Tenerife airport disaster

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Tenerife airport disaster
KLM Flight 4805 · Pan Am Flight 1736
Accident summary
Date March 27, 1977
Los Rodeos Airport
(now Tenerife North Airport)
Tenerife, Canary Islands, Spain
Total injuries (non-fatal) 61
Total fatalities 583
Total survivors 61
First aircraft

A Pan Am Boeing 747-121
similar to the one involved
Type Boeing 747–121
Name Clipper Victor
Operator Pan American World Airways
Registration N736PA[1]
Flight origin Los Angeles Int'l Airport
Los Angeles, United States
Stopover John F. Kennedy Int'l Airport
New York City, United States
Destination Gran Canaria Airport
Canary Islands, Spain
Passengers 380
Crew 16
Injuries (non-fatal) 61
Fatalities 335 (326 passengers, 9 crew)
Survivors 61
Second aircraft

The KLM Boeing 747-206B
involved in the accident
Type Boeing 747-206B
Name Rijn  ("Rhine")
Operator KLM Royal Dutch Airlines
Registration PH-BUF[2]
Flight origin Schiphol Airport
Amsterdam, Netherlands
Destination Gran Canaria Airport
Canary Islands, Spain
Passengers 234
Crew 14
Fatalities 248 (all)
Survivors 0

The Tenerife airport disaster was a fatal runway collision between two Boeing 747s on Sunday, March 27, 1977, at Los Rodeos Airport (now Tenerife North Airport) on the Spanish island of Tenerife, one of the Canary Islands. The crash killed 583 people, making it the deadliest accident in aviation history. As a result of the complex interaction of organizational influences, environmental preconditions, and unsafe acts leading up to this aircraft mishap, the disaster at Tenerife has served as a textbook example for reviewing the processes and frameworks used in aviation mishap investigations and accident prevention.[3]

A bomb explosion at Gran Canaria Airport, and the threat of a second bomb, caused many aircraft to be diverted to Los Rodeos Airport. Among them were KLM Flight 4805 and Pan Am Flight 1736 – the two aircraft involved in the accident. At Los Rodeos Airport, air traffic controllers were forced to park many of the airplanes on the taxiway, thereby blocking it. Further complicating the situation, while authorities waited to reopen Gran Canaria, a dense fog developed at Tenerife, greatly reducing visibility.

When Gran Canaria reopened, the parked aircraft blocking the taxiway at Tenerife required both of the 747s to taxi on the only runway in order to get in position for takeoff. The fog was so thick that neither aircraft could see the other, and the controller in the tower could not see the runway or the two 747s on it. As the airport did not have ground radar, the controller could find where each airplane was only by voice reports over the radio. As a result of several misunderstandings, the KLM flight tried to take off while the Pan Am flight was still on the runway. The resulting collision destroyed both aircraft, killing all 248 aboard the KLM flight and 335 of 396 aboard the Pan Am flight. Sixty-one people aboard the Pan Am flight, including the pilots and flight engineer, survived the disaster.[4]

As the accident occurred in Spanish territory, Spain was responsible for investigating the accident. Investigators from the Netherlands and the United States also participated. The investigation revealed that the primary cause of the accident was the captain of the KLM flight taking off without clearance from Air Traffic Control (ATC).[4] The investigation specified that the captain did not intentionally take off without clearance; rather he fully believed he had clearance to take off due to misunderstandings between his flight crew and ATC.[4] Dutch investigators placed a greater emphasis on this than their American and Spanish counterparts,[5] but ultimately KLM admitted their crew was responsible for the accident, and the airline financially compensated the victims' relatives.[6]


Flight history[edit]

Photograph of Veldhuyzen van Zanten in a KLM magazine

For both planes, Tenerife was an unscheduled stop. Their destination was Gran Canaria International Airport (also known as Las Palmas Airport), serving Las Palmas on the nearby island of Gran Canaria. Both are in the Canary Islands, an autonomous community of Spain located in the Atlantic Ocean off the southwest coast of Morocco.

Pan Am Flight 1736 had originated at Los Angeles International Airport, with an intermediate stop at New York's John F. Kennedy International Airport. The aircraft was a Boeing 747-121, registration N736PA, named Clipper Victor. Of the 380 passengers (mostly of retirement age, but including two children), 14 had boarded in New York, where the crew was also changed. The new crew consisted of Captain Victor Grubbs, First Officer Robert Bragg, and Flight Engineer George Warns; there were 13 other crew members. The same aircraft had operated the inaugural 747 commercial flight on January 22, 1970.[9]

KLM Flight 4805, a charter flight for Holland International Travel Group, had arrived from Amsterdam Airport Schiphol, the Netherlands.[9] Its captain was Jacob Veldhuyzen van Zanten, KLM's chief flying instructor.[10] The First Officer was Klaas Meurs and the Flight Engineer was Willem Schreuder. The aircraft was a Boeing 747-206B, registration PH-BUF, named Rijn (Rhine). The KLM jet had 14 crew members and 235 passengers, including 52 children. Most of the KLM passengers were Dutch; four Germans, two Austrians and two Americans were also on the plane. After the aircraft landed at Tenerife, the passengers were transported to the airport terminal. One of the inbound passengers, who lived on the island, chose not to re-board the 747, leaving 234 passengers on board.[11][12] Fifty-two of the passengers were children who were with their families.[12]


Diversion of aircraft to Los Rodeos[edit]

Both flights had been routine until they approached the islands. At 1:15 pm, a bomb (planted by the separatist anti-Francoist Fuerzas Armadas Guanches) exploded in the terminal of Gran Canaria International Airport, injuring one person.[13] There had been a phone call warning of the bomb, and soon after another call claimed that a second bomb was at the airport. The civil aviation authorities had therefore closed the airport temporarily after the bomb detonated and diverted all of its incoming flights to Los Rodeos, including the two Boeing 747 aircraft involved in the disaster.[4] The Pan Am crew indicated that they would prefer to circle in a holding pattern until landing clearance was given, but were ordered to divert to Los Rodeos.[14]

In all, five[citation needed] large aircraft were diverted to Los Rodeos, a regional airport that could not easily accommodate them. The airport had only one runway and one major taxiway parallel to it, with four taxiways connecting the two. While waiting for Gran Canaria airport to reopen, the diverted aircraft took up so much space that they were parked on the long taxiway, meaning that it could not be used for taxiing. Instead, departing aircraft had to taxi along the runway to position themselves for takeoff, a procedure known as a runway backtaxi or backtrack.[4]


Taxiing and takeoff preparations[edit]

Following the tower's instructions, the KLM was cleared to taxi the full length of the runway and make a 180° turn to get into takeoff position.[15] While the KLM was backtaxiing on the runway, the controller asked the flight crew to report when it was ready to copy the ATC clearance. Because the flight crew was performing the checklist, copying this clearance was postponed until the aircraft was in takeoff position on Runway 30.[16]




Weather conditions at Los Rodeos[edit]

Tenerife / Los Rodeos airport is at 633 metres (2,077 feet) above sea level, which accounts for cloud behaviour that differs from that at most other airports. Clouds at 600 m (2,000 ft) above ground level at the nearby coast, are at ground level at Los Rodeos / Tenerife North. Drifting clouds of different densities cause wildly varying visibilities, from unhindered at one moment to below the minimums the next. The collision took place in a high density cloud.[22]



Communication misunderstandings[edit]














Captain Veldhuyzen van Zanten was KLM's chief of flight training and one of their most senior pilots. His photograph was used for publicity materials such as magazine advertisements, including the inflight magazine on board PH-BUF.[11][36] As such, KLM suggested that he should be part of the investigation team, before learning that he was the captain involved.[37] He had given the co-pilot on the flight his Boeing 747 qualification check about two months before the accident.[12]


About 70 crash investigators from Spain, the Netherlands, the United States, and the two airline companies were involved in the investigation. Facts showed that there had been misinterpretations and false assumptions. Analysis of the CVR transcript showed that the KLM pilot was convinced that he had been cleared for takeoff, while the Tenerife control tower was certain that the KLM 747 was stationary at the end of the runway and awaiting takeoff clearance. It appears KLM's co-pilot was not as certain about take-off clearance as the captain.

Probable cause[edit]

The investigation concluded that the fundamental cause of the accident was that Captain Veldhuyzen van Zanten took off without proper clearance. The investigators suggested the reason for his mistake might have been a desire to leave as soon as possible in order to comply with KLM's duty-time regulations, and before the weather deteriorated further.

Other major factors contributing to the accident were:


The following factors were considered contributing but not critical:

  • The airport was (due to rerouting from the bomb threat) forced to accommodate a great number of large aircraft, resulting in disruption of the normal use of taxiways.[38]

Dutch response[edit]


In particular, the Dutch response pointed out that


Although the Dutch authorities were initially reluctant to blame Captain Veldhuyzen van Zanten and his crew,[5][39] the airline ultimately accepted responsibility for the accident. KLM paid the victims or their families compensation ranging between $58,000 and $600,000.[6] The sum of settlements for property and damages was $110 million[40] (an average of $189,000 per victim,[citation needed] due to limitations imposed by European Compensation Conventions in effect at the time).


This was one of the first accident investigations during which the contribution of "human factors" was studied.[41] The human factors included:

  • The reason only the flight engineer on the KLM plane reacted to the radio transmission "OK, we'll report when we're clear" might lie in the fact that by then he had completed his pre-flight checks, whereas his colleagues were experiencing an increased workload, just at the same time as the visibility worsened.[44]

The extra fuel the KLM plane took on added several factors:

  • it added over forty tons of weight[46] to the plane, which increased the takeoff distance and made it more difficult to clear the Pan Am when taking off;
  • it increased the size of the fire from the crash that ultimately killed everyone on board.[47][48][49]

Safety response[edit]

As a consequence of the accident, sweeping changes were made to international airline regulations and to aircraft. Aviation authorities around the world introduced requirements for standard phrases and a greater emphasis on English as a common working language. For example, ICAO calls for the phrase "line up and wait" as an instruction to an aircraft moving into position but not cleared for takeoff.

Several national air safety boards began penalizing pilots for disobeying air traffic controllers' orders. Air traffic instruction should not be acknowledged solely with a colloquial phrase such as "OK" or even "Roger" (which simply means the last transmission was received[50]), but with a readback of the key parts of the instruction, to show mutual understanding. Additionally, the phrase "takeoff" is spoken only when the actual takeoff clearance is given or when cancelling that same clearance (i.e., "CLEARED FOR TAKE-OFF" or "CANCEL TAKE-OFF CLEARANCE"). Up until that point, aircrew and controllers should use the phrase "departure" in its place (e.g., "ready for departure"). Cockpit procedures were also changed. Hierarchical relations among crew members were played down. More emphasis was placed on team decision-making by mutual agreement, part of what has become known in the industry as Crew Resource Management.[51]


The Spanish authorities installed a ground radar at Tenerife North following the accident.


Tenerife Memorial
Monument in Westgaarde Cemetery, Amsterdam


The 30th anniversary marked the first time that Dutch and American next of kin, and aid helpers from Tenerife, joined in international commemoration service held at the Auditorio de Tenerife in Santa Cruz; the International Tenerife Memorial March 27, 1977 was inaugurated at the Mesa Mota March 27, 2007. The monument was designed by Dutch sculptor Rudi van de Wint.

Notable victims[edit]


The disaster has been featured in many TV shows and documentaries. These include the Mayday special episode "Crash of the Century", the Survival in the Sky episode "Blaming the Pilot", the Seconds From Disaster episode "Collision on the Runway", PBS's NOVA episode "The Deadliest Plane Crash" in 2006, the PBS special "Surviving Disaster: How the Brain Works Under Extreme Duress" (based on Amanda Ripley's book "The Unthinkable") in 2011, and the Discovery Channel TV series Most Deadly and Destroyed in Seconds.

In popular culture[edit]

The season 3 episode "No Más" of the American television show Breaking Bad referenced the disaster, with main character Walter White comparing it to a recent fictional aircraft disaster in the show. White claims that although the Tenerife disaster was much more deadly, barely anyone remembers it.[53]

See also[edit]


  1. ^ "FAA Registry". Federal Aviation Administration. 
  2. ^ "Civil aircraft register". Inspectie Leefomgeving en Transport. 
  10. ^ Official report PDF (5.98 MB), section 5.2, p. 38 (PDF page 41 of 63)"
  12. ^ a b c "The Deadliest Plane Crash". PBS. October 17, 2006. Retrieved 2014-09-23. 
  15. ^ Official report PDF (5.98 MB), p. 2 (PDF page 5 of 63)
  16. ^ Official report PDF (5.98 MB), p. 3-4 (PDF pages 6-7 of 63)
  17. ^ Official report PDF (5.98 MB), p. 3 (PDF page 6 of 63)
  18. ^ Official report PDF (5.98 MB), pp. 56-57 (PDF pages 59-60 of 63)
  19. ^ Official report, annex 6 PDF
  20. ^ ALPA report on the crash PDF (2.70 MB), p. 19 (PDF page 23 of 97)
  21. ^ Official report PDF (5.98 MB), pp. 46 (PDF page 49 of 63)
  22. ^ ALPA report on the crash PDF (2.70 MB), p. 8 (PDF page 12 of 97)
  23. ^ ALPA report on the crash PDF (2.70 MB), p. 11 (PDF page 15 of 97)
  24. ^ ALPA report on the crash PDF (2.70 MB), p. 12 (PDF page 16 of 97)
  26. ^ "Airdisaster.com". Airdisaster.com. Retrieved 2012-05-05. 
  30. ^ Official report, p.48
  34. ^ "Tenerife Disaster, 1977 Year in Review.". Upi.com. 2012-04-30. Retrieved 2012-05-05. [dead link]
  35. ^ Fatal Events Since 1970 for KLM AirSafe.com.
  36. ^ Advertisement showing Veldhuyzen van Zanten, Project-Tenerife.
  38. ^ Official report PDF (5.98 MB), pp. 61–62
  40. ^ Washington Post, March 25, 1980
  43. ^ Bartelski, Jan (2001). Disasters in the air: mysterious air disasters explained. Airlife. ISBN 978-1-84037-204-5. As far as the allegations that co-pilots would not have the nerve to stand up to van Zanten during flight because of his senior position in the company, and that their career could be ruined by his adverse report, this was another example of completely false presumptions. Van Zanten was a serious and introverted individual but with an open-hearted and friendly disposition. He was a studious type and was regarded as the company’s pilot expert on the Boeing 747 systems. Nevertheless, he would have been the last person on the flight desk not to accept his co-pilot’s advice or warning. He believed in partnership, to the extent that he insisted on his first officers addressing him during flight as «Jaap» and not «Captain van Zanten». He had learnt much about cockpit management by representing KLM at an IATA Conference in Istanbul and was trying to put this into practice ... Meurs was not the type to have been easily intimidated by a superior rank and would not have easily given in under stress. Although new to the 747 (he had only ninety hours on that type), he was formerly a temporary DC-8 captain. For personal reasons, he waived his seniority right for a DC-9 command and opted to fly the 747 as a first officer. Meurs was an extrovert and liked to enjoy life, a contrasting disposition to van Zanten. Both complemented each other in personalities as well as in their operational background. What van Zanten lacked in route experience, particularly in the Canary Islands area, Meurs compensated for by his ultimate knowledge of the local situation from his many past flights through Las Palmas. The reverse applied to the handling of the 747. As for his profiency as a co-pilot, I found Meurs cooperative, alert, and far from a meek and mild type. In fact, the opposite was more likely. He could be somewhat abrupt and direct in his manner, as was evident from the way he stopped van Zanten from opening the throttles 
  46. ^ This Spanish report[dead link] says 55,500 liters of jet fuel. Based on a density of 0.8705 kg/l that weighs some 45 metric tons, or 49 US tons
  47. ^ The 55 tons of fuel the Dutch plane had taken on creates a massive fireball that seals the fate of everyone onboard NOVA | The deadliest plane crash, transcript
  48. ^ The extra fuel prolonged the fire, gifteddevil16 on Tenerife 1977
  49. ^ The full load of new fuel ignited immediately, Crossroads Today
  50. ^ CAP 413 Radio Telephony Manual (Edition 15), chapter 2 page 6
  53. ^ IMDb

External links[edit]

External images
PH-BUF (KLM 4805) - Airliners.net
N736PA (Pan Am 1736) - Airliners.net
