data, using mean scores, were reported too. The mean correlation matrix of individuals has been submitted to multi-sample confirmatory factorial analysis (MS-CFA) to investigate differences about the latent structure of the mental representation of hazards, respectively for the expert and non expert groups. The results reported here indicate that (1) a common cognitive map of risks exists for both groups, and it involves three latent dimensions: «dread», «benefits» and «exposition»; (2) individuals shown little variation in their rating of risk characteristics on the same biotechnology application; (3) the role of the expertise does not appear to be a significant modulator factor to represent differences about perceived risks across experts and non experts groups' aggregation. Lastly, a structural equation model (SEM) has been implemented to test the causal statistical dependence of the «dread» and «benefits» from «exposition», separately for each group of participants. Eraldo Francesco Nicotra, Paola Grassi 2017 10.1422/87760 10.1422/87760 9 393 422 Numeri in medicina. Ingredienti per una comunicazione del rischio efficace e trasparente Nowadays, we have much more information about our health than we had in the past, and numerical information is, or should be, commonplace in the communication between doctors and patients. Indeed, evidence-based medicine is the gold standard for public health decisions, for the development of national and international guidelines, as well as for clinical practice on individual patients. In this perspective, risk communication, conveyed mainly through numerical information, need to take into account how people perceive and understand this information. Psychological research on this issue has shown that people are affected by the way information is presented when making judgments and decisions. This paper aims to illustrate some of the main issues to be considered when designing risk communication in the medical domain. By examining some examples of non-transparent risk communication, we will illustrate the effectiveness of different types of numerical information (natural frequencies, 1 in n. percentages) and discuss the concepts of absolute and relative risk, highlighting the importance of making explicit the reference class. Additionally, considering that the same treatment can be described in terms of likelihood of survival or death, and that, although the two information are complementary, people seem to be affected by the communicator's choice, we will examine the various types of frames used in the medical domain and discuss the more recent research findings. Making explicit the reference class to which probabilities refer can also help to understand the results of a clinical test. In a simplistic way, people often think that a positive test result means that a disease is present and that a negative test result means that it is not. Even when it is acknowledged that no test is 100% certain, the margin of error and the extent to which it is affected by the frequency of the disease in the population are difficult to grasp, even by experts. For instance, even with a very precise test, a positive test result is associated with a very low likelihood of having the disease (positive predictive value) when the disease is rare. Research has also shown that people with low numeracy (the ability to reason and to apply simple numerical concepts) are especially susceptible to misunderstanding of numerical information when it is referred to groups of people and that are likely to be affected by stories about single cases (see, for instance, the current debate about childhood vaccinations). Finally, we will discuss about the new frontiers of medical research, resulting in a continuous increase in the complexity of risk communication. For example, with the progress of medical genetics and the possibility to determine the presence of genetic mutations that can be linked to the risk of developing diseases, the complexity of the information to be communicated is clearly increasing. Even if people are driven by the desire to know, we need to remember that it is not always possible to act upon the information obtained (e.g., would you want to know whether you have a genetic predisposition for Alzheimer, considering that at present there is no effective treatment?) and that the decisions made by our «present Self» might not be the same of those that our «future Self» would made for its health. Teresa Gavaruzzi, Lorella Lotto 2017 10.1422/87761 10.1422/87761 10 422 446 Negare il rischio: irrazionalità, salute e architettura delle scelte The psychology of medical decision-making focuses on the study of how agents process information and make choices in the clinical field. More specifically, this research area deals with the ability of physicians to diagnose, predict and evaluate the effectiveness of a treatment, but also includes the study of the compliance degree of patients (for example, compliance with prescribed medication times of intake). However, all of these decisions are posthumous with respect to the event that brings a patient to the doctor. Decisions that affect a person's health, such as nutrition, smoking, alcohol consumption, screening or vaccination, are equally delicate and relevant to people's well-being's as well as from the point of view of decision theory. This article explains the contribution of behavioural economics towards the improvement of health decisions before the occurring of a clinical event. The belief that this approach can complement the traditional tools in the policy makers toolbox is spreading with increasing strength. In this light, we will concentrate on denied risks and invisible risks: why do smokers continue to light cigarettes even when packets display gruesome warnings? Why do some women postpone screening even when solicited directly by letter? Marianna Baggio, Matteo Motterlini 2017 10.1422/87762 10.1422/87762 11 447 468 Povertà e rischio: la diversa percezione e le diverse inclinazioni nei confronti del rischio in contesti di deprivazione estrema In our life we are daily asked to make decisions under risk or uncertainty, but these choices assume a different meaning for the 770 million people that live in extreme poverty. The parents of a poor household know that every risky choice they made can have a huge impact on the well-being and the survival of their kids. The severity of consequences modifies the decisional context and, more radically, might have an impact on the decisional style. The burden of poverty indeed causes negative stress and cognitive load and, in turn, leads to short-sighted and risk-averse decision-making. Recently, experimental evidence of peculiar decision-making style under risk has been found for both poor adults and children. Children exposed to chronic poverty were found to be less sensitive to low frequency-high magnitude losses and exhibited greater maladaptive risk-taking than children not exposed to poverty. Another experimental study, where a sample of poor individuals has been compared with a sample of rich individuals in a risk task, underlines differences in behaviors. As we might expect, choosing how much risk to take, the rich were sensitive to variations in the magnitude of both losses and gains. The poor, however, were sensitive only to changes in the magnitude of gains, while they were completely insensitive to changes in the magnitude of losses. In other contexts, poverty appears to impact individual preferences for risk. Individuals who were more likely to face income uncertainty or to become liquidity-constrained were less willing to pay for a risk security, thus exhibiting a higher degree of absolute risk aversion. In a longitudinal study, lower-income individuals were also found to be less willing to take risks, as measured by a self reported risk question. However, many questions on how poverty affects risk choices remain unanswered. By increasing our effort in studying the poor's decision-making style, we will improve both theoretical comprehension of the phenomenon and effectiveness of poverty eradication policies. Piero Ronzani 2017 10.1422/87763 10.1422/87763 12 469 478 Il ruolo della percezione del rischio, della propensione al rischio e dell'attaccamento affettivo nell'adesione alle norme di sicurezza sul lavoro This essay examines the role that risk perception, risk attitude, and affective attachment of the worker with the company, respectively have, in determining the compliance with occupational safety standards. Looking at the empirical evidence that shows no evidence of the role of individual factors, such as risk perception and risk attitude, in determining the adherence to safety standards, we emphasize the important role of safety climate as the main agent. Within this framework, we insert an innovative element, that is, the degree of attachment of the worker to the company, which, in the presence of a positive safety climate, increases compliance with standards in a virtuous cycle. At the same time, however, we also underline the potential danger that the excessive identification or excessive attachment of the employee to the company can have negative effects by reducing not only the well-being but also the adherence to standards, as is the case with the self-employed workers who worry more about the costs than the benefits of adhering to safety standards. Lucia Savadori, Lorenzo Avanzi 2017 10.1422/87764 10.1422/87764 13 479 498 La regolazione del rischio e il principio di precauzione: Stati Uniti ed Europa a confronto One of the oldest functions of the law is the regulation of risks generated by various human activities. In the contemporary age, technological and scientific progress raises new challenges in this respect. The institutional apparatus of the most industrialized countries that responds to them reflects different approaches to risk regulation. This brings about regulatory conflicts that originate from different political inputs, economic interests, and cultural factors. This contribution highlights which inputs and factors operate to produce those variations, as well as some patterns of hybridization that render these contrasts less acute. Michele Graziadei 2017 10.1422/87765 10.1422/87765 14 499 512 L'efficacia della disciplina sulla profilatura del rischio degli investitori alla luce delle evidenze di economia sperimentale: prospettive future The present study explores the main features of the cognitive processes involved in decision-making by investors, drawing on frontier studies in behavioral and experimental economics. After highlighting the main deviations of investment decisions from the case of perfect rationality, traditionally assumed by economic theory, the paper outlines implications for the study of the circumstances that influence the financial risk perception of the investors (whether they are experts or not), whence the examination of the regulatory instruments that are better able to allow a reliable evaluation of the risk attitudes, by financial intermediaries, of their clients, as mandated for instance by the MiFID regulation. It is indeed highly interesting from a policy perspective to identify the expedients suitable to reduce the exploitation of cognitive effects by unscrupulous parties to the detriment of clients in credit and financial relationships, as well as the techniques that may allow intermediaries to carry out an unbiased profiling of risk tolerance, based on a correct exchange of information. Our investigation is further aimed at verifying if, instead, with the introduction of recent disciplinary measures such as MiFID II and Mifir, regulators have born in mind the results from the cognitive studies on risk perception. The doubt still exists, however, that intermediaries, on the level of concreteness, are only required to guarantee the formal respect of the rules. Therefore, the research discusses the suitability of the current regulations and tackles the main challenges ahead, concerning the context in which financial communication and negotiation occur, the neutrality of subjects who define the context and supply information, the accessibility of unbiased information and the provision of an appropriate time for information processing and decision making. Moreover, we propose regulatory instruments that, in this context, could be more effective and fair than the existing ones in light of the cognitive distortions from which investors normally fall victim. Diego Rossano, Alessandro Sapio 2017 10.1422/87766 10.1422/87766 15 513 533