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by this Court in Balu Sonba Shinde v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 7 SCC 543], Gagan Kanojia v. State of Punjab, (2006) 13 10 (2010) 9 SCC 567 : 2010 INSC 553 9SCC 516], Radha Mohan Singh v. State of U.P.,(2006) 2 SCC 450], Sarvesh Narain Shukla v. Daroga Singh, (2007) 13 SCC 360] and Subbu Singh v. State, (2009) 6 SCC 462. 83. Thus, the law can be summarised to the effect that the evidence of a hostile witness cannot be discarded as a whole, and relevant parts thereof which are admissible in law, can be used by the prosecution or the defence. 84. In the instant case, some of the material witnesses i.e. B. Kamal (PW 86) and R. Maruthu (PW 51) turned hostile. Their evidence has been taken into consideration by the courts below strictly in accordance with law. Some omissions, improvements in the evidence of the PWs have been pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellants, but we find them to be very trivial in nature. 85. It is settled proposition of law that even if there are |
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in the evidence of the PWs have been pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellants, but we find them to be very trivial in nature. 85. It is settled proposition of law that even if there are some omissions, contradictions and discrepancies, the entire evidence cannot be disregarded. After exercising care and caution and sifting through the evidence to separate truth from untruth, exaggeration and improvements, the court comes to a conclusion as to whether the residuary evidence is sufficient to convict the accused. Thus, an undue importance should not be attached to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter and shake the basic version of the prosecution's witness. As the mental abilities of a human being cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb all the details of the incident, minor discrepancies are bound to occur in the statements of witnesses. Vide Sohrab v. State of M.P., (1972) 3 SCC 751, State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony, (1985) |
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to absorb all the details of the incident, minor discrepancies are bound to occur in the statements of witnesses. Vide Sohrab v. State of M.P., (1972) 3 SCC 751, State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony, (1985) 1 SCC 505, Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat, (1983) 3 SCC 217, State of Rajasthan v. Om Prakash, (2007) 12 SCC 381, Prithu v. State of H.P., (2009) 11 SCC 588, State of U.P. v. Santosh Kumar, (2009) 9 SCC 626 and State v. Saravanan, (2008) 17 SCC 587” 1011. In the case of Vinod Kumar v. State of Punjab11, this Court has observed thus: “51. It is necessary, though painful, to note that PW 7 was examined-in-chief on 30-9-1999 and was cross-examined on 25-5-2001, almost after 1 year and 8 months. The delay in said cross-examination, as we have stated earlier had given enough time for prevarication due to many a reason. A fair trial is to be fair both to the defence and the prosecution as well as to the victim. An offence registered under the Prevention of Corruption Act is |
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for prevarication due to many a reason. A fair trial is to be fair both to the defence and the prosecution as well as to the victim. An offence registered under the Prevention of Corruption Act is to be tried with all seriousness. We fail to appreciate how the learned trial Judge could exhibit such laxity in granting so much time for cross-examination in a case of this nature. It would have been absolutely appropriate on the part of the learned trial Judge to finish the cross-examination on the day the said witness was examined. As is evident, for no reason whatsoever it was deferred and the cross-examination took place after 20 months. The witness had all the time in the world to be gained over. We have already opined that he was declared hostile and re-examined. 52. It is settled in law that the testimony of a hostile witness can be relied upon by the prosecution as well as the defence. In re-examination by the Public Prosecutor, PW 7 has accepted about the correctness of his |
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in law that the testimony of a hostile witness can be relied upon by the prosecution as well as the defence. In re-examination by the Public Prosecutor, PW 7 has accepted about the correctness of his statement in the court on 13-9- 1999. He has also accepted that he had not made any complaint to the Presiding Officer of the court in writing or verbally that the Inspector was threatening him to make a false statement in the court. It has also been accepted by him that he had given the statement in the court on account of fear of false implication by the Inspector. He has agreed to have signed his statement dated 13-9-1999 after going through and admitting it to be correct. It has 11 (2015) 3 SCC 220 : 2014 INSC 670 11come in the re-examination that PW 7 had not stated in his statement dated 13-9-1999 in the court that recovery of tainted money was not effected in his presence from the accused or that he had been told by the Inspector that amount has been recovered from the accused. He |
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13-9-1999 in the court that recovery of tainted money was not effected in his presence from the accused or that he had been told by the Inspector that amount has been recovered from the accused. He had also not stated in his said statement that the accused and witnesses were taken to the Tehsil and it was there that he had signed all the memos. 53. Reading the evidence in entirety, PW 7's evidence cannot be brushed aside. The delay in cross-examination has resulted in his prevarication from the examination-in-chief. But, a significant one, his examination-in-chief and the re- examination impels us to accept the testimony that he had gone into the octroi post and had witnessed about the demand and acceptance of money by the accused. In his cross-examination he has stated that he had not gone with Baj Singh to the Vigilance Department at any time and no recovery was made in his presence. The said part of the testimony, in our considered view, does not commend acceptance in the backdrop |
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with Baj Singh to the Vigilance Department at any time and no recovery was made in his presence. The said part of the testimony, in our considered view, does not commend acceptance in the backdrop of entire evidence in examination- in-chief and the re-examination. xxx xxx xxx 57. Before parting with the case we are constrained to reiterate what we have said in the beginning. We have expressed our agony and anguish for the manner in which trials in respect of serious offences relating to corruption are being conducted by the trial courts: 57.1. Adjournments are sought on the drop of a hat by the counsel, even though the witness is present in court, contrary to all principles of holding a trial. That apart, after the examination-in-chief of a witness is over, adjournment is sought for cross- examination and the disquieting feature is that the trial courts grant time. The law requires special 12reasons to be recorded for grant of time but the same is not taken note of. 57.2. As has been |
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examination and the disquieting feature is that the trial courts grant time. The law requires special 12reasons to be recorded for grant of time but the same is not taken note of. 57.2. As has been noticed earlier, in the instant case the cross-examination has taken place after a year and 8 months allowing ample time to pressurise the witness and to gain over him by adopting all kinds of tactics. 57.3. There is no cavil over the proposition that there has to be a fair and proper trial but the duty of the court while conducting the trial is to be guided by the mandate of the law, the conceptual fairness and above all bearing in mind its sacrosanct duty to arrive at the truth on the basis of the material brought on record. If an accused for his benefit takes the trial on the path of total mockery, it cannot be countenanced. The court has a sacred duty to see that the trial is conducted as per law. If adjournments are granted in this manner it would tantamount to violation of the rule of |
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it cannot be countenanced. The court has a sacred duty to see that the trial is conducted as per law. If adjournments are granted in this manner it would tantamount to violation of the rule of law and eventually turn such trials to a farce. It is legally impermissible and jurisprudentially abominable. The trial courts are expected in law to follow the command of the procedure relating to trial and not yield to the request of the counsel to grant adjournment for non-acceptable reasons. 57.4. In fact, it is not at all appreciable to call a witness for cross-examination after such a long span of time. It is imperative if the examination-in- chief is over, the cross-examination should be completed on the same day. If the examination of a witness continues till late hours the trial can be adjourned to the next day for cross-examination. It is inconceivable in law that the cross-examination should be deferred for such a long time. It is anathema to the concept of proper and fair trial. |
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adjourned to the next day for cross-examination. It is inconceivable in law that the cross-examination should be deferred for such a long time. It is anathema to the concept of proper and fair trial. 57.5. The duty of the court is to see that not only the interest of the accused as per law is protected but also the societal and collective interest is safeguarded. It is distressing to note that despite series of judgments of this Court, the habit of granting adjournment, really an ailment, continues. 13How long shall we say, “Awake! Arise!”. There is a constant discomfort. Therefore, we think it appropriate that the copies of the judgment be sent to the learned Chief Justices of all the High Courts for circulating the same among the learned trial Judges with a command to follow the principles relating to trial in a requisite manner and not to defer the cross-examination of a witness at their pleasure or at the leisure of the defence counsel, for it eventually makes the trial an apology |
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relating to trial in a requisite manner and not to defer the cross-examination of a witness at their pleasure or at the leisure of the defence counsel, for it eventually makes the trial an apology for trial and compels the whole society to suffer chicanery. Let it be remembered that law cannot be allowed to be lonely; a destitute.” 12. Relying on the aforesaid judgments, this Court has taken a similar view in the case of Rajesh Yadav and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh12. 13. In the present case also, it appears that, on account of a long gap between the examination-in-chief and cross examination, the witnesses were won over by the accused and they resiled from the version as deposed in the examination-in-chief which fully incriminates the accused. However, when the evidence of the victim as well as her mother (PW-2) and aunt (PW-3) is tested with the FIR, the statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC and the evidence of the Medical Expert (PW-8), we find that there is sufficient |
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as well as her mother (PW-2) and aunt (PW-3) is tested with the FIR, the statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC and the evidence of the Medical Expert (PW-8), we find that there is sufficient corroboration to the version given by the prosecutrix in her 12 (2022) 12 SCC 200 : 2022 INSC 148 14examination-in-chief. 14. Insofar as the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the appellant on the judgment of this Court in the case of Rai Sandeep alias Deepu (supra) is concerned, the said case can be distinguished, inasmuch as in the said case except a minor abrasion on the right side of the neck below jaw, there were no other injuries on the private part of the prosecutrix, although it was allegedly a forcible gang rape. As such, the said judgment would not be applicable in the present case. 15. In the result, we find no reason to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the trial court as well as the High Court on appreciation of the evidence. 16. The appeal is |
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case. 15. In the result, we find no reason to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the trial court as well as the High Court on appreciation of the evidence. 16. The appeal is dismissed. 17. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of. ..............................J. (B.R. GAVAI) ..............................J. (SANDEEP MEHTA) NEW DELHI; MAY 08, 2024 15 |
NON-REPORTABLE 2024 INSC 440 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS. OF 2024 (ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NOS. 7315-7316 OF 2021) CHIEF SECRETARY GOVERNMENT OF ODISHA ..... APPELLANT VERSUS BHARAT PROCESS & MECHANICAL ENGINEERS LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION) AND OTHERS ..... RESPONDENTS W I T H CIVIL APPEAL NOS. OF 2024 (ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NOS. ________ OF 2024 ARISING OUT OF DIARY NO. 1109 OF 2024) J U D G M E N T SANJIV KHANNA, J. Permission to file the special leave petition by TPG Equity Management Private Limited, impugning the orders dated 09.03.2023 and 13.10.2023 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack, is granted. Delay in filing of the appeals is condoned. 2. Leave granted. 3. The appellant – the Government of Odisha, has approached this Court against the judgment dated 03.03.2020 by the Division Bench of the High Court at Calcutta, which upholds the directions given by the |
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appellant – the Government of Odisha, has approached this Court against the judgment dated 03.03.2020 by the Division Bench of the High Court at Calcutta, which upholds the directions given by the Company Judge, that the Central Government in consultation with the Government of Odisha Civil Appeals a/o. SLP (C) Nos.7315-7316 of 2021 Page 1 of 14and the Odisha Mineral Development Company Ltd1 shall form a High Powered committee of not more than three members representing the interests of the three stakeholders to take a decision by a reasoned order with regard to the renewal of mining leases, viz. Kolha-Roida Iron and Manganese Ore Block2, Thakurani Iron & Manganese Ore Block3 and Dalki Manganese Ore Block4, within three months. It is also directed that TGP Equity Management Private Ltd5 will be heard. The decision will be submitted to the Company Court in the form of a report. 4. This judgment will also decide the appeal preferred by TGP challenging the judgment dated 09.03.2023 of |
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will be heard. The decision will be submitted to the Company Court in the form of a report. 4. This judgment will also decide the appeal preferred by TGP challenging the judgment dated 09.03.2023 of the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack, whereby Writ Petition No. 1852 of 2010 filed by the State of Odisha has been allowed setting aside the order of the revisional authority dated 02.02.2009. This judgment relates to one of the mining leases, namely, Kolha-Roida. TGP has also impugned the order dated 13.10.2023 by which its application for the review of the order dated 09.03.2023 was dismissed on the grounds of delay, and on the grounds of review not being made out. 5. The case has a long and chequered history. However, in view of the judgment that we are pronouncing, we shall only refer to the relevant facts. 6. Bird and Company Limited6 was granted three mining leases, namely, Kolha- Roida, Thakurani and Dalki, for 30 years on 15.08.1926, 10.10.1924, and 10.10.1924 respectively, by the |
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relevant facts. 6. Bird and Company Limited6 was granted three mining leases, namely, Kolha- Roida, Thakurani and Dalki, for 30 years on 15.08.1926, 10.10.1924, and 10.10.1924 respectively, by the Raja of Keonjhar. The three leases were 1 For short, ‘OMDC’. 2 For short, ‘Kolha-Roida’. 3 For short, ‘Thakurani’. 4 For short, ‘Dalki’. 5 For short, ‘TGP’. 6 For short, ‘Bird & Co.’. Civil Appeals a/o. SLP (C) Nos.7315-7316 of 2021 Page 2 of 14granted first renewal for a period of 20, 30, and 20 years with effect from 18.08.1956 to 18.08.1976, 01.10.1954 to 30.09.1984, and 01.10.1954 to 30.09.1974 respectively. The Kolha-Roida lease was thereafter renewed for the second time for 20 years from 15.08.1976 to 14.08.1996. The Thakurani lease was renewed for the second time from 01.10.1984 to 30.09.2004 for 20 years. The Dalki lease was renewed for 20 years from 01.10.1974 to 30.09.1994. 7. Bird and Co., however, had never undertaken winning and mining activities. It is an accepted case that the |
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for 20 years. The Dalki lease was renewed for 20 years from 01.10.1974 to 30.09.1994. 7. Bird and Co., however, had never undertaken winning and mining activities. It is an accepted case that the beneficiary of the said lease was OMDC, a subsidiary of Bird and Co. 8. Bird and Co. was nationalised by an Act of Parliament called the Bird and Company Limited (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertaking and Other Properties) Act, 1980. 9. As per Section 37 of the 1980 Act, the undertakings of Bird and Co. and the right, title and interest relating to the undertakings stood transferred and vested with the Central Government, that is, the Union of India. 10. Under Section 78 of the 1980 Act, the Central Government, on vesting of the said undertakings, had the right to vest the undertakings from the date 7 “3. On the appointed day, the undertakings of the company and the right, title and interest of the Company in relating to its undertakings shall, by virtue of this Act, stand transferred to, |
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date 7 “3. On the appointed day, the undertakings of the company and the right, title and interest of the Company in relating to its undertakings shall, by virtue of this Act, stand transferred to, and vest in, the Central Government.” 8 “7. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 3, the Central Government may, if it is satisfied that a Government company is willing to comply with such terms and conditions as that Government may think fit to impose, direct, by notification, that the undertakings of the Company and the right, title and interest of the Company in relation to its undertakings which have vested in the Central Government under section 3, shall, instead of continuing to vest in the Central Government, vest in the Government company either on the date of publication of the notification or on such earlier or later date (not being a date earlier than the appointed day) as may be specified in the notification. (2) Where the right, title and interest of the Company in |
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the notification or on such earlier or later date (not being a date earlier than the appointed day) as may be specified in the notification. (2) Where the right, title and interest of the Company in relation to its undertakings, vest under sub- Civil Appeals a/o. SLP (C) Nos.7315-7316 of 2021 Page 3 of 14specified in favour of a government company willing to comply with such terms and conditions that the Central Government would deem fit to impose. 11. Vide a gazette notification dated 25.10.1980, the Government of India, in the exercise of power under Section 7 of the 1980 Act, transferred the undertaking of Bird and Co., along with right, title and interest, on or from the said date, to Bharat Process & Mechanical Engineers Limited.9 12. OMDC, as a subsidiary of Bird and Co., had continued with the winning and mining activities. On 26.08.1983, BPMEL executed a power of attorney in favour of OMDC to do the mining and to comply with the applicable rules. 13. BPMEL subsequently became |
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with the winning and mining activities. On 26.08.1983, BPMEL executed a power of attorney in favour of OMDC to do the mining and to comply with the applicable rules. 13. BPMEL subsequently became a subsidiary company of another government company Bharat Bhari Udyog Nigam Limited, which has since been renamed Braithwaite Burn and Jessop Construction Company Limited. 14. BPMEL became a sick company during the course of its business and was referred to the Board of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction10 under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. Vide order dated 27.07.2004, BPMEL was directed to be wound up since the attempts to revive it were unsuccessful. The High Court at Calcutta appointed an Official Liquidator vide order dated 27.02.2004. section (1), in a Government company that Government company shall, on and from the date of such vesting, be deemed to have become the owner in relation to such undertakings, and all the rights and liabilities of the |
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Government company that Government company shall, on and from the date of such vesting, be deemed to have become the owner in relation to such undertakings, and all the rights and liabilities of the Central Government in relation to such undertakings shall, on and from the date of such vesting, be deemed to have become the rights and liabilities, respectively, of that Government company.” 9 For short, ‘BPMEL.’ 10 For short, ‘BIFR.’ Civil Appeals a/o. SLP (C) Nos.7315-7316 of 2021 Page 4 of 1415. UCO Bank had loaned and given financial assistance to BPMEL. Due to defaults and non-payments, UCO Bank filed a suit for recovery in 1991 which was transferred to the Debts Recovery Tribunal.11 The DRT, vide order dated 04.11.2003 ordered a recovery of a sum of Rs 1,92,12,957/- against BPMEL, and Rs. 2,16,13,312.35p. against both BPMEL and the Union of India. UCO Bank was entitled to realise interest at the rate of 19.5% on the certified amount from 08.05.1991 till realisation. 16. On |
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and Rs. 2,16,13,312.35p. against both BPMEL and the Union of India. UCO Bank was entitled to realise interest at the rate of 19.5% on the certified amount from 08.05.1991 till realisation. 16. On 16.08.2006, the Union of India/ Central Government paid Rs 2,50,00,000/- to UCO bank against the total claim of UCO bank of Rs 25,00,00,00/-. The letter had advised the bank to recover the balance amount through the liquidation of BPMEL. 17. On 17.11.2009, UCO bank entered into an assignment agreement with TGP for a consideration of Rs. 55,00,000/-. This agreement is neither stamped nor registered. Issues and questions have been raised regarding the validity of the said assignment but we shall not delve into it for the purposes of the present case. 18. Vide an ex parte order dated 15.06.2010, the DRT allowed the impleadment of TGP in the place of UCO Bank, in response to UCO Bank’s application. 19. Despite the order passed by the BIFR for winding up and liquidation of BPMEL in the year 1996, |
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DRT allowed the impleadment of TGP in the place of UCO Bank, in response to UCO Bank’s application. 19. Despite the order passed by the BIFR for winding up and liquidation of BPMEL in the year 1996, the liquidation proceedings have remained pending. The final order for winding up BPMEL has not been passed. 11 For short, ‘DRT.’ Civil Appeals a/o. SLP (C) Nos.7315-7316 of 2021 Page 5 of 1420. Vide communication dated 18.08.2011, the Official Liquidator informed TGP that their claim against BPMEL had been allowed at the sum of Rs.48,18,87,859/- as ordinary/preferential pay being outstanding on winding up, and the balance amount of Rs.1,27,96,66,859/- as an unsecured preferential creditor in terms of Rules 154, 156 and 179 of the Company (Cal) Rules, 1959. 21. The Official Liquidator in September 2011 paid Rs.2,99,12,461/- to the TGP against the certified debt of Rs.1,92,12,957.92p and against the certified debt of Rs 4,08,26,270/-, both TGP and UCO Bank have recovered an amount of Rs |
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2011 paid Rs.2,99,12,461/- to the TGP against the certified debt of Rs.1,92,12,957.92p and against the certified debt of Rs 4,08,26,270/-, both TGP and UCO Bank have recovered an amount of Rs 5,49,00,000 /- 22. Having dealt with the history of the case briefly, we now move on to the question central to the present appeal preferred against the impugned judgment dated 03.03.2020 passed by the High Court at Calcutta. 23. The issue that arises for consideration is the renewal of the three mining leases that were granted to Bird and Co., as noted above. The lease of Kolha-Roida came to an end on 14.08.1996, while that of Thakurani and Dalki ended on 30.09.2004 and 30.09.1994 respectively. 24. TGP contends that BPMEL had applied for renewal of Kolha-Roida lease on 14.07.1995 for 20 years. Vide order dated 16.11.2006, the application was rejected by the State of Odisha. BPMEL, which had already been directed to be wound up by the BIFR on 22.07.1996, did not file a revision. OMDC filed a |
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order dated 16.11.2006, the application was rejected by the State of Odisha. BPMEL, which had already been directed to be wound up by the BIFR on 22.07.1996, did not file a revision. OMDC filed a revision application which was allowed by an order of remand passed by the revisional authority dated 02.02.2009. In effect, the order of rejection dated 16.11.2006 was set aside and the status quo was restored. Resultantly, the Civil Appeals a/o. SLP (C) Nos.7315-7316 of 2021 Page 6 of 14application filed by BPMEL was to be reconsidered. The order dated 02.02.2009 was challenged by the State of Odisha in Writ Petition No. 1852 of 2010, which was allowed by the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack, vide order dated 09.03.2023. TGP, as noted above, has filed an appeal challenging this order as well as the order dismissing the review petition. 25. As far as the lease of Thakurani is concerned, TGP claims that the renewal application was filed on 27.09.2003 and is pending. It is unclear who had filed |
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order dismissing the review petition. 25. As far as the lease of Thakurani is concerned, TGP claims that the renewal application was filed on 27.09.2003 and is pending. It is unclear who had filed the said application. Though TGP claims that the application was filed by BPMEL, it appears to be implausible for the reason that BPMEL was directed to be wound up by BIFR vide order dated 22.07.1996. The Official Liquidator was appointed by the High Court at Calcutta on 27.02.2004. 26. The Dalki lease came to an end by effluxion of time on 30.09.1994. TGP submits that the application for renewal of Dalki was filed by BPMEL on 13.09.1993. However, the application was rejected by the Government of Odisha on 24.08.2006. OMDC filed a revision application before the revisional authority. Vide order dated 14.05.2010, the revisional authority set aside the order passed by the State Government. 27. In the context of the renewal of the lease, the key issue to consider is whether the High Court at |
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dated 14.05.2010, the revisional authority set aside the order passed by the State Government. 27. In the context of the renewal of the lease, the key issue to consider is whether the High Court at Calcutta was justified in directing the formation of a High-Powered Committee comprising no more than three members, representing the Union of India, State of Odisha, and OMDC. This committee was tasked with making a reasoned decision on the renewal of the three leases within three months, after hearing TGP. The reason provided by the Company Judge, upheld by the Division Bench of the High Court at Calcutta, Civil Appeals a/o. SLP (C) Nos.7315-7316 of 2021 Page 7 of 14is rooted in the potential repercussions of non-renewal. Failure to renew the three leases in favour of OMDC, linked to the company under liquidation (BPMEL), could lead to adverse consequences. This includes the non- payment of amounts owed to creditors, including TGP and the workmen. The Company Judge's order observes that |
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under liquidation (BPMEL), could lead to adverse consequences. This includes the non- payment of amounts owed to creditors, including TGP and the workmen. The Company Judge's order observes that the renewal of the lease in favour of the Official Liquidator, facilitated by OMDC or TGP, could lead to optimal mine utilisation and subsequent income, which could be utilised wholly or partially for the settlement of the company's outstanding debts. Additionally, the order emphasises that the Central Government cannot evade accountability for the claims of BPMEL's creditor. 28. The Union of India/ Central Government has taken a categoric stand that it does not want to renew the leases. The State of Odisha has the same stance. However, it is essential that we address the submissions made on behalf of TGP. 29. The arguments raised by TGP can be summarised as: • BPMEL, being a government company, is entitled to an automatic extension of leases under Rule 7212 of the Mineral (Other than Atomic |
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of TGP. 29. The arguments raised by TGP can be summarised as: • BPMEL, being a government company, is entitled to an automatic extension of leases under Rule 7212 of the Mineral (Other than Atomic 12 “(1) All mining leases for minerals granted to a Government company or corporation before the date of commencement of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015 (IO of 2015), namely, the 12th January, 2015, shall be deemed to have been granted for a period of fifty years. (2) The State Government, upon an application made to it in this behalf by the Government company or corporation at least three months prior to the expiry of the mining lease, shall, extend the period of the mining lease for further periods of twenty years at a time: Provided that the State government may condone the delay in making of such application. (3) Subject to sub-rule (1), all applications made by a Government company or corporation for renewal of mining leases and which were pending |
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may condone the delay in making of such application. (3) Subject to sub-rule (1), all applications made by a Government company or corporation for renewal of mining leases and which were pending as on the date of commencement of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015 (10 of 2015) shall be deemed to be applications for extension of the period of the mining lease and shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of sub-rule (2). (4) If an application for extension of a mining lease made within the time referred to in sub-rule (2), including any application for extension of mining lease submitted before the commencement of the Minerals (Other than Atomic and Hydro Carbons Energy Minerals) Concession (Fourth Amendment) Civil Appeals a/o. SLP (C) Nos.7315-7316 of 2021 Page 8 of 14and Hydrocarbon Energy) Concessional Rules, 201613 as amended by modification dated 02.11.2021, on satisfaction of four conditions. First, the beneficiary must be a |
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Nos.7315-7316 of 2021 Page 8 of 14and Hydrocarbon Energy) Concessional Rules, 201613 as amended by modification dated 02.11.2021, on satisfaction of four conditions. First, the beneficiary must be a government company. Second, the renewal of mining lease (RML) application should have been made at least three months before expiry. Third, the renewal applications were pending and were not rejected as of 12.01.2015, the commencement date of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment, 2015 Act. Fourth, the leases did not suffer a lapse. It is submitted that these four conditions are satisfied. • TGP relies on Section 4A(4)14 of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation), Act 1957, as there is no express order by the State Government declaring that the subject leases have lapsed. For the same, reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court in Common Cause v. Union of India15. Thus, the submission is that, though the leases have been non-operational for nearly |
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have lapsed. For the same, reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court in Common Cause v. Union of India15. Thus, the submission is that, though the leases have been non-operational for nearly three decades, they have not lapsed. Rules, 2021, is not disposed of by the State Government before the date of expiry of the mining lease which may take place before or after the commencement of the said Rules, the period of that lease shall be deemed to have been extended by a further period till the State Government grants extension of mining lease and the Government company or corporation may continue mining operations, production and dispatch from such mining lease.” 13 For short, ‘2016 Rules’. 14 “4A(4), Where the holder of a mining lease fails to undertake production and dispatch for a period of two years after the date of execution of the dispatch, has continued the same for a period of two years, the lease shall lapse on the expiry of the period of two years from the date of |
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a period of two years after the date of execution of the dispatch, has continued the same for a period of two years, the lease shall lapse on the expiry of the period of two years from the date of execution of the lease or, as the case may be, discontinuance of the production and dispatch. Provided that the State Government may, on an application made by the holder of such lease before it lapses and on being satisfied that it shall not be possible for the holder of the lease to undertake production and dispatch or to continue such production and dispatch for reasons beyond his control, make an order, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of such application, to extend the period of two years by a further period not exceeding one year and such extension shall not be granted for more than once during the entire period of lease: Provided further that such lease shall lapse on failure to undertake production and dispatch or having commenced the production and dispatch |
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for more than once during the entire period of lease: Provided further that such lease shall lapse on failure to undertake production and dispatch or having commenced the production and dispatch fails to continue the same before the end of such extended period.” 15 (2016) 11 SCC 455. Civil Appeals a/o. SLP (C) Nos.7315-7316 of 2021 Page 9 of 14• Rule 23 of the 2016 Rules permits the transfer of a mining lease or composite licence. The conditions of the said lease are satisfied as OMDC and BPMEL had filed affidavits required as per the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 from BPMEL to OMDC. • Relying on Section 446(2)(d) of the Companies Act, 1956, which is applicable to winding up proceedings not transferred under the Companies Act, 2013, it is submitted that the court can entertain and dispose of any question whether of law or fact that relates to or arises in the course of winding up of the company. • In terms of Section 457(1)(b) and 457(2)(5)(2) of the Companies Act, 1956, the |
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dispose of any question whether of law or fact that relates to or arises in the course of winding up of the company. • In terms of Section 457(1)(b) and 457(2)(5)(2) of the Companies Act, 1956, the liquidator on sanction by the Court can carry on the business of the company so far as may be necessary for the beneficial winding up of the company. The liquidator has the power to appoint an agent to do business if the liquidator is unable to do business himself. Reliance is placed upon decisions of this Court in Ravindra Ishwardas Sethna v. Official Liquidator16, Assistant Commissioner, Ernakulam v. Hindustan Urban Infrastructure17 and on a few other cases. • On the winding up of the company, it is the creditors whose interest must weigh paramount. The objections raised by the Union of India/ Central Government who is a shareholder, and does not want to renew the leases, should be rejected. 30. We are not inclined to examine the aforesaid contentions in great depth and detail for several |
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Central Government who is a shareholder, and does not want to renew the leases, should be rejected. 30. We are not inclined to examine the aforesaid contentions in great depth and detail for several reasons, including the apparent incongruity in the submissions. On the one hand, it is pleaded that the leases should be 16 (1983) 4 SCC 269. 17 (2015) 3 SCC 745. Civil Appeals a/o. SLP (C) Nos.7315-7316 of 2021 Page 10 of 14renewed in favour of BPMEL. Contradictorily, reliance is also placed on Rule 23(1)18 and Rule 23(3)19 of the 2016 Rules for the transfer of composite licence in favour of OMDC. 31. As noted above, OMDC has been operating the mining leases throughout. The undertakings with respect to the mining leases were vested with BPMEL, which had executed a power of attorney in favour of OMDC to continue the mining activities. BPMEL itself never undertook any winning or mining activities from the three mines. On liquidation of the holding company, BPMEL, the power of attorney stood |
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OMDC to continue the mining activities. BPMEL itself never undertook any winning or mining activities from the three mines. On liquidation of the holding company, BPMEL, the power of attorney stood terminated, per Section 20120 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Moreover, OMDC, a subsidiary of BPMEL, is a separate juristic entity. The plea that the juristic entity should be ignored has not been raised or argued. 32. It is also an accepted and admitted position that pursuant to several decisions of this Court, penalties of approximately Rs.800,00,00,000/- (Rs. 800 crores) has been levied on OMDC in respect of the mines. OMDC’s straitened circumstances do not permit it to pay the penalty. Unless it can raise the amount from third parties, it would be impossible for OMDC to continue the mining activities. Furthermore, TGP cannot compel OMDC, a 18 “23. Transfer of Mining Lease or composite licence (1) Where a prospecting licence-cum-mining lease or a mining lease has been granted through |
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activities. Furthermore, TGP cannot compel OMDC, a 18 “23. Transfer of Mining Lease or composite licence (1) Where a prospecting licence-cum-mining lease or a mining lease has been granted through auction, the holder of such concession (the transferor) may transfer such concession in the manner specified in this rule. 19 (3) The transferor and the transferee shall, prior to the transfer, jointly submit an application to the State Government in the format specified in Schedule IX, namely the “transfer application”, which shall also contain details of the consideration payable by the transferee for the transfer, including the consideration in respect of the prospecting operations already undertaken and the reports and data generated during the operations.” 20 “201. Termination of agency.— An agency is terminated by the principal revoking his authority, or by the agent renouncing the business of the agency; or by the business of the agency being completed; or by either the principal or |
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An agency is terminated by the principal revoking his authority, or by the agent renouncing the business of the agency; or by the business of the agency being completed; or by either the principal or agent dying or becoming of unsound mind; or by the principal being adjudicated an insolvent under the provisions of any Act for the time being in force for the relief of insolvent debtors.” Civil Appeals a/o. SLP (C) Nos.7315-7316 of 2021 Page 11 of 14separate juristic entity, to undertake the said exercise. BPMEL is not in a position to pay any amount. In these circumstances, the question of renewal of the three leases does not arise. 33. BPMEL was directed to be wound up by the BIFR in 1996 as the rehabilitation scheme was not financially viable. It took nearly eight years before the Official Liquidator was appointed in 2004. Notably, BPMEL has been non-operational for the last thirty years. However, as recorded above, the final winding-up order is still to be passed. The three leases, |
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Liquidator was appointed in 2004. Notably, BPMEL has been non-operational for the last thirty years. However, as recorded above, the final winding-up order is still to be passed. The three leases, namely, Kolha-Roida, Thakurani and Dalki, had expired by effluxion of time in 1996, 2004 and 1994 respectively. At this distant point in time, when BPMEL has been non-operational and undergoing winding-up proceedings, we do not see any reason to even remotely consider the exercise of power under Section 457(1)(b) of the Companies Act, 1956 to sanction the Official Liquidator to carry on business of the company so far as necessary for winding up, or for that matter the Official Liquidator to appoint OMDC as agent to conduct business in the place of BPMEL. 34. As recorded above, TGP is an assignee in terms of the assignment agreement dated 17.09.2009 with UCO Bank. They paid a consideration of Rs.55,00,000/-. TGP accepts that they had received payment of more than Rs. 2,99,12,461/-. However, |
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in terms of the assignment agreement dated 17.09.2009 with UCO Bank. They paid a consideration of Rs.55,00,000/-. TGP accepts that they had received payment of more than Rs. 2,99,12,461/-. However, this is not to state that TGP is not entitled to amounts as certified by the Official Liquidator in his letter of acceptance dated 18.08.2011 admitting their claim of Rs.48,18,87,859/- as ordinary/preferential and Rs. 127,96,66,859/- as an unsecured preferential creditor. Payment to TGP, the assignee, who has acquired rights post the Civil Appeals a/o. SLP (C) Nos.7315-7316 of 2021 Page 12 of 14liquidation of BPMEL, will be paid as per law, in accordance with the Companies Act, 1956. 35. We are also conscious that the workers' dues are pending. During the course of the hearing, an appearance was made on behalf of 57 workers and it is stated that they have received payment of Rs.99,00,000/- of the admitted amount of Rs.3,00,00,000/-. The workers are also entitled to interest on the unpaid |
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was made on behalf of 57 workers and it is stated that they have received payment of Rs.99,00,000/- of the admitted amount of Rs.3,00,00,000/-. The workers are also entitled to interest on the unpaid amount. 36. However, non-payment of the workers' dues in the aforesaid factual background, does not merit an order of the nature as sought by TGP. The workers will be paid in terms of the Companies Act, 1956. 37. Having considered all aspects of the matter, it is evident to us that entertaining any notion of lease renewal would be an exercise in futility, devoid of any practical or tangible benefit. The sheer magnitude of the liabilities involved renders the prospect of renewal implausible. Besides, the proposition advanced doesn’t have any discernible plan or vision for the requisite financial, technical, and managerial support. BPMEL went into liquidation in 1996 and has been defunct for nearly three decades. OMDC is also barely operational. As such, it cannot be considered a viable |
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technical, and managerial support. BPMEL went into liquidation in 1996 and has been defunct for nearly three decades. OMDC is also barely operational. As such, it cannot be considered a viable option to undertake mining activities. In light of these facts, it is imperative to bring this dispute to an end. Prolonging it any further, sans a feasible resolution in sight, would be otiose. 38. Thus, we allow the appeals filed by the State of Odisha and set aside the judgment dated 03.03.2020 passed by the High Court at Calcutta upholding the order of the Company Judge. The direction to constitute a High Powered Civil Appeals a/o. SLP (C) Nos.7315-7316 of 2021 Page 13 of 14Committee is set aside. The question of renewal of lease, would not be examined by the Company Court. For the same reasons, we dismiss the appeals filed by TGP against the order dated 09.03.2023 of the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack, whereby Writ Petition No. 1852 of 2010 filed by the State of Odisha was allowed setting |
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we dismiss the appeals filed by TGP against the order dated 09.03.2023 of the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack, whereby Writ Petition No. 1852 of 2010 filed by the State of Odisha was allowed setting aside the order passed by the revisional authority dated 02.02.2009. Put simply, the order of the State of Odisha rejecting the request for renewal of Kolha-Roida lease is upheld. We clarify that applications filed for renewal of Thakurani and Dalki leases will be treated as rejected or dismissed. 39. The proceedings will continue before the Company Court of the High Court at Calcutta in accordance with the law. The workmen and TGP will be entitled to raise all pleas and contentions as are available in terms of the Companies Act, 1956 for payment and enforcement of their dues, as alleged, in accordance with law. 40. In the facts of the case, there will be no order as to costs. ......................................J. (SANJIV KHANNA) ......................................J. (DIPANKAR DATTA) |
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with law. 40. In the facts of the case, there will be no order as to costs. ......................................J. (SANJIV KHANNA) ......................................J. (DIPANKAR DATTA) NEW DELHI; MAY 17, 2024. Civil Appeals a/o. SLP (C) Nos.7315-7316 of 2021 Page 14 of 14 |
2024 INSC 386 NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4041 OF 2024 SHRIPAL & ANR. ...Appellant(s) VERSUS KARNATAKA NERAVARI NIGAM LTD. & ANR. …Respondent(s) WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4042 OF 2024 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4043 OF 2024 J U D G M E N T Mehta, J. 1. The appellants herein, who were land losers, have approached this Court by way of these appeals seeking enhancement of compensation pursuant to acquisition of their lands by the respondents for the purpose of construction of canals under the Hippargi Barrage project. 12. There is no dispute that the lands of the appellants were irrigated lands. The land acquisition notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued on 12th April, 2007. The Special Land Acquisition Officer(S.L.A.O.) awarded compensation to the tune of Rs.1,31,263/- per acre to the land owners. 3. The land owners preferred a reference and the Reference Court enhanced the compensation by fixing the |
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awarded compensation to the tune of Rs.1,31,263/- per acre to the land owners. 3. The land owners preferred a reference and the Reference Court enhanced the compensation by fixing the market value of the land at Rs. 3,00,000/- per acre. 4. Aggrieved by the same, the beneficiaries being respondent- Karnaktaka Neravari Nigam Ltd. filed M.F.A. No. 100175 of 2014 before the High Court of Karnataka, Dharwad Bench wherein, the appellant-claimants filed cross-objections seeking enhancement of compensation. 5. In the High Court, the cross-objectors i.e. appellants herein contended that in another M.F.A. No. 23768 of 2013, the High Court had awarded compensation by fixing the market value at Rs. 3,69,000/- per acre along with statutory benefits so far as the irrigated lands are concerned. 6. The said matter arose out of an acquisition notification of the years 2004-2005 and the order passed by the High Court has 2been confirmed by this Court with dismissal of Special Leave Petition(C) No. 8107 |
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matter arose out of an acquisition notification of the years 2004-2005 and the order passed by the High Court has 2been confirmed by this Court with dismissal of Special Leave Petition(C) No. 8107 of 2016 filed by the beneficiary. 7. Shri Anand Sanjay M. Nuli, learned senior counsel representing the appellants drew the Court’s attention to an order dated 17th April, 2021 passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Karnataka wherein, for the very same project, the land owners had been awarded compensation at the rate of Rs.5,00,000/- per acre in respect of lands which are covered under the notifications issued between 2004-2008. He, thus, urged that the appellants are entitled to the same relief. 8. Per contra, Mr. Navin R. Nath, learned senior counsel representing the respondent-beneficiary pointed out that the High Court committed a glaring error in construing the affidavit filed by the respondents in MFA No.101083 of 2016. He urged that in the said matter, the affidavit |
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pointed out that the High Court committed a glaring error in construing the affidavit filed by the respondents in MFA No.101083 of 2016. He urged that in the said matter, the affidavit which was filed pertained to an acquisition of 2009, wherein the Reference Court had determined compensation at the rate of Rs.5,00,000/- per acre. 9. Having given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions advanced at bar and after going through the material available on record, we find that the respondents themselves have agreed to award the market value at the rate of Rs. 3,69,000/- per acre along with statutory benefits for the lands 3acquired under the notification of the years 2004-2005. 10. For the market value fixed in the years 2004-2005 at the rate of Rs.3,69,000/- per acre, an escalation of 5 per cent per year has already been applied. 11. For the lands acquired in the year 2009, the market value had been fixed by the Reference Court at Rs. 5,00,000/- per acre and above. 12. The lands of |
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per cent per year has already been applied. 11. For the lands acquired in the year 2009, the market value had been fixed by the Reference Court at Rs. 5,00,000/- per acre and above. 12. The lands of the appellants herein were acquired in the year 2007. 13. In this background, we feel that ends of justice would be met if the market value of the lands acquired from the appellants is fixed at Rs. 4,50,000/- per acre by modifying the order dated 2nd February, 2018 passed by the High Court. 14. Accordingly, we hereby direct that the appellant-claimants shall be entitled to compensation towards the acquired lands at the rate of Rs. 4,50,000/- per acre with all statutory benefits, interest and costs. However, the direction of the High Court to deny interest for the period of delay in filing the cross-objections is sustained. 15. This order is being passed in peculiar facts of the present case and shall not be treated as precedent. 16. The appeals are allowed in the above terms. 417. Pending |
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Subsets and Splits